NZIRVol50No3MayJun2025

NEW ZEALAND INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

WHARE TAWĀHI-A-MAHI I AOTEAROA

The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (NZIIA) – Whare Tawāhi-a-mahi i Aotearoa is an independent non-governmental organisation that fosters expert discussion and understanding of international issues and emerging trends, particularly as they relate to New Zealand.

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NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL

REVIEW

2 Celebrating a 50-year link

James Kember notes a major milestone in New Zealand’s diplomatic relationship with Vietnam.

7 Charting closer ties

Christopher Luxon proposes a more ambitious approach to broadening the India–New Zealand relationship.

11 War of words: China’s role in the Pacific

Matthew Doidge and Serena Kelly discover a significant shift in the shape of media reporting on China.

15 Sharing intelligence insights

Andrew Hampton outlines what the Security Intelligence Service does to protect New Zealand and its work in our region.

19 Racing to tackle the climate crisis

Harinder Sidhu discusses Australia’s big green economic transition.

22 CONFERENCE REPORT

Environmental diplomacy

Angus Middleton reports on a symposium held at Zealandia, Karori in March.

26 ANNIVERSARY

Exiting Saigon

Ian McGibbon recalls a unique event in New Zealand’s diplomatic history 50 years ago.

28 BOOKS

Jim Rolfe: Prudence, Pragmatism and Principle, New Zealand’s Security in the 21st Century (Peter Grace).

Jennifer Curtin, Lara Greaves and Jack Vowles (eds): A Team of Five Million? The 2020 ‘Covid-19’ New Zealand General Election (Brian Easton)

Jack Vowles and Jennifer Curtin (eds): A Populist Exception? The 2017 New Zealand General Election (Brian Easton).

Stephen Hoadley (ed): Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy, Volume Four (Andrew Wierzbicki).

Michael A. Genovese, Todd L. Belt and William M. Lammers: The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Comparing Leadership styles, FDR to Biden (Angus Middleton).

32 INSTITUTE NOTES

Managing Editor: IAN McGIBBON

Corresponding Editor: STEPHEN HOADLEY (Auckland)

Book Review Editor: ANTHONY SMITH

EditoriaI Committee: ANDREW WIERZBICKI (Chair), PAUL BELLAMY, BOB BUNCH, SASKIA GRANT, GERALD McGHIE, MALCOLM McKINNON, ANGUS MIDDLETON, ROB RABEL

Publisher: NEW ZEALAND INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Typesetting/Layout: SEA STAR

DESIGN

Printing: PIVOTAL+THAMES

New Zealand International Review is the bi-monthly publication of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (ISSN0110-0262, print: ISSN2230-5939, online)

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The views expressed in New Zealand International Review are entirely those of the authors and do not reflect those of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, which is an independent non-governmental organisation fostering discussion and understanding of international affairs, and especially New Zealand’s involvement in them. By permission of the authors the copyright of all articles appearing in New Zealand International Review is held by the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. May/Jun 2025 |

Celebrating a 50-year link

James Kember notes a major milestone in New Zealand’s diplomatic relationship with Vietnam.

While many of the political and security imperatives identified in the 1970s for New Zealand to develop a strong relationship with Vietnam resonate today, it has taken time to adjust to the realities of the rapid economic rise of the world’s sixteenth most populous nation. On the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations, Vietnam is now New Zealand’s fourteenth largest trading partner and an acknowledged key partner in regional security. There have been challenges along the way, but various assessments from earlier decades that New Zealand should stay alert to the potential opportunities in this relationship are as valid now as when first made.

‘Vietnam has become the most important country in IndoChina with the capacity to exert a major influence on the future course of events in South-east Asia’ (Bill Rowling, 1975)

‘Viet Nam is a rising star of Southeast Asia with one of the fastest growing economies in the region’ (Christopher Luxon, 2025)

Two prime ministerial statements bookend five decades of diplomatic relations between New Zealand and Vietnam. Perhaps not surprisingly the first, by Prime Minister Bill Rowling, on 26 June 1975, in announcing the establishment of relations with the then Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), took account of the political change in South-east Asia and the need for New Zealand to ‘be in a position to speak directly to the authorities in Hanoi’.1 Indeed, only a few days earlier, Rowling had spoken at the NZIIA’s annual conference about the need to work with the countries of Indo-China ‘for the wider framework of political and economic consultation which lies at the heart of this Government’s regional foreign policy’.²

Dr James Kember is chair of the NZIIA’s Board and previously chair of its Research and Publications Committee. During the course of over 40 years as a New Zealand diplomat, he served as ambassador to Vietnam in 2006–09.

The second, with a clear economic focus, was from Prime Minister Christopher Luxon on the eve of his February 2025 visit to Vietnam and just ahead of the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh in Hanoi.³ That development made New Zealand only the tenth country with which Vietnam had signed such an arrangement. It brought to mind a remark made during the author’s farewell call on then President Nguyen Minh Triet in August 2009, two years after his own visit to New Zealand. The president remarked that Vietnam was a country with ‘friends and good friends’ — and for him New Zealand was firmly in the latter camp.⁴

The path from one to the other has not been straightforward. Although New Zealand had recognised the DRV in September 1973, its unwillingness to follow DRV prompts to recognise its partner provisional government (PRG) in South Vietnam delayed the establishment of diplomatic relations until the overthrow in 1975 of the Republic of Vietnam government based in Saigon.

p Christopher Luxon with his Vietnamese counterpart Pham Minh Chinh in February

But in those intervening years, there were a series of contacts between the New Zealand and DRV ambassadors in Beijing. On one occasion, Ambassador Bryce Harland reminded his counterpart Nguyen Trong Vinh that one of the first actions of the Labour government, elected at the end of 1972, had been to withdraw its remaining troops in South Vietnam and increase aid in Indo-China. It was ready to extend that assistance to the DRV if desired. Indeed, as Harland commented, some assistance had been provided in the north via international channels and the only assistance in the south was in the humanitarian field.⁵ (The civilian surgical unit in the southern province of Binh Dinh, established in 1963, continued operating until 1975.)

Clear rationale

With the fall of Saigon in April 1975, New Zealand formally recognised the PRG in Saigon (later re-named as Ho Chi Minh City). In June of that year, following advice from Prime Minister Rowling (who was also foreign minister), the Cabinet agreed to open formal diplomatic relations with the DRV in Hanoi, and took note of the emergence of two new governments in Saigon and Cambodia. The rationale was clear: reconciliation in Indo-China and the need for the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries to live with one another made the case compelling; and relations with Hanoi would ‘also help ensure that an identifiable New Zealand contribution is made to the longerterm reconstruction of Indo-China’.6 In announcing the move on 26 June, the prime minister repeated some of the points about the importance of North Vietnam to the region and added that a communiqué to such effect had been signed by the two countries’ ambassadors in Beijing. Rowling said that at a later date it could prove desirable to open a diplomatic mission in Hanoi but for the moment the relationship would be managed through accreditation of the New Zealand’s ambassador in Beijing, Harland.7

Harland presented his credentials to the vice-president of the DRV, Nguyen Luong Bang, on 14 October. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review reported that the two had had a brief conversation in which they agreed the past was over and the two countries now had to focus on developing good relations for the future. In separate discussions with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, possible assistance in the agricultural sector was canvassed, two-thirds of the country’s work force then being employed in agriculture and related light industries.8

Official Release, 26 June 1975

Establishment of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam

The Prime Minister, Mr Rowling, announced today that the Ambassador in Peking [Beijing], Mr W.B. Harland, and the Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)* there, had signed a joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Mr Rowling recalled that when New Zealand had recognised the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in September 1973, the Government had indicated that it would in due course wish to consider the possibility of accrediting a representative to Hanoi.

“North Vietnam has become the most important country in Indo-China,” Mr Rowling said, “with the capacity to exert a major influence on the future course of events in South-east Asia. It is essential, therefore, that the Government should be in a position to speak directly to the authorities in Hanoi, so that we can be in touch with their thinking and be able to express New Zealand’s own viewpoint on matters of common interest.”

The Prime Minister noted that the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam would also enable New Zealand to contribute more effectively to the task of reconstruction and development in the region.

Mr Rowling said that at a later date it could well prove desirable for New Zealand to open a diplomatic mission in Hanoi, but as a first step the Government proposed to accredit to Hanoi the New Zealand Ambassador resident in Peking.

The joint communiqué: Desirous of developing friendly relations between their two countries, the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have decided to establish diplomatic relations at the Ambassadorial level as from 26 June 1975.

[*On 2 July 1976 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was replaced by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam after the formal unification of North and South Vietnam.]

Bryce Harland and the North Vietnamese ambassador to China, Nguyen Trong Vinh, sign the Agreement to Establish Diplomatic Relations in Beijing on 26 June 1975, with New Zealand embassy staff Chris Elder, Gerry Cheyne (trade commissioner) and John Brady watching behind

Christopher Luxon and Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh on the dias at a welcome ceremony at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi on 26 February

In marked contradistinction to how a proposal might be made in more recent years for the opening of a new embassy around trade opportunities, the case for Hanoi was purely the profound power shifts in Indo-China and the fact that the consequences would surely be felt beyond the immediate region. Brian Lynch, then head of the Asian Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, drew attention to a forcible and rapid re-casting of geography and the transformed balance of power. Indo-China, unlike the (then) five countries of ASEAN, he said, had not been an area of uppermost concern, even with the past military involvement. A lengthy period of conciliation and adjustment lay ahead and New Zealand had to be able to speak directly with governments, and to assess their views and policies.⁹

The following year, with the reunification of Vietnam and formation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the two governments confirmed that the arrangements entered into the previous year (under a different New Zealand administration and while there were governments in both Hanoi and Saigon) remained in force.10 In mid-1978, with the opening of a Vietnamese embassy in Canberra, the first resident ambassador was accredited to New Zealand.

Early policy

As noted by Lynch, the policy of the early years was aimed at encouraging Vietnam’s participation in regional and international affairs, thereby reducing distrust and regional tensions, and in part helping constrain the involvement of the Soviet Union. Even if the early years of the relationship were not substantial, New Zealand did back Vietnam’s membership of the Asian Development Bank and, more importantly, its membership of the United Nations on 20 September 1977. While it also joined the World Health Organisation in 1976 and the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1981, Vietnam’s participation in major regional and international organisations remained relatively limited even throughout the 1980s.11

During this period, there were a couple of visits to New Zealand by deputy ministers (foreign affairs and agriculture), but none by New Zealand ministers to Vietnam. Ministers occasionally met in the margins of meetings of the UN General Assembly. There were a few visits by members of Parliament, following in the steps of then first-term MP (and later foreign minister) Russell Marshall, who visited both Hanoi and Saigon in 1975 shortly before the fall of South Vietnam; after witnessing a shooting in the latter, he described it as ‘a frightening place’.12

Even ten years after relations were established, the formal connections were limited. This was due in large measure to Vietnam’s 1978 occupation of Cambodia, which ended only in 1990. At one point, in 1986, Trade Minister Mike Moore considered visiting, only to be told that there were no substantial trade opportunities and that, moreover, a visit would not be seen positively by others. Indeed, in 1988, New Zealand’s exports to Vietnam had fallen to a paltry $150,000.13 Vietnam’s lack of hard currency was a major constraint. An aid programme was an early starter, seen as an investment in the future of New Zealand’s trade prospects. In addition to commodity aid and technical assistance to the dairy industry, training awards were made for students to study English at Victoria University of Wellington. Project assistance was cut following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978, although the small training programme continued for a while.

This somewhat desultory state of affairs saw its end with Vietnam’s decision, foreshadowed earlier but announced in 1989, that it would withdraw its troops from Cambodia by 1990.

Anticipating this, some new approaches were developed and included in a paper approved by Foreign Minister Marshall in July 1988. Noting the potential for Vietnam to become a leading political and economic force in the region, the paper drew attention to the fact that New Zealand’s policy of limited contacts was actually quite severe compared with those of some of the ASEAN countries and of Australia. It referred to an earlier review process having been mooted but abandoned in 1984, to avoid exacerbating New Zealand’s own difficulties with the United States over ANZUS.

Limited prospects

The policy paper did caution against expecting too much from a change in posture, given limited trade prospects and the parlous state of Vietnam’s financial position. It recommended a return to a small humanitarian programme, more diplomatic engagement (that had been switched from Beijing to Bangkok in 1979) and some invitations for an inward trade mission and ministerial visit.14 The trade mission came in mid-1989, and Marshall made an official visit to Hanoi later in the year. It was the beginning of a welcome expansion in two-way trade. From less than $500,000 in 1975, it reached $40 million ($36 million of which were New Zealand exports) by the time of the twentieth anniversary of diplomatic relations in 1995. Significantly, 1995 was also the year in which Vietnam became the seventh full member of ASEAN, established formal relations with the United States and concluded a framework agreement with the European Union.

The pace quickened markedly in the 1990s. The New Zealand visit of Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet in 1993 and one the following year by Foreign Minister Don McKinnon to Hanoi marked the beginning of regular exchanges, increased New Zealand assistance and encouraged more substantial trade. When he announced the formation of the Asia 2000 Foundation (now Asia New Zealand Foundation) in January 1994, McKinnon spoke of the ‘drive into Asia’, monitoring the growth of markets such as Vietnam, and foreshadowed the establishment of a resident embassy in Hanoi.15 A Vietnam–New Zealand Business Council had been established in 1993 and held its inaugural meeting in Hanoi in March 1994. A bilateral trade agreement

Ambassador James Kember with President Nguyen Minh Triet in August 2009

was signed during the McKinnon visit to Hanoi, and a small number of New Zealand companies opened representative offices.

With this growth in mind, some thought was given in Wellington to appointing an honorary consul in Ho Chi Minh City.16 However, in recognition of the potential for more substantial exchange, a full official trade office was established from 1996.

A New Zealand embassy had already opened in Hanoi in 1995, David Kersey presenting credentials as the first resident ambassador on 23 August that year. (Vietnam appointed its first resident ambassador to New Zealand in 2003). The high-level visits continued, with Prime Minister Helen Clark in Vietnam in 2003 (and also for APEC in 2006), and Governor-General Dame Silvia Cartright in late 2005. Prime Minister Phan Van Khai visited New Zealand that same year. President Nguyen Minh Triet followed in 2007 and Party Secretary Nong Duc Manh in 2009.17

Growing trade

By the time of the 30th anniversary in 2005, New Zealand exports were in the order of $155 million (of which two-thirds were dairy products). Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade Simon Murdoch commented in a letter in mid-2006 that Vietnam more than ever required New Zealand attention and was likely to be the next ‘Asian tiger’. It was essential, he added, for New Zealand to be alert to increasing competition from other countries for the attention of the Vietnamese government — and that in turn required hard work on New Zealand’s part. He made the additional observation that the English Language Training for Officials programme continued to deliver significant longterm benefits to New Zealand as those former students gained seniority in the government system.18

Vietnam joined the World Trade Organisation in early 2007,

a signal of its full participation in the global trading environment. Bilaterally, two-way trade continued to flourish, doubling from 2015 to 2020 and reaching $2 billion. By 2024, that figure had extended to $2.7 billion, and Vietnam became New Zealand’s fourteenth largest trading partner.19 A far cry from some of the prognostications of earlier decades.

While trade is a critical factor in the deepening of bilateral relations, which have enjoyed names such as Comprehensive Partnership (2009), Strategic Partnership (2020) and now Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2025), it can be argued that they are all part of a continuum of building the best and strongest links with a country long identified as a heavyweight regional player. New Zealand clearly identifies its future security and prosperity being linked to the success of ASEAN and its members.20

Trade and education have long been at the heart of the relationship. With Vietnam’s young population, global connectivity and rapid economic growth that would have it as one of the top twenty economies within the next 25 years, those earlier views from the beginning of the relationship are eerily prescient.

Educational focus

Education was very much the focus of the remarks made to a NZIIA meeting on 4 February this year by Deputy Foreign Minister Do Hung Viet. Fortuitously, it took place on the premises of Victoria University of Wellington, one of the institutions with a longstanding engagement with Vietnam. In outlining his country’s foreign policy priorities, the pivotal role of ASEAN and the role of the Asia–Pacific region as the principal engine of growth, Viet drew attention to the shared interests and warmth of personal engagement that underpinned the bilateral relationship. Acknowledging the value his country had obtained from having students in New Zealand over the course of many years,21 as

Chief of Defence Lieutenant-General (later Sir) Jerry Mateparae made an official visit to Vietnam in August 2008; New Zealand's defence attaché to Vietnam, Colonel Kevin Burnett, is beside him

well as the involvement of several New Zealand institutions with degree programmes in Vietnam, the deputy minister offered some thoughts on how this might now be taken to a higher level.

In a bow to his country’s own rapid economic development, Viet suggested that educational exchanges might be enhanced through developing an ASEAN Centre of Excellence, that could focus on fields such as high-tech. He also advocated for the establishment of permanent institutional linkages and training programmes and more work on an emerging leadership programme with the venue alternating between the two countries. Without in any way dismissing the value of programmes currently — and previously — followed by Vietnamese students, Viet was gently pointing to the importance of the educational focus moving in step with his country’s own more sophisticated economy.

Vietnam has also paid considerable attention to regional security and its obligations as an international citizen. Through two recent terms on the UN Security Council, participation in UN peacekeeping missions and work on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, it has demonstrated its commitment to regional and global security.22 New Zealand has been a longstanding partner in defence co-operation, through training, regular ship visits and two-way visits of personnel. Vietnam’s location makes it a critical partner in a region facing geopolitical tension. During their exchanges earlier this year in Hanoi, both prime ministers drew attention to the priority of commitment to regional security in response to military expansion.23

Thriving linkages

Important as all the official connections are, and will continue to be, there is now a thriving world of non-governmental, educational, cultural and informal linkages. In part this is due to the impact of tourism in both directions, and the growing number of New Zealanders and Vietnamese living and working in each

other’s country. The involvement of non-government organisations in Vietnam is also of long standing. As the Vietnamese economy grows, the nature of assistance will change. But the foundations laid over decades will surely be beneficial as Vietnam, the world’s sixteenth most populous country, due to reach upper middle-income country status in the next few years, takes its place as the economic and strategic partner that was part of the vision 50 years ago.

NOTES

1. NZ Foreign Affairs Review, Jun 1975.

2. Dunedin, 17 May 1975.

3. www.beehive.govt.nz/release/economic-growth-focus-pm’s-visitviet-nam.

4. Noted in author’s valedictory report to Foreign Minister Winston Peters, 24 Aug 2009.

5. Record of meeting, 30 Dec 1974, attached to memo from Bryce Harland, 31 Dec 1974, External Affairs Records, PM58/521/1, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), R22476592.

6. Memorandum for Cabinet 13 Jun 1975, PM58/521/1, ANZ, R22476592. Rowling noted he had cleared the proposal orally and the ministry should proceed.

7. Press statement, 26 Jun 1975.

8. NZ Foreign Affairs Review, Oct 1975.

9. Ibid., Jul 1975.

10. Minister of State and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Sir Keith Holyoake to Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, 5 Aug 1976, PM 58/521/1, ANZ, R22476593.

11. James Kember, ‘Vietnam — New Zealand Cooperation in Multilateral Institutions’, in International Studies (Nghien cu’u Quoc Te), no 2 (73), Jun 2008. Viet Nam joined APEC in 1998 and hosted it for the first time in 2006, and again in 2017.

12. Ian McGibbon, ‘Hon Cedric Russell Marshall CNZM’, obituary, NZ International Review, vol 50, no 2 (2025).

13. Roberto Rabel in Anthony Smith (ed), Southeast Asia and New Zealand (Singapore, 2005), pp.369, 385.

14. ‘Vietnam Policy’, Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 Jun 1988, PM 58/521/1, MFAT. The switch of responsibility for Vietnam to the New Zealand embassy in Bangkok was for practical reasons, relating to the increased workload in Beijing. It also followed in the wake of the brief Sino-Vietnamese War in February–March 1979.

15. Speech to Rotary Club of Auckland, 24 Jan 1994, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Bulletin, Dec 1993/Jan 1994.

16. Report from New Zealand Ambassador in Bangkok, 11 Feb 1994, PM58/521/1, MFAT.

17. Among subsequent visits have been those of the two prime ministers John Key and Nguyen Tan Dung in 2015 and most recently Pham Minh Chinh’s visit in 2025. President Triet’s visit was memorable not only for the business transacted but also for a boat ride up the Waimakariri River in which his offer to take the wheel was politely declined by this author and accompanying staff on health and safety grounds.

18. Letter to author, Jul 2006. Vietnam’s first resident ambassador, Tran Hai Hau, had himself been one of those students.

19. Viet Nam & New Zealand at 50: The Next Chapter, Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2025.

20. Press release by Prime Minister Luxon, 20 Feb 2025 (see above note 3).

21. Students, especially in English language, have been part of the relationship from the outset: the first five came in 1977. In 2023, there were over 1700 students here, making Vietnam the ninth largest source market for international students. Viet Nam & New Zealand at 50 (see above note 19).

22. Vietnam Ministry of National Defence, 2019 Viet Nam National Defence (Hanoi, 2019).

23. www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/543114/new-zealand-and-vietnamsign-comprehensive-strategic-partnership.

Deputy Foreign Minister Do Hung Viet addresses the NZIIA in Wellington on 4 February

ICM

Charting closer ties

Christopher Luxon proposes a more ambitious approach to broadening the India–New Zealand relationship.

The Raisina Dialogue is a forum that provides a moment every year for thought-leaders from across the world to focus their collective minds on the contemporary strategic challenges being navigated in the Indian Ocean. Under the direction of Dr Jaishankar and Samir Saran over the past ten years, it has grown into a hugely influential forum, attracting six former heads of government and ministers from over 30 countries in 2025. A keynote speaker, Christopher Luxon stressed the longstanding links between India and New Zealand and espoused a vision for closer contact in future to meet growing economic and security challenges.

It is more than 200 years since Indians and New Zealanders first began living side-by-side. At the beginning of the 19th century — well before we became a nation — Indian sailors jumped ship in New Zealand, with some meeting locals and marrying into our indigenous Māori tribes. A few years later, Māori traders began travelling to Kolkata to sell tree trunks used in sailing ships. An exchange that echoes down the ages.

Just as they were 200 years ago, Kiwi–Indians today are fully integrated into our multicultural society. New Zealanders of Indian heritage comprise 11 per cent of the people living in Auckland, our biggest city. I have brought with me to New Delhi a selection of Kiwi–Indian community leaders: members of Parliament, captains of industry, professional cricketers and even an online influencer who has revolutionised investment for women the world over. In short, a selection of Kiwi–Indians who get up every single morning to make New Zealand a better place to live. And our trade has diversified considerably from wood thanks to the increased sophistication of your economy. India today is a critical source of pharmaceuticals and machinery for us. While we are a great tourism and education destination for you.

India has become an ever more significant feature of our society. And yet, while there has been much that has developed and changed, there has been something missing at the core of our relationship. With a country as consequential as India, we need rich political interaction, engaged militaries, strong economic architecture and connections that support a diaspora that bridges between our two great nations.

Rt Hon Christopher Luxon MP is the prime minister of New Zealand. This article is the edited text of part of an address he gave at the opening of the Raisina Dialogue 2025: Kālachakria — People, Peace and Planet in New Delhi on 17 March.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and I met on 17 March and charted out the future of our two countries’ relationship — a future that builds from where we have been. One that is wholly more ambitious about what we will do together in the future.

l We agreed to our defence forces building greater strategic trust with one another, while deploying together and training together more.

l We want our scientists collaborating on global challenges like climate change and on commercial opportunities like space.

l We are supporting our businesses to improve air links and

p Christopher Luxon addresses the Raisina Dialogue

build primary sector co-operation.

l We will facilitate students, young professionals and tourists to move between our countries.

l And we have instructed our trade negotiators to get on and negotiate a free trade agreement between our two great nations.

A comprehensive agenda to underpin a comprehensive relationship. As we look to the future, the opportunity for both our governments is to sustain that momentum. Not only to follow through on the commitments we have made to one another. But to proactively build on that platform, by exploring new opportunities and creating new architecture. To ensure that we are creating strategic trust and commercial connection between two countries at the bookends of our wide Indo-Pacific region.

Biggest opportunities

There are many reasons to be excited about our region. I want to single out the two biggest opportunities. First, India and New Zealand are fortunate enough to live in the world’s most economically dynamic region. The Indo-Pacific region will represent two-thirds of global economic growth over the coming years. By 2030, it will be home to two-thirds of the world’s middle-class consumers.

And India itself lies at the heart of this exciting economic future. It is easy to focus on the troubles the world faces, but it is worth reflecting for a moment on what economic development at this scale means at a human level. Here in India, you have gone from only the very few in rural areas having a water or power connection to almost everyone. It means people with better health and education outcomes. And that creates hope and optimism about the future for individuals and their families. Replicated across literally hundreds of millions of people, that process of development generates dynamic economies. Growth that offers massive opportunities for every country in the Indo-Pacific region, and families and individuals within them.

The second big opportunity is technological change. We are on the cusp of a transformation of our economies and societies in a way that we can barely now imagine. I am talking about artificial intelligence, which is within reach of achieving the cognitive powers of a human being. But I am also thinking of a range of other technologies — quantum, biotech, advanced manufacturing — that are going to have profound impacts on our economies. It has felt like this technological transformation has been long-heralded, but never quite arrived. Well, it seems to me that a series of innovations — the always online world, big data, powerful computing, machine learning — are cumulating in ways that are going to tip over into a dislocation that is new and altogether different.

The game is about to change. We are on the cusp of an explosion in the application of artificial intelligence, a technology that will have an impact across the whole economy, not just in one or two sectors. A technology that will transform the way we work, study and entertain ourselves. A technology that will force governments to think in entirely different ways about how they deliver public services and secure their nations. Certainly, this presents risks that will need to be managed. For example, militaries are already using AI, which means the international community is going to need to develop new norms about how this is done in a way that ensures compliance with the rules of war and ensures human responsibility in conflict.

But my message is that, while we need to manage change, we cannot allow ourselves to be paralysed by the risks. For

those who believe they can out-compete through this period of technological dislocation, the opportunities are there. The citizens, the companies and the countries that embrace the coming change will be the ones that reap the dividends.

Geo-strategic risks

Yet there is also no doubt that there are fundamental trend lines in the Indo-Pacific region that present geo-strategic risks to growth and prosperity. These have longterm drivers that are not going away, and have been amplified by recent events. Past assumptions — that underpinned the previous generation’s geopolitical calculations — are being upended.

A fortnight ago, the Singaporean foreign minister, Vivian Balakrishnan, put this change eloquently when he said: ‘the world is now shifting from unipolarity to multipolarity, from free trade to protectionism, from multilateralism to unilateralism, from globalisation to hyper-nationalism, from openness to xenophobia, from optimism to anxiety’. This is a global change, not isolated to one region. Certainly, though, we live today in an Indo-Pacific region navigating contest and rivalry, with a period of strategic uncertainty. I would highlight three big shifts that make for challenging times ahead.

First, we are seeing rules giving way to power: Previously, we could count on countries respecting the UN Charter, the law of the sea and world trade rules. That sadly cannot be assumed in an age of sharper competition. Instead, we risk dangerous miscalculation at flashpoints. These range from the militarisation of disputed reefs to dangerous air movements; from land border incursions to breakout nuclear capabilities. Of course, it is not just flashpoints, but a slow shift in Indo-Pacific realities that change calculations. Recent demonstrations of naval force near New Zealand’s maritime surrounds, for example, sent a signal that alarmed many of my fellow citizens.

Second, we are witnessing a shift from economics to security: After the Cold War, the dominant paradigm in relations between Indo-Pacific

Christopher Luxon meets Narendra Modi during his visit to India

Vivian Balakrishnan

countries was a sustained effort to raise material living standards by tending to our economies. Make no mistake, ‘bread and butter’ issues still loom very large, and are a priority for governments all around the region. Indeed, economic growth is my government’s highest priority.

Military build-ups

But across the Indo-Pacific region, we also see governments dedicating increased attention and resource to military modernisation. Military build-ups reflect a need to prepare against uncertainty and insecurity. Some military build-ups, however, are underway without the reassurance that transparency brings. National security demands are expanding. Governments need to protect their people and assets against foreign interference, cyber-attacks and terrorism. In the last few months, a new threat has emerged, with damage to critical infrastructure, like sub-sea cables. You cannot have prosperity without security, not least when the tools of commerce themselves require protection.

The third geo-economic shift is from efficiency to resilience: Where previously, Indo-Pacific economies saw ever deeper interdependence as a dynamo for growth, that can no longer be assumed in an age of decoupling. On-shoring, protectionism and trade wars are displacing best price, open markets and integrated supply chains. And so we find ourselves in a world that is growing more difficult and more complex, especially for smaller states. However, we must engage with the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. So, like most countries across the region, New Zealand’s strategic policy is being shaped by our assessment of these trends. We have agency to shape the Indo-Pacific that we want, but we must do so with energy and with urgency.

As New Zealand looks to protect and advance our interests in the Indo-Pacific region, we can only do so alongside partners. Partners like India that have a significant role to play in the Indo-Pacific. In an increasingly multipolar world, India’s size and

geo-strategic heft gives you autonomy. At the same time, your democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific offer you a force multiplier for our convergent interests. For at a time when democracy is in decline with less than half the world’s adults electing their leaders, it is an inspiration that 650 million Indians turned out to vote last year in the largest election in history. Your national election is a triumph of logistics and a triumph of legitimacy. An election that means your leaders serve their people, rather than your people serving their leaders.

Now, I do not advocate arbitrary divisions between democracies and autocracies. And just because we are democracies, we will not always see eye-to-eye. Nonetheless, there is truth in the fact that our democratic governance means we share a belief in the freedom to choose, giving everyone a voice and respect for the rules. Our interests increasingly converge around seeing these three ideas as an aligned set of organising principles for our Indo-Pacific region.

Sovereignty respect

First, we want to live in an Indo-Pacific region where countries are free to choose their own path free from interference. A region where no one country comes to dominate. It is a sign of the times that I stand here defending respect for sovereignty. Yet, New Zealand’s approach is increasingly shaped around that objective. On 15 March, I joined a call led by Prime Minister Keir Starmer focused on what more those contributing to Ukraine’s defence can do to support a just and lasting peace. To help a country whose sovereignty and territorial integrity has been so flagrantly attacked.

In my home region, our fellow Pacific neighbours are navigating geo-strategic dynamics that are their sharpest in nearly 80 years. In a deeply contested world, Pacific partners are being asked to make choices that may undermine their national sovereignty. They risk falling into over-indebtedness, they must make choices about dual-use infrastructure and they face pres-

Christopher Luxon and Narendra Modi confer on 17 March

sure to enter new security arrangements.

New Zealand invests in working alongside Pacific countries to boost their capacity to make independent choices free from interference. Yet, size alone cannot inoculate a country from these dynamics. Building strong and diversified relationships is the key to mitigating the risks of dependence on a few. That is why my government is investing in our key relationships, from traditional partners to thickening and deepening our relationships across South-east Asia, and in a serious way with India, too.

And we have a responsibility to invest in our own security as a down-payment on our future ability to choose our own path. That is why New Zealand will be scaling up and doing more to support our own defence. We plan to better resource and equip the New Zealand Defence Force to ensure we can continue to defend our interests, whether in our near region, in our alliance with Australia or in support of collective security efforts with partners like India. Alongside this investment in capability, we are making tangible contributions across the Indo-Pacific region. When I was in Japan last year, I saw first-hand the work our aviators do to detect and deter North Korea’s sanctions-busting activities.

The Royal New Zealand Navy is leading Combined Task Force 150 responsible for multinational activities to protect trade routes and counter smuggling, piracy and terrorism in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. We are fortunate indeed that India has agreed to take up the deputy command. Underlining these naval connections, one of our frigates, HMNZS Te Kaha, visited Mumbai in March. As we seek an Indo-Pacific region in which countries are free to choose their own path, I am determined New Zealand plays its role—whether through our work with Pacific Islands partners, our relationships in the Indo-Pacific region or through our defence efforts.

Second principle

A second principle both India and New Zealand subscribe to is the criticality of Indo-Pacific regional institutions, even as these evolve. Regional architecture scaffolds our region’s security and its prosperity. ASEAN continues to promote regional peace and economic development. Through its convening power and its centrality, it also provides a place for the region’s players to come together to discuss strategic issues.

ASEAN sits at the centre of the East Asia Summit, which for twenty years now has enabled political dialogue across the region, a forum that builds understanding, reduces the risk of miscalculation and contributes to strategic trust. Yet, the IndoPacific architecture is not static as it adapts to new realities. Mini-lateral groupings are important new pieces of the puzzle.

The Quad has emerged as an important vehicle promoting an open, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. India’s contribution to that evolution has of course been vital. While New Zealand has no pretensions to Quad membership, we stand ready to work with you to advance Quad initiatives. We ourselves are strengthening our work with Japan and the Republic of Korea, as well as Australia. Last year, I convened the Indo-Pacific Four to discuss Ukraine and North Korea. And with serious headwinds buffeting the global trade system, New Zealand is seriously invested in Indo-Pacific trade and economic integration groupings. From the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the gold standard of free trade agreements internationally, to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), perhaps the world’s most inclusive. And we welcome India’s engage-

ment in the regional economic architecture, with our work together in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), important in an era in which we seek to build one another’s resilience.

Subrahmanyam Jaishankar

The third Indo-Pacific principle we align around is a region in which respect for the rules is foundational. Globally, rules are being undermined: whether those around territorial integrity, freedom of navigation or laws of war. Yet, these are the very rules that preserve an Indo-Pacific order that is not ‘might is right’ alone. And, as I have stated above, there is no prosperity without security. The rules that underpin our security also allow our businesses to operate with certainty. Those rules deliver daily in meaningful ways for our people. For example, one in four jobs in New Zealand rely on exports and our exporting businesses being able to depend on the predictability that those rules deliver. And in a miracle that is only possible thanks to globally-accepted aviation standards, 120,000 flights carry 12 million passengers and operate safely between their destinations every day.

These rules shape the character of our region. We remain committed to this rules-based system, even while acknowledging its shortcomings. It is a truism that the world of 2025 is vastly different from that of 1945, and yet global institutions sadly have been slow to adapt. We are not talking about ‘starting over’ by remaking the global order. Instead, I tend to agree with Dr Jaishankar when he says we want an order in which change is evolutionary — at a pace that is comfortable and steady. That is why New Zealand supports reforming global governance frameworks to better reflect today’s realities. Rather than casting them aside, they should give greater voice to the developing world and under-represented regions. Countries like India — that play such a central role in the global community — should have a seat at the table. We have, therefore, long supported India having a permanent seat on a reformed UN Security Council.

Stark picture

The geo-strategic picture I have painted is stark. Rules are giving way to power; economics to security; and efficiency to resilience. The tectonic shifts unfolding highlight that we — working alongside partners and friends — must navigate disruption, uncertainty and sharpening pressure on our national interests. Yet, we will not be overwhelmed by complexity and challenge. We must go forward with confidence.

We live at the heart of the world’s most exciting and dynamic region — the Indo-Pacific. We live in an era of technological transformation that offers outsized opportunities. We are countries with solid underlying democratic institutions, which will underpin our societies’ future success. India and New Zealand have extraordinarily talented people. Both our countries have a clear plan that reflects and reinforces the connections between our security and prosperity. We cannot afford to be thrown by the rapid pace of change — we must grapple with shifting realities and capitalise on these for all our peoples’ benefit. We will create and seize opportunities. Invest in our capabilities. This is our region. Its future will be shaped by the choices we make — together.

War of words: China’s role in the Pacific

Matthew Doidge and Serena Kelly discover a significant shift in the shape of media reporting on China.

A discursive war of words is taking place through the medium of Pacific media. While there is an overwhelming preponderance of Western discourses on China, this does not seem to translate into influence over local reporting and perspectives. Instead, Chinese discourses on China's own regional role appear to have greater resonance in Pacific journalism. This suggests two potential scenarios playing out in Pacific media — that the engagement of China is welcomed in the region and that local journalists, potentially under political or economic pressure and with newsrooms potentially experiencing increased Chinese influence, may be unwilling or unable to counter pro-China discourses.

Dr Mathew Doidge is a senior research fellow at the National Centre for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury. Dr Serena Kelly is a senior lecturer in political science and international relations at the same university. She is a member of the NZIIA Board. This article draws on a much fuller study recently published in open access by The Pacific Review For more detailed analysis and complete references, please consult that publication: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.108 0/09512748.2024.2412010.

That the Pacific Islands region has become a more geopolitically contested space is something of which we, in New Zealand, are intensely aware, sharpened most recently by the strained relations with the Cook Islands’ government following announcement of its plans to establish closer ties with China earlier this year.1 This is a reflection of wider stresses evident between an increasingly regionally assertive China and Western states, particularly the United States. Building on its economic successes since it joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001, over the last decade Xi Jinping’s China has sought to extend its influence on the global stage, inevitably leading to tension as its diplomatic, security and development interests (among others) intersect with those of the West.

This has been particularly evident in the Indo-Pacific macroregion where, as a response to China’s policies, Western states have sought to sharpen their own regional focus, elaborating a range of new strategic frameworks and priorities. Thus we have seen the Indo-Pacific framing formalised in strategies from the United States (which in its 2017 National Security Strategy defined the Indo-Pacific region as an arena of ‘geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order’), Australia, New Zealand, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as increasingly being reflected in the foreign policy postures of key Asian regional actors, including Japan, South Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

While the Indo-Pacific concept is in practice heavily focused on the northern maritime arc, the islands states of the Pacific have also been increasingly brought into the geopolitical frame, most clearly since the 2022 signature of the China–Solomon Islands security pact. The latest concerns over the Cook Islands–China relationship are simply the most recent expression of this. In this Pacific Islands space, the southernmost theatre of the Indo-Pacific region, the China–West rivalry has been focused on discursive contestation — an ‘information war’ or ‘war of words’ in which each side seeks to present a positive view of itself, and a somewhat less rosy one of its rival.² The Pacific states have found themselves positioned between two competing camps, each seeking to convince them of the veracity of

their viewpoint.

A key battleground in this discursive conflict has been regional media. As Shailendra Singh, head of journalism at the Suva-based University of the South Pacific, noted, ‘All the countries jostling for influence [in the Pacific region] are wooing the media, one way or another to win Pacific citizens’ hearts and minds because this can influence government decisions, at least to some extent’.³ For China, this means constructing an image of its positive regional role as a partner to Pacific peoples, while for the West, the opposite is the case — presenting a position on China that highlights the dangers of its engagement, seeking to counter what is perceived as a ‘foreign malign influence’.⁴

Recognising the increasing intensity of this discursive conflict, we were struck by a very simple question: who is winning? To answer this, we examined eight regional print media outlets⁵ during two timeframes of heightened geopolitical contestation: October–December 2019 (following the September 2019 switch in diplomatic recognition of both Kiribati and Solomon Islands from Taiwan to China); and October–December 2022 (following the April 2022 signing of the Solomon Islands–China Security Agreement). From the eight selected outlets over these two blocks of time, we identified and analysed 602 relevant articles.

Significant shift

Shape Shifts in the Shape of Coverage: The first thing our study noted was that, across these timeframes, there was a significant shift in the shape of reporting on China. This was seen firstly in the source of articles published in Pacific media. Of all articles addressing China in 2019, over half were produced by local reporters, with around one-third being re-published from Western media sources. By 2022, only one-quarter came from local reporting, with two-thirds from Western sources. Over both timeframes, Chinese-sourced reporting was present, though it was nowhere near as prevalent as that from local or Western sources.

A variety of factors shaped the increasing footprint of Western material in Pacific media. Already stretched Pacific newsrooms were significantly impacted by a decline in revenues as a consequence of Covid-19, affecting the ability to support local reporting. In some jurisdictions, restrictions on reporting seen as inimical to government interests (including criticising key international partners) may also have played a role. But the most significant reason has been the increase in the volume of reporting coming out of Western media institutions as a result of elevated interest in a more regionally active China, and of a push by the political classes for more favourable messaging. In this respect, former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer emphasised the importance of ‘investing in media platforms in the Pacific so Australia’s interpretation of regional and global events is the default for the region’.⁶ Allied with challenges facing local newsrooms, the increase in re-publication of material from Western media has resulted in something of a ‘flooding of the airwaves’.

Second, at the same time that the number of Western republications increased, we also noted a shift in tone of this reporting. Whereas in 2019, 78.3 per cent of Western-sourced reporting was neutral on China and 16.7 per cent was negative, by 2022, 61.4 per cent was neutral, with 36.3 per cent adopting a negative tone.

Two themes

Axis of Dispute I: Development: But this provides only part of the story. In terms of what is being said — the axes of discursive

dispute — two main themes were evident: development and geopolitical contestation. The development focus is a reflection of the broader attention that has been given to China as it has become more active in the field, in so doing challenging the accepted frameworks and practices progressively established by the Western-dominated Development Assistance Committee of the OECD since the establishment of the grouping in the 1960s. This, alongside the relative lack of transparency associated with China’s activities in the development space, has raised concerns about its role and motivations, and about the type of development assistance being provided and the impact it is likely to have. To its critics, Chinese aid is seen as being driven by economic and political interests, as characterised by poor practice and as contributing to unsustainable debt burdens. Then US National Security Adviser John Bolton’s comments that ‘China uses bribes, opaque agreements, and the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and demands’ and that its ‘investment ventures are riddled with corruption, and do not meet the same environmental or ethical standards as U.S. developmental programs’⁷ are characteristic of this perspective.

There are, of course, two sides to any story. Unsurprisingly, the view of China, and indeed of many of the recipients of Chinese assistance, diverges somewhat from this perspective. China seeks to project the image of a benign and responsible great power, pursuing peace, stability and prosperity. It forwards a view of itself, as then Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted, as ‘a compassionate, committed and responsible China that stands by principles… and lend[s] more confidence and strength to the pursuit of development for all’.⁸ It claims an identity as a developing country, and therefore sees its development engagement as a form of South–South co-operation, of equal partnership that eschews the top-down dynamic of Western programmes. Its development aid is seen as a form of mutual assistance, characterised by ‘mutual respect, equality, keeping promise [sic], mutual benefits and win-win’.9

Our study found both sides of this contested image clearly present in Pacific media, though it was almost twice as common in 2019 as 2022. Notwithstanding the reduced prevalence of the development debate, and mir-

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama co-chair the second China–Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Suva in May 2022

Ralph Regenvanu

roring the increased overall negative tone of Western-sourced reporting, by 2022 the Western position on China had come to be framed in much starker terms. Its development interventions were defined as ‘badly planned’, as ‘white elephants’, as ‘ill-conceived’ and likely to worsen the debt issue, and as involving ‘underhanded dealings’ that endanger democracy. As a direct counter to Western critiques, though as noted far less prevalent, articles re-published from Chinese media clearly forwarded the Chinese perspective. Interestingly, when it came to local Pacific reporting — the product of Pacific journalism — the Chinese position dominated, a trend that strengthened even as re-published Western-sourced articles offered a more strident critique. By 2022, Pacific reporting (and indeed, on occasion, Pacific leaders) was replicating core talking points characterising China’s role as win-win, characterised by mutual respect and so on. In short, what we found was that, while there was a clear contest reflected in Pacific media between the two diverging positions on China’s development role, when it came to local reporting, the pro-China position had greater resonance.

Second area

Axis of Dispute II: Geopolitical Contestation: The second area of dispute we noted in our study centred around issues of geopolitical contestation, though here, in contrast to the continuity of the debate on development, a notable evolution in thematic focus was evident. In 2019, almost 40 per cent of Pacific media articles addressing China centred on the issue of geopolitical contestation, the main focus of which was diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, and the One China Principle. This was driven by the switch in diplomatic recognition of Kiribati and Solomon Islands from Taiwan to China in September of that year. For those Western-sourced articles in the Pacific media, emergent strands of argument included allusions to Chinese inducements to generate support, and increasing concern with an ‘external power’ exerting itself in the Pacific Islands space. In local reporting, too, diplomatic recognition was a core focus, ranging from general acknowledgement of the economic benefits to be gained from closer ties with China through to the more direct assertion of Vanuatu’s then Foreign Minister Ralph Regenvanu that ‘because of its limited economic clout, Vanuatu had no choice but to use its votes strategically in international organisations such as the UN [and] this included targeting infrastructure investment from larger countries, such as China’.10 That said, a significant strand of local reporting also acknowledged the controversy generated by switching diplomatic recognition, largely citing opposition politicians.

By 2022, a turbo-charging of geopolitical contestation was evident, as well as an evolution in the thematic focus. Almost 60 per cent of reporting on China now focused on issues of geopolitics, with security coming very much to the fore. Here again, Western reporting dominated — almost 80 per cent of articles addressing the issue of security and China came from Western sources, and with a notable increase in material coming from Australia and the United Kingdom. This was a direct reflection of the renewed regional interest in the wake of the AUKUS announcement of September 2021, and of the Solomon Islands–China Security Agreement of April 2022. Indeed, articles sourced from AUKUS states were much more likely to focus on issues of security than those from non-AUKUS Western states (such as New Zealand), and were notably negative in tone (around 40 per cent of articles from AUKUS states evaluated China negatively, compared to 7 per cent of articles from New Zealand). In this reporting, China was defined largely in terms

of threat, its actions classed as ‘pernicious’ and ‘malign’. It was seen as ‘aggressive and bullying’, and utilising economic pressure and coercion. Also intrinsic to this reported Western discourse was a clear process of the ‘othering’ of China as different to, and separate from, the values and identity that (at least from the Western perspective) are seen as characterising the Pacific Islands region. This was evident in on-going reference to values that China was seen not to represent — such as respect for human rights — but was perhaps more interestingly seen through the framing of the concept of a ‘Pacific family’. The usage of this concept increased tenfold between 2019 and 2022, and exclusively in articles derived from a Western source addressing issues of geopolitical contestation. The idea of the Pacific family clearly constitutes an effort to define commonality, being utilised particularly as a way to situate New Zealand and Australia as Pacific nations. But importantly, it also comprises a form of coded messaging — a form of dog whistle — whereby, in defining this family and the place of New Zealand and Australia within it, the strong sub-text is the question as to who is not part of that family. The fact that, in our sample, this construction was utilised in relation to a single outside power — China — suggests what the answer to that question might be.

Chinese discourse

While Western-sourced articles dove deep on security in 2022, by contrast with the development issue, we found no specific direct counter-discourse coming from China. Instead, what was evident in China-sourced material, or in articles citing Chinese officials, was a pivoting away from security and towards issues of economics and development. In other words, there was an avoidance of the contested space that security had become, with a shift to those topics where it was seen to offer a strong message of positive regional engagement.

This was a process mirrored by local Pacific reporting, with China’s role generally defined as one of partnership, and with negative characterisations — notably around its security role — largely avoided. Where Pacific voices did express criticism of China’s security role, this occurred in Western articles, not in local reporting. To the extent that local journalism addressed security issues, this focused on expressions of opposition to the securitisation of the Pacific space by external powers, and to the pressure for the islands states to pick sides. Also notable was a strengthening Pacific counter-discourse seeking to shift security debate away from military contestation, and towards regional priorities. Here, climate change was defined as the primary security threat confronting the Pacific.

In a nutshell, while geopolitical contestation, and es-

Shailendra Singh Alexander Downer

pecially security, dominated news articles in relation to China, this was a one-sided discussion. A strongly negative Western discourse, drawing heavily on reporting from the AUKUS states, was evident, but this lacked a direct counter-discourse. Instead, the controversial topic of security in 2022 was avoided, with discussion pivoting towards issues of the economy and development.

Our study, limited in scope as it was, offers some interesting insights into the discursive war of words taking place through the medium of Pacific media. We found that, while there is an overwhelming (and indeed increasing) preponderance of Western discourses on China present (largely re-published from Western media sources), this does not seem to translate into influence over local reporting and perspectives. Instead, and possibly surprisingly, Chinese discourses on China's own regional role appear to have greater resonance in Pacific journalism. This is as evident in relation to China’s regional development role as it is in relation to the increased security focus that we have seen since the signing of the China–Solomon Islands Security Agreement in 2022.

This apparent resonance of China’s discourse, notwithstanding the tide of Western-sourced articles, suggests two potential scenarios playing out in Pacific media. The first is that, regardless of Western reservations, the engagement of China is welcomed in the region, possibly providing greater room for manoeuvre in relation to traditional partners and donors. The second is that local journalists, potentially under political or economic pressure and with newsrooms potentially experiencing increased Chinese influence,11 may be unwilling or unable to counter pro-China discourses. Our dataset does not speak to this issue, but it is certainly one that exercises many commentators on the regional political situation.

A final point that is worth drawing is that our study offers further support for the contention that the Pacific region is not simply a stage on which other actors play. Rather, it is an actor in its own right, with Pacific agency and Pacific perspectives to be seen clearly in relation to security discourses. Where the preponderance of Western-sourced articles leaned heavily into traditional conceptions of security and the framing of China as a threat, a strengthening Pacific approach was evident in local reporting. Here, opposition to securitisation of the Pacific was evident, alongside a reframing of security in terms of the existential threat of climate change.

NOTES

1. Giles Dexter, ‘Explainer: The diplomatic row between New

Zealand and the Cook Islands’, Radio New Zealand, 10 Feb 2025 (www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/541422/explainer-the-diplomaticrow-between-new-zealand-and-the-cook-islands).

2. In the following discussion, we make no assertion as to the veracity of either side’s claims; our interest is only in the shape of the contest as it plays out in Pacific media.

3. Virginia Harrison, ‘US vows to support “free media” in Pacific as concern over China influence grows’, Guardian, 30 Oct 2023 (www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/30/us-china-conflictpacific-free-media).

4. Department of State, ‘Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Allen Travels to Fiji, Vanuatu, Australia, and Chile’, Media Note, 11 Oct 2023 (2021-2025.state. gov/under-secretary-of-state-for-public-diplomacy-and-publicaffairs-allen-travels-to-fiji-vanuatu-australia-and-chile/).

5. Cook Islands News, Fiji Sun, Island Times (Palau), Samoa Observer, Solomon Times, The National (PNG), Vanuatu Daily Post, as well as the Pacific Islands News Association’s (PINA) PACNEWS newswire service.

6. Alexander Downer, ‘Engaging with Asia must not mean disengaging with the Pacific’, Australian Financial Review, 18 Dec 2022 (www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/engaging-with-asia-must-notmean-disengaging-with-the-pacific-20221216-p5c70t).

7. John Bolton, ‘Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy’, Heritage Foundation Lecture, 13 Dec 2018 (agoa.info/news/ article/15564-advisor-ambassadorjohn-bolton-on-the-the-trumpadministration-s-new-africa-strategy.html).

8. Jiangtao Shi, ‘No Wolf Warriors here: Foreign minister sends message of ‘“responsible China”’, South China Morning Post, 8 Mar 2021 (www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3124595/chinasforeign-minister-sheds-wolf-warrior-pose-and-presents).

9. SCIO, China’s Foreign Aid, Beijing: State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2014 (english.www.gov.cn/ archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986592. htm).

10. ‘Vanuatu reviews “passports for sale” scheme over EU worries’, Vanuatu Daily Post, 24 Oct 2019 (www.dailypost.vu/news/vanu atureviews-passports-for-sale-scheme-over-eu-worries/article_ e13d6206-f5d8-11e9-8051-878d0fa2d3b6.html).

11. Mackenzie Smith and Toby Mann, ‘China is trying to buy influence with media in the Pacific as it aims to strengthen its presence in the region’, ABC News, 2 Aug 2023 (www.abc.net.au/news/202308-02/china-buys-influence-solomon-islands-star-newspaper-pa cific/102668914?future=true&).

NOTE FOR CONTRIBUTORS

We welcome unsolicited articles from both members of the NZIIA and others. Priority will be given to those that deal with issues related to New Zealand, Australia and the South Pacific, but we will also consider articles on issues of wider scope. Articles should be not more than 3000 words in length, and preferably with as few references as possible. They should be formatted as in this issue.

Articles should be submitted as Word documents, and include a 100-word executive summary, a one or two sentence biographical note and a head and shoulders photo of the submitter. Image suggestions will also be helpful.

The deadline dates are 25 January, 25 March, 25 May, 25 July, 25 September and 1 November.

Submissions should be made to nziia@vuw.ac.nz or iancmcgibbon@hotmail.com

Sharing intelligence insights

Andrew Hampton outlines what the Security Intelligence Service does to protect New Zealand and its work in our region.

The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service’s mission is to keep New Zealand and New Zealanders safe and secure. In carrying out its functions, intelligence co-operation has become of vital importance. The sharing of intelligence, and guidance informed by intelligence, with decision-makers in other governments is the key to achieving mutually beneficial national security outcomes, including countering foreign interference and espionage. Supporting a secure, stable and prosperous Pacific region has been an enduring intelligence priority for successive New Zealand governments. Our agencies’ efforts in the region help to inform New Zealand and, increasingly, Pacific decision-makers on how strategic competition is playing out.

This presentation will outline the role we at the NZSIS can and do play in the world of intelligence co-operation. This phrase will mean different things to different people. Sometimes people talk about intelligence diplomacy, meaning the sharing of intelligence and guidance informed by intelligence, with decision-makers in other governments. The act of sharing is the important bit with the ultimate aim of achieving mutually beneficial national security outcomes. As will become apparent, intelligence co-operation with the Pacific is an increasing focus for the NZSIS.

A good place to start is to provide a short NZSIS 101 explainer of the why, what and how of a security intelligence agency. This will include a brief overview of some of the national security threats we see facing New Zealand, with a particular focus on strategic competition and how this is driving foreign interference and espionage. I will then discuss in a bit more detail those parts of our work that involve intelligence co-operation of various kinds.

Our mission at the NZSIS is to keep New Zealand and New Zealanders safe and secure. As an organisation we are driven to protect New Zealand as a free, open and democratic society for future generations by staying ahead of the threats we face. That is what is prescribed in our legislation, the Intelligence and Security Act 2017, and is the mission that drives our staff. We are New Zealand’s lead agency for security intelligence. That means we detect, deter and disrupt threats to New Zealand’s national security. In carrying out this role we aim to deliver a range of impacts:

First is countering foreign interference and espionage:

Andrew Hampton is the NZSIS’ director-general of security.

This article is the edited text of his address to the NZIIA’s Wellington branch on 6 March.

l By foreign interference we mean activity undertaken by foreign states, or their proxies, which aims to influence, disrupt or subvert our national interests in ways that are deceptive, corrupt or coercive.

l Espionage describes the clandestine collection activities that foreign states use to gain an advantage against New Zealand and achieve their objectives. Espionage tactics are often used to facilitate foreign interference.

Next is countering violent extremism and terrorism:

l We detect and investigate threats of violent extremism in

New Zealand and overseas, and we partner with other agencies to stop these threats escalating into acts of terrorism.

We also have a foreign intelligence mandate:

l This is not a function we have traditionally spoken a great deal about. It involves collecting, analysing and sharing intelligence to further New Zealand’s interests and those of our region. Intelligence co-operation is an increasing feature of our foreign intelligence function.

This leads me on to our other major function, protective security:

l We have a responsibility to enhance the ability of New Zealand government agencies to protect their people, information and other assets by taking a holistic approach to security and resilience.

l One of the ways we do that is by producing and maintaining a best practice framework — the Protective Security Requirements or PSR. While the PSR is focused on supporting New Zealand government agencies, the framework is free and available for use by any organisation via the PSR website along with a wide range of helpful resources.

l The work of our PSR team includes supporting Pacific partners to build their own protective security frameworks and resilience.

Sometimes when I discuss our functions, I get accused of skipping over some of the more tantalising information about how we undertake our intelligence functions. People want to know how we actually detect, disrupt and deter national security threats.

Some of what might be seen in the movies, we do in New Zealand: running human intelligence sources, undertaking physical and technical surveillance and intercepting of communications. But we also co-operate closely with international partners, make use of data sets and information available in the open sources and receive leads from members of the public or through community engagement.

We, of course, work very closely with the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), the government’s signals (or electronic) intelligence and cyber security agency, which I had the privilege of leading before joining the NZSIS. Between us, we share a number of enablement functions, such as technology, finance, people and capability (or HR), policy and strategy.

We operate under the Intelligence and Security Act 2017, which allows us to use extraordinary powers to gather intelligence in ways that would otherwise be illegal. However, we can only use these powers with the proper authorisation through an Intelligence warrant. This applies whether we are operating domestically or abroad. Everything we do is subject to rigorous oversight by the inspector-general of intelligence and security. It has now been long established through various independent reviews that our agencies do not, and never have, undertaken ‘mass surveillance’ either in New Zealand or our region.

Strategic competition

We are currently operating in the most challenging global security environment in a generation. In recent years, we have seen a sharp rise in strategic competition and global tensions, including armed conflict in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East. In addition to the tragic loss of thousands of lives, this has driven supply chain disruption, global economic uncertainty and the erosion of the rules-based order that is so important for a

small trading nation such as New Zealand.

Strategic competition is a term that often gets flung about, but it essentially means seeking to advance competing visions for regional or global order. Pacific countries, very much including New Zealand, are often stuck in the middle of these competing visions. Within this context, it is not unexpected to see a surge in efforts to win influence through normal diplomatic means, but increasingly, too, we see signs of foreign interference and espionage in the Pacific by states that do not share our values. I will return to this below.

Strategic competition happens on multiple levels — some of it is in our interests, but it can also cause serious harm. For example, state actors and their proxies use malicious cyber activity to advance their interests. They may be trying to steal sensitive information or simply want to cause disruption. New Zealand organisations have been subject to significant cyberattacks from both state-backed and criminal actors. Fortunately, many others have been prevented.

Over recent years the intelligence community has called out foreign interference and malicious state-sponsored cyber activities in New Zealand when it is in New Zealand’s interests to do so. Last year, for example, our government called out an attempted compromise of our parliamentary networks as being connected to a state-sponsored actor linked to the People’s Republic of China.

While emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing and next generation telecommunications all have potentially huge benefits, they, too, are being leveraged by states for strategic purposes, including for espionage, cyberattacks and dis-information. Indeed, some of the sharpest competition playing out at the moment involves the race to secure intellectual property and global market share for emerging technologies.

New Zealand is experiencing the effects of strategic competition in more ways than many people would expect. The nature of the security threats New Zealand faces is evolving rapidly, and strategic competition is a key driving force behind that pace of change. Suffice to say, there is plenty happening in this space to keep all of us in the intelligence community on our toes.

Foreign interference

It is fair to say that New Zealanders have probably struggled with the concept that a foreign state could be interested in our affairs. In the past New Zealand has seen its geographic isolation in the South Pacific as a defence against many forms of harm. Even if that was ever true, it is certainly no longer the case. The NZSIS’s public threat assessment, published last September, said there are a small number of states who conduct foreign interference and espionage in ways that can be a severe infringement on the rights and freedoms of New Zealanders. The assessment notes in particular that the People’s Republic of China remains a complex intelligence concern in New Zealand. Russia and Iran have also been identified in our assessments as among other illiberal states conducting foreign interference. The type of activities we see include:

l foreign intelligence officers who seek to conduct espionage here under the guise of legitimate activity;

l state actors or their proxies seeking to covertly build longterm influence with individuals in our national political environment;

l local government is becoming a more common target;

l our business and research communities are increasingly

susceptible, too, including state sponsored attempts to steal hard-earned intellectual property or other sensitive information;

l Māori organisations are sometimes targeted for influence and leverage; and

l the monitoring and harassment of ethnic communities is becoming more sophisticated and even more insidious. As a security intelligence agency, part of our role is to detect and investigate these threats, and to raise awareness about what we are seeing. Alongside this work we have a range of protective security guidance filled with best practice advice on how organisations can manage risk, build resilience and make themselves harder targets for malicious state actors. We are working hard to make this important information more accessible domestically and increasingly across our home region, the Pacific. This brings me back to intelligence cooperation.

Intelligence co-operation

I use the term ‘intelligence co-operation’ because it aligns with one of the big shifts we are making as an organisation, which is to deliver national security impacts by working with and for others. The word ‘co-operation’ is at the heart of our strategy, but it also recognises that an agency like ours achieves little success by working alone. The term ‘intelligence diplomacy’ is often seen in the literature and is used by some of our partners, but our people often tend to leave the diplomacy to the foreign ministry.

Intelligence co-operation or intelligence diplomacy — call it what you will, but at its essence it is about how the intelligence and protective security guidance, which we and our partners produce, can be shared more widely for the mutual benefit of New Zealand and other countries in our region. When we do our jobs right, we contribute to the safety and security of all. That is why our people come to work each day — it is that mission I discussed — to keep New Zealand safe and secure but also to make a contribution towards an open, stable and resilient Pacific region.

I recently saw intelligence diplomacy described by a former senior Australian foreign affairs official as the use of intelligence actors and relationships to conduct or substantially facilitate diplomatic relations. That same former official was even more succinct and said it is about ‘doing good deeds quietly’.1 I think that just about sums up how we like to go about our work at the NZSIS.

Five eyes

Before I discuss further our work with our Pacific partners, I will touch briefly on the most longstanding and impactful intelligence sharing partnership in our history — the close relationship with our Five Eyes partners. It is a relationship that has persisted through multiple changes of administrations across each of the member countries. Each Five Eyes member operates in accordance with its own independent foreign policy and its own legislative settings and authorising frameworks. But it is also a high trust arrangement based on a long history of working together where our interests align and for our mutual benefit.

The sharing of Five Eyes intelligence insights has, without a doubt, enhanced the safety and security of New Zealand. Intelligence we receive from partners is frequently leveraged to improve the security and resilience of New Zealand, including to help protect information, assets and people. At the same time, New Zealand also makes a unique and highly valued

contribution to the partnership.

I regard the Five Eyes relationship as intelligence co-operation in the purest form. But in the current global environment our partners, like us, have been expanding their own use of intelligence co-operation or intelligence diplomacy in new ways. One of the most prominent recent examples of this has been in the build-up to and during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. There is a saying that the first casualty when war comes is truth, and for the people of Russia this has sadly been the case. Moscow attempted to fabricate stories about attacks on ethnic Russians in the Donbas, and the presence of Western bio labs on Ukrainian territory. Russia used dis-information to vigorously promote its rationale for its illegal and unprovoked invasion and its distorted view of how the conflict is progressing.

During the early stages of the conflict, when I was directorgeneral at the GCSB, that agency was a key conduit of partner intelligence. Thousands of intelligence reports on the Russia–Ukraine crisis were being provided to New Zealand government customers through our shared Intelligence Customer Centre. Often within hours, this intelligence would be declassified by partners and made public — something that at the time I had not seen before. Indeed, I recall heading to the Beehive to urgently brief ministers on the latest classified intelligence about Russia’s plans and then hearing that same information on the radio the next morning.

The CIA director at the time said that sharing accurate and precise insights and information in this way helped cement the solidarity of the global effort in support of Ukraine. Sharing intelligence outside of classified channels can never be taken lightly, given the importance of protecting sources and methods, but in this case it brought crucial transparency at an important time. Using such tactics reflects the need for new thinking and new ways of operating in this demanding era for intelligence.

Supporting resilience

As I mentioned above, strategic competition is not just affecting the threat environment in New Zealand, countries across the Pacific are arguably feeling it far more intensely. The 2018 Pacific Islands Forum’s Boe Declaration makes plain the array of national security concerns affecting Pacific countries. Strategic competition is far from the top of their list. When I speak with our Pacific counterparts, they often say their greatest concerns are with the future of their existence due to climate change, economic security and transnational crime.

Even so, supporting a secure, stable and prosperous Pacific

(From left) Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Director-General Mike Burgess; Canadian Security Intelligence Service Director David Vigneault; FBI Director Christopher Wray; New Zealand Security Intelligence Service DirectorGeneral of Security Andrew Hampton; and MI5 Director General Ken McCallum pose for a group photo during the Emerging Technology and Securing Innovation Summit in Palo Alto, California, on 16 October 2023

region has been an enduring intelligence priority for successive New Zealand governments. Indeed, Pacific resilience and security is publicly listed as a National Security Intelligence priority on the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet website. Our agencies’ efforts in the region help to inform New Zealand and, increasingly, Pacific decision-makers on how strategic competition is playing out. The People’s Republic of China’s ambition is to link economic and security co-operation, create competing regional architectures and expand its influence with Pacific Islands countries across policing, defence, digital, disaster relief and maritime spheres. With regard to strategic infrastructure, we have spoken out on the risks associated with ground-based space infrastructure in particular.

It is our role to watch out for signs of security posturing, and with other relevant agencies ensure the New Zealand government is well-informed about what is happening. We think it is important to ensure our Pacific partners are aware of the risks, too. We have been open with them about the challenging situations we have faced with regard to foreign interference and espionage in New Zealand and are comfortable sharing any lessons learned. We have also been working on ways that we can provide intelligence to Pacific partners that they may find useful. Access to a wider set of information can support more informed decision-making on issues of national or regional significance.

Such intelligence when coupled with best practice protective security advice helps our Pacific partners make their own decisions on how to build resilience. Examples of resilience building could be correcting loopholes in law, understanding the background to investment applications and adopting protective security measures designed to make nations harder targets for threatening activity.

Cooks collaboration

We have worked with a number of states around our Protective Security Requirements framework. Over the past few years, we were proud to collaborate with our Cook Islands partners to help them develop their own PSR. Our work together created a foundation for them to progress their own framework which, over time, will establish a system for classifying sensitive documents and protecting their information and assets.

In addition to supporting the Cook Islands with protective security, we have also shared classified intelligence with them on foreign interference and espionage risks. This was the purpose of my recent visit to the Cook Islands, which has been referred to in the media. It is important that my agency is able to share insights we have on evolving and shared security challenges. With the Cook Islands developing deeper relationships with other parties, this will necessitate an even stronger focus from my agency on national security risks.

Outside of the Cook Islands, we were pleased to provide intelligence support at last year’s CHOGM in Samoa and Pacific Islands Forum in Tonga. Joint training and information exchange sessions with a range of Pacific partners are becoming more common. I regularly discuss intelligence and security matters with Pacific leaders face-to-face when I am in the region and also when they pass through New Zealand, including with the prime minister of Niue in late February. This kind of dialogue is important but should also come as no surprise.

These examples of co-operation show how the NZSIS is uniquely placed to leverage both our protective security and foreign intelligence mandates. The strong historical, cultural and people-to-people connections New Zealanders have with

the region is also key. At the end of the day, we want Pacific partners to feel like our partnerships are enhancing national security with them, not for them. This is not a one-way flow of information either. Intelligence received from Pacific partners is consistently key to filling missing pieces of the intelligence puzzle about what is happening in the region.

Explaining intelligence

It is not just through sharing with decision-makers in other governments that intelligence can make an impact. There is a much broader domestic audience here in New Zealand for whom our insights can help make a difference. As I have stated, the NZSIS is committed and geared towards detecting foreign interference and espionage activities, as well as violent extremism and terrorism. We are keen to involve a broad range of New Zealanders in the conversation on what to watch out for and how to be harder targets for such activity.

Key to managing these threats is intelligence and security agencies, such as my own, working with the private sector, academia, local government and our diverse communities. Such partnerships can probably be considered as an extension of the principles of intelligence co-operation. As I have already touched on, there is a suite of products we have created at an unclassified level designed to raise awareness of the threat environment and to provide advice on managing risk.

A real game changer for us has been the production of an annual public threat assessment on the nature of violent extremism, terrorism, foreign interference and espionage in New Zealand. These assessments have made it considerably easier for us to tell our story as an agency and to show the threats we face are real and affect a broad range of New Zealanders. An increasing focus of our work over the coming years will be finding ways our intelligence insights can be leveraged even more widely to deliver impact.

I will conclude this outline by reflecting on the impact we can make by just discussing this topic. The very fact of my talking about intelligence co-operation to an NZIIA meeting could be considered an example of it. When I put my speech notes up online, which is my practice, they will likely be noticed, and perhaps dissected, by people from other governments, and I am very comfortable with that.

Similarly, raising awareness of the foreign interference that happens here and calling out activity carried out by particular states can shine a spotlight that can act as a deterrence. We need to have a level of understanding about foreign interference in this country where New Zealanders can confidently identify and call out such activity, and where those targeted know they should not have to put up with foreign interference in an open democracy like ours. Look out for more examples of ‘calling-out’ foreign interference in the future, too. We will act when the nature of the threat necessitates a response.

These are more examples of how the sharing of intelligence insights with a broader audience can be an effective tool for managing and mitigating risk. Call it what you want: intelligence co-operation or intelligence diplomacy or even simply sharing, but whichever term we use, the aim is to make sure our insights have an impact. We will continue to do good deeds quietly, but increasingly our intelligence agencies will be seen to be not afraid to make a bit more noise.

NOTE

1. Chris Taylor, ‘ “Doing good deeds quietly”, The rise of intelligence diplomacy as a potent tool of statecraft’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Research Report SI183, 1 Sep 2023.

Racing to tackle the climate crisis

Harinder Sidhu discusses Australia’s big green economic transition.

Australia is tackling the economic challenge of climate change by embracing a wholesale transition of its economy. This green economic transition reflects the integration of domestic and international climate policy that has been achieved in recent decades. Because Australia recognises the urgency of the climate crisis, it accepts the need to play its part in meeting this global challenge by taking concrete action to transition its economy. The effective measures to reduce emissions that it has implemented have increased its credibility. Australia is listening to its partners in the Pacific when they insist that climate change is their greatest security challenge.

Climate policy is a topic very close to my heart, as are the efforts by Australia to drive forward real action on climate change. My biography says that I have devoted several years of my career to climate policy. I am aware this makes me somewhat unusual in diplomatic circles. But I have very much enjoyed my time working on climate change. Because, as far as public policy challenges go, it is about as wicked a problem as you can get — one that requires a truly multi-disciplinary solution. If we are serious about combatting climate change, we have to bring several disciplines together — science, economics, politics, law, business, security and social inclusion, to name a few. As a diplomat, who trained as a lawyer and economist, and who has since had a long career working across foreign, economic, security and domestic policy, the appeal is understandable.

Over my career, I have found that my climate policy experience has become a major diplomatic asset. Particularly as the impacts of climate change have become more acute, especially here in the Pacific, the ability to understand what goes into making climate policy has become more and more valuable as a subject for foreign policy. The reason for this is simple: when it comes to the climate, everything is connected. Emissions do not respect national boundaries, so whatever other countries do to raise or reduce emissions will affect you; and what you do at home matters for the planet.

HE Harinder Sidhu AM was Australia’s high commissioner to New Zealand until March. This article is the edited text of the keynote address she gave to the NZIIA Wellington branch’s Environmental Diplomacy Symposium at Zealandia, Wellington on 12 March 2025, a few days before her departure.

To understand how Australia has gone about managing this balance, I will outline two aspects of our climate policy development over the past decade or two. First, how Australia is tackling the economic challenge of climate change by embracing a wholesale transition of our economy. This is a large topic, so I will only skim the surface, but I will try to give an idea of the scale and speed we are moving at across the ditch.

And second, I want to describe how we have come to integrate domestic and international climate policy in Australia. An integration that, I would argue, has made us more effective and trusted on the issue. My remarks will be informed by my experience as one of the senior executives who helped set up Australia’s first dedicated Department of Climate Change in the late 2000s.

Uncomfortable facts

Let me start with some facts. Australia is both a large emitter of greenhouse gases — the fourteenth largest in the world — and, at the same time, highly vulnerable to climate impacts. Because of our own lived experience, we recognise the urgency of the climate crisis. We accept that we need to play our part in meeting this global challenge. That is why we are taking real, concrete action to transition our economy at pace.

This is not just rhetoric. Across Australia — in every household, every business, every school, every workplace — an economy-wide transition is underway. Australia has not just committed, but we have legislated ambitious emissions reduction targets. We will cut emissions by 43 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050. We are on track: as at November 2024, emissions have fallen by 28.2 per cent below 2005 levels.

Energy production is the largest contributor to Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions (32.6 per cent, according to the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation). So it is only natural that this is where we are focusing our efforts. We are transforming Australia’s electricity supply to harness the power of renewables, with an ambition to see the portion of renewable energy in our grid reach 82 per cent by 2030, a number that is very close to the proportion of renewables in New Zealand’s electricity grid (87 per cent).

This is a big deal. The importance that fossil fuels have traditionally had in the Australian economy is well-known. Less than twenty years ago, some 80 per cent of Australia’s electricity came from coal or fossil-fuel powered generation. Naturally, a transition as ambitious as this will not happen overnight. But we are taking it seriously. De-carbonising our economy will be challenging, but we are absolutely committed to achieving it. The pace here has been staggering — the total capacity of Australia’s wind and solar assets is already roughly 40 per cent greater than it was just three years ago. And last year, the number of installed rooftop solar systems across the country reached 4 million. That is almost 25 gigawatts of capacity, more than that of Australia’s entire current fleet of coal-fired generators. And while total renewable electricity generation now stands at around 40 per cent, we have seen occasions over the past couple of years where renewables have supplied more than 70 per cent of electricity to the grid.

On industrial emissions, we have made reforms to what is called our ‘Safeguards Mechanism’, which requires our biggest emitters to reduce net emissions by 4.9 per cent a year. This will

eliminate over 200 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, equivalent to taking two-thirds of Australia’s cars off our roads.

Transition preparations

Beyond our 2030 target, we are also preparing our economy for the transition to net zero by 2050. We have shifted the way we think about the net zero transition. Rather than a burden to shoulder, we now view it as an economic opportunity we must position ourselves to seize. To do this, the Australian government has developed a plan to invest A$22.7 billion over the next decade to support programmes that will maximise the economic and industrial benefits of the move to net zero.

We are focusing our investments in sectors where Australia has a comparative advantage and those that contribute to de-carbonisation or supply chain resilience. These include renewable hydrogen production, green metals, critical minerals processing and clean energy technology, including to develop battery and solar panel industries. Not only is this good climate policy, it will also build our energy and economic resilience in the changing global and strategic landscape. This is all about doing our part. We know that all countries must be ambitious and move at speed if we want to tackle the climate crisis.

Doing our bit at home has helped us demonstrate our seriousness about climate change beyond our shores. On the foreign policy front, we are listening to our partners in the Pacific when they tell us that climate change is their greatest security challenge. Australia is working to ensure a regional balance that is safe, prosperous and stable for all — and it is essential that climate change be part of this effort. That is why we are deploying high-quality climate finance across the region to support the priorities of our partners. We expect to deliver $3 billion towards global climate financing efforts over 2020–25. And our foundational contribution of $100 million to the Pacific Resilience Facility shows we are backing Pacific leadership on climate adaptation.

Inherent connection

The Pacific is an important, but only one example. There is an inherent connection between what you do at home and your international climate policy. And that is where, from my perspective, a small point of difference has been a game changer for Australia. When we set up our inaugural Department of Climate Change in 2008 — a department that I was one of the original senior executive leaders of — we made a deliberate decision. Rather than leave the responsibility for international climate policy and negotiations with our Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, we chose to bring these international specialists across to the new department, to work side by side with our domestic and technical policy specialists. In short, to integrate our domestic and international policies from their inception.

It was an idea we saw working incredibly well in the United Kingdom, which had also at that time just set up its own Ministry of Climate Change. This might sound like the sort of structural technicality that only somebody who has been a public servant for nearly 40 years could get excited about. But it made the world of difference. It allowed all parts of our system to work together in a mutually reinforcing way. This has meant that we have been represented at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiating table not just by our diplomats, but by climate change experts and economists from the same agency working towards the same goals — tying together the many strands in climate policy. This means we design our do-

The participants in the inaugural Australia–New Zealand 2+2 Climate and Finance Dialogue in June 2023: New Zealand Minister of Climate Change James Shaw, Australian Minister for Climate Change and Energy Chris Bowen, Australian Treasurer Dr Jim Chalmers and New Zealand Minister of Finance Grant Robertson

mestic policies with an eye to what we need to commit to internationally. This awareness of international expectation has driven us to be more ambitious domestically.

On the flip side, our diplomats and negotiators are deeply connected to the practicalities and technicalities of climate policy-making. They are the same people who have to take responsibility for delivery on the things they agree to internationally. It is not something they can then pass on to someone else to do. The bottom line is, we do not make international commitments that we know we cannot deliver. And it is why we are now on track to deliver on our ambitious commitments at home and internationally for 2030. This has been a recipe for building credibility and integrity in our climate policy both at home and abroad.

Strong foundation

So where does this leave us, as we look ahead to the future trajectory of Australia’s climate policy? Well, of course, the transition underway in Australia leaves us with a strong foundation on which to build. But what is obvious is that no country can solve climate change — or even come close — alone. We need partners. And that is why, for Australia, climate is now a critical component of all our major international relationships. This includes with New Zealand.

In 2023 we established an annual 2+2 dialogue with climate and finance ministers coming together on both sides of the Tasman. This dialogue — which seeks to closely integrate our economic and climate policy — is the first of the kind in the world. And it already has a number of runs on the board. Through the dialogue, we have established a net zero working group to support de-carbonising public services and sustainable procurement. We have pooled our efforts to stimulate and secure supply of electric and zero emissions vehicles. And we are co-

ordinating our support for the Pacific, directed towards regional priorities, including climate adaptation and the amplification of Pacific voices in international climate and energy discussions.

Speaking of amplifying Pacific voices, Australia, of course, remains strongly committed to our bid to host COP31 in partnership with the Pacific. We want to deliver a COP with our Pacific partners that brings profile to the climate challenges in our region, accelerates global climate action and raises the voices of first nations people. The bid has been warmly supported by Pacific leaders, and we are continuing discussions with the hope of coming to a resolution soon.

The bottom line is this: Australia is not sitting still in the race to tackle the climate crisis. It is a race we want to win — not just because it is good for the climate, but because we know that if we get it right, it will be good for the future of our economy, for our security and for our region. Our planet depends on it.

New Zealand’s Minister of Climate Change Simon Watts and Minister of Finance Nicola Willis with, at right, Australian Treasurer Dr Jim Chalmers and Minister for Climate Change and Energy Chris Bowen at the second Australia–New Zealand 2+2 Climate and Finance Ministers’ Dialogue

Environmental diplomacy

On 12 March 2025, the NZIIA’s Wellington branch held an Environmental Diplomacy Symposium at the iconic Zealandia ecosanctuary. This landmark event, in development over eighteen months, brought together seventeen speakers, including seven ambassadors to New Zealand, covering perspectives on conservation, sustainability and the circular economy, climate finance and climate change with a keynote from the Australian high commissioner, HE Harinder Sidhu, in her last public speech in New Zealand.

The symposium covered perspectives from New Zealand, Philippines, Costa Rica, Switzerland, Te ao Māori, Australia, Finland, United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and the Pacific. The Pāteke room at the Zealandia Visitor Centre in Karori hosted 160 attendees, comprising university students and high school leaders from around Wellington as well as members of the NZIIA, academic, business and diplomatic communities.

This symposium report summarises some of the key themes and messages that were articulated by speakers and all the panels. The text of the Australian high commissioner’s keynote address can be found elsewhere in this issue. The NZIIA YouTube channel has video recordings from the symposium.

The deputy mayor of Wellington, Laurie Foon, started proceedings by extending a warm welcome to all attendees, emphasising the significance of dialogue on issues of conservation, sustainability and climate change in the context of Wellington’s unique environmental landscape. Foon highlighted Wellington’s strong commitment to becoming a sustainable city, including government initiatives to protect biodiversity, promote ecological stewardship and enhance community engagement in environmental issues. The city, she noted, views itself as a leader in sustainability efforts within New Zealand and globally.

Foon’s speech included examples of innovative projects within Wellington aimed at enhancing biodiversity and sustainability. Specific initiatives, such as urban greening projects and community-led conservation efforts, were highlighted as models for other cities around the world. She urged the global community to work together to address climate change and biodiversity loss. She concluded her speech with a call for ongoing co-operation between nations and local governments, emphasising that collective action is crucial for ensuring a

Angus Middleton is chair of the NZIIA’s Wellington branch.

sustainable future.

First panel

Dr Danielle Shanahan, the chief executive officer of Zealandia and adjunct professor of conservation at Te Herenga Waka–Victoria University of Wellington, moderated the first panel of the symposium. In welcoming attendees to Zealandia, she highlighted how the eco-sanctuary is a global success story of how ambition, innovation and some brave decision-making can help reverse the loss of nature. Simply, if we make space for nature, it can thrive. Shanahan warned that globally more than a million species face extinction in coming decades, a massive problem that needs simple, deep local solutions to overcome, combined with international co-operation.

The Philippines ambassador, HE Kira Christianne Azucena, emphasised that environmental conservation is integral to national policy and embedded in the Philippines constitution and that on-going efforts include a biodiversity strategy and action plan focused on community engagement and eco-tourism. The ambassador discussed how biodiversity challenges transcend borders, noting that Philippines decided early on that international and multilateral co-operation is vital if it is to achieve its conservation goals. National policies in Philippines on biodiversity and conservation are aligned with international conventions, including the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, the Paris Agreement and the UN High Seas Treaty. Azucena stressed the importance of strengthening co-operation between regional platforms, such as the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity, which is hosted in Manila, and the Pacific Islands Forum to enhance cross-border conservation efforts on wildlife trade and fulfil the Manila Declaration on sustainable development and migratory

Angus Middleton reports on a symposium held at Zealandia, Karori in March.

Laurie Foon addresses the symposium

species.

Costa Rica’s ambassador, HE Carolina Molina Barrantes (online from Canberra), highlighted her country’s global leadership in biodiversity conservation, noting that the country is home to nearly 6 per cent of the world’s biodiversity. She outlined successful policies like the Payment for Environmental Services programme, which incentivises landowners to maintain forest cover. Costa Rica has established ambitious targets for marine protection and a robust legal framework that supports restoration and conservation plans. In December 2023, the country introduced new legislation that takes marine protection from 3 per cent to 30 per cent of marine territory; its protected marine territory is, as a result, now ten times its land territory. Costa Rica will share these success stories as co-organiser with France of the upcoming UN Ocean Conference (UNOC3) in Nice, France in June 2025, focusing on accelerating action to conserve and sustainably use the ocean.

Miriana Stephens (Ngāti Rārua, Ngāi Te Rangi, Ngāti Ranginui) from Te Taumata started with a beautiful waiata. The waiata (Māori song) relevant to the symposium theme describes the germination of seeds and the support that those seeds need from our earth and from our sky to ensure that they have an enduring and lasting life. Stephens discussed key Māori principles and practices — kaitiakitanga (guardianship and conservation), rahui (temporary bans on fishing or gathering in areas where species are under threat) and the importance of mana whenua (iwi individuals or groups who act as kaitiaki/caretakers) — that are pivotal to environmental management. Kaitiakitanga provides a holistic, relationship-based approach that centres on responsibility, balance and longterm sustainability. Stephens proclaimed the importance of indigenous models and practices forming part of local, national and international conversations in

conservation. The value of incorporating indigenous knowledge in conservation strategy was also highlighted as fundamental in the world-leading Costa Rican and Philippines approaches.

In concluding, Shanahan summarised the importance of solutions addressing the conservation and biodiversity crisis coming from the grassroots level. While progress may sometimes seem slow, she observed, we must remember that collective action between countries and communities is necessary to tackle these global challenges effectively.

Climate finance

The climate finance session brought together Swiss Ambassador HE Viktor Vavricka and moderator Dr Olayinka Moses from the Wellington School of Business and Government to discuss the critical role of climate finance in addressing global climate challenges. In providing a Swiss perspective, Vavricka observed that Switzerland plays an active role in global climate protection through international development policy. It aims to strengthen the country’s role as a competitive and innovative hub for sustainable finance. In pointing to Switzerland’s commitment to providing financial support for climate action, the ambassador cited a substantial annual contribution to climate finance under the Paris Agreement, amounting to around US$900 million to $1.3 billion.

Vavricka discussed the need for innovative financing solutions to address climate change effectively. This includes green bonds, climate adaptation funds and public-private partnerships that stimulate investment in sustainable practices. Both speakers stressed the importance of international co-operation in climate finance. The session underscored the fact that no single country can combat climate change alone; collective action and partnership among nations, institutions and the private sector

Victor Vavricka and Olayinka Moses

Arto Haapea contributes from Canberra watched by Laurence Beau and John Pearson

Victor Vavricka and Olayinka Moses address the symposium

are necessary to mobilise the required funding. Switzerland has an agreement with Vanuatu from 2013 under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement and has been facilitating their green transition through Swiss solar power solutions.

According to Vavricka, the Swiss political system is bottomup. A government made up of seven ministers in coalition is slow but very stable, meaning that commitments are followed through. The session concluded with a call to ensure that climate finance reaches local communities effectively. Engaging with grassroots organisations and local stakeholders can enhance the impact of climate initiatives and make certain that funding aligns with the needs of vulnerable populations.

Sustainability panel

The second panel was moderated by Mike Burrell, chief executive of the Sustainable Business Council of New Zealand and a former New Zealand high commissioner to South Africa. It focused on the roles of countries in advancing sustainable practices and circular economy initiatives.

French Ambassador HE Laurence Beau emphasised

France’s commitment to sustainability through various initiatives, such as the ‘France Nation, Green Nation’ roadmap, which encompasses 50 ambitious goals in sustainability and the National 3-R Strategy ‘Reduction, Reuse, Recycling’. She discussed concrete actions taken in energy efficiency, sustainable tourism and the protection of biodiversity, all aligned with achieving France’s longterm sustainability goals. The upcoming UN 2025 Ocean Conference in Nice was again raised as a key event globally this year, with New Zealand and Pacific Islands states as important participation partners. Beau alluded to France’s role on the eighteen-partner panel for sustainable ocean economy, also known as the ‘Give it a hundred percent’ initiative.

Finnish Ambassador HE Arto Haapea (joining online from Canberra) pointed out that while Finland (and Europe) are preoccupied with European security and Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine, they are at the same time focused on tackling another huge security challenge, namely the environment. He emphasised key successes with Finland’s Circular Economy Roadmap, launched in 2016; the first in the world, this initiative highlights policies that incentivise businesses and local governments to adopt circular practice. Haapea noted the World Circular Economy Forum launched in Helsinki in 2017. Finland, he stressed, is always happy to discuss hosting in other countries; so why not New Zealand one day? Finland’s approach includes educational programmes that embed principles of circularity at all levels of society, fostering an environment where sustainable practices are the norm.

British Deputy High Commissioner John Pearson, who sees himself as an environmental diplomat, highlighted the United Kingdom’s integration of climate considerations into its sustainability initiatives. Pearson discussed how the United Kingdom has generally had a bipartisan political consensus around climate change and the environment; Margaret Thatcher, he noted, was one of the first world leaders to talk about climate change. He maintained that you cannot do everything in the world on your own to address environmental challenges.

Some of the participants in the symposium: from left, Viktor Vavricka, Sir Anand Satyanand, Laurence Beau, John Pearson, Harinder Sidhu, Ard van der Vorst, Angus Middleton and Saskia Grant

John Pearson at the entrance to Zealandia

Working with partners was essential. As an example, he referred to the British embassy’s close co-operation with New Zealand in linking up with British expertise in an effort to develop offshore wind generation off the North Island.

The session concluded with a call to action for countries, businesses and individuals alike to embrace circular economy principles, innovate and engage in meaningful partnerships in pursuit of sustainability goals. The panellists, noting the large number of youthful members of the audience, reminded them that they represent two-thirds of the world’s population, that there would not be an environmental movement today without the passion and activism of those under 35 and that their actions resonate more than they may realise.

Final panel

The final panel, on Climate Change, was sponsored by the Netherlands. Its moderator, Compass Climate chief executive Dr Christina Hood, a climate change and energy policy expert in Wellington, began by recalling the privilege it had been to be in the room in Paris when the gavel dropped on the Paris Agreement. The stakes of climate change are now so high, she warned, that we simply cannot sit back and do nothing about it.

Dutch Ambassador HE Ard van der Vorst began his remarks by discussing the significant climate challenges facing the Netherlands as a low-lying country with 30 per cent of its land below sea level. Like Pacific Islands countries, it cannot do nothing or it will drown and lose territory. Accordingly, his country is always looking for solutions — on a global, national, regional and local level. The ambassador reminded the audience that the Netherland’s kingdom includes the Caribbean countries of Aruba, Curaçao and Saint Martin, which face the same challenges as Pacific Islands countries; most of the kingdom’s embassies, including in New Zealand and the Pacific, have young people working on climate collaboration and knowledge-sharing, particularly around modern water management strategies.

Dr Iati Iati, a Pacific security fellow in the Centre for Strategic Studies, discussed the intensifying security issues arising from threats of climate change in the Pacific region. This evolving situation is reflected in the Boe Declaration and the Qatar Declaration, he explained, with climate change described as the number one existential threat. Furthermore, it is pivotal to understand the resiliency of Pacific peoples, he pointed out, in creating smart and effective climate policies for the Pacific. Modern technology and climate adaption approaches need to be considered alongside traditional knowledge. Empowerment of Pacific peoples is crucial.

Major challenge

Harinder Sidhu joined the panel after her keynote address and

discussed how historically the major challenge in Australia has been political consensus on climate action. The recent reality is there has been sustained action in Australia and that economic factors are driving much of the change. Sidhu noted that it is now more sensible economically to pursue a clean energy path than rely on traditional energy sources. She lauded Australia’s huge drive to expand solar power generation on home and business rooftops in the last couple decades. Australia’s approach with the Pacific involves not just providing financial support, Sidhu emphasised; it included fostering genuine partnerships in which Pacific nations lead the conversation on their climate needs and amplifying Pacific voices to ensure that their perspectives are included in international negotiations.

The discussion ended on a hopeful note, highlighting the importance of integrity, commitment and innovative co-operation as cornerstones for achieving global climate goals. In expressing optimism regarding the engagement of youth and local communities in climate action, the panellists suggested that generational changes and grassroots movements will play a crucial role in shaping the future of climate policy.

The Climate Change Symposium emphasised a number of key measures and themes, including: the importance of reinforcing international collaboration frameworks, such as the Paris Agreement; the need for bilateral and multilateral agreements incorporating sustainability and climate change measures like the New Zealand–European Union free trade agreement; incorporation of indigenous knowledge and practices into environmental diplomacy; the need for innovative climate finance mechanisms to mobilise resources; the vital role of youth engagement and advocacy; the need for cross-sector collaboration; the need for capacity-building and technical support in developing nations; the need to address global inequities, and the need for extra focus on crisis response mechanisms, particularly in the context of the Pacific Islands.

Closing remarks

In his closing remarks, NZIIA Patron Sir Anand Satyanand recommended the book Not the End of the World by Hannah Ritchie, which presents a hopeful perspective on environmental challenges in emphasising that solutions and progress are achievable. He noted that the book challenges the notion of impending doom regarding environmental issues, instead presenting a narrative of potential and resilience.

The symposium underscored the need for robust measures that are adaptive, inclusive and collaborative to effectively tackle climate change and biodiversity loss and continually to improve sustainability and circular economy measures. Through shared commitments, innovative approaches and a focus on community engagement, Satyanand stated that there is hope for meaningful progress in environmental diplomacy. Expressing optimism for future generations, he concluded by encouraging young people to engage actively in environmental issues with their passion for sustainability and the environment and their ability to hold leaders accountable.

The NZIIA Wellington branch thanks all the organising volunteers, speakers and attendees for joining together for this landmark event. We thank our amazing sponsors, namely the Australian High Commission (Gold Sponsor), the Embassy of Switzerland (Silver Sponsor) and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Silver Sponsor) and our host Zealandia.

Christina Hood makes a point with, at back, Harinder Sidhu, Ard van der Vorst and Iati Iati

ANNIVERSARY

Exiting Saigon

Ian McGibbon recalls a unique event in New Zealand’s diplomatic history 50 years ago.

About midday on 30 April 50 years ago, North Vietnamese tanks crashed through the gates of the presidential palace in the South Vietnamese capital Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City).

Waiting on the steps was General Duong Van (Big) Minh, the acting president of the Republic of Vietnam, who two hours before had ordered the South Vietnamese army to end its resistance. When he declared that he was handing over power, he was contemptuously dismissed as having no power to hand over. With the demise of the South Vietnamese regime, the Vietnam War was over at last. It was the first, and so far only, time that a state in which New Zealand had an embassy ceased to exist.

New Zealand’s relationship with the Republic of Vietnam was relatively short. Twelve years after recognising it in 1950, diplomatic relations were established, with Ambassador Sir Stephen Weir cross-accredited to Saigon from Bangkok. An office was established in Saigon in 1964 largely to support the New Zealand surgical team that had been dispatched to Qui Nhon the previous year. A resident ambassador, diplomat Paul Edmonds, arrived in early 1968; he would be followed by Lieutenant-General Sir Leonard Thornton (1972–74).

Career diplomat Norman Farrell had been in place as ambassador in Saigon only nine months when the situation in South Vietnam suddenly changed dramatically for the worse in mid-March 1975. Following a reverse in the Central Highlands, panic set in among the South Vietnamese army, soon spreading to the entire north of the country. Amid chaotic scenes, North Vietnamese regular troops advanced rapidly south. On 28 March the surgical team’s long stint in Qui Nhon came to a sudden end, leaving the city aboard an Air America flight just before it fell. The six New Zealanders headed to Saigon.1

By early April it was clear that Saigon would soon also be under attack. Apart from Farrell, the embassy at this stage comprised a third secretary (Frank Wilson), a stenographer (Maree Johnston), and Warwick Howe, an administrator with the surgical team, who had been pressed into service when he arrived in Saigon from Qui Nhon. The deputy ambassador, a counsellor, absent on leave, returned on 17 April but left next day, leaving Wilson as the ranking diplomat for two days in the

Dr Ian McGibbon ONZM was formerly general editor (war history) in the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, in which capacity he wrote the official history of New Zealand’s military and civil operations in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War.

temporary absence of the ambassador (in Singapore). Eight locally recruited South Vietnamese made up the rest of the embassy’s complement.

In the first three weeks of April, the embassy was busy helping New Zealanders with dependents and others with New Zealand connections to evacuate. Other tasks included dealing with refugee issues, arranging a planned evacuation of orphans and dispatching the embassy’s records to Singapore. The RNZAF played a prominent part in these activities, with Bristol Freighters shuttling between Saigon and Singapore, and a Hercules making several flights with refugee supplies. From early April there was always at least one Bristol Freighter and a small command detachment at Tan Son Nhut airport.

As the South Vietnamese fell back to the south, the situation in Saigon became increasingly fraught. Personal danger mounted as the city’s civilian population grew increasingly desperate. Law and order was breaking down, with Wilson recalling ‘the risk of public disorder, robbery or violence of a criminal nature’.2 Many were frantically seeking opportunities to flee the country. The possibility of Westerners being attacked because of their impending abandonment of the republic could not be ruled out. Working in these circumstances was not easy or relaxed. Farrell was later glowing in his praise of his three available New Zealand staff, including Howe:

Civilian evacuees from Saigon

As to... Mr Wilson and Miss Maree Johnson, I can express nothing but the highest possible praise. Both worked long hours without complaint (and sometimes without meals) and displayed remarkable versatility and splendid devotion to duty. Both were called upon to do work that was outside their previous experience and which would not normally have been expected of them in the respective capacities in which they were assigned to Saigon. If only two members of the New Zealand-based staff were to be available to me during this trying period I could not have asked for better. They have my highest possible commendation.3

Difficult decision

As the North Vietnamese forces closed in on the capital, the Bill Rowling-led government in Wellington wrestled with the question of what to do about the embassy. Should it remain in the city as a foot in the door to the new regime? Or should it leave? Ultimately, on 20 April, Farrell was told to evacuate the embassy when he felt it appropriate.

Next day, with other embassies having already left or preparing to do so and Tan Son Nhut now within range of North Vietnamese artillery, Farrell decided it was time to go. This put in motion a frenetic few hours for his staff. Wilson and Howe made repeated trips to the airport, conveying Vietnamese who were going to be evacuated on the final flight; these included family members of Vietnamese women married to two New Zealand diplomats and several orphans. None of them held exit clearances from the South Vietnamese authorities. For Wilson and Howe, ferrying people through checkpoints to the Bristol Freighter, the windows of which had been painted over to prevent anyone looking inside, was a nerve-wracking experience.

There were 22 Vietnamese on the plane when Farrell and Johnson boarded it just before departure. With the flight crew, the RNZAF command detachment and the diplomats, 38 were aboard — though only five had been notified to the airport authorities. The ambassador’s presence reduced the possibility of any hitches; had an inspection been demanded, the air crew intended to try to buy off the inspectors, or use weapons but only if this could be done surreptitiously. Taking off after an altercation, all understood, might result in their aircraft being pursued and shot down by a South Vietnamese air force plane.

The tension was palpable, therefore, as the aircraft sought

clearance to take off. When the control tower unexpectedly enquired whether all exit formalities had been completed, the pilot replied with a ‘false affirmative’. After enduring what seemed like a ‘long delay’, but was probably only about ten minutes, all on board were relieved when the go ahead came through at last. Taking off at 6.04 pm, the plane reached the relative safety of the ocean 21 minutes later and headed to Singapore.

Wilson and Howe did not leave on 21 April. The former had an important task to fulfil. Next day, he proceeded to the South Vietnamese foreign ministry to inform it that the embassy had been temporarily withdrawn. When this news was not received positively, the ‘Gallic shrug could then be used to full effect’, he later recalled.⁴ He and Howe then made their way back to the airport and left on an Australian aircraft at 4 pm.

Local staff

There remained the question of extracting the locally employed embassy staff and dependents. Only one had been taken out on the 21 April flight (without his family). There were also about 300 Vietnamese who had been in New Zealand as Colombo Plan students. Acting Prime Minister Bob Tizard eventually agreed that an attempt should be made to evacuate these people. But he made such an attempt subject to the RNZAF commander in Singapore agreeing that the operation was feasible. Wilson and Howe were actually on a Hercules waiting on the runway when the New Zealand commander, Air Commodore Mal Gunton, cancelled the flight, deciding wisely that trying to bring out such a large group amid the growing chaos in Saigon would involve unacceptable risks to both aircraft and personnel. Another attempt on 29 April was also prevented by Gunton, on the same grounds.

Despite being resigned to not being evacuated — the same fate that befell the Vietnamese working in the Australian embassy — the embassy staff continued to man the embassy until almost the end. They sent telexs to Wellington. At some stage a French con-man appeared and was spotted driving around Saigon in an embassy car displaying the ambassadorial flag.

Some New Zealanders remained in Saigon after the embassy left. The long-time leader of the surgical team, Jack Enwright, had come back after being evacuated, as did Sister Mary Lawrence, a Roman Catholic nun who tried to rescue some South Vietnamese nuns. Both would ultimately fly out on US helicopters from the US embassy compound just before the arrival of the North Vietnamese forces.

Journalist Peter Arnett, who had made his mark reporting the war, made no attempt to leave. He, too, made use of the ambassador’s car. He observed the North Vietnamese entry to the city and initial occupation but in late May was ordered to leave. As his Russian jetliner lifted off, he produced a bottle of Johnny Walker whisky he had ‘liberated’ from the ambassador’s office at the embassy, which by this time had been taken over by the North Vietnamese and stripped of its furniture, fittings and vehicles.

NOTES

1. For a more detailed account of these events see my New Zealand’s Vietnam War, A history of combat, commitment and controversy (Auckland, 2010), ch 32.

2. Frank Wilson, ‘The Fall of Saigon’, in Brian Lynch (ed), Celebrating New Zealand’s Emergence (Wellington, 2005), p.150.

3. Norman Farrell to the Prime Minister, 2 May 1975, External Affairs Records, PM58/478/1, Archives New Zealand, R22476612.

4. Wilson, p.151.

The evacuation of civilians from Saigon at Tan Son Nhut airport in April 1975, shortly before the departure of the embassy. Ambassador Norman Farrell is second from right.

BOB DAVIDSON

BOOKS

PRUDENCE, PRAGMATISM AND PRINCIPLE

New Zealand’s Security in the 21st Century

Author: Jim Rolfe

Published by: World Scientific, Singapore, 2025, 320pp, US$118 (hb).

How do you determine whether the national security system is robust enough to withstand the shocks it might experience, and fleet-footed enough to respond to the black swans?

This important book highlights two issues: first, whether the government’s national security system focuses more on the right processes than it does the right people, and second, whether the system ‘lacks imagination’ and, in doing so, might be making New Zealanders less secure.

Jim Rolfe is both a former defence and national security practitioner and scholar (he was the director of Victoria University of Wellington’s Centre for Strategic Studies in 2013–15) and has worked in a defence advisory capacity for the New Zealand, Australian and UAE governments. He is a very careful writer. A certain gruffness is evident in his style, which the reader comes to appreciate is just his desire to be methodical and fair. He engages with two frameworks to help guide us through the book, the 4Rs — risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery; and — as per the title of the book — prudence, pragmatism and principle. The book is encyclopedic in format: Rolfe is precise in his definitions and sorts the issues and case studies into neat categories. It is ideal for a textbook with which to teach national security, and perhaps more importantly a guide to how to think about it.

The book’s method is its strength and, if there is a weakness, it might be its aforementioned fairness. Often Rolfe challenges something he believes the government has not thought about properly, has contradicted itself over or has performed poorly on, only to balance it with an alternative view. The prudence, pragmatism and principle framework itself tends to explain away any questions raised, because the government nearly al-

Notes on reviewers

Dr Peter Grace’s forthcoming book The Intelligence Intellectuals: Social Scientists and the Making of the CIA will be published by Georgetown University Press. He is a co-director of the Otago National Security School.

Dr Brian Easton is an economist, social statistician and public policy analyst (www.eastonbh.ac.nz). He is the author of Not in Narrow Seas, The Economic History of Aotearoa New Zealand (2020).

Former Defence official Andrew Wierzbicki is a member of the NZIIA’s Board.

Angus Middleton is chair of the NZIIA’s Wellington branch.

ways arrives at a policy that is either prudent, pragmatic or principled. This sets up an expectation that the national security system is one that selfcorrects, at least over time. Rolfe, however, seems to be not wholly convinced that this will hold to be true.

The risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery mantra (Rolfe believes there should be five, including review) has developed into a national security system built around processes that can be activated according to need, and which devolves responsibility down to local government and even private enterprise if the issue is not serious enough to deal with at a national level. If it works well as a system, there are questions whether it works consistently well as far as human resources are concerned. (And it is worth remembering that any recruitment strategy based around hiring the ‘best and the brightest’ is also dependent on employees who have high expectations of quick promotion and a global market to turn to if these are not met.) The human resources issues seem to revolve around three things: senior leaders not having any handson experience of dealing with a crisis or even exercises practicing for a crisis; the silo effect of agencies not co-operating or sharing the same mindset; and Rolfe’s idea about lack of imagination — that policy-makers tend to ringfence national security rather than dealing with its wider societal implications. These are all human problems rather than process ones.

Of the hands-on problem, Rolfe makes the point that, although practice exercises exist for just about every event (mass immigration, cyber, bio-security, water contamination eruptions, floods and earthquakes), senior leaders are likely to delegate these to juniors and have little on-going experience of being in the trenches. In preparation for a Covid-like event, an exercise had been run in 2017 but ‘by the time the pandemic struck, staff turnover had been such that there was little personal memory within senior leadership of what was prepared for, what should be done and what responsibilities were held by whom’.

Of the mindset problem, it is evident that much of the system relies on the efficient conduct of all-of-government committees. The Covid response ended up working well, although there were clashes of culture (policy-focused agencies like the Ministry of Health dealing with operational counterparts who wanted things to happen faster and with more effect). During the 2008 global financial crisis, the national security system was not activated, either because it was not enough of a threat or ‘officials from the economic agencies had no belief that sharing their thinking… would help them solve the problems’.

This comes down to the need for mutual confidence between people working on the issue within government. It also speaks to another factor that military leaders and first respond-

ers already recognise: the need to be able to measure cognitive readiness, including the individual’s capacity for situational awareness, ability to work in teams, to lead others, to make decisions in changing and often volatile environments and to be able to critique one’s own decision-making process. These are processes that measure human frailties, rather than weak systems. They are as necessary in determining leadership readiness in our national security sector as they are for front-line readiness, like search and rescue officers and farmers watching for foot-and-mouth disease.

Rolfe says he started writing the book thinking the task a simple one, but this changed after the New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s national security strategy was revealed. He shares with other national security watchers a disappointment that the 2023 Secure Together strategy redefined the mission to be about preventing harm, rather than the prior view that national security was about providing citizens with the ability to go about their lives safely and to prosper. Rolfe introduces a concept he calls ‘societal security’, which he employs when discussing the mounting challenges of climate change, social cohesion and national identity. This is distinct from human security, and an appropriate separation because it focuses on the stability of society and the effects of its possible fracture or the possibility of civil conflict.

I am not sure we needed another conceptual category here. But Rolfe has done something important by drawing attention to the very natural assumption that national security planning is an evolution, and that there are cans we can kick down the road. The danger of this is that the very gaps that Rolfe has so painstakingly identified are left alone until there is a government that has the time, money and patience to invest in figuring them out. Or is prompted by another crisis.

PETER GRACE

A TEAM OF FIVE MILLION?

The 2020 ‘Covid-19’ New Zealand General Election

Editors: Jennifer Curtin, Lara Greaves and Jack Vowles

Published by: ANU Press, Canberra, 2020, 286pp, $60 (also available as a free download).

A POPULIST EXCEPTION?

The 2017 New Zealand General Election

Editors: Jack Vowles and Jennifer Curtin

Published by: ANU Press, Canberra, 2020, 286pp, $60 (also available as a free download).

The cover of the book by the New Zealand Election Study (NZES) on the 2020 New Zealand election shows the re-elected prime minister Jacinda Ardern on the centre left and leaning to the left. She is not there because she ‘won’ the election but because she coined the phrase ‘team of five million’ as a part of New Zealand’s response to the 2020 Covid pandemic. The book is organised around the question of how the pandemic earlier in that year influenced the election outcome.

Certainly, it was a remarkable outcome. Against all expectations, the winning party secured 50 per cent of the list-vote,

ending up with a parliamentary majority unprecedented in an MMP election (although the study rightly compares it to Labour’s 1938 win in a preMMP election format). Leftish parties won 60 per cent of the vote; the centre voted Labour in 2020.

The commentariat revels in elections, with accounts replete with anecdotes and opinions disguised as hard analysis. The 2020 NZES survey was based upon a sample of 3730 voters (the 1246 (over-sampled) Māori are usual size of a political opinion poll of the entire population).

It provides some factual content which may disturb the conventional wisdom. For instance, over a third of voters switched parties between 2017 and 2020 (a similar proportion applied in earlier elections). Allow for those who contemplated changing their party vote but did not, and the conclusion must be that true party-loyalists are less than half of voters. The likelihood is that the party-fickle voters are loyal to some principles. In each election they consider which party is closest to them. Perhaps the parties shift rather than the voters.

The NZES has not explored this. The logistics of each election survey are so challenging that it takes about three years to get their book out (delayed in this case by Covid-19). By which time the commentariat is getting bored with the previous election — the book on the 2023 election is due in 2026 — and turning their mind to the next one.

Which is a pity. Other than the Census of Population and Dwellings — limited in what opinions it can ask — there is no larger regular social survey in New Zealand. Unfortunately, New Zealand social science has neither the resources, nor, often, the mind to exploit the data base. (This is the ninth survey; NZES’s first was in 1990. Once it was funded by the public good research funding; when that funding was cut, a number of funding sources were cobbled together.)

Such election studies go back to 1960. Their grandfather is Bob Chapman, who used the results to provide a stunning insight to the social and political structure of New Zealand in a 1962 Landfall article tracing the changing class structure of the evolving political economy. I shall do the same with the NZES 2017 and 2020 results on a much smaller canvas.

There is a tendency for New Zealand’s public conversation to treat Māori as a homogeneous group. It is not necessarily so. To do so leads to a distorted account of Māori in society and the political economy, where their considerable diversity is ignored and where the community is presented as having few internal differences. (The discussion does the same for most other groups.)

The NZES enables us to compare the views of those of descent on the Māori roll with those Māori on the general roll (the two groups are about equal size). On some dimensions there is

little statistical difference, but often it is substantial. In 2017, 73 per cent of Māori on the Māori roll rated their culture as ‘quite’ or ‘very important’, but only 29.6 per cent of Māori on the general roll did so. Only 3.4 per cent of Māori on the Māori roll rated it as ‘not important at all’ versus 20.2 per cent of Māori on the general roll.

Typically, those on the general roll tend to have views which are closer to those of non-Māori than their relatives on the Māori roll. Less than 10 per cent of Māori on the Māori roll are opposed to Māori electorate seats, while in 2017 around 35 per cent of Māori on the general roll were opposed to them, almost comparable to the 43 per cent of non-Māori.

At first this may seem no great insight, but consider how often you hear someone describing a view as ‘the Māori view’. Whether they are Māori or non-Māori, they are wrong. (As a political example, those who voted for Te Pāti Māori may have reasonably cohesive views, but less than a quarter of those of Māori descent list-voted for it, even in its successful 2023 election. More Māori voted Labour — in fact Labour got more list votes in every one of the seven Māori seats.)

There is a wealth of insights to be unlocked by investigating the unit records of the NZES (anonymously, of course), going back to 1990, not only about electoral behaviour but also on a wider spectrum of social and political issues. There is not a lot of enthusiasm for providing the resources to do so. The commentariat prefers anecdote and opinion, even if it means getting it wrong — nobody is going to find out. In any case the NZES reports are not easy reading, even for a social statistician.

But there are nuggets buried in them. Consider ‘Ardern’s [campaign launch] speech did not mention Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty of Waitangi), nor did issues specifically defined as Māori register among NZES respondents’. What a contrast with the policies which she followed.

I draw a parallel with David Lange, whose 1987 launch played down the neo-liberal policies which his second term government would accelerate. In both years there was a controversial report which, although not published during the election, greatly influenced post-election policy; in 2020 it was He Puapua. Lange could not resist a small coterie in his caucus determined to pursue those policies. Ultimately his tank ran out and he resigned. The political history of the Ardern–Hipkins Labour government is yet to be written — my Not in Narrow Seas is a policy history — but perhaps the same thing happened to Ardern’s control of Māori policy. The NZES 2023 and 2026 election reports should tell us more about the popular response. Alas, we are likely to have to wait until 2026 and 2029 for them.

BRIAN EASTON

PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL

OF THE ROYAL NEW ZEALAND NAVY

Volume Four

Editor: Stephen Hoadley

Published by: The Royal New Zealand Navy, Wellington, 2024, 143pp (available only online).

The presence in the Tasman Sea in February of a three-ship naval squadron from China, which proceeded to conduct unexpected live firing exercises, brought into stark relief the importance of New Zealand having appropriate naval and air assets

to provide a presence in its own direct area of strategic interest. Fortuitously, the New Zealand frigate HMNZS Te Kaha was on its way to a Middle East deployment and was able to be re-tasked to monitor the Chinese ships. Similarly, the replenishment ship HMNZS Aotearoa was on its way back from Antarctica and also able to be re-deployed.

The Royal New Zealand Air Force’s new Boeing P8 maritime patrol aircraft provided air surveillance.

Of particular interest, therefore, is the October 2024 edition of the Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy Under the able leadership of a new general editor, Hon Captain Dr Stephen Hoadley (also a corresponding editor of the New Zealand International Review and former associate professor of political studies at Auckland University), who was appointed following the death of the founding general editor, Dr Lance Beath, this edition is especially timely given the recent circumstances in the Tasman Sea, notwithstanding the four-month gap between publication of the journal and the Chinese deployment. This is because while Hoadley has brought together a range of writers, including a number of serving or former RNZN staff, and articles on maritime subjects grouped under the three broad themes of the past, present and future, presciently the section on the present includes articles on the threat which China could pose to the NZDF in the coming decade in the Pacific Islands region, and the value which New Zealand gets from its naval combat force, of which Te Kaha is half (the other is HMNZS Te Mana).

These articles, as well as the others, provide timely commentary and discussion on matters affecting New Zealand’s maritime domain. At a time when the strategic environment is so unsettled, the prime minister and other ministers are talking of wanting to increase defence expenditure and the government has just released a Defence Capability Plan, this latest edition of the Journal is worth reading. This will require stamina as, like many other publications cutting costs, having the publication only available online creates its own challenges.

ANDREW WIERZBICKI

THE PRESIDENCY AND DOMESTIC POLICY: Comparing Leadership Styles, FDR to Biden

Authors: Michael A. Genovese, Todd L. Belt and William M. Lammers

Published by: Routledge, London, 2024 (third edition), 376pp, $126.

In September 2024, the NZIIA Wellington and Auckland branches hosted Professor Todd L. Belt from George Washington University in Foggy Bottom, Washington DC, a mere few hundred metres from the White House. Belt is a co-author with Michael Genovese (with the late William Lammers honoured) of this third edition of The Presidency and Domestic Policy: Compar-

ing Leadership Styles, FDR to Biden, which is updated specifically to cover the Trump (first term) and Biden presidencies.

In this book, the authors evaluate the styles and strategies presidents employ in their efforts to govern successfully by four specific dimensions: approaches to advisory processes and decisionmaking; administrative strategies; public leadership; and congressional leadership. But how does one rank the greatness of US presidents? In an incredibly polarised United States, effectively ranking presidents becomes an interesting intellectual challenge for historians and political scientists. To avoid any reflection of bias and policy preferences, the authors have based their judgments of presidents not on what they think they should have done, but against what each president stated were their objectives at the beginning of their term. If you want a biased pro-Trump or pro-Biden perspective on their leadership styles, this is not the book for you.

The authors elected to assess presidents on a skill versus political opportunity scale. The level of opportunity is measured by extrinsic factors such as public demand, pro- or antigovernment sentiments, issue ripeness and the strength of the president’s party in Congress. Genovese et al state that when presidents are categorised by opportunity level then it is easier to determine who the more skilful presidents are, though admitting that while some objective indicators are available, ultimately this form of categorisation is somewhat subjective. Obama and Trump were classified moderate opportunity presidents; Nixon, Carter, Bush senior, Clinton and Biden classified as low opportunity, and Reagan and Bush junior the more recent high opportunity presidents. This book was written in the early stages of Biden’s term, and one must wonder whether the authors’ assessment of Biden would be any different after the final two years of his term.

As someone who has only observed (and studied) US presidents from the days of George Bush senior to the present, it was refreshing to learn more about the period of US presidents in the mid-20th century, where many historians believe most of the strongest performances were.

The president chapter descriptors are apt: Barack Obama ‘A Negotiator Without a Partner’; George W. Bush ‘A Reluctant Guardian’; Clinton ‘A Perpetual Campaigner Under Siege’; Trump an ‘Outsider, Disruptor, Norm-Buster, Dissembler’ and Biden ‘Cleaning the Augean Stables’ (alluding to Hercules successfully cleaning up the immense and filthy cattle stables in Greece).

One difficulty in rating a president by opportunity is that political opportunity may vary dramatically in office, for example, with George W. Bush going from a low level of opportunity in his first term to a high opportunity president eight months later following the 9/11 attacks in New York.

So how did the rankings end up? The authors assessed Franklin Roosevelt to be the top performer in skill demonstrated for high-opportunity presidents; Truman the highest for moderate-opportunity presidents; and Biden, perhaps surprisingly, the highest for low-opportunity presidents. Obama and Trump were

rated second and fifth (bottom) in skill assessments for the moderate-opportunity presidents. Biden was rated an over-achiever, and assessments of earlier presidential achievements highlight the fact that he faced an impediment not shared with any other president — a former president actively working to thwart him at every turn, with support from Republican governors and congressional representatives.

In winning the 2024 presidential election, Trump made history by becoming the first US president since Democrat Grover Cleveland in 1892 to win again after being defeated. If this book continues to a fourth edition covering Trump’s second term, it will be intriguing to find how Trump is assessed. Will assessment of him differ from this edition’s ranking as a moderate opportunity president?

What would be particularly interesting is a comparison of leadership styles of Cleveland (a Democrat) and Trump (a Republican) of their two (split) terms. There are a lot of similarities between the two in that they both detested the media throughout their careers, dismissed economist orthodoxy on tariffs and targeted ‘establishment’ politicians inside and outside their respective parties.

While this book focuses primarily on domestic policy, there is some coverage around foreign policy influences. Highlighted examples include George H.W. Bush’s success in the execution of the Gulf War, producing a surge in popularity that assisted him in delivering domestic policy. Meanwhile, Trump’s on-going focus on anti-immigration and ‘America First’ is mentioned as likely to bring foreign policy distractions that could hinder his ability to achieve his domestic goals.

This third edition is a great read for political science students and American history enthusiasts interested in how the leadership style of recent presidents compare with those of past presidents dating back to Franklin Roosevelt. It would, however, be great in a future book for the authors to specifically focus on the presidency and international policy using the opportunity, challenge and skill assessment.

ANGUS MIDDLETON

RECENT

INSTITUTE NOTES

National Office and branch activities

The NZIIA will hold its annual general meeting and annual lecture on 6 May. A full report will be included in the next issue, along with the text of the lecture, by Minister of Defence Judith Collins.

The date of the NZIIA’s National Conference has been changed. It will now take place on 17 June.

Auckland

On 19 March, in conjunction with the Public Policy Club, the branch staged a panel discussion on ‘New Zealand’s International Futures: Security, Economy, Diplomacy’, moderated by NZIIA director Dr Hamish McDougall. The panellists were Hon David Parker (Labour spokesperson for Foreign Affairs), Professor Jennifer Curtin (University of Auckland), John Pearson (British deputy high commissioner to New Zealand) and Dr Brent Burmester (University of Auckland). The following day Dr Reuben Steff, senior lecturer of geopolitics and international relations at the University of Waikato, presented and discussed his new book New Zealand’s Geopolitics and the US–China Competition.

Christchurch

On 3 March HE Makoto Osawa, ambassador of Japan, addressed the branch on ‘Policy Reform, Trade, Negotiation and Diplomacy’.

Hawke’s Bay

The following meetings were held:

10 Mar Ian Hill (retired diplomat, adjunct professor in the Centre of Defence and Security Studies at Massey University and a senior fellow in the Centre for Strategic Studies), ‘Russia–Ukraine and the Return of Realpolitik’.

10 Apr HE William Tan (high commissioner of Singapore), ‘Singapore’s Perspective on Global Affairs’.

Nelson

The following meetings were held:

20 Mar Prof Jonathan Boston (Victoria University of Wellington), ‘Can Democracy Survive the Current Polycrisis?’ 10 Apr Colin James (political journalist and commentator), ‘Disturbances — Then and Now’.

Palmerston North

In conjunction with the Palmerston North City Council, New Zealand Centre for Global Studies, Massey Business School, International Pacific University New Zealand and Manawatu Young Chamber, the branch held a panel discussion on 6 March on ‘Unlocking Doors for Global Experiences’. After Libby Giles (director of the New Zealand Centre for Global Studies) delivered a keynote address, Mayor Grant Smith (president of Global Cities New Zealand), alumni and international programme recipients shared their personal growth stories. The meeting also included an expo with representatives from Education New Zealand, Volunteer Service Abroad, Massey Business School, IPU New Zealand and Massey Global, Asia NZ Foundation, Universal College of Learning Manawatu, Young Enterprise Scheme and Palmerston North City Council global ambassadors.

Wellington

The branch held an Environmental Diplomacy Symposium at Zealandia eco-sanctuary on 12 March. The keynote speaker, Australian high commissioner HE Harinder Sidhu AM, spoke on ‘Australia’s Green Economic Transition’. Her address and a report on the symposium are to be found elsewhere in this issue.

Julia MacDonald’s book launch on 4 March was postponed. On the following day the branch held a student social mixer event at Victoria University of Wellington.

On 2 April a panel discussion, ‘Celebrating the Contribution of Honorary Consuls’, was moderated by Angus Middleton. The panellists were Prof Carmen Dalli (honorary consul of Malta and dean of the Wellington Consular Corps), Peter Kiely (honorary consul of the Slovak Republic) and Gloriana Quirós Venegas (honorary consul of Costa Rica).

A lunch meeting was held on 17 April with the new ambassador of Costa Rica to New Zealand HE Carolina Molina Barrantes, who spoke on ‘Biodiversity, Nature, and Business Opportunities: an Introduction to Costa Rica’.

The International Futures event in Auckland on 20 March

The panellists in the International Futures event: from left, Brent Burmeister, Jennifer Curtin, David Parker and John Pearson

The following meetings were also held:

6 Mar Andrew Hampton (director-general of security at the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service), ‘The Rising Importance of Intelligence Co-operation With the Pacific’. The Centre for Strategic Studies cohosted this meeting. The text of Hampton’s speech can be found elsewhere in this issue.

20 Mar Dr Karam Shaar (a Syrian-New Zealand economist), ‘Post-Assad Syria: Implications for the Country and the Middle East’.

24 Mar HE Jetmira Berdynaj Shala (ambassador of the Republic of Kosovo), ‘Seventeen Years of Independence: The Kosovo Journey to Statehood’.

Brian Lovett

It is with regret that we note the passing on 23 March of long-time production contractor for the magazine Brian Lovett. With the late Peter Robinson firstly in Industrial Art and Design Ltd and then in his own right as the principal of Lovett Graphics, he laid out the NZIR from 1979 to 2018. His enthusiasm for the magazine, his creative contribution and his cheerful bonhomie at our annual dinners are remembered with affection.

Andrew Hampton answers a question put by David Capie following his address on 6 March

The honorary consul panellists after the 2 April meeting in Wellington: from left, James Kember, Gloriana Quirós, Carmen Dalli, Peter Kiely and Angus Middleton

Kosovo ambassador Jetmira Berdynaj Shala (centre) with Karim Dickie and Saskia Grant after her address on 24 March

Jetmira Berdynaj Shala gives her presentation

Harinder Sidhu gives her keynote address at the Environmental Diplomacy Symposium

AN INVITATION

If you are interested in international affairs and you are not already a subscriber to the New Zealand International Review, consider the advantage of receiving this magazine on a regular basis. New Zealand International Review completed its 49th year of publication in 2024. It continues to be the only national magazine exclusively devoted to international issues as they affect New Zealand. Issued bimonthly it is circulated throughout New Zealand and internationally. The NZIR is non-partisan, independent of government and pressure groups and has lively articles from local and international authors, with special emphasis on New Zealand’s international relations. It contains

• stimulating and up-to-date articles on topical issues,

• reviews of recent book releases,

• details of other NZIIA publications,

• information on national and branch activities.

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