Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications
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J. Martín Ramírez • Jerzy Biziewski
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Security and Defence in Europe
Editors
J. Martín Ramírez Nebrija University Madrid, Spain
Jerzy Biziewski Dobczyce, Poland
ISSN 1613-5113
ISSN 2363-9466 (electronic)
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications
ISBN 978-3-030-12292-8 ISBN 978-3-030-12293-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12293-5
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In Memoriam
to Guillermo Velarde (1928–2018)
“our atomic scientist” for his outstanding contributions to CICA
Guillermo Velarde Founder and President of the Spanish Institute for Nuclear Fusion Member of Pugwash and of CICA International, Madrid, Spain
Prologue: European Defence and Security at a Time of Global Mutation
Europe at a Time of Change
Before delving into the question of European defense and security at a time of global mutation, a short note on precision at the outset is needed. These days, precision is frequently lacking to the detriment of effective policy. This lack of definition is seen everywhere, from migration to energy. It is, however, particularly so in the field of security and defense. In a time of safety and certainty, such casualness can be excused, but today, it is something that we cannot afford. This entreaty notwithstanding this short contribution focuses on European Union defense, though, strictly speaking, the “European defense” referred to in the title connotes something more, going to the geographical boundaries of Europe and beyond.
Changing World
We cannot speak about European defense without remembering some facts – no matter how obvious. Power has shifted from West to East. New threats have emerged. Borders have faded and virulent nationalism has returned. And the systematized rule-based liberal order that has defined the world for the last 70 years appears to be giving way to a new era of transactionalism. What was once self-evident and inevitable is no longer so.
This is particularly so for Europe. What makes this such a moment of dislocation is that the EU is a project by and of the rule-based order. It is a creature of the world that we have had, not the one that we seem to be moving toward.
And it is precisely at this moment of underlying and unsettling global change, and the inherent security and defense challenges that it brings, that the EU finds itself directly confronted with two realities that by their very nature force a fundamental reconsideration of the EU approach to security and defense.
The first is the unprecedented uncertainty of the transatlantic relationship. It is hard to understate the seismic nature of the arrival of Donald Trump to the White House. Europe has been slapped in the face with the prospect of a Washington that cannot be counted on. Like many chickens that are today coming home to roost, the American pull away from transatlanticism has been a long time coming. We saw this trend progressively develop over the previous two US administrations, particularly under Barack Obama.
But it was a subtle shift away that allowed many to engage in continued denial that the center of gravity of American security interests was no longer in the heart of Europe but had moved further East.
In this regard, Donald Trump for all of his bluster and mismanagement has provided, in some skewed way, a service. That Europeans cannot fully rely on the United States is now unavoidable. It was a message brought home at the unprecedentedly chaotic 2018 G7 Summit in Quebec. What the G7 shows is not that there is a withdrawal from Europe or America’s allies but rather the absence of strategy. It is now shooting from the hip par excellence. In the face of this unpredictability, it is clear that Europe must truly and actively begin to think of acting for itself.
The other reality is, certainly, Brexit. Since the idea of a Common Security and Defence Policy arose, it has always been taken for granted that the United Kingdom and France – Europe’s only major military actors, permanent members of the UN Security Council, and nuclear powers – would be an integral part. The thought was that Europe could not act in a meaningful way militarily unless at least one of them is involved. And there is reason for that belief. In Europe today, there are not more than six member states that can effectively project power beyond their frontiers.
But the deeper reality has been that Europe is unable to meaningfully act in developing capacities, efficiencies, and strategic autonomy with the United Kingdom involved. British reticence to moving European defense forward and its dogmatic insistence on the preeminence of NATO as the framework for European security are well known.
With Brexit, there is now a necessity and an opportunity for a reset and an opening to move toward strategic autonomy within Europe. To be clear, this is not just a question of Britain. With Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) today, we have member states that are openly trying to undermine the initiative. But Westminster’s past chilling effect is real.
This is not to say that Brexit will be, nor should it be, a cutting of the cord between the continent and the United Kingdom in security and defense matters. Europe needs Britain, its weight, its experience, and its network. And Britain needs Europe. The alternative, a tighter US-UK special relationship, seems an unrealistic opinion in the age of Trump.
I have been a vocal advocate for continuing the connection between Europe and the United Kingdom on security and defense matters. Indeed, I have gone beyond the EU’s supposed redlines on such cooperation. Formal observer status in relevant decision-making bodies such as the PSC should not be denied out of hand. I understand the sensitivities involved and, in particular, the negative signal that the pres-
ence of a permanent, nonvoting, “external” actor sends in terms of establishing Europe’s “strategic autonomy”.
But security and defense are too important to worry about appearances. Europe is coming from a deep enough hole that we cannot afford to turn away from capable allies. As Munich Security Conference Chairman Wolfgang Ischinger said recently: “Trade can be transactional; security is not.”
And so whether it is through a structured strategic dialogue or, preferably, through more formalized ongoing connections, Brexit must not mean a European defense without Britain.
Prior Crossroads: European Defense Community
Europe is today at a crossroad. It is not unlike the one faced by the founding generation of the European Project in the early 1950s.
Robert Schuman described the Atlantic system in 1951 as follows: “even if it can meet demands that are urgent as well as being temporary, offers no solution to the Europe problem. We believe that Europe must organize itself, tear itself free from a fragmentation that has become anachronistic and absurd, and should do so no matter what, irrespective of which intercontinental or global solutions are also adopted.” It is the same today.
The short unhappy life of the EDC is worth at least a short mention, as the forkin-the-road decision to move away from the community in 1954 has had significant implications for the structural and societal development of Europe for the last 60 years. In 1950, Europe was at crossroad. Then, as now, the fundamental problem had to do with the role of Germany’s contribution to defense.
With the dawn of the Cold War and following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, there was a perceived need, particularly in Washington, of balancing forces within Europe. This could only mean the reconstitution of the German Army, something anathema to Western European countries that just 5 years before had been under German occupation.
Into this breech stepped France with a proposal for the creation of a European army. It was a plan that necessarily entailed a political union. It was an artful way satisfying the American’s desire to have Germans under arms without the baggage of a new German army in the heart of Europe.
In 1952, the EDC Treaty was adopted and then nothing. The end of the Korean War and the death of Stalin created a momentary thaw in the Cold War that removed the urgency in moving forward with the plan. In 1954, the EDC ended where it began when France, sharply divided over the idea of European defense, failed to ratify the Treaty.
A year later, the allied occupation of Germany formally ended, Germany entered NATO, and the trajectory of European defense became wholly subsumed within the transatlantic framework. Meanwhile, the European Project turned away from defense (and the common political position that defense entailed) toward markets as
Prologue: European Defence and Security at a Time of Global Mutation
the core driver for the construction. It was to be the single market, not the common defense, that would be the center of gravity of the European project. Indeed, it was the sole center of gravity – with prosperity, not peace (or politics), as the core instrument. It was a fateful fork-in-the-road moment for Europe.
Looking Ahead: New Initiatives
Sixty years later, here we are, the product of that trajectory. But, as in 1950, we are again at another crossroads. The framework and context have changed and Europe must change with it.
There are signs that such change is occurring. PESCO is a positive, if modest, step, though it is presently overshadowed by the mixed feelings of its members. Emmanuel Macron’s coalition of the willing, while not a long-term solution, shows initiative. The establishment of the European Defence Fund, something long overdue, finally prioritizes the communitarization of the defense industry. And there is the revamped European Defence Agency, led by Jorge Domecq of Spain, who is navigating the extremely shallow waters inherent in the transition from internal market to defense.
But before Europe begins to go down the road toward a new and needed approach to security and defense, it must be clear on certain fundamental aspects. Too often, Europe approaches a problem by forging ahead or muddling through without recognizing what it is trying to achieve and what it must overcome. In taking this approach, the first step, indeed the elephant in the room, is addressing perceptions and reality, getting things straight before forging ahead.
Addressing Perceptions
The European relationship with security and defense is loaded: it is loaded by our history, by our political structures, by our alliances, and by our geography. In Malaga you do not perceive Russia as a threat just as it has taken a very long time for Northern Europeans to recognize the Southern Mediterranean as a priority.
In order to move forward, it is necessary to prepare not just member states but also society.
Clarifying Security and Defense
First, we must make clear what we mean by security and what we mean by defense. There is a general tendency to conflate these two related but distinct concepts. It is a trend, however, that is particularly pronounced in Europe, acutely in the Brussels
institutions and in Germany. Nowadays, it is rare to hear the word “defense” in Europe without the words “security and” immediately preceding it.
There are a variety of reasons for this blurring of the lines between security and defense. It is partly the result of the post-Cold War and particularly post-9/11 worlds. It is influenced by the changing nature of threats and international actors as well as the porousness of frontiers and the breakdowns of boundaries through globalization. And it is certainly partly due to the ever-expanding scope of security, a concept that now features energy security, environmental security, cyber security, food security, and most of all human security.
In such a context in which everything becomes a matter of “security,” the traditional distinction between security and defense – whereby security implied the response to internal facing threats and defense related to external facing threats –goes against the tide.
In Europe that fading line is also due to the primacy that NATO and the transatlantic guarantee have played in defense. The feeling that defense is more or less taken care of has enabled the lumping together of security and defense.
However, security and defense are distinct matters. They entail different sensibilities and strategic approaches even if these days, the tools are often the same. These are policies that should be more teammates than twins.
For a number of reasons – budgetary, cultural, structural, convenience, and expedience – we have tended more and more toward a single amalgamated policy. Now, this move has occurred at different speeds in different member states. Overall, there is certainly a general trajectory – and one that has served the predilections of the EU’s most powerful and influential member state.
In today’s world, this continual melding of security with defense is simply not sensible. It feeds and enables a broader sense in Europe that we are past history. What we have seen these last years is that we are not. History is rapidly catching back up to us.
Changing Public Perceptions
Equally important to the untangling of the conceptions of security and defense at the policy level is the need to educate and convince European publics, complacent by our long peace, of the importance and necessity of defense – and, in particular, an external defense that will project beyond our borders.
There are many historical and cultural reasons for Europeans to be reticent about investment in the military. But interestingly, trust for the military is high in Europe. In Spain the military is the second most trusted institution following the crown, while Germany has seen support rise to 76%, one of the highest levels of support in the EU.
There are a number of reasons for this rising support. One that is clear is that we see a retrenchment in trust for the military as a response to the lack of trust in political institutions that citizens perceive as having failed them.
I would posit as well that the military’s positive image is also related to the blurring of the lines between security and defense mentioned above. The military today is associated with benign activity – public safety, humanitarian assistance, and defense at the borders (but not beyond).
As defense has come to mean security, so too has the public’s way of looking at the military shifted. This is food for thought and, in my opinion, cause for concern.
Here, it is interesting to note that while public support for defense and security policy enjoys a similarly high level of support – rising slightly overall from 73% in 2001 to 75% today – European publics have shown a reluctance in relation to the use of force. Pew Research polled individual publics in individual EU member states about their willingness to use force in defense of NATO allies under attack – a treaty obligation. While the United States and Canada had majorities (56% and 53%) supportive of such a use of force, none of the European countries polled had over 50% support for such a notion. We support our military, but in the conduct of security and not defense.
If Europe is to build a defense policy meant for the challenges of the modern world, this has to change. This happens by being clear on policy and by reinvigorating the defense industry. But it also happens through education and discourse. Without entrenched public support, sensible policy will not be sustainable.
Coming to Terms with the Transatlantic Relationship
Finally, in terms of perceptions, there is a need to establish a healthier, clearer-eyed vision of the transatlantic relationship. We tend to be manic when it comes to the United States. Either we slavishly depend on the United States or we reject it – often doing both at the same time. Neither of these is helpful. Instead, there should be moderation and rationality to see where we stand and where our American partners stand as well.
Again this is a difficult and loaded topic. There has always been a persistent strain of anti-Americanism within European societies. There is also a strong sense of our special relationship and cultural connection. We are close but we have our differences, and sometimes we are even estranged.
The United States casts a long shadow in Europe, particularly in the area of defense. It will for the foreseeable future. But the outsized influence of the United States has prevented us from coolly assessing our own position and requirements. We shuttle between complacent dependence and hostility. It is a middle way that is needed.
In order to weigh in serious defense matters and confront major conventional and non-conventional threats, partnership with the United States will remain a sine qua non. We also can be secure that our connection will endure; even within the turbulence of the Trump Administration, we remain linked.
But this is no excuse for inaction. Europe simply has to develop the capacity to act independently in its near abroad and beyond. In this, the presence of the French fleet in the South China Seas is important not just for France but also for Europe. This is not only a question of capacity but of mentality. Europe’s strategic autonomy should not be perceived as a counterpoint or counterweight to the United States. This is not Mr. Chirac’s multipolar world. A Europe able to act independently in its interests is not a replacement for or contrary to the transatlantic alliance. But to achieve such a development, the old resentments and perceptions have to be put aside. This takes a maturity that is in short supply these days.
Recognizing Realities
Moving beyond perceptions to reality, it is necessary to briefly look at what is facing us. In constructing an effective self-standing defense, the European Union (EU) will impinge upon the interests and predispositions of the major powers that surround it. Finding how to navigate around these obstacles will be imperative in moving forward with a sensible policy.
Russia
The most obvious opponent to an effective European defensive system is Russia. The last years have provided ample evidence of Russia’s efforts, and successes, in breeding division rather than cohesion within the European Project. The reason is manifest: we have a compelling message – a narrative of rights and law and prosperity – that is an existential threat to Vladimir Putin’s rule. The diminishment, ineffectiveness, and fragmentation of our model serve his interest. This is to say nothing of the competition for influence in Europe’s east and southeast. If Europe is able to move forward with an autonomous capacity to project power – military power –beyond its borders, it is likely to face a hostile response from our neighbors in Moscow.
United States
Closer, at least spiritually, is the United States. The American desire for Europe to carry its weight and do more on defense is long-standing. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ rebuke during his farewell address in 2011 was clear: “If current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future US political leaders – those for whom the Cold War was not the formative
experience that it was for me – may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.” These prescient words were followed by Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign and presidency which has featured a much heavier drumbeat of this message. Here, we should address our part in this responsibility, but again, that is beyond the scope of these introductory remarks.
At the same time, we see that when Europe does take even baby steps toward establishing autonomy, the United States feels unsettled. We need to look only to the immediate misgivings of the United States put forward as its first response to PESCO, itself only a modest proposal.
The United States wants Europe to carry more of the load, but not at the expense of US influence (or arms purchases). It is a totally understandable position for the United States, but it raises the specter of conflict with the best interests of Europe.
Within (Germany)
Finally, Europe has to face the fact that its most significant power, Germany, is tepid at best when it comes to reinvigorating European defense as well as making the financial commitments necessary for such a development. Beyond the persistent failure to increase defense spending, Germany has pulled back the reins on French attempts to begin to construct the kind of defense capacity that Europe needs, most recently in preventing the development of PESCO as a platform for a military intervention force and limiting its scope to the types of cooperative nonlethal projects that it is currently focused on. This is what spurred Emmanuel Macron’s coalition of the willing idea, which, while positive, is far from ideal, particularly in terms of creating the conditions for strategic thought.
There are historical, financial, and political reasons for Germany’s posture. On a subconscious level, German reticence toward building a full-throated European defense capacity may also be a fear of relinquishing its dominant position in Europe. Since the fork-in-the-road moment in 1954–1956 that saw the EDC fall and the Treaty of Rome rise, the European Project has built around the idea of the market. This was the center of gravity that held everything together and the foundation upon which everything was built, for better or worse.
In such a system, Germany, the largest producer and largest market, has the largest role to play and the most influence. It is a reality that has openly defined Europe for the last decade and beyond.
Building a more well-rounded European Union, one with political and defense components, would necessarily reduce the import of the market – and in the process threaten German primacy, at least for the short run. This would be a hard pill to swallow for any power. Figuring a way around German sensitivities is imperative. As we have seen with institutional governance, a “nein” in Berlin means a “non” in Brussels.
Avoiding These Obstacles
So, what can be done? In all three cases, the key comes down to managing expectations.
In relation to Russia, Europe has to face facts; it will never be able to frontally respond to a challenge like Russia on its own without the United States. It is precisely the kind of challenge that the transatlantic alliance was built for. That imperative still exists. We cannot and should not seek to replace it. That said, today, and the Minsk process as a prime example, when it comes to Russia, we simply do not weigh enough. We have lost our pull. We can and must regain it. We will not be able to stare down Moscow, but we should at least be able to get into the same room. In that, our relationship with Russia offers a reasonable measuring stick for success. Europe will succeed not in showing itself a threat to Russia but in showing its strength. Again, it is a middle path.
Vis-à-vis the United States, we need to come of age. We need the United States, but we also need to begin to spread our own wings. Instead of fending for ourselves as Angela Merkel famously did last year, Europe should frame this more in terms of the value brought to the transatlantic alliance. If Europe develops capacity to act effectively in its neighborhood, it could (and should) relieve pressure on the United States.
This type of burden sharing was openly hoped for by Barack Obama while he was in office. And it is realistic to think that this impulse will be there in a postTrump White House. The key is reassuring the United States that it will remain a primary European power. Europe is not a threat. We can be a strong partner. Germany presents the most imperative and knottiest of these approaches. Without Berlin on board, European policy goes nowhere.
France, for all of Emmanuel Macron’s vision, cannot pull Europe forward alone. Angela Merkel’s recent comments endorsing Macron’s proposed common defense force are positive. But this is not enough. Germany must be convinced. As noted by Ulrich Speck recently, Germany has a long 50-year history of being dragged into defense arrangements at the prodding, cajoling, and insistence of its allies. To have a sustainable and effective European defense, Germany has to internalize that it is in its own best interests, and to take such an approach will expand its own margin of maneuver.
It is a tricky argument to make. Certainly, it involves demonstrating the potential flexibility of Europe: showing the benefits of developing capacity that provides strategic distance from the United States while creating enough strength to approach Russia in a constructive way on basis not dependent on the transatlantic relationship. It will also need elements to provide Germany with an ongoing sense of control. Whatever the approach, Germany must be in.
Conclusion
So here we find ourselves, living in a time of global mutation and fully aware that history does not repeat itself, but knowing as well that we need to learn from our past endeavors. In that sense, Rene Pleven comes to mind. As he did in 1950, we too have to keep the Americans reassured, the Russians countered, and the Germans in. Europe took a fork in the road then that defined its next 60 years. Before we take next, let’s be sure we are ready.
Short Biosketch of the Author
Ana Palacio is an international lawyer specializing in international and European Union law and arbitration. She is the Founding Partner of the law and public affairs firm Palacio y Asociados.
Between 1994 and 2002, Ms. Palacio was a Member of the European Parliament, where she chaired the Legal Affairs and Internal Market Committee as well as the Citizens Rights, Justice and Home Affairs Committee. She participated as member of the Presidium of the Convention for the Future of Europe (2001–2003) in the debate and drafting of the European Constitution. In 2002, Ms. Palacio became the first woman to serve as Foreign Affairs Minister of Spain (2002–2004). She was a Member of the Spanish Parliament (2004–2006), where she chaired the Joint Committee of the Two Houses for European Union Affairs. She has been a Senior Vice-President and General Counsel of the World Bank Group and Secretary General of ICSID (2006–2008), and she has been a member of the Executive Committee and Senior Vice-President for International Affairs of AREVA (2008–2009). She was elected as a Member of the Council of State of Spain from April 2012 to October 2018.
Ms. Palacio sits on numerous boards of directors and is currently a member of the Boards of Enagás (Spanish gas system), Pharmamar (biotechnology), and AEE Power (energy infrastructure), as well as of the International Advisory Boards of Investcorp (a world-leading manager of alternative investments) and Office Chérifien des Phosphates – OCP – (fertilizers), and of the Governing Council of the Instituto de Empresa (business school). She is a member of the Board and of the Executive Committee of the Atlantic Council of the United States. Further, Ms. Palacio serves as member of the External Advisory Board of the Energy Futures Initiative, of the Advisory Board of the Sandra Day O’Connor Justice Prize, of the Board of Trustees of the United Sates – Spain Council and of the Institute for Human Sciences, as well as of the Scientific Council of Elcano Royal Institute. She has recently been appointed as a member of the Global Leadership Foundation.
Ms. Palacio publishes regularly in periodicals and journals. In particular, she maintains a monthly column at Project Syndicate and she is a recurrent participant
Prologue: European Defence and Security at a Time of Global Mutation
and speaker at international conferences and fora. In addition, she is a Visiting Professor at the Edmund E. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
She holds degrees in law, political science, and sociology with honors. She has received numerous awards and decorations, including Officer at the Order of the Legion of Honor of the French Republic, Honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters from Georgetown University, and the 2016 Sandra Day O’Connor Justice Prize acknowledging extraordinary contributions to the rule of law.
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spanish Kingdom Madrid, Spain
Member of the Spanish Council of State Madrid, Spain
Ana Palacio assistant.ap@palacioyasociados.com
Introduction
We want to dedicate this book to Prof. Guillermo Velarde, Founder and President of the Spanish Institute for Nuclear Fusion, who unfortunately passed away at the beginning of this year. Besides being an active member of the CICA International Scientific Committee and of Pugwash Movement for many years, he was a wonderful man, a great scientist –“our atomic scientist,” as the Duke of Tetuan, Hugo O’Donell, liked to call him – and an outstanding military general, who has become part of the Defence of Europe during this last half a century.
After graduating from Pennsylvania State University with a degree in Nuclear Science and Engineering, Prof. Velarde acted as Director of the Division of Technology of the former Spanish Atomic Energy Commission. He was the Chair Professor of Nuclear Physics since 1973 at the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, and, in 1982, he founded the Institute of Nuclear Fusion.
And he also had a very successful career as a General in the Spanish Air Force. In the Spanish Museum of Aeronautics, there is a mural dedicated to him, where his unique contribution to the aeronautics is summarized in the following sentence: de las bombas termonucleares a la fusión nuclear por laser para producir energía eléctrica, i.e., “from the thermonuclear bombs to the nuclear fusion by laser for producing electric energy.”
In the right bottom corner, there is a picture of the main experts appointed by American and Spanish governments on occasion of the infamous Palomares nuclear incident, which occurred on 17 January 1966, when a B-52G bomber of the United States Air Force’s Strategic Air Command, carrying four Mk28-type hydrogen bombs, collided with a KC-135 tanker during mid-air refueling at 31,000 feet (9450 m) over the Mediterranean Sea, off the coast of Spain, near the village of Palomares. Prof. Velarde (second on the left) was the person in charge of the analysis and interpretation of the thermonuclear weapons.
Over the last quarter of a century, we had the honor of attending with General Velarde at numerous Pugwash and CICA conferences in Europe, Asia, the United States, and South America. General Velarde’s presence was always an added value to the experience of the other participants, as well as the quality of the conferences. His warm personality and our close collaboration made us very close friends. His inspiration and leadership in science contributed significantly to the mission of making this world a more secure place, which is precisely one of the main aims of CICA International.
Professor Velarde received several awards and recognitions for his outstanding research, being the most important ones the Edward Teller Award in 1997 for his pioneering research and leadership in the use of laser and ion-particle beams to produce unique high-temperature and high-density matter for scientific research; the Prize Archie H. Harms for his work in emerging nuclear energy systems, in 1998; and in 2011, the Marqués de Santa Cruz de Marcenado Award, granted by the Spanish Armed Forces, for his outstanding scientific work in the Armed Forces. He was also a member of the European Academy of Sciences. He will be sorely missed. May his soul rest in eternal peace!
The present book is a product of some selected contributions to the XLV CICA, plus some other ones on close topics, focused on one of the most timely challenges in Europe: the future of its security and defense. Experts from around 20 countries took part at the conference. They were mostly Europeans (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom), but there were also from other continents (Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Iran, Nigeria, and the United States). We were also very honored by the presence of a top-level delegation from the University of Public and Individual Security “Apeiron” in Cracow, official institutional partner, with Nebrija University in Madrid, of CICA International.
But, who are we? CICA International offers international conferences intended to tackle universal human problems related to conflict in a wide-ranging way that transcends disciplinary and cultural perspectives, offering a transdisciplinary knowledge. These CICAs started in 1983, gathering scholars and researchers interested in the analysis and discussion of the relationship between the brain and aggression and other close topics, such as violence, terrorism, peace, and conflict at different levels, from the internal to the international ones through an integrated, comprehensive, and interdisciplinary approach that considers both biological and psychosociocultural factors. The main characteristic of these CICA meetings throughout the world is precisely this wide-ranging, comprehensive approach, crossing disciplinary boundaries. Consequently, it is open to plenty of disciplines, such as individual and social psychology, psychiatry, physiology, sociology, anthropology, animal behavior, criminology, international law, political science, pharmacology, child development, education, security studies and international relations, law and world affairs, military and peace studies, as well as policy makers, among others, but always trying to integrate the different disciplines with the purpose of helping in laying down a very much needed stable social system.
The scientific fruit of the previous 44 CICAs held to date at about 20 countries in 5 continents [Spain, Chile, Colombia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the United States (California, New England, and Georgia), Greece, Zambia, Italy, England, Nord Ireland, Mexico, Poland, Turkey, Hungary, Bulgaria, India, and Slovakia] is reflected in the elaboration of about 45 publications, most of them in the English language (see: http://www.cicainternational.org).
As mentioned above, this present volume on Security and Defence in Europe brings together a selection of scholar contributions authored by a cast of 21 international researchers and leading thinkers representing 9 countries from Europe, Americas, and the Middle East. The academic background of the contributors is quite diverse: military, law, diplomacy, security and conflict studies, psychology, and humanities. This interdisciplinary approach encourages a broader perspective and thought process, transdiscipline and global collaboration and cooperation, and an integrated synthesis of knowledge.
This rather eclectic group of authors approaches the main topic from four different points of view:
The first section dedicates five chapters to a fundamental attribute of society in general: security. If we want an effective and harmonious social organization founded on the human being, the concern about security issues cannot be avoided, especially at these times of quite varied threats to security, which increase global instability and renew transatlantic tension. In the first chapter, Rector Piwowarski, a Polish expert in security, presents a theoretical framework of the transdisciplinary and multidisciplinary model by the name of security culture. The next two chapters offer a legal approach: Otero, a prestigious jurist specialized in penal law, analyzing the Norwegian model of dealing with the threat of corruption and comparing it with the Spanish one, which does not present major differences, suggests that the solution lies in the ethical and political commitment of a particular country and goes hand in hand with a culture of integrity; and García Segura, a Dominican lawyer, with a previous book on cyberspace, conscious that who controls the cyberspace is who controls the analogical war, focuses his chapter on the European cybersecurity landscape through a human rights perspective. In the fourth chapter, Ramirez, dedicated to control and security issues, does a series of considerations on the refugee crisis in Europe in order to find more pragmatic and sensible solutions. And finally, Mazurier, Delgado, and Payá, scholars from Argentina and Spain, assess another threat to security, the climate change, analyzing the securitization of the Arctic Region.
The second section includes five chapters on several defense aspects of the EU. The first introductory chapter, written by a Spanish Ambassador, JiménezUgarte, does a very valuable historical view of the European Defense, from the initial European Defense Community to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO put into practice recently. In the next chapter, Spanish Air Force Lt. General Zamarripa stresses the potential value of PESCO to strengthen the military capabilities of the European Union and contributing to further development of the European defense industry. In the third one, Ochman, a Polish Navy officer, untangles the separate concepts of security and defense in the context of Brexit, with a serious consideration of its potential consequence. In the next chapter, a Spanish jurist, Gil Ibáñez, does a humanistic approach of why nations fail, with special emphasis on cultural and narrative aspects. The section is closed by two very attractive chapters on the debate over how to reduce the threats of nuclear weapons: the German professor Neuneck wonders how premature and dangerous a scrapping of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the New START Treaty could be, suggesting the need to launch a substantive dialogue between NATO and Russia on how to prevent military escalation; and Ambassador Soltanieh accounts in a critical way that somehow reflects the reality seen by the eyes of an Iranian diplomat, what is to a certain extent understandable, on the present situation of several treaties related to nuclear issues.
The third section considers the outer borders of the EU: the Finish scholar Simonen analyzes the security in the European Northern flank, considering very different risks, such as the Baltic Sea environment, China’s interest in the Arctic, nuclear weapons in the neighborhood, the weaknesses of the EU’s common defense,
and NATO’s role in the region. The Polish General Biziewski observes the Eastern flank, pointing out conflicting political concepts and growing Russian threat as well as reminding the decision makers that the defense starts at home. Finally, the Italian General Spagnol and the Spanish scholar Fernández Sebastián study the Southern one, characterized by the management of migratory flows – worried especially about refugee inflow and regional tensions in North Africa, where threats from nonstate actors predominate. In sum, as Spagnol affirms, the core of the relationship between Africa and the EU is the need for a strengthened dialogue and institutional cooperation that not only addresses issues of peace and stability in Africa but also challenges that Europe is facing.
Four chapters on NATO issues compose the last section: Spanish sociologist Priego outlines the past, the present, and overall the future of the Russia-NATO relationship. Spanish Air General Yaniz and scholar Abad narrate some challenges of the relations between EU and NATO, stressing in the need for coherence of their efforts on capability development and, using the words of the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, “the reality is that Europe can not protect itself; NATO countries that do not belong to the EU play a fundamental role.” Finally, the Belgian professor Sauer enters into a quite provocative perspective on possible future rough times for the Atlantic Alliance.
Last but not least, we have the honor of enjoying an excellent prologue by former Spanish Foreign Affairs minister, Ana Palacio, on European Defense and Security at a Time of Global Mutation, untangling the related but separate concepts of security and defense, accepting a new phase in the transatlantic relationship while clearly defining the cooperation between NATO and European defense, and coming to terms as Europeans with the need to define and support a concept of defense and security that goes beyond our borders.
Security and Defence in Europe is completed by an Introduction and an Epilogue by both coeditors. And, needless to add, respective chapters reflect personal opinions of the authors.
In sum, we hope that reading this volume may help to achieve our purpose of leading to laying down a stable social system and a better understanding of security and defense challenges. These areas, usually discussed among specialists, through this publication, should become the subject of a broader social discussion, as they concern each of us both in the sphere of obligations (taxes, service in defense formations, defense education) and entitlements (sense of security). The current crises, both with regard to illegal migration and military threat, indicate that there is a lot to be improved in these areas.
Founder and President of CICA International J. Martín Ramírez Madrid, Spain
December 2018
Contents
Part I Security Issues
Three Energy Streams of Security Culture – A Theoretical Research Model in Security Sciences
Juliusz Piwowarski
The EU Defence Against a New Type of Threat: Corruption. The Norwegian Legal Responses an Example to Be Followed
Pilar Otero
European Cybersecurity: Future Challenges from a Human Rights Perspective
Luis A. García Segura
The Refugees Issue in the frame of the European Security: A Realistic Approach
J. Martín Ramírez
The Meta-Tragedy of the Commons. Climate Change and the Securitization of the Arctic Region
Pablo A. Mazurier, Juan José Delgado-Morán, and Claudio A. Payá-Santos
Part II Defence Aspects of European Union
From the European Defence Community to Permanent Structured Cooperation
Javier Jiménez-Ugarte
The Permanent Structured Cooperation in the European Union. Its Real Potential Value
Eduardo Zamarripa
Untangling the Separate Concepts of Security and Defence in the Context of Brexit
Jacek Ochman
Why Nations Fail. The Relevance of Stability and Culture for European and Global Security
Alberto J. Gil Ibáñez
The Future of Security and Defense of Europe. EU vis-a-vis NPT, CTBT, and Ban Treaty
A. A. Soltanieh
Part III Outer Borders of Europe
Security in the Northern European Flank
Katariina Simonen
How Can Europe Cope with Challenges and Risks at Its Southern Flank?
Giorgio Spagnol
Maritime Dimension in the Fight Against Illegal Migration on the Western Mediterranean Route
Marta Fernandez-Sebastian
Eastern Flank of EU and NATO – Challenge and Opportunity
Jerzy Biziewski
Part IV NATO
Russia’s A2/AD Policy as a Balancing Strategy vs NATO Enlargement
Alberto Priego
NATO-EU Cooperation
Federico Yaniz
EU-NATO Relations: Between Necessity and Strategic Uncertainty
Gracia Abad-Quintanal
Rough Times Ahead for NATO
Tom Sauer
Epilogue
Index
Part I Security Issues
Three Energy Streams of Security Culture – A Theoretical Research Model in Security Sciences
Juliusz Piwowarski
Outline
1
2.1
2.2
Abstract The chapter presents the theoretical framework of the transdisciplinary and multidisciplinary model by the name of security culture; a model which may be helpful in conducting research within the discipline of security sciences. The security culture model comprises non-military and military factors that provide people with the opportunity to raise security, both on an individual and a collective scale. The concept of security culture constitutes, among others, the scientific axis of a Polish academic journal Kultura Bezpieczeństwa. Nauka – Praktyka – Refleksje [Security Culture. Science – Practice – Review]. The security culture model, as presented in the journal, bases on the concept of the influence exerted on reality by three energy streams of security culture. These streams include: the mental-spiritual stream, the stream of organizational and legal interactions (split into multiple ‘beams’), and the stream of energy related to the material reality, that represents the physical design of social reality
J. Piwowarski (*)
University of Public and Individual Security “Apeiron” in Cracow, Kraków, Poland e-mail: juliuszpiwowarski@apeiron.edu.pl
J. M. Ramírez, J. Biziewski (eds.), Security and Defence in Europe, Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12293-5_1
J. Piwowarski
Keywords Security culture · Social sciences · Security sciences · Research model · Transdisciplinarity · Interdisciplinarity
1 Introduction: The Theoretical Model
The author purports to offer in this chapter the ordering scientific description and clarifications as regards the nature of the proposed (by him and a number of other researchers) theoretical model, designed for investigating research problems within the area of security.
This model has been designed within the culturalist approach to social sciences. It is enrooted in the social-cultural sphere and it has been designed for the purpose of conducting research, implementations, prognoses, and assessment in the areas in which broadly understood security is investigated, regulated and built. Thus, the paper is aimed to offer and popularize the security culture model as a theoretical research platform for academic studies concerning security. Furthermore, this model may help scholars in finding common grounds for research areas of security studies (Pol. studia nad bezpieczeństwem) and security sciences (Pol. nauki o bezpieczeństwie), the latter area facing recently rapid development, among others, in Poland.1
The offer is, therefore, supposed to be conducive to facilitating the correspondence between research results on a very extensive range of security issues, due to
1 Security sciences (author’s equivalent for the Polish term nauki o bezpieczeństwie) – is a separate discipline belonging to the field of social sciences in the Polish classification of the fields of science and technology (largely basing on OECD classification). Security sciences only partially overlap with its ‘elder sister’ subdiscipline of political science – security studies. The word sciences in the name security sciences refers to social sciences approached in a systemic way, rather than to natural sciences as it often does. Much as security sciences belong to the scientific sphere of social sciences, they mainly concentrate on the problematics of security, in the context of the pursuit of the state of freedom from threats by a human being, as well as social groups and organisations that they establish. It should be emphasized that security sciences are equipped with a very precise and rigorous methodological framework, owing to which it has become possible to grant them in 2011 the status of a separate discipline within the Polish classification of sciences. Another distinguishing feature of security sciences is the fact that their focus is not only on the state-centric approach to national security and international security as it is in security studies, developed in English-speaking academia shortly after World War I to provide the theoretical framework for the prevention of new risks to international security Security sciences predominantly focus on the individual and community-related aspects of security, as well as on the systemic approach to such aspects of security as internal security, homeland security, public security, or common security
Despite the general separateness of security sciences and security studies, they share vital common elements. First and foremost, both approaches concentrate on the security of a human being, and the human is their main focus. The second and the third shared elements are two research frameworks used in both approaches: the framework postulated by the Copenhagen school of security studies, and the theoretical model by the name of security culture (probably the most transdisciplinary and versatile concept within security research); both explained in the following article.
the interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary and multidisciplinary offer,2 which may be found in, for instance, the Polish periodical Kultura Bezpieczeństwa. Nauka –Praktyka – Refleksje [Security Culture. Science – Practice – Review].
The said offer was wrought in accordance with an idea the essence of which is best defined by the well-known sententia e pluribus unum, reflecting in itself a holistic attitude to reality.3 Thus, the security culture concept, as presented here, acts as research ‘interface’ and a research platform, which, although already existing in scientific discourse, is, in the author’s opinion, too rarely used as a research model, taking into account numerous capabilities that it offers to researchers.
The word model comes from Latin. In this language, the word modulus means measure or pattern. Looking at the term from the point of view of social sciences methodology, one may distinguish models of a theoretical or realistic nature.4
1. Theoretical (nominal) model – it is such set of assumptions adopted for a given realm of science that facilitates finding solutions for the issues raised in the following paper. The nominal model is an abstract intellectual construct, a simplified representation of social reality, from which features, relationships and other elements of lesser importance for the research subject matter have been removed. As commonly known, theoretical models in scientific research are created and implemented due to their usefulness: they act as specialist tools to researchers, helping them build scientific theory for the sake of a given research activity.
2. Realistic model – it is a specific subject or a certain class of subjects, such as events, processes, or situations that meet the assumptions of a given theory. The realistic model of a theory may be understood as its implementation or interpretation. This model refers to a specific arrangement of subjects involving, for instance, processes, events, facts that proves sufficiently similar, analogous or isomorphic to the real system under examination, but this model is much simpler and more easily available to research. For example, appropriate diagrams, graphs, maps or mock-ups may serve as examples of the realistic model of a given system.
From the perspective of logic, the structure of axiomatic theory, i.e. the model of a formalized language, serves a vital function in science. The language model is a set of sentences in which all of its sentences are true. In addition, it is worth remembering that each language may include many models.
The application of various models in order to conduct scientific research is based on a prior determination as for the existence of an isomorphism or analogy between the system to be tested and its model.
The use of various types of models are supposed to help researchers reduce the complexity of the phenomena being analyzed in order to facilitate the research
2 Issues concerning noticing differences between interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity – see in: Piwowarski [49].
3 E pluribus unum – (Latin) ‘out of many, one’.
4 The present article refers in its content, but also provides an extension, to the following work: Piwowarski [47].
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Title: Life in a tub; with a description of the Turkish bath
Author: Diogenes [pseudonym]
Release date: March 24, 2024 [eBook #73251]
Language: English
Original publication: Ireland: William McGee & Co, 1858
Credits: Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net/ for Project Gutenberg (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive) *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LIFE IN A TUB; WITH A DESCRIPTION OF THE TURKISH BATH ***
LIFE IN A TUB;
WITH A DESCRIPTION OF THE TURKISH BATH.
BY
“If men knew how to use water so as to elicit all the remedial results which it is capable of producing, it would be worth all other remedies put together ” Dr
Macartney’s Lectures at Trinity College, 1826
“The Sixth Commandment is suspended by one Medical Diploma, from the North of England to the South.” Sydney Smith.
THIRD EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED.
DUBLIN: WILLIAM M’GEE & CO., 18, NASSAUSTREET.
CORK: BRADFORD & CO., 44, PATRICK-STREET, AND AT ALL RAILWAY STATIONS. 1858.
Price Sixpence.
[Contents]
DUBLIN: PRINTED BY ALEX THOM & SONS, 87 & 88, ABBEY-STREET
[Contents]
D .
“Men’s evil manners live in brass; their virtues We write in water.” Henry VIII. Act IV. Sc. 2.
TO RICHARD BARTER. ESQ., M.D.
D S ,
To whom can I more fitly dedicate the following pages than to one, to whom, under Divine Providence, I owe the inestimable blessings of renewed health and of an invigorated constitution? Having derived untold benefit from the use of the Turkish Bath, first introduced by you into this country, and having witnessed the wonders effected by it in the case of others, I have felt it my duty to propagate the knowledge of its virtues in every direction: this I have endeavoured to do in the following pages, in conjunction with some observations on the Hydropathic and Allopathic systems.
Should the perusal of these pages lead to the currency of more correct ideas on the subject of Hygiene, and a greater knowledge of the principles of Hydropathy, than, at present prevail, my object in writing will have been fully attained.
Wishing you a long continuance in your career of enlightened usefulness,
I remain, Dear Sir,
Very sincerely yours,
[Contents]
Dublin, October, 1858. [5]
LIFE IN A TUB.1
See the wretch that long has tost, On the thorny bed of pain, At length repair his vigour lost, And breathe and walk again.—G
Perhaps there is nothing more characteristic of the march of intellect of the present day, or more indicative of a healthy tone of mind, than the suspicion with which the public in general, and many physicians in particular, are beginning to regard the use of drugs as curative agents—that chiefest engine of the allopathic physician for the relief of suffering humanity.
The freeing of the mind from old and preconceived ideas—from practices, with which we have been familiarized from childhood—the looking with distrust upon a system which since the times of Æsculapius and Hippocrates has held undisputed sway, arrogating to itself the name of Orthodox, and dubbing its opponents as quacks —such a change in public opinion deserves respect or reprobation, according to the causes from which it springs, whether from a calm investigation of the question presented for examination, in which strong arguments, based on natural laws—prescribing a treatment which produces the results aimed at—are found to preponderate in favour of a new system, or from a revolutionary love of novelty, indicative of versatility and want of faith in established institutions, a love of change which would espouse and propagate any doctrine irrespective of its merits, merely because it was new.
That this change of opinion to which we refer, viz., the want of confidence in drugs, is not altogether frivolous, would [6]appear from
the following confession of Dr. Forbes, a distinguished allopathic physician, who thus sums up the experience of a long professional career:—
“Firstly, that in a large proportion of the cases treated by allopathic physicians, the disease is cured by nature and not by them. Secondly, that in a lesser, but still not a small proportion, the disease is cured by nature in spite of them; in other words their interference opposing instead of assisting the cure; and Thirdly, that consequently in a considerable proportion of diseases it would fare as well or better with patients, if all remedies, especially drugs, were abandoned ”
Again one of the most eminent of living medical writers says:—
“When healthy properties are impaired, we know of no agent by which they can be directly restored, when vital action is perverted or deranged, we possess no means of immediately rectifying it, but we must be satisfied with using those means under which it is most likely to ”
It is the knowledge of these facts that has produced discontent with the usual mode of medicinal treatment, and has encouraged the belief, that it does more harm than good in cases of disease. Dr. Gully states:—
“By it (the drug system) the body is placed in the most unnatural position, and its efforts at relief constantly thwarted. Disease, which is quite as natural a process as health, is not allowed to go on as nature would; the internal organs whose morbid action alone can cause death, are made the arena for all sorts of conflicting and inflicting medical stimulants; and between the action which these excite, and that which originally existed, their vitality fails, their efforts towards restoration flag, and their functions are at last extinguished.”
Dr. Rush says:—
“We have multiplied diseases we have done more, we have increased their mortality ”
The celebrated Dr. Bailie, who enjoyed, it appears, a long and lucrative practice, declared at the termination of his career, “that he had no faith in physic;” and on his death-bed frequently exclaimed, “I wish I could be sure that I have not killed more than I have cured.”
Abernethy observes sarcastically,
“There has been a great increase of medical men of late years, but upon my life, diseases have increased in proportion ”
The British and Foreign Quarterly Journal—the leading advocate of drug medication—thus writes:—
“This mode of treating disease (Hydropathy) is unquestionably far from inert, and most opposed to the cure of diseases, by the undisturbed processes of nature It in fact perhaps affords the very best evidence we possess of the curative power of art, and is unquestionably when rationally [7]regulated a most effective mode of treatment in many diseases Still it puts in a striking light, if not exactly the curative powers of nature, at least the possibility nay, facility with which all the ordinary instruments of medical cure, drugs, may be dispensed with. If so many and such various diseases get well entirely without drugs, under one special mode of treatment, is it not more than probable, that a treatment consisting almost exclusively of drugs may be often of non-effect sometimes of injurious effect?”
Dr. Headland, in his prize essay on the action of medicines on the system, thus writes:—
“On no question perhaps have scientific men differed more than on the theory of the action of medicines Either facts, essentially opposed and incompatible, have been adduced by the disagreeing parties, or which is
nearly as common, the same fact has received two distinct and opposite interpretations ”
Such quotations as the above, which might be multiplied ad infinitum, by any student of medical lore, show that enquiry is abroad amongst the medical profession, and that some at least of its members are dissatisfied with the truth of the system which would consider drug medication as an essential instrument in the cure of disease.
The following remarks by Dr. Maclæoud, contained in a letter written by him to Professor Simpson of Edinburgh, show at least, that if the lay public place confidence in allopathic drugging, they place their faith in a system which does not command the confidence of physicians themselves.
“Formerly there were several wards in the Edinburgh Royal Infirmary, of which three Fellows of the Royal College of Physicians had the charge. One physician had the top ward, another the middle ward, and a third the low ward. It happened that on the same day, three young persons of nearly the same age, ill of typhus fever, were admitted into the hospital. The disease was of equal severity in each, and the stage of complaint the same in all What was the treatment pursued in those three cases, by the three Fellows of the College? Of course, it should have been the same, at least, if the system be correct; for the physicians in question would choose the best. But, sir, it was not the same. He in the top ward bled his patient with lancet and leeches. He in the middle ward treated his patient with drastic purgatives. He in the low ward, again, gave whiskey, wine, and opiates What was the result of such deplorable freaks? I refer you to the statistic book; I have no doubt you will find it there!”
“In the University formerly, two professors used to lecture, on alternate days, on clinical medicine It happened once that each had, at the same time, under his care an acute case of pericarditis. The professor who lectured on his case on Monday night, said in substance, as follows:
“G . As to the treatment of this disease, it has been the practice to give large doses of mercury, so as to bring the constitution under its action, and to effect this as rapidly as possible, small quantities of opium are usually combined with it The practice I, however, believe [8]to be erroneous; for I have observed the progress of the disease unchecked, even during profuse salivation. The most efficient remedy in fact our sheet-anchor in this disease is tartar emetic. You will have noticed the large doses I have given of this remedy, and yet the patient seems not to suffer from it In fact, the constitution in this disease, as in some others, has a remarkable tolerance for tartar emetic ”
“When the lecture was finished, I left the hall fancying I had heard some great truth, and knew better than an hour before how to save life. On Wednesday evening, during the same week, in the same hall, and to the same students, the other professor lectured. The lecture was devoted to the acute case of pericarditis under his care in the hospital. After describing the case, and giving a sketch of the character and progress of the disease, he spoke in substance, as follows:
“G It is a remarkable thing that there should be any difference in regard to the mode of treatment to be pursued in a disease such as this, I believe it is the Italian and French schools which advocate so very strongly the employment of tartar emetic; but I would strongly urge you to put no confidence in this remedy, for if you do so, you will lean on a broken reed. Our sheet-anchor in this disease is mercury; under the action of which you must bring the patient as soon and as freely as you possibly can even bleeding is of little importance in comparison with the use of mercury The two combined, i e , mercury and blood-letting is, of course, best; but at all events use mercury, and never trust to tartar emetic.
“Thus doctors differ and the patient dies.”
As in the theatrical world a peep behind the scenes destroys the illusion of the piece, so in the real world such revelations as the foregoing, are well calculated to stagger thoughtful minds, and to shake to the centre a blind and unreasoning faith in the allopathic system.
Does not the reflection suggest itself on reading such a revelation as the above—since it is impossible that the practice of both these learned professors can be right, is it not possible that the practice of both may be wrong?
That eminent physician, the late Sir Philip Crampton, was in the habit of warning all his gouty and rheumatic patients to avoid the use of colchicum, terming it a “desperate remedy,” and affirming that it was better to bear any amount of pain than have recourse to it. This was the deliberate opinion of one of the most able men in his profession, who must have been fully impressed with a conviction of its injurious effects; yet this remedy is continued to be prescribed to thousands, with what result let those who have experienced it testify. Here then again is a serious disagreement in practice between members of the medical profession, in which one party must again be wrong. If those who use colchicum are to be ranged amongst the latter, where our own sufferings [9]under it would place them, their victims may well be pitied. If colchicum be not a poisonous drug, why did Sir Philip Crampton so strongly inveigh against it? If it be, can that system be right which prescribes it as a remedy? Such is the system termed orthodox, styling all who presume to differ from it quacks.
Before we proceed to inquire whether any escape is open to us from this unsatisfactory state of affairs—whether any system has been discovered more intelligible in its principles and more certain in its action, whose professors are found to agree in their practice, instead of maintaining opinions directly opposed to each other—we would respectfully address a few words to those whom we have often heard exclaiming, “I cannot believe that a system which has existed so long as the allopathic can be wrong; if it were, it would long since have been exposed and its errors refuted. No; when I reflect how long it has existed, I cannot but believe it is right.” To such we will merely say that we charitably hope they do not call this exclamation
an argument, and that if they reflected for a moment they ought to remember numberless instances where error has existed for centuries unrefuted, and acquiesced in by all mankind; that on their principle error ought to prevail in exact proportion to its greatness, since the oldest errors are the earliest, and the earliest are, generally speaking, the greatest, the infancy of every science being its most imperfect stage. According to them, we should at present believe that the sun moves round the earth, because this doctrine prevailed for upwards of 5,000 years, and “if it had been wrong it could not have existed so long.” If such persons studied human nature better, they would acknowledge the truth of Horace’s lines, especially when applied to the medical profession, who, with some honourable exceptions, have on every occasion opposed all innovation on their system with the most uncompromising hostility—
“Vel quia nil rectum, nisi quod placuit sibi, ducunt, Vel quia turpe putant parere minoribus et. quæ Imberbes didicere, senes perdenda fateri;”2
an hostility which can only be ascribed to the effects of professional habit and prejudice. In such a profession reform must be brought about by the action of an enlightened public opinion, which, unwarped by prejudice and unfettered by [10]professional trammels, is free to perceive truth, and hold to it when discovered. When the public take the lead, the medical profession will “move on,” but not before. We are sorry to be forced to make these observations, but we appeal to the history of the medical profession past and present, and to the observation of our readers, in confirmation of their truth.
Sir Bulwer Lytton has well observed:—
“A little reflection taught me that the members of a learned profession are naturally the very persons least disposed to favour innovation upon the practices which custom and prescription have rendered sacred in their
eyes. A lawyer is not the person to consult upon bold reforms in jurisprudence A physician can scarcely be expected to own that hydropathy will cure diseases that have resisted an armament of vials ”
On looking about us for some therapeutic system more satisfactory than the allopathic, simpler in its principles and more consonant with the laws of nature, we select for examination hydropathy, on account of the great success which has attended its practice, the simplicity and rationality of its processes, and the high recommendations it has received from several eminent men, amongst which we extract the following. Mr. Herbert Mayo, Senior Surgeon of the Middlesex Hospital, speaking of hydropathy, thus expresses himself:—
“It (hydropathy) more than doubles our power of doing good Of course it will meet with much opposition, but none, come from quarter it may, can possibly prevent its progress, and its taking firm root. It is like Truth, not to be subverted.”
Sir Charles Scudamore, . ., records his opinion as follows:—
“The principles of the water-cure treatment are founded in nature and truth We have in our power a new and most efficacious agent for the alleviation and cure of disease in various forms, and in proper hands as safe as it is effectual. I should be no friend to humanity nor to medical science if I did not give my testimony in its recommendation.”
Dr. James Johnson, Editor of the Medical Quarterly, thus writes of hydropathy:—
“Its paramount virtue is that of preserving many a constitution from pulmonary consumption ”
These are no small recommendations for any system to possess. Let us, therefore, with the readers’ permission, proceed at once to examine the principles and mode of action of this novel system, and
see how far it can prove the title it lays claim to, of being a true rational and natural mode of curing disease.
The most eminent physiologists of the present day agree in regarding disease in general, as an effort of nature to relieve [11]the system of matter injurious to its well-being. This being the case, the natural and common sense mode of curing disease, would obviously consist in assisting nature in its efforts to expel the morbid substance from the system, and thus relieve it from the danger which threatened it. Now, this is exactly the principle on which Hydropathy proceeds; it aids, encourages, and strengthens the efforts of nature to heal herself, instead of irritating, thwarting, and weakening those efforts, by the pernicious administration of drugs.
To render the foregoing position intelligible to our readers, it is necessary to premise, that the action of all active medicines depends upon the principle (admitted by all physiologists), that nature ever makes a continued effort to cure herself, never ceasing in her attempts to relieve the body from whatever injurious matter may be present in it. It is this effort of nature to expel the irritant matter from the system, which makes the drug produce its effect. Thus when a preparation of sulphur is administered as a medicine, nature, in her effort to get rid of the sulphur, opens her pores to expel it. This is proved by the resulting perspiration, and by the circumstance that everything in contact with the patient is found, on analysis, to be largely impregnated with the constituents of the medicine;—the wellknown fact of all articles of silver about the person, being tarnished, being an illustration of this effect;—in addition to this the stomach is weakened and irritated by the medicine which has been poured into it; and further, if the dose is repeated, nature, getting gradually accustomed to the intruder, ceases from her inhospitable exertion to expel it, and, as a consequence, the medicine fails in producing its intended effect. We have here referred to the successful
