The manufacturing sector in argentina, brazil, and mexico: transformations and challenges in the ind
The Manufacturing Sector in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico: Transformations and Challenges in the Industrial Core of Latin
America
Juan Eduardo Santarcángelo
Visit to download the full and correct content document: https://textbookfull.com/product/the-manufacturing-sector-in-argentina-brazil-and-mex ico-transformations-and-challenges-in-the-industrial-core-of-latin-america-juan-eduard o-santarcangelo/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant download maybe you interests ...
THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND MEXICO
Transformations and Challenges in the Industrial Core of Latin America
EDITED BY JUAN EDUARDO SANTARCÁNGELO
Palgrave Studies in Latin American Heterodox Economics
Series Editor
Juan Eduardo Santarcángelo
National Research Council of Science and Technology (CONICET)
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Universidad Nacional de Quilmes (UNQ)
Bernal, Argentina
The aim of the series is to analyze the economic, social, and political evolution of countries in Latin America. The authors in the series are serious heterodox economics scholars who want to shine light on Latin America’s economic profile. Each book in the series takes on a single topic (crisis, growth, income distribution, the manufacturing sector, etc.), either from the point of view of a single country or a group of them. This analysis then in turn adds to our understanding of Latin America’s regional economic character and development challenges and capabilities. In this way, this series makes an unusual contribution to economics by studying a region as a whole without losing sight of the particularities of each country as a part.
More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14614
Juan Eduardo Santarcángelo Editor
The Manufacturing Sector in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
Transformations and Challenges in the Industrial Core of Latin America
Editor Juan Eduardo Santarcángelo
National Research Council of Science and Technology (CONICET)
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Universidad Nacional de Quilmes (UNQ)
Bernal, Argentina
Palgrave Studies in Latin American Heterodox Economics
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To
Victoria, Violeta, Nico,
and Male
Acknowledgments
I am pleased to publish the second book of the Series Palgrave Studies in Latin American Heterodox Economics with Palgrave Macmillan. Palgrave Macmillan has long served as an important source for heterodox economic analysis and has provided throughout the years rigorous and deep analysis on Latin American problems and more importantly on the possible solutions and ways to be applied by the countries of the region.
In particular I want to thank Elizabeth Graber, in-house editorial director of the project, for his constant support and assistance for the realization of the project, Sujitha Shiney and especially Ganesh Ekambaram for their copyediting. I also want to thank the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientítficas y Técnicas (CONICET) and the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes (UNQ) for giving me the economic and institutional support to carry out this project.
Introduction 1
Juan Eduardo Santarcángelo
The Manufacturing Sector in Argentina at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century 7
Juan Eduardo Santarcángelo
Structural Change and the Manufacturing Sector in the Brazilian Economy: 2000–2014 61
Carlos Aguiar de Medeiros, Fabio Neves Peracio Freitas, and Patieene
Alves Passoni
The Manufacturing Sector in Mexico During the Neoliberal Period 97
Abelardo Mariña Flores and Sergio Cámara Izquierdo
The Evolution and Challenges of Latin American Industrial Development in the Twenty-First Century: An Analysis from Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico 149
Juan Eduardo Santarcángelo and Juan Manuel Padín
Notes on Contributors
Sergio Cámara Izquierdo is Professor of Political Economy at the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Azcapotzalco, Mexico.
Fabio Neves Peracio Freitas is a professor at the Economics Institute of the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil.
Abelardo Mariña Flores is Professor of Political Economy at the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Azcapotzalco, Mexico.
Carlos Aguiar de Medeiros is a professor at the Economics Institute of the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil.
Juan Manuel Padín is a researcher at the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Patieene Alves Passoni is a PhD graduate student at the Economics Institute of the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil.
Juan Eduardo Santarcángelo is a researcher at the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientítficas y Técnicas (CONICET) and a professor at the Universidad Nacional de Quilmes in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
List of Figures
The Manufacturing Sector in Argentina at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century
Fig. 1 Average growth rates of GDP and value added of the manufacturing sector, 1998–2017, selected periods. Source: Own elaboration using INDEC
Fig. 2 VA evolution and share of VA 500 biggest firms and VA total, 1993–2001, in index number (1998 = 100) and percentage. Source: Own elaboration using ENGE (INDEC)
Fig. 3 Five hundred largest companies according to the origin of capital, 1993–2001, in percentages. Source: Own elaboration using ENGE (INDEC)
Fig. 4 VA in the manufacturing sector by technological content, 1997–2017 (1997 = 100). Source: Own elaboration using INDEC
Fig. 5 Employment in the manufacturing sector by technological content, 1997–2017 (1997 = 100). Source: Own elaboration using INDEC
Fig. 6 Labor productivity in the manufacturing sector by technological content, 1997–2017 (1997 = 100). Source: Own elaboration using INDEC
Fig. 7 Wages in the manufacturing sector by technological content, 1997–2017 (1997 = 100). Source: Own elaboration using INDEC
12
24
26
27
30
31
33
Fig. 8 The ratio of labor productivity to real wages in the manufacturing sector by technological content, 1997–2017 (1997 = 100). Source: Own elaboration using INDEC
Fig. 9 VA evolution and share of VA 500 biggest firms and VA total, 1994–2017, in index number (1998 = 100) and percentage. Source: Own elaboration using ENGE (INDEC)
Fig. 10 Five hundred biggest firm compositions according to capital’s origin, 1991–2016, in percentage. Source: Own elaboration using ENGE (INDEC)
Fig. 11 Manufacturing trade balance, exports, imports, and terms of trade, 1998–2017 (million USD and index number 1997 = 100). Source: Own elaboration using INDEC and UN COMTRADE
Fig. 12 Exports by technological content, 1998–2017, in percentage and total exports 1998 = 100 (index number). Source: Own elaboration using UN COMTRADE
Fig. 13 Top export destinations and relative participation, 1998–2017, in percentage. Source: Own elaboration using UN COMTRADE
Fig. 14 Imports by technological content, 1998–2017, in percentage and total imports 1998 = 100 (index number). Source: Own elaboration using UN COMTRADE
Fig. 15 Top import origins, 1998–2017, in percentage. Source: Own elaboration using UN COMTRADE
34
37
38
39
41
43
44
44
Fig. 16 Trade balance by technological content, 1998–2017, in million USD. Source: Own elaboration using UN COMTRADE 45
Structural Change and the Manufacturing Sector in the Brazilian Economy: 2000–2014
Fig. 1 GDP, GFCF, and labor productivity rates of growth: 2000–2014 (%). Source: Author’s elaboration based on IBGE data 69
Fig. 2 Annual average rates of growth of gross output of the four industry groups for selected periods (%). Source: Author’s elaboration based on the SNA, IBGE 74
Fig. 3 Industry group share in total gross output of the economy (%). Source: Author’s elaboration based on the SNA, IBGE 75
Fig. 4 The contribution of industry groups to gross output rate of growth for selected periods (in terms of percentage points of the annual average rate of growth of gross output). Source: Author’s elaboration based on the SNA, IBGE 76
Fig. 5 The rate of growth of employment of the industry groups for selected periods (%). Source: Author’s elaboration based on the SNA, IBGE 77
Fig. 6 Employment share in total employment by industry group for selected periods (%). Source: Author’s elaboration based on the SNA, IBGE 78
Fig. 7 Rate of growth of value added of the industry groups for selected periods (%). Source: Author’s elaboration based on the SNA, IBGE 79
Fig. 8 The share of the value added of the four industry groups in total value added for selected years (%). Source: Author’s elaboration based on the SNA, IBGE 80
Fig. 9 Labor productivity of the industry groups in relation to the average labor productivity of the economy. Source: Author’s elaboration based on the SNA, IBGE 81
Fig. 10 Rate of growth of labor productivity by industry group.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the SNA, IBGE 82
Fig. 11 Market share of imports (ratio of imports to total demand).
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the SNA, IBGE 83
Fig. 12 Share of exports of the four industry groups in total Brazilian exports (%). Source: Author’s elaboration based on the SNA, IBGE 84
Fig. 13 External market share of AC and IC exports. Source: Elaboration by GIC-IE/UFRJ based on COMTRADE (2017) database 85
Fig. 14 External market share of TI and II exports. Source: Elaboration by GIC-IE/UFRJ based on COMTRADE (2017) database 86
The Manufacturing Sector in Mexico During the Neoliberal Period
Fig. 1 Domestic market as motor of accumulation, Mexico, 1950–2016. Source: System of National Accounts of Mexico, base years 2013, 2008, 1993, 1980, 1970, 1960, 1950, Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) 99
Fig. 2 External opening, Mexico, 1970–2016. Source: See Table 2. Note: The different stages of analysis are shown consecutively in light and shadow areas 109
Fig. 3 Maquila exports (current prices), Mexico, 1970–2016. Source: System of National Accounts of Mexico, base year 1993, INEGI; Estadística de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportación, INEGI. Note: Data from 2007 onward include not only maquila, but all manufacturing exports included in the IMMEX Export Promotion Program that substituted the maquila program in 2006. Total maquila includes nonmanufacturing maquila exports; no data available for 2007 and 2008
Fig. 4 Growth of exports, Mexico, 1982–1993
Fig. 5 Growth of imports in relation to the growth of exports, Mexico, 1982–1993
Fig. 6 Openness and trade balance, manufacturing subsectors, Mexico, 1982–1993
Fig. 7 Cyclical growth of manufacturing exports, Mexico, 1980–2016. Note: The rate of growth of manufacturing exports is plotted in the left axis and the GDP growth in the right axis. The different stages of the analysis are separated by a vertical dotted line
Fig. 8 Growth of exports, Mexico, 1994–2016
Fig. 9 Most dynamic export manufacturing subsectors, Mexico, 1993–2016
Fig. 10 Less dynamic export manufacturing subsectors, Mexico, 1993–2016
Fig. 11 Trade balance, Mexico, 1970–2016. Note: The manufacturing sector is plotted in the left axis and the total economy in the right axis. Trade balance as a percentage of the gross value added and the gross domestic product, respectively
Fig. 12 Manufacturing trade balance, Mexico, 1970–2006. Source: See Fig. 3. Note: Trade balance as a percentage of the gross value added of the total manufacturing sector
Fig. 13 Growth of imports in relation to the growth of exports, Mexico, 1994–2016. Note: Petroleum and coal products is omitted from the figure given its outlier behavior
110
114
115
116
117
119
120
121
122
123
123
Fig. 14 Trade balance and degree of openness, Mexico, 1994–2016. Note: Petroleum and coal products is omitted from the figure given its outlier behavior. (1) Food, beverages, and tobacco; (2) textile, apparel, and leather; (3) wood; (4) paper, printing, and related activities; (5) chemical, plastic, and rubber products; (6) nonmetallic mineral products; (7) primary metals; (8) fabricated metal products, machinery, and furniture; (9) computer, and electronic and electrical products; (10) transportation equipment
Fig. 15 Economic growth and growth of exports, Mexico, 1982–1993
Fig. 16 Economic growth and growth of exports, Mexico, 1994–2016
Fig. 17 Gross fixed capital formation, Mexico and United States, 2003–2015. Source: See Table 5. The US data corresponds to the fixed assets from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
Fig. 18 Productivity growth and growth of exports, Mexico, 1994–2016. Note: Petroleum and coal products and primary metals, sectors that appropriate a considerable amount of ground rent, are omitted
Fig. 19 Employment growth and growth of exports, Mexico, 1994–2016
Fig. 20 Real wage, employment, and productivity growth, Mexico, 1994–2016. Note: Productivity and employment growth are both plotted in the horizontal axis. Petroleum and coal products and primary metals, sectors that appropriate a considerable amount of ground rent are omitted. (1) Food, beverages, and tobacco; (2) textile, apparel, and leather; (3) wood; (4) paper, printing, and related activities; (5) chemical, plastic, and rubber products; (6) nonmetallic mineral products; (8) fabricated metal products, machinery, and furniture; (9) computer, and electronic and electrical products; (10) transportation equipment
The
Evolution and Challenges of Latin American Industrial Development in the Twenty-First Century: An Analysis from Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
Fig. 1 Trade share to GDP, 1960–2015 (percentages). Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank data
124
130
130
135
136
139
140
152
Fig. 2 GDP based on PPP, share of world (1980–2015). Source: Own elaboration based on IMF data 156
Fig. 3 Shares of global manufacturing value added, by leading countries (1970–2015). Source: Own elaboration based on UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Database 158
Fig. 4 World financial assets and global GDP USD trillions (1980–2007). Source: Own elaboration based on McKinsey 2009 161
Fig. 5 GDP (annual average growth). 1994–2002, 2003–2007, 2008–2011, 2012–2015, 2016–2017. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (%). Source: Own elaboration using World Bank statistics
168
Fig. 6 Manufacturing, value added (annual average growth). 1994–2002, 2003–2007, 2008–2011, 2012–2015, 2016–2017. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (%). Source: Own elaboration using World Bank statistics 168
Fig. 7 Gross domestic expending on research and development, total % of GDP. 2000–2014. Source: Own elaboration using World Bank statistics 174
Fig. 8 500 largest corporations in Latin America, by country and share of total sales. 2004–2016. Source: Own elaboration based on AméricaEconomía (2017) and AméricaEconomía (2009)
178
List of Tables
Structural Change and the Manufacturing Sector in the Brazilian Economy: 2000–2014
Table 1 Total backward and forward linkages (2000, 2008, 2010, and 2014) and their evolution for selected periods 87
The Manufacturing Sector in Mexico During the Neoliberal Period
Table 1 Goods and services trade, Mexico, 1970–1981
Table 2 Trade of goods and services, Mexico, 1982–2016
Table 3 Growth, employment, productivity, and real wages, Mexico, 1970–1981
Table 4 Growth, employment, productivity, and real wages, Mexico, 1982–2016
Table 5 Fixed investment and FDI, Mexico, 1982–2016
The Evolution and Challenges of Latin American Industrial Development in the Twenty-First Century: An Analysis from Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
108
112
126
128
132
Table 1 GDP ranking, current USD, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2017 157
Table 2 Import origins. Selected Latin American countries. 1996, 2006, 2016. Percentages and percentage points 160
Table 3 Trade Balance by industrial branch (2003–2017, annual average). Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Millions USD 176
Introduction
Juan Eduardo Santarcángelo
After the hegemony of neoliberalism and the application of the Washington Consensus recommendations, actively supported by International Monetary Fund and the World Bank during the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, Latin America experienced strong political changes that led to the arrival of a new group of political leaders to the government, with a renewed vision regarding economic development, and determined to improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable citizens. Néstor Kirchner (Argentina, 2003), Lula Da Silva (Brazil, 2003), Evo Morales (Bolivia, 2006), and Hugo Chávez (Venezuela, 1999), among others, were the main political figures in the new era, and they clearly expressed a new attempt to create a development strategy away from the financial sector and more articulated around the development of productive forces.
J. E. Santarcángelo (*)
National Research Council of Science and Technology (CONICET), Buenos Aires, Argentina
Universidad Nacional de Quilmes (UNQ), Bernal, Argentina
J. E. Santarcángelo (ed.), The Manufacturing Sector in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, Palgrave Studies in Latin American Heterodox Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04705-4_1
J. E. Santarcángelo
The abandonment of neoliberal policies led the region to a period of sustained growth: the growth rates of the countries grew above 4% from 2003 to 2013 (annual average). In that context, one of the most significant characteristics was the outstanding performance of the manufacturing sector. However, it should be noted that industrial development in Latin American countries differs significantly among countries, and it is highly concentrated on the performance of the three most important economies of the region, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, which on average from 1960 to the present have generated 75% of the manufacturing value added. The aim of the book is to analyze the recent performance of the manufacturing sector in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, the industrial core of Latin America, in order to account for the transformations, challenges and true possibilities of achieving economic development based on industrialization.
In that respect, if we analyze the performance of the manufacturing core of Latin America formed by these three countries, we can see that the virtuous dynamics registered during the first decade of the twentyfirst century exhibited significant heterogeneities between them. For instance, until the 1970s, Argentina and Brazil had a model of industrial development, roughly similar, that was strongly anchored in a state-led industrialization strategy; but a few years later, this policy was abandoned and replaced by neoliberal policies, generating a huge setback in terms of industrial development. In the 2000s, in a context of significant global transformations in which the dynamics of production began to be articulated around global value chains, through the use of different economic and industrial policies, both countries intended to deepen the existing industrial framework, generate new jobs, and improve real wages. On the other hand, Mexico’s free market development strategy has been roughly the same since the 1980s and, therefore, its industrial policy shows a higher degree of continuity centered in the stimulus and development of the maquila and the trade integration with the United States’ economy.
Despite the high rates of growth, after more than a decade of application of heterodox policies, the final results were rather ambiguous, and more than once the manufacturing sectors of these countries encountered old problems that resurfaced again (as the external constraint or the pressure in the balance of payments due to capital flight and the remission of profits of multinational corporations), which favored the reversal
of many achievements, as well as a gradual appeasement of the growth dynamics. Times are tough today in Latin America. The weak economic performance in the last few years since 2013, boosted by the rise of the governments of Mauricio Macri in Argentina and Michel Temer in Brazil seeking to reinstate the neoliberal dogma and the supremacy of markets, opens serious questions about the ability of these countries to achieve an autonomous industrial development in the long term.
The book seeks, in particular, to provide an exhaustive analysis of the historical evolution of the industrial sector of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico since the import substitution industrialization stage, the economic impacts of the process of deindustrialization in the last quarter of the twentieth century during the rise of neoliberal policies, as well as the main transformations registered during the first decades of the twentyfirst century when a reindustrialization process was registered. Also, the book studies the existence (or lack) of structural change in the economy and in the industrial sector given the share of the value added (and employment) of specific industry groups in total value added (and employment), its level of technological development, and the degree of articulation and density of the interindustry relations. The third objective of the book is to analyze the evolution on the degree of external dependence and international integration that the different industrial sectors of the countries have in order to identify the evolution of the industrial profile that has been consolidated in the three most industrial countries of Latin America and the place that the Latin American industry occupies today in the world economy.
Another objective of the manuscript is to examine the capacity of the industrial sector in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico to generate employment and improve the living conditions of the working class. In order to do this, we study the evolution of employment during the last decades, the changes in real wages and income distribution in the sector, as well as the different ways that the industrial working class has found to face the transformations suffered by the sector in recent years. The fifth goal of the present volume is to give an account of the role played by the Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican states in the development of the manufacturing sector during the last decades. Therefore, we examine the main characteristics, changes, and specific impact that the industrial policy has had in
J. E. Santarcángelo
the sector as well as the different mechanisms applied for its promotion in each country. Finally, the book also analyzes the historical evolution of the degree of concentration, centralization, and foreign ownership of the manufacturing sector of the countries under analysis in order to understand the role performed by great corporations and multinational enterprises, as well as the limitations and possibilities that these evolutions have to economic development.
Although there are individual works that analyze the specific trajectories of the industrial sector in the countries analyzed, there is an enormous vacancy in studies that simultaneously: (1) link together the impacts of the processes of internationalization of the productive process, financialization of the economy, and pressures imposed by trade agreements on the ability to implement industrial economic policy; (2) analyze in depth and in a comparative perspective the successive transformations suffered by the manufacturing sectors of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico; and (3) examine these phenomena from heterodox theoretical perspectives, which allow not only to look at the main axis of analysis but also to emphasize elements that are not considered in the mainstream approaches.
All the chapters gathered in this book have been prepared by outstanding specialists in the field and the book has four chapters after this brief introduction. In Chap. 2, Santarcángelo aims to examine the productive transformations that the Argentine manufacturing sector has experienced since the late 1990s to the present; give an account of the capacity of the industrial sector to generate employment and the evolution of real wages of industrial workers; examine the degree of external dependence of its productive structure; and study the impact that industrial policies have had on the performance of the sector.
Chapter 3, written by Medeiros, Neves Peracio Freitas, and Alves Passoni, focuses the attention on Brazil, the most important and industrialized country of the region during the beginning of the twenty-first century. The aim of this chapter is to examine the process of structural change in the Brazilian manufacturing sector from 2000 to 2014, which covers the last years of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s second government term, Lula’s presidencies, and Dilma Rouseff ’s first government. The authors proposed the use of a new indicator and a methodological approach that emphasize the role of accumulation rate and its
influence on the measures of industrialization, and the connections between technical progress and interindustrial relations.
In Chap. 4, Mariña Flores and Cámara Izquierdo analyze the general characteristics of the neoliberal restructuring of the manufacturing sector in Mexico and pay special attention to the role played by the precarization of labor as a precursor and result of the external opening. After this deep characterization, the authors investigate the specific way in which the Mexican manufacturing sector articulated to the world market and present the main structural changes experimented by the manufacturing sector during the last decades. Finally, the chapter closes with a very powerful critical evaluation of the manufacturing export-led accumulation model that has emerged from the neoliberal restructuring processes and the urgent need to be reformulated.
Finally, in Chap. 5, Santarcángelo and Padín critically analyze and compare the industrial performance of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, the three most industrialized countries in Latin America. After a brief account of all major global transformations that have occurred in capitalism and influenced the dynamics of economic growth that these countries have had since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the authors focus on studying the key variables that describe their industrial path, the impact of the industrial policies applied, and the role performed by the state. The chapter closes underlining the main challenges that Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico will face in the years to come.
In sum, basing our analysis on a precise diagnosis of the main characteristics and transformations registered by global capitalism and the industrial sector of the most industrialized countries of the region, we provide an account of the challenges that Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico will face if they try to articulate their possibilities of development around the industrial sector.
The Manufacturing Sector in Argentina at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century
Juan Eduardo Santarcángelo
1 Introduction
Historically, Argentine economic development was closely linked to industrial development. The country achieved during its model of industrialization by import substitution not only the deepest and most articulated industrial framework of the Latin American region but also the most organized and combative working class. During this period, real gross domestic product (GDP) grew 300% and the manufacturing sector led this process, and its ratio to GDP went from 18% in 1930 to 39% in 1975 (Basualdo 2006).
In a context of profound economic transformations around the world, especially since the early 1970s, when manufacturing production began
J. E. Santarcángelo (*)
National Research Council of Science and Technology (CONICET), Buenos Aires, Argentina
Universidad Nacional de Quilmes (UNQ), Bernal, Argentina
J. E. Santarcángelo (ed.), The Manufacturing Sector in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, Palgrave Studies in Latin American Heterodox Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04705-4_2
to be articulated globally in what now is known as global value chains, neoliberalism became the dominant ideology in developing countries and the financialization process quickly spread all over the world; the industrialization model of development in Argentina was interrupted by the military dictatorship that seized power in March 1976. The aim of the dictatorship was not only to interrupt the process of industrialization but also to eradicate the bases that made it sustainable, and the attack was particularly severe on the organizational capability of the working class.
With these objectives, the dictatorship imposed a model of openness and financial hegemony, where the industrial sector ceased to be the core of the economic development process, which drastically became to be focused on financial activities. One of the main impacts of the model was an abrupt process of deindustrialization all over the country, which saw not only a loss in the relevance of the sector in the economy but also a fall in the absolute number of industrial companies, wage workers, and real wages. Only during the first year of dictatorship, the wages of industrial workers fell by 35%, the industrial wage cost fell by 31%, and the surplus obtained by industrial companies improved by 69% (Basualdo 2006).
The return to democracy at the beginning of the 1980s not only failed to reverse the development model based on financial valorization, but this economic model was deepened during the administrations of Alfonsin, Menem, and De la Rua. As a result of the interaction of economic policies applied, which included economic and trade liberalization, deregulation of financial markets, privatization of major companies, indebtedness, and reduction of state capacity to design a successful economic development process, the country ended up suffering in 2001 its worst economic and social crisis.
The manufacturing sector was not oblivious to this reality. Due to the 2001 crisis, manufacturing production and the level of employment in the sector declined 30% and 26%, respectively, between 1998 and 2002 (Porta et al. 2014). However, the almost 130% increase in the exchange rate quickly recomposed the rate of profit, which, in an extremely favorable international context for the export of primary goods, led the economy to quickly start to grow. The working class and fixed income earners were big losers since the real wage fell around 25% during the crisis.
The arrival of Néstor Kirchner in May 2003 and the two successive presidencies of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner after this administration marked a turning point again. By rejecting the main ideas of the Washington consensus and using a set of economic policies aimed at restoring real wages, favoring domestic consumption and investment with successful policies of de-indebtedness, the country had an enormous growth in the industrial sector that for the first time since the industrialization by import substitution stage grew at average annual rates higher than the aggregate of the economy.
However, the virtuous dynamics of the industrial sector of growth and job generation could not be sustained over the 12 years that Kirchnerism remained in power, and since 2012 the sector started to show signs of being limited by the resurgence of the external constraint. The arrival of Mauricio Macri in December 2015 to the presidency increased these imbalances due to the decision to return to the application of neoliberal policies (such as economic liberalization, financial deregulation, and external indebtedness). All these policies had a huge impact on the Argentine economy and in particular on the performance of the industrial sector.
The objectives of this chapter are, first, to examine the productive transformations that the Argentine manufacturing sector has experienced since the late 1990s to the present; second, to give an account of the capacity of the industrial sector to generate employment and the evolution of real wages of industrial workers; third, to examine the degree of relation that the sector has with foreign markets as well as the degree of external dependence of its productive structure; and finally, to study the impact that industrial policies had on the performance of the sector.
Following these objectives, the work is structured into five sections after this brief introduction. In the second section, we provide a brief account of the performance of the economy and the manufacturing sector at the aggregate level, an analysis of the main political transformations of the period under analysis, as well as the main initiatives of each government and some of the challenges presented to it between 1990s and 2017. In the third section, we present the evolution of value added (VA) generated by the manufacturing sector, employment, labor productivity, real wages, and income distribution in each branch of industrial activity classified according to its technological characteristics. In the fourth
section, we study the evolution of trade balance of the manufacturing sector as well as its degree of dependence of foreign machineries and equipment. In the fifth section, we underline the main characteristics of the industrial policies during the period under analysis and the effects that they have on the performance of the sector. Finally, in the sixth section, we present the main conclusions of the analysis and the challenges that the sector will face in coming years.
2 Argentina at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century
At the end of the 1990s, Argentina was going through its worst economic and social crisis. It was the result of the perfect application of the Washington consensus and the structural adjustment plans recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and pleasantly applied by Menem and De la Rua’s administration. The structural transformations of the economic model generated a decline in the GDP of almost 20% between 1998 and 2002 and a subsequent increase in the rates of unemployment, underemployment, poverty, and indigence, which reached some of the highest values in their history.
With the economy collapsed, President Fernando De la Rua was forced to resign by a set of popular protests in December 2001. The country had then five presidents in 11 days,1 abandoned the convertibility regime which has tighted the peso to the dollar for almost a decade, declared the cessation of payments of its external debt, and various quasi-currencies arose and began to be used in different provinces of the country. Eduardo Duhalde assumed the presidency of the country on January 2002 with the idea to complete the original mandate of De la Rua and appointed Roberto Lavagna as the Ministry of Economics. Duhalde’s administration imposed export duties on agro-industrial and hydrocarbon exports,
1 On the night of December 21, 2001, Fernando De La Rua resigned and was succeeded by Ramón Puerta, who resigned on December 23, 2001. Puerta was replaced by Rodriguez Saa, who resigned on December 30, 2001, and was succeeded by Eduardo Camaño, who remained in office only two days. On January 1, 2002, Eduardo Duhalde was named president.
ordered the so-called asymmetric pesification of debts and deposits,2 pesified and froze tariffs on privatized public services, introduced a series of regulations in the foreign exchange market, and maintained the partial cessation of payments of the external debt, in a framework of strong mistrust with the IMF and the neoliberal regime.
The new presidential elections of May 2003 consecrated Néstor Kirchner, a politician who had been governor of the province of Santa Cruz since 1991 and had won the governor’s office three times in a row. During the first years of his presidential administration, Kirchner maintained a marked continuity with the economic policy of Duhalde by keeping Lavagna as minister of economy, who was very valuable in the normalization of the functioning of the financial system and a negotiated exit from the default. Kirchner kept a preference for a depreciated real exchange rate, which improved the competitiveness of Argentine products, maintained the pesification of the tariffs of privatized public services, and pursued the redistribution of part of the agrarian and oil income into the rest of the society (Kulfas 2016).
The 12 years of Kirchner’s government can be divided in three economic periods that correspond fairly close to each presidency: 2003–2007, 2008–2011, and 2012–2015. During the first period, strong incentives to aggregate demand were set in a framework of high levels of idle capacity as well as good conditions on the external markets. Thus, there was a strong increase in real public spending, which grew by 82%, and in particular of public investment (mostly in infrastructure), which registered an exponential growth which changed a long trend of more than 30 years of poor performance. Likewise, the government promoted a deep recomposition of the minimum wage—with an increase of 50% in nominal terms between June and December of 2003 and subsequent readjustments up to 2006 inclusive—and of the minimum retirement benefits. Likewise, in 2005 the government implemented the Pension Inclusion program, which incorporated 1.6 million elderly people into the retirement system within two years.
2 The debts denominated in dollars were pesified 1 to 1, while the deposits denominated in dollars were pesified at a rate of 1.40 pesos per dollar (both being updated for inflation by means of the reference stabilization coefficient [CER]), and the state payed and covered the difference.
J. E. Santarcángelo
This boost to domestic demand led to a rapid recovery of the domestic market, especially in the manufacturing sector and the construction industry. As a result, production and employment levels increased rapidly, and a five-year period of great business dynamism was inaugurated, especially in small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The tendencies to economic recovery outlined in the last months of the Duhalde’s government were consolidated in the following years: between 2003 and 2007, the GDP grew at average annual rates above 8% and the manufacturing sector achieved an annual average growth rate of 10.40% (see Fig. 1).
During this period and in contrast to the 1990s, when a large part of the productivity increases were explained by the increase in unemployment, economic growth coexisted with a highly dynamic job creation rate (unemployment went from 22.5% in 2003 to around 9% in 2007). Moreover, the increase in the economic activity brought with it an increase in fiscal revenues: the expansion of the domestic market pushed tax collection linked to consumption, and the rapid creation of formal jobs allowed to multiply the income derived from contributions to social security (Porta et al. 2017, 111).
Fig. 1 Average growth rates of GDP and value added of the manufacturing sector, 1998–2017, selected periods. Source: Own elaboration using INDEC
Another particularity of the first Kirchner administration was a current account surplus that averaged 2.9% of GDP. Since the country also had a slight average deficit of the capital account during those years, the strong surplus of the current account allowed for a rapid accumulation of international reserves which passed from just under 9000 million dollars in July 2002 to more than 46,000 million dollars in December 2007 (Santarcángelo 2013). The main cause behind this trade balance was the improvement in the terms of trade, which raised 25% between 2003 and 2007 centrally due to the rise in commodity prices.
Financial normalization and the exit from default was achieved by Kirchner’s administration in February 2005. As a result of the negotiations undertaken, the country resumes payment on 76% of the 82 billion dollars in sovereign bonds that defaulted in 2001 (Cifra 2009). This successful policy was deepened in January 2006 (Lavagna was no longer the ministry of economy)—when Kirchner ordered the cancelation of the full debt with the IMF with an anticipated payment of 9530 million dollars. As a result of these strategies, external indebtedness fell substantially throughout the first period and went from representing 129% of GDP in 2003 to 48% in 2007. Debt relief was one of the structural changes achieved by the Kirchner’s administration and was one of the fundamental pillars of management. Not only resources were released to execute and finance public and economics policies but also the conditionality of the multilateral credit agencies was avoided, and therefore, greater autonomy in economic policy was gained (Porta et al. 2017).
After a strong recovery of real wages throughout Néstor Kirchner’s administration, the scourge of inflation began to whip the country. The situation was worsened because the government took the bad decision to intervene the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) and started manipulating the price statistics. As a corollary, the economy stopped having an indicator that allows the correct estimation of inflation, which led the economy to set prices guided by their own expectations, which clearly fueled the dynamics of inflation.
In October 2007, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner won the president election with 46% of the votes. The economy was growing at annual rates above 8% per year, and showed a completely different appearance to that of May 2003. New challenges were already evident, and the most notori-
Another random document with no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Six little Bunkers at farmer Joel's
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
Title: Six little Bunkers at farmer Joel's
Author: Laura Lee Hope
Illustrator: Walter S. Rogers
Release date: October 3, 2023 [eBook #71791]
Language: English
Original publication: New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1923
Credits: Bob Taylor, David Edwards and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SIX LITTLE BUNKERS AT FARMER JOEL'S ***
THE HAY SLIPPED OFF ALONG WITH THE SIX LITTLE BUNKERS AND ADAM.
Six Little Bunkers at Farmer Joel’s Frontispiece—(Page 152)
SIX LITTLE BUNKERS AT FARMER JOEL’S
BY LAURA LEE HOPE
A “S L B G B ’ ,” “S L B M J ’ ,” “T B T S ,” “T B B S ,” “T M B S ,” E .
ILLUSTRATED BY WALTER S. ROGERS
NEW YORK GROSSET & DUNLAP PUBLISHERS
Made in the United States of America
BOOKS BY LAURA LEE HOPE
12mo. Cloth. Illustrated.
THE SIX LITTLE BUNKERS SERIES
SIX LITTLE BUNKERS AT GRANDMA BELL’S
SIX LITTLE BUNKERS AT AUNT JO’S
SIX LITTLE BUNKERS AT COUSIN TOM’S
SIX LITTLE BUNKERS AT GRANDPA FORD’S
SIX LITTLE BUNKERS AT UNCLE FRED’S
SIX LITTLE BUNKERS AT CAPTAIN BEN’S
SIX LITTLE BUNKERS AT COWBOY JACK’S
SIX LITTLE BUNKERS AT MAMMY JUNE’S
SIX LITTLE BUNKERS AT FARMER JOEL’S
THE BUNNY BROWN SERIES
BUNNY BROWN AND HIS SISTER SUE
BUNNY BROWN AND HIS SISTER SUE ON GRANDPA’S FARM
BUNNY BROWN AND HIS SISTER SUE PLAYING CIRCUS
BUNNY BROWN AND HIS SISTER SUE AT AUNT LU’S CITY HOME
BUNNY BROWN AND HIS SISTER SUE AT CAMP REST-AWHILE
BUNNY BROWN AND HIS SISTER SUE IN THE BIG WOODS
BUNNY BROWN AND HIS SISTER SUE ON AN AUTO TOUR
BUNNY BROWN AND HIS SISTER SUE AND THEIR SHETLAND PONY
BUNNY BROWN AND HIS SISTER SUE GIVING A SHOW
BUNNY BROWN AND HIS SISTER SUE AT CHRISTMAS TREE COVE
BUNNY BROWN AND HIS SISTER SUE IN THE SUNNY SOUTH
BUNNY BROWN AND HIS SISTER SUE KEEPING STORE
BUNNY BROWN AND HIS SISTER SUE AND THEIR TRICK DOG
THE BOBBSEY TWINS SERIES
(Sixteen Titles)
THE MAKE BELIEVE SERIES
(Twelve Titles)
THE OUTDOOR GIRLS SERIES
(Thirteen Titles)
GROSSET & DUNLAP, PUBLISHERS, NEW YORK
Copyright, 1923, by GROSSET & DUNLAP
Six Little Bunkers at Farmer Joel’s
SIX LITTLE BUNKERS AT FARMER JOEL’S
CHAPTER I
RUSS IN DANGER
“Margy, will you look out on the porch and see if she’s there?”
“Yes, Vi, I will. But you ought to say please to me, ’cause mother says——”
“All right then. Please look and see if she’s there,” begged Vi, otherwise Violet Bunker. There were six of the little Bunkers. The other four will be out presently.
Margy, who had been looking at picture books with her year-older sister in a room off the porch, kindly dropped her book and started for the door.
“If she’s there bring her in—please.” Violet laughed a little as she added the last word. She remembered what Margy had started to say about politeness.
Violet was piling up the books, for she had just thought of something new to play, when Margy came hurrying back into the room.
“She isn’t there!” gasped the smaller Bunker girl.
“She isn’t?” Violet fairly gasped out the words, and you could easily tell that she was very much excited. “Are you sure, Margy?”
“No, she isn’t there, Vi! Maybe a tramp has taken her!”
“Oh!” cried Violet, in such a loud voice that Mrs. Bunker, having heard part of the talk, came quickly from the room where she had been sewing.
“Who’s gone?” demanded the mother of the six little Bunkers. “Don’t tell me Mun Bun is lost again!”
Mun Bun was the youngest of the six little Bunkers. His real name was Munroe Ford Bunker, but that was entirely too long for the little
fellow, so he was called “Mun Bun.” It was a name he had made up for himself.
“Where is Mun Bun? Is he lost again?” asked Mrs. Bunker, starting to take off her apron to go in search of the “little tyke,” as she often called him, for he certainly did get into mischief very many times.
“Mun Bun isn’t lost,” answered Violet, as she hurried out on the porch with Margy. “He’s out in the yard with Laddie, digging a hole.”
“An’ he says he’s going to dig down to China,” added Margy.
“And I just put clean bloomers on him!” sighed Mrs. Bunker. “But who is gone?” she asked again. “It can’t be Rose or Russ—they’re too old to be taken by a tramp!”
There, now you have heard the names of all six of the little Bunkers, though Russ, being nearly ten, I think, wouldn’t like to be called “little.”
“No, it isn’t Russ or Rose,” said Margy. “I saw them going down the street. Maybe they’re going to daddy’s office to ask him for some money to buy candy.”
“Oh, they mustn’t do that!” exclaimed Mrs. Bunker. “This is the first of the month and daddy is very busy. They shouldn’t have gone there. Are you sure, Margy?”
“Oh, they didn’t zactly say they were going there,” announced Margy. “But I thought maybe——”
“You mustn’t tell things you aren’t sure of,” said her mother. “But who is——”
“Mother, why is daddy so busy the first of the month?” asked Vi, forgetting for the moment all about what she had sent Margy to look for. Violet Bunker was, as her father said, “a great girl for asking questions.” Her mother knew this, and, fearing that Vi would get started on a list of inquiries that would take some time to answer, Mrs. Bunker said:
“Now don’t begin that, Vi, dear. I’ll answer just this one question, but not any more. Your father is busy the first of the month more than
at other times because tenants pay their rents then, and he collects the rents for a large number of people. That’s one thing a real estate dealer, like your father, does. Now, don’t ask another question!” she commanded, for she saw that Vi was getting ready, as Russ would say, “to spring another.”
“I wasn’t going to ask a question,” said Vi, looking a little hurt in her feelings. “I was going to say——”
“Wait until I find out what’s happened first,” broke in Mrs. Bunker. “Who is missing? It can’t be any of you, for you’re all present or accounted for, as they say in the army. Who is——”
“It’s Esmeralda!” exclaimed Violet. “I had her out on the porch playing with Margy. Then we went in to look at the picture books, and I forgot about Esmeralda and——”
“Russ says her name ought to be Measles ’cause she’s all spotted,” put in Margy, with a shake of her dark, tousled hair. “But it’s only spots of dirt.”
“Come on,” demanded Vi of Margy, taking her younger sister by the hand. “We’ve got to find Esmeralda!”
“Oh, it’s your doll!” remarked Mrs. Bunker, with a sigh of relief. “I thought one of you children was missing. I had quite a start. It’s only your doll. That’s different.”
“Esmeralda is my child, even if she is only a doll,” and Vi marched away with Margy, her head held up proudly.
“Oh, my dear, I didn’t mean that you shouldn’t want to find your missing play child,” called Mrs. Bunker quickly, for she realized that a little girl’s feelings might be hurt by a slighting remark about even a dirty and spotted doll. “I only meant that I was glad none of you children was missing. I’ll help you look for Esmeralda.”
“She isn’t out on the porch. I looked,” said Margy
“We left her there, didn’t we?” asked Vi, for sometimes there was so much going on at the Bunker house that to remember where one of the many dolls or other playthings was left became a task.
“Yes, we left Esmeralda out on the porch,” agreed Margy “But she isn’t there now. I looked. She’s—she’s gone!”
Margy felt almost as sad over the loss as did Vi, though Esmeralda, or “Measles,” as Russ called her, belonged particularly to Violet.
“Do you s’pose a tramp would take my doll, Mother?” asked Violet, for Mrs. Bunker was now walking toward the side porch with her two little girls.
“No, my dear, I don’t believe so,” was the answer. “What would a tramp want with a doll?”
This puzzled Vi for a moment, but she quickly had ready a reply.
“He—he might want to give her to his little girl,” Vi said.
“Tramps, as a rule, don’t have little girls,” remarked Mrs. Bunker. “If they had they wouldn’t be tramps.”
This gave Vi a chance to ask another question. Eagerly she had it ready.
“Why don’t tramps have little girls?” she inquired of her mother. “Do they run away? I mean do the little girls run away?”
“No, that isn’t the reason,” and Mrs. Bunker tried not to smile at Vi’s eagerness. “I’ll tell you about it some other time. But show me where you left your doll,” she added, as they reached the shady side porch. “Esmeralda certainly isn’t here,” for a look around showed no doll in sight.
“Oh, where can she be?” gasped Vi, now on the verge of tears. Margy, seeing how her sister was affected, was also getting ready to weep, but just then a merry whistle was heard around the corner of the house. It was the merry whistle of a happy boy.
“Here comes Russ!” exclaimed Violet, for she knew her oldest brother’s habit of being tuneful. “He’ll help me look for Esmeralda.”
“Maybe he took her,” suggested Margy.
“No. If he did he wouldn’t be coming back whistling,” decided Vi.
Russ Bunker, next to his father the “man” of the family, swung around the path at the side of the house. Following him was Rose, his sister, a year younger, a pretty girl, with light, fluffy hair. And, very often, Rose had a merry song on her lips. But as Russ was now whistling Rose could not sing. She always said Russ whistled “out of tune,” but Russ declared it was her singing that was off key.
“Oh, Russ!” exclaimed his mother, “you didn’t go to daddy’s office and bother him to-day, did you, when it’s the first of the month? And he is so busy——”
“No, Mother, I wasn’t at daddy’s office,” Russ answered. “Rose and I just went to the store for some nails. I’m making a seesaw, and ——”
“Oh, can I be on it?” begged Margy. “I love to teeter-totter! Please, Russ, can’t I——”
“I want a ride, too!” put in Vi.
“All right! All right!” agreed Russ, with a laugh. “You can all have rides—Mun Bun and Laddie too—as soon as I get it made. But it’s a lot of work and it’s got to be done right and——”
Russ paused. He could see that something was wrong, as he said afterward. Russ was a quick thinker. Also he was always making things about the house. These were mostly things with which to play and have a good time, though once he built a bench for his mother. The only trouble was that he didn’t make the legs strong enough, and when Norah O’Grady, the cook, set a tub of water on the bench the legs caved in and there was a “mess” in the kitchen.
“Has anything happened?” asked Russ, for he could see that his mother and his two small sisters had come out on the porch with some special idea in mind.
“Violet’s doll is gone,” explained Mrs. Bunker. “She left it on the porch, and she feels sad over losing it. If you know anything about it, Russ——”
“You mean that old Measles doll?” asked the oldest Bunker boy, laughing.
“She hasn’t the measles at all—so there!” and Violet stamped her foot on the porch.
“Well, she looks so—all spotted,” added Russ, with another laugh. Then, as he saw that Violet was ready to cry and that Margy was going to follow with tears, Russ added: “I guess I know where your doll is. Henry Miller just told me——”
“Oh, did he take her?” cried Violet. “If he did I’ll never speak to him again and——”
“Now, wait a minute!” advised Russ. “You girls always get so excited! I didn’t say Henry took your doll. I just met him and he said he saw a dog running out of our yard with something in his mouth. Maybe it was the dog that took your doll, Violet.”
“Oh! Oh!” cried the little girl, and she was now sobbing in real earnest.
“Oh, the dog will eat up Esmeralda!” and Margy added her tears to those of Violet.
“I’ll go down the street and look for her,” quickly offered Russ. He was a kind boy that way Of course he didn’t care for dolls, and he was anxious to start making the seesaw, nails for which he and Rose had gone after. But Russ was willing to give up his own pleasure to help his little sister.
“I’ll get your doll,” he said. “I guess that dog wouldn’t carry her far after he found out she wasn’t a bone or something good to eat.”
“She—she—she’s a nice doll, anyhow, so there!” sobbed Violet. “An’—an’ I—I want her!”
“I guess I can find her,” offered Russ. “Here, Rose, you hold the nails.”
Russ started on a run toward the front gate. Mrs. Bunker and the three girls followed. As yet Laddie and Mun Bun had not heard the excitement over the missing doll, for they were still in the back yard, “digging down to China.”
Russ reached the gate, looked down the road in the direction Henry Miller had told him the dog had run with something in its mouth, and then Russ cried:
“I see her! I see your doll, Vi! The dog dropped her in the street! I’ll get her for you.”
Russ started on the run toward a small object lying in the dust of the road. Before Russ could reach the doll a big automobile truck swung around the corner and came straight for poor Esmeralda.
“Oh, she’ll be run over!” screamed Violet. “My child!”
But Russ had also seen the truck and, knowing there would be little left of the doll if one of the heavy wheels went over her, he ran a little faster and darted directly in front of the big lumbering, thundering automobile.
“Russ! Russ! Be careful!” called his mother.
“Look out there, youngster!” yelled the man who was driving the truck.
On came the heavy automobile, bearing down on Russ who was now in the middle of the street, stooping over to pick up Esmeralda.
CHAPTER II
A LOAD OF FLOWERS
Three of the six little Bunkers—Rose, Margy and Violet—stood grouped around their mother, looking with anxious eyes toward Russ, who had made up his mind that he was going to get Vi’s doll and snatch it out of danger before the big truck reached it. But, in doing this, Russ was also in danger himself.
“Russ! Russ! Come back!” cried his mother, darting forward.
“It’s going to run right over him!” screamed Margy.
“He’ll be smashed!” and Violet covered her eyes with her hands.
“Let the old doll go!” shouted Rose.
But Russ did not heed. Straight across the street, directly in front of the truck he ran, and toward Vi’s doll Esmeralda that was lying in the highway, where she had been dropped by the stray dog.
The man driving the big truck, after giving one call of warning, had ceased, and was now doing his best either to steer out of the way, so he would not run over Russ, or else to put on the brakes. This last was not so easy to do as the street just there was down hill and the truck was a heavy one.
Russ reached the doll before the truck got to it. The Bunker boy picked up Vi’s plaything and started to run out of danger, but he slipped on a stone and down he fell in the dust of the road.
“Oh! Oh!” cried his mother. “Oh, Russ!”
Russ was down, but, as he said afterward, he was not “out.” He rolled to one side, out of the way of the thundering big wheels of the truck. A moment later he was on his feet, dirty and dusty, but holding proudly aloft the doll he had rescued.
