Dr. Robert Lloyd Executive Director, LeMieux Center for Public Policy, Loreen Beisswenger Farish Chair for Political Thought, Dean, School of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Palm Beach Atlantic University
On October 7, 2023, hundreds of armed men breached the border between Palestinian-controlled Gaza and neighboring Israel. The militants systematically murdered men, women, and children in areas adjacent to Gaza. The scale, brazenness, and brutality of the attacks were shocking. It was the deadliest attack on Jews since the Holocaust. Scores of Israelis were taken hostage and transported back to Gaza.
Those responsible were supporters of Hamas, an acronym for the Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya or Islamic Resistance Movement. Hamas has governed the Gaza Strip since 2007, following Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the territory. This provided a further opportunity to advance
the two-state solution envisioned in the 1993 Oslo Accords. Hamas, however, strongly opposes a negotiated settlement that recognizes Israel and supports an armed struggle to defeat the Jewish state. This stance has led to periodic fighting between Hamas and Israel, culminating in the October 7 attacks.
The Hamas attacks were a complete and total surprise to Israeli defense and intelligence agencies. Civilians living near the border had to defend themselves the best they could. Israeli forces were then mobilized, and Hamas militants were killed and driven back to Gaza. Psychologically, Israelis were stunned by the enormity of the attacks and Israel’s failure to prevent them. This stance would underlie the Israeli response throughout the coming war, bringing sudden unity to a politically divided Israel. Within days, Israel mobilized for war in Gaza.
Israeli forces launched a strong attack on Gaza on October 27. Israeli military aims were, in the words of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the “destruction of Hamas’s military and governing capabilities; and returning the hostages home.” Gaza, a densely populated urban area with underground tunnels, posed risks to Israeli soldiers and led to increased Palestinian casualties. Israel sealed off the Gaza Strip, and then systematically concentrated its efforts on securing Gaza City in the north of the Strip. Israel then moved its forces towards Khan Younis, the second largest city, in the south. Hamas militants fought Israel in these campaigns, taking refuge among displaced civilians in Rafah, near Gaza’s southern border with Egypt.
Israel recognized that there was a limited timeframe for military action before international pressure mounted for a ceasefire, potentially hindering Israel’s stated military objectives. Given the growing international and domestic pressure to end the war short of Israeli stated goals, the response of the United States, Israel’s key ally, was always crucial. Despite the pressure, the Biden Administration did indeed provide political, diplomatic, financial, and military support for Israel. Early in the conflict, the administration deployed the Navy’s largest carrier, the Gerald R. Ford, to the eastern Mediterranean, signaling its support for Israel and regional security.
Internationally, most of the United Nations member states sought to end the conflict to curtail Palestinian civilian casualties. From Israel’s perspective, this would also preclude the destruction of Hamas. On October 27, 2023, the United Nations General
Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of a non-binding resolution calling for a “humanitarian truce” between Israel and Hamas. However, on December 8, the United States vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that proposed a “ceasefire” between Israel and Hamas. In response, on December 23, the United Nations General Assembly passed a stronger non-binding resolution demanding an “immediate humanitarian ceasefire” between Israel and Hamas. Approaching the issue legally, South Africa presented its case to the International Court of Justice on January 11, 2024. The court, a legal body in the UN that hears disputes between member states, heard South Africa’s argument that Israel had contravened the genocide convention through a “pattern of genocidal conduct.” On January 26, the court did not grant South Africa’s request for a permanent ceasefire but ruled that Israel must take steps to ensure the protection of Palestinians in the conflict.
The administration also faced strong domestic opposition from major elements of its political coalition, whose sympathies lay with the Palestinians. To varying degrees, they categorized Israel as an apartheid state and an example of racist settler-colonialism, criticized its treatment towards Palestinians, denounced civilian casualties in Gaza, and accused it of genocide. Antisemitic rhetoric and demonstrations on American campuses raised concerns about the safety of Jewish American students. Both the presidents of Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania resigned due to public outrage over their unwillingness to forthrightly condemn antisemitism. American policy aimed to placate domestic and international opposition to Israel by encouraging humanitarian ceasefires, facilitating
the delivery of food and water to displaced civilians in Gaza, sanctioning some Jewish settlers in the West Bank, and expressing growing unease over civilian casualties. American support for Israel, which traditionally had been bipartisan, showed increasing signs of a partisan split between Republicans and Democrats.
The violence in Gaza soon spread far beyond the tiny strip of territory, amplifying simmering disputes in the Middle East. For years, Iran had threatened to destroy the Great Satan (United States) and the Little Satan (Israel) to gain geopolitical prominence in the region. Iran became a key supplier of arms and political support to both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, with both groups launching rockets and shells into Israel. Iran also supported militant Islamist groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, which attacked the United States and other countries. Both Israel and the United States responded with military attacks in different places and at different times. The conflict in Gaza also put political pressure on Jordan and Egypt to push back against Israel diplomatically. It delayed Saudi Arabia from formally becoming a signatory to the recent Abraham Accords, which had led to diplomatic recognition of Israel by four Arab countries. The potential for a political miscalculation leading to a regional war increased.
The Gaza war will eventually end. Yet October 7 will have longstanding repercussions. First, Hamas attacks on innocent civilians paradoxically fueled increasing antisemitism and anti-Zionism worldwide, as Israel sought to hold those responsible for the attacks and secure the release of Israeli hostages held in Gaza. Opponents argue that Israel is the aggressor due to its racist policies and
genocidal actions against oppressed Palestinian civilians. This is a big gap to bridge politically and diplomatically. Second, the 1993 Oslo Accords, which envisioned a two-state solution, almost certainly died alongside the Israeli civilians on October 7. It is hard to envision a scenario in which Israelis trust Palestinians to address Israeli security needs. Palestinians, on their part, are outraged by the attacks on civilian targets in Gaza. Furthermore, polls of Palestinian opinion revealed widespread public support for the October 7 attacks. Third, the reputation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has been damaged as evidence emerged of UNRWA locations being used by Hamas and some employees participating in the attacks. Finally, bipartisan support for Israel within the United States is fading. The rising progressive wing of the Democratic Party shows greater sympathy with the plight of the Palestinians. This shift is causing major reassessments among Jewish Americans, who traditionally identified with progressive policies and have been part of the Democratic coalition.
These developments, though concerning, must be viewed in context. There has been an increase in Arab diplomatic support for Israel, bipartisan opposition to Iran the troublemaker in America, a continued strong backing of Israel by the United States, and forceful public denunciations of antisemitic statements and actions worldwide. While the spirit of Oslo may indeed be dead, it remains imperative to find a way to address the security needs of the Jewish state and the national aspirations of Palestinians. This will be the task for political leaders “the day after” the war ends.
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Dr. Robert Lloyd, Executive Director, LeMieux Center for Public Policy, Loreen Beisswenger Farish Chair for Political Thought, Dean, School of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Palm Beach Atlantic University
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