Appendix
Summary of Community-Led Development Initiatives used for Comparative Analysis
To accompany the report titled Supporting CommunityLed Development in Manitoba: Policy Alternatives for Inclusive and Participatory Community Renewal
by Michael Barkman, Jesse Hajer, Holly Scotland
All references in this Appendix can be found within the full report.
The Vancouver Urban Development Agreement (VA)
The Vancouver Urban Development Agreement (VA) was a federally led program initially agreed to by the provincial and municipal governments in 2000 with a five-year mandate which was renewed in 2005 for an additional five years (Bradford, 2013). The program was originally intended to be city-wide, however the focus quickly changed to a place-based program for Vancouver’s Downtown EastSide neighbourhood. The program was originally an unfunded collaborative model with each level of government redirecting existing resources in line with common priorities, using a new intergovernmental partnership coordinated by Health Canada and Western Economic Diversification Canada. Ideas flowed from street-level task teams, who represented the voice of the community, up to a policy committee made up of the mayor and relevant provincial and federal Ministers who had
decision-making power. In 2003 federal and provincial governments allocated a total of $20 million in funds to the project and an integrated strategic plan was created in consultation with the community at which time focus shifted to specific revitalization projects. Using policy links between the various levels of government the VA program coordinated the implementation of projects such as North America’s first Safe/Supervised Injection Site, the Mobile Access Project for Sex Trade Workers, the $183 million redevelopment of a former department store as a mix use housing/community space project, and Building Opportunities with Business non-profit CED organization.
Evaluation
The VA was found to be very successful in bringing together multiple government departments and agencies together at all levels of government to work collaboratively to improve the coordination of existing social resources and create innovative new ones (Bradford, 2013). A report by the Auditor General of Canada found the program to be “the most ‘promising governance model of collaboration to meet community needs’” (Bradford, 2013, p. 167). In a follow up survey, a large majority of government respondents reported that they felt their goals were being supported across departments, and that they had also adjusted their own work to support others because of improved understanding that came from collaborative work in the VA program. There were also many significant community level improvements for the Downtown Eastside attributed to the VA program including overall social stabilization of the neighbourhood (Bradford, 2013). Economically, the VA program was successful in connecting businesses to social purchasing opportunities, and increasing employment and training opportunities through community benefits agreements. Social housing for multi-barriered residents was increased as part of a heritage restoration program. Health outcomes, including death rates related to addiction, suicide, and HIV/AIDS, improved with better access to primary healthcare and a safe injection site. Finally, the presence of the Mobile Access Project was found to improve safety for at least some at risk populations.
Vibrant Communities
Vibrant Communities is a pan-Canadian poverty reduction initiative which began in 2002 with a partnership between Tamarack: An Institute for Com-
munity Engagement, the Caledon Institute of Social Policy, and the J.W. McConnell Family Foundation. Since its inception other donors including the government of Canada have also contributed to Vibrant Communities (Leviten-Reid, 2007). Vibrant Communities was an expansion of a project called Opportunities 2000 in Waterloo, Ontario. The success of the Opportunities 2000 initiative led the principal donors to wonder if the same framework would work in other community contexts. The Vibrant Communities framework uses an integrated set of approaches to “tackle complex issues through comprehensive, multi-sectoral efforts” (Leviten-Reid, 2007, p. 3). The five key themes of Vibrant Communities approach are poverty reduction, comprehensive thinking and action, multisectoral collaboration, community asset building, and community learning and change (LevitenReid, 2007, pp. 3–4). There were initially three components to the Vibrant Communities program. The first two components were a Pan-Canadian Learning Community which represented a wide network to share insights and experiences of community-led poverty reduction strategies, and a smaller group of initially six “Trail Builder” communities that experimented implementing innovative poverty reduction strategies locally and then reported on the outcomes to the larger network in a process of action learning. Trail Building communities received funding for each of three phases of the initiative. Phase I involved a community consultation process to ensure local interest which was supported by a $5000 grant. Phase II was a design and development phase supported by a $20,000 grant and coaching support from the Tamarack Institute. Phase III was the implementation phase of the initial local poverty reduction strategy which was supported by matching funds of up to $100,000/year for up to three years and additional coaching resources. The final component of the Vibrant Communities framework was ongoing work to build an enabling environment for local poverty reduction programs. This component focused particularly on the effect of government policy on comprehensive, multi-sectoral poverty reduction programs and the relationship between all donors and local community initiatives. By 2010 the Trail Builders component ended, however the Vibrant Communities project has continued as a key part of the Tamarack Institute’s programming.
Evaluation
In 2006 an early evaluation of the Vibrant Communities program found that it was working, in that stated goals were being met or exceeded (Leviten-Reid, 2007). Specifically, the goal of reducing poverty for 5,000 households had
been exceeded with an estimated 16,200 low-income households receiving program benefits in areas such as income support, more affordable goods and services, better education and early childhood development opportunities, improved housing, and improved employment situations. The goals of engaging 250 non-profit organizations and government agencies and 100 businesses in the Vibrant Communities projects had been exceeded, however the goal of engaging 100 low-income leaders had fallen somewhat short at 82. The goal of having 15 communities participating in a Pan-Canadian Learning Community had been met and an external evaluation found that 92 percent of respondents had found this to be a useful program. Furthermore, the goal of having five communities participating in the Trailer Builder program had already been met, with additional communities set to join. The more general goal of producing active learning research for the purposes of shaping policy and sharing knowledge had resulted in numerous networking groups, speaking engagements, research papers, community stories and newsletters, and an interactive website. Leviten-Reid (2007) concluded that the Vibrant Communities program showed that a comprehensive multi-sectoral approach to poverty reduction was viable in many different community settings, that communities were interested in learning how to apply CLD principles from each other, and that the framework of a simultaneous, place-based, panCanadian project was important for both ongoing learning and policy change.
Action for Neighbourhood Change
Action for Neighbourhood Change Pilot Learning Initiative (ANC) was a twoyear active learning program from 2005–2007 designed to explore how the federal government could play a catalyst role in place-based community-led neighbourhood revitalization projects (Bradford, 2013). The ANC project was a response to learnings from two other programs. First, the National Homelessness Initiative which recognized the importance of communityled planning and linking shelter initiatives to broader poverty reduction strategies. Second, the Vibrant Communities program (previously discussed) which emphasized the role of intermediary organizations as facilitators in CLD programs. Funding was provided for the ANC by four federal programs from three departments with the National Homelessness Secretariat taking the lead.
Partnering with 3 national organizations, each with particular areas of specialization in place-based initiatives, the federal government worked to
support neighbourhood revitalization in targeted urban neighbourhoods with high concentrations of poverty in five cities—Halifax, Toronto, Thunder Bay, Regina, and Vancouver (Bradford, 2013). First, the United Way/Centraide with its local affiliates was responsible for overall project coordination and management, and the selection of target neighbourhoods. Second, the Tamarack Institute for Community Engagement brought practical knowledge of comprehensive community-led initiatives and organized conferences among the five community sites. Finally, the Caledon Institute of Social Policy was responsible for directing the learning process, producing and disseminating policy research and progress reports to government officials, community partners and other interested parties. Provincial and municipal governments were not involved directly in the ANC program, however local sites did link with other levels of government in pursuit of locally identified priorities and it was hoped that these linkages would continue after the federal program ended. Each community followed the same initial steps and had access to the same resources to enable systematic comparisons between sites (Bradford, 2013). The first step was the establishment of a baseline community profile based on census data and other indicators of well-being. The community then used the baseline profile to establish local priorities for community revitalization through participatory processes. Next, the ANC made $160,000 available in start-up funds for each community for community implementation of projects to advance identified community priorities. Since the ANC program was designed to be community-led in line with local priorities, there was considerable diversity in projects prioritized between the five sites. In the second year, the Caledon Institute of Social Policy introduced a report on a Neighbourhood Theory of Change (Gorman, 2006) as an action learning piece of the ANC project which was then tested on the local projects in the five targeted neighbourhoods. A final piece of the ANC design was the Policy Dialogues which encouraged sustained joint work and opened a communication mechanism between the federal government and local communities for effective collaboration.
Evaluation
The goal of the ANC project was to build networks and relationships and to increase understanding between local residents, community organizations, national partners, and federal departments for the purpose of creating a national policy network to improve CLD project outcomes (Bradford, 2013).
A key contribution of ANC was the identification of obstacles in place-based policy and the exploration of possible solutions, including the use of innova-
tive community narrative strategies and the development and application of Gorman’s Theory of Neighbourhood Change to better measure and improve the evidence bases for CLD program initiatives. Three outcomes of the ANC program were that it built local community capacity which could be used to continue CLD work after the program ended, it created knowledge capital for future CLD work, and it contributed to “a federal policy ‘community of practice’ on neighbourhood revitalization” (Bradford, 2013, p. 173).
Neighbourhood Action Strategy
Hamilton’s Neighbourhood Action Strategy (NAS) was launched in 2011 using an asset-based community-led model intended to mobilize existing community resources and build civic engagement to address local problems from the bottom-up (Pothier, 2016). The initiative is a partnership between the City of Hamilton and the Hamilton Community Foundation which targets eleven urban neighbourhoods with high levels of poverty and poor health outcomes for the residents. NAS was intended to have neighbourhood members work with city staff, service providers, and community development workers to create and realize neighbourhood action plans based on neighbourhood assets and priorities. Furthermore, the action plans were intended to inform policy and program development. Project planning occurred at monthly meetings with both government representatives and a wide range of community stakeholders in attendance including residents, business owners, service providers, school representatives, civil servants, and representatives of local religious organizations. NAS was designed to provide a unified structure for community development which reduces bureaucratic barriers to achieving community goals and problems of piecemeal service delivery. NAS also maximizes the voice of community members particularly those which might otherwise be marginalized such as recent immigrants. Early community projects of the NAS program included neighbourhood beautification, community social events, street safety initiatives, youth engagement programs, and community advocacy work. In 2018 the NAS program was reimagined as a citywide community development program built around the goal of health equity (Cooper, Fletcher, & City of Hamilton, 2019). Many of the earlier Neighbourhood Action Plans had identified opportunities that could be extended beyond the local community such as the Neighbourhood Leader Institute, the youth employment and training centre Xperience Annex, and an urban farm project for reducing food security.
Evaluation
Baseline evaluation surveys were conducted in 2013/2014 in six of the NAS communities with 2-year follow-up surveys already completed in two communities and in progress in the remaining four as part of the Hamilton Neighbourhoods Study (NHS) at time of reporting in 2015 (McMullan, 2015).
Survey results concluded that although it will take many years to see the full impact of NAS, residents of participating communities generally reported more positive impressions of their communities in the 2-year follow-up surveys and fewer negative impressions. Residents who had completed the follow-up survey felt that there was more community engagement and better availability of information on community services. There was a greater feeling that their neighbourhood was a good place to raise children and overall neighbourhood satisfaction improved from an already high baseline of 79 percent. The perception of the presence of serious social problems such as drugs, vandalism, and sex work declined. However, respondents to the follow-up survey felt that economic opportunities remained poor at 75 percent.
Through an evaluation process which included in-depth participant interviews, observations at NAS meetings, and tracking progress of neighbourhood action plans, the Neighbourhood Action Evaluation (NAE) team identified three key themes regarding NAS (Wakefield, 2015). First, the NAS program improved relationships and culture within the City of Hamilton staff and between city staff and communities by building trust and increasing openness to new ideas, however some residents still felt their voices were not being heard. The second theme revolved around inclusion and equity and the evaluation concluded that there was still much work to do to support broader community engagement. The final theme was the acknowledgment by all stakeholders that CLD is a long-term commitment, and that the NAS program was an important piece on which to build lasting change.
As of 2015 the Neighbourhood Action Strategy had used $1.4 million from a city fund supporting community development to leverage $4.5 million in external funding for a 4:1 return of city investment (Frith, McMullan, & Brown, 2015).
The New Deal for Communities
The New Deal for Communities (NDC) program was an intensive, place-based initiative in England which ran from 2001–2010. It was designed with six broad objectives to transform 39 deprived communities (Batty, et al., 2010).
The objectives were: achieve holistic change in neighbourhoods with respect to place-related and people-related outcomes; close the poverty gap between participating communities and the rest of England; achieve transformation of neighbourhoods with value for money; strengthen working relationships with local delivery agencies and local government; focus on community centred initiatives; and ensure continuation of local improvements once funding ended. The three desired place-related outcomes were improved community engagement and capacity, reduced crime, and improved housing and physical environment. The three people-related outcomes were improved health, educational, and employment outcomes. 36 core indicators were used to measure neighbourhood change in the NDC areas across the three place-related and three people-related outcomes. The core indicators were benchmarked against local government changes, national averages and comparator areas which were not part of the NDC program.
The government funded each of the 39 NDC partnerships an average of £50 million for the implementation of local revitalization initiatives over the 10 year program for a total of £1.71 billion. An additional £730 million was leveraged from other public and private sources. Value for money of the NDC program was calculated using shadow pricing methods (Batty, et al., 2010). Central government and regional government offices established the broad framework for the NDC program, however the NDC partnerships maintained a degree of independence from the local parent authority and had some autonomy in delivery of local interventions as required by each neighbourhood. The NDC program centred around 39 NDC partnerships which each partnered with delivery agencies such as police, primary healthcare, schools as well as local government (parent local authorities) and local communities. NDC partnership boards included local residents, from the communities and representatives from partnering agencies. As program funding ended succession plans were put in place to replace government funding from other sources.
Evaluation
The NDC program was evaluated using 36 core indicators to measure changes on three place-based outcomes (crime, community, and housing and the physical environment) and three people-based outcomes (health, employment, and educational attainment) (Batty, et al., 2010). Changes in partnership communities were measured in four ways: over time (2002–2008); relative to changes in national averages; relative to changes in the Local Authority Districts (LADs); and relative to similar communities which did not have
the intervention. Overall findings indicated many areas of improvement in the 39 NDC partnership communities, however there were some indicators that showed no change/statistically not significant, and a few indicators that actually showed deterioration. More positive findings were observed for place-based outcomes than people-based outcomes. This was attributed to place-based changes becoming apparent more quickly, and place-based changes generally stay in the community compared to people who may choose to leave as their situation improves. Although there were mixed results for all six program outcomes, evidence found net positive changes for outcomes regarding crime, health, and housing and the physical environment; no statistical change for measures of employment; and negative net change for educational outcomes in the NDC communities. Findings also concluded that the NDC program achieved good value for money although the degree of benefit was difficult to ascertain. Furthermore, evidence indicates that the participating NDC communities generally succeeded in improving relationships with local delivery agencies and LADs which are seen as being an important part of improving long-term outcomes in disadvantaged communities. The evidence that the NDC program effectively engaged local communities is mixed. On the one hand the 39 partnerships “made immense efforts to engage residents and to enhance the capacity of the local community”, and the “partnerships ‘involved’ over 40 percent of residents” (Batty, et al., 2010, p. 32). On the other hand, only small numbers of residents were found to be directly involved in planning or decision-making functions. Furthermore, social capital indicators failed to show any significant change to suggest a sense of community empowerment. Overall, the final evaluation questioned the extent and type of community involvement that is desirable in such a program. Finally, regarding the sustainability of change in participating communities the results suggest that even a 10-year commitment may not be sufficient to achieve lasting change in communities, and uncertainty surrounds community succession strategies particularly in an austerity environment where replacement funding will be difficult to find.
Inspiring Communities/CommunityLed Development Program
Inspiring Communities was formed in 2008 as an independent non-profit community and voluntary sector organization to help support and strengthen CLD work already being done in Aotearoa, New Zealand. The Inspiring Com-
munities Trust lobbied the National Party government to fund a CLD pilot project based on the success of the Victory Village project. The first publicly funded CLD pilot project involving five communities ran from 2011–2015 and was then extended until 2016. Based on the success of the pilot project, in 2016 the Community-Led Development Program (CLDP) became a permanent program under the Department of Internal Affairs with a $4 million fund. The CLDP is a “multi-faceted programme and philosophy that seeks connection and positive change from the starting point of communities’ own aspirations” (Dovetail, 2022, p. 2) by using a CLD approach. Specifically, the CLDP acts as a catalyst for community change, seeks to strengthen community capacity, builds connections with other funding sources, and seeks to bridge disconnected communities (Dovetail, 2022). The CLDP has based its core principles on the work done by Inspiring Communities through the practical experiences of their ‘Core Learning Cluster’ communities. The five core principles identified from these learnings are: local vision must drive planning and action; build from local strengths; creativity and resources can be found when local people work together across sectors; grow local leadership capacity; and action based learning needs to be adaptive and run concurrently with reflection on outcomes (Bijoux, 2015; Dovetail, 2022).
The fundamental role of CLDP is providing communities with a variety of intensive advisory services, including community advisors and relationship managers employed by the government and a CLDP coordinator who is employed by the community partner. These resources are available over a five-year period and are intended to catalyze community-led change not in support of ongoing programs or service delivery (Dovetail, 2022). As of 2021 participating communities (approximately 20 communities depending on the year) had received on average $206,000 per year (Dovetail, 2022). The government requires each participating community to employ a fundholder who may or may not be part of the larger community governance structure to manage the money and employ any additional staff. Using a five-year funding envelope allows participating communities to move at their own pace, have access to funds quickly without a heavy administrative burden, or feeling that they are fighting for funds (Dovetail, 2022).
Evaluation
In 2022 a comprehensive evaluation of the CLDP was completed by an independent agency which was based on a documents analysis and a broad range of stakeholder interviews from each of the 18 then participating com-
munities (Dovetail, 2022). Participating communities were found to have different degrees of success with the program however, this was partly due to different starting points of communities as well as different start dates of their five-year program. Overall findings were that the CLDP was “a catalyst or springboard for change” (Dovetail, 2022, p. 11) in communities and the program was “strengthening community capacity to advocate for themselves and to be self-determining” (Dovetail, 2022, p. 11). The flexible five-year funding was found to be useful in that it acknowledged that communities began the program at different starting points regarding preparedness and advanced in projects at different speeds, however the fund holding system was found to be confusing and administered inconsistently between programs. CLD principles were found to provide good guidance and a community roadmap for change. The most successful communities applied CLD principles more consistently and internalized them to a greater degree which translated to an ability to better leverage CLDP resources including advisory services to move beyond individual projects to programs that led to permanent change. Local government co-ordinators who were skilled at providing advice and guidance without taking control of community initiatives were found to be key resources in the most successful communities. Coordinators also provided a valuable role for communities in relationship building between indigenous and non-indigenous groups and networking with other organizations including other funders (Dovetail, 2022).
Building Healthy Communities, California
Building Healthy Communities, California (BHC) was a comprehensive community initiative funded by The California Endowment which funded $1 billion over 10 years (2010–2020) to 14 underserved communities in California to improve a wide range of social determinants of health by using funds to leverage local resources and local knowledge (Rosen, O’Neill, & Hutson, 2022).
Evaluation
Case studies from two representative communities, Richmond and East Oakland were studied during the implementation phase. Baseline demographics taken in 2010 established that the two communities had similar backgrounds in terms of population, economic challenges, and history. Demographics along with participant observations and document analysis
were compared again in 2013 to determine differences in the progress of the implementation phase of the initiatives. Results showed that BHC had difficulty building trust in both communities and difficulty identifying community goals and priorities in the initial phase of the program. However, in Richmond the initiative coincided with local government plans to incorporate a broad citywide health and wellness program into the general city plan. Collaboration between the city and the funding foundation gave the BHC program access to better community outreach through the city which encouraged more grassroots engagement in the program. Also, the collaborative relationship meant that the BHC initiative was able to work with the city to shape government policy that was more supportive. In East Oakland, although there appeared to be alignment between the BHC initiative and local government, political leaders were found to be inconsistent in their support of the initiative making it difficult to implement strategies because key government decision makers were absent. Findings concluded that where political will is in alignment with CLD initiatives local government can act as an enabler even without direct funding by building community trust and awareness in programs and adjusting government policies to be more accommodating to initiatives. Therefore, initiatives will progress further if they focus on educating communities and local government and building relationships of trust with local governments, even if local governments are not involved in funding than communities such as East Oakland which lack consistent local government support.
Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program (NRP)
In the late 1980s signs of neighborhood decline prompted the city of Minneapolis to set aside $20 million/year from its Tax Increment revenue for the next 20 years (a total of $400 million) for a citywide physical revitalization program (NRPPrimer.Pdf, n.d.). The program officially ran in two 10-year phases beginning in 1991 and ending in 2011. All 81 city neighbourhoods self-selected into 1 of 3 categories: “Protection” neighborhoods that were fundamentally sound, more affluent neighborhoods; “Revitalization” neighborhoods that were generally middle class but beginning to show signs of decline; or “Redirection” neighborhoods which were the most impoverished and had already experienced significant decline (Holzer, 2017). The City then required each neighborhood to complete a lengthy (on average 3.2 years)
multi-step process beginning with the incorporation of a nonprofit neighbourhood association to act as a representative body for the neighborhood, next developing a Participation Agreement with the NRP office specifying how diverse members of the community would be consulted, then draft a plan based on input from extensive citizen participation obtained through a variety of methods of community outreach, followed by reviewing the plan at the neighborhood level, then submitting the plan to the city through the NRP office for funding approval, and finally implementing the plan (Fagotto & Fung, 2006). The City allocated funds for the program “using a formula based on neighborhood size, poverty level, and housing conditions that favored disadvantaged and declining neighborhoods” (Holzer, 2017, p. 4).
By empowering neighborhood residents to determine local priorities and help implement projects in collaboration with the city, the NRP program intended on capitalizing on the energy of local volunteers to revitalize their own neighborhoods (Fagotto & Fung, 2006). Other intended goals were to redesign public services, increase collaboration within and between government departments, and create a sense of community (NRPPrimer.Pdf, n.d.).
Evaluation
The NRP successfully revitalized many parts of the city infrastructure (Fagotto & Fung, 2006) and Minneapolis also experienced an increase in income and value of housing stock and commercial corridors compared to the control city of St. Paul over the same period (Holzer, 2017). The design of the NRP has been found to institutionalize the deliberative role of neighborhoods in community planning and there is a relationship of ‘accountable autonomy’ between the neighborhood associations and the City through the supervisory role played by the NRP office (Fagotto & Fung, 2006). Furthermore, supporters believe that neighborhood participation “created a civic infrastructure of vocal and engaged citizens’’ (Fagotto & Fung, 2006, p. 643).
The NRP was often criticized for only granting some residents a voice in determining how neighborhood funds would be spent (Fagotto & Fung, 2006; Filner, 2006). Fagotto and Fung (2006) found that volunteer work was indeed carried out largely by white homeowners while renters and minorities participated at much lower rates. Barriers to participation include resource constraints, particularly time, that fall more heavily on disadvantaged residents, cultural barriers including language, and the original design of the program being primarily for homeowners (Fagotto & Fung, 2006). However, it has also been found that “when programs address needs that
are important to disadvantaged residents, those residents often participate at high rates” (Fagotto & Fung, 2006, p. 646) which was indeed the case in redirection neighborhoods where participation increased sharply over the Phase I period even though there was a dominance of property owners over renters which in some neighborhoods has led to conflict between CDC’s which represent renters and low-income residents, and NRP associations that largely represent homeowners (Fagotto & Fung, 2006; Filner, 2006).
Although Holzer (2017) found that the NRP program was unable to “accomplish citywide goals such as affordable housing”, Fagotto and Fung found that the NRP actual was able to “deliver benefits of a much more general, even redistributive nature” (Fagotto & Fung, 2006, p. 647), with more disadvantaged neighborhoods receiving more funding and choosing to concentrate on affordable housing, rent subsidies, and housing for the homeless than wealthier neighborhoods which received less funding and concentrated on amenities. Fagotto and Fung (2006) also found that since the NRP distributed funds to all neighborhoods it increased legitimacy for the program and created a wide constituency and that overall the NRP provided resources, support and authority which contributed to the creation of strong neighborhood organizations even if some operated more effectively because of access to greater volunteer resources (Fagotto & Fung, 2006, p. 651).
Another finding was that City Hall departments did not receive clear direction for working with neighborhood associations (Fagotto & Fung, 2006), and the NRP initiative did not change the way business was done at City Hall (Nathanson, 2014). Filner found that due to structural limitations of the program there was no increase in government agency collaboration, redesign of public services or sense of community (Filner, 2006, p. 75).
