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Preface
ThisbookdealswiththenexusofJewishcontractlawandJewishfamilylaw andtheirpotentialmutualinfluence.Theessenceoftheresearchexploreswhether andtowhatextentthereisconsiderablehalakhicroomfortheusageofancientand moderncontractualdevicesanddoctrinestoprivatelyregulatetheJewishfamily. WhereasJewishlawregulatescomprehensivelyandthoroughlyboththespousaland parentalrelations,itisnecessarytodiscusswhetherandtowhatextentthereis freedomofcontracttoprivatelyregulatethevariousanglesofthoserelations.The subjectoftheresearchismainlythehorizontalrelationshipbetweenspouses,butit alsodiscussestheverticalrelationshipbetweenparentandchild.Theresearchdraws uponmaterialfromthebiblicalperiodandconcludeswithcurrentanalysisand materials.ItfocusesmainlyontheMishnahandtheTalmudperiodsonward.This bookdiscussesmainlyJewishlaw,whichIpreferforseveralreasonstocall halakhah andwhichstandsatthecrossroadsoftheologyandlaw,butitalsoengageswith moderncivillaw.
Thisisespeciallytrueinthelastchapterofthebook,Chapter 5,whereonecan finddiscussionsofthemostcutting-edgelegal-ethicaldilemmasinthe fieldof advancedbiomedicalinnovationsregardingwhoshouldbedeterminedasthelegal parentofachildconceivedthroughartifi cialmeans.Themethodologyofthe researchistakenmainlyfromthehalakhicdogmaticmethodbutoftenalsoapplies thehistoricalmethod;itisthusanexampleofProfessorMenahemElon’scombined historical-dogmaticstandpoint.Thisbookconcludestheresultsofmywritingsover thelastdecadeinbothJewishandcivillaw.TheresearchcommencedwithmyMA thesis, “PublicRegulationandPrivateAgreementofSpousalConjugalPrivilegesin JewishLaw,” whichwaspublishedin 2006.Thiswasfollowedin 2011 withthe publicationofmyPhDdissertation, “DeterminingLegalParentagebyAgreement.” Followingthesetwomajorresearchprojects,Idevelopedmythinkinginovertwenty publicationsinvariouslawreviewsintheUnitedStatesaswellasinIsrael,drawing ittogetherinthisbook.
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Introduction
Oneofthemostfascinatingissuesineverylegalsystemisthenexusofcontract lawandfamilylawandtheirpotentialmutualin fl uence.Ontheonehand, onecancontemplateusingcontractualdevicesanddoctrinestoachievea more fl exibleandnuancedregulationofthevariousissuesarisinginfamilylaw insteadoftherigidanddeterminedregulationbypublicpolicy-inspiredstatute. Ontheotherhand,itispossibletoexplorewhetherandtheextenttowhich familylawassistsinthevalidationofdiff erent(family)agreementsandcontracts. Inscholarlyliterature,onecan fi ndinthelastdecadeswritingregardingthe expandingin fl uenceofcivilcontractlawonmodernfamilylaw. 1 Thisbook focusesmainlyonregulatingsomeaspectsofmaritalstatus.Bywayofexample,it usesvariousspousalagreements,suchasp renuptialandpostnuptialagreements, divorceagreements,cohabitationagreements,andevenagreementsbetween same-sexpartners.
Similarly,inthe fi eldofparent– childrelationships,thisbookincludesdiscussionsofvariousco-parentingagreements. 2 Inthemodernera, “nontraditional” families,inboththespousalandtheparentalcontexts,urgentlyrequirethe provisionofsuchagreementssincetheirr elationshipsarenotrecognizedbytheir jurisdictionsasamarriedcouple.The uniqueinterplaybetweengreatersocial opennessandrapidbiomedicaldevelopmentsinthe fi eldofreproduction enablesreproductioninalmosteveryfamilystructure,withlargenumbersof
1 See,e.g., ShaharLifshitz, ContractualRegulationofSpousalRelationshipinCivil Law263 n.2 (PhDthesis,Bar-IlanUniversity, 2002)(Heb.);ibid, TheRegulationoftheSpousal ContractintheIsraeliLaw – FirstOutline, 4KiryatHamishpat271 (2004–05)(Heb.).
2 See CharlesP.Kindregan, CollaborativeReproductionandRethinkingParentage, 21J.Am. Acad.MatrimonialL 43 (2008);BixBrian, DomesticAgreements, 35HofstraL.Rev 1753 (2007);KatherineM.Swift, ParentingAgreements,ThePotentialPowerofContract,andthe LimitsofFamilyLaw, 34Fla.St.U.L.Rev 913 (2007
childrenbeingbornusingnontraditionalmeans. 3 Consequently,theneedto contractuallyregulatetherelationshipbetweenallthepartiestothoseenterprises hasbeenaccelerated.
Thereismuchlessacademicdiscussionconcerningthepotentialinfluenceof variousfamilylawdoctrinesandprinciplesontheregulationofmoderncontractual devicesanddoctrines.4 Moderncontracttheoryhasbeenregardedasmuchmore sensitiveandpotentiallyevenmorehumanethanclassicalcontracttheoryis.5 There isastarkcontrastbetweencontractsregulatingfamilysettlementsandcontracts governedbyclassicalcontracttheory,whichholdsthatanygivencontractingparties arerationalandreasonableenoughforsigningthebestcontractforthem6 – and therefore “Quiditcontractual,ditjuste”7 – andtheymustfulfilltheircontractual obligations.Thisistrueeventhoughtheremightbevariousproblemsconcerning theformationandoperationofacontract,suchasunequalbargainingpowerofthe contractingparties,achangeofheart,changedcircumstances,andothercognitive obstaclesforproperlyforeseeingthefutureatthemomentofsigningthecontract. Likewise,boththerabbinicandthescholarlyliterature8 havenotdealtextensively enoughwiththepossibleinfluenceofcontractualdevicesanddoctrinesonthe
3 See recentlyYehezkelMargalit, DyingtoBeaFather – AbouttheAppropriateNormativeLimits ontheUseoftheWilloftheDeceasedtoReproduceafterHisDeath ch. 1 (on filewithauthor) (Heb.).
4 Forseminalacademicwritingsregardingthemodern/neoclassicalcontractdoctrine,seeIan Ayres, ValuingModernContractScholarship, 112YaleL.J 881 (2003);MortonJ.Horwitz, The TransformationofAmericanLaw, 1780–1860 (1997); GoodFaithandFaultinContractLaw7–12 (JackBeatson&DanielFriedmanneds., 1995);JayM.Feinman, The SignificanceofContractTheory, 58U.Cin.L.Rev 1283 (1990);IanR.Macneil, TheNew SocialContract:AnInquiryintoModernContractualRelations (1980).
5 See,e.g.,ElizabethS.Scott&RobertE.Scott, FromContracttoStatus:Collaborationandthe EvolutionofNovelFamilyRelationships, 115Colum.L.Rev. 293 (2015)passim;Yehezkel Margalit, InDefenseofSurrogacyAgreements:AModernContractLawPerspective, 20Wm.& MaryJ.Women&L 423 (2014)passim;AllenM.Parkman, TheContractualAlternativeto Marriage, 32N.Ky.L.Rev 125 (2005);RobertLeckey, RelationalContractandOtherModels ofMarriage, 40OsgoodeHallL.J 1 (2002);JohnWightman, IntimateRelationships,RelationalContractTheory,andtheReachofContract, 8FeministLegalStud 93 (2000); ElizabethS.Scott&RobertE.Scott, MarriageasRelationalContract, 84Va.L.Rev 1225 (1998).
6 See IanR.Macneil, Contracts:AdjustmentofLong-TermEconomicRelationsunderClassical, NeoclassicalandRelationalContractLaw, 72Nw.U.L.Rev 854 (1978);MichelRosenfeld, ContractandJustice:TheRelationbetweenClassicalContractLawandSocialContract Theory, 70IowaL.Rev 769 (1985);KevinM.Teeven, AHistoryofLegislativeReformofthe CommonLawofContract, 26U.Tol.L.Rev 35 (1994); PatrickS.Atiyah,AnIntroductiontotheLawofContract7 (1995);MelvinA.Eisenberg, WhyThereIsNoLawof RelationalContracts, 94Nw.U.L.Rev 805 (2000).
7 Forthislegaldoctrine,seeLouiseRolland, Quiditcontractual,ditjuste(Fouillee) entrois petitsbonds,areculons, 51McGillL.J. 765 (2005–06).
8 ForageneraldiscussionoftheJewishcontractlaw,seeMenachemElon, Contract in The PrinciplesofJewishLaw246–56 (MenachemEloned., 1975); LevineAaron,Free EnterpriseandJewishLaw:AspectsofJewishBusinessEthics33–57 (1980).Fora discussionofthegeneraldifficultytoformulatecontemporarycontractthatcanbereconciled
regulationofJewishfamilylaw,mainlyin findingaviablesolutiontotheproblemof the agunah (Jewishchainedwoman),asisdiscussedextensivelyintheoutsetofthe thirdchapterofthisbook.Thesediscussionsrevolvearoundcontractualdevicesand doctrinesthatarebasedoncontractualagreementsperseandareincludedin prenuptialagreementsandacommitmenttogranta get (religiousdivorce)andin differentcontractualdoctrinessuchasconditionalmarriage,mistakenmarriage, andsoon.Ifthosecontractualsolutionsareacceptedasaviablealternativeforthe acuteneedofreceivingthe get,onemayproperlycopewiththeheart-wrenching caseofthe agunah
Besidesthecomplexitiesarisingbecauseofthestatusofmarriage,discussed above,thereisanurgentneedforfurtherdiscussionregardingtheregulationof different financialaspectsarisingfromthespouses’ useofanexplicitorimplicit contract.9 Thesediscussionsshouldbemucheasierfromhalakhicperspectivesince theydealonlywiththemonetaryanglesofspousallife,suchasmutuallyagreeing uponegalitarianorcontractualownershipanddistributionofthefamilyassets. Inaddition,theseprivateagreementsmayenablethespousestomutuallyagree uponincreasing,decreasing,orevenabsolutelyabolishinggenderhalakhicobligations,suchascontractualagreementstoexemptorobligatethehusbandtopaythe wife’smaintenanceand/orthechildsupportortowaivethehusband’srightto inherithiswife.Itismyopinionthattheseimportantandsubstantialcontractual deviceshavenotreceivedtheattentiontheydeserveineitherthehalakhicorthe scholarlyliterature.Thislacunawillbe filledwiththetheoreticalandpractical conclusionsofthisbook.
thestructureofthiswork
Themainthemeofthisbookisexploringthepotentialinfluenceofhalakhic contractlawonhalakhicfamilylawinbothspousalandparent–childrelationships. InChapter 1,Iinitiatethediscussionoftheuseofcontractualdevicestoprivately regulatethevarioushalakhicspousalobligationsthatderivefromthestatusofbeing marriedaccordingto “thelawofMosesandIsrael” (kedatMoshehveYisrael). withtherigidhalakhicrestrictions,seethefollowingHebrewreferences:DavidBass, Contracts AccordingtoDineTorah, 1Keter17 (1996);BenjaminPorat, TheLawofFraudulentPrices –Fundamentals,PrinciplesandValues, 4Keter292 (2004); DefectiveContracts (Nahum Rakovered., 2011); RemediesforBreachofContract (NahumRakovered.,tobepublished);andthevariousarticlesintheperiodical 4MishpeteiEretz (2016). 9 Forexample, ArielRosen-Zvi,TheLawofMatrimonialProperty (1982)(Heb.)hasdealt extensivelywithregulatingthemonetaryspousalrelationshipviacontractualdevicesinboth halakhah andcivillaw. See,respectively,ibid,at 124–27, 132, 222, 339,and 349–50,andinthe index,s.v. “contractlaw” (hozim).Foradiscussionofthevariousspousalmonetaryagreements andwavingawaythevarious ketubah stipulations,see,respectively, BenzionSchereschewsky,FamilyLawinIsrael98,157,164,and 101–02 (4thed., 1993)(Heb.)andmore recently BenzionSchereschewsky&MichaelCorinaldi,FamilyLawinIsrael vol. 1, 225–78 (2015)(Heb.).
Recentlytherehasbeenanincreaseinacademicandrabbinicalliteraturedealing withvariousaspectsoftheapproachofJewishlawtomaritalrelationsbetween spouses,discussionsthatuntilnotlongagotookplaceonlyinprivate.Jewishlaw regulatesthisrelationshipinamostcomprehensivemanner,inaccordancewiththe conceptof halakhah.Thisisdifferenttocivillaw,whichinliberalmodernsystems avoidslegalinvolvementinthisintimaterelationship.Thehalakhictermusedfor regulatingthisrelationshipisthecommandment/dutyof onah.
Inthischapter,Iseektodiscussanewthetraditionaldeterminationthatseesthe elementof onah inJewishmarriagesasmandatory,arigidhalakhicandbasic obligationowedbyahusbandtohiswife,fromwhichamancannotbeexempted eitherbymutualagreementbetweenthepartiesorbyaunilateralstipulationonhis part.ThistraditionalapproachisexpressedinthedeterminationoftheBabylonian Talmud,whichchosetheelementof onah astheprototypeforanyattemptto stipulatewithregardtoanobligationthatoriginatesfromtheTorah.Anysuch stipulationwillbevoidsinceitcomeswithinthecategoryof “onewhostipulates aboutwhatiswrittenintheTorah”;thus rishonim (earlyrabbis)insistedthat onah is the “essenceofmatrimony” and “theessenceofTorahmarriage” andthat “marital relationsaretheessenceofmarriagefromtheTorah.” Thischapterreexaminesthis traditionalapproach,seekingtoilluminatethedispositivefoundationsoftheelementsof onah – whetherbyimposingaconditioninthe kiddushin (Jewishbetrothal) andthusnegatingtheobligationof onah orbypermittingthewifetorenounceher onah rightsorgivingherpermissiontoviolateher onah right.
ThediscussioninChapter 2 isadirectcontinuationoftheconclusionsof Chapter 1,focusingonlyonthepossibleprivateregulationofthemaritalrelations betweenspousesbyconsent.ThediscussioninChapter 1 highlightstheessential differencesbetweentheBabylonianTalmud,whichrejectsfromtheoutsetalmost anyprivateagreementregardingthisintimaterelationship,andthePalestinian Talmud,whichismuchmore flexibleandenablesthistypeofspousalagreement. InthischapterIexaminewhetherthereexistsonlyoneessentialdifferenceinthe Talmudicpointsofviewregardingconjugalrelationsorwhetherthereisamuch morecomprehensiveandmeaningfulgapintheTalmud’soutlook.Recentlythere hasbeenconsiderableinterestalsointhecontractualaspectsoftherelationship betweenspousesinboth halakhah andcivillaw.In halakhah thediscussionis primarilyconcernedwiththelimitsoffreedomofcontract.Inotherwords,the questionistowhatextentacouplemarriedunderJewishlawcanuseacontractto regulatetheir financialrelationsatthecommencementoftheirmarriedlife.These halakhiccontractsaregenerallycalledprenuptialagreements.
InthischapterIaminterestedinreconsideringtheextentof “freedomof contract ” inTalmudicfamilylawinlightofthespecialapproachfoundinthe PalestinianTalmudandcontrastitwiththatoftheBabylonianTalmud.Idevote mostofthediscussiontothosecomponentsdealingwithmattersofritual(issura), issuesthatarenotspeci fically fi nancialfromapurehalakhicpointofviewbutthat
areconnectedtoJewishmarriage.Amongthesubjectsdiscussedbesidesthe husband’sdutiesregarding onah arethepossibilityoflimitingthroughcontracts obligationsandprivilegesresultingfrommaritalstatus,suchasthehusband’ s obligationtopaythebasic ketubah sumandhisrighttoinherithisdeceasedwife’ s estate.ThespecialapproachfoundinthePalestinianTalmudpermitsamuchwider andmore flexibleapproachtothefreedomofcontractthanthatoftheBabylonian Talmud.Inthelightofthisapproach,Chapter 2 isprimarilyconcernedwiththe dogmaticbasisforthewoman’srighttoinitiateadivorcebecauseshehatesher husbandbasedonprioragreementatthetimeofthemarriage,aconditionthatwas commoninPalestineduringtheperiodofthePalestinianTalmud.
Afterconcludinginthe firsttwochaptersthatindeedwehaveanexplicit contradictionbetweenthetwoTalmudsandthereisanessentialgapintheir perspectivesregardingthelimitsoffreedomofcontractforcoupleswhowishto marryaccordingtothelawofMosesandIsrael,IseekinChapter 3 totaketheissue onestepfurtherandexplorewhetheritispossibletopracticallyuseoneofthe availablecontractualdevicesasapossiblesolutionfortheheart-wrenchingcaseof the agunah.Inthemodernera,therehavebeenanumberofsuggestionsfor halakhicsolutionsfortheproblemofthe agunah.Thosesolutionsarebasedon contractualagreementsperseandareincludedinprenuptialagreementsanda commitmenttogranta get andindifferentcontractualdoctrinessuchasconditional marriage,mistakenmarriage,andsoon.Theuseofdoctrinalcontractsthatleadto conditionalmarriageisrejected fi rstbecauseoftheAmoraicrejectionofconditional marriageandsecondbecausetheyarenotinaccordancewithTorahlaw.
Myintentioninthischapteristonegatethesetwoclaims.Icitebothearlyand recenthalakhicauthorities,whichputforwardtheopinionthatsincewehave unifiedthetwostages kiddushin and nissuin (Jewishmarriage),anyconditionlaid downwithregardto kiddushin isalsoapplicableto nissuin.Furthermore,itismy intentiontodemonstrateaprinciple,whichwasacceptedbyearlyauthorities,that allhalakhicmarriagesarebasicallyconditional.Ialsoattempttoextractsamples fromTannaiticandAmoraiclevelsoftheMishnahandTalmudthatinclude differentpreconditionsinmarriageandtoshowthattheycouldevenbeconsidered conditionalmarriages.Therearethusearlyhalakhicprecedentsfortheuseof conditionsinJewishmarriage,ashasbeensuggestedasacontemporarysolution fortheproblemsofthe agunah.AttheTannaiticlevel,Iexaminethefollowing conditions:thewifehavingnooutstandingvowsorblemishespriortothemarriage, themarriagebeingsubjecttotheconsentofathirdparty,andthepostponement ofthe kiddushin untilentryunderthemarriagecanopy.AttheAmoraiclevel, Iconsiderthefollowingconditions:thewifehavingnooutstandingvowsorblemishespriortothemarriageandthePalestinian simphon
InChapter 4,whichisconsequentuponthediscussioninChapter 3,Ipresenta little-knownpotentialhalakhicsolutiontotheproblemofthe agunah – thatof temporarymarriage.Iconsideritsrootsandthedifferentapplicationsofthissolution
inTalmudicsources,inboththePalestinianTalmudandtheBabylonianTalmud, wherethereisamoredetaileddiscussion.AnexampleoftheBabylonianapplication ofthissolutionisthecrybyimportantBabylonian amoraim –“Whowillbeminefor aday?” Inthiscase,someofthehalakhicauthoritiesrulethatthereisnonecessity fora get inordertoterminatethemarriage.Iconsidertheearlyhalakhicrulingsin thiscaseandthemodernversionofthissuggestion,whichwasalsorejectedby modernhalakhicauthorities.Ialsoundertakeacomparativestudyofapossible paralleltothisuniquemarriage – theShi’itetemporarymarriage,whichisintentionallyrestrictedtoanagreedperiodoftimeanddoesnotrequiredivorcetoannul it.IconcludethediscussionbyrevealingthepossiblecommonrootsoftheTalmudictemporarymarriageandShi’itetemporarymarriageinancientPersianlaw.
Recentdecadeshavebornewitnesstodramaticchangesintheinstitutionsof familyandparenthood.Varioussociologicalchanges,however,havebroughtabout rapidandmajorchangestothedefinitionsoffamily,partnership,parenthood,and parent–childrelations.Asifthiswerenotenough,advancesinmodernmedicine haveintensifi edtheabilitytoseparatesexuality,fertility,andparenthood.Thereisa dramaticincreasetodayinthenumberofcouplesandparentswhoseektoacquire parentalstatus,alongwithalltherightsandresponsibilitiesinherenttherein,by meansofavaryingsetofcontractsandagreements.Itisimperative,therefore,to bridgethegapcreatedbetweenthecurrentfamilystructureandexistingnormative law.Theproblemisthatlegislatorsandjudgesconsistentlychoosetoconfer traditionalpublic-regulatoryarrangementsonthesekindsofrelationshipsandusuallydonotpermitprivatearrangements,nordotheyrecognizethevalidityofthese agreementsandcontracts.
Intheconcludingchapter,Chapter 5,Iexaminetheregulationofthesematters fromthepointofviewofcivilfamilylawincomparisonwith halakhah.My intentionistocomparethelegalandbioethicalframeworksinbothsystemsinsome detail,focusingonthequestionoftheappropriateplaceandextentofthefreedomof contractwithrespecttobringingchildrenintotheworldinanontraditional manner,andtodealwiththepossibilityofestablishingparenthoodbyagreement. Iexaminethisquestioninthefollowingtestcases:spermandovadonations, surrogateagreements,anddispositionagreementspertainingtotheuseoffrozen embryos.Afterexploringthemainthemesof halakhah andthecivillaw,Itryto find acompromisebetweenthosetwocontradictoryapproachesandopenthequestion ofwhetherweareonthewaytoestablishinghalakhicparenthoodbyagreement.
methodology
Ichosetowritethisbookalmostentirelyfromthestandpointofthedogmatic methodofhalakhicresearch.Thismethod,incontrasttothehistoricalmethod,10
10 Foraseminalwritinginthehistoricmethodofhalakhicresearch,seeShalomAlbeck, Lawand HistoryinHalakhicResearch,in ModernResearchinJewishLaw1 (BernardS.Jacksoned.,
focusesthediscussiononlyonexploringthelegal/halakhicaspectsofthe relevantsourceswithoutanyconnectio ntothebroadhistoricalbackground, whichwouldlookatwhereandwhentheywerewritten. 11 Itshouldbeemphasizedthatnumerousprominenthalakhicscholarshavechosenthedogmatic methodofhalakhicresearchasthepreferredone. 12 Moreover,manystudents ofProfessorMenahemElonhavecriticizedhistwo-headedmethod,the historical-dogmaticstandpoint,andhavearguedthatthedogmaticmethodisa muchsuperiorone. 13 Iusethismethodinwritingthevastmajorityofthe researchinfrontofus.
Inaddition,theresearchwasbased, interalia,onTalmudicresearch 14 byusing theacceptedphilologicaldevicesintherealmoftheTalmudiclaw ’sresearch. 15 Inthiscontext,itisnoteworthythatintranslatingtheBabylonianTalmudtexts, IconstantlyusedtheOnlineSoncinoBabylonianTalmudTranslation,http:// ancientworldonline.blogspot.co.il/2012/01/online-soncino-babylonian-talmud.html. ThatisthebestandmostacceptedEnglishtranslation,asfarasIknow.Therefore,Ihavequoteditverbatimwithoutmakinganycorrections,omissions,or additions.ThePalestinianTalmudtr anslationiswellknownforitslackof
1980)andthevariousresearchesofChaimSoloveitchik.ForsupportingAlbeck’smethod,see BaruchShiber, TheAlbeckSysteminTalmudicResearch,in ModernResearchinJewish Law112 (BernardS.Jacksoned., 1980). Seealso PeretzSegal, JewishLawduringtheTannaitic Period,in AnIntroductiontotheHistoryandSourcesofJewishLaw101, 137 (Neil S.Hechtetal.eds., 1996).
11 See MenahemElon,JewishLaw:History,Sources,Principles (BernardAuerbach& MelvinJ.Sykestrans., 1994);ibid,JewishLawCasesandMaterials (1999),andmore specificallyibid, MoreaboutResearchintoJewishLaw,in ModernResearchinJewish Law66 (BernardS.Jacksoned., 1980).Forthehistorical-dogmaticstandpointofhisresearch books,seeZe’evW.Folk, WhatIs “JewishLaw”?AReviewofJewishLaw:History,Sources, Principles-Ha-MishpatHa-IvribyElonMenachem.JewishPublicationSociety, 1994, 11(2) J.L. &Religion835 (1994).Forotherpossiblemethodsofhalakhicresearch,seeIzhakEnglard, ResearchinJewishLaw – ItsNatureandFunction,in ModernResearchinJewishLaw21 (BernardS.Jacksoned., 1980);HaimH.Cohn, TheMethodologyofJewishLaw – ASecularist View,in ModernResearchinJewishLaw123 (BernardS.Jacksoned., 1980); BoazCohen, JewishandRomanLaw:AComparativeStudy vol. 1,vii–xxvii(1966).
12 Suchas EliavShochetman,IllegalActinJewishLaw17–21 (1981)(Heb.),whostatesin theprefacetohisbookthatheusesthedogmaticmethod.
13 See,e.g.,theprefacesofthefollowingdissertations: BerachyahuLifshitz,OneDoesNot ReceiveBoththeDeathPenaltyandPayment1–11(PhDthesis,HebrewUniversity, 1979) (Heb.); ShalomLerner,ElementsoftheLawofPledgesinJewishLaw13–17(PhD thesis,HebrewUniversity, 1980)(Heb.).
14 See asimilarstatementintheoutsetof Shmuelshilo, Dinade-MalkhutaDina–TheLaw oftheStateIsLaw1(1974) (Heb.).Forthehistorical-dogmaticstandpointofthisbook,see PeterElman, Dinade-MalkhutaDina(TheLawoftheStateIsLaw).ByShiloS.[Academic Press,Jerusalem, 1974, 511], 11IsraelL.Rev 133 (1976).
15 ItshouldbenotedthatBerachyahuLifshitz,whosupportstheusageoftheTalmudicresearch’ s methodinresearchingtheJewishlaw,hasmadeasimilarstatementintheoutsetofhis dissertation; see Lifshitz, supra note 13.Similarly,theperiodical DineIsrael hasdedicated anentiregateforthevariousanglesofthismethod; see 20–21DineIsrael437–589 (2000–01) (Heb.)(“TalmudicLaw”).
reliablecomprehensivescienti fi ctranslation.IpreferredtouseHeinrich W.Guggenheimer’ stranslation 16 inthehopethatitismuchbetterthanJacob Neusner ’stranslation. 17
Althoughthevastmajorityofthisbookisbasedonthedogmaticmethod,fromtime totimeIalsousethehistoricalmethod.Ienumeratesomesociological-historical reasonsforexplainingthegapbetweenthetwodifferentTalmuds’ perspectives regardingtheavailablefreedomofcontractinprivatelyregulatingthespousalrelationshipasadeviationfromtherigidpublicregulationoffamilialrelations.Forexample, usingthehistoricalmethodmaygreatlyassistusinexplainingthepatternoffreedomof contractinthePalestinianTalmud,whichallowsustointroduceconditionswith regardtodifferentaspectsofacouple’sintimaterelations – theconditionsofthe ketubah,thehusband’sinheritinghiswife’sproperty,andthepossibilityofthewife initiatingdivorceproceedingsareextensivelyexploredinChapter 2.Thehistorical methodproposesthatthisPalestinianwidefreedomofcontractwasaimedprimarilyat alleviatingtheheavyhalakhicspousaleconomicburden.
Thus,ontheonehand,thegroommaydecreasetheexpensesheisrequiredto paytohisbridewhenmarryingher,suchasimposinginthemarriagecontractthe conditionthathewillbeexemptfrompayingforherclothingandfoodorby reducinghispaymentofherbasic ketubah sum(ikkarketubah).Ontheotherhand, thebridealsomayimposeastipulationthatwaiveshergroom’srighttoinherither property.ThisdoubleandurgentnecessitywascrucialespeciallyinPalestinedueto thetougheconomicsituationintheeraoftheMishnahandtheTalmud.18 Wehave severaltestimonies,theearliestofwhichdatebacktotheTannaiticperiod,that teachushowmuchthesevereeconomicsituationinfluencedancientPalestinian familylaw.OneprominentexampleisfoundinthedeedofR.Tarfon,alate firstcenturyCEsageandpriest19 whobetrothed 300 womeninordertofeedthem
16 See TalmudYerushalmi:Edition,Translation,andCommentary (Heinrich W.Guggenheimered., 1999–2012).
17 See TheTalmudoftheLandofIsrael:APreliminaryTranslationandExplanation (JacobNeusnertrans., 1982).ForanevaluationofNeusner’swork,seeTirzahMeacham, Review:Neusner’ s “TalmudoftheLandofIsrael,” 77(1) JewishQ.Rev 74 (1986).
18 ForthepossibleeffectofthesevereeconomicsituationinancientPalestineontheprevailing usageofimposingaconditioninthemarriagecontract,see YitzhakD.Gilat,Studiesinthe DevelopmentoftheHalakha240–43(1992) (Heb.)andthereferencesheenumerated.For ageneralhistoricaloverviewofthismiserablesituation,see GedaliahAlon,TheJewsin TheirLandintheTalmudicAge,70–640CE,vol. 2, 66–69, 182–93 (1961)(Heb.); Avraham Buchler,StudiesinthePeriodoftheMishnahandTalmud113–37 (Ben-ZionSegal trans.,1968) (Heb.).Fordescribingthesevereeconomicsituationalreadyinthethirdcentury, see,e.g.,SaulLiberman, PalestineintheThirdandFourthCenturies, 36JewishQ.Rev.329 (1945–46);DovHerman, TheHistoricalBackgroundofHalakhotPraisingtheNocturnalStudyof Torah, 6Sidra:AJournalfortheStudyofRabbinicLiterature31, 37 n.28 (1990)(Heb.).
19 Fordiscussingthisvagueaction,seeBenZionRosenfeld&HaimPerlmutter, “WhoIsRich”? TheRichinRomanPalestine 70–250 C.E., 6(2) J.AncientJudaism275, 284 (2015).For possibletestimoniesthatR.Tarfonwasindeedapriest,see,e.g.,Rashi,inhiscommentaryto BT Kiddushin 71a,s.v. “aharahi”;PT Yoma 1:1 (38:4).
priestlytithesduringadroughtyear.20 Hehadexplicitlystipulatedthatallofthem wouldbepermittedtoeatthepriestlyfoodfromtheverymomentoftheir betrothal;21 nonetheless,itwasobviousthatitwasonlya fictionalactandhenever seriouslyintendedtomarrythem.22
Similarly,thehistoricalmethodmayclaimthatthePalestinianTalmudenables thewomantounilaterallyinitiatedivorceproceedingsagainstherhusband,asis extensivelyexploredinChapter 2,followingthemassiveHellenisticinfl uenceon thisTalmud.Thisforeignconceptualizationofthemarriageismuchmore egalitarianwhiletreatingthespousalrelationshipasafullpartnershipinallaspects ofthefamily;theiraimwasthatitshouldleadtoegalitarianandharmonicrelations. ItisreasonabletoassumethattheHellenisticapproachisthesourceoforatleastthe inspirationfortheTalmud’suniqueapproachthatenablesawomantounilaterally initiatedivorceinaccordancewithanexplicitstipulationthatwasagreeduponto thiseffectinthemarriagecontract,evenifherhusbandstronglyopposesthe divorce.23
20 See Tosefta Ketobut (Libermaned.) 5:1.Fortheparallels,seePT Yevamot 4:11 (6:2). Midrash ShirHa-Shirim 6:2 (Greenhoted.).
21 ForadditionalPalestinianevidencethatdocumentstheabilityofamantobetrothawifeand imposeaconditionwithherthatshewillbepermittedtoeatpriestlytithesfromthevery first momentoftheirbetrothal,seePT Nedarim 10:4 (42:1);PT Ketobut 11:1 (34:2).
22 See EnochAlbeck, BetrothalandBetrothalWrits,in StudiesinMemoryofMosesSchorr, 1874–1941, 12 (LouisGinzbergetal.eds., 1944)(Heb.).
23 FortheHellenisticconceptualizationofthemarriage,seethereferencesenumeratedby Adiel Schremer,MaleandFemaleHeCreatedThem:JewishMarriageintheLateSecond Temple, MishnahandTalmudPeriods302–04 (2003)(Heb.).Similarly,Iwanttosheda lightuponthewidefreedomthathadbeengiveninRomanlawtoboththebrideandthe groominenablingthemtounilaterallyinitiatedivorceproceedingsagainsttheirspouse(atleast untiltheConstantinusChristianlegislationattheyear 331; see CodexTheodosianus 3 16 1). ThisimportantancientjurisdictionmayhavemassivelyinfluencedthePalestinianTalmud’ s uniqueapproachthatenablesawomantounilaterallyinitiatedivorceinaccordancewithan explicitstipulationthatwasagreedupontothiseffectinthemarriagecontract,evenifher husbandstronglyopposesthedivorce.Itisnoteworthythattheprevailingopinioninthe TalmudicresearchdatedthisTalmudatthelatesttotheyear 360–70, see YaakovSussmann, AndAgaintoYerushalmiNeziqin,in TalmudicStudies vol. 1, 55, 103 (DavidRosenthal& YaakovSussmanneds., 1990)(Heb.).Moreover,evenChristianlegislationdidnotabsolutely abolishtheabilityofthewomantoinitiateherdivorcebutonlyimposedlegalsanctionson suchawoman.ItissafetoassumethatthePalestinianJews,whowerelivinginPalestineunder theRomanEmpire,wereenormouslyinfluencedbytheperceptionthatevenawifeiseligible tounilaterallyinitiateadivorce.
RegulatingMaritalRelationsbetweenSpousesbyConsent
introduction
Inthischapter,Idiscussthepossibilityofprivateorderingandthelimitsoffreedom ofcontractforcoupleswhowishtomarryaccordingto “thelawofMosesandIsrael” (kedatMoshehveYisrael)asameansofmutuallyregulatingtheirsexualrelationship. But firstIpresentabriefbackgroundsummaryofthisissueinbothJewishandcivil law.Theissueoftherebelliouswife(moredet)1 whorefusestohaveasexual relationshipwithherhusband,usuallyclaimingthat “heisrepulsivetome” (mais alay/me ’is ‘alay)2 andthereforedemandingadivorce,hasbeendiscussedextensively bothinrabbinicandacademicliterature.3
Butrecentlywehavewitnessedanincreaseinacademicandrabbinicalliterature dealingwithvariousaspectsoftheapproachofJewishlawtothespouses’ marital relations,discussionsthatuntilrecentlytookplaceonlybehindcloseddoors.
1 See ShlomoRiskin,WomenandJewishDivorce:TheRebelliousWife,theAgunah andtheRightofWomentoInitiateDivorceinJewishLaw,AHalakhicSolution 31–32 (1989); ElimelechWestreich,TransitionsintheLegalStatusoftheWifein JewishLaw:AJourneyamongTraditions (2002)(Heb.); AvishalomWestreich,TalmudBasedSolutionstotheProblemoftheAgunah4–24(2012); BernardS.Jacksonetal., Agunah:TheManchesterAnalysis passim(2011),http://static1 1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/784513/ 11612882/1302166384333/BSJ+ARU+Final+v2.pdf?token=RSyrg%2F9cedI5z83pXkaDqfKWoZQ% 3D.
2 Foradiscussionofthisclaimandthegreatweightitcarriedinearly halakhah,seethe referenceslisted infra note 3
3 Forseminalrabbinicwritings,see AvrahamHorowitz,KontrasHa-Birurim (1975); Raphael A.BenSimeon,BatNaavatHa-Mardut (2000).Foradiscussionofacademicarticles,seethe followinginHebrew:MosheSchapiro, DivorceonGroundsofRevulsion, 2DineIsrael117 (1971);RazonArussi, TheEthnicFactorinRabbinicalDecision-Making – Enforcementof DivorceontheGroundofRevulsionintheYemeniteCommunity, 10–11DineIsrael125 (1981–83); BenzionSchereschewsky,FamilyLawinIsrael185–203 (4thed., 1993);Avishalom Westreich, “SuchCoercionNeverOccurredtotheSages” (Nachmanides,Ketubot 63b) – Divorce CompulsionintheMishnaicandTalmudicLawsoftheRebelliousWife, 25(2) Bar-IlanL.Stud. 563 (2009).
Thus,nowadaysonemay findlivelydiscussionsofthehalakhicimplicationsof engaginginasexualrelationshipbeforemarriage4 andafterthemarriagehasbeen dissolved;5 thelegitimacyofasexualrelationshipassingleswithoutmarriage;6 marital rape;7 andsoon.Similarly,theissueofthecouple’smaritalrelationsbeingregulated byJewishlawhasbeendiscussedinseveralrabbinicandseculararticles8 andincludes theappropriateintentionthatthecoupleshouldhavewhenengaginginsexual relations.9 Thegeneralperceptionofsexualityin halakhah andtheplaceoftheevil inclination(yetzerhara)arealsodealtwithextensivelyinnumerousbooks10 and
4 See,e.g.,thefollowing:IsraelM.Lau, TheHalakhicRamificationsofSexualRelationships beforeMarriage, 27TorahShe-Be’alpe84 (1986)(Heb.); JennieRosenfeld&David S.Ribner,TheNewlywed’sGuidetoPhysicalIntimacy (2011).
5 Thisistheissueofthe “old get” (getyashan).Thereisadisputeamongthe tannaim withregard toacouplethatengagesinsexualrelationsafterthe get – billofdivorce – hasbeenobtained,as towhetheranew get isrequired,outofthehalakhicconcernthatthedivorceemayhaveagain becomethewifeofherex-husbandviathissexualact. See Mishnah Gittin 8:4;BT Gittin 79b. Forasummaryregardinga getyashan,see TalmudicEncyclopedia vol. 5, 688 (ShlomoZevin etal.eds., 1976)(Heb.). Seealso RabbinicalCourt(BeerSheva) 1086905/2 Anonymousv. Anonymous(unpublished,Nov. 23, 2016).
6 See inthescholarlyliterature GetselEllinson,Non-HalakhicMarriage:AStudyofthe RabbinicSources (1975)(Heb.).Theissuemostdiscussedisthecomparisonbetweenthe ancient pilegesh andcohabitationwithoutmarriageinmoderntimesandthepreciserelationshipbetweenthem.Inanyevent,thecommondenominatorinbothcasesisengagingina sexualrelationshipwithoutofficiallybeingmarriedaccordingto halakhah.Seetherecent highlydebatedseriesofarticleslistedinChapter 4 ofthisbook,n.46
7 Foradiscussionofthehalakhicperspective,seeNahumRakover, CoerciveMaritalRelations betweenaManandHisWife, 6–7Shnatonha-Mishpatha-Ivri295, 299 (1979–80)(Heb.), www.mishpativri.org.il/researches/mekorotalimut.htm;YigalTzfira, CoerciveSexualRelationships, 24Techumin222 (2004)(Heb.).Foradiscussionfromtheperspectiveofcivillaw,see DianaE.H.Russell, RapeinMarriage (1982);IreneHansonFrieze, Investigatingthe CausesandConsequencesofMaritalRape, 8(3) Signs532 (1983);JillElaineHasday, Contest andConsent:ALegalHistoryofMaritalRape, 88Cal.L.Rev.1375 (2000).
8 Forrabbinicwritings,seethefollowinginHebrew:MosheEhrenreich, TheOnahObligation: AnOrdinaryObligationortheEssenceoftheMarriage, 2Hemdatha’Aretz42 (2002); Shagar, MitzvatOnah,in AndHeNamedThemAdam:LoveandRelationshipsfroma NewJewishPointofView193 (ZoharMaored., 2005)(Heb.).Foracademicwriting, see YehezkelMargalit,PublicRegulationandPrivateAgreementaboutSpousal ConjugalPrivilegesinJewishLaw (LLMthesis,Bar-IlanUniversity, 2006)(Heb.) (hereinafter Margalit,PublicRegulation).Foraninitialandbriefdiscussionofthe dispositiveelementsofthe onah obligation,seeYehezkelMargalit, OntheDispositiveFoundationsoftheObligationofSpousalConjugalRelationsinJewishLaw, 18JewishL.Ass’n Stud161 (2008)(hereinafterMargalit, OntheDispositive).
9 Foradiscussionoftheappropriateintention,seeJeremyCohen, IntentioninSexualRelations AccordingtoTwelfth-andThirteenth-CenturyRabbinicalOpinion, 13Teudah155 (1997) (Heb.).
10 See DanielBoyarin, CarnalIsrael:ReadingSexinTalmudicCulture (1995);ibid, UnheroicConduct:TheRiseofHeterosexualityandtheInventionoftheJewish Man(1997);DavidBiale,ErosandtheJews:FromBiblicalIsraeltoContemporary America (1997); SexualityandtheFamilyinHistory:CollectedEssays (IsraelBartal& IsaiahGafnieds., 1998)(Heb.); IshayRosen-Zvi,DemonicDesires:“YetzerHara”and theProblemofEvilinLateAntiquity(2011).
articles.11 Myobjectiveinthischapteristoexplorethehalakhicpublicregulation ofspousalmaritalrelations,asdistinctfromtheprocreationalaspectofthe first commandmenttobefruitfulandmultiply,whichisdiscussedinChapter 5. 12 Differentiatingbetweenthesetwocommandments – theobligationofsexualrelations andtheobligationtoprocreate – hasthreemainimplications.
First,thevastmajorityof poskim (halakhicdecisors)13 contendthatthe onah obligation(thehusband’sconjugalobligationstohiswife)isindependentofthe possibilityofthewifeconceivingasaresultofthesexualrelations.Therefore,the conjugalobligationappliesevenifthewifeisbarren,pregnant,orpostmenopausal andthusunlikelytoconceive.14 Afurtheraspectofthisdistinctionisthatahusband whohasalreadyful filledthecommandmenttoprocreatemustcontinuetocarryout his onah obligationtowardhiswifeevenwhenthecoupleisbeyondreproductive ageandthereisnopossibilityofherconceiving.15 Second,asIsoondiscussat length,ahusbandandwifemaymutuallywaivethe onah obligation,oralternatively, thewifemayrenouncethisright,whereasrefrainingfromful fillingthecommandmenttoprocreateisprohibited.Third,becausethe onah obligationisunrelatedto thecommandmenttoprocreate,thehusbandmayfulfillthisobligationwithout engaginginfullsexualrelations.
Since,ontheonehand,the onah obligationneednotresultinprocreationandits outcomeisnotimportant,thehusbandmayfulfi llhisobligationtowardhiswifeby meansofsuchphysicalintimaciesaskissingandhugging,withoutengaginginfull sexualrelations.16 Ontheotherhand,thecommandmenttoprocreate,tobefruitful
11 ForadiscussionofthegeneralJewishattitudetowardssexuality,see ShmuelBoteach, KosherSex (1998); StephenG.Post, EncyclopediaofBioethics,s.v. “sexuality, Judaism” (2004). Seealso JewishExplorationsofSexuality(JonathanMagoneted., 1995); YakirEnglander,SexualityandtheBodyintheNewReligiousZionist (2015). ForadiscussionofacomparativestudyofChristianity’sapproachtotheprocreationaspectof sexuality,whichisbeyondthescopeofthepresentdiscussion,see JeremyCohen,“Be FertileandIncrease,FilltheEarthandMasterIt”:TheAncientandMedieval CareerofaBiblicalText(1989).
12 See PT Ketubot 5:7.Foradiscussionofthecentralityandimportanceofthiscommandment, see RonitIrshai,FertilityandJewishLaw:FeministPerspectivesonOrthodox ResponsaLiterature225 (JoelA.Linsidertrans., 2012)andtheotherreferenceslistedin Chapter 5 ofthisbook,n.9.Thereisacleardichotomyamong poskim withrespecttothe commandmentregardingthespousalsexualrelationshipandthecommandmentregardingits procreationalimplications,whichareactuallytwoseparateandindependentcommandments. See, e.g.,thecommentaryMaggidMishnehonMaimonides, Ishut 15:1
13 See EliyaRabbah, OrachChaim 240b;LeketYosher, OrachChaim 46;AfikeiMeginim, Orach Chaim 240a.
14 Maimonides, Ishut 15:1
15 MosheFeinstein,Resp.IgrotMoshe Evenha-Ezer vol. 1 ch. 102 (1959).
16 Thisdistinctionhasalreadybeendiscussedbyseveralprominent aharonim,suchas Haimben MordehaiSofer,Resp.MahaneHaim OrachChaim vol. 2 ch. 41, 129 (1963); Avraham S.BenMoshe,Resp.KtavSofer Evenha-Ezer ch. 102 (1960);RabbinicalCourt(TelAvivJaffa) 4237/1952 Anonymousv.Anonymous 1 PDR 340, 344 (unpublished, 1953); Avrohom Y.Karelitz(HazonIsh)&YaakovKanievsky, HolyLettersfromtheOutstanding RabbisoftheGeneration8 (1968)(Heb.).
andmultiply,necessitatesthepossibilityofimpregnatingthewife,whichcannot occurwithoutfullsexualrelations.17 Iwishtosuggestameta-halakhicexplanationfor thosetwoseparateobligationsintermsoftwogoalsofmarriage:(1)love,partnership, andspousalrelations,whichareembodiedinthe onah obligation;and(2)creatinga legalmechanismforbegettingandraisinglegitimatechildren,asisexploredin Chapter 5 ofthisbookandwhichisrefl ectedintheprocreationobligation.18
Thischapterfocusessolelyonexploringthescopeofthehusband’sobligationto havemaritalrelationswithhiswifeandnotonthemirrorimage,thewife’sobligationtowardherhusband.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatthereisnoexplicit mentionofthewife’sobligationineithertheBibleortheTalmud.Itisdeduced onlyfromadiscussioninTractate Nedarim thatawomancannotrefusetoallowher husbandtocohabitwithher,assheisunderobligationtohiminthisregard accordingto halakhah.Inotherwords,anyattemptonheraparttocircumvent herobligationbymeansofanoaththatthehusbandisnotallowedtoenjoyhaving maritalrelationswithherisinvalidbecauseofherobligationtohim.19 Theonly possiblesolutionforhertocircumventherobligationisforhertovownottoallow herselftoenjoyhavingmaritalrelationswithherhusband,andifthehusband wishestohaveconjugalrelationswithher,hemust fi rstannulhervow.Several rishonim (earlyhalakhicauthorities)pointedoutthatthebride’sobligationtoward thegroomregardingtheirconjugalrelationsisadirectderivativeoftheJewish nissuin andthespousalrelationship(zikatishut).20
Inaddition,thereisawidelyacceptedunderstandingamongthe aharonim (later halakhicauthorities),suchasNaftaliZ.BerlinofVolozhin,thattheobligationofa wifetoherhusbandmeansthatsheisobligatedtohavesexualrelationsonlywithhim andnotwithstrangers.21 Itshouldbenotedthatseveralscholarsaswellarguethat obviouslythebrideisnotliterally “enslaved” toherhusband.Theyprovethisbythe factthattheentiremonetary “transaction” inthe kiddushin ceremonyinvolvesa minimalsumofmoney(shvepruta)thatthegroomgivesthebride.Thefactthatthe transactioninvolvestheminimumavailablecoinclearlyreflectsthesymbolicnature
17 Foradiscussionofthisview,see,e.g., YosefC.benEliyahu,Resp.RavPealim Orach Chaim vol. 3 ch. 10 (1980); AvrahamZ.benEliezerPerlemuter,Resp.DamesekEliezer Evenha-Ezer ch. 92 (1905).Forasummaryoftheopinionsof poskim concerningthispoint,see Otzarha-Poskim vol. 20, 40a–b(2001).
18 See YosefB.Soloveitchik, TheMarriage,in FamilyRedeemed:EssaysonFamily Relationships31 (DavidShatz&JoelB.Wolowelskyeds., 2000).
19 BT Nedarim 81b,andcomparewiththeparallelsinBT Nedarim 15b;BT Ketubot 71b.
20 ForthisobligationthatisaderivativeoftheJewish nissuin,seeNovellaeofHa-Rashbaon Tractate Nedarim 15b,s.v. “ ve ’amarRavKahana” ; CommentaryofAvrahamMinHaHar ibid,s.v. “vechiha” (1962).
21 See NaftaliZ.Berlin,Resp.MeshivDavar vol. 4 ch. 35 (1968). Seealso NovellaeofHaRashbaonTractate Gittin 75a,s.v. “tmiaa” ; ChaimSofer,Resp.MachneChaim EvenhaEzer vol.2 ch. 44,s.v. “ vegammesvara ” (1963); YosefS.Natanson,Resp.ShoelUmeshiv3rd ed.,vol. 3 ch. 9 (1973); Ben-ZionM.Uziel,Resp.MishpateiUziel Evenha-Ezer vol. 5 ch. 49 (1964); KopelKahana,TheTheoryofMarriageinJewishLaw101–23 (1962).
ofthe “transaction” and “acquisition, ” indicatingthatthewifeisnotanacquisitionof goodsbythehusbandintheusualsenseofatransactionfortheacquisitionofgoods.22
Thehusband’sobligationtohaveconjugalrelationswithhiswifeisanchoredin the onah commandment.AsIproveshortly,thetraditionalhalakhicdetermination seestheelementof onah asmandatory,arigidhalakhicandbasicobligationowed byahusbandtohiswife,fromwhichthehusbandcannotbeexempted,eitherby mutualagreementbetweenthepartiesorbyaunilateralstipulationonhispart.This traditionalapproachisexpressedinthedeterminationoftheBabylonianTalmud, whichchosethe onah astheprototypeforanyattempttostipulatewithregardtoan obligationthatoriginatesintheTorah.Anysuchstipulationwillbevoidsinceit comeswithinthecategoryof “onewhostipulatesaboutwhatiswritteninthe Torah. ” Perceivingthe onah obligationasoneofthethreebasicTorahobligations ofahusbandtohiswifeisawell-acceptedpremiseintheTalmud,asexpressedin thefollowingdiscussionintheBabylonianTalmud:
RavAddathesonofRavIkareplied:Whenwesaythatwhereastipulationismade tobreakaninjunctionlaiddownintheTorahtheconditionisvoid,wereferfor instancetoastipulationtowithholdthefood,raimentandmarriageduty(conjugal rights/onah)[ofamarriedwoman],whereitisthemanwhonullifiesthe injunction.23
Indeed,anyonefamiliarwiththehalakhicworldhasencounteredthewidely acceptedhalakhictheme,whichIdiscussshortlyandwhichisre flectedinthe BabylonianTalmud,thatthe onah obligationinthetraditionalJewishmarriageis regardedasaprototypeofanobligationwrittenintheTorah.Assuch,itisrigid,has severalbindingaspects,andisnotsimplyadispositiveobligation.Therefore,any attempttostipulateinitsregardisdoomedtofailurefromtheoutset.
Thispremisewasreinforcedparticularlyduringthetimeofthe rishonim ,manyof whompointedoutthecentralityandimportanceofthe onah obligationinexplainingwhyanyattempttowaiveitisvoid,sinceitistheheartofanyJewishmarriage: onah isthe “essenceofmatrimony,”“theessenceofTorahmarriage,”“marital relationsaretheessenceofmarriagefromtheTorah.” Inaddition,thisunderstandingisanchoredintheauthoritativehalakhiccodices,boththeMishnehTorahof Maimonidesandthe ShulhanArukh, 24 thatanyattempttowaivethisobligationis rejectedfromtheoutset,includingaunilateralstipulationbythehusbandtoexempt himselffromthe onah obligation.But,inmyopinion,anin-depthandthorough rereadingofthehalakhicliteraturethroughoutthegenerations,includingboththe
22 Foradiscussionofthevariousaspectsofthissymbolic “acquisition,” see HanochAlbeck, TheSixOrdersoftheMishnah SederNashim Kiddushin 1:1 (2ded., 1955)(Heb.).Fora moreextensivediscussionoftheseaspects,see YaakovNeubauer,TheHistoryofMarriage LawsinBibleandTalmud (1994)(Heb.).
23 BT Gittin 84b.
24 See,respectively,Maimonides, Ishut 6:9–10; ShulhanArukhEvenha-Ezer 38:5
TannaiticandAmoraicliteratureandparticularlythePalestinianTalmudand medievalliterature,willyieldafarmorecomplexpicture.Thisdifferentand suprisingpicturecouldchallengethestablehalakhicpremisethatthe onah obligationisabindingandunchangeableone.
Ihavedevotedthe fi rstsectionofthischaptertoabriefexplorationofthemain differencebetweenJewishlawandcivillawwithrespecttoregulatingacouple’ s maritalrelations: halakhah regardsitselfasajurisdictionthatregulatesallaspectsof therelationship,includingintimatemaritalrelations,whereascivillawprefersto minimizetheregulationofintimatespousalrelations.Inthesecondsection, Iexaminethevariousbindingaspectsofthe onah obligation,whichsuggeststhat thehalakhicobligationisinfl exible,derivingfromthestatusofmarriageasa religiousinstitution.Thisapproachwould primafacie blockanypossibilityofprivate contractualarrangementsinitsregard.Inthethirdsection,whichisthecoreofthis chapter,Iattempttoilluminatethevariousdispositiveaspectsofthe onah obligation foundintheearlysources.Theseaspectsformabasisforgivingamarriedcouplea measureofcontractualfreedomtomakeprivatecontractualarrangementsfor regulatingtheirintimaterelations.Thisreviewofearlysourcesdemonstratesthat thereareconsiderabledifferencesofopinionswithregardtothepossibilityofusing privateratherthanpublicmeanstoregulateintimaterelationsbetweenacouple.
WhiletheBabylonianTalmudisconsistentwiththehalakhicapproachthatviews thedutyof onah asa fi xed,infl exible,bindingdutythatisnotsubjecttoprivate stipulation,theapproachofthePalestinianTalmudisdifferent,regardingitasan areathatmaybegovernedbyfreecontractualagreements.Justasthemonetary aspectsofthemaritalbondaresubjecttochangebymutualagreement,theintimate relationshipbetweenacouplemayalsobechangedbymutualagreement.Inthe fourthsection,Iexamineanotherpossiblehalakhicdevice,whichwhilenotentirely uprootingthe onah obligation,enablesthewifetowaivethisrightbygivingthe husbandadispensationtemporarilyorpermanentlynottoperformthisobligation. Afterward,inthe fifthsection,Idiscussthehalakhicfoundationsofthepossibility thatawifegivespecialpermissiontoherhusbandtorefrainfromful fillinghis onah obligationinaprenuptialagreementthattheysignbeforetheweddingorevenina postnuptialagreementafterthewedding.
1thedifferencebetween halakhah andcivillaw
Oneofthemostbasicandcentraldifferencesbetween halakhah andmodern, liberalcivillawisconceptualizingtherelationshipbetweenapersonandhisor hersovereignintotallydifferentrhetoric.WhereasJewishlawstructurestherelationshipbetweenanindividualandhisorherCreatorintermsofduties,civillaw conceptualizestherelationshipbetweenindividuals,orbetweenindividualsanda sovereignintermsofrights.Toputitdifferently,in halakhah peopleaskthemselves whataretheirdutiesinthisworld,whereasincivillawpeopleprimarilyhaverights
andtheroleofthelawistoprotecttheirhumanrights.25 Likewise,conjugal relationsandtheconsequentprocreationandraisingofchildrenarereferredtoas halakhicobligationsthatarebindinguponallJews,apartfromcertainexceptions. Civillaw,ontheotherhand,viewsthefamilycellfromtheperspectiveofthe individual,withtheinstitutionofmarriagebeingprimarilyahumaninstitution, basedonanautonomousrelationshipbetweentwoequalindividuals.Becauseof thisapproach,thepossibilityofmarryinganddissolvingthemarriageisregardedas oneofthemostbasicrightsintheWesternworld.
Butinspiteofthedramaticchangeintheapproachofthecivilcourtsinthelast decade,andtheirgrowingrecognitionofthedifferentcontractsthatcouplesmay sign,theystillobstinatelyrefusetoaddressagreementsorcontractsdealingwitha couple’sintimaterelationsandtheresultingfertilityissues.Thisapproachcanbe deducedfromvariousincidentalremarksinjudgmentshandeddownintheUnited States26 thatclearlyindicatetheextenttowhichthecourtsappeartoavoidany involvementinsuchmatters.27 Indeed,Ihavefounditdifficultto findprecedentsin legaldatabasesfortheuseofcontractstogovernconjugalrelations,thusconfirming LauraP.Graham’sclaim28 thatshefoundveryfewprecedentsinthisregardinthe UnitedStates.Therearealsofewacademicdiscussionsonthissubject.29 Inthis
25 See MosheSilberg’sseminalarticle, LawandMoralsinJewishJurisprudence, 75Harv.L.Rev. 306, 311 (1961)(“thelawitselfdoesnotonlyorderrelationshipsbetweenmanandmanbutalso betweenmanandGod.Thesysteminitsentiretyisreligiousinoriginandthereforeinvolves obligationstoGod.”). Seealso PamelaLaufer-Ukeles, Gestation:WorkforHireortheEssenceof Motherhood?AComparativeLegalAnalysis, 9DukeJ.GenderL.&Pol’y91,125–26(2002); Margalit, OntheDispositive, supra note 8,at 164–66
26 See Caseyv.PlannedParenthood, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
27 Foracademicdiscussionsoftherightsoftheprisonertointimaterelationsandartificial inseminationandtherightofthestatetolimittheseprivilegesforsecurityreasons,andso on,see,e.g.,AdamM.Breault, “Onan’sTransgression”:TheContinuingLegalBattleover Prisoners’ ProcreationRights, 66AlbanyL.Rev.289 (2002);RichardGuidice, Procreationand thePrisoner:DoestheRighttoProcreateSurviveIncarcerationandDoLegitimatePenological InterestsJustifyRestrictionsontheExerciseoftheRight?, 29FordhamUrbanL.J 2277 (2002); RachelRoth, NoNewBabies?:GenderInequalityandReproductiveControlintheCriminal JusticeandPrisonSystems, 12Am.U.J.GenderSoc.Pol’y&L.391 (2004).
28 See LauraP.Graham, TheUniformPremaritalAgreementActandModernSocialPolicy:The EnforceabilityofPremaritalAgreementsRegulatingtheOngoingMarriage, 28WakeForest L.Rev.1037 (1993).ProfessorGrahamcitesonlyoneruling,whichdealswiththehusband’ s claimthathedoesnothavetopayalimonytohisformerwife,assheviolatedtheircontract dealingwiththefrequencyofintimaterelations; see Favrotv.Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La.Ct. App. 1976).
29 Tothebestofmyknowledge,thereareveryfewscholarlyarticlesthatdealwiththeregulation ofintimaterelationsbetweenspouses. See thefollowingseminalworks:GreggTemple, FreedomofContractandIntimateRelationships, 8Harv.J.L.&Pub.Pol’y121 (1985); Lenore J.Weitzman,TheMarriageContract:Spouses,Lovers,andtheLaw ch. 10 (1987); LaurenceDrewBorten, Sex,Procreation,andtheStateInterestinMarriage, 102(4) Columbia L.Rev.1089 (2002);JolineF.Sikaitis, ANewFormofFamilyPlanning?TheEnforceabilityof No-ChildProvisionsinPrenuptialAgreements, 54Cath.U.L.Rev 335 (2004);KaiponaneaT. Matsumura, PublicPolicingofIntimateAgreements, 25YaleJ.L.&Feminism159 (2013).
chapter,Iexplore halakhah’scomprehensiveandthoroughpublicregulation ofmaritalrelations,but firstIbeginbysheddinglightuponthebindingaspects oftheintimatespousalrelationship,atleastasregardsthehusband’sobligation towardhiswife.
2thebindingaspectsofthehusband’sconjugalduty Elsewhere 30 Ihavepointedoutthat halakhah regulatesintimaterelationsnarrowly, obligatingthehusbandtohavesexualintercoursewithhiswife.Thehalakhic requirementsare fixedandinflexibleandaretreatedasanabsolutelegal “debt” thatmustbe “paid” atclear,rigid,and fixedtimes,asinanyotherlegaldebt.31 The etymologyoftheHebrewword “onah” meansbotha fi xedtimeandtorture, implyingthatthehusbandmust fixtimes(onah)forintercourse,oralternatively, thatthehusbandmaynottorturehiswifebydenyingherintimaterelations.The frequencyofintercourseisafunctionofthehusband’soccupationandtheamount oftimehespendsathome,asdeterminedintheMishnahin Ketubot 5:6:
ThetimesforconjugaldutyprescribedintheTorahare:formenofindependence, everyday;forlaborers,twiceaweek;forassdrivers,onceaweek;forcameldrivers, onceinthirtydays;forsailors,onceinsixmonths.Thesearetherulingsof R.Eliezer.32
ThisTannaiticsourceformallyandrigidlyregulatesthefrequencyofahusband’ s halakhicobligationtoengageinconjugalrelationswithhiswife.However,theseare also flexibledeterminationsthatdependuponthehusband’soccupationandthe amountoftimehespendsathome.Allmeninaparticularcategoryaretotally obligatedtothisspecificfrequencyofmaritalrelationswiththeirwives.The continuationoftheMishnahrevealsadditionalaspectsofthe onah obligationthat areincumbentuponthehusbandasstrict,bindingobligations,allowingnofreedom ofactionforthecoupletomakespecialconditions,andcertainlynotallowingthe coupletorefrainfromsexualintercourse.TheMishnahcommencesbynegatingthe rightofthehusbandtomakeanoathdenyinghiswifeanybene fitfromhim,which ofcourseincludessexualrelations.TheMishnahthenestablishesthemaximum periodthatahusbandmaydenyhiswifesexualrelationsbeforeheisforcedto divorceherandpayherthefullsumwritteninthe ketubah.Finally,theMishnah alsoestablishesamaximumperiodthatahusbandmaybeawayfromhomewithout
30 See Margalit, OntheDispositive, supra note 8,at 167–70 andmoreextensivelyin Margalit, PublicRegulation, supra note 8
31 Foradiscussionofanethicalapproachtowardthisobligation,see Tur, OrachChaim 240:1. Iassumethatthe Tur’ssourceisthecommentaryofRabbeinuYonahbenAvrahamofGerona onMishnah Avot 2:12
32 Formoreinformationonthefrequencyofthe onah obligationfordifferentoccupations,see Margalit,PublicRegulation, supra note 8,at 45–57
hiswife’spermission.Thatis,thelengthoftimethehusbandmaybeawayfrom homeandthusnotcarryouthis onah obligationtowardhiswife:
Ifamanforbadehimselfbyvowtohaveintercoursewithhiswife,BethShammai ruled:[shemustconsenttothedeprivationfor]twoweeks;BethHillelruled:[only for]oneweek.StudentsmaygoawaytostudytheTorah,withoutthepermission [oftheirwivesforaperiodof]thirtydays.33
Inmyopinion,onemayinferfromthisdisputeandfromotherTannaiticsources thatitisnormativeforahusbandto apriori vownottohaveintercoursewithhis wife.Theabove-mentioneddisputerevolvesonlyaroundthequestionofthe maximumperiodoftimeamanmayvownottohaveintercoursewithhiswife. BethHillelmaintainsthatitshouldbenolongerthanoneweek,butBethShammai disagreesandextendsthetimetotwoweeks.Inanyevent,allagreethatifthe husbandabstainsforalongerperiodoftime,heshouldbecoercedtodivorcehis wifeandpayherthemarriagesettlementinher ketubah.ThefollowingTalmudic sourcealsoteachesusabout halakhah’srigidapproachtothe onah obligation. ItstatesinBT Ketubot 62bthatawomenispresumedtoalwayspreferahusband whostaysathomewithher,andthuscarriesouthis onah obligations,toahusband whoisoftenawayfromhomeanddoesnotcarryouthis onah obligations.Thisis trueevenwhentheabsenthusbandismakingalotofmoney:
SaidRabbahsonofR.HanantoAbaye:What[isthelawwhere]anass-driver becomesacamel-driver? – Theotherreplied:AwomanprefersoneKabwith frivolitytotenKabwithabstinence.34
Thus,withoutmutualspousalagreementand/orthewife’spermission,orher renouncingherconjugalright,itisforbiddentoevenpartiallyreduceherfull conjugalright,evenifthehusbandisearningmuchmoremoney.TheTalmud makesapresumptionthatisrelevanttoallwomen – theirpreferencethattheir husbandsspendmoretimeathomeratherthanearnmoremoney.
Tosummarizethissection,itmaybededucedfromseveralTalmudicdiscussions thathalakhicmaritalrelationsarearigidobligationofahusbandtohiswife.They arethusabindingandnotonlydispositiveelementofeverydayJewishspousallife. Bycontrast,InowexploreotherTannaiticandAmoraicsourcesthatofferatotally differentunderstandingofthe onah obligationandviewitasapurelydispositive one.Thesesurprisingdiscussionsindicatethatthereisroomin halakhah forprivate orderingofmaritalrelations,andthefrequencyoftheserelationsmaybechanged andreducedoreventotallyeliminated,instarkcontrasttothesourcespresentedin thissectionandto halakhah
33 Mishnah Ketubot ibid.Formoreinformationaboutoverridingthe onah obligationbymeansof differentsortsofoaths,see Margalit,PublicRegulation, supra note 8,at 15–27
34 See extensively Margalit,PublicRegulation, supra note 8,at 15–27, 27–39, 39–45
3“conditional”marriage–“youarebetrothed tomeonconditionthatyouhavenoclaims ofconjugalrights”
3.1 TheTannaiticPeriod – IsThisIndeedaConditionThatIs ContrarytoTorahLaw?
Evenifwefollowthegenerallyacceptedopinioninrabbinicliteraturethatthe onah obligationisabiblicalobligation,therearediscussionsinanumberofTannaitic sourcesastowhether,incertaincontexts,onecanmakeconditionsthatdepartfrom Torahlaw.BelowisaTannaiticsourcethatiscitedintheBabylonianTalmudand dealswithadisputebetweenR.MeirandR.Judahregardingwhichofahusband’ s obligationstohiswifearesubjecttonegotiationandmayevenbenulli fied:
Ifonesaystoawoman, “Behold,thouartbetrotheduntomeonconditionthatthou hastuponmenoclaimsofsustenance,raimentandconjugalrights,” sheis betrothed,buttheconditionisnull;thisisR.Meir’sview.R.Judahsaid:Inrespect ofmoneymatters,hisconditionisvalid.35
ThedisputebetweenR.MeirandR.Judahregardingthepossibilityofmaking conditionsregardingclothingandfood,whichare financialmatters,isobvious,since thedisputerevolvesaroundthequestionofwhetheronemayormaynotmake conditionswithrespectto financialconditionsthatarenotinaccordancewitha Torahruling.IpresentananalysisofR.Judah’spositionwithregardtothevalidityof conditionsrelatingtothe onah obligation,sinceinallthecitationsintheBabylonian TalmudofthismajorTannaiticdispute(Kiddushin 19b; BavaMetzia 51b, 94a; Bava Batra 126b),R.Judah’spositionisunclear,andwedonotknowwhathisopinionis regardingthepossibilityofmakingconditionswithregardtothisobligation.Thereare halakhicauthoritieswhoclaimthatR.Judah’spositionof “[i]nrespectofmoney matters,hisconditionisvalid” (bedavarshebemamontnaokayam)showsthathe distinguishesbetween financialconditions –“clothingandfood”– wherehediffers fromR.Meir,andholdsthattheconditionsarevalid,butthathedoesnotregardthe onah obligationasa fi nancialmatter.Wecanacceptthispositionofthehalakhic authoritiesthatR.Judahdoesnotregardthe onah obligationasa financialmatter sinceifR.Judahhadbeenoftheopinionthatthe onah obligationtooisa financial matterandthehusbandmayindeedmakeconditionsinitsregard,itwouldhavebeen sufficientforhimtostateonly “hisconditionisvalid” (tnaokayam).36
Thewidelyacceptedopinion,anchoredintheauthoritativehalakhiccodices,as mentionedabove,37 followstheapproachofR.Judahthatthe onah isabinding
35 BT BavaMetzia 94aandintheparallelsources.
36 See, e.g.,thecommentaryParashatha-MelekhonMaimonides, Ishut 6:10; OvadiaHadaya, Resp.YaskilAvdi Evenha-Ezer vol. 7 ch. 20 (1931).
37 See thesourceslistedin supra note 24
elementoftheJewishmarriageandisanunchangeableobligation.However, theTorahmaybesuccinctinoneplaceandmoreexpansiveinanotherplace. TheanswertoourinvestigationofwhatexactlyisR.Judah’sopinionmaybefound inthewordingofthetextoftheToseftain Kiddushin:
[Ifhesays] “Iherebybetrothyou onconditionthatifIdieyoushallnotbe subjecttoleviratemarriage,” sheisbetrothed,andtheconditionisvoid,ashehas contractedoutofaLawcontainedintheTorah,andwhenanyonestipulatesoutof aLawcontainedintheTorah,theconditionisvoid.[Ifhesays] “onconditionthat youhavenoclaimagainstmeforfood,clothing,orconjugalrights,” sheis betrothed,andtheconditionisvalid.Thisistheprinciple:Contractingoutofa LawcontainedintheTorahastoamonetarymatterisvalid,butastoanonmonetarymatterisvoid.38
ThisToseftacomparesandcontrastsaconditionwhoseaimistosaveawomanfroma leviratemarriageshouldherhusbanddiewithoutchildren – aconditionthatisinvalid becauseitcontradictsaTorahlawandseekstonullifythelawofaleviratemarriage –withaconditionthataimstoexemptahusbandfromhisobligationsoffood,clothing, and onah,aconditionthatmaybeupheldbecauseitdoesnotcontradictaTorahlaw. Inotherwords,theTosefta’sapproachisnotinaccordancewiththegenerally acceptedhalakhicopinion,includingthatofthe amoraim intheBabylonian Talmud,whichregardstheattempttocancelthe onah obligationasanexampleof aconditionthatcontradictsaTorahlawandpresentsanopposingapproach.
AccordingtotheTosefta,notonlyisthe onah obligationnotincludedamongthe conditionsthatcontradictTorahlaws,butalsoitispresentedasadifferentcase, whichisspecificallyexcludedfromthatcategory.Fromthecombinationofthetwo rulingsintheToseftaandthefactthattheyarepresentedtogether,wecanassume thatinR.Judah’sopinion,whichispresentedwithoutattributioninthesecondpart oftheTosefta,andinlightoftheinternalexplanationoftheTannaiticsources attributedtoR.Judah,the onah obligationisadispositiveobligation,andmaking conditionswithregardtothisobligationisasvalidasmakingconditionswithregard
38 Tosefta Kiddushin (Liebermanedition) 3, 7–8.TheTosefta’sversion,whichappearsinthetext above,istheversionofthepassageintheErfurtmanuscriptoftheToseftaandintheprinted editions.Earlyrabbinicauthoritieswhoacceptthisversionofthetextinclude HaimBenIzhak, OrZarua Piske BavaMetzia vol. 3, 301 (1862).TheparallelsourceinPT BavaMetzia 7:7 (11c)omitsthewords “andtheconditionisvalid,” andtheyarealsoomittedintheLeiden manuscript.However,both SaulLieberman&EliezerS.Rosenthal,YerushalmiNeziqin71(2008) (Heb.)andJ.N.Epstein, SeferHa-Ma‘asimLi-VneiEretzYisrael, 1Tarbiz33, 40 (1930)(Heb.)supporttheversionpresentedinthetext.Forotherdocumentationofthis version,see SaulLieberman,ToseftaKi-fshutah:AComprehensiveCommentaryon theToseftaTractateKiddushin947 n.27 (1973). Foranacademicdiscussionofthis importantsource,seeBernardS.Jackson, MishpatIvri,HalakhahandLegalPhilosophy: AgunahandtheTheoryof “LegalSources, ” 1 JewishStudies,anInternetJournal 69, 88 (2002);ibid, AgunahandtheProblemofAuthority:DirectionsforFutureResearch, 1 Melilah 1, 8 (2004); Jacksonetal., supra note 1,at 64–65
tofoodandclothing.Tosummarize,thequestionofwhetheritispossibletowaive thehusband’ s onah obligationtowardhiswifeisdisputedbytheTosefta,andthere definitelyisnotaconsensusthatitisabindingelementregardingwhichno conditionsmaybemade.
3.2 TheAmoraicPeriod – Is Onah aDispositiveObligation?
3.2.1
AfterestablishingthatinTannaiticsourcesthe onah obligationisregardedas dispositiveandnotbinding,Iwishtodemonstratethatthereisadisagreement betweenthetwoTalmudsonthisissue,andincontrasttotheacceptedhalakhic opinionbasedupontheBabylonianTalmud,thePalestinianTalmudandapparentlythePalestinianMidrash,Bereshit(Genesis)Rabbah,39 followtheapproachof theTosefta,astheygenerallydo.Indeed,anexaminationoftherelevantreferences inthePalestinianTalmudrevealsthatinonecase,theTalmudcitestheTosefta, andintwoothercases,itappliesthisunusualapproachasnormative.Ibeginmy discussionwiththesourceinthePalestinianTalmudthatisbasedontheMishnah in BavaMetzia 7:11,thesameMishnahthatservesasthebasisfordeterminingthat thelawsofguardianshipofobjectsrestondispositiveprinciples.Theguardianis entitledtoestablishthelevelofguardianshipoftheobjectforwhichheisresponsibleandtousetheappropriatecategoryfromthecategoriesde finedintheTorah.40 Theuniquenessofthissourceisthatanonymouslyandunanimouslyitdictatesthe basicthemeofourentirediscussion – thatinnonmonetarymatters,anystipulation againstwhatiswrittenintheTorahisinvalid,whichismentionedelsewhereonlyin thenameofRabbanShimonbenGamliel.41 ThetextinthePalestinianTalmud regardingtheaboveMishnahreadsasfollows:
39 ItshouldbementionedthatMidrashBereshit(Genesis)Rabbah,whichwasredactedafterthe redactingofthePalestinianTalmud(apparentlytowardtheendofthe fifthcenturyCE)isan earlymidrashicworkoriginatinginPalestine, see YonahFrankel,TheWaysofthe MidrashandtheAggadah vol. 1, 6–7 intheintroduction(1991)(Heb.).Rashi,inhis commentarytothePentateuch(Genesis, 47, 2),callsthisMidrash, “agadatErez-Israel ” ; ZechariahFrankel,IntroductiontotheJerusalemTalmud51, 2 (1967)(Heb.)commentedthatmanyofthe “aggadot’” thatappearinthePalestinianTalmudappearinthe midrashicworks,especiallyinBereshitRabbah.Thisisalsotheopinionof HanochAlbeck in theintroductionto GenesisRabbah67 (1965)(Heb.).HeclaimsthattheredactorofBereshit RabbahreliedheavilyonthePalestinianTalmud.Icanthereforeconcludethatthereisan additionalearlysourcethatdemonstratesthatthetraditioninPalestinewastorecognize conditionsthatnullifiedthevariousobligationsincumbentuponthehusband,includingthe dutyof onah
40 Foramoreextensivediscussionofthepossibilityofaguardian fixingand/orchangingthelevel ofhisorherguardianship,see BaruchKahane,BailmentLaw (1998)(Heb.).
41 Mishnah Ketubot 9:1
ThestipulationofanybodywhostipulatesagainstwhatiswrittenintheTorah,etc. Itwasstated: “Thestipulationofanybodywhostipulatesagainstwhatiswrittenin theTorah,monetarystipulationsarevalid,non-monetarystipulationsareinvalid.” Howisthis?Ifonesaidtoawoman:bepreliminarilymarriedtomeoncondition thatyouhavenoclaimonmeforsustenance,clothing,andmaritalrelations,42 she ispreliminarilymarried[andhisstipulationisvalid.43 onconditionthat]ifIdieyou shallnotbeobligatedforleviratemarriage,44 sheispreliminarilymarried45 buthis stipulationisinvalid.46
ThisappearstobeadirectquotationoftheToseftain Kiddushin,exceptforthefact thattheexamplesarepresentedinreverseorder – food,clothing,and onah appearingbeforeleviratemarriage.Similarly,theassumptionunderlyinganother discussioninthePalestinianTalmudrefl ectsthesamenotion,thatnormatively speakingthehusbandhasthelegalcapacitytomakeconditionswithregardtohis onah obligation,andeventotallyannulit,inthesamewaythathemaymake conditionswithregardtohismonetary,food,andclothingobligations.The Mishnahin Ketubot 5:7 maintains, “Ifawiferebelsagainstherhusband,her ketubah maybereducedbyseven denarii aweek. ... Similarly,ifahusbandrebels againsthiswife,anadditionofthree denarii aweekismadetoher ketubah. ” ThisMishnahlaysdownthatawifewhorebelsandrefusestohaveintercoursewith herhusbandis finedseven denarii,tobetakenoutofher ketubah eachweek, whereasahusbandwhorefusestohaveintercoursewithhiswifemustaddthree denarii tothe ketubah eachweek.
42 IntheeditionofthePalestinianTalmudbyLieberman&Rosenthal, supra note 38,thetext reads “notsustenanceandnotclothingandnotmaritalrelations,” anadditionthatwas probablyaddedtoemphasizethatthehusbandwasexemptfromthesethreeelementsor becauseoftheinfluenceoftheparallelsinthePalestinianTalmud,suchasPT Kiddushin 1:2 (59c),PT Ketubot 5:8 (30b),andtheversioninSeferHa-Ma‘asim, supra note 38
43 InMs.Leiden,andintheVenetianeditions,thewords “andhisstipulationisvalid” (vetna’ o kayam)aremissing.But, Lieberman&Rosenthal,aswellastheversionofSeferHaMa‘asim, supra note 38,supportthisaddition,asdoes ZeevW.Rabinovitz,Notesand CommentsonYerushalmi493 (1940)(Heb.).
44 See therelevantdiscussionsbyYomTovIshbili(Ritba)inhisnovellaeon Ketubot, Bava Metziah,and BavaBatra andin Resp.Ritba ch. 117 (1959).Inthescholarlyliterature, Lieberman, supra note 38,suggestedthatRitbadidnotgivehisownopinionbutcopiedthis versionfromanunknownearliercommentator.Foradiscussionofthelimitsofspousal freedomofcontractregardingthestipulationthattheirmarriagewillbeatemporaryone,such asthestipulationthatifthehusbanddies,thebridewillnotbesubjecttoaleviratemarriage, seeextensivelyinChapter 4 ofthisbook.
45 InMs.Leiden,theword/s “sheisdivorced” (megoreshet)was/werewronglycorrectedbythe copyistorbysomeotheranonymousperson.(Liebermanassumesthatthischangewasmadeby thecopyist.)However,thisisactuallyawrongversionthatdoesnot fitthecontext.Infact,itwas eventuallyreplacedwiththeappropriateword/s “sheismarried” (mekudeshet),asin Lieberman&Rosenthal’seditionofthePalestinianTalmud, supra note 38.Forotherdocumentationofthecorrectversion “sheismarried” (mekudeshet),see ShimonbenTzemachDuran, Resp.Tashbetz vol. 2 ch. 17,s.v “tshuvapliaa” (1998).
46 PT Ketubot 7:7 (11c).
Wethusarepresentedwithanapproachwherebyahusbandcanmakeconditions regardinghis onah obligationorevennullifyit,inthesamewaythathecanmake conditionsornullifyhismonetaryobligationsoffoodandclothing.ThePalestinian Talmudin Ketubot 5:8 presentsR.YosibarHanina’sexplanationthatbecauseawife mustundertakesevendifferenthouseholdtasks,shethereforepaysa fi neofseven denarii perweek,whereastherebellioushusbandwhodoesnotfulfillhisthree obligationstohiswife(food,clothing,and onah)paysthree denarii perweek.The PalestinianTalmud fi ndsthisapproachproblematicandaskswhatwouldhappenin thecaseofacouplewhodidnothavetheseobligations.Forexample,ifthewife broughtfemaleslavestodothehouseworkorthehusbandhadalreadynullifi edhis threeobligations,wouldwenot finethem,andifnot, “whatisthepointofthe rabbinicaldecree?”
Thinkofit(agahatzmecha),47 ifshebroughthimslaves,sheisnotobligatedfor anything!Thinkofit,ifhestipulated[thatheisnotobligatedfor]either se ’ er,or dress,or onah, 48 heisnotobligatedforanything!49
ThisbasicassumptionalsoappearsinthePalestinianTalmudin Kiddushin 1:2 (59c),but firstwithanobjectiontothisapproach:50
Butdidwenotstate:Apersonmaymarryawomanandstipulatewithherthatshe havenoclaimonhimforfood,clothing,ormaritalrelations?Oneunderstands foodandclothing.Butaremaritalrelationsnotapersonalmatter?HiyyabarAda said,explainitforanunderagegirl.
47 Incidentally,itshouldbenotedthatinthePalestinianTalmud,theterm “consider” (agah atzmecha)generallyappearsintheimperativeform; see AlexanderKohut,ArukhhaShalem vol. 4, 108,entry “ yga ” (1955).However,inourcontext,itwouldbemoreappropriate totranslatethetermasanexpressionofsurpriseandnotasacommandorexplanation,as pointedoutby LeibMoskovitz in TheTerminologyoftheYerushalmi:ThePrincipal Terms,intheentry “agahatzmecha’”(2009).The firstexplanationofthetermisappropriatein mostcases.
48 Meiri,BeitHa-BehirahinhiscommentaryontheMishnahinBT Ketubot 63awritesthat “onah” shouldbeomittedfromthispassagesinceitwaswrittenherebymistakefollowingthe generaldiscussionoftherebellioushusband,whichisgenerallyassociatedwiththesexual relationship.
49 ThispassagefromthePalestinianTalmudwascitedin TeshuvotHakhmeiProvence ch. 73 (AvrahamSofered., 1967)withaminorchange.
50 YissacharTamar,AleyTamaronSederNezikin406,s.v. “beonah” (1983)suggeststhat sincetractates BavaKama, BavaMetziah,and BavaBatra inthePalestinianTalmudwere writtenandredacteddifferentlyfromtheothertractatesinthePalestinianTalmud,asconcludedbyvariousTalmudicresearcherssuchasYaakovZussman,MosheAssis,andothers.Itis suggestedthatthismaybeanothercontradictionintheredactingofTractateNezikinandthe redactingoftheothertractatesofthePalestinianTalmud.Foracademicsupportforthisclaim, see SaulLieberman,TheTalmudofCaesarea (1931)(Heb.).Clearlyitisdifficultto reconcilethisexplanationwiththeabove-mentioneddiscussioninPT Ketubot,orperhapsit isanotherexampleof “contradictorydiscussions” (sugyotmuhlafot),whichwillbediscussedin Chapter 3 ofthisbook,n.113
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CHAPTER IV
Y F walked straight down the hill to her doom. She had no Spanish silk umbrella, like Cartouche’s, to shield her head from the tempest, nor any strength, like his, to dare orthodoxy. She wore only a simple cloak and hood, like “Red-riding-hood the darling, the flower of fairy lore;” and that was quite insufficient to protect her from the wolf.
At the door of the “Hôtel” her father met her, distraught and nervous. He led her, his lips quivering, into the little side study which he called an ante-room. He was obviously, pitifully, agitated.
“Where have you been?” he said. “But no matter, since you are here. Yolande, the moment has come when you must decide.”
“Decide, father?” She trembled.
“Whether,” he answered, “you will bow to my earnest wishes, or commit me to dishonour and the grave.”
She felt suddenly faint, and sat down in a chair.
“Father!” she whispered; “I don’t understand you.”
“I am only too easily understood,” he said. “The Marquess di Rocco, who holds my very existence in the hollow of his hand, renews his suit at this moment, and peremptorily.”
“I cannot marry him.”
“Wait, before you condemn me, me, your father, to worse than death. I must be plain with you, Yolande, in this terrible crisis. I do not plead my word to him, although you as a de France should appreciate its inviolability. It is associated with other pledges which, in default of your consent, would mean my instant ruin. I owe him money, Yolande, which it is impossible for me to repay—money borrowed chiefly to enable you, my daughter, to maintain the condition which is your due. You alone have it in your power to liquidate that debt.”
She did not speak. She could not, indeed. But he gathered a little confidence from her silence.
“And after all,” he said, with a sickly smile, “one can conceive a less attractive way out of an impasse. Riches, position, a princely jointure, an alliance with the most powerful house in Savoy, whereby our own would be enabled to recover its lost influence—are these small considerations to be discarded for a personal sentiment, which a month of such devotion would cure?”
She shuddered, repeating, “I cannot marry him.”
“On the other side,” he hurried on, ignoring her words desperately, “utter material ruin and, what is worse to me, my word, my honour foresworn. Listen, Yolande. In that very hour when you become, if you will become, his wife, he settles his entire property upon you by will. You will be the most influential woman in the duchy, a force for the good which is so dear to your heart. Is to put this in your power the act of a libertine, or of one rather who yearns to find his redemption at the hands of a virtue which he holds so inestimably dear?”
She cried out at last, rising from her seat and staggering as if she were blind.
“Father! father! give me time at least!”
Even in her despair she knew that it were useless to plead how her heart, her soul were engaged elsewhere. The shock, at this pass, would have driven him to a very frenzy of cruelty. As it was, he leapt to the little concession implied in her appeal, and sought to improve upon it instantly.
“Impossible. He is on the very eve of a journey. He demands the ceremony at once—this moment.”
“The ceremony? O, mother of God!”
“A formal one only, conditionally, for a year. Not till that time has elapsed may he claim you for his wife in fact. It was my provision, made in consideration of your youth and inexperience.”
She stared at him as if mad.
“You are my father,” she began. He interrupted, to better her,—
“Your dead mother’s trustee for your welfare, Yolande. As I hold that charge sacred from abuse, believe at least in the sincerity of my desire to urge, impartially, upon you the wisdom of a step which I am sure she would have approved.”
The girl gave a little rending laugh—horrible—in a note quite foreign to her.
“Is he—M. di Rocco—in the house?” she asked.
“He is in the next room awaiting us. The Maire, the notary, and the good Father of Le Marais are also there, attending on your decision.”
“Only my mother is wanting,” said Yolande. “Call her to this conspiracy against her child, and see what she answers to the impartial head of it.”
He had turned his fine eyes from her, even as, it is said, the royal despot of beasts will cower under the fearless human gaze; but at this the goaded fire flashed into them.
“She would answer,” he cried, “cursing the graceless offspring of our house, who could so misread a father’s tender love.”
“No, father, she is in heaven. The secrets of our hearts are bared to her.”
He cringed before her for a moment, defeated and exposed. Looking in her noble eyes, he knew that his moral tenure of her heart, her duty, hung upon a thread—knew that nothing but the last poignant threat of self-destruction could restore them to him. His stately cowardice had even foreseen this contingency.
“You leave me no alternative,” he said, his face as grey as ashes. “I cannot survive dishonour and my broken word. Thus, Yolande, do I take your message to her!” and with the word he fetched a pistol from his pocket and put its muzzle to his temple.
She uttered a fearful scream, and flew to him—wrenched down his arm, cried, and fondled him with inarticulate moans. He stood quite passive.
“Give me time!” she could only sob at last.
“I can give you nothing, Yolande,” he answered. “Yours is all the gift. I am a bankrupt but for you.”
He made a movement as if to break from her. She held him madly. In that minute the whole joy of life drained from her veins and left them barren. At length she released him, and stepped back.
“Father,” she said, “in all your life never mention my mother’s name to me again. When I die, bury me away from her in another grave. I am only worthy to be your daughter. Deal with me as you will.”
A double rose of colour had come to his cheeks. He made an eager step towards her, but she retreated before him.
“It is enough for me that you have vindicated your name,” he said. “It is enough that I am not mistaken in you.”
“Spare me that comment on my shame,” she said. “Why will you keep me in this torture?”
But he must still hunger to justify his self-degradation by enlarging on it.
“Hush!” he said. “It is a sacrifice, I know; but perhaps, Yolande, only a provisional sacrifice. Dare I whisper my own expectations? You will be free for a year—a wife in nothing but the material endowments of wifehood; a—a prospective dowager, Yolande. The Marquess is much shaken—a prematurely old man—a—”
She turned from him, feeling sick to death.
“I am waiting,” she said icily.
* * * * * * * *
That was how the Marchese di Rocco gained his wife. For the rest, the priest, the Maire and notary were creatures of his own, and among them soon accomplished the ceremony and settlements. At the end, monsignore offered to kiss his newly-made bride; but she backed from him.
“Is this in the bond?” she asked coldly of her father. He was very righteous and peremptory at once.
“It is a breach of it,” he said. “I must ask you, monsignore, to observe our compact to the letter.”
The old libertine grinned.
“A pledge only, to be redeemed in a year,” he said. “But it will keep, sweet as roses in a cabinet. In the interval, I hope the Marchesa will honour my poor abode, during the absence of its master.”
“No, pardon me,” said de France. “She will continue in her father’s house.”
“I shall do neither,” said the lily.
“How!” cried the Chevalier.
“I am my own mistress,” she said. “From this moment please do not forget that—” and she swept from the room.
He stared after her, dumbfoundered; but di Rocco burst into a great laugh.
“By God, I like her spirit!” he said. “She is a prize worth the winning.”