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WittgensteinonLogicastheMethodofPhilosophy WittgensteinonLogic astheMethodof Re-examiningtheRootsand DevelopmentofAnalyticPhilosophy
OskariKuusela
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TothememoryofSalla-MarjaKuusela-Nymanand AleksiTimoteusTarzanKuusela 1.Frege’sandRussell’sNewLogic:ThePromiseofPhilosophical Progress13
1.1LogicastheMethodofPhilosophy:TheNotionofaLogicalLanguage 14
1.2TheObjectofInvestigationofLogic:Anti-Psychologism 22
1.3Frege,Russell,andthe Tractatus
1.4AnInterpretationalDisputeRelatingtothe Tractatus 37
2.TheTractatus’ PhilosophyofLogicandtheLogocentricPredicament45
2.1LogicasaUniversalScienceandtheLogocentricPredicament
2.2The Tractatus’ SolutiontotheLogocentricPredicament
2.2.1Wittgenstein’scritiqueofFrege’sandRussell’saxiomatic accountsoflogic 54
2.2.2Logictakescareofitself:Apriorityandlogicasaclarificatory discipline 59
2.2.3Logicalgeneralityandthefailureofthesesasexpressionsof logicalnecessity 65
2.3TruthorCorrectnessinLogicandthePossibilityofaMetaperspective 72
3.The Tractatus’ PhilosophyofLogicandCarnap77
3.1LogicasSyntax:Agreement,SomeDifferences,andCarnap’sDeparture
3.2TheWittgenstein–CarnapPlagiarismAffairRevisited
3.4WittgensteinandtheQuasi-SyntacticalModeofSpeech
3.5Quasi-SyntaxandTranslatability
3.6TheSaying–ShowingDistinctionandCarnap’sPhilosophyofLogic99
3.7ShowingandTolerance
4.IdealityandReality:BeyondApriorism,Empiricism, andConventionalism109
4.1Wittgenstein’sStartingPoint:LogicasIdealandPure
4.2IdealityandSublimation:TurningAwayfromConcreteCases
4.3TheNewRoleoftheIdealand ‘OurRealNeed’
4.4TurningtheExaminationAround:IdealizationinLogic
4.5BeyondtheTrichotomyofApriorism,Empiricism,and Conventionalism
4.6TheIntertwinednessoftheFactualandtheLogical
5.TheMethodofLanguage-GamesasaMethodofLogic142
5.1BeyondCalculiofPropositions:PluralityandtheAbsence ofFoundations
5.2TheNotionofaLanguage-Game
5.3Language-GamesastheContextfortheUseofWords
5.4TheNotionsofCompletenessandSystematicTheory
5.5TheStatusofLanguage-GamesasModelsforLanguageUse
5.6TheMethodofLanguage-GamesasanExtensionofLogic
6.Non-EmpiricistNaturalism:TheUsesofNaturalHistoryinLogic180
6.1Quasi-Ethnology:NaturalHistoricalPicturesandTruthinLogic
6.2WaysofUsingNaturalHistoryinLogic
6.3EmpiricalExplanationsvsLogicalDescriptions
6.4NaturalHistoryandPhilosophicalAnthropology
6.5ComplementaryUsesofModels:MultidimensionalLogicalDescriptions
6.6Multidimensionality,Completeness,andTruth
7.ResolvingtheDisputeBetweenIdealandOrdinary LanguageApproaches220
7.1TwoApproachestoPhilosophicalClarification
7.2Strawson’sCritiqueofCarnapandProblemswithStrawson’sCritique
7.3LogicalIdealization:DissolvingtheDispute
7.4ExplicationvsClarificationsasObjectsofComparison
Acknowledgements ThisbookhastakenafewyearstocompleteandintheprocessIhaveaccumulatedmanydebtsofgratitude.Partsofitwereoriginallywrittenasarticleswhich areincorporatedhere,butinarestructured,expanded,andrevisedform.The firstarticleswerecompletedin2010,andin2011theUniversityofEastAnglia grantedmeasemester’sresearchleavetocompletesomeothers.Thebookitself wascompletedduringanothersimilarleavein2015.IammostgratefultoUEA forthisopportunitytodevotetimeformyresearch.Atamorepersonallevel IwouldliketothankAnssiKorhonenforhiscommentsonChapters1and2,and GildNirforcommentsonChapters1–3.Chapter3waspresentedattheSet Theory,ModelTheory,GeneralizedQuantifiersandFoundationsofMathematicsconference,UniversityofHelsinki(September2010),UEAPhilosophySociety (December2010),intheseminaroftheZukunftskolleg,UniversityofKonstanz (February2011),andattheContemporary Tractatus conference,AuburnUniversity,Alabama(March2011).Iwouldliketothanktheparticipantsatallthese eventsfortheirquestionsandcomments,aswellastheanonymousrefereesfor JournalforthePhilosophyoftheHistoryofAnalyticPhilosophy,whereanarticle similartoChapter3waspublishedunderthetitle ‘Carnapandthe Tractatus’ PhilosophyofLogic’,1(3),2012.ApaperthatconstitutesthebasisofChapter5 waspresentedatWittgenstein’sMethodandAestheticssymposiuminMarifjøra, Norway(May2011),andtheVisitingSpeakerSeminaratStirling(November 2011).Iwouldliketoexpressmygratitudetotheseaudiences.Additionally, IwanttothankJohnCollins,MarieMcGinn,EdMinar,RupertRead,Davide Rizza,andAngusRossfortheircommentsonthispiece.AngelaBreitenbach deservesaspecialthanksforcommentsandhelpwithtranslationsfrom Wittgenstein’ s Nachlass inconnectionwiththisarticle,subsequentlypublished as ‘TheMethodofLanguage-gamesasaMethodofLogic’ in Philosophical Topics,42(2),2014,andfortheonethatconstitutesthebasisofChapter4, ‘LogicandIdeality:Wittgenstein’sWaybeyondApriorism,Empiricismand ConventionalisminthePhilosophyofLogic’,publishedinNunoVenturinhaed., TheTextualGenesisofWittgenstein’sPhilosophicalInvestigations,Routledge, 2013.InconnectionwithChapter4IwouldalsoliketothankAlbertoEmiliani, RupertRead,DavideRizza,andNunoVenturinha,aswellasthosewhowere presentattheUniversityofSouthamptonVisitingSpeakersSeminar(October2012).
Onesectionfrommyarticle ‘GordonBaker,WittgensteinianPhilosophical
ConceptionsandPerspicuousRepresentation:ThePossibilityofMultidimensional LogicalDescriptions’ , NordicWittgensteinReview,3(2),2014isutilizedin Chapter6.Originally,thispaperwaspresentedinaconferenceinmemoryof GordonBakerinOxford(September2012).Apaperthatconstitutesthebasisof Chapter7waspresentedintheContemporarySignificanceofOrdinaryLanguage PhilosophyconferenceatÅboAkademiUniversity,Finland(May2013).Besides theparticipantsthereIamgratefultoJohnCollins,SilviaPanizza,andHenry Wagnerfortheirquestions,comments,andsuggestions.Igaveatalkrelatingto WittgensteinandlogicalidealizationatthePhilosophiesofPhilosophyconference,UniversityCollegeDublin(June2013),andwouldliketothanktheaudience there.Finally,naturalismandWittgenstein’sphilosophyoflogicwerethetopics ofmytalksattheWelshPhilosophicalSocietyAnnualMeeting,Gregynog (May2015),atUsingWittgensteininContemporaryPhilosophy,TheFifth SymposiumoftheInternationalLudwigWittgensteinSociety,Madrid(May 2015),andtheFacesofNecessityconference,UEA(June2015).Thequestions andcommentsIhavereceivedattheseeventshavehelpedmeinimportant ways,andIwouldliketoexpressmygratitudeforthem,andtothepeople involved.AtthebookmanuscriptstageIhavebenefitedfromcommentsby WolfgangKienzler,JakubMácha,GeniaSchönbaumsfeld,andJoachim Schulte,includingSchulte’ssuggestionsregardingtranslations.Iamextremely gratefulforthis,aswellasforcommentsbyanonymousreviewersatOxford UniversityPress.Finally,IwouldliketothankLucianoBazzocchifor alertingmetoexegeticalissuesrelatingtothe Tractatus’ numberingsystem andMartinPilchforhelpwithphilologicalmattersrelatingtoWittgenstein’ s pre-Tractarianwritings.Itisaprivilegetohaveenjoyedalltheseinteractions.
Fromwintertosummer2015,whenthe firstcompletedraftofthisbookwas completed,theprocessofwritingwasperfectlybalancedbytheopportunityto performandrecordmusicwithShaneO’Linsky,JosephQuinnandtheAmazing WorldofLivingThings,andothers.Thankstoallwhoplayedinthevarious outfits,tothosewhocontributedtothe firstDaysToalbum FracturedRooms (2016),andtoallfriendsontheNorwichmusicscene.Artisticmadnessisthebest waytokeepsane.
ThisbookisdedicatedtothememoryofmysisterSallawhodiedinsummer 2013,fartooearly.Insummer2016mybrotherAleksijoinedherinTuonela. Iamextendingthededicationwithsadnessandacontinuingsenseofloss.
TheepigraphattributedtoFregeatthestartofthisbookoriginallyappeared inG.Frege, ‘OntheScientificJustificationofaConceptualNotation’,in
T.W.Bynum(ed.), ConceptualNotationandRelatedArticles,1972,Oxford: ClarendonPress,andhasbeenreprintedbypermissionofOxfordUniversity Press.TheepigraphattributedtoWittgensteinhasbeenreproducedfrom L.Wittgenstein, PhilosophicalInvestigations,FourthEdition,trans.P.M.S. HackerandJoachimSchulte,2009,Oxford:Wiley.
‘Thus,letnoonedespisesymbols!Agreatdealdependsonchoosingthem properly.’
(Frege,SJCN,84)
‘Anunsuitabletypeofexpressionisasuremeansofremaininginastateof confusion.Itasitwerebarsthewayout.’
(Wittgenstein,PI§339)
Introduction GottlobFregeandBertandRussellarewidelyregardedasthefoundersofanalytic philosophy.AlongerlistalsoincludesG.E.MooreandLudwigWittgenstein. ThisisnotbecauseanalyticphilosopherssubscribetoFrege’sandRussell’sviews aboutparticularphilosophicalmatters.Itishardtothinkofexamplesofsuch agreed-uponviews.Rather,Frege’sandRussell’sroleasfoundersisdue,before all,tocertainmethodologicalideaswhichtheyintroduced.Especiallyimportant inthisregardistheideathatphilosophicalprogresscouldbeachievedbymeans ofthemethodsofsymbolicormathematicallogictowhosedevelopmentboth contributedinimportantways.Thisbook,inessence,isanexaminationof Frege’sandRussell’smethodologicalandlogicalideasandtheirfurtherdevelopmentandtransformationbycertainotherphilosophers,especiallyLudwig Wittgenstein,butalsoRudolfCarnapandPeterStrawson.Itisinthissensea bookonmethodologyinanalyticphilosophy.Andalthoughthebookassumes theformoftheexaminationofthehistoryofanalyticphilosophy,especially theworkofWittgenstein,itisjustasmuch ormore aboutthefutureof analyticphilosophy.Theunderlyingquestionthatmotivatesthisbookiswhat analyticphilosophycouldbeorbecome,andwhetheritispossibleforitto redeemitsoriginalpromiseofprogress.Foritseemsfairtosaythatprogress hasbeenlessimpressivethanRussellpromisedandmorecontroversialthanhe mayhaveexpected(seeChapter1).Awaytodescribethisbookisthatitaimsto rewritepartsofthehistoryofanalyticphilosophyinordertouncoverpathstothe futurethatprevioushistorieshavecoveredup.
MymaingoalinwhatfollowsistoclarifyhowWittgensteindevelopsfurther, firstinhisso-calledearlyandespeciallylaterphilosophy,Frege’sandRussell’ s logicalandmethodologicalideas,transformingtheminawaythat,Ibelieve,can bejustifiablydescribedasasecondrevolutioninphilosophicalmethodologyand thephilosophyoflogic,followingFrege’sandRussell’ s firstrevolution.Inany case,Ihopethatthesubsequentchapterswillshowthisdescriptiontobeworth
consideringseriously.*¹Thisincludesreconceivingthestatusoflogicasanonempiricaldisciplineinsuchawaythatlogicbecomesabletotakeintoaccount empiricalfactsaboutthinkersorlanguageusersandtheirenvironment,andyet retainsitsnon-empiricalcharacter.AsIexplain,thisprovidesuswithanewkind ofnon-empiricistnaturalisminlogicandphilosophy,andWittgenstein’slater accountcannotbereducedtoanyofthealreadyextantaccountsofthestatusof logic,apriorism,conventionalismorempiricism.Relatingtothis,hearticulatesa newaccountoflogicalidealizationthatcanarguablysolvecertainimportant problemspertainingtotherigouroflogic,andtotheemploymentoflogical calculiforthepurposeofphilosophicalclarification.Theseproblemspertain especiallytotheclarificationoflocutionsoriginatinginnaturallanguageand philosophicalproblemsrelatingtowhateverwespeakaboutintheirterms,and theythreatenthecapacityoftheFregean–Russellianlogicalapproachtoachieve itsphilosophicalgoalsandthehoped-forprogress.ButWittgenstein’saccountof idealizationcanexplain,amongotherthings,howprecise,simple,andstaticrules canbeusedtoclarifyvague,complex,and fluidusesofnaturallanguage. Moreover,healsointroducesanumberofnewlogicalmethods,suchasthe methodofgrammaticalrules,themethodoflanguage-gamesandquasiethnology(asIwillcallthem),thatarecontinuouswithcalculus-basedlogical methodsbutextendlogicbeyondthem,makingnewareasofthoughtand languageuseaccessibletologicalexaminationandclarification.Nowcalculusbasedmethodscanberegardedasaspecialcaseoflogicalmethodology,with theirowncoreareasofapplication.InthissenseWittgenstein’saccountoflogic coversallthecasesthatFrege’sandRussell’saccountsoflogiccover,but additionallyitcanalsodealwithfurthercases,similarlytoanewKuhnian paradigmthatreplacesanoldone.Thus,Wittgenstein’srevolutionaffirmsor consolidatesFrege’sandRussell’srevolutioninaqualifiedform.Finally,on Wittgenstein’saccount,notonlyaretheremultiplelogicalmethodsfordifferent tasksofclarification,butdifferentlogicaldescriptionsandmethodscanbeused simultaneouslyinanon-exclusivewaytoclarifydifferentaspectsofcomplicated casessoastocreatemultidimensionallogicaldescriptions.
*InordertocaterforthedifferentinterestsofreadersIadoptthefollowingconvention: philosophicallysubstantialendnotesaremarkedwithastarindistinctionfromnotesrelatingto exegeticalquestionsandlessimportantmatters.Asitisthemaintaskofthisbooktodevelopanovel accountofWittgenstein ’sphilosophyoflogic,therelationsbetweentheproposedinterpretationand otherextantonesaremostlydiscussedinnotes.Icommentonotherreadingswhenthisisuseful,for example,inordertoexplainhowtheproposedinterpretationsolvesproblemsthatariseforothers. Evidently,thisdivisionbetweenexegeticalandotherphilosophicalquestionscannotbesharpsince philosophicalinterpretationisaphilosophicalundertaking.ButIhopethishelpsreaderswith differentintereststo findwhatmostintereststheminthebook.
DespiteawealthofliteratureonWittgenstein,itseemsthathislaterphilosophyoflogichasremainedlargelyunrecognizedforwhatitis.Contraryto Wittgenstein’sowntestimony(seebelow),hislaterphilosophyisusuallynot readasa positive contributiontothephilosophyoflogic.²Morecommonly,his laterphilosophyisseenasanegativecontribution,withWittgensteinarguing againsttheapproachesofFrege,Russell,andhisownearly Tractatus,and generallyagainsttheemploymentofcalculus-basedlogicalmethods.Intheir placehethenpromotestheviewthatweshouldsticktotheemploymentand descriptionofeverydayornaturallanguageinphilosophy,perhapsforthe purposeofsomekindofphilosophicaltherapy.However,ifWittgenstein’slater workistobeseenasapositivecontributiontologic,anexplanationisrequired forwhatsuchdescriptionsofeverydaylanguagehavetodowithlogicandlogical clarification,giventhatthemultiplicityofthelinguisticformsofnaturallanguage isanempiricalphenomenon,whilelogic isnotanempiricaldiscipline.Whydoes Wittgenstein’sphilosophythusconstruednotbecomeempiricalundertaking,perhapssomedubiousformoflinguisticarmchairanthropology?Moreover,giventhe complex,vague,and fluidcharacterofnaturallanguage,whydoesWittgenstein’ s allegedrejectionofcalculus-basedmethodsnotamounttoabandoningtheidealsof simplicityandexactnessoflogic,andthereforeabandoninglogic?³
ThereisanotherbroadlyKantianvariantofreadingthelaterWittgensteinthat hasaclaimtoavoidingtheproblemwitharmchairempiricism.Accordingtothis lineofinterpretation,Wittgenstein’sso-calledgrammaticalstatementsarticulate conditionsofintelligibilityfortheemploymentofconcepts,clarifyingwhatis necessarilyassumedintheiruseandwhattheirpossibleusesare.Thusconstrued, Wittgenstein’sdescriptionsoflanguagearenotempirical,buthemightinsteadbe characterizedasengagedinphilosophicalanthropologywhoseaimistoclarify theessential(ratherthanmerelyaccidental)featuresofthephenomenaofhuman languageuse.AlthoughWittgensteiniangrammarcannowbeunderstoodasheir tothelogicofFrege,Russell,andthe Tractatus inthatgrammaticalinvestigation clarifiesnon-empiricalnecessitiesandpossibilities,itremainsunclearhowthis wouldcountasapositivecontributiontologic,insteadofWittgensteinmoving ontoadifferent,relatedinvestigation.For,onthisinterpretation,theconnection ofgrammaticalinvestigationwithFregean–Russellian–Tractarianlogicissevered throughWittgenstein’srejectionofcalculus-basedmethods.AnadditionalproblemwhichIhavediscussedelsewhereisthatKantianreadingsrunintodifficulties inaccountingforWittgenstein’sclaimtoabandonphilosophicaltheses(seePI §§109,128).Readinthisway,grammaticalstatementsarguablyconstitute philosophicalthesesinthesenseofclaimsaboutwhatisnecessaryandpossible, andthebroadlyKantianinterpretationisnotexegeticallyorphilosophically satisfactoryinthissenseeither(seeKuusela2008b).⁴
Iintendtoshowthattheconception,accordingtowhichthelater Wittgenstein’scontributiontologicisatbestnegative,mustbereconceived. WittgensteinremainsaphilosopheroflogicandasupporteroftheFregean–Russellianconceptionofphilosophyasalogicalinvestigationthroughouthis career,withlaterWittgensteinradicallyrevisingthe Tractatus’ philosophyof logic.RelatingtoWittgensteinasaphilosopheroflogic,thefollowingsimple historicalhypothesisunderpinstheproposedinterpretation.Havingdiscovered Russell’sworkthroughhisinterestinmathematicsanditsfoundations,WittgensteinbecameakeensupporterofRussell’sandFrege’slogical-philosophical approaches.ButalthoughWittgensteinwholeheartedlyacceptedthegeneral thrustoftheirapproaches,hesoonfounditinneedofre-articulationonvarious pointsofdetail.Thisworkofclarificationhesoughttocarryoutinthe Tractatus, whichseekstoresolveanumberofproblemsrelatingtoFrege’sandRussell’ s accountsoflogic,forexample,withregardtoquestionsconcerningthestatusof logicallaws,andthenatureofthedisciplineoflogic,logicalgenerality,logical constants,thejustificationofinference,thebindingnessoflogic,andsoon(see Chapter2).Afterhisreturntophilosophyin1929,however,Wittgensteincameto problematizeevenmoreassumptionsoftheFregean–Russellianapproach,for example,theviewthatthefoundationorstartingpointoflogicshouldbeageneral accountofthenatureofthoughtorproposition,thatthereissomethinglike the universallogic,andthatthenon-empiricalcharacteroflogiccanbeexplainedin termsofanaccountofthoughtorpropositionasabstractentities,ratherthantheir beingessentially(notmerelyaccidentally)partofhumanlife.Inresponse,he soughttodevelopfurthertheFregean–Russellianapproachinrelevantrespects whichalsoledhimtointroduceotherlogicalmethodsthatdonotenvisage languageasacalculus,andextendlogicbeyondcalculus-basedmethods.Onthe proposedinterpretation,anaspirationtofurtherdeveloptheFregean–Russellian philosophicalapproachthereforeinformsWittgenstein’sworknotonlyinhis earlyperiod,butalsoinhislaterperiod.Letmesubstantiatethisclaim.
Ifnotthe first,Wittgensteinwasinanycaseoneoftheearliestfollowersand developersoftheFregean–Russellianapproach.Accordingly,heremarksinthe Prefacetothe Tractatus: ‘HowfarmyeffortsagreewiththoseofotherphilosophersIwillnotdecide.[ ... ]Iwillonlymentionthattothegreatworksof FregeandthewritingsofmyfriendBertrandRussellIoweinlargemeasurethe stimulationofmythoughts’ (TLP,Preface).InhisbookWittgensteinthen assumesandbuildsontheRussellianconceptionofphilosophicalproblems aslogicalones,tobesolvedbymeansoflogicalmethods.⁵*Onmorethanone occasionRussell,too,acknowledgedthevalueofWittgenstein’searlyworkon logic,writingearlyoninaletterin1912that ‘[ ... ]Ifeelhewilldothework
Ishoulddo,anddoitbetter.HestartsfreshatapointwhichIonlyreachedwhen myintellectualspringwasnearlyexhausted’ (RusselltoOttolineMorrell,1.6.12, quotedinMcGuinness1988,103).Beyondsuchprivateremarks,Russellalso characterizedWittgenstein’sworkasinvolving ‘vitallyimportantdiscoveries’ , andasWittgensteinprogressed,acknowledgeditsinfluenceonhim(OKEW,9). Ofhis PhilosophyofLogicalAtomism Russellsaysthatitis ‘[ ]verylargely concernedwithexplainingcertainideaswhichIlearntfrommyfriendand formerpupilLudwigWittgenstein’ (PLA,1;cf.12–13,34,58,139).⁶
ButalthoughRussell’sverypositiveperceptionoftheearlyWittgensteinseems tohaveneverchanged,hewasnotabletoappreciateWittgenstein’slaterwork fromtheearly/mid1930sonwards.Russellwritesaboutthis:
IhavenotfoundinWittgenstein’ s PhilosophicalInvestigations anythingthatseemedto meinterestingandIdonotunderstandwhyawholeschool findsimportantwisdominits pages.[ ]TheearlierWittgenstein,whomIknewintimately,wasamanaddictedto passionatelyintensethinking,profoundlyawareofdifficultproblemsofwhichI,likehim, felttheimportance,andpossessed(orsoatleastIthought)truephilosophicalgenius.The laterWittgenstein,onthecontrary,seemstohavegrowntiredofseriousthinkingand inventedadoctrinethatwouldmakesuchanactivityunnecessary.Idonotforone momentbelievethatthedoctrinewhichhastheselazyconsequencesistrue.[ ]ifitis true,philosophyis,atbest,aslighthelptolexicographers,andatworst,anidletea-table amusement.(MPD,216–17)
Accordingly,RussellexpressedhissupportforErnstGellner’spolemicattackon ordinarylanguagephilosophywithwhichWittgensteinwasassociated,andwrote himselfrathernegativelyabouttheordinarylanguageapproachasacult.⁷ As IwillargueinChapter7,however,ratherthantakingthesideofordinary languagephilosophy,Wittgenstein’slaterphilosophyisbetterunderstoodas incorporatingelementspresentinboththeso-calledideallanguagephilosophy andordinarylanguagephilosophy.Insodoing,itarguablyenablesustoresolve thedisputebetweenthetwoschools.Moreover, pace Russell,Wittgenstein’slater workcanstillbedescribedasdeeplyRussellianinthesensethathenevergaveup theconceptionofphilosophicalproblemsaslogical,toberesolvedbymeansof logicalinvestigation.Forexample,heremarksin1948: ‘Merelyrecognizingthe philosophicalproblemasalogicaloneisprogress.Theproperattitudeandthe methodaccompanyit’ (MS137,104b/LWI,§256).
InthesecircumstancesaplausibleexplanationforRussell’sinabilityto appreciateWittgenstein’slaterworkisthatRussellcouldnolongerrecognizeit aslogic.(ThecriticalquotesuggeststhatheregardedWittgensteinashaving abandonedlogicforanempiricalinvestigation,giventhatlexicographyisan empiricaldiscipline.Similarly,thepeculiaritiesoflanguagediscussedastea-table
amusementwouldpresumablybeempiricalphenomena.)Infailingtorecognize Wittgenstein’sworkaslogicRussellisnotalone,ofcourse.Themethodswhich Wittgensteinintroducesinhis PhilosophicalInvestigations havegenerallynot beenperceivedasmethodsoflogicthatwouldexhibitanintimatecontinuitywith Wittgenstein’searlyapproachtophilosophyaslogicalclarificationandwiththe workofFregeandRussell althoughcontinuityintheintendedsensedoesnot excludeveryradicalrethinkingofthenatureoflogicandphilosophical methodology.⁸
ThisperceptionofWittgensteinisincertainwaysunderstandable.Russell alreadyworriedabouttheyoungWittgenstein apparentlycorrectly,giventhe difficultiesanddisputesrelatingtothereceptionofthe Tractatus that ‘Iam seriouslyafraidthatnoonewillseethepointofanythingthathewritesbecause hewon’trecommenditbyargumentsaddressedtoadifferentpointofview’ (RusselltoOttolineMorell28.5.12;quotedinMcGuinness1988,104).Albeit stylisticallyquitedifferentfromthe Tractatus,the Investigations likewisetriesto getthereaderstothinkforthemselves,ratherthanengaginginextensive explanations.Thus,whileWittgensteinwritesinthePrefacetothe Tractatus thatitisnotatextbook,and ‘[ ... ]willperhapsonlybeunderstoodbythosewho havethemselvesalreadythoughtthethoughtsexpressedinit orsimilar thoughts’ (TLP,Preface),the Investigations forewarns: ‘Ishouldnotlikemy writingtospareotherpeopleofthetroubleofthinking.Butifpossibleto stimulatesomeonetothoughtsoftheirown’ (PI,Preface).Indeed,Wittgenstein himselftoorealizedthatitmightbedifficulttorecognizehislaterworkaslogic. Discussingthedistinctionbetweenthenotionofexperiencingmeaningandthe conceptofmeaning,heremarksinamanuscriptfrom1947–8: ‘Strangeasitmay sound,inalltheseinvestigationsIamdoinglogic.EvenifIdoitclumsily&the logicalsignificanceofwhatIsayisdifficulttomakeout’ (MS136,72a).⁹
ThatWittgensteinlaterdescribedhimselfasengagedinagrammaticalrather thanalogicalinvestigationhasundoubtedlycontributedtotheperceptionthathe isnotdoinglogic(seePI§90).However,onmanyoccasionsWittgensteinuses theterms ‘ grammar ’ and ‘logic’ andtheircognatesinterchangeably,andhenever, tomyknowledge,seekstoexplicitlydistinguishgrammarfromlogic.(Although interchangeabilityonmanyoccasionsdoesnotindicatesynonymy,itdoes indicateacloserelationship.)Thiscloserelationbetweenlogicandgrammaris particularlyevidentintheyearsafterhisreturntophilosophy(from1929tothe early1930s),whenWittgensteinstartstotalkincreasinglyaboutgrammarrather thanlogicorsyntax,whilecontinuingtoemploy ‘ grammar ’ as ‘logic’ earlier. Thus,forexample,accordingtohim,grammarspellsoutlogicaldistinctions,and grammaticalrulesdeterminetheroleofvariables(MS108,153).Grammarshows
whatislogicallypossible(MS140,8/TS211,244/PG,45;BB,56),andclarifies whatlogicallyfollowsfromasentence(MS109,15).Logicalproblemsand questionsaresaidtobegrammaticalones(MS109,224/TS211,398;Z§590), andlogicalanalysisischaracterizedastheclarificationofgrammar(MS108,88/ TS209,1/TS213,417/PR,51).Wittgensteinsumsuphisviewatthistime: ‘[ ] everythingthatisbusinessinlogicmustbesaidingrammar’ (MS109,122). However,hecontinuestouse ‘ grammar ’ , ‘logic’ andtheircognates(nearly) interchangeablylatertoo,andthereisnoevidenceforachangeofmindregarding theirrelation(seeMS138,17b;MS157a,54v;MS167,26r;TS233a,38;TS245, 310/RPPI§1050).Theuseof ‘logic’ isparticularlyprevalentin OnCertainty, basedonexcerptsfromWittgenstein’slastmanuscripts,wherehe,forexample, connectshisnotionofalanguage-gamewithlogicinthefollowingway: ‘[ ]to logicbelongseverythingdescriptiveofalanguage-game’ (MS174,18/OC§56; cf.§§82,628).Wittgensteinthereforedoesnotseemtodrawanydramatic distinctionbetweenlogicandgrammarwhichwouldbeareasontopostulatea breakbetweenlogicandgrammar,asheemploysthelatternotion.¹⁰
Still,itisafactthatthelaterWittgensteinmostlyusestheterm ‘ grammar ’ insteadof ‘logic’,andthisoughttobeexplained.Intheabsenceofanyknown commentsonthisissuebyWittgenstein,Iproposethefollowingexplanation, basedontheinterpretationofWittgensteindevelopedinthisbookwhich, however,willnotbeinplaceuntilChapter6.Onthisreading,Wittgenstein’ s useoftheword ‘ grammar ’ reflectshislaternon-intellectualistconceptionof language,wherebylanguageisseenasintertwinedwithactionsandhuman formsoflife,andassomethingthatemergesfromactinganddoingofembodied beings,ratherthanhavingitsbasisindisembodiedreason.Whiletheword ‘ grammar ’ (like ‘syntax’)continuestosuggestaconcernwithlanguage,with whoseclarificationWittgensteinregardslogicasconcernedthroughouthis career, ‘ grammar ’ lackstheintimateconnectionof ‘logic’ withreason,thatis, λόγος.Accordingly, ‘ grammar ’ canbenaturallyassociatedwithWittgenstein’ s latermethods,suchasthemethodoflanguage-games(Chapter5)andhisnatural historicalorquasi-ethnologicalmethods(Chapter6),characteristicofwhichis thattheyexaminethefunctionofwordsinthecontextofactionswithwhich languageuseisintertwined.However,becausethenotionofalanguage-game coversthatofacalculustoo(seesection5.1)and,astheprecedingquotestestify, Wittgensteinregardsanythingthatbelongstologicasbelongingtogrammar,we maysaythat ‘ grammar ’ coverseverythingthatispartoflogic.Butitisalso possibletounderstand ‘logic’ asanarrowerterm,inwhichcase ‘ grammar ’ covers whateverfallsunderWittgenstein’sextensionoflogicbeyondFrege’sandRussell’ s calculus-basedlogicalmethods.
Inanycase,thefactthatWittgenstein’slaterapproachdiffersfromhisearly one,orthoseofFregeandRussell,isnotyetareasonnottoregardhisworkas logic.ConstruedasanobjectiontoWittgenstein,thisislikecomplainingagainst Fregethathislogicisnotlogic,becauseitisnotsimilarenoughtothatof Aristotle.Whatisatstakeistheidentityofthedisciplineoflogicoroflogicas abranchofinvestigation whichcertainlywasanexplicitconcernforWittgenstein (seePI§§89,108).Buttheidentityoflogiccannotbedefinedbyreferencetoany particularauthorities,suchasAristotle,FregeorRussell,andtherevolutionin logicbroughtaboutbythedevelopmentofsymboliclogicdoesnotexcludethe possibilityoffurtherrevolutions.WhatmattersiswhetherWittgenstein’ slater approachcananswertothekindsofneedsinresponsetowhich,forexample, Aristotle,Frege,andRusselldevelopedtheirlogics.Ifitcandothis,thisisa reasontoregarditasacontributiontologic irrespectiveofwhetherwecallit ‘logic’ , ‘ grammar ’ orsomethingelse.Thisquestionnowemergesasmerely terminological.
AsIaimtoshow,thenewmethodsthatWittgensteinintroducesinhislater workcanbeunderstoodasmethodsoflogicbyrelevantcriteria.Asnoted,these methodsextendlogicbeyondlogicalcalculisoastobettersuittheclarificationof thehighlycomplexand fluctuatingusesofnaturallanguage.Inthisregarditis thenimportantthat,whenitcomestotheanalysisofnaturallanguagesand resolvingphilosophicalproblemsconnectedwiththeirconceptsorwhateveris spokenaboutintheirterms,itisatbestcontroversialwhetherthekindof piecemealbutsteadyprogresshasbeenachievedthatRussellbelievedlogical methodswouldmakepossible(RussellOKEW,112–13;quotedinChapter1). Wittgensteincommentsonrelevantissuesin1946inconnectionwithadiscussionofMoore’sparadox,i.e.statementsofthetype ‘Thingsaresoandso,butIdo notbelieveit’.Fromthepointofviewoflogicasusuallyunderstood,ifweassume thatcontradictionshavetheform ‘pandnot-p’,suchastatementisnota contradiction.Butthatlogiccannotrecognizesuchastatementasacontradiction,Wittgensteinlaments,revealsitsinabilitytohandlesomethingitoughttobe abletohandle.Hecomments: ‘Thisshowsseriousgapsinlogic.Itindicates whatsomanythingsindicate thatwhatweusuallycall ‘logic’ isonlyapplicable toatinypartofthegamewithlanguage.Thisisalsowhylogicisasuninteresting as,judgingbyitsappearance,itshouldbeinteresting’ (MS132,119–20).The problemhere,toanticipate,isthatlogicisstilltoomuchhungupongrammatical form,failingtopaysufficientattentiontotheuseofexpressions,whereby Wittgenstein’slaterstrugglestoliberatelogicfromthedictatesofgrammatical formbyfocusingonusecanbeseenasdirectlycontinuouswiththoseofFrege andRussell.
Wittgenstein’slaterworkcanbecharacterizedasaimingto fillinthementionedkindofgapsinlogic.Thisrequirestheintroductionofnewmethodsthat canhandlethecomplexitiesoflanguagebetterthanlogicalcalculiaccordingto preciseand fixedrulesseemabletodo.Aboutthishealsoremarks: ‘Languageis muchmorecomplexthanlogiciansandtheauthoroftheTract.Log.Phil.have imagined’ (MS152,47;cf.PI§23;MS134,120/RPPI§920).And: ‘Onecouldsay thatwearemerelytryingtocometoknowword-useinallitscomplexity;inorder avoidfallingintothoseerrorsthatarisefromourconceivingtheword-useas moreprimitivethanitis’ (MS157a,33v–34r).Inthisregarditisalsonoteworthy that,asopposedtothe Tractatus’ programmaticcharacterizationsofhowa symbolicnotationoraconcept-scriptenablesustodealwithphilosophical problems(TLP3.323–3.24,6.53),Wittgensteinintroduceshislatermethodsby applyingthemtorealphilosophicalproblems.Hisdiscussionofproblemsrelatingto,forexample,meaning,rule-followingorprivatelanguagearenotillustrationsbymeansofmeretoy-examples.Theymeritseriousconsiderationas examplesoftheapplicationofhislogicalmethods.Inthissense,hislaterwork lackstheprogrammaticcharacterofthe Tractatus.
However,fromthepointofviewoftheproposedinterpretationofWittgenstein’ s laterworkasan extension ofFregean–Russellianlogic,itisimportantthathis laterphilosophyoflogicdoesnotcontradictorgenerallyexcludetheemploymentoflogicalcalculiforthepurposeoflogical-philosophicalclarification. Whereverlogicalcalculiaresuccessfullyemployed,thereisnocomplaintagainst them,andthecomparisonbetweenlanguagesandcalculi IbelieveWittgenstein wouldagree remainsimpressive(cf.PI§§81,104).AsIexplaininChapter4, thelaterWittgenstein’saccountoftheemploymentoflogicalcalculiinlogicalphilosophicalclarificationrestsonhislateraccountofthestatusoflogicwhich alsoexplainsthepossibilityofidealizationinlogicandphilosophy.Thisaccount ofthestatusoflogicmustthereforeberegardedasacrucialcomponentof Wittgenstein’slaterphilosophyoflogicandlogical-philosophicalmethodology.
Tooutlinebrieflythediscussioninthefollowingchapters,IbegininChapter1 withadiscussionofFrege’sandRussell’saccountsoflogicandtheirideasrelating totheapplicationoflogicalmethodstophilosophicalproblems.Thisisintended asbackgroundforthediscussionsthatfollow,andattheendofthechapter (section1.3)InotevariousconnectionsbetweentheapproachesofFregeand Russellandthe Tractatus.Chapter2continuesthisdiscussionbyoutlining the Tractatus’ critiqueofFregeandRussell,andthewaysinwhichtheearly Wittgensteinseekstoresolveproblemswiththeirphilosophiesoflogic.Key issuesrelatetothenatureoflogicalinvestigation,logicalgenerality,howto explaintheaprioristatusoflogic,thejustificationoflogicandlogicalinferences,
andthebindingnessoflogic.Accordingly,thechapterseekstoshowthat Wittgenstein’srejectionofthepossibilityofstatementsaboutlogic(including theTractariansentences)isnotaconsequenceofthepicturetheory,contraryto whattraditionalmetaphysicalinterpretationsofthe Tractatus haveheld.Rather thanarguingaboutlogicdogmaticallyfromthepointofviewofatheorytowhich FregeandRusselldonotsubscribe,Wittgenstein’scorecriticismsoftheirphilosophiesoflogicrelatetotensionswithinFrege’sandRussell’saccounts.
Afurtherconsequenceofthisreadingisthatthereisnoparadoxofnonsensical thesesinthe Tractatus,andthatnoparadoxicallynonsensicalthesesareneeded toexplainthe Tractatus’ positivecontributiontologic.Thus,Ialsoproposea solutiontothedisputebetweentheso-calledmetaphysicalandresolutereadings ofthe Tractatus thathasexercisedWittgenstein’sreadersforthelasttwentyorso years,althoughtheinterestoftheproposed Tractatus interpretationdoesnot dependonthisdispute.Relatedly,Ialsoargueagainstawell-establishedtradition inthehistoriographyoflogicthatWittgenstein’searlyviewdoes not excludea metaperspectiveonlogic,despitehissubscribingtoauniversalistconceptionof logicsimilarlytoFregeandRussell.Thisisanimportantkeytounderstanding the Tractatus’ philosophyoflogic,andhisconceptionoflogicasaclarificatory discipline.Chapter3thenexaminestherelationbetweenthe Tractatus’ philosophyoflogicandCarnap’saccountoflogicin TheLogicalSyntaxofLanguage, arguingthat,contrarytoawidelyacceptedaccount,Carnapdoesnotovercome theTractarianphilosophyoflogicinthesenseheclaimstodo.Rather,his approachisbetterunderstoodasafurtherdevelopmentofthe Tractatus’ philosophyoflogic,withtheTractariandistinctionbetweensayingandshowing anticipatingCarnap’sdistinctionbetweenobject-andsyntax-language.The functionofthesentencesofthe Tractatus,explainedinCarnapianterms,isto introduce,byusingthematerialmodeofspeech,logicalconceptsandprinciples constitutiveofalogicallanguagethatenablesustophilosophizeintheformal mode.Thisputsusinapositiontorecognizethestatementsofthe Tractatus at thesametimeasnonsensicalandpositivelycontributingtologic.Wittgenstein’ s statementsmerelyhavetheappearanceofmetaphysicaltheses,butarereallyused foradifferentpurpose.Thischapterisimportantforthebookasawholeinthatit bringstoviewcertaineasilyhiddencontinuitiesbetweenWittgenstein’searlyand laterphilosophies.
TurningtothelaterWittgenstein,inChapter4IexplainhowWittgenstein reconceivesandtransformsthe Tractatus’ philosophyoflogic.HereIintroduceWittgenstein’ slateraccountofthestatusoflogicandlogicalidealization whichoffersanalternativetoapriorism,conventionalism,andempiricism.An importantissueinthisregardisWittgenstein ’ srejectionofso-calledapriori
statementsasknowledgeclaims,andhisexplanationoflogicalgeneralityand theuniversalityofphilosophicalstatementsintermsoftheirnon-temporal use.Thismakesitunnecessarytopostulateanyapriorientitiesandstructures astheobjectoflogicalorphilosophicalstatements.Onthisbasis,Chapter5 providesaninterpretationofWittgenstein’ smethodoflanguage-games,elucidatingbothitscontinuityanddiscontinuitywithRussell ’ sandWittgenstein’ s earlylogic.Thechapteralsoexplainshowthismethodextendsthescopeof logicbeyondcalculus-basedmethods.Similarly,Chapter6continuesonthe themeofWittgenstein ’ sextensionoflogic,turningtotheissueofhownatural historicalconsiderationscanberelevanttologic.IprovidehereaninterpretationofWittgenstein’ snaturalhistoricalorquasi-ethnologicalmethodsas methodsoflogic,explaininghowhisemploymentofsuchmethodsavoids fallingintoempiricism,andclarifyhowexceptionlesslogicalnecessitycanbe accountedforfromthispointofview.Wittgenstein ’ soutlookinthisregard canbedescribedasnon-empiricistnaturalism,anditis,forallIknow, unprecedented,exceptthatsomeofitsemploymentscanbecomparedwith Nietzsche’ sgenealogicalmethodsuitablyinterpreted.ThischapteralsooutlinesthepossibilityofwhatIcall ‘ multidimensionallogicaldescriptions ’ ,based onWittgenstein ’ slateraccountofthestatusoflogic.Finally,Chapter7argues thatWittgenstein’ slaterphilosophyoflogicandphilosophicalmethodology canbeusedtodissolvethelongstanding,unresolveddisputebetweenthesocalledideallanguageandordinarylanguageschoolsinanalyticphilosophy.As Iproposetoresolvethisdispute,neithersideemergesasthewinner,andboth approachescanlearnfromtheother.InthelastsectionofChapter7Idiscuss someadvantagesofWittgensteinianclarifi catoryconceptsoverCarnapian explications.AsIhopeallthisshows,Wittgenstein’ sphilosophyoffersan exceptionallyrichsourceofstimuliforthinkingaboutlogicandphilosophical methodology.
Onthewholethesediscussionsareintendedtooutlineanalternativeto Russellianphilosophicallogic,characterizedbyitsemploymentoflogicalcalculi asinstrumentsoflogicalclarification,thatextendslogicalmethodsbeyond calculus-basedmethods.Consequently,logicisnolongercommittedtofunctionargumentstructurescharacteristicofmathematicalorsymboliclogic,andclarifying theusesoflanguagenolongerrequiresexplainingthemintheseterms.Withthe introductionofthesenewmethodslogic’scapacityforphilosophicalclarificationis arguablysignificantlyincreased.Thisisimportantespeciallyinphilosophicalas opposedtometamathematicalcontexts,andwithrespecttothetaskofclarifyingthe usesofnaturallanguageandconceptsoriginatingtherein.(Themostcentral conceptsofphilosophicalattentionhavethisorigin,forinstance,truth,goodness,
freedom,thought,language,meaning,andsoon.)Thus,byelucidatingWittgenstein’searlyandlaterphilosophiesoflogic,Iaimtoputforwardanaccountoflogic asamethodforphilosophythatgoesbeyondhowFregeandRussellproposedto employlogicassuchamethod.Thisishowmyproposedrewritingofpartsofthe historyofanalyticphilosophyisintendedtoopenupnewpathsandtouncover covered-uppathsforthefurtherdevelopmentofanalyticphilosophy.¹¹
Finally,anoteontheexegeticalmethod:theexegeticalmethodusedinthis bookinvolvestheemploymentofWittgenstein’snotebooks,manuscripts,typescripts,andlecturenotesasanaidintheinterpretationofhisremarksinthe Tractatus andthe Investigations.Wittgenstein’ s Nachlass thusplaysasupportive, albeitveryimportant,roleinthetaskofinterpretation.Butultimatelythe Nachlass isonlyanaidinreadingthetwomoreauthoritativeworksthat Wittgensteinhimselfcompletedoralmostcompleted.Tobesure,the Nachlass cannotautomaticallysolveanyproblemsofinterpretingthesebooks,andcaution mustbeexercisedbypayingattentiontothecontextofremarkstoensurethe legitimacyoftheiremploymentforrelevantpurposes.Nevertheless,different variantsandformulationsofthesameorrelatedremarkscanbeextremely helpfulforthetaskofinterpretation.(Fordiscussionoftheprinciplesofthe methodofinterpretation,seealsoKuusela2008a,13–15.)Wittgensteinhimself seemstoalsohaveacknowledgedthelegitimacyofsuchanemploymentofhis literaryremains: ‘Ibelieveitmightinterestaphilosopher,onewhocanthink himself,toreadmynotes.ForevenifIhavehitthemarkonlyrarely,hewould recognizewhattargetsIhadbeenceaselesslyaimingat’ (MS175,64v/OC§387). However,asthisremarkalsoimplies,theresponsibilityremainswiththe philosopher-readertothink,andthisresponsibilityisnottransferrable.As regardsthemethodofinterpretingthe Tractatus,attentionmustadditionally bepaidtothecontextandrelationshipsbetweenitsremarks,asindicatedby Wittgenstein’snumberingsystem,designedtoindicatethe ‘logicalweight’ ofhis remarks(seefootnoteonthe firstpageofTLP).Althoughthis,onceagain,does notautomaticallysolveanyinterpretationaldisputes,usingremarksfromthe bookwithoutpayingdueconsiderationtotheirnumberingandarrangement risksmisinterpretation.¹²
1 Frege’sandRussell’sNewLogic ThePromiseofPhilosophicalProgress ThischapteroutlinescertainkeyinsightsandfeaturesofFrege’sandRussell’ s accountsoflogicandtheirapproachestophilosophy.Suchanoutlineisneeded asbackgroundforsubsequentdiscussionsofWittgenstein’searlyandlater philosophiesoflogicandphilosophicalmethodology.Weneedit,thatistosay, inordertoseehowmuchWittgensteininheritsandretainsfromFregeand Russell,andhowheseekstoresolveproblemswiththeirphilosophiesoflogicand philosophicalapproaches, firstinthe Tractatus andtheninhislaterphilosophy. InthischapterIwillthereforefocusonaspectsofFrege’sandRussell’saccounts oflogicandphilosophicalmethodologythataremostrelevantfromthepointof viewofthelaterdiscussions.Thetwomostimportantpointsinthisregardare: 1)thatphilosophicalproblemscanberesolvedbymeansoflogicalmethods,and 2)thatthedevelopmentoflogicalmethodsshouldtaketheformofdevelopinga logicallyperspicuouslanguage,asymbolicnotationintermsofwhichtheanalysesoflogicallylessperspicuousformsofthoughtandlanguagecanbecarried out.OnboththesepointsFregeandRussellagree,andtothisextentitispossible tospeakofaFregean–Russellianapproach,asifitconstitutedoneunified approach.Accordingly,inthe PrinciplesofMathematics Russelldescribesthe relationbetweenhisviewsandthoseofFregebysaying: ‘[ ... ]thepointsof disagreementareveryfewandslightcomparedtothoseofagreement’ (PoM, 509).Byspeakingofagreement,Idonot,ofcourse,meanthatFregeandRussell wouldagreeonallrelevantpoints,andIwillpointoutdifferencestoo.For example,whileRussellmaintains atleastintheperiodunderconsideration, roughly1903–20 thatphilosophicalproblemscanonlybesolvedbymeansof logicalmethods,Fregeseemsmorecautiousinthisregard,sayingonlythatsuch methodsareusefulandimportantforphilosophy.
IbeginbyoutliningthelogicalmethodologiesofFregeandRussell,and explainingtheirphilosophicalsignificanceastheyperceivedit.
1.1LogicastheMethodofPhilosophy: TheNotionofaLogicalLanguage InhisLowellLectures,deliveredin1914,Russellspeaksaboutthephilosophical significanceofthenewmathematicallogictowhosedevelopmentheandFrege, amongothers,hadimportantlycontributed.AccordingtoRussell,thenewlogic has ‘[ ]introducedthesamekindofadvanceintophilosophyasGalileo introducedintophysics[ ]’ (OKEW,68–9).Asinphysics,theadvancein philosophyisnotsomuchamatterofthediscoveryofanynewfactsortruths, butmethodological: ‘Itisinthiswaythatthestudyoflogicbecomesthecentral studyinphilosophy:itgivesthemethodofresearchinphilosophy,justas mathematicsgivesthemethodinphysics’ (OKEW,243).InRussell’sview,the introductionoflogicalmethodsintophilosophyalsoclarifiesthenatureof philosophicalproblemsinthat ‘[ ... ]everyphilosophicalproblem,whenitis subjectedtothenecessaryanalysisandpurification,isfoundeithertobenot reallyphilosophicalatall,orelsetobe,inthesenseinwhichweareusingthe word,logical’ (OKEW,42;cf.68).Consequently,hebelieves,progressbecomes possibleinphilosophy,becausethenewlogicalmethodsarecapableofsecuring agreementontheresultsofphilosophy: ‘[ ... ]whereasolutionappearspossible, thenewlogicprovidesamethodwhichenablesustoobtainresultsthatdonot merelyembodypersonalidiosyncrasies,butmustcommandtheassentofallwho arecompetenttoformanopinion’ (OKEW,69).
RusselldulygivescredittoFregeforhavingbeenthe firsttointroduceand employthelogicalmethodologyinquestion,remarkingthat ‘the firstcomplete example’ ofthislogical-analyticalmethodis ‘tobefoundinthewritingsofFrege’ (OKEW,7;cf.PLA,127–8).¹³InsayingthisRussellisreferring,ontheonehand, toFrege’ s ConceptualNotation or Begriffsschrift (1879),whereFrege firstintroducedhislogicalnotationorconcept-script,andthedevelopmentofwhichFrege himselfconsideredasoneofhiskeycontributionstoscienceandphilosophy (OKEW,204).Thus,similarlytoRussell,Fregeemphasizesintheprefacetothe ConceptualNotation theimportanceofmethodologyforscience,remarkingthat, evenifonewouldfailto findnewtruthsinhiswork, ‘Iwouldneverthelesstake comfortintheconvictionthatanimprovementinmethodalsoadvancesscience. [ ... ]infact,allgreatscientificadvancesinrecenttimeshavehadtheiroriginsin animprovementofmethod’ (CN,105).Ontheotherhand,thevalueofamethod ismeasuredintermsofwhatitcanachieve.Accordingly,Russellcharacterizes Frege’streatmentofquantification,whichthenotationmakespossible,asthe ‘firstseriousadvanceinreallogicsincetheGreeks’ (OKEW,50).¹⁴ Ofcourse,
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Title: Sketches in Egypt
Author: Charles Dana Gibson
Release date: July 19, 2022 [eBook #68568]
Language: English
Original publication: United States: Doubleday & McClure Co, 1899
Credits: Chuck Greif (This file was produced from images available at Google Books) *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SKETCHES IN EGYPT ***
Illustrations
Chapter First
Chapter Second
Chapter Three
SKETCHES IN EGYPT Sketches in Egypt Written and illustrated by
Charles Dana Gibson
New York
Doubleday & McClure Co. 1899
Copyright, 1899, by S. S. McCLURE Co.
Copyright, 1899, by DOUBLEDAY & McCLURE Co.
ECHAPTER FIRST GYPT has sat for her likeness longer than any other country. Nothing disturbs her composure. Financial ruin may stare her in the face, armies may come and go, but each year the Nile rises and spreads out over her, and all traces of disturbances are gone.
Newspapers may be busy telling of her troubles, but very few of those troubles seem to affect her expression. The stockholders in London worry, and send out more Englishmen to look after their interests. Sugar-factories are inspected, and the barrage is doctored. But it is all very quietly done.
The French cabinet may resign on account of her, and the English army may be increased for her sake, but few signs of these compliments does she show. All is tranquil. The only disturbance seems to be made by the dragomans who meet you at the station.
Important events follow each other so closely in Egypt that a year-old guidebook is several chapters too short. Last year it was Kitchener’s campaign against the dervishes, and now the French are threatening to interfere with England’s march to the Cape. The dragoman is sometimes as satisfactory as the guide-book, and it is often pleasant to find how soon he is through with his recitation and you are allowed to go alone among the great temples. Earthquakes have shaken some in orderly ruin, as if the unseen hands of the men who built them were quietly and slowly building them up again.
But there is a temptation to grow sentimental over Egypt. It is far more cheerful than it sounds. It is happy and a place for a holiday—a country to make sketches in. These were made between December, 1897, and March, 1898, and I have been asked to help them tell their story of that part of Egypt the tourist is most likely to see, where the old and the new world meet most often.
The ancient Egyptian artist must have been very happy. Temples were built with great smooth walls for him to cover with pictures that required very little writing to go with them, seldom more than Pharaoh’s cartouches, and even these he made more like a picture than a name. That must have been very pleasant, and it should have compensated him for all the restrictions imposed upon him by the high priest of those days, who often limited his choice of subject to a king. The choice of subject is now unlimited. There never were so many different kinds of people in Egypt before. But it would be difficult to draw the king now, for there is much difference of opinion as to who he is.
I left New York with a small library of Egyptian guide-books, and in nearly every one of them was a good description of a traveler’s feelings upon arriving at Alexandria or Port Saïd. I have been in both places, and about the same sensations will fit either port; and traveling is too personal a matter to describe at length, unless it is done with skill. To give advice is much more simple; and mine is that if you are on a steamer that is going
A Son of the Desert.
A Peddler
through the Canal, don’t stay on her until she gets to Ismailia, but disembark at Port Saïd and get to Cairo that night all the way by
The Slipper Bazaar, Cairo, January 22, 1898.
Egyptian High Life.
rail. You will see as much of the Canal as you want to, and you will not run the chance of being delayed a day, as the Königin Luise was last year by a little tramp steamer that had run foul of a coal-barge.
More advice is to look out of the right-hand window of the car for a first glimpse of the pyramids, the first sure proof that you are in Napoleon’s Egypt. After they are once found, it is easy for your eye to follow them through palm-trees and over mud villages until darkness interferes. Then you come to the station in Cairo, a hotbed of porters and dragomans, and through the confusion you finally reach Shepheard’s, on the street like a great show-window—all but the plate glass—full of odds and ends from all the world. New arrivals are handed in by the dragomans and porters. It is as if you climbed over the footlights to assist in the performance. You finally stand before the good-looking Mr Bailer, at the back of the stage. If he thinks you will stand a room overlooking the stable-yard, you will get it. The next morning I moved to the sunny side, overlooking the garden, where a tame pelican walked among tall palm-trees.
The dragoman who first lays hands on you claims you for his own. You will find him waiting for you in the morning. He will sell you antiques, will take you snipe-shooting. He knows when the dervishes will howl or whirl, or where there is a native wedding, to which he will take you. It may be the fame of Shepheard’s, or the magic name of Egypt, but it all has a wonderful charm.
The Present Situation.
The remains of Rameses and Seti are lying on their backs out in the Gizeh Museum, and there is a strong desire to hurry to them, in spite of the fact that they will keep. But the panorama in front of Shepheard’s is absorbing, and your first morning will most likely be spent in watching it.
My first afternoon was spent with an evil-eyed dragoman whose pockets were filled with dirty cards and letters, all testimonials from former customers proving that he was, as he continually told me, the best dragoman in the business. He could recite some of
A Dealer in Antiquities.
The Bridge.
“Mother Goose,” but knew very little English besides. With him I drove through streets that might have been in Paris, and by barracks and sentries that might have been in London, to a river that could only be
In the Fish-Market.
in Egypt. My carriage went between the two bronze lions and joined in the procession of camels across the bridge over the famous river to the Gizeh side, where tall trees meet overhead; then to a smaller bridge, more trees, quaint shipping, and a stucco palace, once a harem where some of Ismail’s wives
A Village on the Road to the Pyramids.
lived, and now a museum, the temporary resting-place of those uneasy mummied heads that once wore Egypt’s crown; small mouse-colored
Rameses the Great.
donkeys on all sides, and, streaking in among them, tall camels; then seven more miles of trees and a good causeway to the pyramids. Since then I have gone over the road many times, and I am of the opinion that the Nile’s valley would make an ideal “happy hunting-ground,” to which all good tourists might go when cruel waves have ceased to toss them and their hotel lives are over.
All too soon you must go hack to Cairo, where the Bedouin ceases to be the proud son of the desert and becomes a peddler, where sheep become mutton and clover is only fodder But Cairo is about what the tourist expects of it and what the hotel proprietor thinks you want. He fills the halls of his hotel with gaily painted columns, and on each side of the staircase are gaudy figures; and for those tourists who take their Egypt between the slipper bazaar and the fish-market it may do.
