War of words: China’s role in the Pacific

Matthew Doidge and Serena Kelly discover a significant shift in the shape of media reporting on China.

A discursive war of words is taking place through the medium of Pacific media. While there is an overwhelming preponderance of Western discourses on China, this does not seem to translate into influence over local reporting and perspectives. Instead, Chinese discourses on China's own regional role appear to have greater resonance in Pacific journalism. This suggests two potential scenarios playing out in Pacific media — that the engagement of China is welcomed in the region and that local journalists, potentially under political or economic pressure and with newsrooms potentially experiencing increased Chinese influence, may be unwilling or unable to counter pro-China discourses.

That the Pacific Islands region has become a more geopolitically contested space is something of which we, in New Zealand, are intensely aware, sharpened most recently by the strained relations with the Cook Islands’ government following announcement of its plans to establish closer ties with China earlier this year.1 This is a reflection of wider stresses evident between an increasingly regionally assertive China and Western states, particularly the United States. Building on its economic successes since it joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001, over the last decade Xi Jinping’s China has sought to extend its influence on the global stage, inevitably leading to tension as its diplomatic, security and development interests (among others) intersect with those of the West.

This has been particularly evident in the Indo-Pacific macroregion where, as a response to China’s policies, Western states have sought to sharpen their own regional focus, elaborating a range of new strategic frameworks and priorities. Thus we have seen the Indo-Pacific framing formalised in strategies from the United States (which in its 2017 National Security Strategy defined the Indo-Pacific region as an arena of ‘geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order’), Australia, New Zealand, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as increasingly being reflected in the foreign policy postures of key Asian regional actors, including Japan, South Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

While the Indo-Pacific concept is in practice heavily focused on the northern maritime arc, the islands states of the Pacific have also been increasingly brought into the geopolitical frame, most clearly since the 2022 signature of the China–Solomon Islands security pact. The latest concerns over the Cook Islands–China relationship are simply the most recent expression of this. In this Pacific Islands space, the southernmost theatre of the Indo-Pacific region, the China–West rivalry has been focused on discursive contestation — an ‘information war’ or ‘war of words’ in which each side seeks to present a positive view of itself, and a somewhat less rosy one of its rival.² The Pacific states have found themselves positioned between two competing camps, each seeking to convince them of the veracity of their viewpoint.

A key battleground in this discursive conflict has been regional media. As Shailendra Singh, head of journalism at the Suva-based University of the South Pacific, noted, ‘All the countries jostling for influence [in the Pacific region] are wooing the media, one way or another to win Pacific citizens’ hearts and minds because this can influence government decisions, at least to some extent’.³ For China, this means constructing an image of its positive regional role as a partner to Pacific peoples, while for the West, the opposite is the case — presenting a position on China that highlights the dangers of its engagement, seeking to counter what is perceived as a ‘foreign malign influence’.⁴

Recognising the increasing intensity of this discursive conflict, we were struck by a very simple question: who is winning? To answer this, we examined eight regional print media outlets⁵ during two timeframes of heightened geopolitical contestation: October–December 2019 (following the September 2019 switch in diplomatic recognition of both Kiribati and Solomon Islands from Taiwan to China); and October–December 2022 (following the April 2022 signing of the Solomon Islands–China Security Agreement). From the eight selected outlets over these two blocks of time, we identified and analysed 602 relevant articles.

Significant shift

Shape Shifts in the Shape of Coverage: The first thing our study noted was that, across these timeframes, there was a significant shift in the shape of reporting on China. This was seen firstly in the source of articles published in Pacific media. Of all articles addressing China in 2019, over half were produced by local reporters, with around one-third being re-published from Western media sources. By 2022, only one-quarter came from local reporting, with two-thirds from Western sources. Over both timeframes, Chinese-sourced reporting was present, though it was nowhere near as prevalent as that from local or Western sources.

A variety of factors shaped the increasing footprint of Western material in Pacific media. Already stretched Pacific newsrooms were significantly impacted by a decline in revenues as a consequence of Covid-19, affecting the ability to support local reporting. In some jurisdictions, restrictions on reporting seen as inimical to government interests (including criticising key international partners) may also have played a role. But the most significant reason has been the increase in the volume of reporting coming out of Western media institutions as a result of elevated interest in a more regionally active China, and of a push by the political classes for more favourable messaging. In this respect, former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer emphasised the importance of ‘investing in media platforms in the Pacific so Australia’s interpretation of regional and global events is the default for the region’.⁶ Allied with challenges facing local newsrooms, the increase in re-publication of material from Western media has resulted in something of a ‘flooding of the airwaves’.

Second, at the same time that the number of Western republications increased, we also noted a shift in tone of this reporting. Whereas in 2019, 78.3 per cent of Western-sourced reporting was neutral on China and 16.7 per cent was negative, by 2022, 61.4 per cent was neutral, with 36.3 per cent adopting a negative tone.

Two themes

Axis of Dispute I: Development: But this provides only part of the story. In terms of what is being said — the axes of discursive dispute — two main themes were evident: development and geopolitical contestation. The development focus is a reflection of the broader attention that has been given to China as it has become more active in the field, in so doing challenging the accepted frameworks and practices progressively established by the Western-dominated Development Assistance Committee of the OECD since the establishment of the grouping in the 1960s. This, alongside the relative lack of transparency associated with China’s activities in the development space, has raised concerns about its role and motivations, and about the type of development assistance being provided and the impact it is likely to have. To its critics, Chinese aid is seen as being driven by economic and political interests, as characterised by poor practice and as contributing to unsustainable debt burdens. Then US National Security Adviser John Bolton’s comments that ‘China uses bribes, opaque agreements, and the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and demands’ and that its ‘investment ventures are riddled with corruption, and do not meet the same environmental or ethical standards as U.S. developmental programs’⁷ are characteristic of this perspective.

There are, of course, two sides to any story. Unsurprisingly, the view of China, and indeed of many of the recipients of Chinese assistance, diverges somewhat from this perspective. China seeks to project the image of a benign and responsible great power, pursuing peace, stability and prosperity. It forwards a view of itself, as then Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted, as ‘a compassionate, committed and responsible China that stands by principles… and lend[s] more confidence and strength to the pursuit of development for all’.⁸ It claims an identity as a developing country, and therefore sees its development engagement as a form of South–South co-operation, of equal partnership that eschews the top-down dynamic of Western programmes. Its development aid is seen as a form of mutual assistance, characterised by ‘mutual respect, equality, keeping promise [sic], mutual benefits and win-win’.9

Our study found both sides of this contested image clearly present in Pacific media, though it was almost twice as common in 2019 as 2022. Notwithstanding the reduced prevalence of the development debate, and mir- roring the increased overall negative tone of Western-sourced reporting, by 2022 the Western position on China had come to be framed in much starker terms. Its development interventions were defined as ‘badly planned’, as ‘white elephants’, as ‘ill-conceived’ and likely to worsen the debt issue, and as involving ‘underhanded dealings’ that endanger democracy. As a direct counter to Western critiques, though as noted far less prevalent, articles re-published from Chinese media clearly forwarded the Chinese perspective. Interestingly, when it came to local Pacific reporting — the product of Pacific journalism — the Chinese position dominated, a trend that strengthened even as re-published Western-sourced articles offered a more strident critique. By 2022, Pacific reporting (and indeed, on occasion, Pacific leaders) was replicating core talking points characterising China’s role as win-win, characterised by mutual respect and so on. In short, what we found was that, while there was a clear contest reflected in Pacific media between the two diverging positions on China’s development role, when it came to local reporting, the pro-China position had greater resonance.

Second area

Axis of Dispute II: Geopolitical Contestation: The second area of dispute we noted in our study centred around issues of geopolitical contestation, though here, in contrast to the continuity of the debate on development, a notable evolution in thematic focus was evident. In 2019, almost 40 per cent of Pacific media articles addressing China centred on the issue of geopolitical contestation, the main focus of which was diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, and the One China Principle. This was driven by the switch in diplomatic recognition of Kiribati and Solomon Islands from Taiwan to China in September of that year. For those Western-sourced articles in the Pacific media, emergent strands of argument included allusions to Chinese inducements to generate support, and increasing concern with an ‘external power’ exerting itself in the Pacific Islands space. In local reporting, too, diplomatic recognition was a core focus, ranging from general acknowledgement of the economic benefits to be gained from closer ties with China through to the more direct assertion of Vanuatu’s then Foreign Minister Ralph Regenvanu that ‘because of its limited economic clout, Vanuatu had no choice but to use its votes strategically in international organisations such as the UN [and] this included targeting infrastructure investment from larger countries, such as China’.10 That said, a significant strand of local reporting also acknowledged the controversy generated by switching diplomatic recognition, largely citing opposition politicians.

By 2022, a turbo-charging of geopolitical contestation was evident, as well as an evolution in the thematic focus. Almost 60 per cent of reporting on China now focused on issues of geopolitics, with security coming very much to the fore. Here again, Western reporting dominated — almost 80 per cent of articles addressing the issue of security and China came from Western sources, and with a notable increase in material coming from Australia and the United Kingdom. This was a direct reflection of the renewed regional interest in the wake of the AUKUS announcement of September 2021, and of the Solomon Islands–China Security Agreement of April 2022. Indeed, articles sourced from AUKUS states were much more likely to focus on issues of security than those from non-AUKUS Western states (such as New Zealand), and were notably negative in tone (around 40 per cent of articles from AUKUS states evaluated China negatively, compared to 7 per cent of articles from New Zealand). In this reporting, China was defined largely in terms of threat, its actions classed as ‘pernicious’ and ‘malign’. It was seen as ‘aggressive and bullying’, and utilising economic pressure and coercion. Also intrinsic to this reported Western discourse was a clear process of the ‘othering’ of China as different to, and separate from, the values and identity that (at least from the Western perspective) are seen as characterising the Pacific Islands region. This was evident in on-going reference to values that China was seen not to represent — such as respect for human rights — but was perhaps more interestingly seen through the framing of the concept of a ‘Pacific family’. The usage of this concept increased tenfold between 2019 and 2022, and exclusively in articles derived from a Western source addressing issues of geopolitical contestation. The idea of the Pacific family clearly constitutes an effort to define commonality, being utilised particularly as a way to situate New Zealand and Australia as Pacific nations. But importantly, it also comprises a form of coded messaging — a form of dog whistle — whereby, in defining this family and the place of New Zealand and Australia within it, the strong sub-text is the question as to who is not part of that family. The fact that, in our sample, this construction was utilised in relation to a single outside power — China — suggests what the answer to that question might be.

Chinese discourse

While Western-sourced articles dove deep on security in 2022, by contrast with the development issue, we found no specific direct counter-discourse coming from China. Instead, what was evident in China-sourced material, or in articles citing Chinese officials, was a pivoting away from security and towards issues of economics and development. In other words, there was an avoidance of the contested space that security had become, with a shift to those topics where it was seen to offer a strong message of positive regional engagement.

This was a process mirrored by local Pacific reporting, with China’s role generally defined as one of partnership, and with negative characterisations — notably around its security role — largely avoided. Where Pacific voices did express criticism of China’s security role, this occurred in Western articles, not in local reporting. To the extent that local journalism addressed security issues, this focused on expressions of opposition to the securitisation of the Pacific space by external powers, and to the pressure for the islands states to pick sides. Also notable was a strengthening Pacific counter-discourse seeking to shift security debate away from military contestation, and towards regional priorities. Here, climate change was defined as the primary security threat confronting the Pacific.

In a nutshell, while geopolitical contestation, and es- pecially security, dominated news articles in relation to China, this was a one-sided discussion. A strongly negative Western discourse, drawing heavily on reporting from the AUKUS states, was evident, but this lacked a direct counter-discourse. Instead, the controversial topic of security in 2022 was avoided, with discussion pivoting towards issues of the economy and development.

Our study, limited in scope as it was, offers some interesting insights into the discursive war of words taking place through the medium of Pacific media. We found that, while there is an overwhelming (and indeed increasing) preponderance of Western discourses on China present (largely re-published from Western media sources), this does not seem to translate into influence over local reporting and perspectives. Instead, and possibly surprisingly, Chinese discourses on China's own regional role appear to have greater resonance in Pacific journalism. This is as evident in relation to China’s regional development role as it is in relation to the increased security focus that we have seen since the signing of the China–Solomon Islands Security Agreement in 2022.

This apparent resonance of China’s discourse, notwithstanding the tide of Western-sourced articles, suggests two potential scenarios playing out in Pacific media. The first is that, regardless of Western reservations, the engagement of China is welcomed in the region, possibly providing greater room for manoeuvre in relation to traditional partners and donors. The second is that local journalists, potentially under political or economic pressure and with newsrooms potentially experiencing increased Chinese influence,11 may be unwilling or unable to counter pro-China discourses. Our dataset does not speak to this issue, but it is certainly one that exercises many commentators on the regional political situation.

A final point that is worth drawing is that our study offers further support for the contention that the Pacific region is not simply a stage on which other actors play. Rather, it is an actor in its own right, with Pacific agency and Pacific perspectives to be seen clearly in relation to security discourses. Where the preponderance of Western-sourced articles leaned heavily into traditional conceptions of security and the framing of China as a threat, a strengthening Pacific approach was evident in local reporting. Here, opposition to securitisation of the Pacific was evident, alongside a reframing of security in terms of the existential threat of climate change.

Dr Mathew Doidge is a senior research fellow at the National Centre for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury. Dr Serena Kelly is a senior lecturer in political science and international relations at the same university. She is a member of the NZIIA Board. This article draws on a much fuller study recently published in open access by The Pacific Review For more detailed analysis and complete references, please consult that publication: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.108 0/09512748.2024.2412010.

Notes

1. Giles Dexter, ‘Explainer: The diplomatic row between New

Zealand and the Cook Islands’, Radio New Zealand, 10 Feb 2025 (www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/541422/explainer-the-diplomaticrow-between-new-zealand-and-the-cook-islands).

2. In the following discussion, we make no assertion as to the veracity of either side’s claims; our interest is only in the shape of the contest as it plays out in Pacific media.

3. Virginia Harrison, ‘US vows to support “free media” in Pacific as concern over China influence grows’, Guardian, 30 Oct 2023 (www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/30/us-china-conflictpacific-free-media).

4. Department of State, ‘Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Allen Travels to Fiji, Vanuatu, Australia, and Chile’, Media Note, 11 Oct 2023 (2021-2025.state. gov/under-secretary-of-state-for-public-diplomacy-and-publicaffairs-allen-travels-to-fiji-vanuatu-australia-and-chile/).

5. Cook Islands News, Fiji Sun, Island Times (Palau), Samoa Observer, Solomon Times, The National (PNG), Vanuatu Daily Post, as well as the Pacific Islands News Association’s (PINA) PACNEWS newswire service.

6. Alexander Downer, ‘Engaging with Asia must not mean disengaging with the Pacific’, Australian Financial Review, 18 Dec 2022 (www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/engaging-with-asia-must-notmean-disengaging-with-the-pacific-20221216-p5c70t).

7. John Bolton, ‘Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy’, Heritage Foundation Lecture, 13 Dec 2018 (agoa.info/news/ article/15564-advisor-ambassadorjohn-bolton-on-the-the-trumpadministration-s-new-africa-strategy.html).

8. Jiangtao Shi, ‘No Wolf Warriors here: Foreign minister sends message of ‘“responsible China”’, South China Morning Post, 8 Mar 2021 (www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3124595/chinasforeign-minister-sheds-wolf-warrior-pose-and-presents).

9. SCIO, China’s Foreign Aid, Beijing: State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2014 (english.www.gov.cn/ archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986592. htm).

10. ‘Vanuatu reviews “passports for sale” scheme over EU worries’, Vanuatu Daily Post, 24 Oct 2019 (www.dailypost.vu/news/vanu atureviews-passports-for-sale-scheme-over-eu-worries/article_ e13d6206-f5d8-11e9-8051-878d0fa2d3b6.html).

11. Mackenzie Smith and Toby Mann, ‘China is trying to buy influence with media in the Pacific as it aims to strengthen its presence in the region’, ABC News, 2 Aug 2023 (www.abc.net.au/news/202308-02/china-buys-influence-solomon-islands-star-newspaper-pa cific/102668914?future=true&).

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