The pursuit of technological superiority and the shrinking american military daniel r. lake - Downlo
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Shrinking the Earth: The Rise and Decline of American Abundance 1st Edition Donald Worster
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To my mother and my wife, two ladies who rock.
6.3
List of figures
Fig. 2.1 US military personnel (office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2017, pp. 246–248)
Fig. 2.2 Navy ships (Naval History and Heritage Command 2017)
Fig. 2.3 Air Force aircraft (The Air Force in facts and figures 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017; Ruehrmund and Bowie 2010)
Fig. 2.4 The declining burden of the military (office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2017, pp. 250–252)
Fig. 2.5 The defense budget (office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2017, pp. 121–127; office of Management and Budget 2018)
Fig. 2.6 Major components of the defense budget (office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2017, pp. 121–127)
Fig. 2.7 Personnel spending per service member (office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2017, pp. 121–127, 246–248)
Fig. 2.8 The procurement budget (office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2017, pp. 121–127)
Fig. 2.9 The rapidly rising cost of tactical aircraft (A-10 Thunderbolt II fact sheet 2015; Angelucci and Bowers 1987, pp. 114–115; Aronstein and Piccirillo 1997; Ferguson 2005; F-15 Eagle fact sheet 2005; F-16 Fighting Falcon fact sheet 2015; F-22 Raptor fact sheet 2015; Golan 2017; Keefer 2017, p. 223; Knaack 1978; McDonnell Douglas/British Aerospace AV-8B Harrier II Attack Fighter 2012; United States Government Accountability office 2017, p. 165; United States Navy Fact File: F/A-18 Hornet Strike Fighter 2009)
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Fig. 2.10 The RDT&E budget (office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2017, pp. 121–127)
Fig. 2.11 o&M spending per service member (office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2017, pp. 121–127, 246–248)
Fig. 2.12 The declining share of combat troops in theater (Binkin 1986; McGrath 2007)
Fig. 2.13 Air Force personnel per aircraft (The Air Force in facts and figures 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017; office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2017, pp. 246–248; Ruehrmund and Bowie 2010)
Fig. 2.14 Navy personnel per ship (Naval History and Heritage Command 2017; office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2017, pp. 246–248)
Fig. 8.1 The militaries of major US allies (World Development Indicators 2018)
Fig. 8.2 Changes in the size of the Russian and Chinese militaries (World Development Indicators 2018)
Fig. 8.3 Changes in Russian and Chinese defense spending (World Development Indicators 2018)
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CHAPTER 1
The Problem of Overstretch
The United States, arguably the most powerful state in the world today, has a problem. At great cost it has built a military that is second to none in its capabilities with a potentially critical weakness: it is prone to “overstretch.” Overstretch is the general term used to describe what happens when excessive demands are placed on something to the point of injury or failure. For example, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy argued that empires are prone to “imperial overstretch,” where their expansion results in military and economic commitments that exceed their capacity, resulting in either their collapse or being superseded by a rival (Kennedy 1987). Military overstretch can take one of two forms. Simple overstretch, where the military lacks enough capabilities to perform the mission(s) it is tasked with, and compound overstretch, where a state seeks to stretch inadequate military capabilities to perform a mission well beyond the scope of their traditional missions (Wilson 2013, p. 23). Since the end of the Cold War, the US military has repeatedly suffered from overstretch whenever it has been asked to perform what by historical standards are quite moderate missions, and it will continue to do so in the future if nothing changes.
This book explores how and why the United States has built a military prone to overstretch. It focuses on one critical factor, the consistent emphasis on gaining and maintaining technological superiority. The US military has consistently seen technology as the solution to military problems such as the challenges offered by potential foes ranging from the
Soviet Union to Iran. I argue that this effort to maintain a technologically superior military capable of dealing with all potential foes is directly responsible for the instances of overstretch since the end of the Cold War. I further argue that absent major changes in military procurement and force structure, it has become almost inevitable that overstretch will occur any time the American military is asked to conduct sustained operations much more extensive than routine deployments and training. This fixation on achieving technological superiority is the result of pro-technology attitudes that are deeply rooted in American culture. As such, the search for technological superiority is neither an accident of history nor is it a natural solution to the various military problems facing the United States. Instead, it is a natural expression of the very materialistic American “way of war,” and as such it will be very difficult to reform the procurement process and the military to make overstretch less likely.
The vulnerability of the US military to overstretch became apparent fairly soon after the occupation of Iraq, though there were instances in the 1990s that should have raised warning flags. In December 2003, Jeffrey Record of the Strategic Studies Institute (U.S. Army War College) and U.S. Air Force Air War College suggested that unexpected post-war requirements for ground forces in Iraq were stressing the U.S. Army “to the breaking point” (Record 2003, p. 39). Rather than dissipating as the occupation of Iraq progressed, they continued and, by late 2004, Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution was arguing that the demands on the Army risked “breaking the all-volunteer force” (O’Hanlon 2004, p. 10). These concerns about overstretch persisted for the next several years, until the end of the Iraq occupation and the drawdown in Afghanistan reduced the stress on the U.S. Army (Haddick 2009; Isenberg 2007; Kagan 2006; Korb and Ogden 2006).
This raises an important question: why was the U.S. Army stressed by conducting operations in Iraq to the point that analysts worried about “breaking” it? The United States spends far more on national defense than any other country in the world, over $646 billion in 2018 (almost 36% of total world defense expenditures in 2016, the latest year available) (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense [Comptroller] 2017, p. 6; SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2017). In size, the United States has the third largest military in the world, after China and India (two states with at least four times the population of the United States) (Total available active military manpower by country 2018), though its Army is a much smaller share of the total US military than is the case for most countries.1
Because of its size and technological sophistication, the US military is typically considered to be the most powerful military in the world by far. If any country should be able to handle the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan without too much trouble, it is the United States. Nevertheless, while the fears of “breaking” the Army turned out to be overblown the U.S. Army was severely stressed during the eight years when it was at war in both Afghanistan and Iraq. This is particularly interesting because the much larger deployment into the Middle East to conduct Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990–1991 caused no such strain.
The fundamental problem is that the US military, particularly the Army, was simply too small for the missions it was asked to perform during the occupation of Iraq. From 2003 to 2010, the United States generally had between 150,000 and 180,000 troops (mostly from the Army and Marine Corps) deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan (Belasco 2009). In addition, up to 120,000 more personnel were deployed to the region in support of operations in those countries, for a total of up to 300,000 military personnel deployed to perform those two missions. In addition, the US military has roughly another 160,000 personnel deployed outside the United States on more or less permanent assignments in East Asia (81,000 personnel), Europe (66,000 personnel), Africa (11,000 personnel), and the Western Hemisphere (2300 personnel) (Defense Manpower Data Center 2018). US overseas deployments thus peaked at around 460,000 military personnel between 2003 and 2010, though some of those forces in Europe and East Asia were available for other missions if need be. Since 2010, the number of personnel deployed overseas has decreased but still total some 240,000 (The Editorial Board 2017).
To accomplish these missions, the US military had up to 1.45 million active duty personnel (currently about 1.3 million) and 850,000 reserve personnel (currently just over 800,000) (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense [Comptroller] 2017). That sounds like plenty of personnel to support those overseas missions, but in reality it would put some stress on the US military even if the total force were being utilized. The U.S. Army considers the demands on its personnel to be at a “steady state” level (meaning they can be conducted indefinitely) when the “active” to “dwell” ratio is 1:3 for its active duty troops and 1:5 for reserve troops. This means that active duty personnel should not spend more than one out of four years in what it euphemistically calls “full-spectrum” operations (e.g. combat zones) and reserve component troops should not be on active duty more than one out of every six years (of which they are only available for
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operations for nine months). If we extend this to the US military as a whole, at its peak size in the last decade it would be able to maintain a rotation of 362,500 active duty and 106,250 reserve troops available for operations indefinitely. That is very close to the estimated 460,000 military personnel deployed during the peak of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, so why did these wars pose such a burden?
The simple answer is that the burden of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan did not fall evenly across the US military. Because the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were counterinsurgency campaigns, the main burden of fighting these wars fell on the Army (Baiocchi 2013; Belasco 2009). The Marine Corps was also a significant participant in these operations, especially compared to the Air Force and Navy, but the percentage of the Corps deployed for these operations at any time was much lower than that of the Army. Because the majority of the troops deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) were Army personnel, a mission which would have only put minor stress on the US military as a whole put a lot of stress on the Army. At the start of the Iraq War in 2003, the Army had a total strength of just over 1 million (480,000 active duty, plus 550,000 in the Army Reserve and National Guard) (O’Hanlon 2004, p. 5).2 The peak strength of the active duty Army was 566,000 in 2010–2011 (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense [Comptroller] 2017, pp. 246–248).3 The Marine Corps had about 175,000 active duty troops in 2003 (plus 40,000 reserves), increasing to 203,000 in 2009, so the total active duty ground forces available for Iraq, Afghanistan, and other missions around the world (Korea, Okinawa, at sea Marine Expeditionary Units, training missions around Africa and the Western Hemisphere, etc.) was at most a little over 750,000. From 2004 through 2010, the combined (Army and Marine) troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan ranged from 146,000 to 188,000, averaging just under 167,000 per year (Baiocchi 2013; Belasco 2009). In 2006, the Army had roughly 120,000 troops deployed in Iraq, at least 15,000 in Afghanistan, and another 64,000 deployed elsewhere in the world (Congress of the United States: Congressional Budget Office 2007; Isenberg 2007, p. 14). To support this deployment of 199,000 troops the Army had 505,000 active duty forces available, far short of the nearly 800,000 required for such a deployment rate to be indefinitely sustainable.4 Even if we assume a “surge rate” rotation is acceptable, which accepts some wear and tear on the Army in exchange for a higher deployment rate, the active duty forces were still nearly 100,000 personnel short
of the 600,000 needed to sustain that deployment rate. Reserve and National Guard forces were not able to make up the shortfall because they had already been heavily used. Roughly 95% of the National Guard’s combat troops had already been mobilized by 2006, and some had already hit the legal deployment limit of two years overseas out of every five for the reserve components (Isenberg 2007, p. 13). Note that this was at the beginning of the “surge” in Iraq. The deployment of additional troops to Iraq meant that the estimated ratio of troops deployed abroad to troops at home dropped below 1:1 in 2007 (Congress of the United States: Congressional Budget Office 2007, p. 2), what the Army calls a “full surge” level of deployment. The high wear on equipment and stress on personnel associated with this rate of deployment, with almost half of the Army on their second or later tour in Iraq or Afghanistan by the end of 2011 (Baiocchi 2013, p. 5),5 was by itself enough to put substantial stress on the Army.
The level of stress on the Army was exacerbated by the fact that the burden of deployments abroad did not fall evenly across the force, but rather was heavier on certain specialties and types of units. Conducting counterinsurgency operations such as in Iraq and Afghanistan requires combat troops, especially infantry, military police, and special operations troops (including Special Forces, Rangers, civil affairs, and psychological operations troops). These troops bore the brunt of the burden of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, while other parts of the Army rotated through at a much lower level or (in some cases) not at all. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan put a disproportionate burden on the combat arms (infantry, armor, air defense, artillery, aviation, combat engineers, and Special Forces). Combat troops made up 40% of the forces deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007, even though they only make up about 25% of the personnel in the military (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018; McGrath 2007, pp. 50–53). Beyond this, while combat arms make up around 25% of the Army not all branches were equally involved in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mechanized units, particularly armor, are of little value for counterinsurgency and occupation duties so while they were rotated into Iraq (and Afghanistan) their presence may have actually undermined the mission because of the way they separate the troops from the population and their destructiveness (Lyall and Wilson 2009). Artillery is even less valuable for these missions, and air defense units are completely worthless. The main combat forces needed for counterinsurgency operations are infantry, and as 2004 of there were only about 71,000 infantry in the active duty Army
and Marines combined (roughly 50,000 in the Army) (Boot 2005). Manpower shortages in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly in infantry, led the Department of Defense under Donald Rumsfeld to call up the Reserves (including inactive reserves) and National Guard, offer large bonuses, implement “stop-loss” (preventing troops from leaving active duty at the end of their contracts), and outsource extensively to contractors (Lewis 2012, pp. 482–483). It was not until after the drawdown in Iraq was complete at the end of 2011 that the Army was able to start recovering from the stress of repeated deployments.
While the focus has so far been on the Army, the risk of overstretch is high for all the American armed services. The Marines have a slightly higher percentage of combat troops than the Army but, due to their smaller size, will have the same problem with any large and extended deployment overseas. They have also been experiencing a high rate of aircraft crashes and accidents and low aircraft readiness rates that have been attributed to the high operational rate, aging aircraft that need to be replaced, and inadequate resources and personnel to maintain the aircraft under these conditions (Freedberg 2017b, 2018a). The vulnerability of the Air Force to overstretch was noted even earlier. In an analysis of fighter operations during Operation Desert Storm by RAND, the authors concluded that it will be harder for a downsized Air Force to sustain operations because it will not have as many non-deployed aircraft to scavenge for spare parts to support the deployed aircraft (Pyles and Shulman 1995). While this particular problem has not yet manifested during subsequent operations, the impact of a shrinking Air Force did become apparent during the Kosovo intervention in 1999, even though that mission seemed relatively minor since it only involved 731 of the 6736 aircraft in the Air Force inventory (including Air National Guard and Reserves) (Ruehrmund and Bowie 2010). Carrying out Operation Allied Force (the Kosovo intervention) caused problems for the Air Force because its burden was not evenly borne across the Air Force. Instead, the mission ended up involving 7 of the 20 Air Force combat wings and required the call-up of reservists to conduct mid-air refueling (Richter 1999). It also required that the Air Force pull electronic warfare and surveillance aircraft out of Iraqi airspace and stop enforcing the no-fly zone there until Operation Allied Force was over. More recently, overstretch is starting to hit the Air Force as a whole. It is experiencing low aircraft availability across the board due to having too few maintenance personnel. Only a handful of Air Force combat aircraft (e.g. F-15s, F-16s, A-10s, F-22As, F-35As, AC-130s,
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B-52s, B-1s, B-2s) and mobility aircraft (C-17As, C-130s, KC-10As, KC-135s) types achieved an availability rate within 5% of the standard set for that particular aircraft type between 2006 and 2016 (Brissett 2017, p. 25; Losey 2017). Similarly, the Navy is becoming more prone to overstretch whenever the rate of deployment increases because it has too few warships (Kaplan 2009). The Navy found it impossible to deploy enough ships off the coast of Somalia to deal with piracy there in the late 2000s because of other demands on its limited number of ships (Kraska and Wilson 2009; No stopping them 2011). More recently, a rash of accidents in 2017 involving one Naval vessel running aground and two others colliding with cargo ships were attributed to the Navy not having enough ships, since it is unable to properly train crews when so many ships were deployed at sea (Freedberg 2017a, 2018a). The small size of the Navy and shortages in manpower and parts are also likely to cause problems if any confrontation with China (or other wartime operations, for that matter), which is rapidly building its own naval strength (Defense spending in a time of austerity 2010; Freedberg 2018b; Kaplan 2009).
1.1 The ArgumenT in Brief
So, we are left with a puzzle. How is it that the most powerful military in the world, one of the largest and by far the most expensive, is so vulnerable to overstretch by relatively small deployments and missions? As has been implied by the analysis so far, a partial answer can be provided by looking at the size and composition of the military. The active duty US military is currently smaller than it has been at any time since the late 1940s (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense [Comptroller] 2017, pp. 246–248). While the population of the United States has more than doubled since World War II, the military has been shrinking in absolute terms more or less steadily since the end of the Vietnam War, such that relative to the US population it is half the size it was at the beginning of the Cold War. In addition, the composition of the military has also shifted with combat forces (aka the “tooth” of the military) shrinking relative to support forces (the “tail” of the military). Because combat forces are essential for any military operation, the combination of an absolutely smaller military and a relatively smaller share of combat forces has made the American military increasingly prone to overstretch. While remaining quite powerful, by concentrating American combat power into fewer and fewer deployable assets it has led to the current situation, where actually employing the
American military for military purposes risks overstretching it even when the deployment is relatively small.
The main reason the military is shrinking in both absolute and relative terms is the strong American bias toward high technology. While technological change and scientific breakthroughs are not themselves the main impetuses for new weapons development (Brown 1992, p. 14), the goal of achieving and maintaining technological superiority is central to the development of American weapon systems. This bias drives up research and development costs (which crowds out other elements of defense spending like operations and maintenance or personnel), unit procurement costs, and support requirements (Clark 1989, pp. 9–10,12; Gansler 1989, pp. 207–208). Since budgets have not expanded to match these higher costs, the inevitable result has been an American military that is both absolutely and relatively shrinking. Absolutely shrinking, in that the active duty forces are smaller today and are operating fewer weapon systems (ships, planes, tanks, etc.) than at any time since the 1940s. Relatively shrinking, in that the share of the military made up of combat forces—the “tooth”— has shrunk relative to the share of the military made up of support units— the “tail.”
The US military depends on technological superiority as an asymmetric advantage over its foes (Suddarth 2002),6 but it goes beyond that. The US tendency has been to seek a high-tech solution to nearly every military problem (Gray 1989; Luttwak 1981). This is deeply rooted in American culture, and the pro-technology bias has been reinforced by the military success achieved through material superiority, the abundant resources available to the US military, and a philosophical commitment to liberalism that helps rationalize substituting machines and firepower for manpower.
1.2
The hisTory of This issue
This is not a new issue, or debate. There have been efforts to reform defense procurement to deal with problems like these for the last 50 years (Brown 1992, pp. 14–15; Gregory 1989; United States Congress: Senate Committee on Armed Services: Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel 1981; Ward 2009). Prior to World War II, there was an active debate over whether the United States should try to have the best aircraft, or focus on fielding a large fleet of planes. Rapid increases in aircraft cost meant that the Army Air Corps7 was unable to procure as many aircraft as were authorized, but aviators considered this reasonable as long as performance was going
up since they believed quality was an effective counter to quantity.8 In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a strong military reform movement that pushed for changing procurement patterns away from the heavy reliance on advanced technology, particularly in the case of tactical aircraft (Chiarelli and Gagnon 1985; Hart 1986; Kummer 2014; Record 1983; see also Clark 1984; Clark and Lilley 1989; Hammond 2001; Stevenson 1993). What became known as the “Lightweight Fighter Mafia”9 pushed for lighter fighters because lower weight means lower cost and better maneuverability, and thus better air combat performance.
The debate has often been described as one of quality versus quantity, but that is inaccurate. The reformers argued that what the US military requires is both, and that it is possible to have both high-quality weapons and large numbers of them with better practices and less emphasis on technology for its own sake (Clark 1989, pp. 14–15; McNaugher 1989, p. 7; Perry 1984; Stevenson 1993, p. 19). The emphasis tends to be on quantity because that is what is being sacrificed. This threatens to undermine American military effectiveness because of the ways quantity and quality affect the combat performance. In his landmark treatise on military combat, Frederick Lanchester found that there is a square-law relationship between unit/equipment quality and quantity (Lanchester 1916, 19–27; Perry 1984, p. 186). As a result, to compensate for a 2:1 numerical inferiority it is necessary to achieve a 4:1 qualitative superiority.10 It is very difficult and expensive to achieve this kind of qualitative superiority, especially given the way that high equipment and support costs lead to reductions in training time. Instead, the argument made is that we need to have both good equipment and enough of it, and the way to achieve that is to only use advanced technology selectively, when it results in superior warfighting capabilities (Perry 1984).
It should also be noted that the issue is not one of technology driving weapons development. There is no evidence of this happening even in an area where it would be particularly likely, such as strategic bomber development (Brown 1992, p. 306). It is not the capabilities of technology that are driving the process, but rather aspirations about technology that are often not possible without advancing technology beyond current levels. The US military has developed a tendency to propose weapon systems that are literally not possible given the available technology, and then push the technological frontier to make the weapon system work. This has caused research and development spending to skyrocket, the resulting equipment is typically far more expensive to produce than the initial
proposal called for, and the new equipment also requires far more maintenance and support than would be acceptable if the support requirements were known before development was complete. This is what is ultimately driving the US military to shrink, both absolutely and, with respect to its combat forces, relatively.
1.3 summAry of ConTenTs
Chapter 2 examines the size and structure of the US military to describe how it is shrinking, and why. It goes into detail about how the size of the US military and the size of the defense budget have changed over the last 70 years, in particular noting how the military has shrunk even as defense budgets have tended to rise. By analyzing the different components of the defense budget, it shows how dramatic increases in procurement costs are a primary reason for this combination of a shrinking military and a rising budget. A further discussion of the sources of high procurement costs puts the focus on the effort to maintain qualitative superiority, particularly through technological superiority. Technological change, and the effort to exploit technological superiority, is also linked to the relative decline of the combat forces as a share of the military.
Chapter 3 explores the history of American military strategy and related procurement decisions since the beginning of the Cold War to explain why the US military is so focused on technological superiority. It shows how the United States has consistently chosen to rely on technology to solve military problems since the early days of the Cold War, to the point that leveraging technology can be described as the dominant practice for the American military. The roots of this preference for technology are explored, and the reason this should be understood not as a functional and rational strategy but rather as an expression of a particularly materialistic American way of waging war is explained.
Chapter 4 is about the Air Force and its relationship with technology. By examining its organizational structure and culture, we see that the Air Force is extremely focused on high technology. This makes the downsides of the pursuit of technological superiority particularly visible as a result. By exploring the history of the Air Force since it became an independent service and its biases regarding how it wants to wage war, we see how these factors affect the equipment it seeks to procure. In particular, we see that the Air Force is prone to insisting on high technology for its own sake, rather than on whether it actually adds to the capabilities of the
equipment. By looking in detail at Air Force procurement of tactical aircraft, particularly the newest fighters in the inventory, the F-22A and F-35A, as well as the way the Air Force is incorporating Remotely Piloted Aircraft (aka “drones”) we see how Air Force biases regarding missions and high technology are creating an organization very vulnerable to overstretch.
Chapter 5 looks at the Navy and its relationship with technology. By exploring its organizational structure and culture, we see how its interest in high technology is tempered by other factors such as its strong traditions, institutional conservatism, and an inherent caution related to its conduct of operations at sea. By examining Navy decisions regarding the procurement of tactical aircraft as well as recent major procurement programs including the DDG-1000 Zumwalt class destroyer and the Littoral Combat Ship, we see how enthusiasm for the potential offered by technology tends to be moderated by other considerations such as maintaining the size of the fleet. As such, while the Navy is also very vulnerable to overstretch, it is actively taking steps that offer some promise to alleviate that risk in the future.
Chapter 6 focuses on the Army, which has traditionally been less fixated on technology due to its strong traditions and an organizational culture emphasizing the human element of war. By looking at the historical development of Army doctrine and equipment, we see that the Army has traditionally had a materialistic approach to war, rather than a technological one. We also see a greater embrace of technology over the last 20 years, though high profile program failures in recent years have somewhat tempered its enthusiasm for cutting-edge technology. By going into more detail in an analysis of Army aviation, the RAH-66 Comanche program, the Future Combat System (FCS) program, and a brief discussion of automation we see how the Army is somewhat subject to the lure of superior technology, but that overall its approach tends to be more moderate and restrained. As a result, while the Army is vulnerable to overstretch, it is less due to a focus on technological superiority than the highly technological and materialistic model of war it has adopted.
Chapter 7 explores the Marine Corps and its relationship with technology. We see how the history, strong traditions, and emphasis on the human element combine to create an organization that is fairly resistant to enthusiasm for technology. By looking in more detail into how the Marines look at their amphibious warfare mission, and how it has developed over time, we see how the Marines are somewhat prone to embracing technology
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related to that key mission. A focused look at the amphibious vehicles of the Marines shows how important technology can be, as well as how for the most part the Marines do not emphasize cutting-edge technology in this area. In contrast, we see through an examination of the Marine enthusiasm for helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that can also take off and land vertically (the V-22 Osprey, AV-8B Harrier II, and F-35B) one area where the Marines tend to embrace the potential of cutting-edge technology as much as any other armed service. Overall, we see that the Marines are mostly at risk of overstretch due to their small size, but that their affection for exotic fixed-wing aircraft also causes them some problems.
Chapter 8 looks at the near future prospects for the US military to suffer from overstretch. While the armed services have largely backed off from what was at times a fairly unrestrained pursuit of technological superiority, their efforts are not likely to be sufficient for significantly reducing their vulnerability to overstretch. Instead, we see that the kind of fundamental transformation that is necessary to make overstretch unlikely is itself unlikely to happen because it would require the armed forces to radically change their approach to procurement, and the political environment does not favor such a change. Finally, I consider the implications of a continuation of the status quo. Other countries are emulating the United States to some extent, and thus are likely to themselves experience overstretch in the future. Possible foes are also engaged in asymmetric attempts to counter US superiority, with unpredictable results. Finally, for the US military we should expect periodic episodes of overstretch and, more troubling, there is a significant risk that the US military will be unable to sustain operations if it gets involved in a larger war.
noTes
1. The U.S. Air Force and Navy are larger than comparable organizations for most countries, and the Marine Corps is virtually unique in its size and structure.
2. The US military also can draw upon inactive reserves, individuals who are not assigned to a reserve unit and not attending drill. There are over 100,000 inactive reserves available, but less than 25,000 served on active duty as part of these wars.
3. The reserve components did not see a corresponding increase.
4. The Marine Corps was also providing troops for these operations, but with a smaller share of the Corps involved it was better able to sustain its commitment.
5. Note that this does not count the large number of Army personnel who had left active duty by the end of 2011 after serving more than one tour in either Iraq or Afghanistan.
6. Senator Sam Nunn characterized the strategy of reliance on superior technology to gain a decisive edge over our foes as the basis of America’s defense effort (United States Congress: Senate Committee on Armed Services: Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel 1981, pp. 1–2).
7. The Air Force became independent in 1947.
8. After World War II broke out, it became apparent that the United States had neither quality nor quality. During the war, the United States went with quantity over quality (McNaugher 1989, pp. 19–20; Stevenson 1993, pp. 62–63, 71).
9. The “Mafia” was named by its opponents, and was composed of Boyd, Sprey, and Riccioni, though Chuck Myers also was in effect a member.
10. More than just equipment quality determines whether a qualitative edge exists. Training, morale, tactics, and leadership are also relevant, for example.
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CHAPTER 2
The Shrinking American Military
As previously noted, overstretch is fundamentally a problem of inadequate capacity. When the demands placed on an organization exceed what it is capable of sustainably meeting, it will experience overstretch and if this stress is sustained it can damage the organization. In recent decades, we have seen the American military repeatedly overstretched by the operational demands placed upon it, and at times this has had severe consequences for its personnel and equipment. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq severely stressed the Army in particular, with the repeated deployments resulting in significant strain on the infantry and special operations forces that were in high demand. The Air Force has found it difficult to carry out multiple relatively small operations at the same time due to limited numbers of specialized aircraft. This problem has been compounded by lower than desired rates of aircraft availability over the last decade due to the combination of aging aircraft and inadequate maintenance capacity. Navy and Marine aviation are experiencing similar problems, with low aircraft availability and high accident rates resulting from worn out aircraft and maintenance crews due to the high rate of deployment. The Navy is also finding out that it has too few ships to maintain normal peacetime operations, much less fight a war, and as a result several Navy warships have had accidents over the last couple of years. The end of operations in Iraq reduced the stress on the Army, but overall the American military’s problems with overstretch have been persistent and seem likely to remain so.
D. R. Lake, The Pursuit of Technological Superiority and the Shrinking American Military, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-78681-7_2
R. LAKE
It may seem odd that the US military would experience problems related to overstretch so often in recent decades, given its size and capabilities. After all, only China and India have militaries larger than the 1,393,000 active duty personnel of the US military (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2017, pp. 278, 289; Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2017, p. 248). The US military is also relatively lavishly equipped compared with any other national military due to the large US defense budget (just over 36% of the world’s military expenditures for 2016) (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2017). Due to its size and budget, the US military is arguably the most powerful military in the world by a large margin. Nevertheless, the fact that it still periodically experiences overstretch indicates that it lacks the capacity needed to accomplish all the missions with which it is tasked. To understand why this has been repeatedly happening since the end of the Cold War, it is important to note that while the US military is still large, for decades it has been shrinking in both absolute and relative ways. Today, the American military is the smallest it has been since the end of World War II. Furthermore, the composition of the military has been changing with the share of combat forces (troops, aircraft, and ships) declining relative to support forces (administrative, maintenance, supply, etc.). Since both the total size of the US military and the portion of it capable of performing critical combat functions are both shrinking while its obligations (missions) are not, overstretch was basically inevitable.
The shrinking of the American military in both absolute and relative terms has been going on for decades. The post-World War II military peaked in size during the 1950s, in response to the Korean War and burgeoning Cold War, and has been shrinking fairly consistently since then. Over the same time period, we see even greater declines in the combat forces available when measured in terms of troops, ships, and planes. I argue that these trends are mainly due to the increasing technological sophistication of the equipment used by the US military. This is the continuation of a process that has affected the militaries of the great powers over the last two centuries. Navies that were once composed of wooden sailing vessels now field nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines. Armies that employed muzzle-loading muskets are now equipped with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and helicopters. Air forces did not even exist until the twentieth century, and in the last 100 years have progressed from primitive cloth-covered planes with simple gas engines to stealth jet aircraft. This mechanization of war inevitably required military organizations
D.
to increase their provision of support functions (logistics, maintenance, and administration) as they took advantage of the potential offered by the new technologies. As the mechanization of war has made militaries more capable, it has also made them costlier, and that is ultimately what is shrinking the American military.
2.1 Trends in Personnel and equiPmenT
Before we get into why the American military has been shrinking, it is worth examining how its size has changed over the last 70 years. Starting with its personnel, three things are apparent when we look at the number of active duty personnel in the US military over the last 70 years (Fig. 2.1). First, the size of the military (particularly the Army and Marine Corps) has varied in response to changes in the strategic environment. This is the typical pattern since the establishment of the Republic, where the United States mobilizes to fight wars and otherwise maintains a small peacetime military. The large “peacetime” military establishment of the Cold War reflects the high level of international tension. Second, there is a general trend toward a smaller military since the early days of the Cold War. That is noteworthy, because even the higher tension of the Reagan years did not do much to
Fig. 2.1 US military personnel (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2017, pp. 246–248)
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Flip scrambled to her feet and Madame Perceval tried them against her. "How are they?" Flip asked eagerly.
"Perfect. Couldn't be better Put on your things and we'll go out and try them."
As Flip snapped the skis onto her boots Madame Perceval said, "Now don't expect miracles, Philippa. The skis don't make as much difference as all that. Just go very slowly and do as I say."
Madame Perceval was right. Flip was not able, all of a sudden, to ski like an angel because of the new skis. But she no longer fell quite so frequently, or had such a desperate struggle to get to her feet again.
"Better, much better!" Madame Perceval cried as Flip slid down a tiny incline and stopped without falling. "Now turn around."
Flip raised her leg and the long ski no longer tumbled her ignominiously onto the snow. She snapped her other leg around and there she was, all in one piece and erect.
"Bravo!" Madame cried. "Now herring-bone up the little hill and come down again."
Her tongue sticking out with eagerness, Flip did as Madame Perceval told her.
"Good," the art teacher said. "Good, Philippa. More spring in your knees if you can. How about that bad knee? Does it bother you?"
"Not much." Flip shook her head. "Oh, Madame, do you think I can learn?"
"I know you can. Just don't stick your tongue out so far. You might bite it off in one of your tumbles."
"Do you think Fräulein Hauser will take me back in the skiing class?"
"Wait! Wait!" Paul cried, waving his ski sticks in wild excitement. "I have a much better idea."
Madame laughed and ducked as one of the sticks went flying. "All right, Paul. Calm down and tell us this magnificent idea." But Flip
could see that she was pleased because Paul sounded excited and happy, and the dark look had fled from his face.
"Well, Flip was telling me about this ski meet you have at school and how everybody can go in for it and there's a prize for form, and a long race, and a short race, and a prize for the girl who's made most progress and all sorts of things. And I think it would be wonderful if we could teach Flip and she could enter the ski meet and win and surprise everybody."
Madame Perceval started to laugh but then she looked at Flip and Paul and their eager excited faces, and she said slowly, "It would be rather a tall order teaching Flip just on week-ends. She needs lots of practice."
"I could slip out in the morning before Call Over," Flip cried. "If I make my bed before breakfast and hurry breakfast I'd have almost an hour and nobody'd see me then."
"And think how surprised that Fräulein Hauser would be," Paul cried.
"And the girls would be so surprised," Flip shouted. "Erna and Jackie and all of them. Oh, Madame, do you think I could learn? I'd work terribly hard. I'd practice and practice."
"If you keep on improving the way you've improved this afternoon," Madame Perceval told her, "I'm sure you could."
"Come on, Aunt Colette," Paul cajoled.
Madame Perceval looked at them for a moment longer. Then she smiled and said, "Why not?"
F finished her still life of a plaster head of Diana, a wine bottle, a loaf of bread, and a wine glass, early during the next art class.
"That's good, Flip," Madame Perceval said. "Really very good, though your perspective is wobbly—everything's going up hill at quite an alarming angle and poor Diana looks as though she were about to fall on her ear. But the color and texture is excellent. That's
really bread, and the transparency of your glass is a great improvement over your last still life. That's good work, Flip."
Flip blushed with pleasure, partly at the praise, and partly because Madame was calling her Flip. Several of the girls looked up at the name and Gloria actually winked at her.
"You have time to start something else," Madame was saying. "Here's a clean sheet of paper and a piece of charcoal. Just draw anything you like. Either from something in the room or from your imagination."
For the past two days Flip had been thinking of three things, Paul, skiing, and Madame's daughter. She had not had another opportunity to ask Paul about Denise, how old she was, or whether she was alive or dead. Somehow Flip felt that she must be dead and that perhaps that accounted for the sadness in Madame Perceval's eyes. She wondered what Madame's daughter would look like and, almost without volition, her hand holding the charcoal moved across the paper and she began to draw a girl, a girl about her own age sitting on a rock and looking out across the valley to the mountains.
The likeness was stronger than she could possibly have guessed. She was trying, more or less, to draw a girl who looked like Madame and who had short hair like hers. But the girl who appeared on the paper did not look like Madame and Flip felt discouraged because she knew the perspective was wrong again and the mountains were too small and far away and the girl's feet weren't right. She sighed and tried to erase the mountains and the feet and correct them.
Madame Perceval stood behind her and looked over her shoulder down at the paper. Flip almost jumped as the art teacher's strong fingers dug into her arm.
"What are you doing?" Madame Perceval's voice was calm and low, but Flip felt the strain in it.
"Just—just a girl looking at the mountains," she stammered. "The— the feet aren't right."
"I'll show you," Madame Perceval said; but instead of explaining what was wrong, and then telling Flip what to do to correct it, as she
usually did, she took the charcoal and swiftly put the feet in again herself; and then she took the thumbtacks out of Flip's board and took the paper and walked over to the cupboard with it and Flip saw that her hands were trembling.
In a moment she came back with a fresh piece of paper. "Why don't you try drawing one of the girls in the class?" Madame suggested, and her voice was natural again. "Erna, you've finished, haven't you? Will you sit still and let Flip sketch you?"
"Yes, Madame. How do you want me to sit, Pi—Philippa—uh—Flip?"
Madame Perceval smiled as Erna stumbled over Flip's name, and Flip said, "Oh, the way you are now looking over the back of your chair is fine, if you're comfortable."
She took up the charcoal and sketched quickly and then she laughed because the girl on her paper was so out of proportion and funnylooking and at the same time she was Erna. In trying to get a likeness Flip had over-accentuated and the braces on Erna's teeth were ridiculous and her chin jutted out and the barette pulled the hair back far too tightly from the forehead.
"What are you laughing at?" Erna demanded. Flip looked at her drawing and thought,—oh, dear, now Erna will be mad.
But Madame Perceval had come over and was laughing, too, and showing the paper with Erna on it to the class, and everybody was laughing.
"I think you have a flair for caricature, Flip," Madame said. And Jackie bounced up and down on her chair, crying, "Draw me, Flip, draw me!"
"Hold still, then, Jackie," Madame said, handing Flip another sheet of paper.
Flip's hand holding the charcoal made Jackie's curly hair fly wildly about the paper; the enormous, long lashed black eyes took up half the page, and the mouth was a tiny bud above the pointed little chin.
Erna had been watching and as Flip laid down the charcoal for a moment she grabbed the paper and held it up, shouting, "Look at Jackie! She looks just like a cat!"
"Draw me! Draw me!" All the girls were shouting at Flip until Madame Perceval stopped them, saying, "Not now, girls. The bell just rang. You can get Flip to draw you any time. I know she'd like to, wouldn't you, Flip?"
"Oh, yes, Madame!"
So they besieged Flip in the Common Room with requests for caricatures to send home, and Flip went to her locker, her face bright with happiness, to get her sketch book and pencils.
"Don't make my nose too big!" "Should I take my glasses off, Flip?" "Oh, Pill, don't put in my freckles!" 'Flip' and 'Pill' came indiscriminately, and somehow quite suddenly and surprisingly Flip knew that she no longer minded the 'Pill' because it sounded friendly; it was being said to her, not at her —I'm liking school, she thought.—I'm liking it. Now it will sound better when I tell Paul I like it.
Only Esmée Bodet was discontented with her picture. "I don't look like that!" she said, and tore the page across, tossing the pieces in the waste paper basket.
"She looks exactly like that," Erna said in Flip's ear "Come on up on the billiard table and let's play jacks." The entire school had a jacks craze on. Even the seniors were playing though Esmée turned up her nose and said it was a child's game, and continued to play very bad bridge.
"Oh, jacks! Let me play too!" Gloria cried, clambering up and sitting cross-legged on the green felt of the billiard table; and Flip realized that one reason Gloria never lacked for partners, or a place in the Common Room games, was that she never hesitated to ask.
"Come on, Jackie," Erna called. "Climb up."
Flip was quite good at jacks and Gloria bounced up and down impatiently. "Come on, Pill, miss can't you? I want a turn." And she gave Flip's elbow a jog, but Flip caught the ball and laughed triumphantly.
"Good for you, Flip," Erna cried. "You can't play if you're going to cheat, Glo."
"It's Erna's turn next, anyhow," Jackie said. "By the way, Pill, I think it's a dirty shame Hauser made you drop skiing."
"Me too." Erna nodded so violently that her hair came out of the barette and she had to fasten it again.
Flip thought of the progress she had already made on her skis, and smiled to herself. Then she shrugged, "Well, if she thinks I'm too impossible to teach, I guess that's that."
"The old minge, the mangy old minge," Gloria muttered. "I say, Pill. What're you going to be when you get out of this place, an artist?"
Flip nodded. "I'd like to be. The way my father is. I'd like to paint portraits and do illustrations for children's books." She reached wildly for the jacks' ball, which was this time an old golf ball Gloria's mother had sent, but it bounced off the table and Erna scrambled after it.
"At last," she said, bringing it back and collecting the jacks. "I'm going to be a doctor like my father. I think it must be wonderful to cut people up and put them back together again." Underneath her joking words Flip could tell that she was serious.
"The trouble is that you can't always put them back together again," Jackie said.
"I will." Erna swept up her jacks with a confident gesture. "If people have their legs and things blown off I'll discover a way to put them back or give them new ones off dead people."
Flip started to tell Erna that Paul wanted to be a doctor too, but Gloria, who didn't mind when she herself talked about glass eyes or false teeth, put her hands over her ears. "Oh, stop! Stop!"
"Well, dead people can give their eyes so blind people can see," Erna said, "so I don't see why they shouldn't give their legs and things, too."
Gloria clapped her hand over Erna's mouth. "You go talk about your old operations somewhere else."
"Who asked you to play jacks anyhow?" Erna mumbled from behind Gloria's hand. "Let go and let me play. I'm on fivesies, eggs in the basket."
"Foursies."
"Fivesies."
"It's fivesies," Flip corroborated. "Are you going to be a movie actress, Jackie?"
Jackie laughed and waved her arms. "My father says I'll be an actress over his dead body. I haven't thought about it much. Maybe I'll just be a wife like my mother. She says that's a career in itself, only lots of people forget it."
"Love," Gloria sighed, "that's what I'm cut out for."
"Do you believe in love at first sight?" Flip asked and blushed.
"I believe in love." Gloria placed her hand dramatically over her heart. "It's love that makes the world go round."
"Have you seen Maggie Campbell's brother?" Jackie asked. "He's the handsomest man I ever saw Maggie's going to give me a snapshot of him for Christmas."
Flip sat with her legs stuck out in front of her on the old hotel billiard table, because her stiff knee kept her from sitting cross-legged or on her heels, and watched, and listened, and occasionally said a word, and she felt so excited that she could feel the excitement like hunger in the pit of her stomach. She was excited because for the first time she felt on the inside, and underneath the new warm sense of being one of them was the glorious secret knowledge of Paul—and tomorrow she would see him again.
T thing Paul asked Flip the next day was, "Have you been practicing your skiing?"
Flip nodded. "Every morning."
"How's it going?"
"Better."
"Well, come on and let's go. Is Aunt Colette coming over?"
"I don't know."
"Well, come on, Flip," Paul said impatiently. "I want to see how much you've improved."
They went out, Ariel rushing madly about them, digging up the snow, running and jumping against them, until Paul had to send him in.
Paul was visibly impressed with Flip's progress, and when Madame Perceval appeared on skis, Paul flew over to her in great excitement. "Flip's a natural born skier, Aunt Colette!" he cried. "She's magnificent!"
Madame Perceval smiled at Paul and held out her hand to Flip. "Let's see what you've accomplished, little one."
She, too, was impressed. "You must have been working hard!" she said. "We'll have you doing Christianas and all sorts of things in no time."
"Oh, Madame, do you really think so?"
"Just keep up the practicing, Flip, as you've been doing, and I'm sure of it."
"She'll be quite a shock to everybody at the ski meet, won't she?"
Paul asked.
Madame laughed. "She certainly will."
And Flip went to bed that night to dream of soaring through the air on her skis, watched by admiring throngs of girls; of executing perfect Christianas and the delicate loops of telemarks; and when she woke
up in the morning her mind was still a happy jumble of snow conditions, stems, and langlaufs.
Flip had thought as she slipped out the ski room door after breakfast each morning that the girls would become curious about her hurried breakfasts and ask what she was doing; but they were used to her disappearances and absences and were too hungry and sleepy and hurried in the cold dark of the mornings to pay much attention to anything besides getting themselves out of their warm beds and then eating as much hot chocolate and porridge and rolls and jam as possible.
Flip was out practicing intently one Saturday morning when she noticed someone watching her. She looked up, fearful that she was being discovered, but it was no one from the school. It was a man with a dark, wild face, and the look in his eyes frightened her; but he waved and grinned at her cheerfully and moved away. He wore climbing boots and carried a stick and he struck off up the mountain, walking very rapidly. She watched after him until he was lost in the trees, wondering what a strange man was doing on the grounds of a girls' school. Then she thought he might be a new gardener or perhaps someone to help with flooding the hockey field for ice skating, though that was not to be done till the Christmas holidays.
Oh, well, she thought, there's never anybody around who isn't meant to be around, so I guess it's all right.
And she kept on working at the skiing until time to get the mail before Call Over.
Most of the girls were already at the desk in the Hall when she arrived, flushed from her early morning exercise; and Signorina, who was on duty, was giving out the mail. Since she had begun noticing other people besides herself, Flip had learned a lot from the mail. Hardly a day went by that Jackie did not have a letter from her mother. Erna always came rushing eagerly to the desk but seldom received anything. Gloria frequently didn't even bother to come and if she had a letter someone took it to her. Esmée had already begun to get letters from boys and read them aloud to anyone who would
listen. Solvei's letters came as regularly as Jackie's, and Sally received hers every Wednesday and Saturday.
"Philippa Hunter," Signorina called.
Flip took the letter from her father and opened it eagerly.
"My darling baby," he said, beginning the letter as he had not done in years, "here I am in a hospital in Shanghai, but don't be worried because it's nothing serious—jaundice—but it's a great nuisance especially because the doctor says I won't possibly be able to get to you for your Christmas holidays. Flippet, Flippet, don't be too terribly disappointed and don't weep that sweet face into a pulp. Eunice will be delighted to have you for your holidays, and she is in Nice, and the weather will be wonderful, and I know she'll do everything she can to make you happy. Your letters have sounded so much more contented recently and I feel that you are growing up and that you try to enjoy yourself without your yellow old father. I expect to be in Germany and Switzerland shortly after New Year and I promise you that nothing will interfere with our Easter."
Flip's disappointment was so acute and overwhelming that she thought for a moment she was going to be sick. She turned and ran until she reached the bathroom and then she shut herself in and leaned against the door and she felt all hollow inside herself, from the top of her head down to her toes, and there was no room in this cold vacuum for tears.
After a few moments she heard a knock. She clenched her fists and held her breath but whoever it was did not go away, and the knock came again. If it's Miss Tulip I'll kick her, she thought in fury.
Then Erna's voice came. "Flip."
"What?" Flip said, sounding hard and forbidding.
"Flip, it's just me. Erna."
"Oh."
"Did you—was it—was there bad news in your letter?"
"No. It's all right." Flip's voice was stifled.
"Well, look, Flip," Erna said. "I just meant Percy's taking Call Over this morning and you know how strict she is ... and the bell's about to ring...."
Flip opened the door and came out. "Thanks, Erna."
"Oh, that's all right," Erna said uncomfortably. "I'm sorry if it was bad news in your letter."
"It's just that my father's sick in China and I can't be with him for the Christmas holidays," Flip started to explain in a controlled voice. Then she burst out, "and I have to spend the holidays with Eunice— she's a friend of my father's—and I don't like her and if she marries my father I'll—I'll want to kill her."
"Ach, that's awful," Erna said. "I'm awful sorry, Flip. It certainly is awful."
"Well—" Flip's voice trailed off; then she spoke briskly. "We'd better get down to Call Over."
6
T day she told Paul about the letter and for the first time since she had received it she started to cry. Ariel, distressed at her unhappiness, jumped up at her, almost knocking her over, and licked excitedly at her face.
"That Eunice," Paul said, frowning heavily and pushing Ariel away from Flip and sending him over to the hearth. Then he jumped up. "Put on your skis and go on out and start practicing," he commanded. "I'll be out in a minute." And he half-shoved Flip out the door.
Flip went out obediently and put on her skis and started working on her turns. In just a few minutes Paul came flying out of the lodge, shouting, "Flip! Flip!"
He rushed up, panting, and gasped, "My father says you may stay here with us for Christmas if your father says it's all right! And Aunt Colette is going to be with us because my mother can't come." His face was radiant with pleasure.
Flip sat down in the snow, her feet going every which way
"And you can work on your skiing every day. And I'm sure Aunt Colette can take us up to Gstaad to ski, and to Caux too, so you'll be familiar with Gstaad and all the runs for the ski meet and maybe you will become such a good skier that we can do a double jump! Papa said he'd write your father right away this afternoon. Oh, Flip, it will be wonderful to have you here all the time instead of just on Sunday afternoons!"
"Oh, Paul!" Flip cried and scrambled to her feet. "Oh, Paul! Next to being with father it's the most wonderful thing in the world. I know he'll let me!"
"Well," Paul said, giving her a quick, shy hug. "What a relief. Come on. Let's get to work on your skiing."
Flip had been skiing conscientiously for about an hour under Paul's tutelage when Madame Perceval came out and called them.
"Come on in to tea, children!"
They skied over to her, Flip with almost as great ease and confidence as Paul, shouting, "Hello, Madame!" "Hello, Aunt Colette!"
"So," Madame said, raising Flip's chin and looking into her eyes. "You're happy about your holidays now?"
"Oh, yes, Madame!"
"I was wondering what had happened to upset you, my problem child. You seemed so much happier and then gloom descended. But you did have some reason this time. It's hard to be away from your father at Christmas time."
"And it would have been awful to be with Eunice," Flip said. "Eunice always makes me feel—well, even clumsier and gawkier and tongue-tieder and everything than I am. But oh, Madame, I'll love being here, and I'll try to help and not be a bother."
"Hurry up, Flip, take off your skis," Paul called impatiently. "Papa went over to Lausanne to the dentist yesterday and brought us back
cakes from Nyffeneggers."
When they had finished tea Madame said, "How about skiing back to school with me, Flip? Feel up to it?"
"Yes, Madame, I think so."
"You haven't skied any distance at all, yet, and I think it would be good for you. Not afraid of skiing in the dark? I'll keep right beside you."
"I'm not afraid, Madame."
They pushed off, Flip feeling excited and happy as she turned around to wave good-bye to Paul, who was standing in the lighted doorway. And Flip thought how beautiful the night was with the stars just coming out; and the pine trees' noble arms bowed with snow; and the shadows of the ruined chateau looming behind them; and the warmth and comfort of the lodge, the golden light pouring out the open door and Paul standing there waving good-bye.
"Yes," Madame Perceval said, as if in answer to her thoughts. "It's beautiful, isn't it? In the spring the fields are as white as they are now, with narcissi, not snow.... Shall we go?"
They started off down the mountain side, Madame calling Flip from time to time to check her speed or give her instructions. Now at last Flip had the feeling of being a bird, of having wings. And as she pushed through the cold night air she felt that it was as solid and entire an element as water. A bird must know this solidity; but as she felt the air against her body the only thing within her own knowledge with which she could compare it was water, and she felt as she broke through it that she must be leaving a wake of air behind her, as a boat does, cutting through water.
Madame let her go faster and faster, and, exhilarated by the speed and the beauty, she would have gone flying past the school gates if Madame had not checked her. They turned through the gates together and moved slowly down the white driveway.
"That was good skiing, Flip," Madame said. "I'm really very proud of you."
Flip dropped her head in quick confusion, then looked up with eyes that shone in the starlight. "I love it, Madame, I just love it!"
"You know," Madame told her, "We're not going to be able to enter you in the beginner's class at the ski meet. You'll have to go in the intermediate. If you go on improving at this rate you'd be disqualified from the beginner's class. And with all the skiing you'll be able to do during the holidays I don't think there's any question but you'll go on improving. I want to work with you on your left stem turn. Your right is fine, but the left is the only place where your weak knee seems to bother you. Don't worry, though. I think a little extra practice and the left stem will be as good as the right."
They went indoors and Flip put her skis on the rack, stroking them lovingly. The smell of the ski room, of hot wax and melted snow, and damp wool from the ski clothes, was almost as pleasant to her now as the smell of the art Studio.
"Madame," she said softly, "thank you so much for the skis."
"The girl who left them was rolling in money," Madame spoke shortly, "and I suspect it was black market money. They're in far better hands now—or rather on far better feet." She laughed. "Run along upstairs to the Common Room. There's about half an hour before dinner. We made better time than I expected."
F ran up the stairs and across the Hall, almost bumping into Miss Tulip.
"Really, Philippa Hunter!" Miss Tulip exclaimed in annoyance. "Will you kindly remember that you are supposed to walk, not run. You used to be such a nice, quiet girl and you're turning into a regular little hoyden." And Miss Tulip shut herself up in the cage of the faculty elevator and pressed the button.
Instead of being crushed by Miss Tulip's irritation Flip had to surpress a laugh as she watched the elevator rise and saw the matron's feet in their long, narrow white shoes slowly disappearing up the elevator shaft. Then, completely forgetting her admonition, she ran on down the corridor and into the Common Room.
She had just started a letter to her father when the big glass door was opened and Martha Downs and Kaatje van Leyden came in. A sudden hush came over the Common Room because the senior girls had studies and a special living room of their own on the second floor, and seldom came downstairs unless it was to lecture one of the girls for some misdeed that affected the two school teams, the Odds and the Evens, or that came under the jurisdiction of the Student Government. Martha and Kaatje walked towards Flip now and she knew that everybody was wondering, "Now what has Pill done?"
But Martha smiled in a friendly way and said, "Hi, Philippa."
"Hi," Flip said, standing up awkwardly.
"I hear you're good at drawing people."
"Oh—just sort of caricatures," Flip mumbled. Erna, who had been listening curiously, broke in, "She's wonderful, Martha! I'll show you the ones she did of Jackie and Gloria and me in the dormitory last night."
Erna had forgotten that they weren't supposed to have books or drawing materials in the dormitory at night, but Martha and Kaatje kindly ignored this and looked at the slips of paper Erna held out. They both laughed.
"Why, you're a genius, Philippa," Kaatje cried.
And Martha said, "We came down to see if you'd do us."
"Oh, I'd love to," Flip said. "Right now?"
"How long does it take you?"
"About a second," Erna told them. "Here's a chair, Martha, and one for you, Kaatje. Run get your sketch book, Flip."
Flip got her pad and a couple of sharp pencils out of her locker. "Just stay the way you are, please," she said to Martha. "That's fine."
It wasn't quite as easy to draw Martha as it had been the girls she saw constantly in the Common Room and the class room, or as easy as the faculty, whose caricatures, sketched hurriedly at the end of
study halls had thrown the girls into fits of laughter; but she managed to get a passable exaggeration of Martha's almost Hollywood beauty onto the paper, and the Head Girl was very pleased.
While Flip was drawing Kaatje, Martha said, "My mother writes me you're going to be spending the holidays in Nice with Mrs. Jackman, Philippa. We're going to be there for a week, so maybe we'll see you."
Flip shook her head, glancing up briefly from her sketch of Kaatje. "I'm not going to be with Mrs. Jackman. I'm staying up the mountain with Paul Laurens."
"Percy's nephew?" Martha asked in surprise. "How did you get to know him?"
"She has tea with him every Sunday afternoon." Erna, who had evidently appointed herself as Flip's spokesman told the seniors. "She's just come back from there now, haven't you, Flip?"
Flip nodded, tore off her page, and gave it to Kaatje.
"Thanks simply ages, Philippa," Kaatje said. "You'll probably be besieged by every girl in school."
"I don't mind," Flip said. "It's what I love to do. If those aren't right or if you want any more I'd love to try again."
"We may take you up on that." Martha smiled at her. "Sorry you aren't going to be in Nice for the holidays."
"Flip, you're made," Erna said when the older girls had left. "If Martha and Kaatje like your pictures there won't be a girl in school who won't want one. I bet you'll get artist's cramp or something."
"It's all right with me." Flip grinned happily.
"And it's wonderful about the holidays. When did that happen?"
"This afternoon. And Madame's going to be there, too."
"Percy?" Erna looked dubious. "I'm not sure I'd like that. She's so strict."
"She's not a bit strict when you're not at school. She's—oh, she's so much fun and she doesn't act a bit like a teacher. And Paul says she'll take us on all kinds of trips on the holidays, to Gstaad, and we'll come down from Caux on a bobsled, and we'll go to Montreux and places to the movies and all sorts of things."
"It's too bad you can't ski," Erna said; and Flip turned away to hide a grin.
8
F was out skiing by herself before breakfast several mornings later when she saw the strange man again. At first she did not notice him, and then she became vaguely aware through her concentration on her skiing that someone was watching her, and she swung around and there he was leaning against a tree. This time he did not smile and wave and move away up the mountain. He just stood there watching her and she stared nervously back. He was very thin and his cheeks were sunken and his jaw dark as though he needed to shave. He wore shabby ski clothes and a small beret and his eyes were very dark and brilliant. She stood, leaning lightly on her ski sticks, looking back at him and wishing he would go away when suddenly he came stumbling across the snow towards her. She started to push away on her skis but he made a sudden leap at her and she fell headlong. She started to scream but he clapped his hand across her mouth.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Stranger
"DON'T be afraid. Don't be afraid. I won't hurt you," he kept saying, and he righted her and stood her up again, keeping a firm grip on her arm. She could feel each of his fingers pressing through her sweater and ski jacket and they hurt as they dug into her arm.
"Let go!" she gasped. "Let me go!"
"It's all right," he repeated. "I won't hurt you. Don't be afraid."
"But you are hurting me! Let go!"
Slowly his fingers relaxed, though he did not release her. "I didn't mean to knock you down like that. I lost my balance and fell against you. I'm very tired and hungry. Have you any food?"
She shook her head.
"Just a cracker or a piece of chocolate? School girls always have something to eat in their pockets."
She shook her head again. "I haven't anything. What are you doing here?"
"I'm the—uh—I'm the new janitor. I'm going to keep the furnace going so you'll be warm enough all winter. I live—uh—I live up the mountain and I didn't have a chance to eat breakfast this morning because I overslept. Are you sure you haven't even a crust of bread?"
"I haven't anything. Won't the cook give you something in the kitchen?"
"She's in a bad mood this morning. What are you doing out here all alone? Shouldn't you be in the school?"
"Not till Call Over at a quarter to nine."
"But why are you here all alone?" the man asked her, and she was afraid of the hungry look in his dark eyes. "I'm skiing."
"But why do you ski here all alone every morning?" he persisted. "I like it."
Now at last he let go her arm. "Well, I'm off up the mountain," he said, and without another word or a backwards glance he struck off across the snow.
The thought of him troubled her until she went in to get the mail before Call Over. Then she had a letter that made her so angry that she forgot all about him. The letter was from Eunice, and it ran,
"My dear Philippa, I am glad to hear from your father that at last you are getting along better at school. But I must admit that I am rather hurt that you choose to spend the holidays with some strange boy you have just met rather than with me. However, you have always been an odd child so I suppose I shouldn't be surprised. I do want to say, though, Philippa dear, that I know your poor father would be happier if you came to Nice, and I assure you that I would see that you had a pleasant vacation. As I said in my letter to you last week, there will be a number of charming young people nearby, and I am sure it would do you good to know them. Just remember that all you have to do if you change your mind is to let me know, and don't forget that you have your father's peace of mind to think of as well as your own choice. It is very hard on him to be laid up in the hospital, poor darling, and I shouldn't think you'd want in any way to add to his worries. I'm afraid this will make you angry, Philippa dear, but do remember that I'm just thinking of your best interests and that I'm very fond of you and devoted to your father. Affectionately, Eunice."
Quivering with rage she tore the letter into as small pieces as possible. Madame Perceval, on duty behind the desk, finished distributing the mail and asked with a smile, "What's the cause of your fury, Flip?"
"It's that Eunice again," Flip said. "A woman who's always after my father. She thinks I ought to spend the holidays with her and I'm
afraid she'll try to convince father that I ought to, too. There isn't time for that, is there?"
"No, Flip, there isn't. Anyhow, Mlle. Dragonet had a cable from your father this morning giving his permission for you to stay with Paul. She supplemented Georges' cable by one of her own saying that she thought it far better for you to stay with her nephew than for you to make the difficult trip to Nice. So I don't think you need worry."
"Thank goodness," Flip said. "I think I'd die if I couldn't spend the holidays with Paul. I just wish Eunice hadn't written the letter and tried to spoil things for me."
"Just forget it and enjoy yourself," Madame Perceval advised.
"I will," Flip said, and she ran upstairs to throw the scraps of Eunice's letter in the classroom waste paper basket. Erna was there before her, sitting glumly at her desk.
"What's the matter, Erna?" Flip asked shyly.
"I can't spend the holidays with Jackie," Erna answered and put her head down on her arms.
Flip perched awkwardly on her desk and put her feet on the chair.
"Oh, Erna, why not?"
"My mother wrote Mlle. Dragonet and said she wanted me home for Christmas. She doesn't want me home at all. She sent me away to school because she didn't want me home."
"Oh, Erna," Flip said, her voice warm with sympathy.
"Both my brothers were killed in the war," Erna said in a muffled voice. "And I know mutti wishes it had been me. She always liked my brothers better. I was the baby and so much younger and I always got in the way."
"Oh, no, Erna," Flip protested. "Your mother wouldn't feel like that."
"She does," Erna said. "If my father would be home and be all funny and nice the way he used to be before the war when I was tiny it would be all right. But he's always at the hospital. He says the only thing he can do to help people's souls is to try to give them strong,
