POLIS: Unity

The University of Toronto Association of Political Science Students is excited to publish:

UNITY VOL. 8 (1) OF POLIS

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Dear readers, It is an honour to be working with the University of Toronto Association of Political Science Students (UTAPSS) in order to execute the publishing of our eighth edition of POLIS. After working to publish the seventh volume of POLIS, I understood that I wanted my role as Editor-in-Chief (EIC) to be meaningful; it is my role as EIC that enables me to promote the spread of robust undergraduate political science academia. As such, I decided that it was not only a good idea but rather a necessary course of action to initiate the concept of semestered publishing! For the first time in UTAPSS history, we are on track to publishing two thoughtprovoking, fantastic journals by the end of this year.

Our theme this year is unity, a concept that is central to our understanding of the global political system.

Unity is fundamental to a variety of political science phenomena that include: identity politics, globalization, and resistance movements. In light of COVID-19, we have seen the implications of divisive policies; in fact, our last journal, titled Divergence, did an excellent job of detailing the impact of division on our political system. Needless to say, it would be only timely to publish a journal that deconstructs our current understanding of unity, and challenges the alleged simplicity of such unity. From investigating disaster relief policies to analyzing the residual impact of colonialism on African climate initiatives, the theme of unity is a pertinent one.

I am beyond grateful to have the support of a wonderful team of associate editors, who have worked long and hard in editing and refining our selected essays. I want to especially thank Grace Yang, the managing editor of POLIS and Ciara McGarry in supporting the entire team throughout this process; your help has been monumental in helping this journal come to fruition. On a final note, we hope you enjoy the read!

Sincerely

Ira Chandershekar

Masthead Managing Editor: Grace Yang

Editors: James Jiang Alana Boisvert Anuraag Kumar Nair Isabella Reny Jolie Gan

Unity Against Disasters By: Pengyu Chen

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t is not a natural phenomenon that resource distribution is unequal in the world, and countries are no longer isolated by distance nor are people still unaware of global injustices and human disasters. As moral philosopher Onora O’Neil once remarked, “The present international economic order is patently an institutional structure whose normal operation does not eliminate coercion or deception, but often institutionalizes them” (Onora 1986, 145). Moral philosopher, Peter Singer’s criticism of wealthy governments for their inadequate human rights responses during the 1971 Bengal genocide is still pertinent today. He argued that “it is not beyond the capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering to very small proportions. Unfortunately, human beings have not made the necessary decisions” (Singer 1972, 229). It is an evil that people are dying from preventable harm.

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In light of inadequate international unity in the cause of ending preventable evils that result from governments upholding only supererogatory and negative duties, I argue that resourceful countries have a positive moral duty to help and distribute resources to victims of man-made or natural disasters in faraway countries. I will first examine Singer’s moral theory and reject its demanding principle. Singer’s theory requires individuals to contribute their resources to the point where their marginal utility equals that of those suffering. Then, I argue that moral philosopher W. D. Ross’ concept of prima facie duties can animate governments of resource-abundant countries into making concrete actions to aid ongoing global crises and injustice without necessarily imposing such a demanding moral duty on individuals, as Singer’s theory requires.

In his 1972 article, Singer argues that individuals from resourceful countries have the moral obligation to prevent something evil from happening only when they can prevent such evils, regardless of distance and identity, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance (Singer 1972, 231). Singer’s argument implies that individuals in wealthy countries have the positive duty (a duty that demands the moral agent to perform a set of actions that bring about some goods) to donate resources to the point where individuals in wealthy countries and the victims of natural disasters have the same marginal utility per dollar. (Singer 1972, 241). Another implication of this argument is that individuals ought to refrain from overspending on nonessential goods, such as fashion and frills, to maximize their resources that could contribute to preventing ongoing evil. In Singer’s moral theorizing, supererogatory duties are now made obligatory. One critical point in Singer’s moral theorizing is his emphasis on the “principle of impartiality, universalizability, equality” (Singer 1972, 232). This principle, in addition to today’s interconnected world, grounds his moral claim that people should not discriminate against other people’s plights based on distance and identity. Singer’s claim is perhaps also strengthened by findings that suggest that in an increasingly interconnected world, wealthy societies and their consumers are causally involved in the production and reproduction of social and economic relationships that victimize the people of undeveloped regions (see Simon 1975, 99; Fanon 1963; Friedmann 1982; Chomsky 1994; Valley 1990; Birdsall 2005; Tidewell and Zellen 2016; Hirsch 2022). As philosopher Thomas W. Pogge notes, consumers, corporations, and governments are “morally involved in that [they] are exceptionally privileged and powerful participants in a global institutional scheme that is, with a good deal of continual violence, imposed upon large numbers of desperately poor and impotent human beings” (Pogge 1992, 100).

Two objections challenge Singer’s theory. First, given that life is uncertain in today’s market economy, and that there are often economic downturns, Singer fails to recognize that individuals could do more harm to themselves in the long run by giving away their resources even slightly closer to the point of equivalent marginal utility. In doing so, participants of the market economy could threaten their long-term financial stability and agency, further hindering their capacity to contribute to charities and NGOs consistently. If individuals donate their money to the point where they are at an equal economic standing as victims of institutional injustices on the other side of the globe, they will hardly sustain their life in a market economy characterized by risks, competition, and entrepreneurship. Individuals would lose their entrepreneurial agency, which is contingent in part on the wealth one has, thereby reducing their opportunities to further enhance their personal well-being and the prospect of them donating money to victims of globalization and disasters.

Second, Singer is vague about what items he defines as nonessential. Singer seems to suggest that such nonessential items are luxuries and that people should refrain from consuming them because it is absurd to spend money on what is excessive while people are dying for unnecessary evil (Singer 1972, 236). Singer’s definition may suggest other consumer goods beyond fashion and frills. However, he provides no clear moral standard by which people can judge whether their consumption decision is, in fact, morally insignificant and unjustifiable. People have very different conceptions of luxury, especially in societies with vast inequalities. One may see a person’s essential needs as nonessential or vice versa. If this is true, it is morally challenging to determine what is rightly considered something morally insignificant to individuals. And the more important question is who should define the moral limits of individual freedom to consume items and what items are (un)necessary for individuals. As a corollary to the need to restrict one’s consumption habits based on a determined standard of what is (un)necessary, paternalistic laws may be required to restrict free individual actions. Perhaps insofar as people live in a liberal market society, there may never be a social consensus that determines whether some consumption habits and choices are truly nonessential for individuals.

Nevertheless, Singer’s two presuppositions are still valuable despite his argument being overly demanding and impractical. First, it is intrinsically evil that people are suffering and dying from a lack of care, shelter, and medical aid (Singer 1972, 231). And, second, people

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should have a moral duty to help relieve preventable evils, regardless of distance and identity, if doing so is within their power (Singer 1972, 231). One can reject Singer’s moral theory on the grounds that his theory’s implication (viz, donating to the point where their marginal utility equals that of those suffering) is unfeasible, overly demanding and even dangerous. However, to reject his strong argument does not entail the rejection of these two presuppositions.

If these two presuppositions are still valid, it is not impossible they can animate individuals to form a positive duty to help stop preventable harm. It is the intensity and scope, as well as the agent of the morally demanded support according to Singer’s theory with which this paper contends. Furthermore, these two presuppositions ought to animate resource-abundant governments to embrace and embody pertinent moral duties to help prevent further evils and reparate ongoing and historical injustice (see Acemoglu, et al. 2002; Nunn 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). Indeed, resourceful governments of wealthy countries today have the capacity to decelerate preventable harm (Belhaj 2019; Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions 2022).

Unlike Singer, who stipulates an absolute duty that tells people the right action to do in a given circumstance, Ross’ notion of prima facie duty allows for more alternative actions and space for decision-making. Ross’ prima facie duty posits that whether an action is an absolute duty depends on considering other possible alternative duties (Ross 2002, 24-25). The ultimate action, or what is the most morally right action, is determined after the moral agent has taken into consideration other competing absolute duties, such as justice, fidelity, beneficence, and more. That is, a more compelling moral reason can outweigh the previous moral reason and duty. Moreover, while people often apply Ross’ prima facie duties at the individual level, governments can also apply prima facie duties in global affairs. Unlike Singer’s overly demanding moral theory, the advantage of upholding prima facie duty is the policy flexibility the theory gives to the wealthy government. Ross’ notion of prima facie duty gives governments more options and space to allocate and redistribute their resources according to their society’s conditions. Indeed, the notion of government’s prima facie duty will work only if the governments embrace Singer’s two presuppositions—that suffering is intrinsically evil and that agents have the moral duties to help relieve preventable evils. Accordingly, the moral urgency of injustice should push the government to undertake prima facie duties, especially duties of reparation, harm prevention, and beneficence.

But how should the government choose between stopping preventable domestic evils and foreign evils?

The moral rightness of the resource-abundant government’s decision to stop evils depends on its overall balance of duty. The morally right acts, out of all possible options in a particular circumstance, should have the “greatest balance of prima facie rightness… over their prima facie wrongness” (Ross 2002, 41). The government has to reason and prove to the public with empirical evidence of the seriousness of the circumstances, whether the weight of its duty to prevent domestic evil is more urgent and thus ‘weightier’ than the duty to send aid and resources to another place or vice versa. Indeed, as Ross notes, some acts in a particular circumstance will inevitably be viewed by some as bad and others as right, because actions have countless effects, both direct and indirect, on countless people, and too often the decision to make one choice is inevitably carried out at the expense of other choices (Ross 2002, 41). If it is proven that the weight of its duty to help prevent domestic evil is much greater, then, overall, the government’s choice of action is right, despite doing so can produce adverse effects on people suffering in faraway places. In addition, the government would refrain from over-taxing their citizens to the point of equivalent marginal utility of those who are suffering in faraway places in order to extract adequate money for humanitarian assistance (for, as argued earlier, this could lead to more harm) or other gross violations of rights in order to help others. This is because, according to Ross’ theory, “to injure others is incidentally to fail to do them good” (Ross 2002, 21). Nevertheless, it is rarely an ‘either-or’ situation where a resourceful country lacks the capacity to provide aid, money, and support for the cause of preventing both domestic and foreign evils.

An objection to the application of Ross’ prima facie duty in the government decision-making process would stress that having the power to determine what the right thing to do is dangerous because the government’s moral intuition and its weighing of the “weightiness” of duties can be incorrect and subject to corruption and/or elite influences. This objection stems from the suspicion of state power and the fallibility of human reasoning. If moral reasoning is human and human reasoning can be distorted, the government administration’s moral perception is not free from vices and corruption.

Therefore, the government can still make the wrong decision while upholding Singer’s two presuppositions.

To this objection, it can be said that individuals, too, should embrace Singer’s two assumptions, even if they find Singer’s moral theory overly demanding. If a political community does not want to undertake the implications of Singer’s theory, citizens of that political community can choose, and be morally obliged, to hold the POLIS

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government accountable for the latter’s moral reasoning in its institutional decision-making process. Indeed, parts of the public may also distort their own moral reasoning.

However, the public is never a coherent whole. Just as the public can hold the government accountable, parts of the public can hold other parts of the public accountable.

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Bibliography Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (4): 1231-1294.

Belhaj, Ferid. 2019. “Why Wealthy Countries Must Step up Their Contribution to Fight Global Poverty.”

World Bank, December 5, 2019. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2019/12/05/why-wealthycountries-must-step-up-their-contribution-to-fight-global-poverty.

Birdsall, Nancy. “The World is not Flat: Inequality and Injustice in our Global Economy.” The 9th WIDER Annual Lecture. Helsinki, 26 October 2005, https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/world-not-flat.

Chomsky Noam. 1994. World Orders Old and New. New York: Columbia University Press.

Citi GPS. “Closing the Racial Inequality Gaps: The Economic Cost of Black Inequality in the U.S.” Citi GPS, September 2020. https://ir.citi.com/NvIUklHPilz14Hwd3oxqZBLMn1_XPqo5FrxsZD0x6hhil84ZxaxEuJUWmak51UHvYk75V KeHCMI%3D. Fanon, Frantz. 1963. “On Violence” in The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York: Grove Press.

Friedmann, Harriet. 1982. “The Political Economy of Food.” In Marxist Inquiries: Studies of Labor, Class and States, 248–87. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hirsch, David. 2022. “Study Shows Economic Impacts of Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” Dartmouth, July 12, 2022. https://home.dartmouth.edu/news/2022/07/study-shows-economic-impacts-greenhouse-gasemissions.

Nunn, Nathan. 2008. “The Long Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 1: 139–176.

Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa.”

American Economic Review 101 (7): 3221–52.

O’Neill, Onora. 1986. Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Development and Justice. London: Allen & Unwin.

Pogge, Thomas W. 1992. “An Institutional Approach To Humanitarian Intervention.” Public Affairs Quarterly 6 (1): 89–103.

Ross, William David. 2002. “What Makes Right Acts Right?.” In The Right and the Good, edited by Philip Stratton-Lake, 16–64. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Simon, Arthur. Bread for the World. New York, Paulist Press, 1975.

Singer, Peter. 1972. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (3): 229–43.

Tidewell, Alan C. and Barry Scott Zellen, eds. 2016. Land, Indigenous Peoples and Conflict. New York: Routledge.

Valley, Paul. 1990. Bad Samaritans: First World Ethics and Third World Debt. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

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EL PARO NACIONALE: Fabiola Cruz

A Non-Ending Fight

The long duration of the 2021 Anti Government protests in Colombia is due to the heterogeneity of the protestors’ demands and lack of a well-established organization that represents them uniformly. The protests started on April 28th, initially in response to a bill that would increase taxes on food staples, utilities and gas (Moreno 2021). Even after the reform was lifted by the government following the massive protests, these continued in large numbers (Moreno 2021). The mobilizations continued as unions, students, doctors, teachers, activists and Indigenous organizations, among other actors, demanded an end to a long list of issues that have afflicted Colombians such as: inequality, poverty, corruption and police brutality (Sanchez 2021). Each of the groups protesting on the streets have their own specific demands (Newbery 2021), which complicates negotiations with the government. This is evident through the failed attempts of the National Strike Committee at negotiating concessions with Duque’s administration. The National Strike Committee is a group formed by unions and students, who happen to form a small fraction of those protesting on the streets (Noriega 2021). In fact, most protestors do not feel represented by this organization (Noriega 2021). While the National Strike Committee has met with the government to negotiate concessions, their demands are not fully representative of the concerns voiced on the streets (Newbery 2021). Even if the government grants such concessions, the National Strike Committee has no authority to call off the demonstrations as many of the protestors are not affiliated with it. Thus, the wide array of the demonstrators’ demands and lack of an organization that fully represents them explains why the protests are still ongoing.

The concepts of constituent and constitutional power are evident in these protests. Constituent power refers to that of the people (Ciccariello-Maher 2013, 128) which is expressed through social movements. To be more precise, it denotes the collaboration that makes politics possible (Kingsbury 2021). On the other hand, constitutional power refers to that of the state (Ciccariello-Maher 2013, 127), as seen through the power of government institutions such as the police. In the case of Colombia, constituent power is present in the massive mobilizations that continued demanding changes to the system even after the successful withdrawal of the proposed tax reform. It is also seen through the newly formed popular assemblies, where community members discuss and consolidate the grievances they expect the government to resolve (Noriega 2021). While their demands have not been addressed by Duque’s administration (Sanchez 2021), the formation and consolidation of these popular assemblies shows a moment of constituent power in resistance to the current status quo.

On the other hand, constitutional power

– the one commanded from above – is expressed through the state response, most notably the police.

From the onset, the police and armed forces were deployed to contain the protests and they have shown unrestrained brutality against the demonstrators (Gomez 2021). These protests exemplify the tension between constituent and constitutional power as protestors clash with the police on the streets while the government refuses to cede to their demands.

There are multiple potential outcomes to the protests in Colombia. While the government did withdraw the initial tax reform that sparked the demonstrations relatively quickly, it has not enacted a meaningful policy to address the concerns of the protestors (Sanchez 2021), which may expand the scale of these mobilizations and extend them indefinitely. As well, the government has not taken substantial action against the police either in the form of destitutions, convictions or even a reform of the institution in itself (Temblores 2021), which suggests a non-ending cycle of protests and repression. Lastly, in light of the brutality of the police response, protestors — who for the most part have been peaceful (Gomez 2021) — may be forced to take more drastic measures to defend themselves, such as bringing their own weapons, which is bound to create more violence and exacerbate an already dire situation.

The large scale of the demonstrations can be attributed to the lack of a Pink Tide moment in Colombia. The majority of the grievances put forward by many of the protestors – such as rising poverty and inequality – are directly linked to Colombia’s current neoliberal economic model and related austerity measures (Dyer 2019). Up until this day, the government has not made substantial investments in social welfare which has contributed to increasing poverty and inequality rates in the region (Alviar Garcia 2013, 30). In fact, Colombia is the second most unequal country in Latin America (Noriega 2021).

The increased social spending by the governments of the Pink Tide resulted in widespread support from those of lower socioeconomic status as these investments reduced poverty and inequality (North and Grinspun 2016, 1497). Similar to the governments of The New Left, a Pink Tide moment in Colombia would have decreased poverty and inequality rates through such investments in social welfare. Considering that thousands of those protesting on the streets belong to the impoverished class and that two of major themes of the demonstrations are long-standing poverty and inequality, a Pink Tide moment in Colombia would have reduced the magnitude of the protests.

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To conclude, the long duration of the Anti Government protests in Colombia is due to the heterogeneity of the protestors’ demands and the lack of a well-established organization that represents them uniformly. As of December 2021, the protests have not ceased. While the protestors have an array of demands, they are unified by their discontent with the structural problems that have plagued Colombia for the last centuries. Time will tell if these protests continue or eventually subside. In the case of the latter, unless the government addresses such structural problems, people will eventually take to the streets to fight for change.

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Bibliography Alsema, Adriaan. 2021. “Colombia’s Anti-Government Protests Swell to Historic Proportions.”

Colombia Reports, May 16, 2021. https://colombiareports.com/colombias-anti-government-protests-swellto-historic-proportions/.

Alviar Garcia, Helena. 2013. “Social Policy and the New Development State: The Case of Colombia”. In Law and the New Developmental State: The Brazilian Experience in Latin American Context, edited by David M. Trubek, 345–368. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ciccariello-Maher, George. 2013. “Constituent Moments, Constitutional Processes: Social Movements and the New Latin American Left.” Latin American Perspectives 40 (3): 126–45. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X13476001.

Dyer, Chelsey. 2019. “Colombia’s War of Neoliberal Economics.” North American Congress on Latin America, March 7, 2019. https://nacla.org/news/2019/03/07/colombia%E2%80%99s-war-neoliberal-economics.

El Colombiano. 2021. “Comité de Paro Anunció Jornada de Marchas Para el 20 de Octubre.” El Colombiano, October 11, 2021. https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/anuncian-nueva-jornada-de-paronacional-para-el-20-de-octubre-DL15874153.

Gomez, Santiago. 2021. “Colombia: ¿Quién Elige al Comité del Paro?” Latin American Post, May 20, 2021. https://latinamericanpost.com/es/37014-colombia-quien-elige-al-comite-del-paro.

Humans Rights Watch. 2021. “Colombia: Brutalidad Policial Contra Manifestantes.” Human Rights Watch, June 9, 2021. https://www.hrw.org/es/news/2021/06/09/colombia-brutalidad-policial-contra-manifestantes.

Kingsbury, Donald. 2021. “Progressive Extractivism” University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, October 20, 2021.

Moreno, Camila. 2021. “Que Esta Pasando en Colombia? Resumen Delos 24 Dias de Protestas Contra el Gobierno.” Anadolu Agency, May 21, 2021. https://www.aa.com.tr/es/mundo/-qu%C3%A9-est%C3%A1pasando-en-colombia-resumen-de-los-24-d%C3%ADas-de-protestas-contra-el-gobierno/2250385.

Newbery, Emma. 2021. “Tax Reform Scrapped, but Protests in Colombia Continue.” The Bogota Post, May 3, 2021. https://thebogotapost.com/tax-reform-scrapped-but-protests-in-colombia-continue/48830/.

Noriega, Christina. 2021. “Colombia Protests Spur Local Community Organizing.” North American Congress on Latin America, August 17, 2021. https://nacla.org/news/2021/08/17/colombia-protests-popular-assemblies.

North, Liisa L, and Ricardo Grinspun. 2016. “Neo-Extractivism and the New Latin American Developmentalism: The Missing Piece of Rural Transformation.” Third World Quarterly 37 (8): 1483–1504.

Sanchez, Karen. 2021. “¿Qué Es, Qué Pide y a Quiénes Representa el Comité del Paro en Colombia?” Voz de America, May 20, 2021. https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/america-latina_que-es-quepide-y-quienes-representa-el-comite-del-paro-en-colombia/6073988.html.

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Sanchez, Katy. 2021. “Primera Línea Asegura Que Seguirán Marchando: 'Comité del Paro No Nos Representa.'”

Radio Cadena Nacional (RCN) Radio, June 15, 2021. https://www.rcnradio.com/politica/primera-linea-asegura-que-seguiran-marchando-comite-del-paro-no-nosrepresenta.

Temblores. 2021. “Comunicado a la Opinión Pública y a la Comunidad Internacional por los Hechos de Violencia Cometidos por la Fuerza Pública de Colombia en el Marco de las Movilizaciones del Paro Nacional.” Temblores, June 28, 2021. https://www.temblores.org/comunicados.

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How Colonial Legacies Inhibit Climate Initiatives in Africa and How Indigenous Philosophies Can Combat these Initatives By: Stephanie Gymiah

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frica has a paradoxical relationship to climate change. While the continent is not a main contributor to the issue, research indicates Africans have and will continue to experience the most adverse consequences of the problem (Berck et al. 2018, 2). Climate change in Africa exacerbates existing problems such as food insecurity and poverty and jeopardizes economic and political development thus illustrating the need for immediate solutions for the protection of vulnerable communities. This essay will argue that, while it is essential for Africa to play a leading role in climate change, organizations such as the African Union (AU) and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) need to mould Western notions and ideologies into a more local context. Such an initiative can thereby improve the efficacy of such organizations while limiting the influence of colonial institutions and thought within pan-African institutions. To combat this post-colonialism mentality within African politics, there should rather be a focus on indigenous African philosophies that promote sustainable and attainable solutions, while also counteracting Western rhetoric. Through highlighting viable African initiatives, Western perceptions of superiority over African indigenous ideologies are thereby discredited.

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The Importance of Climate Initiatives in Africa Climate initiatives are crucial in Africa because Africans experience the consequences of climate change disproportionately due to their abundance of rural communities, proving the need for immediate solutions to ensure the security of these communities. Many researchers argue that there is a heavy reliance on agricultural-related goods and environmental activities.

They characterize Africans as living ‘nature-dependent livelihoods’ (Berck et al. 2018, 28). This dependence on the environment makes rural Africans more susceptible to climate change damages. As many regions of Africa have not undergone successful industrialization, they cannot diversify their exports, causing a reliance on agricultural goods for their economies. There are large concentrations of communities within rural areas that rely on the environment for both food and financial sources (Berck et al. 2018, 7). This increases their vulnerability because as the environment deteriorates, it becomes less suitable for cultivation. This prevents the production and export of agricultural goods. Climate change inhibits their main financial source and increases food insecurity due to the lack of crops. Africa experiences adverse effects of climate change because its lack of development creates a dependence on environmental activities, which become unsustainable as the environment worsens. This lack of development also explains the inadequate infrastructure in the continent.

Africans are more susceptible to climate change damages because many countries in the continent do not have adequate infrastructure to withstand these harms, illustrating the necessity of climate initiatives to protect the people within the continent. Reliable infrastructure is fundamental in ensuring the security of the people because it provides various resources and adaptive methods in times of adversity and turmoil. Researchers refer to this as an adaptive capacity (Berck et al. 2018, 3).

The adaptive capacity of a country includes the wealth, technology, education, and resources that help a country adjust to the new conditions that climate change may create (Berck et al. 2018, 3). Therefore, a strong infrastructure increases the adaptability of a country.

Contrarily, countries that have weak infrastructure are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change because they do not have disaster management s within their states. Many African countries are already burdened with political discourse and failing development attempts that inhibit the efficacy of their infrastructures and institutions.

Climate change works to exacerbate existing problems and display the weaknesses of these institutions. It is crucial to address climate change initiatives to create protections for marginalized communities that are at the forefront of these consequences.

Climate change intensifies existing problems of food insecurity and poverty while also hindering economic, social and political development in the continent.

Therefore, solutions and initiatives for climate change are fundamental in the development and prosperity of Africa.

As mentioned previously, Climate change burdens the economy; “climate change poses an enormous threat to Africa’s economic growth (through its harmful effects on natural systems and resources),” (Ruppel 2013, 412).

Due to the lack of diversity in Africa’s exports, as climate change prevents the creation of the main exports within the continent, it limits economic growth. When analyzing the effects climate change has had on Africa's wealth, research has shown, “had it not been for the rainfall decline, today’s gap in African GDP per capita relative to the rest of the world could have narrowed by a magnitude of 15% to 40%,” (Berck et al. 2018, 31). As climate change worsens, there is a decrease in annual rainfall which creates inadequate conditions for cultivation. This decrease in rainfall creates inadequate conditions for cultivation, decreasing exports in the continent, and as a by-product, decreasing economic development. Climate change prevents economic development in the continent, and therefore, effective climate initiatives are crucial for future economic prosperity.

Furthermore, as climate change worsens living conditions, it contributes to conflict and political instability. Without resolutions to the issues climate change creates, it threatens political order within states.

At the UN Security Council debate of 2011, Steiner stated, “competition over scarce water and land, exacerbated by regional changes in climate, are already a key factor in local-level conflicts in Darfur, the Central African Republic, northern Kenya, and Chad, for example when livelihoods are threatened by declining natural resources, people either innovate, flee or can be brought into conflict,” (Steiner 2011). Divides among African countries over ethnicity and religion already pose problems for states. When this tension is exacerbated by scarce resources, political instability can quickly ensue.

This inhibits the development of African countries by creating political disorder and weakened institutions.

Violent conflict destroys political, economic, and social organizations, constraining development. Therefore, initiatives for climate change are fundamental to creating security, order, and development within the continent.

Climate Initiatives Created by Continental Organizations and their Limitations

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Pan-African organizations have long recognized the importance of combating climate change to protect vulnerable communities and facilitate development within their countries, so they have attempted to create various climate initiatives. For example, the African Union is an organization that advocates for solidarity, peace, and order within Africa. To ensure peace in extenuating circumstances, the African Union has the right to intervene (Ruppel 2013, 425). This right presumably also applies to conflicts facilitated by climate change and scarce resources in the continent. Therefore, in theory, the African Union would ensure security within the continent by intervening in violent conflicts to protect vulnerable and marginalized communities. To combat problems regarding state security and political instability exacerbated by climate change, the African Union holds the right to intervene to prevent the escalation of war and violence.

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is another continental organization that has its initiatives to prevent the hindrance of economic development by climate change. NEPAD’s objectives as an organization are facilitating economic growth to eradicate poverty and integrate Africa into the global economy (Ruppel 2013, 415).

NEPAD also has initiatives exclusive to combating climate change, the Climate Change and Natural Resource Management Programme. The Programme’s objective is to increase Africa’s adaptive capacity to combat the dangers of environmental change (Ruppel 2013, 415). As mentioned previously, African communities are vulnerable to climate damage because of the inadequate infrastructure in the continent. The infrastructure is unable to adapt to various circumstances created by climate change. NEPAD argues that through increasing development, infrastructure in the continent will be strengthened as well (Ruppel 2013, 415).

This will increase Africa’s ability to adapt to climate damage and will decrease the vulnerability of African communities.

Additionally, by creating infrastructure that can withstand climate damage, economic and political development will not be hindered. NEPAD’s climate initiatives focus on facilitating development to establish an infrastructure that can withstand the conditions that climate change creates.

While both the AU and NEPAD have policies in place to combat the problems created by climate change, they have been ineffective because they adopt Western concepts that are unfitting in an African context. For example, during the conception of the AU, the founders thought to base it on a successful Western organization.

The European Union was the prototype for the African Union (Ayittey 2010, 96). The organization uses this framework in the hopes of receiving similar success and legitimacy in the international sphere. However, in

exchange for global validation, the organization loses credibility and effectiveness within the continent. The institution is ineffective because the Western framework it utilizes is unable to operate properly within an African context.

To elaborate, despite the EU operating efficiently in Europe, this same organization may not work in Africa because of differences in the political, economic, and social conditions in which they operate. In comparative research measuring the efficacy of the EU and the AU, it was found that “their influence is a function of three determinants: willingness, legitimacy, and capacity” (Kingah and Van Langenhove 2012, 202). Willingness refers to the power that member states provide to the regional organization, legitimacy refers to the standing of the regional organization in the international realm, and capacity refers to the functions of organizational capabilities and experiences (Kingah and Van Langenhove 2012, 202). The European Union is recognized as an effective organization because states within this organization have the willingness to provide power to the EU, possibly because of the economic benefits. Furthermore, the historical domination of Western powers, alongside industrialization, affluence, and democracy within these countries provides the organization with legitimacy in the international realm.

The legitimacy and power increase the capability of the organization.

The AU does not have these same powers, limiting the effectiveness of the institution, and illustrating how despite using a successful regional organization as a prototype, there are conditions exclusive to Africa that prevent its success. For example, African leaders are unwilling to provide power to the organization. The AU has a track record of being unable to regulate tyrannical leaders within the organization; “[the AU] could not actually extract sufficient powers from unwilling dictators such as Mugabe in Zimbabwe and Omar al-Bashir in Sudan. The AU has a particularly bad record in preventing elected heads of state from abusing their powers and has been unable to pressurize military governments into liberalizing their political systems” (Jahn 2014). Many leaders in Africa are unwilling to give up state power in exchange for an effective regional organization. As a result, the AU does not hold much power in regulating state behaviours. Therefore, despite having policies such as the right to intervene, security challenges continue to plague the continent. To extrapolate, this also means the AU is inefficient when coping with violence and conflict instigated by the climate crisis.

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Furthermore, the AU lacks legitimacy in the international realm, further decreasing the influence and effectiveness of the organization. The AU is dependent on the World Bank and International Monetary Fund for operation, which adversely has harmed the organization by delegitimizing it in world politics (Jahn 2014). Relying on banks has reduced the independence of the organization, delegitimizing the institution because of its inability to operate autonomously.

Without power and legitimacy, the AU has little power within the continent and in the international sphere. Despite adopting Western frameworks, the organization remains unsuccessful because of the unique conditions of Africa.

Similar to the AU, NEPAD’s creation was inspired by western ideals of development and the organization adopts various Western ideologies, limiting the effectiveness of the institution because these policies are inappropriate in an African context. NEPAD chose neo-liberalism as its ideological orientation. NEPAD idolizes neoliberalism despite its dismal mixed success among member states.

Conversely, while encouraging the adoption of these economic policies, the organization fails to recognize how this ideology contributes to the marginalization and exploitation of the global south. Without barriers to prevent the exploitation of workers within this economic system, exploitation becomes a commonality; as Peksen argues, “a competitive business climate might lead to increased economic efficiency, [however] meeting the needs of the market may not be synonymous with protecting the human security of the poor and vulnerable,” (Peksen and Blanton 2017). Its justifications for the subordination of marginalized communities, often residing within the global south, resembles justifications of colonialism and imperialism in the 19th and 20th century. It values economic prosperity over human protection, illustrating the dangers of this system.

NEPAD and the ideology of neoliberalism are counterproductive in Africa because they do not facilitate economic development, nor do they protect vulnerable communities. Paradoxically, this ideology and economic system has worsened poverty within the continent. After adopting neoliberal policies, poverty in Africa increased. It rose from 44.6% in 1990 to 46.4% in 2001, and the disparities between the global north and south widened.

This is because this economic system “tends to exacerbate the level of inequality and poverty in adjusting countries” (Osimiri 2013, 66). Neoliberalism is counterproductive in Africa because this free market allows for the exploitation of marginalized communities. Within the system of economic neoliberalism, the state plays a limited role, meaning powerful entities can capitalize off the vulnerabilities of poor communities, reproducing inequality. Therefore, it is inefficient in accelerating economic development. It is also ineffective in protecting Africans against climate damage

because through increasing inequality and poverty within the continent, more individuals are vulnerable and susceptible to the damage of climate change. The objectives of the organization are contradicted by the consequences of its neoliberal policies. As inequality in the continent becomes exacerbated by neoliberalism, poor communities remain vulnerable to the effects of climate change, demonstrating how Western ideologies are unhelpful in African politics.

These continental organizations use Western ideologies because of an internalized conception of inferiority. This perception of inferiority can be attributed to colonial legacies, and it demonstrates the influences of postcolonialism on the contemporary African political state.

The post-colonial theory provides explanations for power disparities, arguing that global class relations emerge because of discriminatory narratives spread by the global north that describe the global south as primitive, inadequate, and effeminate. The West uses these narratives to justify the power imbalance, arguing these traits make them undeserving of power and legitimacy (Nair 2017). Many African organizations adopt Western frameworks to legitimize themselves in the international sphere. They believe that through assimilating to the international standard of the political and economic system and ideologies, they can rise in the hierarchy and obtain political power. Instead, this results in the domination of Western political frameworks that are unfitting in a non-Western context. This domination of the West illustrates how colonialism has transformed to ensure the continued subordination of Africa. Through pushing narratives of inferiority and incompetence of the global south, the Western hegemony remains intact and unchallenged. Although African countries have received the right to self-determination, new forms of colonialism manifest through the Western hierarchy in politics.

African organizations adopt Western ideologies and concepts for the sake of legitimizing themselves in global politics, but this just contributes to an increase of Western power and influence in areas where it is unfitting.

Indigenous African Climate Initiatives and How they Combat the Limitations of Organizational Initiatives Recognizing the inadequacies of Western frameworks in African politics and the fight against climate change illustrates the necessity for indigenous African initiatives that incite genuine change. One African ideology increasing in popularity is Ubuntu. Ubuntu is explained by the phrase, “a person is a person through other persons,” (Terblanché-Greeff 2019, 97), meaning, an POLIS

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individual reaches their full potential as human being through community and social interaction. This concept rejects individualism and embraces collectivism and involvement in the greater society. The focus on community creates a moral responsibility to others intertwined in the community, within the past, present, and future. This connectedness extends to humans, nonhumans, and the environment (Terblanché-Greeff 2019, 97). By recognizing the importance of collectivity and holding the needs of the community over individual interests as argued in Ubuntu, individuals can value the environment rather than degrade it.

Western ideologies emphasize the importance of individualism, which often increases inequality and exploitation of individuals and the environment. Therefore, embracing different perspectives centring on collectivism can counteract the weaknesses of Western frameworks that have caused environmental degradation. Western societies justify the exploitation of the environment; “in individualisticcapitalistic Western societies, humans have authority and control over nature as it should be dominated and utilized to meet basic and false needs” (Terblanché-Greeff 2019, 94).

The environment becomes commodified for the benefit of the individual. Ubuntu ethics and philosophy counters this by removing the hierarchy between humans, non-humans, and the environment. Ubuntu requires the community to “only utilize resources in nature to satisfy their basic needs.

Nature is not commodified and used in a competition that will satisfy self-interest” (Terblanché-Greeff 2019, 102). By seeing all beings as equals and rejecting the domination of one being over another, the environment can be protected.

When individuals think of their responsibility to the greater society, this reduces overconsumption and environmental degradation.

Furthermore, through an emphasis on the community over the individual, there is an increase in social cohesion and a decrease in susceptibility to climate damage as a byproduct. In research determining how social cohesion assists with disaster management, it was found that it is beneficial for, “upstream planning and relationship building before a disaster occurs,” (Jewett, Howell, and Larsen 2021, 325). Social cohesion can decrease vulnerability to climate damage by providing various forms of mutual aid that the community can supply. Therefore, rejecting notions of individualism and establishing a community that values the well-being of others and helps others adapt to various circumstances created by climate change is fundamental when coping with the climate crisis.

Highlighting indigenous initiatives is important because it brings awareness to solutions that are made for the conditions of Africa and these initiatives discredit Western narratives of inferiority.

While the West often characterizes initiatives and ideologies from the non-West as inferior, recognizing the effectiveness of indigenous solutions discredits this argument. As the IPCC states, “indigenous, local, and traditional forms of knowledge are a major resource for adapting to climate change… Natural resourcedependent communities, including indigenous peoples, have a long history of adapting to highly variable and changing social and ecological conditions,” (Field et al.

2012). Despite narratives spread to discredit initiatives by Africans and others in the global south, as individuals who have maintained the environment properly before Western interference, their contributions are the most important when developing sustainable solutions for the climate crisis. Specifically, Ubuntu poses a sustainable solution for climate change. It is more effective than many Western ideologies that prioritize self-interest over the greater good of the community and surrounding environment. Furthermore, “incorporating indigenous knowledge into climate change policies can lead to the development of effective mitigation and adaptation strategies that are cost-effective, participative, and sustainable” (Gnonolonfoun, Assogbadjo, and Gnagle 2019, 23). Meaning that by including the indigenous initiatives, they can achieve the objectives for climate action and protection that the AU and NEPAD failed to achieve. These solutions assist increasing adaptive capabilities and are easily participative. Indigenous solutions in Africa are necessary to resolving climate issues because they combat the limitations of continental organizations, and the efficacy of these ideologies disproves racist Western rhetoric.

In conclusion, to combat challenges of social, economic, and political instability exacerbated by the changing climate, African continental organizations have devised various solutions and initiatives. While these initiatives advocate for the protection of vulnerable communities during times of adversity and climate damage, they often fail to achieve their objectives.

Continental organizations in Africa are unsuccessful in their attempts to limit the effects of climate change because rather than using indigenous, sustainable African philosophies, they adopt Western solutions that create more harm than good. To protect the vulnerable within Africa and ensure the continent can adapt to the various problems climate change may create, there should be a focus on indigenous African philosophies that reject notions of Western individualism and promote collectivism and equality to protect the environment from further deterioration and vulnerable communities.

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Bibliography Ayittey, George B. N. 2010. “The United States of Africa: A Revisit.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 632 (1): 86-102.

Berck, Cyndi Spindell, Peter Berck, and Salvator Di Falco, eds. 2018. Agricultural Adaption to Climate Change in Africa. New York: Routledge.

Field, Christopher B., Cicente Barros, Thomas F. Stocker, Qin Dahe, David Jon Dokken, Kristie L. Ebi, Michael D. Mastrandrea, Katherine J. Mach, Gian-Kasper Plattner, Simon K. Allen, et al, eds. 2012.

Climate Change and Land: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Gnonolonfoun, Isidore, Achille Ephrem Assogbadjo, Césaire Paul Gnanglè, Glèlè Kakaï, and Romain Lucas. 2019. “New Indicators of Vulnerability and Resilience of Agroforestry Systems to Climate Change in West Africa.” Agronomy for Sustainability Development 39 (2): 23-35.

Hulme, Mike, Ruth Doherty, Todd Ngara, Mark New George, and David Lister. 2001. “African Climate Change: 1900 – 2100.” Climate Research 17 (2): 145-68.

Jahn, Thaddeus. 2014. “The African Union: Organization of African Unity 2.0 or Regional Renaissance?”

E-International Relations 23.

Jewett, Rae, Sarah M. Mah, Nicholas Howell, and Mandi M. Larsen. 2021. “Social Cohesion and Community Resilience During COVID-19 and Pandemics: A Rapid Scoping Review to Inform the United Nations Research Roadmap for COVID-19 Recovery.” International Journal of Health Services 51 (3): 32536.

Kingah, Stephen, and Luk Van Langenhove. 2012. “Determinants of a Regional Organization’s Role in Peace and Security: The African Union and the European Union Compared.” South African Journal of International Affairs 19 (2): 201-22.

Osimiri, Peter. 2018. “An Ethical Critique of Neoliberal Development in Africa,” Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 48 (1): 55-59.

Pesken, Dursun, Shannon Blanton, and Robert Blanton. 2017. “Neoliberal Politics and Human Trafficking for Labour: Free Markets, Unfree Workers?” Political Research Quarterly 70 (3): 673-86.

Ruppel, Oliver. 2013. “Climate Change Law and Policy Position in the African Union and Related Developments in Selected African Countries.” In Climate Change: International Law and Global Governance, edited by Oliver C. Ruppel, Christian Roschmann, and Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting, 409-48.

Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH. Steiner, Achim. 2011. “UN Security Council Debates Security Impacts of Climate Change.” International Institute for Sustainable Development, July 22, 2011. http://sdg.iisd.org/news/un-security-council-debatessecurity-impacts-of-climate-change/.

Terblanché-Greeff, Aïda. 2019. “Ubuntu and Environmental Ethics: The West Can Learn from Africa When Faced with Climate Change.” In African Environmental Ethics, edited by Munamato Chemhuru, 93-109.

Cham: Springer.

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UNITY IN Abril Masola

RESISTANCE

Power does not exist in a vacuum. The existence of a powerful organization or system implies the existence of an entity where power is exerted over. Therefore, resistance can be understood as the oppressed taking a stance against the oppressor, which can hold various shapes. In this resistance, unity among the resistors can be found. This essay argues that resistance can take various physical and emotional forms, and that it can achieve the creation of counterpublics. Counterpublic spaces attempt to resist the norms that dictate what fits into the generally accepted “private” and “public” spheres. What is considered “public” is usually prioritized for the necessary governmental action/attention, while that which is “private” is considered an issue that lies within the individual’s responsibility. Counterpublics are their own manifestations of unity, as bodies come together to create their own safe space against public norms.

Physical forms of resistance, such as the Catacombs (I and II) in the ‘70s and ‘80s, were counterpublics that resist heteronormative ideas about bodies and pleasure.

Additionally, ACT UP’s emotion work during the AIDS pandemic served to channel anger into the resistance of overbearing views that see sex and sexual acts, especially by queer people, as a solely private matter.

Therefore, while the Catacombs are a physical representation of resistance, ACT UP’s activism demonstrates the emotional form of resistance and unity.

Counterpublic spaces act as a physical manifestation of unity that can take any form for the creation of a “safe space” where resistance to widely-accepted social norms can take place. In their article, Berlant and Warner expose how publicly-mediated norms regulate intimacy and create a divide between what is “public” and “private” which is neither natural nor universal. Despite the regulation of public sex cultures and other cultures that may differ from popular normativity, counter-publics still arise.

Counterpublics are “world-making project[s]” that allows and decriminalize nonstandard intimacies that norms actively constrain within the “private” sphere (Berland and Warner 1998, 558-59). An example would be queer culture or virtual social worlds found in social media or other digital landscapes. These spaces create their own notions of what is public and what is intimate, especially through the development of cultural meanings and narratives (Berland and Warner 1998, 558). Queer worldmaking creates a reimagined sense of intimacy that does not fit the requirements posed by norms, and with “no necessary relation to domestic space, to kinship... to the nation,” (Berland and Warner 1998, 558). Counterpublics are an act of world-making that creates a space for the marginalized that does not have to be necessarily physical like public protests. Instead, counter-publics may not have

a specific number of participants but are bound together nonetheless because they reimagine what is intimate (Berland and Warner 1998, 558). In sum, counterpublics, like the gay bars on Christopher St in New York described in Berlant and Warner’s work, are acts of resistance against the norms that force queerness and queer sex into the “private” sphere.

Physical forms of resistance, such as the Catacombs (I and II), were counter-publics because they resisted heteronormativity by normalizing publicly-ignored notions of pleasure. Rubin tells the story of the Catacombs, a queer sex club where individuals were allowed to partake and experiment with their sexual desires in the ‘70s and ‘80s. The Catacombs resisted the heteronormative view that saw the exploration of physical pleasure, especially queer pleasure, as something negative and private by providing a safe and “sexually organized environment where people treated each other with mutual respect,” (Rubin 2011, 239). The Catacombs I and II were resisting a societal standard that saw queer sexuality as a matter for the “private sphere,” especially during the AIDS pandemic, by allowing people to partake in sexual acts without being married to each other (Rubin 2011, 239). By providing a space where mainly men, and occasionally women, were allowed to partake in sex acts of their choice. The Catacombs I and II became icons and future examples of spaces that can create communities. Consequently, the Catacombs were a world-making space because they allowed and celebrated non-standard intimacies.

The Catacombs were a counter-public because they created a space where the meaning of intimacy was reimagined to celebrate, value, and love the “body and its capacities for sensory experience,” as opposed to the public (Rubin 2011, 239).

While the Catacombs are an example of physical resistance to normativity, resistance can also take an abstract form through emotions. The use of emotion work for resistance, as seen in ACT UP, is “nonstrategic and unpremeditated” as the emotions of a group are mobilized as “an effect of a movement’s activities” (Gould 2002, 183). ACT UP’s emotion work served to channel anger into the resistance of overbearing views that see sex and sexual acts as a non-public issue, thus not one of importance for public health. ACT UP was an activist group mobilized to increase governmental accountability for people with HIV and AIDS. Gould’s work argues that emotions, and emotional processes, have a big role in maintaining and growing movements. Gould demonstrates how ACT UP’s activism linked and proliferated feelings of anger and channelled these into political confrontantional POLIS

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activism (Gould 2002, 186). ACT UP presented new rhetoric where lesbian and gay love was appreciated, and their anger towards the political and social systems that failed them inspired “rebellious activism to fight for what is right” (Gould 2002, 190). Essentially, ACT UP “reeroticized [queer] sex and catapulted their proud sexual differences in a bid for mainstream social acceptance” (Gould 2002, 193). Thus, ACT UP, through emotion work, made queer sex and sex acts an issue for the “public” sphere. This created resistance to the healthcare system that allowed people to die of AIDS. By making their resistance inherently emotional, especially by focusing on feelings of anger and grief, ACT UP was capable of creating a sense of community among the participants. As Gould’s work stated, ACT UP meetings and marches reminded participants that they were not alone, and allowed them to channel their feelings outwardly instead of internalizing them (Gould 2002, 185-86). ACT UP was a physical manifestation of resistance through protest and emotion in its mobilization of anger and grief. ACT UP encouraged nonstandard intimacies that view sex as an issue for the public health sphere. In short, ACT UP’s world-making through resistance demonstrated the importance of reconstructing what should be kept in the “private” sphere for the responsibility of the individual, and what should be considered a “public” issue.

In conclusion, resistance can take various physical and emotional forms and can achieve the creation of counterpublics. Counterpublic spaces attempt to resist the norms that dictate what fits in the “private” and “public” spheres of information and create communities in the process. Physical forms of resistance, such as the Catacombs (I and II), are counterpublics that resist heteronormative ideas about bodies and pleasure by celebrating queer sex acts and creating communities from them. Nonetheless, resistance is not only physical as ACT UP’s emotion work served to channel anger into the failure of the public sphere in protecting bodies against AIDS and for trying to make a public health crisis into a “non-public” issue. Resistance is important because it reminds the oppressed that they are not alone in their discrimination, and through its various forms, allows spaces for exploration of oneself and others. By standing up against the oppressor, the unity of the oppressed always serves as a reminder that no power exists in a vacuum.

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Bibliography Berlant, Lauren and Michael Warner. 1998. “Sex in Public.” Critical Inquiry 24 (2): 547-566.

Gould, Deborah. 2002. “Life During Wartime: Emotions and the Development of ACT UP.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 7(2): 177-200.

Rubin, Gayle. 2011. Deviations: A Gayle Rubin Reader. Durham: Duke University Press.

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Transfiguring Internet Access Into an Inalienable Human Right By: Mehek Berry

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s the contemporary world becomes increasingly interconnected with the advent of the Internet, human beings are also facing challenges that come with living in the technological era. As the global pandemic encompassed the world, society was brought to a standstill; hence, educational systems, professional enterprises, and more have swiftly remedied the disruption of social interaction along with their other significant drawbacks by turning to the Internet to help people sustain their newly altered lifestyles. Though the availability of technological instruments and Internet access may seem widely accessible, there are still groups within society without adequate means and resources to utilize the Internet as well as other products of globalization. At a time when a disruption of Internet access can be detrimental due to one’s reliance on it to administer their everyday life, the debate surrounding the inequality regarding access to cyberspace is exacerbated (Kaur 2021, 767).

With authoritarian and oligarchic governments beginning to implement restrictions on the internet in light of civil or political unrest, there has been rising popularity for the notion emphasizing the need to normalize the protection of Internet access across the world (Kaur 2021, 767). In such cases, some argue that creating a human right aimed toward transfiguring Internet access into a norm for all people, which obligates international states to promote as well as protect this fundamental freedom granted to all individuals. Yet, it is also argued that the creation of a human right to allow all human beings to access the Internet requires a more holistic and all-encompassing methodology to facilitate the collaboration between nations, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations alike.

This research brief will examine the differing positions on Internet access being developed into a fundamental human right that is inherent to all human beings whilst also providing a systematic analysis of the divergent perspectives on the subject by reviewing studies, reports, and articles that pertain to the topic of comprehensive access to the Internet. It will consider the increased vulnerability of human beings as dependency on the Internet rises, especially in the time of a worldwide epidemic. Moreover, it will examine the lack of human rights allocated to access the Internet – and whether it is better situated as a civil and political right or an economic, social, and cultural right. Lastly, this brief will analyze the contrasting views on the benefits and limitations of creating a right to Internet access. Finally, this paper will explore unresolved questions regarding this topic that may require additional research.

A prevalent perspective pertaining to an increased dependency on the Internet in the contemporary world dictates that citizens become more vulnerable to being targeted by social media platforms and their algorithms.

Due to the insecure ecosystem established on the Internet, it is believed by some scholars that rights must be protected online with regulation. Mark Zuckerberg, the co-founder of Facebook, published an opinion piece for The Washington Post concerning the need for change in the world of technology. He assesses the effect of updating rules and responsibilities that should be followed as well as upheld by users, including individuals, companies, and governments.

By recognizing the importance of holding social media firms accountable for their intrusive policies, Zuckerberg postulates the idea of asking state governments around the world to play a more active role as a regulator; contrary to how a plethora of social media platforms, including Facebook, aim to create profits by trading public safety for user data (Zuckerberg 2019). The author’s proposal for the future of companies operating within the global network includes regulating four areas: harmful content, election integrity, privacy, and data portability (Zuckerberg 2019).

According to Zuckerberg, Internet companies “should be accountable for enforcing standards” to protect users and address underlying issues in order to create more transparent interactions and services. A study published in the Digital Policy, Regulation and Governance Journal raises similar concerns, citing the Internet as a loose structure wherein norms, rules, codes, and customs are woven through the insecurities present and are often exploited by governments and other criminal actors for their advantage (Lindsay 2017). With a communications environment and ecosystem designed to be invasive, scholars seem to reiterate the crucial importance of remembering that the Internet and social media are constantly evolving – mutating at the same speed as, if not faster than, the rest of the world – and is bound to reforms that construct a more secure technological world for all.

The restrictions brought on by COVID-19 relating to physical mobility compound on an inequitable relationship between the expansion of internet access and people without the means to connect to the global network. Ryan Shandler’s analytical piece for The Washington Post considers if society’s dependence on the Internet should render Internet access a human right.

He asserts that the inequity in relation to access to the Internet at a time of increased interconnectedness, the digital divide requires scholars to reflect upon whether the growing importance of the Internet necessitates a human right as to its lack of accessibility despite being linked to “basic civic rights we take for granted” (Shandler 2020). The article cites an op-ed written by Vinton Cerf, “Internet Access Is Not a Human Right,” which claims that technology enables universal rights that are respected and observed, but technology itself is not a right due to misinterpretation that the Internet and the freedoms facilitated by it are interchangeable. With an emphasis on technology becoming a means of protection against the pandemic engulfing the economic, social, and political worlds, Shandler suggests that humans are now growing vulnerable to disconnection (Shandler 2020).

Though the absence of a human right for access to the Internet has been clearly established with respect to the inequity dislocating groups of people from the digital world, it can also be rendered that the emerging era requires the recognition of universal Internet access.

Undeniably, every year since the creation of the web, its importance has grown in people’s lives. Brian Skepys’ research explores five arguments on the subject of whether Internet access is to be classified as a human right: freedom of communication, autonomy, equality, expression, and assembly. He identifies that, despite POLIS

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there not being a current human right to Internet access, the denial of Internet access is a threat to human rights in the contemporary world as it demands the acceptance of the negative duties of citizens (Skepys 2012, 16).

Undeterred by such a way to derive the right to Internet access from other fundamental human rights, there are “a number of rights that might be used to claim a right to the Internet” (Skepys 2012, 19).

Wang Xiaowei brings in a distinctive interpretation upon his examination of Internet access as a derived human right that has normative weight rooted in human rights participating as a method of reserving the right to democracy across nations in this source. The scholar conceptualizes human rights as inherent to human beings in accordance with Alan Gewirth, a philosopher known for his ethical rationalism, by defining the possession of rights to something means that individuals can compel others to protect their rights and assist in facilitating its fulfillment (Xiaowei 2016, 657). He concludes that the formulation of such a concept that is inherent to all human beings in a modernizing world can justify the human right to a democratic government due to research indicating a “positive correlation between Internet penetration rate and the degree of a country's democratization” (Xiaowei 2016, 669). Thus, Xiaowei delineates a link between Internet access and economic, social, and cultural rights.

Some scholars may argue that Internet access can be exhibited as an enabler of the realization of human rights and a promoter of democracy. In reference to Merten Reglitz’s journal article, it can be claimed that the assessment of why Internet access should be reviewed as a human right can be framed by recognizing it as an enabler of the realization of other human rights and promoter of democracy. The author seeks to assert that the promotion, protection, and enjoyment of human rights offline must also be protected online (Reglitz 2020, 326).

Regardless of the fact that access to the Internet alone will be insufficient in protecting human rights, Reglitz believes that this does not undermine its value as a right because the Internet has the capacity to become a more pragmatic and reliable tool for society if the right is realized in the context of “other conducive social arrangements,” including but not limited to a functioning democracy within a state and an international community eager to counter human rights violations (Reglitz 2020, 322).

Another benefit of the creation of a human right concerning the access to the Internet is the multifaceted understanding of the actualization of other rights. An article published by Stephen Tully in the Human Rights Law Review recognizes that the creation of a human right pertaining to Internet access furthers the notion of a multidimensional aspect of the Internet which ranges from political, economic, and social to cultural dimensions. Tully

evaluates the United Nations Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on the freedom of expression in relation to four themes identifying the challenges and merits of initiating a human right regarding access to the Internet (Tully 2014, 185). He recommends initiatives to be taken by governments to promote Internet access by extending telecommunications to rural and under-serviced areas in relation to the UNSR; urging nations to promote universal Internet access whilst cautioning against the implementation of rules to limit certain content (Tully 2014, 185). Access to the web implies freedom to services and participation in democracy through an increased expression of ideas and opinions. He affirms that giving effect to the right to freedoms of expression and access to information, indicating that nations have a positive obligation in promoting and facilitating universal Internet access, which enhances the direct support and special measures that may be instituted to ensure equitable access (Tully 2014, 186).

In addition to Tully’s article, Monika Zalnieriute and Milan Stefania’s academic article proposes that issues of human rights violations are dependent on Internet content and usage, as well as the underlying technological structure that supports the global network.

Their special issue report suggests that the political and civic power of private actors amounts to a widening human rights gap despite the lack of suspicion that the Internet is being privatized, implicating and circumventing the protections in place by the international human rights framework (Milan and Zalnieriute 2019, 12). Milan and Zalnieriute imply that there is a relationship between reimagining human rights and addressing the challenges of the present technologically inclined world and that the public sector would greatly benefit from the actualization of the universal right to Internet access.

In response to the benefits that may come with universal access to the digital world, a human right pertaining to Internet access comes with extensive requirements when implementing it as it is costly and requires States to plan an eradication of inequality to a greater extent to connect all citizens. In Abhinav Mehrotra’s article, he takes into consideration the effect of the global pandemic on the restricted access to the Internet at a time wherein technology can also help ensure the safety of citizens. Furthermore, he proposes that taking an international approach is much less feasible than taking a legally systematic approach as states must cooperate with other jurisdictions to prevent any online issues which may arise as they are extraterritorial and transnational at times (Mehrotra 2021, 322). It has been identified that the implementation of such a right also requires governments to work POLIS

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comprehensively and inclusively to involve collaboration with multiple nations and international organizations (Mehrotra 2021, 327). Such cooperation can prove to be difficult when countries like Taiwan, which are theoretically sovereign but are not internationally recognized.

open the discussion to the installation of updated as well as more secure regulations that protect users both in the public and private sector– an attempt in bridging the divide of inequality and inequity within the technological sphere.

In fact, Tully’s article further explores the problems with creating a human right to access the Internet by challenging the notion of discerning Internet access as an independent entity rather than being linked to the pre-existent right to one’s freedom of expression. Without a defined or comprehensive scope as the proposal to such a right, accessibility can range from access to electronic devices, infrastructure, information, and service, to the mere ability to communicate with others – all of which entails the need for a large budget that all governments may not be equipped to allocate or ready to part with as they may have other responsibilities to pay for (Tully 2014, 186).

It is also crucial to ponder upon the implementation of this universal entitlement as there is no international organization that can attempt to legally enforce the implementation and protection of this right. The United Nations Human Rights Council vets the actions of states who would ratify the document yet the implementation of a multilateral treaty is limited by the organization’s inability to condemn countries that do not enact sufficient change to make widespread Internet access attainable (Kaur 2021, 769). This would render it infeasible to approach such a wide-scale administration without an international governing body to oversee it.

After conducting a systematic analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of transfiguring Internet access into a fundamental human right, it is clear that there remain a multitude of factors that must be considered before the establishment of such a right. In a world where civil society is obliged to hold governments and political leaders accountable for their interference with one’s access to the global network, there may be more benefits from normalizing the protection of Internet access across the world (Kaur 2021, 799). However, solely focusing on the United Nations and other international organizations’ capacity to create resolutions and regulations as a solution to this dilemma fails to consider the consequences of not having ratified binding proposals that can improve living standards through improved access to the Internet. Further empirical research on the logistics of the implementation of universal access to the digital world is required to determine if and how states can manoeuvre through this endeavour together.

Scholars, in spite of their differing perspectives, need to reimagine human rights in our ever-evolving and technologically-inclined world. Reports and studies considering the effects of surveillance capitalism hindering the use of the Internet to exercise an individual’s rights can

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Bibliography Kaur, Harpreet. 2021. “PROTECTING INTERNET ACCESS: A HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY APPROACH.” Brooklyn Journal of International Law 46 (2): 767-799.

Lindsay, Jon Randall. 2017. “Restrained by Design: The Political Economy of Cybersecurity.” Digital Policy Regulation and Governance 19 (6): 493-514.

Mehrotra, Abhinav. 2021. “Access to Internet as a Human Right – Justification and Comparative Study.”

Comparative Law Review 27: 313-27.

Milan, Stefania, and Monika Zalnieriute. 2019. “Internet Architecture and Human Rights: Beyond the Human Rights Gap: Internet Architecture and Human Rights.” Policy and Internet 11 (1): 6-15.

Reglitz, Merten. 2020. “The Human Right to Free Internet Access.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (2): 314-31.

Shandler, Ryan. 2020. “The Pandemic Shows We Depend on the Internet. So Is Internet Access a Human Right?”

The Washington Post, July 13, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/13/pandemic-shows-we-depend-internet-so-is-internetaccess-human-right/.

Skepys, Brian. 2012. “Is There a Human Right to the Internet?” Journal of Politics and Law 5 (4): 15-29.

Tully, Stephen. 2014. “A Human Right to Access the Internet? Problems and Prospects.” Human Rights Law Review 14 (2): 175-95.

Xiaowei, Wang. 2016. “A Human Right to Internet Access: A Gewirthian Approach.” Frontiers on Philosophy in China 11 (4): 652-70.

Zuckerberg, Mark. 2019. “Opinion | Mark Zuckerberg: The Internet Needs New Rules. Let’s Start in These Four Areas.”

The Washington Post, March 30, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mark-zuckerberg-the-internet-needs-new-rules -lets-start-inthese-four-areas/2019/03/29/9e6f0504-521a-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story. html.

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THE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN Sommer Pesikan

IN CANADIAN POLITICS

Introduction: In Canada, women are consistently underrepresented in the House of Commons and in provincial legislatures. To maintain a sustainable democracy, possible solutions must be explored to improve their representation. Women are a heterogeneous group with diverse political views that should be represented to promote equitable opportunities for women in the political sphere (Thomas 2013, 221).

Historically, women have been underrepresented as they were prohibited from participating in democracy and politics (Thomas 2013, 220). While historical barriers have been removed, informal obstacles continue to limit the political participation of women, impeding institutions from functioning in a just and democratic manner (Thomas 2013, 220). In this paper, I argue that the underrepresentation of women in the House of Commons and provincial legislatures is attributed to the structure of Canada’s electoral system, particularly the amount of control political parties have during the nomination process, and their treatment of female candidates. While I explain that socioeconomic, psychological, and political barriers to the election of more women Members of Parliament (MPs) exist, I posit that the main barrier is the amount of control political parties exercise over the partisan selection process. Finally, I address potential reforms for Canada’s political system to encourage more women to enter politics, such as modifying Canada’s electoral system, adopting gender-targeted public funding in provinces, implementing campaign schools for women, and altering the political environment to be more “family-friendly.”

Canada’s Electoral System Improving the representation of women in Canada’s House of Commons and in provincial legislatures is an ongoing challenge. As of 2021, Canada ranks 59th out of 193 countries worldwide in terms of the representation of women in national lower houses of Parliament (Annett and Monpetit 2021, 3). Canada’s 44th federal election was the first time that the representation of women in the House of Commons exceeded just 30 per cent (Annett and Monpetit 2021, 3). Similarly, women are underrepresented in provincial legislatures as well. While the number of female legislators varies per province and territory, Ontario and Québec are the only provinces that have reached the parity zone, between 40 and 60 per cent (Standing Committee on the Status of Women 2019, 17). Furthermore, this issue is amplified for women who belong to visible minorities. In 2021, only 3 per cent of Members of Parliament publically identified as LGBTQ and only 2.4 per cent were Indigenous (Annett and Monpetit 2021, 3).

To determine the existing barriers to the election of more women MPs, it is important to understand how Canada’s electoral system operates. Canada uses a single-member plurality or majority system, also known as the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system (Virgint 2016, 4). Canada is divided into 338 electoral districts, called ridings, with each riding possessing a seat in the House of Commons (CCLA 2018, 1). This system operates in a winner-take-all format in that each riding is represented by a single MP. Since the electorate votes for individuals rather than parties, this system is said to be “candidatecentred” rather than “party-centred” (Virgint 2016, 4).

The winning candidate must only receive a simple plurality or majority of votes, namely the most votes out of any candidate, as opposed to more than half the votes. Then, the winning candidate becomes the MP for their riding and will earn a seat in parliament.

Obstacles to an Equal Representation of Women in Canadian Politics One theory that explains the underrepresentation of women is the supply and demand theory. Developed by Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris, the supply and demand theory analyzes the political recruitment framework for potential candidates (O’Neill 2015, 24).

The supply portion of the theory refers to the number of women who are able and willing to run for office (Medeiros, Forest, and Erl 2019, 390). There are several socioeconomic and psychological barriers that can hinder women from embarking on a political career.

First, women may face socioeconomic challenges based on their income, level of education, and occupational status (Thomas 2013, 22). Due to the prevalence of patriarchal social hierarchies in the labour market, women have traditionally been pushed to take on a disproportionately large share of family responsibilities, such as childcare. This social norm causes women to perceive family responsibilities as their primary duty, which excludes women from entering the labour force and limits their ability to participate in politics (Thomas 2013, 223). Women are thus less inclined to pursue careers in politics due to their preoccupation in the domestic sphere. Next, women often have lower incomes than men and less financial independence. This can be problematic for financing campaigns which rely largely on one’s personal income (Cool 2013, 3). Furthermore, women may be underrepresented in upper levels of academia and business, limiting their access to professional networks and connections that are valued by political parties (Cool 2013, 3).

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Second, women face psychological barriers which avert their interest in politics. For example, women fear gender stereotypes and discrimination. Both explicit and implicit forms of sexism can affect the ways women perceive themselves and are perceived by others (Standing Committee on the Status of Women 2019, 27). Explicit sexism is overt and based on gender stereotypes and prejudice, while implicit sexism is an internalized unconscious bias found in women themselves and is informed by gender norms (Standing Committee on the Status of Women 2019, 27). Similarly, women may have been socialized to view politics as an unsuitable profession (Cool 2013, 3). Women may fear that running for office is too difficult, lowering their levels of political self-confidence (Thomas 2013, 223). As a result, their desires to run for office are suppressed.

On the other hand, the demand aspect refers to the preferences political parties have when it comes to recruiting candidates. Political parties typically select candidates with a low electoral risk. Assessing a candidate’s electoral risk involves determining how likely it is for a candidate to win a seat in the House of Commons (O’Neill 2015, 25). Political parties assume that women have a higher electoral risk and are thus less attractive candidates. This assumption relies heavily on a woman’s professional reputation and her social/political connections (Medeiros, Forest, and Erl 2019, 390). Political parties assume that women are not a desirable choice for voters and will hence not recruit women. Further, it is argued that Canada’s FPTP system poses the most challenges for electing women because the electorate votes for individuals rather than parties (Virgint 2016, 4). Consequently, to maximize their chances of winning, political parties often run the 'safest' candidates.

In addition, researchers Melanee Thomas and Marc André Bodet explain that even if parties do recruit women, they are more likely to be used as “sacrificial lambs” (Thomas and Bodet 2013, 153). In other words, women serve as place fillers in districts where their party has little to no chance of winning (Thomas and Bodet 2013, 153).

Women are not commonly nominated in ridings that parties perceive to be “winnable” because political parties fear that female candidates are too risky for electoral success (LCC 2004, 105). Overall, parties fail to provide women with a fair chance of running for office. Since Canada’s electoral system is candidate-centred, parties exercise control by making assumptions about female candidates which can hinder women from attaining political success.

While both aspects of supply and demand are crucial, I argue that the lack of female representation in Canadian electoral politics is attributed to the demand aspect, namely the control exercised by political parties. For one, some supply factors are outdated.

For instance, women are becoming more educated and reaching higher levels of academia, enabling them to attain a more reputable professional status. More importantly, however, the components of supply and demand are not independent phenomena, but rather operate in a reinforcing cycle (Medeiros, Forest, and Erl 2019, 390). The gendered demands of political parties can have a negative impact on the supply of female candidates (Medeiros, Forest, and Erl 2019, 391). For example, if women are aware that it is not as likely that parties will recruit them, then women will continue to be discouraged from running for office. To break this cycle, political parties must attempt to recruit more women to demonstrate that a political career is equally attainable by both women and men.

Furthermore, it is important to clarify that which does not constitute a barrier to the underrepresentation of women. Since Canada is a democracy, one may argue that the underrepresentation of women in the House of Commons is attributed to voter preferences, rather than the interests of political parties. Using the supply and demand theory, I will reveal why this claim falls short of being conclusive. First, this argument fails to acknowledge the structure of Canada’s electoral system, through which women are restricted before the voting process begins. Even once a woman decides to run for office, she must first surpass the gatekeepers of the electoral system, namely the parties in charge of recruitment. Studies have shown that voters are equally as likely to support male and female candidates (O’Neill 2015, 24). Therefore, gender bias in the Canadian electorate does not constitute a barrier to the election of female candidates (Thomas 2013, 229). The issue is rather a matter of the partisan selection process.

Gatekeepers can decide not to select a woman candidate if they fear she will not be appealing to voters (Medeiros, Forest, and Erl 2019, 390). Voters often do not even have the opportunity to see or vote for all the women candidates who decide to run for office because the majority were not recruited by parties. As a result, it cannot be justified that women are underrepresented based solely on voter outcomes; the whole election process must be taken into account.

Solutions to the Improve the Underrepresentation of Women Given that Canada's FPTP system is a barrier to the election of more women candidates, I suggest that Canada adopt other electoral systems to improve the underrepresentation of female politicians. Two alternative electoral systems include proportional representation (PR) systems and mixed electoral systems.

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The objective of PR systems is to match a political party’s vote share with its seat allocation in legislature (Virgint 2016, 5). To determine which individuals will sit in the legislature and the distribution of seats for each party, the electorate either votes for several candidates or a party.

Several variations of the PR system exist, though the most common type is the list system (Cool 2013, 5-6). In this system, political parties create regional or national lists of their running candidates. All votes are counted and each party is awarded seats according to its share of the national vote. Winning candidates are selected according to their placement on the party list (Virgint 2016, 5). Alternatively, mixed electoral systems combine PR and FPTP systems. In this system, members of the electorate each cast two votes.

The first vote is to elect a member to represent their constituency, similar to the FPTP system (Virgint 2016, 6).

The second vote is similar to the PR system, where the electorate votes for a party based on a predetermined list of candidates (Virgint 2016, 6).

In light of the various electoral systems, the PR system best facilitates underrepresentation of women. Some scholars argue that PR systems are more effective because they are “party-centred” rather than “candidate centred” (Virgint 2016, 5). In PR systems, political parties have more control over the election of a gender-balanced assembly.

PR systems incentivize parties to broaden their appeal by adding female candidates to their party lists (Virgint 2016, 5). Several Nordic countries have had success with PR systems in improving the representation of women. For example, Sweden and Finland, countries with PR electoral systems, rank 5th and 10th in the world for their representation of women respectively (Virgint 2016, 6).

Furthermore, party lists make it easier to implement gender quotas and reach gender parity. Gender quotas are mandatory targets that specify the number of seats to be allocated to women in the legislature, or the number of women that must be included on candidate lists (Virgint 2016, 7). In FPTP systems, because parties have less control over which candidates will win in each riding, gender quotas are more difficult to mandate (Virgint 2016, 4).

Lastly, it is important to note that mixed electoral systems are moderately effective in improving the representation of women because of their PR aspect. To improve the representation of women, Canada should consider implementing strategies used by PR systems.

Conversely, other scholars argue that PR systems are not sufficient to achieve a balanced gender representation (Cool 2013, 6). Since parties continue to exercise discretion in drafting candidate lists, there is no guarantee that the lists will be more gender neutral (Cool 2013, 6).

Although I mentioned that PR systems have been successful in Nordic countries, it is argued that this is only because voters in such countries already have high

expectations for male and female equality, and hence influence parties to ensure gender-balanced lists (Cool 2013, 6). Further, it is argued that it is risky to view electoral reform as the sole solution for increasing the representation of women because it ignores the cultural and social realities that have long prevented the participation of women in electoral politics (Virgint 2016, 4). Although electoral reform may not completely solve the underrepresentation of women in government, it provides with direct control in creating candidate lists, and therefore it is less likely that women will be outvoted in ridings or placed in unwinnable ridings. For these reasons, it is clear that, as long as parties are pressured by voters to create gender-equal lists, PR will be better than FPTP in terms of gender equality in parliament.

At the provincial level, a newer reform that could improve the representation of women in legislatures is the adoption of financial incentives for political parties, namely gender-targeted public funding (GTPF) (Albaugh and Everitt 2022, 127). The objective of the policy is to impact the nomination and election of women by adjusting to the existing per-vote subsidy for female candidates (Albaugh and Everitt 2022, 129-130).

Originally, each vote for a party’s candidate results in one dollar of direct funding to the party; however this new reform counts the votes cast for women candidates to be worth 1.5 dollars (Albaugh and Everitt 2022, 129).

In other words, each vote for a female candidate is now 1.5 times the value for a party compared to a vote for a male candidate. This reform encourages parties to nominate more women, specifically in ridings that are ‘winnable,’ because the more votes women get, the more money parties receive. This reform offers a potential solution to representing more women in politics since it supports the interests of political parties who are in positions to make effective changes.

Aside from changing the current electoral system, another reform is the implementation of campaign schools for women. Campaign schools are designed to help women acquire the skills needed to create and finance an effective campaign. Several Canadian organizations have coordinated campaign schools for women. These schools operate according to wellestablished campaign schools in the United States. For instance, the Ready to Run program, offered by the Center for American Women and Politics, is a very successful campaign school; 25 per cent of their graduates have run for office and 70 per cent of those graduates have won (Thomas 2013, 231). Campaign schools in Canada are a newer reform and I argue that further research on these efforts is a step in the right direction.

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Finally, the political environment itself can be modified to be more “family-friendly” (Galandy and Tavcer 2019, 1718). Researchers Jennifer Galandy and D. Scharie Tavcer conducted a study on the Politics of Presence Theory and found that the political culture can be remodelled by implementing mandatory training and education programs for politicians. The Politics of Presence Theory holds that a gender-balanced political environment can only be achieved by increasing female representation and prioritizing the ideas of women and determining solutions to the problems women have (Galandy and Tavcer 2019, 14).

Participants in their study agreed that gender-focused education, as well as harassment training, should be required (Galandy and Tavcer 2019, 18). This would modify the political culture to be more inclusive and supportive of women. As a result, enacting policies within parties to provide funding and training resources would be helpful (Galandy and Tavcer 2019, 18). Furthermore, the Politics of Presence Theory holds that the political community can adopt a more gender-balanced lens by implementing required programs such as the Gender-Based Analysis plus (GBA+) tool (Galandy and Tavcer 2019, 18). This tool is used to assess how various genders experience policies and programs. Overall, this solution can be helpful for policy analysts and researchers to explore how to foster a stronger relationship between political parties and female candidates.

Conclusion The barriers that prevent the election of more women MPs can be explained in terms of the supply and demand theory. Although a variety of barriers exist, I assert that the underrepresentation of women is mainly due to the amount of control exercised by political parties during the partisan selection process. Political parties assume that female candidates are a ‘risky’ choice and therefore do not recruit them, or treat them as ‘sacrificial lambs.’ To improve the underrepresentation of women, I have addressed certain reforms that could be made at the federal and provincial levels, with emphasis on adopting gender-targeted public funding in provinces, implementing campaign schools for women, and altering the political environment to be more family-friendly. While other barriers and solutions to this issue exist, I have explored those that I believe are most significant in Canada.

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Bibliography Annett, Clare, and Dominique Montpetit. 2021. “Women in the Parliament of Canada: 100 Years of Representation.” Library of Parliament, December 1, 2021. https://hillnotes.ca/2021/12/01/women-in-theparliament-of-canada-100-years-of-representation/.

Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA). 2018. “Voting in Canada: The First Past The Post System.”

CCLA, January 25, 2018. https://ccla.org/get-informed/talk-rights/voting-in-canada-the-first-past-the-postsystem/.

Cool, Julie. 2011. “Women in Parliament.” Library of Parliament, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2013/bdp-lop/bp/2011-56-1-eng.pdf.

May

10,

2011.

Everitt, Joanna, and Quinn M. Albaugh. 2022. “The Origins of Gender-Targeted Public Finance Measures: the Case of New Brunswick, Canada.” European Journal of Politics and Gender 5 (1): 127–44.

Galandy, Jennifer, and D. Scharie Tavcer. 2019. “Improving Gender Representation in Canadian Federal Politics and Parliament.” Canadian Parliamentary Review 42 (1): 14–19.

Law Commission of Canada. 2004. “Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada." Law Commission of Canada. https://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/J31-61-2004E.pdf.

Medeiros, Mike, Benjamin Forest, and Chris Erl. 2019. “Where Women Stand: Parliamentary Candidate Selection in Canada.” Politics, Groups, and Identities 7 (2): 389-400.

O’Neill, Brenda. 2015. “Unpacking Gender's Role in Political Representation in Canada.” Canadian Parliamentary Review 38 (2): 22-30 Standing Committee on the Status of Women. Rep. Elect Her: Roadmap for Improving the Representation of Women in Canadian Politics. Ottawa, Ontario: Library of Parliament, April 2019.

Thomas, Melanee, and Marc André Bodet. 2013. “Sacrificial Lambs, Women Candidates, and District Competitiveness in Canada.” Electoral Studies 32 (1): 153-66.

Thomas, Melanee. 2013. “Barriers to Women’s Political Participation in Canada.” University of New Brunswick Law Journal 64, 218-33.

Virgint, Erin. 2016. “Electoral Systems and Women’s Representation.” Library of Parliament, July 5, 2016. https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/bdp-lop/bp/YM32-2-2016-30-eng.pdf.

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Why International Trials Are Inadequate By: Javahir Saidov

I

nternational trials and tribunals are several of the tools that fall under the umbrella of transitional justice. As such, they are required to fulfil the pillars of transitional justice: truth-seeking, justice, reparations, and a guarantee of nonrepetition (Roht-Arriaza 2016, 445). However, international trials are inadequate as they fail to fulfil the pillars of justice and guarantee of non-repetition. By analyzing various cases and looking at studies that have been done on the topic, it is valid to conclude that due to light sentences, as well as failure to promote continuous peace in countries that face human rights abuses, they fail to contribute to the mission of transitional justice.

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Transitional justice-based interventions and procedures should aim to promote the aforementioned pillars of transitional justice. International courts and tribunals, however, fail to ensure several of these principles. Firstly, international trials fail to ensure justice. A clear example of such a case is the the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. This genocide saw ethnic Hutus turn against minority ethnic Tutsis, resulting in the deaths of over 500,000 Tutsi victims (Guichaoua 2020, 127). In an effort to bring justice to the Rwandan population, the International Tribunal for Rwanda was only able to try twenty-six individuals in seven years.

Although this number may at first appear sufficient, the ICTR and the Rwandan government have not been consistent. At one point, the Rwandan government claimed that there were approximately 130,000 offenders (Ku and Nzelibe 2006, 808). Such a low number of convictions demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the tribunal, considering it cost $1 billion (Ku and Nzelibe 2006, 808).

Another example of a lack of justice as a result of an international tribunal is the case of former President of Chile, Augusto Pinochet. During the 17 year rule, Pinochet and his government subjected the population to arbitrary arrears, torture, rape, seizure of private property, imprisonment and even execution and exile (McHale 2001, 50). According to the Latin American Institute on Mental Health, about 10 per cent of the Chilean population in the 1980s were affected by the situation whether by being subject to arrests, threats, or having relatives in prison (McHale 2001, 50). Augusto Pinochet, through self-granted amnesty, avoided investigation. However, on October 16th, 1998, the British government arrested Pinochet at the behest of Audiencia Nacional, the Spanish centralized court (McHale 2001, 49). As a result of this, he was tried by the Spanish government for human rights abuses and violations throughout his regime. Although he was initially accused of over 30 offences, his charges were reduced to just three. He was later allowed to return back to Chile due to old age. As a result, this international trial failed to hold Pinochet accountable for his regime’s human rights abuses (Sikkink 2011, 4).

International tribunals against human rights abusers not only fail to provide justice to victims, families of victims, and entire nations affected by human rights abuses, but also fail to provide a deterrent effect in the long run; thus, international tribunals and courts also fail to ensure the guarantee of non-repetition. Compared to various local trials, the punishments handed out by international tribunals and courts have commonly failed to provide punishments and consequences that are sufficiently deterrent against human rights abuses. As of 2006, all of the existing International Criminal Courts were in Africa (Sudan, Uganda, Congo).

Hence it is appropriate to turn to the African continent to analyze the deterrent impacts of the international trials (Ku and Nzelibe 2006, 801). However, between 1955 and 2003, the number of coups in African countries have remained steady, despite over 60 per cent of successful coup participants being executed, arrested or exiled in domestic court proceedings or through extrajudicial measures (Ku and Nzelibe 2006, 804). Indeed, undemocratic political regimes implement a wider range of criminal sanctions than international tribunals; nevertheless, they fail to sufficiently deter coup plotters or reduce the number of coups. Hence, it is fair to assume that these criminal actors would disregard the risks of tribunal prosecutions, as they could be faced with much harsher consequences internally by domestic regimes (Ku and Nzelibe 2006, 806).

International courts further fail to deter future human rights violations due to inability to strengthen democratic institutions within the countries. All tribunals are considered international institutions; however, when dealing with human rights violations, tribunals overlook the importance of building lasting institutions within governments (Ku and Nzelibe 2006, 785). As tribunals are temporary bodies, their main function is to punish those guilty of human rights violations. Although punishing perpetrators is important, when strong domestic institutions are not enforced by these tribunals, it allows for unchecked power for future leaders. As a result, politically well-connected individuals have no deterrent mechanisms, and there are possibilities for future abuses of power (Ku and Nzelibe 2006, 818). In fact, to peacefully strengthen domestic institutions, there needs to be collaboration with the same actors that have abused their powers (Ku and Nzelibe 2006, 818). Such institutions include strong independent courts, government bodies that limit the powers of the leaders and advocacy institutions. In the case of South Africa, there were multiple calls to hold the Apartheid government responsible for human rights violations.

However, international trials and tribunals would have jeopardized the possibility of a peaceful transition due to civil unrest and struggle for power (Ku and Nzelibe 2006, 819). To achieve a peaceful transition and democracy the opposition movements offered to go into negotiations with the Apartheid government. They agreed to offer amnesty to the officials of the previous government, as well as the right to appoint a Deputy President for the future government (Ku and Nzelibe 2006, 819). In exchange, the Apartheid government would allow for free elections and a democratic structure going forward, including altering institutions to reflect more democratic and progressive values (such as creating strong courts, placing limits on government powers, ensuring more freedoms for citizens, etc.)

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When international courts and tribunals are implemented, such an opportunity for a transition is not an option, as the main focus is placed on punishing human rights violators.

As courts do not have jurisdiction over local institutions, no attention is paid to the government structures and institutions. Hence, there is no guarantee of more democratic institutions. Furthermore, without such institutions and strong democracy, there is nothing stopping future human rights abuses from happening. The case of South Africa shows that in order to ensure democracy and functioning institutions following human rights abuses, the path of negotiations should be taken. Such methods can better guarantee non-repetition of human rights abuses and a more democratic future, as they help create conditions to hold governments accountable, limit their powers and create systematic change.

International courts and tribunals have been a part of transitional justice for decades; however, their effectiveness is debated to this day. Although they are praised for punishing human rights violators, they are not the right tool to promote the goals of justice and non-repetition, as stipulated by the United Nations. Firstly, there have been multiple cases of human rights abusers escaping punishment for their actions. In addition, international trials fail to deter future human rights violations, as their punishments are considerably lighter than those of local courts and governing bodies. Finally, due to their inability to promote democratic institutions in countries that have suffered human rights abuses, they are unable to prevent future violations from happening. Due to such shortcomings, international trials and tribunals fail to meet the goals set forth by the United Nations.

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Bibliography Guichaoua, André. 2020. “Counting the Rwandan Victims of War and Genocide: Concluding Reflections.” Journal of Genocide Research 22 (1): 125-41.

Ku, Julian, and Jide Nzelibe. 2006. “Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?” Washington University Law Quarterly 84 (4): 777–833.

Laura McHale. 2001. “The Case Against General Augusto Pinochet.” Litigation 27 (3): 49–71.

Roht-Arriaza, Naomi. 2016. “Guatemala: Lessons for Transitional Justice.” Research Handbook on Transitional Justice: 445–65.

Sikkink, Kathryn. 2012. Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics.

New York: W. W. Norton.

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SOUTH AFRICA'S TRUTH Nada Abdelaal

AND RECONCILIATION COMISSION

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is considered to be one of the most successful examples of truth commissions. However, they let many human rights violators escape any sort of punishment, after the abolishment of the apartheid. Apartheid was a system of legally enforced racial segregation in South Africa between 1948 and 1990. The ruling National Party stripped Black South Africans of their civil and political rights and implemented segregated education, health care, and all other public services (Boraine 2000, 141). Any internal resistance was met with violent punishment, such as police brutality, detention, or torture (Boraine 2000, 141).

However, after the Cold War, the Apartheid government engaged in negotiations with the African National Congress (ANC). In 1994, democratic elections were held and an interim constitution was passed (Boraine 2000, 142). The new government created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) endorsed by Nelson Mandela. Although the South African TRC is considered to be one of the most successful examples of truth commissions, the justice that was attained was limited due to issues such as a lack of accountability among the higher levels of command, as well as the inability to properly compensate victims.

The TRC was created to investigate the human rights violations imposed during the period of the Apartheid regime, such as abductions, killings, and torture (United States Institute of Peace 1995). The TRC had four goals: first, to promote national unity and reconciliation which transcends conflicts; second, to grant amnesty to those who made full disclosure of their association with the crimes committed; third, to make known the whereabouts of victims and to restore their dignity; and lastly, to create a report in which they address the successes and failures of their first three goals, and make recommendations for the future.

Unlike many previous truth commissions, this TRC was the first commission to hold public hearings in which both victims and perpetrators were heard. The TRC took testimonies from 21,000 victims, 2,000 of which appeared in public hearings (Hayner 2011, 26). The voices of the victims were prioritized rather than dismissed as lacking in objectivity (Asmal 2000, 15). The commission also recommended that each victim or family should receive $3,500 USD each year for six years as part of the reparations program (Asmal 2000, 15). Moreover, the commission received over 7,000 amnesty applications, but only 849 were granted amnesties (United States Institute of Peace 1995). When individuals apply for amnesty, they are required to go to the TRC and admit their wrongdoings and take responsibility for their actions. The applicant only receives amnesty if the panel decides that the crimes were purely politically motivated (Hayner 2011, 9); however, if they were done for personal gain then the applicant does not qualify for amnesty.

The South African TRC was successful in many ways: it was the first commission to hold public hearings involving both the victims and perpetrators, which set a precedent for the international transitional justice discourse (Asmal 2000, 18). Additionally, the TRC allowed for a smoother transition from an armed struggle to a democracy (Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice 2013). The TRC was able to expose and acknowledge the atrocities that occurred while also exploring more ways to establish social cohesion and coexistence amongst former enemies (Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice 2013, 445).

Although the TRC set a precedent, many were unsatisfied as most high-profile perpetrators failed to apply for amnesty nor did they get criminally charged (United States Institute of Peace 1995). The failure to prosecute was the result of a lack of political will from the government due to the fear that having trials would foster chaos or cause further political issues (Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice 2013, 446). Furthermore, the trials that did take place resulted in restrained judgments. For instance, former President P. W. Botha, who led the government during Apartheid, merely received a suspended court sentence for failing to work with the TRC (Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice 2013, 446).

On the other hand, some perpetrators in the lower chain of command were convicted and imprisoned (Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice 2013, 447).Therefore, there is a lack of accountability at the higher levels of command, as many influential officials were not adequately prosecuted.

Other criticisms of the commission regarded individual victims and the reparation committee. As stated earlier, the recommendation by the committee was that each victim should receive a grant of around $3,500 per year for 6 years (Hayner 2011, 11). However, in 1998, the government paid payments of $330 to the victims and released a statement stating more money would be given to the victims, but they were not paid (Asmal 2000, 6).

Approximately 50 victims were interviewed by Ruth Picker in a study done in 2005, and many were unsatisfied with how the TRC dealt with the process (Picker 2005, 4). Many victims stated that the TRC failed to uphold its end of the deal when it came to compensation (Picker 2005, 5). Additionally, the victims complained about the lack of justice in the TRC process, specifically about how they were treated in comparison to the perpetrators (Picker 2005, 5). It was stated that “while the perpetrators did not visibly have to pay for their deeds, [our] lives did not improve” (Picker 2005, 6).

Therefore, some of the victims believe that they did not attain justice to the extent that they had hoped for.

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In conclusion, the TRC allowed for a smoother transition to democracy and created a precedent amongst commissions by bringing in the perspective of the perpetrators and victims. However, it is important to acknowledge that the justice attained was limited, as many high-ranking officials were not held accountable, and victims were not compensated accordingly. As stated earlier, the reason higher-ranking officials were not held accountable was that the TRC was afraid of fostering chaos among people. Given that these shortcomings come at the expense of the victims, it is difficult to say whether the TRC brought justice to the victims. In other words, do we have to sacrifice either justice or peace to attain the other? Are they both mutually exclusive?

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Bibliography Asmal, Kadar. 2000. “Truth, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience in Perspective.”

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