Assessing the Impact of Competition Authorities’ Activities - Presentation by John Kwoka

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Assessing the Likely Impact of Competition Policy Actions

OECD Competition Committee

Paris 16 June 2025

Overview of competitive assessments

• Knowledge of likely impact of competition policy action is useful policy tool

• Useful in evaluating agency effectiveness, often by external authority

• Useful to agency itself for improving internal resource allocation

• Experience has confirmed usefulness of these assessments

• Systematic assessments of likely impact generally rely on information from past experience

• Amount of existing evidence varies by antitrust offense

• For cartels, vast amount of data from past experiences

• For abuse of dominance, little systematic evidence

• Evidence regarding mergers lies in between

The issues: Methodology and substance

• Studies in all three areas face similar methodological issues

• Number of observations

• Statistical reliability

• Possible selection/bias/distortion

• Risk of undue focus on what is measurable

• Further substantive issues

• Nature of harm (price vs nonprice)

• Short vs longer term effects

• Non-economic effects

The case of mergers

• Merger studies confront all these issues

• Ideal body of evidence would be studies of a large random samples of “policy-relevant mergers” that measure several important outcomes

• In reality, largest body of evidence comes from merger retrospectives

• These are before-and-after studies of effects: Difference-in-differences

• Isolate merger effects by controlling for other factors possibly causing observed effects

Merger retrospectives and meta-analyses

• Merger retrospectives are now common but they have limitations

• Not necessarily random

• Tend to focus on one or two measurable effects, especially price

• Most examine one merger at a time

• To capture the collective implication of this body of evidence, best technique is a meta-analysis of retrospectives

• Meta-analysis compiles and synthesizes results of multiple studies

• Uses common format, permitting summary statistics across all studies

• My meta-analysis from 2015 appears still to be as large and robust as any

• That study compiled all published U.S. merger retrospectives

• 60 published studies covered 42 distinct mergers in 20 industries

Findings of studies

• Key analysis reported that prices rose in more than 80% of studied mergers

• Overall average price rise was 7.2 %

• Among those 80 %, average price rise was 9.5%, ranging up to 29.4%

• Confirmed by my second meta-analysis of studies of multiple mergers

• Collectively covered thousands of mergers and reported similar effects

• Results further confirmed by later studies cited in Background Note:

• Olsen et al report effects on large number of mergers (not all at enforcement margin) between 5% and 7%

• Ashenfelter-Weinberg study of 5 mergers finds 3-7% price rise

• Two studies of consumer/package goods show smaller effects, but these are all mergers, not just policy-relevant ones

Closer look at evidence: First result

• Overall, best evidence is that price effects of “policy-relevant mergers” average between 3% and 7%

• This comes from hundreds of studies and thousands of mergers, conducted by numerous researchers

• These are after controlling for other possible causes

• This is first important result

Closer look at evidence: First result

• Overall, best evidence is that price effects of “policy-relevant mergers” average between 3% and 7%

• This comes from hundreds of studies and thousands of mergers, conducted by numerous researchers

• These are after controlling for other possible causes

• This is first important result

• But the same average can arise from different patterns of actual data

Further look at evidence: Second result

• Second important result concerns this possible variation in outcomes

• If all measured effects are near average, that single number is sufficient

• But if data indicate a wider range of effects, the use of simple average for all cases will make mistakes that can be costly

• My study found substantial variation

• Estimates of price increases range between 0.7% to 29.4%

• Outcomes include some price decreases, as large as 4.9%

• Similarly wide range of effects are reported in other studies

• Possible policy measures to address this variation

• Median of data may be better than mean since it captures “typical” case

• Could use lower quartile to ensure “conservative” estimate, although in this context “conservative” means explicit underestimating

• Or could use different metrics depending on industry, characteristics

• Mean vs median:

• My study found average price increase of 9.5% but median was 5.9%

• Lowest quartile

• In my study, this was 3.5%, below both mean and median

• Different measures according to characteristics known to affect magnitude

• By industry:

• Olsen finds largest price distortion in healthcare, airlines

• My study found largest distortion in hospitals, publishing, airlines

• Thus, for such mergers, policy might consider larger percent

• By characteristics:

• Largest price effects arise in the most concentrated industries

• Effects most pronounced where entry barriers are high/moderate

• Thus, for mergers in high concentration industries, one could use larger percent, and even greater where barriers are high/moderate

Third result and conclusions

• Third result is the important reminder that price distortions are only one aspect of competitive effects of mergers

• Adverse effects on quality

• Innovation effects, especially over time

• Many fewer studies of these other effects

• They are more difficult to measure, or subject to significant lags in their outcomes

• Recommendations

• Conduct more merger retrospectives

• Greater focus on nonprice outcomes

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