The berlin baghdad railway and the ottoman empire industrialization imperial germany and the middle
The Berlin Baghdad Railway and the Ottoman Empire Industrialization
Imperial Germany and the Middle East Murat Özyüksel
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Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art Empire and Infrastructure Peter H. Christensen
Murat Özyüksel is Professor of History and Political Science at Istanbul University.
‘In the era of globalization and Great Power rivalry before World War I, construction of railroads not only provided access to raw materials and markets, it was also a means for Germany, Great Britain and France to carve spheres of influence especially in the Middle East. The Ottoman government was also interested in railroad construction in order to bring about political centralization and economic development. Each project unfolded through many stages of coalitions, negotiations and high-level politics. Murat Özyüksel, a leading historian of railroads in the Ottoman Empire, has skilfully combined Ottoman and European archival sources with secondary materials to produce a fascinating and up-to-date account of the Berlin–Baghdad Railway from1888 to 1914.’
Şevket Pamuk, Professor of Economics and Economic History, Istanbul Bosphorus University
THE BERLIN –BAGHDAD
RAILWAY AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Industrialization, Imperial Germany and the Middle East
The right of Murat Özyüksel to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.
References to websites were correct at the time of writing.
Library of Ottoman Studies 47
ISBN: 978 1 78076 882 3
eISBN: 978 1 78672 162 4
ePDF: 978 1 78673 162 3
Afull CIP record for this book is available fromthe British Library Afull CIP record is available fromthe Library of Congress
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available
List of Abbreviations
Map
Introduction
Chapter One Historical Development of Railway Construction in the Ottoman Empire
Chapter Two The Struggle for the Baghdad Railway Concession
Chapter Three FromConcession to Constitution (1903–8)
Chapter Four The Second Constitutional Period
Chapter Five The Process of Delayed Agreements
Conclusion
Notes Bibliography
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Admin.Reg. Administrative Registratur
AfEW Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen
B.D. British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914
B.D.F.A. British Documents on Foreign Affairs
B.O.A. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
CUP Committee of Union and Progress
D.S.I. Der diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis, 1911–14
G.P. Die Grosse Politik der Europaeischen Kabinette
HHStA Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv
MFA The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
N.A. Department of State Archives, National Archives Washington, D.C.
PA/AA Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes
P.D.H.C. The Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons
Ottoman Railways. Used courtesy of Türkiye İş Bankası
Map 1
Kültür Yayınları.
INTRODUCTION
Devant de tells temoins, o secte progressive
Vantez-nous le pouvoir de la locomotive
Vantez-nous le vapeuret les chemins de fer. 1
Very few inventions have influenced the destiny of humankind to the extent that railways have. There can be no doubt that railways have brought about radical change in the economic, political, social and intellectual structures of many societies. While the politics and the ideology of the nineteenth century were determined by the French Revolution, the economic history of the era was determined largely by the British industrial revolution. One of the important dynamics in this process was the tremendous progress achieved in transportation thanks to railways. Railways both introduced the meta-production process to rural areas and contributed extensively to the solution of problems related to labour, raw material and markets. Industrial products manufactured by means of steam engines could be swiftly delivered to faroff markets by locomotives, and raw materials could also be dispatched to industrial hubs. Moreover, railways facilitated the flow of labour fromrural to urban areas, thus contributing to the solution of the manpower shortage. The function of the railways was significant not only in that they connected the rural areas of an industrial country to its own market, but also because they tied underdeveloped countries into this chain. Put differently, railways were one of the major determining factors in the formation of the capitalist world economy.
The first railway was inaugurated between Manchester and Liverpool on 15 September 1830. In 1832 in France, in 1835 Germany and in 1836 in Belgium locomotives started to operate. Meanwhile, the American continent was in no way lagging behind Europe. In order to grasp the speed of the growth, it should suffice to say that the length of railways, which had totalled around 5,000 miles in 1840, reached up to 500,000 miles in the year 1900. Rails, bridges, viaducts and tunnels had transformed the landscape of the earth.
Naturally, the rates of railway construction were not the same everywhere. The speed of this development was very high in industrializing countries, where railway construction was driven by the internal dynamics of their own economies. The more the railways gave momentumto industrialization, the greater the need for new lines to cater to the requirements of industry. In the first two decades of railways, iron and coal production in Britain tripled. This increase is understandable, since approximately 300 tons of iron per mile was required for the rails alone. As railway investments speeded up, it became clear that steel lines were much more durable than iron ones. Therefore, railways became one of the main factors leading to the establishment of the modern steel industry. Production of cheap and high-quality steel paved the way for the development of new industries such as shipbuilding, construction and the heavy chemical industry.
In addition to capital accumulation, railways contributed to the establishment of the new lifestyle called capitalism by creating new areas of employment and, with them, needless to say, new problems. In 1847 around 50,000 workers were employed on existing lines, while 250,000 workers were constructing new lines. Thousands of others were producing iron, rails, construction material, locomotives and coal for these railways. By 1907 the number of people working only on the railways exceeded 600,000. For the first time in history, workers were working very intensively and under the same conditions as their peers. This resulted in the first labour movements. Factory smokestacks, clanging rails and mushrooming workers’ districts –all a harbinger of a new era that would be marked by political freedom.
Capital accumulation had started to accelerate in the nineteenth century. The capital which was previously exported as external loans then started to gravitate to specific investments in mines, irrigation systems and gradually railways. Railroad companies that engaged in investments abroad received the political backing of governments because railroads provided outstanding means of economic and political expansion. The Ottoman empire was one such area for competition among the imperialist states for investment; yet the foreign companies could not avoid competing with one another to get railroad concessions.
Since it first appeared, the Baghdad Railway question was a constant and important element of the agenda of international relations. Acountry granted a railroad concession by the Ottoman state would gain influence in that region. It was known that railways previously constructed by the British and the French had carried out similar functions. Naturally enough, the Germans would use their concessions in the Ottoman empire for similar aims. Even more so in this case since the railway subject of concession was planned to begin in Istanbul, go all through Asia Minor and Mesopotamia and reach the Persian Gulf. The potential demand of the people living all along this long route and the natural resources of the area – for example the cotton of Adana and Konya or the oil of Mesopotamia – greatly increased the value of the railway. In addition the country controlling the Baghdad Railway would, at the same time, be controlling the route to India.
In this study, the defining role played by the Anatolian–Baghdad Railways within the process of development of Ottoman–German relations, has been clearly spelt out. Naturally enough, different parts of German society had different approaches towards the Baghdad Railway. According to official German policy, the railway was a solution to growing imperialist competition. Within this context, the Baghdad Railway was a way for Germany to increase its economic and political influence within the Ottoman Empire. Even a superficial study of German official documents will be enough to show that it was German officials themselves, who viewed railways as a peaceful means of expansion. It is for this reason that supporters of straightforward colonization of the Ottoman Empire, like Alldeutscher Verband, openly opposed official state policy. As for capital spheres led by the Deutsche Bank, which had the railway concession, they supported nationalist policies so long as they contributed to profits. It was for this reason that from time to time they were in disagreement with statesmen like Marschall, who gave precedence to “Germany's interests” over the profits of banks. Albeit in limited numbers, in German society there were those like Rosa Luxemburg, who analysed the Baghdad Railway enterprise fromthe point of view of social class within the context of the
exploitation of Ottoman peasants. However, we shall see in this study how even German social democrats did not protest too much in those cases when foreign investments like the Baghdad Railway served a purpose within the context of imperialism.
The basic sources of this study consist of Ottoman, German, British, Austrian, American and, in so far as they were translated into English and German, Russian documents. These are documents that I researched in Ottoman, German, Austrian and American archives or that were published by these institutions. Naturally enough, consulate reports make up the most important group of foreign documents. It is obvious that reports sent to their own foreign offices by upper level officials and diplomats, who witnessed events as they unfolded, are extremely important from the point of view of our study. Within this context, reports sent to Emperor Wilhelm, who was at the very centre of the matter, and the notes added by the Kaiser himself to these documents, have contributed greatly to our study. The fact that very frequently we had the opportunity of comparing views written by different British, German or Ottoman sources in relation to the same events has increased the soundness of the conclusions reached by us. Of course it would be unfair not to mention the wealth of information present in Ottoman documents. Not only did the documents I researched in the Ottoman archives have the abovementioned characteristics, but they were also extremely useful as far as understanding the transformations within Ottoman society, resulting from the introduction of railways, was concerned.
During the same time, various articles, brochures and books by scientists, politicians, journalists and associations of all stripes, have been studied since they represented the views concerning railways of a variety of spheres. Apart from all of this, I obviously have tried to study a vast majority of the work of scholars who have distinguished themselves in this field. Among these secondary sources I have to mention the special place occupied by Karl Helfferich's studies. Helfferich, who took part actively in the Baghdad Railway process and who made it possible for us to shed light on many an obscure point thanks to his three-volume, wide-ranging biography of George von Siemens, managing director of the Deutsche Bank and of the diaries he kept. In 1906, Helfferich was appointed assistant general manager of the Anatolian Railways and, one year later, was elected a managing director of the Deutsche Bank.
The Anatolian–Baghdad Railways can be considered to have been the locomotive of Ottoman–German relations; 1888 on the other hand, which was the year when Deutsche Bank was awarded its first railroad concession in Anatolia, can be considered the date when the locomotive started operating. It was following this event that Germany's presence in the Ottoman empire began to be felt in a concrete way. Before following step-by-step the long route of the Baghdad train, we shall be studying the history of the period, as this will help to better comprehend the process. The social dynamics behind railways built before 1888 have been studied, so as to try and understand the circumstances in which the Anatolian Railway was born. It is because of this same consideration that the historical development of Ottoman–German relations has been stressed, and the meaning of rapprochement from the point of view of both countries has been presented. Following the description in this way of formative circumstances, the “Anatolian Railway” consisting of the Haydarpaşa–Ankara and of the Eskişehir–Konya lines has been studied in all its aspects within first chapter of this work.
The second chapter, which focuses on the struggle waged for the part of the railroad extending after Konya, makes up a rather detailed part of the study. The struggle to obtain the Baghdad Railway concession is a perfect laboratory as far as the comprehension of economic and political history is concerned. Chiefs of state, prime ministers, ministers and diplomats acted in unison with private citizens in the pursuance of this enterprise. The active participation of these people, who directed political and economic life, is one of the concrete signs of the importance of this railroad. Elements like the appointment of as important a diplomat as Marschall to Istanbul and his success there, Emperor Wilhelm's visit to Sultan Abdülhamid and his famous speech in Damascus, the concession wars, the Kuwait problem, colonization theses, efforts to internationalize railways, the preliminary protocol signed with Deutsche Bank and finally the contract in 1902 are the milestones of this chapter.
The third chapter has been dedicated to the period beginning on 5 March 1903 when the Baghdad Railway contract was signed. In consideration of its importance, the 1903 Baghdad Railway contract has been presented in detail. The fact that, even though in 1903 there were also British and French entrepreneurs wishing to take part in this venture and even governments ready to support them, the opportunity for compromise should have been missed made it necessary to analyse this process in detail. This sub-chapter deserves to be read as an exemplary case describing the results of irrational nationalism. In the following sub-chapter, the reasons why for many years not even a single kilometre of rail was laid out, thus dashing the high hopes resulting fromthe speedy completion of the Ereğli line, have been analysed, and the dynamics developing within the framework of the Baghdad Railway, which remained as an international problem up to the declaration of the constitution, have been presented. Beginning from late 1905, Edward Grey and his quadrilateral conference thesis took centre stage within this process. At the end of this process, Germany realized that it had been surrounded by entente powers, but did not lose its hopes that it could break this chain at its weakest point.
The fourth chapter describes the transformations resulting from the declaration of the constitutional monarchy. This chapter might be considered interesting since it shows us the increase in importance of internal dynamics within this new stage in the history of the Ottoman empire. The half-hidden opposition to the railway surfaced in the new parliament. Apart from this, the workers of the Baghdad Railway went on strike in an organized way for improved working conditions. All of these were new developments that were not customary for the Ottoman empire. For the first time ever, society and the state came across to new concepts like strikes, the working class and socialism. The other important matter taken up in this chapter concerns the way the change in regime brought about a big transformation in the nature of the struggle for influence of the great powers within the Ottoman empire. With the inclusion of the USA, the struggle for the Baghdad Railway concession became much more complicated.
The last chapter focuses on the 1911–14 period when pre-war efforts for compromise continued by means of multilateral negotiations. This chapter will begin with the study of the dynamics behind the process, through which the Germans managed to break the encirclement of the entente powers by unexpectedly reaching an agreement with the Russians, and will continue with the Ottoman–British, German–French, German–British and multilateral oil wars/agreements. One of the interesting ironies of history has been the way that all conflicts
related to the Baghdad Railway were solved at an international level by means of multilateral agreements. This notwithstanding, I think it would be a mistake to claim on this basis, as some researchers have done, that the Baghdad Railway matter did not have an effect on the outbreak of war, because it should not be forgotten that the Baghdad Railway continued to be a nightmare poisoning the political atmosphere in Europe for 18 years, beginning from the signing of the preliminary contract. Later developments demonstrate how important it was not only to win the war, but also to sign just and permanent peace treaties. Were all the necessary lessons learnt during and after the struggle for the Baghdad Railway? Present-day developments in the Middle East, with Baghdad still at the centre of the region's problems, permit only “I amnot sure” as the most optimistic answer possible.
CHAPTER ONE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Introduction to the History of the Ottoman Railways
The economic structure of the Ottoman empire was not mature enough to support railway construction. Nevertheless, as early as the 1830s, a British officer named Chesney had formulated the very first railway project to be carried out in the Ottoman territory. Given the conditions at that time Chesney's project, one of those initiatives put by the British to reach out to India through the Persian Gulf, could not be realized. The first railway concessioners in Anatolia were also British, who obtained a concession in 1856 for the İzmir–Aydın Railway. The incentives for British capital to construct this line were the raw material resources of the region, and its potential as an assured market for finished goods. However, the company could not complete the first 70 km of the railway in due time. In such cases, even though the agreement entitled the Ottoman government to seize the precautionary money and take over the management of the company, Ottoman authorities instead decided to extend the period by three years. The reason behind the decision of the Ottoman government, of granting additional privileges to the company, instead of enjoying its aforementioned rights, explains the increasing importance attached by Ottoman rulers to railway construction in the country. The same two general reasons that led Ottoman rulers to support railway construction throughout the country also held true for the Izmir–Aydin region. The first was the hope that railway construction would help ease the financial bottleneck that the country was besieged by. As predicted, between 1856 and 1909, agricultural taxes collected from the regions where the Izmir–Aydin Railway passed soared by 13 times. The second reason was that mounting internal and external unrest could be averted by rapid soldier deployment. Such unrest had an adverse impact on the economic life of the region as well.1
Meanwhile, the British constructed a second railway that would connect Izmir to Kasaba. Thanks to the Aydin and the Kasaba Railways, the British could hold sway over the western Anatolian region very rapidly. Railway constructions were followed by an upswing of the British trade in the region and British investments shifted to other sectors like mining and municipal services. Besides these, the completion of the railway and the newly enforced Ottoman land law in 1866, which enabled foreigners to possess land, led the British to next establish capitalist ranches.2 To a great extent the expectations of Ottoman rulers were also met
in that, with the resolution of the transportation problem, security was ensured and production increased.3
Since the period of Ottoman Reform, the Tanzimat, Ottoman rulers had attached great importance to political integration with Europe. The positive atmosphere created in Europe after the Crimean war fuelled the aspiration to construct a railway that would connect the Ottoman empire with Europe. The Tanzimat bureaucrats had underlined the significance of railways for the Ottoman empire in the proposals that they submitted to the sultan.4 Moreover, the 1856 trip of the Ottoman Sultan Abdülaziz to Europe with his nephews Murat and Abdülhamid had created a positive influence on the sultan and the princes about railways.5
Therefore in 1869, an agreement for Rumeli Railways was signed with the banker, Baron Hirsch. However, after a short time it was understood that Hirsch did not have the financial capacity to execute such a project. Although the Ottoman empire would in the end have a railway of 1,279 km, these lines would not ultimately be connected to the Austrian network. That is to say, the Ottoman dream to connect to Europe via the railways did not come true.6 In spite of these shortcomings Rumeli Railways nevertheless realized significant military services. According to the contemporaneous historian Engelhardt these examples indicated how much the Ottoman empire could be successful in the future if it constructed railways in an efficient manner.7
Although the Ottoman empire lacked the capital accumulation necessary to finance railways, and it was short of experienced technical personnel, in 1871, Sultan Abdülaziz issued a decree for surrounding the entire Asian territory with a railway network. Because the mishaps with Baron Hirsch had shattered the credibility of private entrepreneurs, the government decided to construct the railway on its own. When the government started laying the rails from Haydarpaşa to İzmit, Abdulaziz realized the difficulties of such a gigantic project. In February 1872, he invited and commissioned the German engineer Wilhelm von Pressel to the Directorate General of Asian Ottoman Railways to design a railway project to meet his goals. Pressel had already proved his merit in fulfilling the missions that he undertook in Germany, Switzerland and the Roumelia railways.8
In the years 1872–3, Wilhelmvon Pressel formulated a detailed railway project, which was 4,670 km in length. In line with the sultan's requests, Pressel's project commenced from Haydarpasa and reached Basra.9 In those years, the Ottoman economy was foundering because of the unrestrained debts that it had begun to incur during the Crimean War. At the end of this process, the government had to reduce the interest rate of the internal and external debts by half for five years.10 The government was unable to operate the line that was constructed up to İzmit and leased it to a British company for 20 years.11 Apparently, with the bankruptcy of the Ottoman treasury in 1875, Pressel's project had to be shelved, which marked the end of the dream to construct a railway by government initiative. When a similar project was being prepared by Minister of Public Works, Hasan Hilmi Pasha, in 1880, it was already obvious that initiatives of such scale could not be realized without collaboration with European investors.12
After 1875, European financial circles ceased to apply for concession to the Sublime Porte. It was natural that capital holders were reluctant to undertake new investments on the territory of an empire, which was swirling in a spiral of debt. The revival of European investors’ interest in the Ottoman railways after 1881 can be explained with the establishment of the Office of Public Debts, known as Düyun-ı Umumiye.13 This office was in charge of collecting the revenues allocated for kilometre guarantees and reimbursing them to railway companies.14 That is to say, the existence of the Public Debts Council removed the risks associated with the Ottoman empire's insolvency.
In later years, organic bonds between the railway companies and the Düyun-ı Umumiye appeared. Members of the board of directors of the railway companies were also at the same time members of the Düyun-ı Umumiye Council. The British representative on the Council, Sir Vincent Caillard, was elected to the board of the Anatolian Railway Company immediately. Major Sir Edward Fitzgerald, who was elected British representative to the Council in 1897 in place of Caillard, was at the same time appointed also to Caillard's place on the board of directors of the Anatolian Railway Company.15 Managers, who served in both the Düyun-ı Umumiye and in a railway company, would naturally enough pursue the interests of the companies whenever there was a disagreement between the Ottoman government and railway companies.16
The elimination of the risks associated with the Ottoman empire's insolvency once again attracted foreign capital to undertake railway investments in the Ottoman territory. The Sublime Porte started to receive applications for railway concessions one after another. Among these applications were British entrepreneurs like Cazalet and French entrepreneurs like Collas.17 However, the Deutsche Bank was also among the competitors and Abdülhamid would opt for the Germans in granting concession. The Anatolian and Baghdad Railways, which would be constructed by Deutsche Bank, were to become the engine of Ottoman–German relations. By then, imperialist states had to also take into consideration Germany in their competition in the Ottoman empire.
Historical Development of Ottoman–German Relations
A) The Bismarck period (1871–88)
Germany managed to establish its union after winning the 1870–1 war with France. At the end of the war Germany annexed Alsace and Lorraine and obliged France to pay war reparations. In the following years, Bismarck's policies were influenced by a concern to prevent France from waging a war of revenge by isolating it within Europe. In any case, conflicts concerning colonial expansion were preventing Britain and France from acting in unison in those years. The powers, the alliance of which with France would worry Bismarck, were the AustroHungarian and Russian empires. It was for this reason that in 1872 Bismarck reached an agreement called the League of the Three Emperors with the Austrian and Russian emperors. This agreement accepted the European status quo as something that was not to change, and in
this way the German–French border was confirmed by Austria and Russia.18
Relations with Russia influenced Bismarck's attitude towards the Ottoman empire. He did not want problems related to the Ottoman empire to damage relations with Russia. It was during a speech in 1876 at the Reichstag that he pronounced the widely quoted and famous statement “I would not exchange the bones of a single Pomeranian soldier for all of the lands of the Balkans”, that is related to this matter.19 However, the main contradiction of Bismarck's policy consisted of the impossibility of keeping Austria and Russia within the same alliance. Both countries asked for Germany's help in the policies they followed against each other in the Balkans. When in 1878, during the Congress of Berlin, Austria sided with Britain against Russia, Russia left the League of the Three Emperors. Following this, Germany understood that their conflicting interests in the Balkans made it impossible to keep Russia and Austria together, and established a new alliance with Austria in 1879. Considering all, Bismarck had reached the conclusion that keeping a united “German Block” was necessary for a permanent and long-termpolicy.20
Following these developments, Bismarck was able to follow a more flexible policy towards the Ottoman empire. For example, he accepted Sultan Abdülhamid's request for a German Military Commission to help in the reform of the Ottoman army. The intention of using an Ottoman army directed by German officers during a probable war with Russia had led Bismarck to take this decision. Vice-chairman of the General Staff Graf von Waldersee went even further stating that war with Russia was inevitable. It was for this reason that Waldersee championed the idea that the Ottoman army had to be strengthened and turned into an ally of Germany.21
This statement by Waldersee led to conflict with Bismarck, because Bismarck still considered the Ottoman army to be a reserve force to be used in case panslavist and antiGerman ideas should gain dominance in Russia, but at the same time he continued to make efforts not to sever ties with Russia more than was absolutely necessary.22 Sure enough, in 1881 he took the opportunity presented by the increase in disagreements between Russia and Britain and led the way for a restoration of the League of the Three Emperors. In this way, he made sure that in case of a war between Germany and France, Russia and Austria would remain impartial. However, because of contrasts between Russia and Austria in the Balkans this alliance was short lived. It was upon this, and with the aim of preventing Russia from going over completely to the side of France, that he signed a treaty of guarantee with this state in 1887.23
In conclusion we can say that during the time of Bismarck, the Ottoman empire was not very important for Germany. Bismarck's main worry related to the contrast between Germany and France. It was for this reason that while, on the one hand, he was establishing an alliance with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he was, on the other hand, simultaneously making efforts to at least prevent Russia from going over to the opposing camp. Within this framework, Bismarck did not follow a policy of containment of Russia's aspirations concerning the Ottoman empire; however, he refrained from actively supporting it. Another aspect of the flexible policy Bismarck followed in the case of the Ottoman empire was his hope that in case of an inevitable
conflict with Russia he could use the help of Ottoman armies.24
B) Wilhelm II and Weltpolitik
In 1888, following the ascension to the throne of WilhelmII as emperor, there was a substantial change in Germany's Ottoman policy. Wilhelm thought that the cautious approach of Bismarck was needless, and opted for an expansionist policy like other imperialist states. As a result of this divergence in opinions, Bismarck had to resign in 1890.25 Germany's expansionist policy known as Weltpolitik is generally identified with Emperor Wilhelm. But actually, what led Wilhelm to follow a colonialist policy was not so much his personality and political views as the need for new markets and for cheap sources of raw materials of German industry, which had developed enormously in a very short time span. If, in addition to this economic factor, you also take into consideration Germany's political conditions of the time, you will see that it would have been difficult to follow a different policy, because there was no party that might formulate an alternative policy and stand behind it in a determined way. The SPD (Sozialistische Partei Deutschland) was not strong enough and, what is more, as far as imperialism was concerned it followed an unreliable policy of compromise rather than a socialist one. The only current with which they might form a political alliance consisted of the liberals, but the liberals were openly in favour of Weltpolitik. As for cooperation between socialists and conservatives, who were not happy with Germany's policy of strengthening its navy, the fact that in domestic policy matters they had completely opposite views, prevented it.26 Schöllgen thought that the source of Weltpolitik consisted not so much of the will of politicians championing this ideology, but rather of the process by which Germany turned into a nation state on the basis of the “verspaetete Nation” (delayed nation) phenomenon. He explained Bismarck's abandonment of his status quo, preserving practices in favour of Weltpolitik, as a situation resulting from the speedy development brought about by internal dynamics, and studied the matter within the context of the theoretical legitimization and practical application of belatedly having become a world power.27
Also France's war reparation payments and the annexation of the two rich provinces of Alsace and Lorraine contributed to the speedy industrialization of Germany.28 The development of Germany's steel and textile industries was in great part due to the contribution of this area. Lorraine's iron reserves were around 700 million tonnes. While in 1871 1,564,000 tonnes of raw iron were processed in Germany, in 1910 a production of 14,794,000 tonnes had surpassed all European countries. As for steel production, the German empire had surpassed its British competitor with 7,372,000 tonnes as early as 1900.29 Also coal and machinery production increased surprisingly fast. Besides these, the armaments industry had an extraordinary rate of development. The taxable income of Krupp, which was 119 million marks in 1895, rose to 187 million marks in 1902.30 Electricity generation and the chemical industry were also among the sectors getting stronger.
The fast rate of growth can be seen also from foreign trade data. German foreign trade, which in 1890 amounted to 7.5 billion marks, had reached the level of 10 billion in 1900 and
of 21 billion in 1913.31 During this process of rapid industrialization, Germany solved its transportation problem by means of a rapid expansion of its railway web. In this way, iron production was also supported. The following table summarizes the rapid expansion of the German railway web.32
Table 1.1 Expansion of the German railway web.
A strengthening German industry provided employment opportunities to an ever-growing mass of people. This notwithstanding, Germany's population growth continued to be a problem. Beginning from the early nineteenth century, Germans began to emigrate in great numbers, and their main destination was the USA. Chancellor Caprivi, who was appointed in place of Bismarck in 1890, described the situation by saying, “We have to export either goods or people.” Sure enough, Germany's need for markets and raw materials was growing rapidly as a result of its equally rapid industrialization, and this was straining the pro-peace policy that Bismarck would have liked to follow.
The change in the nature of Germany obliged even Bismarck during his last years to take steps concerning the question of colonization; in 1884–5, Germany took over eastern and south-west Africa, Cameroon, Togo and some islands on the Pacific Ocean.33 However the colonies that Germany had managed to take over were far from satisfying the needs of German industry. What is more, Germany had no possibility of expanding its colonies. The reason for this was that Germany had appeared as a capitalist state much later than Britain and France, and by the last quarter of the nineteenth century all lands that could be colonized had already been shared out.34 All of these conditions led the German empire to follow a “policy of peaceful expansion” by various means.
With the introduction of the expansionist policy of Wilhelm II, known as Weltpolitik, the importance of the Ottoman empire increased enormously. While in the early 1880s Bismarck thought that “It is not worth to read correspondence from Istanbul”, in 1889 the German emperor went in person to Istanbul and visited the sultan. This trip also led to the divergence of opinions between the emperor and Bismarck gaining visibility. Sure enough, Bismarck tried to minimize the effects of Emperor Wilhelm's visit to Sultan Abdülhamid within the international arena, and did all he could to prevent this trip from leading to an estrangement between Russia and Germany. For example, he tried to ease the worries of the tsar by stating that the aim of this trip was for the emperor to also see Istanbul, once he had gone as far as Athens. In addition to this, the chancellor had added his son Herbert von Bismarck to the
delegation, so that he could check the emperor's exuberance.35 As for Wilhelm, he had used his visit to the Ottoman empire to escape from the shadow of the powerful chancellor. The statement by the kaiser, “I realized that my ministers saw themselves as Bismarck's employees”, explains very well the conflict between Emperor Wilhelm and Bismarck.36 The following statement by Gooch expresses the matter as seen by Bismarck: “The chancellor hated the emperor for having stopped his projects and never forgave him.”37
For reasons that we shall explain a little further on, Sultan Abdülhamid realized that the visit by the German emperor was an important occasion and received his guests with a care unseen up to then. The sultan had commissioned the building of a special pavilion (Seyir Köşkü) so that the kaiser and his entourage should be able to follow the ceremony of himgoing to Friday prayers, and of the Chalet Pavilion (Şale Köşkü), which was a sumptuous mansion, as a residence for the emperor and empress. In other words, the kaiser and his wife lived, as Empress Augusta put it, “in a dream land out of [a] thousand and one nights” for exactly five days and nights.38
When the imperial yacht carrying Wilhelm sailed into the Bosphorus, the German flag was flying on all towers and battlements, and a military band was playing the German national anthem. This enthusiastic welcome impressed the newly enthroned young kaiser. In their meetings, the sultan and the kaiser spoke directly in French without the use of interpreters. Abdülhamid treated Wilhelmas if he were a confidante of his, and complained to himabout the imperialist powers’ intrigues aiming to increase their influence within the Ottoman Empire. And with his answer, “my visit must have ruffled them quite a bit”, the kaiser did not refrain from going further even than Bismarck had feared. All through the trip, Wilhelm did not miss any opportunity of conversing at length with the German engineer Wilhelm von Pressel about the advantages brought about by railway construction in the Ottoman empire. There was an exchange of extremely precious gifts, and during the farewell banquet the emperor raised a toast to Ottoman–German friendship. In other words, it had become clear that a new actor had joined the Eastern question.39
With its not yet exploited raw material sources and the potential demand for industrial products of its population of more than twenty millions, the Ottoman empire seemed to be the country that could satisfy Germany's needs. Previously, the Austro-Hungarian empire had been integrated to the German economy by means of a series of commercial treaties. Following this, treaties with Romania made the oil reserves of this country available for the use of German industry. From then on, the Germans set their sight on the vast and virgin lands of the Ottoman empire and most of all of Anatolia and Mesopotamia. As Karl Helfferich stated it, the course of German economic development led Germany to take an active interest in the Ottoman empire.40
In a way, the dream of a “Mitteleuropa” put forward by Friedrich List in the 1840s was coming true. According to many writers, an economic union, the nucleus of which would consist of Germany and Austria, with the Ottoman empire being added to Balkan countries like Romania and Bulgaria, was the objective of Germany.41 Among the writers championing this view, Ernst Hasse, Friedrich Naumann, Anton Sprenger and Paul Rohrbach are the first that
come to mind.42 This new programme meant also the abandonment of Bismarck's principles concerning relations with Russia, because, in a way, competing over this geographical area meant that the ideas of a Greater Russia and of a Greater Germany would clash.43 With the following statement, Ambassador Marschall, who was to play an important role within Ottoman–German relations, implied that for this objective they were ready to wage war:
The enormous industrial rise in the United States, English imperialism, and the development of things in the Far East threaten our old and best markets [abroad]. A substitute for that we can only find in the Orient. If political frictions arise from that, so be it: that is the price we will have to pay, though we should also be ready to come to understandings in particular instances.44
C) Circumstances of the Ottoman Empire
During those years when Germany was searching for raw materials and markets, the Ottoman Empire found itself in extremely dire straits. Since the Ottoman State was not able to pay back its debts, the Düyun-ı Umumiye, made up of the representatives of creditor countries, was founded in 1881 with the authority to collect certain important sources of income of the state. This development “was a a humiliating confession of inferiority and incapacity on the part of what had been one of the greatest powers of Europe”.45
The Ottoman–Russian war of 1877–8 had shown that the Ottoman empire could not hope to survive without foreign support anymore. The Treaty of Saint Stephen, which contained conditions that were extremely onerous for the Ottomans, contrasted also with British and Austrian interests. Following the intervention of these two countries the Treaty of Berlin, which had slightly better conditions for the Ottoman state, was substituted for the Treaty of Saint Stephen. However, in exchange for blocking the Treaty of Saint Stephen, Britain had taken over the administration of Cyprus. This action by Britain had shown that as a result of the Ottoman empire's inability to maintain control over its lands, the British government would follow a policy of taking over those Ottoman lands that were of strategic value.46 Sure enough, Britain's de facto occupation of Egypt in 1882 led to an increase in the suspicion felt by Sultan Abdülhamid and his court towards Britain. However, these steps by the British did not mean that they had abandoned completely their traditional policies towards the Ottomans. Sure enough, Edward Grey was still defining their Ottoman policies as, “preventing the fall and break up of the Empire”. The reason for this was that a final collapse would lead to unsolvable problems, like whose was İstanbul going to be, and thus to an inevitable European war.47
There was another reason deriving from domestic policy for the mistrust felt by Abdülhamid towards Britain; he thought that the British were supporting the Young Turk opposition in the country. In his memoirs, the sultan wrote, “The way that the British support the Young Turks at every occasion, is noteworthy.”48 As was to become clear later on, an important aspect of Sultan Abdülhamid's approach was to be able to hold on to the Muslim areas of the empire. According to the sultan, the Ottoman empire looked like a majestic
sycamore. Losing the provinces in the Balkans meant losing the dead branches. However, it was absolutely necessary to keep the main trunk consisting of the Muslim provinces.49 And with their new policies targeting Muslim areas, the British had directed their attention towards the main trunk. The sultan expressed his ideas on this matter by saying, “The Arab tribes incited by the British are revolting one after the other.”50
Sultan Abdülhamid was justified in not trusting great powers like France, Austria or Italy. France had occupied Tunisia in 1881. The fact that the French were governed as a republic was an additional source of worry for the sultan. He expressed his suspicion of France in the following way: “We find the French to be less attractive than in the past. This is due not just to the fact that they took Tunis from us, but also to the fact that they are governed by a republic, because, as we see it, in a place not governed by a monarch there can be no order.”51 Russia's goals concerning the Balkans and the Straits, Austria's goals for the Balkans and Italy's for Ottoman Africa were well known.
Looking at it fromthis point of view, Germany was the only European country never to have expressed territorial requests concerning Ottoman lands. The fact that there were no Muslim lands among the colonies of the German empire was another significant element in the eyes of Ottomans. The aim of the Ottoman administration was to hide collapse in morale, resulting from economic and political weakness, by means of the dream of assembling the Muslims of the entire world under the leadership of the caliph, against imperialist European countries. It was for this reason that attempts by European countries and most of all by Britain, to incite Muslim nations against the empire, increased the enmity felt towards these countries. The suspicion felt by the sultan on this matter towards Britain can be seen in the following statements: “With the aim of weakening my sovereignty, Britain is spreading the idea of nation within Islamic countries. Without realizing it, Egyptian patriots serve British interests, and weaken the power of Islam and the prestige of the caliphate.”52 As for the Germans, they refrained fromsuch provocations and continued to increase goodwill towards them.
It was at a late stage that Germany became an imperialist power, but this nevertheless disturbed the balance of power in Europe. It was because of this that Ottoman diplomacy found once more the opportunity of following its characteristic foreign policy based on a careful use of the existing balance in power. Sure enough, later developments led to Germany filling the void created in Ottoman foreign policy by Britain's exit. Actually, it could be claimed that from the point of view of the Ottoman administration this process had begun with the Berlin negotiations, since the only leader in Berlin who had not requested anything from the Ottoman state had been Bismarck. Even though this attitude had been the result of his foreign policy aiming for stability in Europe,53 it was enough for him to gain the friendship and gratitude of Ottoman administrators. In this way, and probably without realizing it, Bismarck had made the best investment for his country at the Congress of Berlin.
The more the enmity of the sultan and of Ottoman administrators against other imperialist countries increased, the more the sympathy they felt towards Germans increased. Rather than resisting German political and economic power frompenetrating the country, they welcomed it. Sultan Abdülhamid expressed the personal sympathy he felt towards Germans by saying,
“Sometimes they call Turks the Germans of the Orient. And sure enough the character of Germans is similar to ours and it might be because of this that we are turning towards them […] Courage, honesty, courtesy and honesty are properties of Germans as much as they are ours.” It is obvious up to which point a sultan made the Germans' job easier, and who in his political memories could say, “If, rather than making useless efforts to conquer colonies of no use to herself almost everywhere, Germany had been able to extend its influence to the Persian Gulf, this would undoubtedly have been better for both ourselves and for Germany”.54
The fact that, contrary to Britain and France, the German empire should have had an autocratic government was another element that endeared Germany to the sultan. And sure enough, while the other two states put pressure on Ottoman administrators with their requests for reforms and “democratization”, German diplomats like Ambassador Marschall relieved the anxieties of the sultan with statements like, “Turkey will be [an] autocratic country or it will not be.” According to Marschall, the requests for reforms of Young Turks, who lived in a world of dreams, were fantasies with no realistic basis, which would bring about the end of the empire. It was because of these views that in 1899, when the sultan asked for his help, Marschall notified German intelligence and made sure that all information about the “destructive activities” of Young Turks residing outside the empire should be sent to Sultan Abdülhamid. Marschall also praised the sultan's foreign policy for his ability in “playing the greed of certain powers against one another” within the context of the Eastern question.55
We see that in addition to Ottoman functionaries, intellectuals also were in favour of increased German influence. The following statement by Mehmet Akif is another example of pro-German sentiments brought about by a sense of crisis and despair: “If we are ruined, the key of the east will fall not into the hands of the Germans, but of its competitors. Safeguarding and civilizing the east, advancing towards the east together with the Ottomans, taking over the east for German commerce and industry […] This is a magnificent programme for Ottoman and German governments, who really know what they are doing.”56 The circumstances in which the Ottoman Empire found itself created a mood of readiness to accept the influence of Germany,57 and rapprochement between the two countries became practically inevitable.
D) Ottoman–German economic and military relations
Efforts by German industrialists for a systematic penetration of near eastern markets began in 1880 with the establishment of the Deutscher Handelsverein. Before the beginning of Deutscher Handelsverein's activities, its President Loehnis toured the places that had been targeted as the company's area of activity. At the end of this tour, Loehnis wrote a book, in which he analysed the potential value for German trade of all the cities he had visited.58 However, notwithstanding all efforts, the company was not successful and Deutscher Handelsverein closed down in 1889.
During that period, the cheapest kind of transportation continued to be sea transport. Regular trips between Kiel and Istanbul introduced by German shippers in 1884 and between Hamburg and İzmir in 1888 were not successful. The reason for this failure was that Ottoman–
German trade had not yet reached the level necessary to justify regular sea trips. The Deutsche Levante Linie, founded in 1889, did not find itself in the circumstances suffered by its predecessors and managed to continue with regular trips. The fact that a great quantity of railway material had begun to be transported for the railway being constructed by Deutsche Bank played a great role in the company's success.59 In addition to this, by carrying for lower prices from various parts of the country to the port of Hamburg the goods being exported to the Ottoman empire, German railways supported regular sea trips.60
After Deutsche Bank was granted the railway concession, the rate of growth of trade between Germany and the Ottoman empire became dramatically high.61 Sure enough, Flaningam, who explained the development of German trade in Ottoman lands on the basis of four factors, underlined the presence of newly available transport facilities as a vital factor. In addition to this he considered the readiness of Germans to provide more favourable credit conditions and lower prices in comparison to their competitors; the fact that they established personal relations with consumers to be one of the other factors leading to their success in this field.62
Even though during the 1880–8 period Ottoman–German trade did not reach very high levels, military equipment exported to the Ottoman empire by the German weapons industry grew at an exceptional pace. This fast growth is one of the results of the activities of a German Military Commission that in 1882 began to reformthe Ottoman army.
Following the disastrous defeat of the Ottoman empire in the 1877–8 Ottoman–Russian war, the Ottoman government decided that the army needed reforming. Because Sultan Abdülhamid did not trust Britain and France, he decided to grant responsibility for this mission to a headquarters staff from the German army, which had demonstrated its power during the war with France in 1870. The days in May 1880 when Sultan Abdülhamid had submitted an official request for a headquarters staff team to be sent by Germany coincided with Russia's withdrawal from the League of the Three Emperors and this situation led to the request being accepted by Bismarck. While submitting the request of the sultan to the emperor, Chancellor Bismarck stated his own opinion that in this way their influence over the Ottoman empire would increase.63 In addition to this, the requirements of the German weapons industry increased the attractiveness of such a proposal.
The first to be sent to Istanbul in 1882 were Colonel Kaehler, and Captains Kamphövener, von Hobe and Ristow. Von der Goltz's long adventure in the Ottoman empire began when in 1883 Sultan Abdülhamid requested a German officer for military training. In 1885, Goltz claimed that German officers had not accomplished anything in the Ottoman army up to then. According to Goltz, Sultan Abdülhamid was not actually sincere in his intention to reform the army. This is probable because the sultan lived in constant dread of a plot against him by the army.64 Nevertheless, Goltz did not refrain from pointing out certain defects resulting from the failures of German officers. His main criticism was that these officers were trying to apply the Prussian system to the Ottoman army as it was, without taking into consideration the particularities of the country.65
All this notwithstanding, the contracts with the Germans was renewed in 1885. Why had Sultan Abdülhamid done all he could to renew the contracts, even though the Germans themselves admitted that they were not contributing much to the Ottoman army? A statement by the military representative of Austria in Istanbul can be considered to be a partial answer to this question. According to Baron Wladimir Giesl, Sultan Abdülhamid was trying to project an image of readiness for war of the Ottoman empire in the eyes of both friend and foe. Giesl thought that Sultan Abdülhamid perceived the officers at his service, and the great amounts of armaments that began to be bought with their arrival, as the means of establishing an alliance with Germany.66
In 1886, von der Goltz was appointed chief of mission in place of Kaehler, who had died the year before. Goltz's most important duty was to train the young staff officers in the army. During a 12-year teaching career he had prepared more than 4,000 pages of notes. It could be said that he had played a key role in increasing German influence within the Ottoman army, thanks to the good relations he had established with young officers.67 Beginning from 1883, Ottoman officers were sent to Germany for training, as well as having German officers serve in the Ottoman army. The aim of this was to let European countries know that military relations with Germany were intensifying. In addition to this, the Turkish officers, who returned to their country following their training in Germany, were leading the pro-German current within the Ottoman army.68
The greatest success of the German Military Commission within the Ottoman army had been to open up the Ottoman market to the German weapons industry. The German Krupp company had received orders from the Ottoman army even before these developments. However, back then the sale of armaments to the Ottoman state had been dominated by British or French companies like Vicker-Armstrong or Schneider Creusot. It was only after the establishment of a German Military Commission and especially after the successful and intense efforts of Goltz,69 that German weapons manufacturers like Mauser, Loewe and Krupp managed to increase their competitiveness and to gradually become monopolists. The order from Krupp in 1885 of the 500 heavy cannons to be deployed for the defence of the Dardanelles was Goltz's first big success in winning orders for the German armaments industry. In the years 1889 and 1890, the value of armaments bought from Germany reached a total of 15.3 million marks and from then on the orders of the Ottoman state from Germany continued to increase. Whenever a German officer was sent to the Ottoman empire, Goltz Pasha would have him presented personally to the German armaments monopolists. In 1893, Ludwig Loewe rewarded Goltz for his services to the German war industry with stock certificates.70
Anatolian Railway
A) Construction of the Ankara line
As a matter of fact one of the above-mentioned weapons agreements played an important role also in Deutsche Bank being awarded the Ankara Railway concession. Since 1897, Alfred
Kaulla, director of Württembergische Vereinsbank and also sales director of Mauser,71 had been carrying out negotiations for a big arms deal in Istanbul.72 During this process, he met Wilhelm von Pressel, the General Director of Ottoman Railways. For years, Pressel had been applying to strong financial institutions in Germany, Britain, France and Italy so as to finance the railway project that he had prepared for the Ottoman empire, but he had not had success. Wilhelm von Pressel told Kaulla about his own project and about the details of his applications to the Sublime Porte and had convinced himof the need to begin negotiations with Ottoman functionaries.73
Among the first persons to whom Pressel had applied there was George von Siemens, managing director of Deutsche Bank. However, as a result of the aloofness towards the Ottoman empire in German official policy in those days, Siemens had not shown any interest in the project. However, after various negotiations Kaulla managed to get Siemens interested in railways to be constructed in Anatolia. Finally on 9 August 1888, Siemens notified Kaulla that he had accepted to try and receive a concession.74 Kaulla's convincing style played a role in Siemens taking this decision. Kaulla provided detailed explanations about the seriousness of the sultan concerning railways and about the privileges that he was ready to award. In addition to this, the fact that the Düyun-ı Umumiye was a guarantor of the kilometre guarantees was another important factor in the eyes of Siemens.
Before beginning the process, Siemens wrote on 15 August to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to learn the ministry's view about this matter. The general director was asking whether or not there were political problems concerning the request for a concession and asked to have the German embassy in Istanbul support Kaulla, who was going to carry out the negotiations.75 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs answered on 2 September stating that the consulate in Istanbul had been asked to provide Deutsche Bank managers all the support they needed. However, it was also stressed that laws regulating investments in Ottoman lands were inadequate, and that such investments were quite risky because of the insecure environment resulting from internal and external circumstances. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated clearly that in those cases the German empire would provide no support, and that responsibility for this kind of risk would rest solely on German entrepreneurs.76
The Ankara Railway concession was signed on 4 October 1888 by the Ottoman government and Deutsche Bank. The fact that Deutsche Bank granted a 30 million mark credit with an as low an interest rate as 5 per cent, played a very important role in the parties reaching an agreement in such a short time.77 A while before this agreement, credit request by the Sublime Porte was rejected by the Ottoman Bank. A great part of the credit granted was used for the Ottoman state's weapons purchases from Germany. In this way Kaulla killed two birds with one stone.
The contract established the construction and operation conditions of the 486 km İzmit–Eskişehir–Ankara line. As part of the concession agreement, the Haydarpaşa–İzmit line was also transferred to Deutsche Bank for 6 million francs,78 despite the fact that the Haydarpaşa–İzmit line had been leased in 1880 to a British company. The awarding to Deutsche Bank, of the concession for this line, created a legal conflict between the British company and the
Sublime Porte, and the British put pressure on the Ottoman administration through various means, including the press. For example, on 11 January 1889, the Financial News published an article claiming that by transferring the line to the Germans, the Ottomans had done something against the law, since the Ottomans had transferred the concession to Deutsche Bank without any consultation with the British, even though in the contract, precedence in case of an extension of the line had been granted to the British.79 Finally, in an Ottoman document dated 1 August 1894, it was stated that the parties had got closer to an “auspicious result” as far as the indemnity to be paid to the British company was concerned.80 In conclusion, following long negotiations, an agreement was reached on the amount to be paid by the Sublime Porte.81
The concession of the Ankara line had been granted for 99 years, and the construction time had been set at three years. The kilometre guarantee of the Haydarpaşa–İzmit line, which had previously been constructed, had been set at 10,300 francs, and of the İzmit–Ankara line to be constructed at 15,000 francs. However, if operational incomes were to be above 15,000 francs, 25 per cent of this was to be transferred to the Ottoman treasury. In addition to this, the railway company was granted the right to prospect for minerals and fell trees within an area extending for 20 kmon both sides of the line. The source for the guaranteed payments consisted of the tithe income of the provinces of İzmit, Ertuğrul, Kütahya and Ankara, through which the line was to pass. Düyun-ı Umumiye was to collect these taxes and pay the railway company.82
The consortium, which was going to construct the İzmit–Ankara line, consisted of Deutsche Bank, of Deutsche Vereinsbank and of Württembergische Vereinsbank. On 23 March 1889, a joint-stock company called the Société du Chemin de fer Ottoman d'Anatolie was founded. Otto von Kühlmann, who had been operations director of the Rumeli Railways, was appointed general manager of the company.83 The capital of the company consisted of stock certificates for a value of 45 million francs, of which 60 per cent were paid up.84
The agreement with Graf Vitali, which was known as being specialized in its field, was signed on 23 March 1889 for the construction. However, Siemens also wanted a German company to take part in the construction of this first railway in Anatolia. It was because of this that it was decided that together with French Vitali the German Philipp Holzmann Company would also take part in the railway construction. The companies formed a company called Gesellschaft für den Bau der Anatolischen Bahnen. By taking part in the construction of the Ankara line, Philipp Holzmann gained experience for the Ankara–Konya and Baghdad line construction that was going to be carried out later by Deutsche Bank.85
The British representative in the Düyun-ı Umumiye Council, Caillard, was made a member of the company's board of directors. The aim of this was to have favourable relations between the company and the Düyun-ı Umumiye. Caillard's services to the company were a concrete example of the close relations between the Düyun-ı Umumiye and European capital investing in the Ottoman empire.86
In 1889 Wiener Bankverein joined the consortium led by Deutsche Bank. The consortium made a new move and took over the control of the railways that Baron Hirsch had set up in the European lands of the empire.87 Of the 100,000 stock certificates of Hirsch, 88,000 were
bought by the consortium. That Deutsche Bank should have taken over the above-mentioned Istanbul–Edirne–Plovdiv–Bellova line, was very important from the point of view of the railways it was going to construct in Anatolia, because with the arrival to Istanbul on 4 October 1883 of the train that would later become famous as the Orient Express, the capital of the Ottoman empire had been connected by rail to the important cities of Europe.88 There were many celebrities among the first passengers of this train that was later to be the subject of various adventure novels and films. Belgian Minister of Public Works M. Ohlin, novelist Edmont About who was later to write a book about Istanbul and Henry Stefan Opper de Blowitz who was the first foreign journalist to interview Sultan Abdülhamid, were a few of these.89
In addition to the Rumeli Railways, the consortium was granted a new railway concession for the 219 km Salonica–Manastır line. According to the contract, which was signed on 28 October 1890, the concession was for a 99-year period and the Ottoman government undertook to pay a 14,300 franc per kilometre guarantee. The guaranteed payments would be done by the Düyun-ı Umumiye, and the source would be the tithe income of the Salonica and Manastır. In this way, Germany, which up to 1888 did not possess a single kilometre of railway line in the Ottoman empire, had become by late 1890 the holder of around 2,000 km of railway concessions.
Holding the concession for the construction and operation of such a vast web of railways brought with it financial, administrative and political problems. Most important of all, majority control in the above-mentioned railway operations had to be maintained. The facts that the concessions had been obtained in an extremely competitive environment and that Ottoman railways were of a nature that was political as much as it was economic, made it important to own a majority of stock certificates. So as to solve this kind of problem, the consortium led by Deutsche Bank founded in the second half of 1890 a bank called Bank für Oriantalische Eisenbahnen; up to 1907, it kept all its stocks in this bank, which had its headquarters in Zurich. The 88,000 stocks bought from Baron Hirsch were included in this. Beginning from 1907 the stocks began to be sold in the market. However, the majority was still held.90
Construction work proceeded quickly under the energetic management of Otto Kapp, and the 50 km İzmit–Adapazarı line was inaugurated officially on 2 July 1890.91 In his speech during the inauguration, Raif Pasha, the Minister of Public Works, expressed his wish for the German company to extend this railway as far as Baghdad.92 According to Ambassador Radowitz's report about the inauguration of the line, Georg von Siemens, Kaulla, and Kühlmann, as well as a “great part of Turkish officials”, were present at the inauguration ceremony. Radowitz stated that notwithstanding all the efforts of the French to obstruct the project, railway construction work was continuing with success. According to him, Sultan Abdülhamid and other officials were quite satisfied with the work of Germans. It is for this reason that they wanted to begin negotiations with the Anatolia Railway Company for the extension towards Mesopotamia of the railway, as soon as possible. The “good” note added by Emperor Wilhelm II at exactly this point of the report was a concrete sign of the importance he attributed to the construction of railways in the Ottoman Empire.93
In consideration of the positive evolution of its relations with the Ottoman state, the German empire signed a new commercial treaty with it in 1890; and was the first and only country to do this. However, article 35 of agreement stipulated that for the treaty to be valid, the other countries had also to sign agreements with the same conditions.94 This article meant that the treaty was of no practical value, since the other European countries were not going to sign new trade agreements along these lines. As a matter of fact the Germans had used an opportunity to be courteous to the Ottoman state without incurring any cost.
B) Extension of the Ankara Railway
1) New applications
That the Anatolian Railway would not end in Ankara was a truth known by all those pursuing concessions in the Ottoman empire. Sure enough, on 9 February 1889, a “company with the aim of obtaining a concession for the construction of a railway between Ankara and Baghdad was formed by respectable capital holders of America” even before work for the Anatolian Railway had begun. Ottoman officials decided to “invite the company representative with no undertaking to negotiations” so as to increase their negotiating power vis à vis the Anatolian Railway Company.95
In 1891, a Belgian–French group applied for a concession for the Samsun–İskenderun Railway. The applicants had brought a reference letter from the king of Belgium. In his letter, King Leopold praised the Belgian applicants and stated, “I hope that Your Magnificence will deign to accept this application of my subjects for a concession.”96 The other concession application from Belgium was the one submitted by Member of Parliament Baron de Makar. The baron had stated that if the sultan so wished, he could have connected the railway he wished to construct between Samsun and Sivas with the Anatolian Railway. He undertook not to damage any of the rights of the Anatolian Railway Company while doing this.97 However, in a letter dated 6 October 1891, the Anatolian Railway Company listed the disadvantages from their point of view of the concession requested by the baron and stated in very clear terms their opposition to this concession.98 Consequently, the Sublime Porte stated that the construction of the Baghdad Railway had precedence and rejected this application.99
Also in 1891, Staniforth presented a proposal that might have been in competition with the Anatolian Railway Company. The railway that this British entrepreneur, who enjoyed the support of the British ambassador, wanted to construct was supposed to begin in Ereğli and through Ankara to extend to Baghdad. As for the aim of a French group led by the Belgian Nagelmakers, it was to extend an existing railway from Mudanya to Bursa, as far as Konya over Kütahya.100
In that same year, another interesting application was the one submitted by a Parisian entrepreneur named Charles Cotard, for the construction of a railway between Samsun and Sivas. In a letter to the Sublime Porte, dated 8 April 1891, Cotard “dared to submit” his availability to construct the railway without asking for kilometre guarantees, and in extremely
Another random document with no related content on Scribd:
Grishkin is nice; her Russian eye
Is underlined for emphasis; Uncorseted, her friendly bust
Gives promise of pneumatic bliss.
The couched Brazilian jaguar
Compels the scampering marmoset
With subtle effluence of cat; Grishkin has a maisonette:
The sleek and sinuous jaguar
Does not in his arboreal gloom
Distil so rank a feline smell
As Grishkin in a drawing-room.
And even abstracter entities
Circumambulate her charm;
But our lot crawls between dry ribs
To keep its metaphysics warm.
THE HIPPOPOTAMUS
Similiter et omnes revereantur Diaconos, ut mandatum Jesu Christi; et Episcopum, ut Jesum Christum, existentem filium Patris; Presbyteros autem, ut concilium Dei et Conjunctionem Apostolorum. Sine his Ecclesia non vocatur; de quibus suadeo vos sic habeo.
S. I A T .
And when this epistle is read among you, cause that it be read also in the church of the Laodiceans.
broad backed hippopotamus Rests on his belly on the mud; Although he seems so firm to us He is merely flesh and blood.
Flesh-andblood is weak and frail, Susceptible to nervous shock;
While the True Church can never fail For it is based upon a rock.
The hippo’s feeble steps may err In compassing material ends, While the True Church need never stir To gather in its dividends.
The potamus can never reach The mango on the mango tree; But fruits of pomegranate and peach Refresh the Church from over sea.
At mating time the hippo’s voice Betrays inflexions hoarse and odd, But every week we hear rejoice The Church, at being one with God.
The hippopotamus’s day Is past in sleep; at night he hunts; God works in a mysterious way The Church can sleep and eat at once.
I saw the potamus take wing Ascending from the damp savannas, And quiring angels round him sing The praise of God in loud hosannas.
Blood of the Lamb shall wash him clean And him shall heavenly arms enfold, Among the saints he shall be seen Performing on a harp of gold.
He shall be washed as white as snow, By all the martyr’d virgins kist, While the True Church remains below Wrapt in the old miasmal mist.
A COOKING EGG
En l’an trentiesme de mon aage
Que toutes mes hontes j’ay beues...
Supported on the mantelpiece
An Invitation to the Dance.
I shall not want Honour in Heaven
For I shall meet Sir Philip Sidney And have talk with Coriolanus
And other heroes of that kidney.
I shall not want Capital in Heaven
For I shall meet Sir Alfred Mond:
sate upright in her chair
Some distance from where I was sitting; Views of the Oxford Colleges Lay on the table with the knitting.
Daguerrotypes and silhouettes, Her grandfather and great great aunts,
We two shall lie together, lapt In a five per cent Exchequer Bond.
I shall not want Society in Heaven Lucretia Borgia shall be my Bride; Her anecdotes will be more amusing Than Pipit’s experience could provide.
I shall not want Pipit in Heaven: Madame Blavatsky will instruct me In the seven Sacred Trances; Piccarda de’ Donati will conduct me....
But where is the penny world I bought To eat with Pipit behind the screen? The red-eyed scavengers are creeping From Kentish Town and Golder’s Green;
Where are the eagles and the trumpets?
Buried beneath some snow-deep Alps. Over buttered scones and crumpets Weeping, weeping multitudes Droop in a hundred A. B. C.’s.
LUNE DE MIEL
les genoux
ont vu les Pays-Bas, ils rentrent á Terre Haute; Mais une nuit d’été, les voici à Ravenne, A l’aise entre deux draps, chez deux centaines de punaises;
La sueur estivale, et une forte odeur de chienne.
Ils restent sur le dos écartant
De quatre jambes molles tout gonflées de morsures.
On relève le drap pour mieux égratigner.
Moins d’une lieue d’ici est Sainte Apollinaire
In Classe, basilique connue des amateurs
De chapitaux d’acanthe que tournoie le vent.
Ils vont prendre le train de huit heures
Prolonger leurs misères de Padoue à Milan
Où se trouvent le Cène, et un restaurant pas cher.
Lui pense aux pourboires, et rédige son bilan.
Ils auront vu la Suisse et traversé la France,
Et Sainte Apollinaire, raide et ascétique, Vieille usine désaffectée de Dieu, tient encore
Dans ses pierres écroulantes la forme précise de Byzance.
DANS LE RESTAURANT
garçon délabré qui n’a rien à faire
Que de se gratter les doigts et se pencher sur mon épaule: “Dans mon pays, il fera temps pluvieux, Du vent, du grand soleil et de la pluie; C’est ce qu’on appelle le jour de lessive des gueux.”
(Bavard, baveux, à la croupe arrondie, Je t’en prie, au moins, ne bave pas dans la soupe.)
“Les saules tout trempés, et des bourgeons sur les ronces—
C’est là, dans une averse, qu’on s’abrite.
J’avais sept ans, elle était plus petite.
Elle était toute mouillée, je lui ai donné des primevères.”
Les tâches de son gilet montent au chiffre de trente-huit.
“Je la chatouillais, pour la faire rire.
Elle avait une odeur fraîche qui m’était inconnue,—”
Mais alors, vieux lubrique—
“Monsieur, le fait est dur, Il est venu, nous péloter, un gros chien,
Moi j’avais peur, je l’ai quittée à mi-chemin; C’est dommage.”
Mais alors, tu as ton vautour.
Va-t’en te décrotter les rides du visage; Tiens, ma fourchette, décrasse-toi le crâne, De quel droit paies-tu des expériences comme moi? Tiens, voilà dix sous, pour la salle-de-bain.
Phlébas, le Phénicien, pendant quinze jours noyé, Oubliait le cri des mouettes et la houle de Cornouaille, Et les profits et les pertes, et la cargaison d’étain; Un courant de sous-mer l’emporta très loin, Le repassant aux étapes de sa vie antérieure.
Figurez-vous donc, c’était un sort pénible. Cependant, ce fut jadis un bel homme, de haute taille.
LE SPECTATEUR
Bras-dessus bras-dessous
Font des tours
A pas de loup.
Dans un égout
Une petite fille
En guenilles
Camarde
Regarde
Le directeur
Du Spectateur
Conservateur
Et crève d’amour.
à malheureuse
Tamise!
Qui coule si pres du Spectateur.
Le directeur Du Spectateur
Empeste la brise.
Les actionnaires
Réactionnair
es
Du Spectateur
Conservateur
MÉLANGE ADULTÈRE DE TOUT
que je me coiffe
Casque noir de jemenfoutiste.
En Allemagne, philosophe
Surexcité par Emporheben
Au grand air de Bergsteigleben; J’erre toujours de-ci de-là
A divers coups de tra la la De Damas jusque à Omaha; Je célebrai mon jour de fête
Dans un oasis d’Afrique, Vêtu d’une peau de girafe.
On montrera mon cénotaphe
Aux côtes brulantes de Mozambique.
Amérique, professeur; En Angleterre, journaliste; C’est à grands pas et en sueur Que vous suivrez à peine ma piste.
En Yorkshire, conférencier; A Londres, un peu banquier; (Vous me paierez bien la tête.)
C’est à Paris
ODE
To you particularly, and to all the Volscians
Great hurt and mischief.
Misunderstood
The accents of the now retired Profession of the calamus.
Tortured. When the bridegroom smoothed his hair
There was blood upon the bed. Morning was already late. Children singing in the orchard
. Subterrene laughter synchronous With silence from the sacred wood And bubbling of the uninspired Mephitic river.
(Io Hymen, Hymenæe)
Succuba eviscerate.
Tortuous.
By arrangement with Perseus
The fooled resentment of the dragon Sailing before the wind at dawn. Golden apocalypse. Indignant
At the cheap extinction of his taking-off. Now lies he there Tip to tip washed beneath Charles’ Wagon.
PRUFROCK.
THE LOVE SONG OF J. ALFRED PRUFROCK
S’io credesse che mia risposta fosse
A persona che mai tornasse al mondo, Questa fiamma staria senza più scosse. Ma perciocche giammai di questo fondo Non torno vivo alcun, s’i’ odo il vero, Senza tema d’infamia ti rispondo.
night cheap hotels And sawdust restaurants with oyster-shells: Streets that follow like a tedious argument
, I, When the evening is spread out against the sky Like a patient etherized upon a table; Let us go, through certain half-deserted streets, The muttering retreats
Of restless nights in one-
Of insidious intent
To lead you to an overwhelming question.... Oh, do not ask, “What is it?”
Let us go and make our visit.
In the room the women come and go Talking of Michelangelo.
The yellow fog that rubs its back upon the window-panes, The yellow smoke that rubs its muzzle on the window-panes, Licked its tongue into the corners of the evening, Lingered upon the pools that stand in drains, Let fall upon its back the soot that falls from chimneys, Slipped by the terrace, made a sudden leap, And seeing that it was a soft October night, Curled once about the house, and fell asleep.
And indeed there will be time
For the yellow smoke that slides along the street, Rubbing its back upon the window-panes; There will be time, there will be time To prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet; There will be time to murder and create, And time for all the works and days of hands That lift and drop a question on your plate; Time for you and time for me, And time yet for a hundred indecisions, And for a hundred visions and revisions, Before the taking of a toast and tea.
In the room the women come and go Talking of Michelangelo.
And indeed there will be time To wonder, “Do I dare?” and, “Do I dare?”
Time to turn back and descend the stair, With a bald spot in the middle of my hair— (They will say: “How his hair is growing thin!”)
My morning coat, my collar mounting firmly to the chin, My necktie rich and modest, but asserted by a simple pin— (They will say: “But how his arms and legs are thin!”)
Do I dare
Disturb the universe?
In a minute there is time For decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse.
For I have known them all already, known them all: Have known the evenings, mornings, afternoons, I have measured out my life with coffee spoons; I know the voices dying with a dying fall Beneath the music from a farther room.
So how should I presume?
And I have known the eyes already, known them all— The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase, And when I am formulated, sprawling on a pin, When I am pinned and wriggling on the wall, Then how should I begin To spit out all the butt-ends of my ways and days? And how should I presume?
And I have known the arms already, known them all— Arms that are braceleted and white and bare (But in the lamplight, downed with light brown hair!) Is it perfume from a dress
That makes me so digress?
Arms that lie along a table, or wrap about a shawl. And should I then presume?
And how should I begin?
Shall I say, I have gone at dusk through narrow streets And watched the smoke that rises from the pipes Of lonely men in shirtsleeves, leaning out of windows?...
I should have been a pair of ragged claws
Scuttling across the floors of silent seas.
And the afternoon, the evening, sleeps so peacefully! Smoothed by long fingers, Asleep ... tired ... or it malingers, Stretched on the floor, here beside you and me. Should I, after tea and cakes and ices, Have the strength to force the moment to its crisis? But though I have wept and fasted, wept and prayed, Though I have seen my head (grown slightly bald) brought in upon a platter, I am no prophet—and here’s no great matter; I have seen the moment of my greatness flicker, And I have seen the eternal Footman hold my coat, and snicker, And in short, I was afraid.
And would it have been worth it, after all, After the cups, the marmalade, the tea, Among the porcelain, among some talk of you and me, Would it have been worth while, To have bitten off the matter with a smile, To have squeezed the universe into a ball To roll it toward some overwhelming question, To say: “I am Lazarus, come from the dead, Come back to tell you all, I shall tell you all”— If one, settling a pillow by her head, Should say: “That is not what I meant at all, That is not it, at all.”
And would it have been worth it, after all, Would it have been worth while, After the sunsets and the dooryards and the sprinkled streets, After the novels, after the teacups, after the skirts that trail along the floor— And this, and so much more?—
It is impossible to say just what I mean! But as if a magic lantern threw the nerves in patterns on a screen:
Would it have been worth while If one, settling a pillow or throwing off a shawl, And turning toward the window, should say: “That is not it at all, That is not what I meant, at all.”
No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be; Am an attendant, lord, one that will do To swell a progress, start a scene or two, Advise the prince; no doubt, an easy tool, Deferential, glad to be of use, Politic, cautious, and meticulous; Full of high sentence, but a bit obtuse; At times, indeed, almost ridiculous— Almost, at times, the Fool.
I grow old ... I grow old ... I shall wear the bottom of my trousers rolled.
Shall I part my hair behind? Do I dare to eat a peach? I shall wear white flannel trousers, and walk upon the beach. I have heard the mermaids singing, each to each.
I do not think that they will sing to me.
I have seen them riding seaward on the waves Combing the white hair of the waves blown back When the wind blows the water white and black.
We have lingered in the chambers of the sea By sea-girls wreathed with seaweed red and brown Till human voices wake us, and we drown.
PORTRAIT OF A LADY
Thou hast committed—
Fornication: but that was in another country, And besides, the wench is dead.
T J M
Ioverhead,
the smoke and fog of a December afternoon You have the scene arrange itself—as it will seem to do— With “I have saved this afternoon for you”; And four wax candles in the darkened room, Four rings of light upon the ceiling
An atmosphere of Juliet’s tomb Prepared for all the things to be said, or left unsaid.
We have been, let us say, to hear the latest Pole Transmit the Preludes, through his hair and finger-tips.
“So intimate, this Chopin, that I think his soul Should be resurrected only among friends
