Introduction: Setting the Agenda
Abstract The introduction sets the aims of the book. It discusses the current state of research, focusing in particular on the nascent study of Islamophobia in Poland. The introduction also considers the rationale for the book and its methodology and summarises its added value. It also discusses the structure of the book and explains the aims of individual chapters. It also introduces the main line of argumentation of particular chapters and discusses the major conclusions.
Keywords Refugee crisis · Nationalism · Islamophobia · Poland · Qualitative research
The aim of the book is to explore the attitudes towards the migrants and refugees from MENA in Poland in the context of the vernacular understanding of the Polish nation and national boundaries. My point of departure is the brief analysis of the so-called migration crisis of 2015–2016 and the reaction to it on the part of the EU and Polish governments. I focus primarily on the analysis of the Polish right wing, which identifed refugees with Muslims who allegedly posed a threat to the Polish nation. The analysis of this Islamophobic discourse, which gained hegemonic status, sets the background for the main aim of the book, namely, the exploration of lay views on refugees in the context of the EU relocation plan. In other words, I am interested in how ordinary people perceived refugees, what they thought about Poland accepting refugees,
© The Author(s) 2019
K. Jaskułowski, The Everyday Politics of Migration Crisis in Poland, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10457-3_1
and to what extent they reproduced, negotiated or contested hegemonic Islamophobic discourse. I analyse their attitudes towards refugees in the context of the lay understanding of Polishness, Polish national identity and the logic of inclusion into and exclusion from the Polish nation. In my analysis, I rely on 191 individual semi-structured interviews that were carried out in 2015–2017 in Wrocław, Opole, Wałbrzych and four smaller cities and towns, whose names I do not disclose due to confdentiality concerns (Surmiak, 2018). Additionally, I also draw on two group interviews conducted with twelve inhabitants of Wrocław.
The book on the one hand fts into the study of the lay understanding of the nation and nationalism (Bonikowski, 2016; Fox & MillerIdriss, 2008; Skey, 2011). On the other hand, it deals with the question of attitudes towards Muslims, because informants identifed refugees mainly with Muslims. The book is therefore part of a wider stream of research on contemporary Islamophobia (Bobako, 2017; Ekman, 2015; Pratt & Woodlock, 2016; Saeed, 2016). Most of the research on anti-Islamic prejudices focuses mainly on the Western world (Bobako, 2017; Narkowicz & Pędziwiatr, 2017a, 2017b). However, as post-colonial studies demonstrate, one cannot assume in advance that the West is a universal norm, that the West is a reference point for other regions which, after all, have their own history, specifcity and determinants (Mayblin, Piekut, & Valentine, 2016). In my work, I analyse the specifcity of Islamophobia in Poland using the example of attitudes towards refugees. Regarding the criticism of methodological nationalism, I do not assume, however, that this specifcity is conditioned by the national context (Wimmer & Schiller, 2002). I suppose that there are a number of different factors, both national and global, local and transnational that shape Islamophobia in Poland. My book is the frst systematic qualitative analysis of bottom-up reactions to the so-called migration crisis in Poland, though, of course, there has been some research on the attitudes towards immigrants and refugees, including Muslims. However, these studies have been dominated by three main approaches.
First, the question of the attitude towards refugees, as well as Polishness and national identity, was the subject of public opinion polls, for example, those conducted by the Center for Public Opinion Research (CBOS, 2015, 2016). However, quantitative opinion polls have a number of disadvantages. They assume that there is a public opinion, i.e., that people have well-defned and consistent views (Bourdieu, 1993; Kilias, 2004). However, people’s views are often contradictory,
fragmented and inconsistent. In short, quantitative public opinion polls do not refect the complexity of human beliefs and views. Public opinion polls impose categories and structures on experiences, giving minimal opportunity to obtain insight into the vernacular interpretation of social reality. For example, it would appear that the category of immigrant is quite obvious, but the informants tend to understand it in a specifc way. They commonly identifed immigrants with refugees, Arabs, Syrians and Roma (interviewers usually used the pejorative term ‘Cygan’, Dźwigol, 2007), but not, for example, with the Japanese. Allegedly under the infuence of media images, some interviewees started to use the word ‘immigrant’ to refer not to all foreigners but only to those whom they regarded as radically different, having low social status and threatening ‘us’ Poles. Therefore, although they regarded Japanese as culturally different, they do not view them as immigrants due to their high social status and high level of human capital (directors, managers). In contrast, the informants counted Roma as immigrants, overlooking the fact that Roma have lived in Poland for centuries, because they associated them with radical cultural and racial difference, unemployment and crime. In short, quantitative research does not allow the capture of nuances and contradistinctions among lay categories and provides poor insight into the reach meaning ordinary people attach to social reality.
The second dominant trend is the analysis of the media (e.g., Bertram, Puchejda, & Wigura, 2017; Pędziwiatr, 2017; Skorupska & Mordacz, 2017), intellectual discourse (commentaries and academic works, e.g., Bobako, 2017) and political discourse (e.g., politicians’ speeches, Cap, 2018; Krzyżanowska & Krzyżanowski, 2018; Krzyżanowski, 2018). These studies often bring valuable fndings, and I will draw on them intensively later in my book. However, this type of analysis also has its limitations. This approach generally focuses on topdown analysis of high profle media. Not only does it overlook more pop-cultural channels (e.g., Majewski, 2015, 2017) but it sometimes implies naively that media is akin to a ‘conveyor belt’ for directives from the top of the state, as if the ideas formulated, for example, by politicians or journalists are neatly translated into everyday practice or passively consumed by their recipients. In other words, studies on media or politicians do not say much about the discourse reception in everyday life. Referring to critical media theory (Hall, 1980, 1994), this book relies on the assumption that people are active agents capable of modifying, transforming and resisting media and offcial discourse according
to their own interests and aims (Jaskulowski & Majewski, 2016, 2017). This is an assumption that recipients must be treated as active agents who do not always reproduce offcial discourse and who are also capable of negotiating and contesting it. Thus, drawing on various reports and secondary sources in my book, I analyse the hegemonic discourse on the so-called migration crisis and refugees. Then, I explore how the hegemonic discourse works in everyday life: how ordinary men and women defne national boundaries in relation to refugees, to what extent they reproduce, contest or negotiate dominant anti-Muslim images, and what they think about the EU relocation programme. At the same time, I am not interested in individual differences and individual interpretations but rather in wider socially shared patterns of reproduction, negotiation and contestation of hegemonic discourse (Hall, 1980).
The third approach is an attempt to explain Islamophobia in Poland in the context of structural and historical processes. Thus, referring to the theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, Bobako (2017) claims that Islamophobia is the by-product of the semi-peripheral status of Poland in the global economic system. In short, looking from a broad structural–historical perspective, she argues that Islamophobia is an ideological expression of the structural dependence of Poland on the core Western economies. Anti-Muslim feelings are based on ressentiment, which is a form of false consciousness: it masks the inferior status of Poland by diverting attention from the real problems generated by neoliberal capitalism, such as growing precarity or reduced public social spending. While I do not deny the necessity for such broad historical–structural analyses, my book focuses more on the micropolitics of Islamophobia. I build here on pioneering research on everyday Islamophobia in Poland conducted by such scholars as Narkowicz and Pędziwiatr (2017a, 2017b). The macro-structural approach does not explain how the Islamophobic discourse is constructed from the bottom-up and is rooted in the day-to-day experiences of ordinary people. I am starting from the ontological assumption that, ultimately, all social structures are maintained and modifed in everyday interactions, which are worth analyses on their own (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).
There are also various journalistic commentaries on discourse about refugees. Although they sometimes offer interesting insights, they do not rely on systematic observations and most often they present a very simplifed picture of Polish society, which does not stand up to the confrontation with empirical data. For example, one of the most often
repeated misleading interpretations speaks about the confict between a liberal Poland and a conservative Poland, i.e., an open, well-educated, metropolitan middle class and a socially excluded, low-waged, narrowand closed-minded and uneducated class of villagers and inhabitants of small towns who are susceptible to various populists and xenophobic discourses (Jaskulowski & Kilias, 2016).
My book addresses the yet unexplored issue of Islamophobia in Poland in the context of a vernacular understanding of the Polish nation and national boundaries. I examine this issue using the example of the attitudes of ordinary people towards refugees. I present my analyses in six chapters. In Chapter 2, I briefy discuss the theoretical framework of the book. I explain how I understand the concept of nation and nationalism because these two concepts constitute the main axis of my book: the subject of my analysis is the relationship between the understanding of the Polish nation and the construction of the image of the Other. I do not assume in advance that Poles are different from refugees and that difference generates prejudices. I am interested in how this difference is produced and understood. I refer to the constructivist theory of nationalism, which says that the category of nations does not refer to real, clearly bounded, durable social groups with discrete cultural identities (e.g., Anderson, 1991; Billig, 1995; Brubaker, 2004; Hall, 2017; Jaskulowski, 2009; Kamusella, 2016; Skey, 2011). Following constructivist theory, I assume that a nation is not some social Ding an Sich but that it is the process of a cultural constructing of social reality (Jaskulowski & Majewski, 2016, 2017). In other words, nationalist practices and discourses organise social reality around the concept of a nation that is imagined as a clearly bounded sovereign social entity and the basic source of individual identity. Although the meaning of the nation is the site of symbolic struggle, it is not completely fuid since it is stabilised by hegemonic discourses. Following Hall (1980, 2017), I stress the importance of bottom-up analyses: how these hegemonic meanings are reproduced, negotiated and contested in everyday life. The chapter also discusses in more detail the methodology and social context of the research, e.g., sampling, the kind of interview questions asked and the basic social characteristics of the research site.
In Chapter 3, I set the broader political context for my analysis. I briefy discuss the causes and the course of the so-called migration crisis, which began in 2015. I analyse ‘the migration crisis’ in the context of the growing tendency to see immigrants as a threat to national
security in the EU. I argue that the ‘migration crisis’ is actually a crisis of the EU, which has itself contributed to it with its securitisation policies. The EU has not been able to develop a humanitarian, solidarity-based and sustainable approach to migrants. I then discuss the Polish government’s stance on the EU refugee relocation programme (the key element of EU policy and the main matter of controversy in Poland) and the public and political discourse on refugees. On the basis of reports, politicians’ speeches and secondary sources, I analyse how politicians stirred up a moral panic related to refugees and how the Islamophobic rhetoric of fear gained hegemonic status in Poland. This hegemonic Islamophobic discourse largely reproduces Oriental ideas about Muslims, constituting a kind of pathological Europeanisation of the Polish public sphere. However, it also draws on earlier anti-Semitic ideas and substitutes a Muslim for a Jew: the fgure of the Muslim plays a similar role to that of the earlier fgure of the Jew, namely, it performs the function of a threatening other. I also briefy discuss the popular version of Islamophobia in the form of hip-hop music. I show the paradoxical nature of this phenomenon that I call hegemonic contestation: on the one hand, hip-hop music gives young people a sense of protest, while on the other hand, it reproduces hegemonic Islamophobia under the guise of rebellion against mainstream culture.
The next four chapters are devoted to the bottom-up analysis of Islamophobia in the context of a vernacular understanding of the Polish nation and national boundaries. I draw here on interviews with people who have high Polish national capital, and I try to give voice to the informants themselves to show how they construct the Polish nation and speak about refugees in their own words. Thus, in Chapter 4, I analyse the lay conception of the Polish nation and the vernacular understanding of various dimensions of Polishness, the criteria for inclusion into and exclusion from the Polish nation, as well as the general attitude towards migrants. The main thesis of this chapter is that the Polish nation is defned mainly in cultural terms. The state is understood as an emanation of a culturally understood nation: the public sphere should refect the domination of Polish culture, traditions and symbols. However, I argue that the way in which national culture is understood makes the national boundary rather impermeable. Thus, although the Polish nation is defned in cultural terms, it bears a similarity to a closed ethnic one. The dominant way of interpreting Polish culture makes it easily susceptible to anti-immigrant mobilisation. I show that attitudes
towards migrants are shaped not only by the logic of cultural nationalism but also by neoliberal discourse. The interviewees divide migrants into more and less desirable categories depending upon their perceived cultural proximity and how large their store of human capital is.
Chapter 5 analyses attitudes defnitely hostile to refugees, reproducing to a large extent the hegemonic Islamophobic discourse (I call these informants the rejectors). The chapter explores the various interconnected and mutually reinforcing dimensions of Islamophobia. Thus, the rejectors viewed refugees as a terrorist, public order, demographic, economic, cultural and political threat. I argue that Islamophobia is a selective and cultural racism that is linked to cultural and ethnic nationalism. However, I show that we cannot reduce all the voices against refugees to ethnic nationalism, distinguishing liberal Islamophobia as well. Unlike the dominant trend in the literature comparing Islamophobia to anti-Semitism (Bobako, 2017; Linehan, 2012; Narkowicz, 2018), I also show the importance of anti-Tsiganism. The rejectors tried to understand the nature of Muslim refugees by referring to their local experiences with Gypsies. I argue that Islamophobia must be understood as a complex phenomenon shaped both by right-wing hegemonic discourse and by local and transnational factors such as social remittances (i.e., stereotypes and prejudices circulating across national borders). Particularly Islamophobic were young people who, paradoxically, at the same time believed that they were rebelling against the mainstream culture, a kind of paradoxical hegemonic contestation. Young people also do not trust offcial media. Although they often rely uncritically on allegedly more authentic and trustworthy social media, they were convinced that they have the necessary skills to assess media credibility, which I call incompetent competences.
Chapter 6 is unfortunately the shortest chapter in the book. At this point, I analyse the attitudes of interviewees who unequivocally support the reception of Muslim refugees (I call them the welcomers). Sadly, there were very few such votes. Generally, refugees were welcomed by interviewees who distanced themselves from the category of the nation and stressed the importance of individual or universal identity, blurring national boundaries. Though the chapter on Polishness shows that many interviewees attached great importance to Catholicism, the welcomers did not evoke religion at all to justify their stance towards refugees. Among the welcomers, no one has invoked the authority of the Church either. It appears that Catholicism is of great social importance as
a marker of the national boundary but that its ethical message is weakly internalised. In other words, it was not Catholicism that determined the welcomers’ positive attitude towards refugees. Interestingly, while welcomers supported the EU relocation plan, no one has invoked the pragmatic reasoning that Poland should fulfl its international obligation. In this chapter, I distinguish three discourses about refugees, which I name accordingly: open borders, humanitarianism and multiculturalism. I also discuss the problems connected with these discourses, namely, utopianism, the treatment of refugees as passive victims of war who need humanitarian aid, the reproduction of some Islamophobic stereotypes, and boutique multiculturalism. I argue that even the welcomers are not free from hegemonic ideas and do not take into account the fact that refugees have agency and seek not only humanitarian aid but also rights and effective protection of those rights.
Chapter 7 concerns the informants who held an ambivalent position towards taking refugees (I call them ambivalents). This chapter builds on previous fndings and necessarily contains some repetitions. The ambivalents did not unambiguously oppose the reception of refugees, nor did they speak out unequivocally in favour. Ambivalents referred to Islamophobic discourse, as they see Muslims as a threat to the Polish nation. At the same time, however, they resorted to humanitarian discourse. On the one hand, they were afraid to accept refugees, but on the other hand, driven by empathy, they wanted to help them. They referred to the media images of threatening refugees, but they also expressed doubts as to whether they were not being manipulated by the media. Generally, they seemed not to have access to alternative sources of knowledge about refugees. Some of the interviewees were unable or unwilling to make a clear decision on whether or not to accept refugees. I am analysing here attitudes that are usually hidden in opinion polls under the heading ‘I do not know’ or ‘it is diffcult to say’. These responses hide complex meanings that escape quantitative surveys. Other ambivalents formulated various reservations and conditions under which Poland could take refugees. For example, the ambivalents said that only a small number of refugees could be admitted, preferably families or Christians, implying that Muslim men are troublesome. In a word, on the one hand, they reproduced Orientalist and racist stereotypes of Muslim refugees, while on the other hand, they tried to distance themselves from the atmosphere of fear and even resort to universal humanitarian discourse.
The book ends with conclusions that focus on three issues. First, I sum up and discuss the dominant lay understanding of Polishness, showing its susceptibility to anti-immigrant mobilisation. I argue that, due to its closed nature, the dominant understanding of Polishness can easily be used to stir enmity towards immigrants. I claim that although the dominant approach is not openly racist, it is easily reconcilable with cultural racism. Polish nationalism is not unequivocally racist, but it has the potential to be racist towards selected groups. Second, I focus on the main elements of the anti-Muslim discourse in the context of literature on Islamophobia in Poland and in other countries. I draw attention, in particular, to the necessity to analyse the reluctance to accept Muslims in the local context. Third, I consider the prospects and possibilities of changing attitudes towards refugees who must be seen as right holders and some practical proposals for policies targeting potential refugees. I hope that the next election will bring a change of government and Poland will ultimately accept its responsibility and take refugees and create conditions for their full participation in social and political life.
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CHAPTER 2
Preliminaries:
Nationalism Without Nations
Abstract This chapter presents the theoretical and methodological framework of the book focusing on the concept of nationalism and nation. It draws on the constructivist theory of nationalism. It assumes that a nation is not a cohesive and real group with clear boundaries, but a set of signifying practices and discourses. It argues that a nation is a social construction, the meaning of which is an object of symbolic struggle. The meaning of a nation is stabilised by hegemonic discourses. Hegemonic discourses, however, are not only reproduced but also negotiated and challenged in everyday life. The chapter also discusses the research methodology. It also introduces the context of the research, focusing on the basic social conditions of the localities where the interviews were conducted.
Keywords Nationalism · Nation · Constructivism · Qualitative research
2.1 IntroductIon
The aim of this chapter is to present the theoretical and methodological framework of the book. The chapter focuses on the concept of nationalism and nation, which are the main axes of the book. The starting point is the criticism of the traditional theory of nationalism focused on the question of the origins of nations. I draw on the constructivist theory
© The Author(s) 2019
K. Jaskułowski, The Everyday Politics of Migration Crisis in Poland, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10457-3_2
of nationalism, arguing that a nation must be understood as a process of cultural construction, not as an enduring social entity that has a similar ontological status to the natural world ‘out there’. In other words, nationalist practices and discourses organise social reality around the concept of a nation. A nation is imagined as a social group with clear boundaries, identity and political rights. However, the meaning of the nation is the subject of constant symbolic struggle, negotiations and contestation. Thus, although hegemonic discourses stabilise the meaning of the nation, its meaning is always susceptible to change. I also assume that we cannot assume from the outset that the way that the elites defne a nation determines how the category of nation functions and how it is understood in everyday life by laypersons. Consequently, I assume that so-called ordinary people are active agents that are capable not only of reproducing but also of negotiating and contesting hegemonic messages. The chapter also aims to discuss the methodology of my research, including ethical issues. In the last part of this chapter, I also discuss the social context of the research, i.e., I provide basic information about the cities and towns where the interviews were conducted.
2.2 understandIng natIonalIsm
Nationalism studies traditionally have focused on the processes of nation formation. The main disputes concerned the question of how and when nations came into being, as well as the question of continuity between nations and preceding communities (Jaskulowski, 2009; Lawrence, 2005; Özkirimli, 2010; Smith, 1998, 2001). On the one hand, modernists argued that nations emerged together with modernisation processes such as state-building, urbanisation, mass communication, industrialisation, capitalism or democratisation (e.g., Deutsch, 1966; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Tilly, 1992). For example, Gellner (1965, 1983) argued that the emergence of nations was the result of public education, which was an imperative of industrial society. At the same time, he stressed that nations are a radically new phenomenon without any links in pre-modern social groupings. As he wrote, ‘nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist’ (Gellner, 1965, p. 168). Ethno-symbolists, on the other hand, indicated that nations have a much longer history and that their origins should be sought even in pre-modern times (Guibernau & Hutchinson, 2004; Leoussi & Grosby, 2007; Smith, 1986, 2009). For instance, Smith (1986) argued that nations
were based on pre-modern ethnic groups (ethnies). Thus, according to him the process of modernist transformation involves turning ethnic groups into fully fedged nations. However, due to the persistence of ethnic cultural traditions (myth-symbol complexes) the emergence of nations was a continuous and gradual process that did not pose a radical break with the pre-modern period. On the margins of this discussion were primordialists who, contrary to the vast majority of researchers, persistently and unsuccessfully tried to argue that the nation is something natural that is simply ‘out there’ and deeply rooted in human nature (Coakley, 2018; Isaacs, 1975; Özkirimli, 2010; Smith, 1998).
Despite the differences between modernists’ and ethno-symbolists’ theories, they share a similar perspective on nations. Both modernists and ethno-symbolists focus on macro-analyses of broad historical and structural processes (e.g., capitalism or industrialisation) and of large social structures that are durable and solid sociological entities (Billig, 1995; Edensor, 2002; Jaskulowski, 2009). They tended to treat nations as Durkheimian social facts, i.e., as realities external to individuals, that exert pressure on individuals. Referring to the terminology of Lakoff and Johnsen (1980), one can say that their theories are based on a more or less clear ontological metaphor of the nation as a thing. It is also clear that modernists and ethno-symbolists see nationalism (understood as movement and ideology) in terms of the attempts to establish a nation-state. They have no interest in nationalism in stable, so to speak, ‘fulflled’ nation-states. From this perspective, nationalism becomes a research problem only in situations where the national movement seeks to create a nation-state, where the existing political order is contested and its legitimacy is questioned. Thus, as for example Billig (1995) rightfully argues, researchers show limited interest in the question of how the ‘national’ character of established nation-states is naturalised and reproduced on a daily basis.
It was constructivists who proposed going beyond historical discussions about the origins and beyond the attempt to fnd a universal causal theory explaining the origins of nation-states (Billig, 1995; Brubaker, 2004; Edensor, 2002). The constructivist approach to nationalism is my theoretical starting point. However, I do not refer to any specifc theory of nationalism. Drawing on such authors as Billlig (1995), Brubaker (2004) and Hall (2017), I rather make some assumptions, which I treat as sensitising concepts (Blumer, 1954). In other words, my method is more inductive than deductive, and the considerations and conceptual
categories discussed here play an introductory and guiding rather than strictly defnitional role. I presume that nationalism is not so much a coherent ideology or a political movement striving to create its own state but a certain ‘politically relevant cultural construct’ (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 428). Nationalism is about a cultural construction of social reality focused on the concept of a nation. I reject ‘defnitional ontology’ in not trying to answer what a nation truly is: nations are not really existing and clearly bounded social groups, some social Ding an Sich, having permanent and stable identities, but rather cultural, discursive and affective practices (Bonikowski, 2016).
In other words, I assume that the concept of nation does not involve some ‘ontological collectivism’ (Wimmer, 2008, p. 981); it does not refer to some sociological reality, but a set of practices and discourses that construct social reality as naturally divided into nations. Nationalism presupposes that the social reality consists of clearly defned nations, which have their own distinct and easily discernible identity, and which also constitute the only legitimate source of political power. It claims that individuals are, above all, homo nationalis (Balibar, 2002; Jaskulowski & Majewski, 2016, 2017). The nationalist construction of reality inevitably includes the division of reality into ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Strømsø, 2018; Triandafyllidou, 1998). Thus, my book focuses on the construction of national boundaries using the example of attitudes towards refugees. I do not assume in advance that Poles are different from refugees, which is the cause of resentment and prejudice, but I am interested in how this difference is produced and what it tells us about the folk understanding of the Polish nation.
It should be underlined that in the light of the theoretical perspective adopted here that the category of nation does not refer to a social stasis but to a dynamic process of giving meaning to social reality, which is the subject of continuous struggle, contestation and negotiation in everyday life (Hall, 2017; Jaskulowski & Majewski, 2017). A number of researchers stress that minimal research is done into the bottom-up understanding of a nation (Skey, 2011; Strømsø, 2018). Most studies appear to address the top-down construction of a nation. For example, although the aforementioned Billig (1995) criticised theories of nationalism for overlooking the daily reproduction of national identity, his analysis of banal nationalism in the press had little to say about its reception in everyday life. To some extent, my book combines both perspectives,
top-down and bottom-up. It tries to fll a gap since ‘the connection between political discourse and everyday nationalism remains undertheorised (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 443). The concept of hegemony is useful here: I assume that some political actors have more power to defne social reality than do others and can impose their defnition of social reality (Hall, 2017; Jaskulowski & Majewski, 2017). Thus, in the next chapter, I analyse the Polish government’s policy towards refugees, as well as the political and public discourse constructed difference between us Poles and then refugees. ‘However’—as Wimmer (2008, p. 995) rightly points out—‘we should not overstate the hegemonic power’. As he further explains, ‘While powerful actors can make their vision of the social world publicly known and consequential for the lives of all, subordinates may develop counter-discourses’ (Wimmer, 2008, p. 995). Following critical media theory, I assume that meaning is never stable and fxed (Hall, 1980). The people have agency and they are capable of transforming, negotiating and challenging hegemonic meanings according to their interests and needs (Majewski, 2013). Thus, the analysis of hegemonic discourse is only a baseline against which I explore the vernacular construction of refugees in the context of lay understanding of the Polish nation.
Most of the research on the vernacular understanding of the nation focuses on various types of minorities (Skey, 2011). In contrast, I am interested in how the nation and national boundaries are constructed by people belonging to the titular nation. My research concerns a quite specifc moment, which is diffcult to consider as a settled time (Bonikowski, 2016). As we will see, the rhetoric of the ‘migration crisis’ has been used by right-wing politicians to stir up a moral panic around allegedly threatened national security. The public and political discourse created an atmosphere of increased awareness and importance of the national identity, which is a good opportunity to explore how ordinary people understand the category of the nation. As Bonikowski (2016, p. 429) pointed out, ‘such periods of heightened self-awareness bring to the surface latent tensions that pre-exist and succeed them’ (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 429). In other words, the time of the perceived national crisis was a kind of ethnomethodological experiment that undermined the self-evidence and taken-for-granted of the nation, breached the ‘natural order of the world’ and forced people to think about and reveal their understanding of the nation (Fox, 2017).
In contrast to analyses of everyday nationalism, which focus on national practices (how respondents talk with a nation, in what circumstances they implicitly invoke a category of a nation, e.g., Skey, 2011), I am primarily interested in what people expressis verbis say about a nation and what meaning they attach to this category (Strømsø, 2018). I concur with Bonikowski (2016, p. 435), who comments practice-based research on nationalism: ‘What these approaches do not directly confront, however, is what meanings the nation evokes when its salience increases. The nation as a symbolic, discursive, and cognitive category is not content-free’. As he further rightly explains: ‘What matters is not just when and why people think and talk with the nation, but also what the nation signifes to them and their communities’ (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 435). By examining various meanings people attached them to the nation, we can trace how symbolic boundaries are constructed and what (and how) particular categories of people are excluded from the nation (Bonikowski, 2016).
I assume that people are refective and have their own conception of social reality. However, their concepts cannot be seen in isolation; they must be seen in a broader context. I assume that people do not live in a social and political vacuum: what they think about nationhood and migration is to a large extent informed by hegemonic discursive structures (Hall, 1980, 2017).
2.3 note on methods
The work is based on individual semi-structured interviews conducted between 2015 and 2017 with Polish residents. Additionally, I also draw on two group interviews. The interviews were conducted by a team of researchers who were experienced in conducting qualitative research or research assistants who had received appropriate training. Interviewers had a list of issues to raise during the interview. However, the specifc form of the question, as well as the order in which the questions were asked, depended upon the dynamics of a given interview. The technique of semi-structured interviews was chosen due to its fexibility: it combines predetermined questions with open questions. Thanks to the open questions, informants had the opportunity to raise themes that were important to them (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2018). The questions revolved around several basic issues: the understanding of the Polish nation, the importance of national identity in relation to other social identities,
criteria for inclusion within and exclusion from the Polish nation, attitudes towards immigrants, and the potential inclusion of immigrants within the Polish nation.
I am aware that for many interviewees, these issues may seem abstract (Skey, 2011). Therefore, the conversation was initially about more concrete issues, such as, for example, everyday life, living conditions, the feeling of home, neighbours and the specifcity of the places they live and their inhabitants (Fox & Miller-Idriss, 2008; Strømsø, 2018). In this context, interviewees often mention issues related to the more abstract category of the nation. For example, they explain that the town is a typical place for Poland, or that people living here are just as Polish as they are anywhere else in the country. Then, the researchers explored these national themes and asked further questions, for example, about who was a Pole. As I have already explained, the questions were not focused on the issue of refugees but initially concerned the foreigners with whom the interviewees were confronted in their localities. However, the informants associated the word ‘immigrant’ with ‘Muslim’, which is most likely because the public debate on migration was dominated by the fgure of Muslim refugees. The issue of Muslim refugees appeared, as it were, spontaneously in the interviews; it was not imposed by the researcher and was often the main subject of interest for the informants. In sum, 191 individual interviews and 2 group interviews were conducted (with a total of 12 participants). Considering the standards of qualitative research, the sample is very large, which ensures that saturation has been reached (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006; Sim, Saunders, Waterfeld, & Kingstone, 2018). The selection of the participants was based on maximum variation sampling (Patton, 2002). Thus, the sample includes interviewees of both sexes. There were 104 women and 99 men among the informants, which refects the social structure of Polish society. The interviewees were also diverse with regard to age (ranging from 18 to 67 years old), education (primary, secondary, academic), occupation and place of living (metropolitan city, town or village). Interviews were conducted in Wrocław (44 individual interviews plus 2 group interviews including 12 participants), Walbrzych (50 individual interviews), Opole (50 individual interviews), and in fve smaller towns and villages, whose names I do not provide due to the need to maintain confdentiality (a total of 47 individual interviews). All the respondents were born in Poland and had Polish citizenship—as I said, I was interested in the views of people belonging to the titular nation. It should be
stressed, however, that in accordance with the qualitative methodology, the sample is not representative but purposeful. Therefore, according to the logic of qualitative research, the fndings cannot be extrapolated to the whole Polish population. The analyses presented in the book provide insight into the types of attitudes and arguments but do not allow us to draw conclusions about their percentage distribution in society.
In accordance with ethical standards, researchers obtained informed consent from each interviewee (Hammersley & Traianou, 2012; Surmiak, 2016). The participants were told that they did not have to answer all the questions and that they could withdraw from the interview at any time. All interviews, with the interviewees’ consent, were recorded and then transcribed. The transcriptions were also anonymised and saved on an encrypted disk. The interviewees allowed the use of the interviews for academic purposes under the condition that their identity would not be disclosed. Therefore, I am not giving out any real names of the interviewees. I also do not provide precise information on age, place of residence or type of education. In some cases, in order to avoid possible identifcation, I link different quotations together or attribute them to other people. Sometimes I change some details of the interviewees’ stories, not important enough to distort their meaning, but signifcant enough to make identifcation impossible (Caine et al., 2017). I attach great importance to anonymity and confdentiality, since the book concerns sensitive issues. Revealing interviewees’ identity can harm their personal or professional lives (Baez, 2002; Surmiak, 2018). For example, some interviewees openly expressed racist views or called for violence (here it should be added that, for ethical reasons, the questions were not intended to elicit racist views; such content was not intentionally provoked in interviews, but when it spontaneously appeared, it was queried by researchers, Fox & Mogilnicka, 2017). At the same time, however, interviewees occupy important professions, or even professions of public trust, such as serving as civil servants or teachers. While I personally regret and do not accept their racist views, my aim is not to stigmatise these people, but to understand their ways of thinking.
Regarding the analysis, my point of departure was open coding (Saldaña, 2012). Thus, at this frst stage of interpretation, I immersed myself in the interview data and made note of any themes and categories that seemed to appear in the data. Following the recommendations of Auerbach and Silverstein (2003), while making my coding decisions, I considered my research concern and theoretical frameworks. Thus, I was
interested in three general questions: How did the informants understand the Polish nation? What did they think about immigrants in general? What do they think about Poland accepting refugees? As a result of the initial coding, I obtained several dozen loosely related themes and categories, for example, the taken-for-granted character of Polish national identity, the emotional appeal of the Polish nation, the moral obligation to the nation, the distinctive features of the Polish nation, the idea of legitimate members of the Polish nation, and attitudes to immigration. In the next step, I conducted focused coding that aimed to merge themes and categories that seemed to be related. For example, I merged the abovementioned themes into one more general theme: understanding of the Polish nation. Consequently, I obtained four broad themes: understanding of the Polish nation, rejectors (those against taking refugees), welcomers (those supporting taking refugees) and ambivalents (those who have mixed feelings), which were divided into a few more specifc categories (for example, the theme rejectors contained more detailed categories referring to different kinds of threats refugees allegedly pose to the Polish nation). Then, I reread the interviews to confrm that my themes and categories accurately represented the interview data. In the course of the post-coding reading, due to its signifcance in the informants’ narratives and its relevance to my research concern, I decided to distinguish one more theme, namely, the links between refugees and Roma. Then, I used the themes to organise the structure of my book (Saldaña, 2012; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).
2.4 research context
As I have already mentioned, the interviews were conducted in various towns: Wrocław, Wałbrzych, Opole and several smaller towns and villages. The informants were not only differentiated in individual terms but also came from different social backgrounds. They came from dynamic metropolitan cities, which attracted migrants, as well as from economically stagnant or deprived towns and cities (Schiller & Çağlar, 2009). Let us discuss the specifcity of these localities since they constitute a context for the analyses carried out later in the book. All the locations have a similar geographical location: they are in south-western Poland (Lower Silesian and Opolskie Voivodeships). Before 1945, this territory belonged to Germany and was mainly inhabited by Germanspeaking or Silesian-speaking populations. After the end of WWII, it was
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death, 357
Frederick of Swabia, 209, 213, 218.
Frotmonde, 69.
Fulque, priest, 254.
Gaita, 24.
Galata, 273.
Galileo, 60.
Garnier, 144.
Gautier of Brienne, 327.
Gaza, 326.
Genghis Khan, 324.
Geoffrey, son of Henry II., 201.
Geoffrey de Sargines, 349.
Gerard, Master of Hospitallers, 157.
Gerard of Avernes, 141.
“German tax,” 246.
Germany, during crusades, 370.
Ghibelline, 334.
Gibbon, quoted, 79, 81, 89.
Gilbert, 172.
Godfrey of Bouillon, 8; career, 82 sq.; expedition, 86; relations to Alexius, 86; at Dorylæum, 97; Antioch, 107; straits, 113;
discretion, 120; services to Moslems, 121; attacks Jerusalem, 121 sq.; spoils, 133; Baron of Holy Sepulchre, 134 sq.; Ascalon, 136 sq.; quarrel with Raymond, 138; rule, 140; attacks Asur, 141; submission to Pope, 142; Assizes of Jerusalem, 142; death and character, 142, 143; assists Hospitallers, 157; gifts to Papacy, 371.
Godric, 146.
Golden Horn, captured, 273.
Gottschalk, 80.
Green, quoted, 21.
Gregory V., 45.
Gregory VI., 45.
Gregory VII. See Hildebrand.
Gregory IX., 300, 315, 316 sq., 322, 323; weakness, 374.
Grosseteste, Robert, 374.
Guelph, 334.
Guibert, antipope, 50.
Guibert, quoted, 77, 105.
Guiscard, Robert, 24, 83, 84, 247.
Guizot, quoted, 33, 37, 199; portrait of Richard I., 202;
of Louis VIII., 330
Gunther, 288, 289.
Guy d’Ibelin, 354.
Guy of Lusignan, 185, 188, 189; disregards oath, 214; maintains right to sceptre, 218; supported by Richard, 223; Cyprus, 228.
Hadrian IV., 201.
Hallam, quoted, 9, 11, 30, 34.
Hamah, 154
Hanifs, 52.
Hanseatic League, 378.
Harding, 147.
Haroun-al-Raschid, 55, 67
Hassan, 228.
Helena, 65, 133.
Henry, brother of Baldwin, 294.
Henry I., England, 21, 138, 164
Henry II., England, 34; crown of Jerusalem, 186; possessions, 199, 201; death, 201; relations to Philip Augustus, 206 sq.
Henry III., England, 331, 357.
Henry III., Germany, 46.
Henry IV., Germany, papal opposition, 23, 47, 49; relations to Godfrey, 82.
Henry V , Germany, 161
Henry VI., Germany, 232, 234, 237; in Sicily, 238; death, 240; “German tax,” 246.
Henry Dandolo. See Dandolo.
Henry of Hesse, 334.
Henry of Sicily, 247.
Heraclius, Greek emperor, 67, 133.
Heraclius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, 186.
Herbaud, 10.
Hezas, emir of, 121.
Hildebrand, 8, 39; reforms, 44, 46, 47; claims, 47 sq.; reliance on emperor, 49; bull against Henry IV., 49; negotiations with Greeks, 50; alliance with Saracens, 58; summons against the Turks, 62; sends Cencius on pilgrimage, 70.
Holy Lance, 114 sq.
Honorius II., 166.
Honorius III., 303.
Hospitallers, 156 sq.; Saladin’s revenge, 190; permitted to remain in Jerusalem, 193; rivalries, 236, 297, 367; refuse help to Frederick II., 318; overtures to Louis IX., 338, 355; at Mansourah, 345, 347.
Hovenden, quoted, 221
Hugh Capet, 33.
Hugh de Payen, 158.
Hugh de Puzas, 219, 232.
Hugh of Vermandois, 116, 140
Humphrey, 218.
Iconium, Sultan of, 170, 246.
Ida of Austria, 139, 140.
Ida of Bouillon, 8, 82.
“Il Consolato del Mare,” 379.
Innocent II., 162.
Innocent III., 253, 262; hastens crusaders, 265, 279; rebuke, 290; preaches fifth crusade, 301-303; guardianship of Frederick II., 313; absolute power, 374.
Innocent IV., 328, 329, 334, 357, 374.
Inquisition, 374.
Iolante, 314.
Ireland, time of Henry II., 200.
Irene, daughter of Isaac Comnenus, 247.
Irene, opinion of Alexius, 88.
Isaac, King of Cyprus, 222.
Isaac Angelus, 211, 212, 217, 258, 267, 278, 281, 282.
Isaac Comnenus, 244.
Isabella, widow of Conrad, 228.
Isabella, wife of Amaury II., 297
Jaffa, in third crusade, 226, 230, 238; conquered by Bibars, 363.
James of Vitri, 302.
Jean Tristan, 351, 365.
Jerome, St., to Paulinus, 66.
Jerusalem, Assizes of, 142.
Jerusalem, Patriarch of, 72, 303.
Jerusalem, under Omar, 55; fall of, 63; captured by Chosroes, 66; by crusaders, 125 sq.; under Saladin, 192; acquisition by Frederick, 319; carnage under Carismians, 326, 327.
Jews, persecution of, 204.
Joanna, sister to Richard I., 222, 227.
John, Cardinal, 247.
John, King of England, 232, 233; fifth crusade, 302.
John VIII., 56.
John X., 57.
John Baliol, 363.
John Comnenus, 152.
John Eleemon, 157.
John of Brienne, 297, 298, 307, 310, 311, 318, 320, 322.
Joinville, Prince de, 335, 336, 338, 344, 347, 348, 350, 353-355, 358.
Josselin II., 155
Josselin de Courtenay, 147, 150, 154.
Kanabos, Nicholas, 282.
Kerbogha, 109, 112, 115, 116; routed, 117; revenge, 140.
Khalil, 367
Kilidge-Arslan, 81, 91, 94, 97; routed, 117; revenge, 139; third crusade, 212.
Koran. See Mohammed.
Koutouz, 362.
La Marche, 331.
Lance, Holy, 114 sq.
Lanfranc, 7.
Lascaris, 275, 322.
Lateran Councils. See Councils.
Leo IX., 46
Leopold of Austria, 227, 232 sq.
Liegnitz, battle of, 325.
Litz, Martin, 288.
Longchamp, 220, 232
Longsword, William, 342, 345, 346.
Lothaire, 164.
Louis, St. See Louis IX.
Louis, St., laws of, 34, 35
Louis IV. (the Fat), 36, 161.
Louis VI., 33.
Louis VII., 164, 166, 167; rupture with Eleanor, 173; at Jerusalem, 173; Damascus, 174; return, 176; divorce, 198.
Louis VIII., 330.
Louis IX., 330; character, 331 sq.; seventh crusade, 333, 335 sq.; valor, 339, 346, 349; illness, 348, 350; overtures to sultan, 348; prisoner, 350 sq.; liberation, 353 sq.; treaty with sultan, 358; broken, 358; grief at death of Blanche, 359; return, 359, 360; eighth crusade, 363 sq.; death, 365, 366; revolt against Rome, 375.
Louis of Chartres and Blois, 255.
Lucius III., letter to Henry II., 186.
Ludwig, Landgrave of Thuringia, 316. Lydda, 123.
Lyons, Council of, 329. Maarah, 121
Mad Hakem, 57, 68
Magna Charta, 377.
Malek-Ahdel, 192, 227, 236, 238, 240; treaty with Dandolo, 262, 280; renewal of truce, 297; policy, 304; death, 306.
Malek-Kamel, 308, 309, 316, 318, 320.
Malek-Shah, 62, 63.
Mamelukes, 361 sq.
Mansourah, 310, 343, 344 sq.
Manuel, 168, 170, 179.
Manzikert, battle of, 62.
Marco Polo, 378.
Margaret of Hungary, 237, 241.
Margarit, Admiral, 214.
Marguerite, wife of Louis IX., 330, 335, 339, 341, 351, 353, 354, 359.
Maria, daughter of Manuel, 259.
Maria, widow of Isaac, 292.
Maria of Constantinople, 246.
Mariolatry, 53.
Marozia, 44.
Martin Litz, 288.
Mary, daughter of Isabella, 297, 298, 314.
Matilda, Countess, 8; gift to Papacy, 372.
Matilda, wife of William the Conqueror, 21, 199.
Matthew Paris, reference to Tartars, 325;
to Blanche of Castile, 330; to Henry III., 357.
Melisende, 152, 173
Melun, Count of, 113.
Merlin, prediction of, 202.
Merseburg, crusading army at, 80.
Michael, Emperor, 63
Michaud, criticised, 3.
Michelet, quoted, 161.
Milman, quoted, 4, 132.
Milo de Plausy, 182
Moguls, 324.
Mohammed, 51 sq.
Mohammed, Sultan of Carismia, 324.
Mohammed II., 275, 380
Mohammedanism, 51 sq.
Montferrat, Marquis of, 184, 214.
Mortmain, Statute of, 375.
Mourtzouphlos, 282, 283, 285, 294
Nahr Falik, 225.
Nazareth, destroyed by Bibars, 363.
Negmeddin, 338, 343.
Nicæa, fall of, 91 sq.
Nicephorus, 25.
Nicetas, quoted, 212, 270, 271, 273, 285-287.
Nichita, Bulgarian prince, 79
Nicholas, boy, 299.
Nicholas IV., 367.
Nicholas Kanabos, 282.
Nicholas Roux, 271
Nisch, Peter’s army at, 79.
Norgate, quoted, 200.
Nourredin, 155, 175; character, 178; magnanimity, 179; supreme, 181; death, 182.
Octai, 324.
Odoacer, 242.
Oleron, Laws of, 379
Oliver, 20.
Omar, 55.
Ortuk, 73.
Othello, Shakespeare’s, 59
Othman, 70.
Otho, contest with Philip of Swabia, 298, 302.
Otho the Great, 34.
Oxford, University of, 378
Padua, University of, 378.
Palazzo Vecchio, 377.
Papacy, effect of crusades on, 161 sq., 371 sq.
Paris, University of, 378.
Parliament, English, 377.
Paschal II., 23; sanctions Hospitallers, 157, 162.
Paula, companion of Jerome, 66.
Paulinus, 66
Pears, Edward, quoted, 295.
Pelagius, Cardinal, 307, 309-311.
Pelusium, captured, 180.
Pembroke, Earl of, 363
Peter Barthelemi, 114, 118; Ordeal, 119.
Peter Capuano, 262.
Peter the Hermit, not solely responsible for crusades, 3; career, 71 sq.; meets chieftains, 91; desertion, 105; messenger to Kerbogha, 115; before Jerusalem, 129; end of career, 138.
Petrarch, 377.
Pharamella the Moor, 196.
Philip, son of Louis IX., 365
Philip I., 148, 152.
Philip Augustus, 199, 201; third crusade, 207 sq., 219 sq.; anger at Richard, 222; declares for Conrad, 223; jealousies, 223;
returns, 225; plots, 232, 233, 237; fifth crusade, 302.
Philip of Swabia, 258, 261; message to Zara, 266; contest with Otho, 298; emperorship, 292.
Philip the Fair, 375.
Phirous, 108, 109, 111.
Piacenza, Synod of, 74.
Pilgrimages, 64 sq. Pisano, 377.
Poitiers, Count of, 343, 355.
Portugal, King of, 363.
Pragmatic Sanction, 375.
Ptolemaïs. See Acre.
Ptolemaïs, emir of, 123.
Ramleh, 123; capture of, 146.
Raymond d’Agiles, 133.
Raymond de Puy, 157.
Raymond of Poitiers, 172.
Raymond of Toulouse, 22, 83; expedition, 87; at Dorylæum, 97; Antioch, 106; defiance of Bohemond, 108; straits at Antioch, 113; quarrels with Bohemond, 120, 121;
attacks Maarah, 121; besieges Arkas, 122; Jerusalem, 130, 131; clemency, 133; plots, 135; sulks, 136; at Ascalon, 137; claims Ascalon, 137; quarrel with Godfrey, 138; after first crusade, 139; flight, 140; submission to Pope, 142; death, 148.
Raymond of Tripoli, 182, 183, 187, 189.
Redowan, 121.
Renaud of Carac, 183, 189, 190.
Renoart, 20.
Reynier, brother of Boniface, 259.
Rheims, Archbishop of, 94.
Rheims, Council of, 45.
Richard I., 24, 34, 201; character, 202; releases Eleanor, 202; crowned, 203; vow, 205; recklessness, 208; third crusade, 219 sq.; quarrels with Tancred and Philip, 222, 223; subdues Cyprus, 222; declares for Guy, 223; massacres Moslems, 225; at Nahr Falik, 225; Jaffa, 226; finesse, 227;
retreat, 229, 230; recaptures Jaffa, 230; peace, 231; returns, 232; prisoner, 232 sq.; release, 234; hatred of Philip Augustus, 237; gives Cyprus to Templars, 246; traditional author of “Laws of Oleron,” 379.
Richard of Cornwall, 323.
Robert, brother of Henry I., England, 21.
Robert d’Artois, 342, 344, 347
Robert de Clari, quoted, 260.
Robert Guiscard. See Guiscard.
Robert of Flanders, 23, 85; expedition, 87; at Antioch, 110.
Robert of France, 18.
Robert of Leicester, 233.
Robert of Normandy, 70, 85; expedition, 87; at Dorylæum, 96 sq.; desertion, 105; refuses help, 136; at Ascalon, 137, 138; end of career, 138.
Roger de Wendover, 202
Roger of Sicily, 11, 168, 247.
Roland, 20.
Rollo, 7.
Romanus IV , 62
Rosamond, 201, 202
Rudolph, 82.
Rufinus, Bishop of Acre, 189.
Sa’di, 297.
Safed, destroyed by Bibars, 363.
Saif Eddin, 362.
St. John, Knights of. See Hospitallers.
St. Sophia, Church of, 250.
Saladin, 176, 180; rise, 181; defeat at Ascalon, 183; revenge on Renaud, 183, 190; victories, 187 sq.; revenge on Templars, 190; fall of Jerusalem, 191 sq.; generosity, 192, 193; challenge of Barbarossa, 210; his reply, 211; attacks Tyre, 214; Tripoli, 214; Carac, 214; releases Guy, 214; at Acre, 215 sq., 225; courtesies, 223, 224; at Nahr Falik, 225; burns Ascalon, 227; finesse, 227, 228; captures Jaffa, 230; peace, 231; death, 235.
Saladin’s tithe, 207, 208.
Salisbury Cathedral, 377
Santa Croce, 377.
Saracens. See Mohammedans.
Saxony, Duke of, 237, 240.
Scott, Walter, quoted, 24; opinion of Alexius, 88.
Seljuk, 61
Semlin, looted by Peter, 79.
Shirkuh, 180.
Sibylla, 184, 185, 192; death, 218.
Sidon, capture, 149.
Sigur of Norway, 149.
Simeon, Patriarch of Jerusalem, 72.
Simon de Montfort, 237, 298.
Sismondi, quoted, 15.
Soissons, Bishop of, 284, 293.
Solyman, 63, 102.
Stanley, quoted, 19.
Stephen, boy, 299.
Stephen, King, 199.
Stephen of Blois, 85, 87, 101; desertion, 113, 139; slain, 147.
Stephen of Burgundy, 147.
Suger of St. Denis, 168, 176, 177, 199.
Sweno of Denmark, 104.
Sylvester II., 7, 45
Tancred, agent of William II., 247.
Tancred de Hauteville, 84, 85, 90, 97; at Tarsus, 99; quarrel with Baldwin, 99; character, 105; valor, 106; at Bethlehem, 124; Jerusalem, 131; clemency, 133; Ascalon, 136 sq.; Godfrey’s right hand, 141; escape, 147; death and character, 149.
Tancred of Sicily, 222.
Tarik, 56
Tarsus, 99.
Tartars, 324 sq.; overtures to Louis IX., 337; progress, 362.
Tasso, quoted, 24, 25, 126.
Templars, 158, 159; Saladin’s revenge, 190; rivalries, 236, 298, 367; get Cyprus, 246; refuse help to Frederick II., 318; overtures to Louis IX., 338; at Mansourah, 345, 347; ask Louis to remain in Syria, 355; abolished, 375.
Teutonic Knights, 159; ask Louis to remain in Syria, 355.
Theobald of Champagne, 228, 255, 258
Theodora, 44.
Theodora, daughter, 44.
Theodora, sister of Isaac Angelus, 259.
Theodora, wife of Baldwin II., 179
Theodore Lascaris, 275, 322.
Thibaut V., 322, 323.
Thibaut of Champagne, 164.
Thierri, 172, 175
Thierry, quoted, 12.
Third Estate, 377.
Thoron, 239.
Thoros, 100
Tiberias, battle of, 187 sq.
Tolosa, battle of, 298.
Tortosa, 122.
Tripoli, captured, 148; resists Saladin, 214; fall, 297.
Tristan, Jean, 357, 365.
Troubadours, 377.
Troyes, Bishop of, 284.
Truce of God, 17.
Tunis, 364.
Turkomans, 358.
Turks, 60 sq.; advance of, 379, 380.
Tyre, fall of, 152, 297
Urban II., not solely responsible for crusades, 3; his opportunity, 50, 63; speech at Clermont, 70, 74; commissions Peter, 72; synod at Piacenza, 74; absolves crusaders, 373.
Urban III., 194.
Vataces, 322.
Vaux, Abbot of, 264.
Vecchio, Palazzo, 377
Venice, relations with East, 248. See Dandolo
Victor III., 45.
Villehardouin, 255, 256, 263, 278, 285.
Vivien, 23.
Volkman, 80
Waldenses, 197, 198, 375.
Waldo, Peter, 197, 198.
Walter the Penniless, 78.
Warwick, Earl of, 363.
Westminster Abbey, 377.
William, brother of Tancred, 97.
William II., Sicily, 247.
William of Champeaux, 8.
