Rethinking punishment leo zaibert

Visit to download the full and correct content document: https://textbookfull.com/product/rethinking-punishment-leo-zaibert/

More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant download maybe you interests ...

The Theory and Practice of Ontology 1st Edition Leo Zaibert (Eds.)

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-theory-and-practice-ofontology-1st-edition-leo-zaibert-eds/

Leo Tolstoy Daniel Moulin

https://textbookfull.com/product/leo-tolstoy-daniel-moulin/

Receptive Bodies Leo Bersani

https://textbookfull.com/product/receptive-bodies-leo-bersani/

The Cuckoo Carew Leo

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-cuckoo-carew-leo/

https://textbookfull.com/product/african-entrepreneurship-leopaul-dana/

Classification and Regression Trees Leo Breiman

https://textbookfull.com/product/classification-and-regressiontrees-leo-breiman/

Leo Tolstoy Critical Lives Andrei Zorin

https://textbookfull.com/product/leo-tolstoy-critical-livesandrei-zorin/

Leo Tolstoy Critical Lives Andrei Zorin

https://textbookfull.com/product/leo-tolstoy-critical-livesandrei-zorin-2/

Crime Punishment Through Time C1000 present Alec Fisher

https://textbookfull.com/product/crime-punishment-throughtime-c1000-present-alec-fisher/

rethinkingpunishment

Theage-olddebateaboutwhatconstitutesjustpunishmenthasbecomedeadlocked. Retributivistscontinuetoprivilegedesertoverallelse,andconsequentialistscontinueto privilegepunishment’sexpectedpositiveconsequences,suchasdeterrenceorrehabilitation,overallelse.Inthisimportantinterventionintothedebate,LeoZaibertarguesthat, despitesomeobviousdifferences,thesetraditionalpositionsarestructurallyverysimilar andthatthedeadlockbetweenthemstemsfromthefacttheybothoversimplifythe problemofpunishment.Proponentsofthesepositionspayinsufficientattentiontothe conflictsofvaluesthatpunishment,evenwhenjustified,generates.Mobilizingrecent developmentsinmoralphilosophy,Zaibertoffersaproperlypluralisticjustificationof punishmentthatisnecessarilymorecomplexthanitstraditionalcounterparts. Anunderstandingofthiscomplexityshouldpromoteamorecautiousapproachto inflictingpunishmentonindividualwrongdoersandtodevelopingpunitivepolicies andinstitutions.

LeoZaibertisProfessorofPhilosophyatUnionCollege,Schenectady,NewYork.

RethinkingPunishment

UniversityPrintingHouse,Cambridge cb28bs,UnitedKingdom

OneLibertyPlaza, 20thFloor,NewYork, ny10006,USA

477 WilliamstownRoad,PortMelbourne, vic3207,Australia

314–321, 3rdFloor,Plot 3,SplendorForum,JasolaDistrictCentre, NewDelhi– 110025,India

79 AnsonRoad,#06–04/06,Singapore 079906

CambridgeUniversityPressispartoftheUniversityofCambridge. ItfurtherstheUniversity’smissionbydisseminatingknowledgeinthepursuitof education,learning,andresearchatthehighestinternationallevelsofexcellence.

www.cambridge.org

Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781107194120

doi: 10 1017/9781108151740

Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements, noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress.

Firstpublished 2018

PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabySheridanBooks,Inc.

AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.

isbn978-1-107-19412-0 Hardback

isbn978-1-316-64539-0 Paperback

CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof URLsforexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain, accurateorappropriate.

Preface

ThemainquestionsIinvestigateinthisbookrevolvearoundatrulyimportant issue–thejustiﬁcationofpunishment–andthushaveattractedtheattentionof manythinkersthroughouthistory.Itmayperhapsseemotiosetorevisitthemagain. ButtheapproachtothejustiﬁcationofpunishmentIundertakehereisdifferent fromallothersandindeedresponsivetowhatappeartomeasgenerallyoverlooked shortcomingsofthepreviousefforts.

Necessarily,then,Ispendconsiderableenergyexamining–oftencritically–the viewsofothers,andtoaconsiderableextentitiswithinthecontextofthatcritical examinationthatmyownviewsgraduallyemerge.Iherefocusoncontemporary authors,fortwomainreasons:first,becausewiththebenefitofhindsight,and cognizantofthelonghistoryofpunishmenttheory,contemporaryauthorshave tendedtoavoidatleastsomeearliermistakes;second,becausemyownapproachis inimportantwaysinformedbyrecentdevelopmentsinmoralphilosophy.Itwould havebeenanachronistic,andpointlessinotherwaystoo,tomobilizetheserecent developmentsagainstpastviewsthathavebeensubstantiallyrefinedoraltogether abandoned.Inotherwords,IherefocusonwhatItaketobetherealcuttingedgein punishmenttheory,andIsuggestthatevencuttingedgepunishmenttheoristsstand tobenefitfromembracingthesortoffundamentalrethinkingIrecommend. Ihaveincurredmanyintellectualdebtsintheprocessofwritingthisbook,and Iwouldliketoexpressmygratitudetothefollowingpeopleandinstitutions.Inthe summerof 2013,IwasavisitingprofessorattheUniversityofToronto.Iamgrateful toMarkusDubberforarrangingthisvisitandformanystimulatingconversations. Inthefallof 2013,IwastheH.L.A.HartFellowatOxfordUniversity’sCentrefor EthicsandPhilosophyofLaw.IamgratefultotheCentre,toUniversityCollege,to theJurisprudenceDiscussionGroup,andtoJohnGardner.Inthefallof 2016, IwasaScholar-in-ResidenceatNewYorkUniversityundertheauspicesofthe FacultyResourceNetwork.IamgratefultoAnneLydiaWard,toSamuelScheffler,

andtotheconvenersoftheColloquiuminLegal,Political,andSocialPhilosophy thatfall–LiamMurphyandJeremyWaldron.Iamgrateful,too,toUnionCollege foritscontinuedsupportovertheyears.Finally,IamverygratefultoCambridge UniversityPress,itsreferees,andespeciallytoJohnBergerandhisteam.John shepherdedthisprojectfromitsbeginningwithwarmenthusiasmandwithutmost professionalism.WorkingwithJohnandwithKristinaDeusch,BeckyJackaman, KarinKipp,andKarthikOrukaimanihasbeenagenuinepleasure.

Thisbookismuchimprovedthankstofriendsandcolleagueswhoeitherhave invitedmetopresentpartsofthemanuscriptattheirinstitutionsorhavereadparts (or,inafewcases,theentirety)ofthemanuscriptandofferedilluminatingsuggestionsandcriticisms.Withouttheirinputthisbookwouldnothavebeenwhatitis. TheyareVeraBergelson,LuisChiesa,FelmonDavis,JulienDeonna,Stevede Wijze,TonyDilloff,MarkusDubber,KimFerzan,GeorgeFletcher,Stephen Garvey,StuartGreen,AdilHaque,PaulHughes,KyronHuigens,DougHusak, IngvarJohansson,JohnKekes,AdamKolber,ElenaLarrauri,AmbroseLee,JaeLee, HarryMarten,CalumMiller,KevinMulligan,AliceRistroph,Jose ´ Marı´aSauca Cano,JonathanSimon,BarrySmith,HillelSteiner,MariamThalos,Emma Tieffenbach,JerryVildostegui,MarkWunderlich,andEkowYankah.Needlessto say,theydonotallagreewithme,andtheyhavenotalwayssucceededinsavingme fromerrorsandinfelicities.

WhileIhavebeenwritingaboutthethemesdiscussedhereinformostofmy professionallife,thematerialinthisbookisessentiallyallnew.Thereareahandful ofexceptions.Section 2.2 ofChapter 2 coversgroundsimilartothatcoveredinmy “JustOrganicWholes,”inLeoZaibert(ed.) TheTheoryandPracticeofOntology, London:Palgrave/Macmillan(2016): 135–156;Section 4.5 ofChapter 4 expandson someofthepointsImadein“BeyondBad:PunishmentTheoryMeetstheProblem ofEvil,” MidwestStudiesinPhilosophy 36 (2012): 93–111;andtheappendixis aslightlyeditedversionofmy“OntheMatterofSuffering:DerekParﬁtandthe PossibilityofDeservedSuffering,” CriminalLawandPhilosophy 11 (2017): 1–18

ByfarIowemygreatestdebttoAnnaSchur.Shehashelpedmeinmorewaysthan IcancountandprobablyinmorewaysthanIwilleverknow.WithoutAnna’s profoundinsightsandwithoutherunwaveringsupport,thiswouldhavebeena really verydifferentbook.Iamveryhappytodedicatethebooktoher. x Preface

PunishmentasaProblem

Theexpression“theproblemofpunishment”isextraordinarilycommon;infact,it hasbecomeacliche ´ inthespecializedliterature.1 Insofaraswhateverelsepunishmentseekstodo,itseekstomakewrongdoerssuffer(bysomehowdiminishingtheir well-beingorbyvisitinguponthemsomethingtheydonotwant),itisimmediately obviousthatthereisindeedsomethingproblematicaboutit,somethinginneedof ajustiﬁcation.Understandably,muchhasbeenwrittenaboutpunishmentandits justiﬁcation.Inspiteoftheensuingvoluminousandunwieldyliterature,however, surprisinglylittleattentionhasbeenpaidtothediscussionofthe type ofproblem–or indeedofthe typesofproblems –thatpunishmentgenerates.

Theseproblemscanusefullybebrokendownintotwogeneraltypes:practicaland theoretical.Whenauthorsusetheexpression“theproblemofpunishment”(orits cognates),theyaboveallhaveinmindthesufferingbroughtaboutbythestate(or otherauthorities).Throughouthistorystateshaveoftenover-criminalized–thatis, theyhavedeﬁnedaspunishable–fartoomanyactivities,andtheyhaveoverpunishedboththoseactivitiesthatshouldhavebeencriminalizedandthosethat shouldhavenot.2 Buttheextremestowhichmodern,conspicuouslydemocratic stateshavetakenover-criminalizationandover-punishmentareparticularlyworrying.CommentingontheUnitedStates,DouglasHusaknotes:“1 inevery 138

1 Compilingacomprehensivelistofallusesofthisexpressionisunnecessary.Afewrecentexamples shouldsuffice:“TheProblemofPunishment”isthetitleofDavidBoonin’s 2008 book(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress),anditisthetitleofchaptersorsectionsinbooksbyJ.AngeloCorlett (ch. 3 ofhis ResponsibilityandPunishment,Dordrecht:Springer[2013]),byWhitleyR.P.Kaufman (ch. 1 ofhis HonorandRevenge:ATheoryofPunishment,Dordrecht:Springer[2012]),andby VictorTadros(firstsectionofthefirstchapterinhis TheEndsofHarm:TheMoralFoundationof theCriminalLaw,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress[2011]).

2 Forexample,almosttwomillenniaago,commentingonthe LexPapiaPoppaea,whichcriminalized (amongotherthings)notmarryingandnotprocreating,Tacituscomplained:“[W]herethecountry oncesufferedfromitsvices,itwasnowinperilfromitslaws.”Further,reactingtothe“countlessand complexstatutes”ofhisday,Tacitusadded:“[W]henthestatewasmostcorrupt,lawsweremost abundant.”SeeTacitus, Annals(3 25) (JohnJackson,trans.),Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity Press(1931), 563

residentsisincarcerated.Anestimated 1 in 20 childrenbornintheUnitedStatesis destinedtoservetimeinastateorfederalprisonatsomepointinhislife.” The“grandtotal”ofpeopleundersomeformofsupervisionoranotherbythe Americancriminaljusticesystemisastaggering“over 7 million.”3

Byandlarge,ithasbeenthesesortsofpracticalproblemsthathaveattractedthe attentionofcontemporarypunishmenttheorists.Thisfocusmaypartlyexplainthe factthat“theproblemofpunishment”isoftentakentobeeitherexclusivelyor predominantly“theproblemof state punishment.”4 Thereisnodenyingthatthese practicalproblemsarebothpressinganddepressing.Butthisdoesnot,Ithink,justify thecomparativelylittleenergythathasbeenexpendedinaddressingthetheoretical problemofpunishment.Inthisbook,thus,Iattempttoshedmuchneededlighton thistheoreticalproblem.

Iammovedbytwoconvictions.First,Iamconvincedthattheexaminationof theoreticalproblems,ingeneral,isgenuinelyimportantinitself.Forexample, reflectingonhisownviewsin“ACritiqueofUtilitarianism,”BernardWilliams remarked:“[T]heseconsiderationsdonotthemselvesgivesolutionstopractical dilemmas butIhopetheyhelptoprovideotherwaysofthinkingaboutthem.”5 Therecanbelittledoubtthat,say,Williams’sviewthatutilitarianismisunableto copewith“thecomplexitiesofmoralthought”hasgreatlyadvancedthatgeneral debate–evenifithasnotsolvedanypracticalproblems.6 Myapproachinthisbook isverysimilarto,andinsomewaysinspiredby,Williams’s,forIwilldefendtheview thatcontemporarypunishmenttheoryisunabletocopewiththecomplexityof moralthoughtandmorallife.Thus,asafirstapproximationtomygoalshere,itcan besaidthatIseektodeploy,withinthespecificcontextofpunishment,criticisms similartothosemoregeneralcriticismsWilliamsdeployedagainstbothutilitarianismandwhathecalled“themoralitysystem.”Second,Iamconvincedthatthe specializedliteratureonpunishmenthasreachedakindofstalemate(whichIwill explainshortly).Inlightofthisstalemate,theexaminationofthetheoretical problemssurroundingpunishmentmayinfacthelpusbetterunderstand–and

3 DouglasHusak, Overcriminalization:TheLimitsoftheCriminalLaw,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress (2008), 4–5.SeealsoMarkusDirkDubber, VictimsintheWaronCrime:TheUseandAbuseofVictims’ Rights,NewYork,NY:NewYorkUniversityPress(2002),andDavidCole,“TheTruthaboutOur PrisonCrisis,” TheNewYorkReviewofBooks 44, 11 (June 22, 2017): 29–31.Fortheinternational(mostly European)dimensionoftheseproblems,seeElenaLarrauri,“LaEconomı´aPolı´ticadelCastigo,” RevistaElectro ´ nicadeCienciaPenalyCriminolo´gica 6 (2009): 2–22

4 IhavecriticizedthisviewinLeoZaibert, PunishmentandRetribution,Aldershot:Ashgate(2006).

5 BernardWilliams“ACritiqueofUtilitarianism,”inJ.J.C.SmartandB.A.O.Williams, Utilitarianism:ForandAgainst,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress(1973), 117.Consideranother eloquentexample:“Thisbookisunabashedlydevotedtosolvingtheseproblems,thoughtoputitthat waysuggestsanincredible hubris onthepartoftheauthor,andmightalsomisleadthereaderinto thinkingthatthebookisintendedtoputtheseproblems,onceandforall,torest.Itwouldbejustas accuratetodescribethebook’saimastoprovideawayofunderstanding–or,ifyoulike,interpreting–theseproblems,”inSusanWolf, FreedomwithinReason,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress(1990), 4

6 Williams,“ACritique ,” 149

eventuallyevenhelpussolve–someofthosepracticalproblemsthathavehitherto monopolizedattention.Afullappreciationoftheimportanceoftheoverlooked theoreticalproblemwill,ofcourse,developslowly,asthebookprogresses.Fornow, anaccountofwhatthetheoreticalproblem is shallsufﬁce.

Wehavejustseentheessentialconceptualconnectionbetweenpunishmentand suffering(understoodverygenerally).Theotheressentialconceptualconnection worthourattentionlinkspunishmentand(perceived)wrongdoing.7 Theideaisthat bymakingwrongdoerssuffer, justice isachieved.Punishmentisthusimmediately revealedasgeneratingthetheoreticalproblemofhavingtobringjustice through suffering.Thereis,Iwillassume,obvious value indiminishingsufferingintheworld andobvious value inimpartingjustice.8 Byandlarge,Iwillfocusononespecific typeofsuffering-diminution–variouslycalledforgiveness,mercy,leniency(etc.)–andononespecifictypeofjustice-imparting–punishment.Itisobvious,too,that thesevaluescanconflictwitheachother,independentlyofanypracticalproblems.

Theoreticallyspeaking,then,punishmentpresentsuswithamoraldilemma: Whichoftheseconflictingvaluesisweightier?Importantly,andincontradistinction tothevirtuallyuniversallyacceptedposition,Iwillnotassumethatthedilemma simplyevaporates,inthesenseofbeingfullyresolved,whenpunishmentistakento be(ornottakentobe) justified.Theexpression“justification”(andcognates), particularlyinthewaycontemporarypunishmenttheoristsuseit,isfartooimpoverishedtomatchthecomplexityofpunishmentandconcomitantphenomena. Thus,Iwillhereattempttoplacethediscussionofpunishmentinmuchcloser proximitytodiscussionsofmoraldilemmasingeneral.Iwillinfactsuggestthat punishmenttheoryhasdevelopedinremarkableisolationfromothergeneral advancesinmoralphilosophy–inparticularthoseassociatedwiththebudding specializedliteratureonmoraldilemmas.

Punishment,Iwillargue,presentsuswithpreciselythesortsoffamousquandaries generatedbyothermoraldilemmas–aboveallthoseassociatedwithforgivenessand relatedphenomena.Iwillevidentlyhavemuchmoretosayaboutforgivenesslater on,butIwouldatoncewishtosuggesttwoimportantfeaturesofmyunderstanding ofthisconcept.First,theessenceofforgivenessistheideaofadeliberaterefusalto punish–itisaformofsparing(deserved)sufferingthatismotivatedbya special moralreason.Second,whiletheideaofmercyisadmittedlymoregeneralthanthe ideaofforgiveness,Iwilltreatbothassynonymshere.Surelyonecouldshowmercy

7 Foreaseofexposition,Iwillhenceforthignorethe“perceived”riderandassumethatperceived wrongdoingisalways correctly perceivedwrongdoing.

8 Idonotthinkthatthisassumptionisproblematic.Humansdotendtodisvaluebothgratuitous sufferingandobviousinjustice.Iwillnotengageinthisbookwiththosethoroughgoingformsof skepticism,fatalism,incompatibilism,ordeterminismthatcallintoquestionmoralresponsibilityin general.Notingthisassumptionwouldscarcelybenecessarywereitnotforthefactthatthereare inﬂuentialauthorswho,notwithstandingtheiroppositiontothesethoroughgoingformsofskepticism, defendformsoflimitedskepticismaimedspeciﬁcallyatthemoraldefensibility(ormetaphysical possibility)ofdeservedpunishment.

absentanywrongdoing:the“mercykilling”ofapatientafﬂictedwithapainful terminaldiseaseisevidentlynotamatterofforgivingher;helpingsomeoneinneed maybeanactofmercy,but,again,itisnotamatterofforgivingher;etc.Butwhen authorstalkaboutmercywithinthecontextofpunishmenttheory,theyareoften talkingaboutwhatIamherecallingforgiveness:mercyinthiscontextmeansthe deliberatesparingofasufferingthatisdeservedasaresultofwrongdoing(again: basedonaspecialmoralreason).9 Thegeneral,age-oldtensionbetweenjusticeand mercyis,withinthespeciﬁccontextofourreactionstowrongdoing,thetension betweenpunishmentandforgiveness.

Inthischapter,Iwillbegintodelineatethecontoursofamorecomprehensive–andmorecomplicated–approachtopunishment.Inthefirstsection,Iwillplacethe (theoretical)problemofpunishmentwithinthecontextofgeneraltheodicies.One importantgoalofdoingsoistohighlight,asIdoinSection 1.2,somecentral differencesbetweenaxiologicalanddeonticconsiderations.Althoughthesedifferencesareverywellknowninmoralphilosophyingeneral,theyaretypicallyoverlookedbycontemporarypunishmenttheorists–tothedetrimentofthatparticular, specializedliterature.InSection 1.3,Isuggestanewwayofunderstandingthe centraldebateregardingthejustificationofpunishment:insteadoffocusingon thedistinctionbetweenretributivismandconsequentialism,weshouldfocusonthe distinctionbetweenmonisticandpluralisticjustifications.Thediscussionofthe differencesbetweentheaxiologicalandthedeonticontheonehandandofmonism andpluralismontheothersetsthestageforageneraldiscussion,inSection 1.4,of thenatureandstructureofthosemoraldilemmasthatIsuggestareverysimilarto punishmentandfromwhoseconsiderationthespecializedliteratureonpunishment standstobenefit.Withtheseinitialpiecesmoreorlessinplace–oratleastinsight–Iconcludethechapterwithanoverviewoftheremainderofthebook.

1.1punishment,theodicies,andmeaning

Asplainasitisthatpunishmentseekstocausesuffering,itisalsoplain–ifnot plainer–thatpunishmentisnottheonly,oreventhemain,sourceofsufferinginthe world.Theexistenceofsuffering ingeneral hasalwaysstoodinneedofanexplanation.Helpingustoovercome,toreduce,oratleasttocopewithsufferingingeneral isanessentialaspectofeverymajorcomprehensiveworldview–fromthemost

9 Inanauthoritativeentryon“Forgiveness”inthe StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,PaulHughes documentedtheproximityofforgivenessandmercy–particularlyofmercywithinthecontextof wrongdoing.SeePaulM.Hughes,“Forgiveness,” TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy (Winter 2016 edn.,EdwardN.Zalta,ed.),https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/forgiveness/. Anewversionoftheentry–coauthoredwithBrandonWarmke–preserves,inattenuatedform,this idea:https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/forgiveness/.Acertainloosenessregarding thesetermsgoesbackforcenturies.SeeJohnM.CooperandJ.F.Procope ´ ’s“Introduction”to Seneca’s OnMercy intheir Seneca:MoralandPoliticalWritings,Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress(1995): 119–127

seculartothemostreligious.G.W.Leibnizcoinedaveryusefultermtorefer preciselytothesystematicefforttoexplainwhythereisevilintheworld:theodicy.10 Intheirtheisticversion,theodiciesseektoexplainwhyanallegedlybenevolentand omnipotentGodallowssufferingtoexist.Butseculartheodicies,asMaxWeber’s toweringworkunderscores,arealsoperfectlypossibleandilluminating.11 Human beings,independentlyoftheirreligiouscommitmentsandindependentlyoftheir differingdegreesofintellectualsophistication,havenaturallybeenattractedto theodiciessincelongbeforethetermwascoined.Tryingtomakesenseofthefact ofmiseryintheworldisanessentialpartofthehumancondition–andthisiswhat theodiciesseektodo.

Thecentralquestionoftheodicycanbeposedinavarietyofways,andinthe previousparagraphIhaveinfactdeliberatelyphraseditusingthreedifferentterms–“suffering,”“evil,”and“misery”–preciselyinordertohighlighttheirrelevance,for mypurposes,ofterminologicalminutiae.Wewellknowthemeaningofclaimsto theeffectthatpunishmentcausessuffering,andwewellknowwhatitistowonder whythereisevilormiseryintheworld.Investigatingtheprecisemeaningofthese termsmaybeanimportantandworthwhileprojectinsomecontexts,butnotinours. Thefundamentalquestionoftheodicycanbeexpressedverygenerally:Whydobad thingshappen?

Theexpression“badthings”is,withinthecontextoftheodicies,necessarily–and unproblematically–loose,anditisindeedconsistentwiththingsthatcause“suffering,”with“misery,”withthingsthatcanbeconsidered“evil,”andwithahostof otherpossibledescriptions.Thosewhohavefelttheexistentialpullofthefundamentalquestionoftheodicyhavenothad,andhavenotneeded,anyprecise definitionoftheseterms.Infact,thisunproblematicloosenessregardingthe“bad things”ofinteresttotheodiciesisconspicuous,too,inconnectiontothe“bad things”thatpunishmentissupposedtoinvolve.Themostinfluentialcontemporary definitionofpunishment,theFlew–Benn–Hartdefinition,clearlyexhibitsthis looseness:inHart’sownwords,punishment“mustinvolvepainorotherconsequencesnormallyconsideredunpleasant.”12 Thesethings“normallyconsidered unpleasant”inthedefinitionofpunishmentevidentlyareamongthe“badthings” ofconcerntotheodicies.

10 GottfriedWilhelmvonLeibniz, Theodicy:EssaysontheGoodnessofGod,theFreedomofMan,and theOriginofEvil (AustinFarrer,ed.),NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress(1952).

11 MaxWeber, EconomyandSociety:AnOutlineofInterpretiveSociology (GuentherRoth,ed.), Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress(1978).SeealsoFrederickNeuhouser’s Rousseau’s TheodicyofSelf-Love:Evil,Rationality,andtheDriveforRecognition,Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press(2008),wherehearguesthatRousseauisbestseenaspresentingaseculartheodicy(of amourpropre)thatis“morepalatable”thanHegel’sseculartheodicy(4).

12 H.L.A.Hart, PunishmentandResponsibility:EssaysinthePhilosophyofLaw, 2ndedn.,Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress(2008), 4.WhileIhaveobjectedtoaspectsoftheFlew–Benn–Hartdefinition ofpunishment,Ifindthisloosenessunobjectionable.Myowndefinitionofpunishmentrecognizes thatthepunisherwishessomethingtohappentothepunisheethatwould“somehowoffset”the“bad thing”thatshehasdone.Seemy PunishmentandRetribution, 31 ff.

Thefundamentalquestionoftheodicycanonlybemeaningfullyaskedon thebasisofassumingthetruthofanotherviewwherebytheworldwouldbe betteriffewerbadthingshappened.Ot herthingsequal,aworldwithless sufferinginitisbetterthanonewithmoresufferinginit.Andthenthe connectionbetweentheodiciesandpunishmenttheorybeginstoemerge,for punishmentinvolvesthedeliberatecreationofabadthing–suffering.This confrontsuswiththeparticularlypoignantquestionaboutpunishment:while thefundamentalquestionoftheodicyingeneralinquiresaboutwhatreason couldbeadducedforthere being anysufferingintheworld(assuming,to repeat,thatlesssufferingisbetterthanmoresuffering),punishmenttheorists needtoexplainwhyitissometimesgoodtodeliberatelychooseto create more sufferingintheworld.

Assoonastheconnectionemerges,however,apotentialobjectionarisestoo. Theobjectionisthatpunishmentis essentially amatternotofinﬂictingsufferingbut ofsomethingelse:amatterofdenouncingsomeacts,educatingsociety,preventing orreallocatingharms,ordefendingourselvesoroursocieties.Ifthisobjection succeeded,theparticularquestionofpunishmentwouldloseatleastpartofits poignancy–forwhatwewouldbedeliberatelychoosingtodowhenwepunish wouldbetocausenotsufferingbutsomethingelse.Sufferingwouldbemerelyaside effect(althoughaperfectlyforeseeablesideeffect)ofwhatwe really choosetobring about:denunciation,education,prevention,defense,etc.

Buttheobjectionfails.Itfails,ﬁrstly,becauseoftheabusivelystipulative determinationofwhatexactlyitisthatwearechoosingtodo.IfI know thatmy choosingto ϕ willcauseyousuffering(evenifthatisnotmymainordirect intention)–howcompellingisittosaythatbychoosingto ϕ Iamnot, eoipso, therebychoosingtocauseyousuffering?ThisisreminiscentofwhatPascalmocked asthe“grandmethodofdirectingtheintention.”13 But,secondly,theobjectionfails morefundamentallyaswell,asitevincesamisunderstandingofwhatpunishment itselfmust–onpainofincoherence–mean.AsWittgenstein,amongmyriad others,hasputit:itisperfectly“clear”thatjustas“rewardmustbesomething acceptable[orpleasant],”punishmentmustbe“somethingunacceptable[or unpleasant].”14

Inanimportantarticlethatwilloccupymyattentionlateron(inChapter 5),John Tasioulasusefullytracesthegenealogyofapowerfulresponsetothisobjection. TasioulascitesWilliams’spithyversionoftheresponse:

13 BlaisePascal,“TheProvincialLetters,”in WorksofPascal (O.W.Wight,ed.),NewYork,NY:Derby &Jackson(1859),Vol. 1., 231 andff.

14 LudwigWittgenstein, TractatusLogico-Philosophicus (C.K.Ogden,trans.),London:KeganPaul (1922), 88 (6 422).SeealsoLudwigWittgenstein, Notebooks 1914–1916 (G.H.vonWrightand G.E.M.Anscombe,eds.),NewYork,NY:Harper/Blackwell(1961), 78e.TheGermanterms translatedas“acceptable”and“unacceptable”byOgdenandas“pleasant”and“unpleasant”byvon WrightandAnscombeare Angenehmes and Unangenehmes.WhileIpreferthelattertranslation,this variationisusefulformypurposes:rewardsinvolvegoodthings,punishmentsbadthings.

Theideathattraditional,painful,punishmentsaresimplydenunciationsisincoherent,becauseitdoesnotexplain,withoutbeggingthequestion,whydenunciationshavetotaketheformofwhatNietzscheidentiﬁedastheconstantof punishment,“theceremonyofpain.”15

Whateverspeciﬁcpunishmentsturnouttobe,16 totheextentthattheyremainforms ofpunishment,theywillnecessarilyhaveto(seekto)makethewrongdoersuffer. Thepointhereisinnowayspeciallylinkedtodenunciatoryorcommunicative theoriesofpunishmentinparticular.Thepointapplieswithequalforcetoany accountofpunishmentinwhichtheconceptualconnectionbetweenpunishment andsufferingisrejected.

Denunciatorytheoriesofpunishmentarebutanexampleofwhatinhis Theodicy Leibnizusefullycalled“medicinal”punishments–thosethatseek“tocorrectthe criminal,oratleasttoprovideanexampleforothers.”17 Rehabilitative,educative, preventive,ordefensiveapproachestopunishmentareallequallysusceptibleto Williams’spoint,aslongastheselosesightofthefactthat,whenwepunish,anyof these(orother)goalsareachieved bymeansof makingwrongdoerssuffer. Conceptually,inflictingthissufferingisnotoptional:torefusetoinflictthissuffering (whetherornotthisrefusalentailsabandoningotherulteriorgoalsaswell)isto therebyrefusetopunish.Topunish,then,isto(tryto)inflictsuffering(orpainor miseryorabadthing,etc.)onsomeoneasaresponsetoherwrongdoing. Punishmentwithouttryingtoinflictsufferingislikegiftinganobjectwithout intendingtotransferanyrightoverthethinggiftedorlikefeedingsomeonewithout intendingtogivehersomenourishment.Thisisnotto abuse anydefinition(inthe senseofHart’sfamousprotestation)18 –itismerelyto use one.

Leavingtheobjectionbehind,then,wecanreturntothepeculiarpoignancyof thequestionregardingthesufferingthatpunishmentcauses.Thereisplentyof sufferingintheworld:sufferingarisingfromtheinevitableclashesbetweenhuman vulnerabilitiesandthebruteforcesofnatureorfromhumanmaliceandcrueltyor

15 JohnTasioulas,“PunishmentandRepentance,” Philosophy 81 (2006): 279–322,at 287 ff.Tasioulas tracesthisviewtoHartand,viaWilliams,toNietzsche.Williams,however,doesnotgivecitationfor thepassageinNietzschetowhichherefers.MichelFoucaultstrikesmeasamoreappropriatesource fortheideaofa“ceremonyofpain.”Inhis DisciplineandPunish (NewYork,NY:Vintage[1995]),the ceremonialaspectsofstatepunishmentareacentralmotif,andFoucaultrepeatedlytalksabout“the ceremonyofpunishment,”“thepenalceremony,”“theceremonyofpublictorture,”“theceremonyof publicexecution,”“theceremonyofpower.”FoucaultspeciﬁcallyusestheexpressionthatWilliams attributestoNietzsche,“theceremonyofpain,”onpage 257

16 Onthevariabilityofacceptableformsofstatepunishment,seeMichelFoucault, Disciplineand Punish, andmy“JustifyingIncarceration,”in TheUniversalityofPunishment (AntonioIncampoand WojciechZelaniec,eds.),Bari:Cacucci(2015): 135–154.

17 Leibniz, Theodicy ..., 424–425.Ishallmakeampleuseoftheterm“medicinal,”inpreferenceofthe admittedlymuchmorewidespread(andperhapslessjarring)term“instrumental.”Ihavechosento reviveLeibniz’stermbecauseitseemshelpfulinstressingtheremarkableparallelbetweencertain viewsofpunishmentandmedicine.

18 Hart, PunishmentandResponsibility , 5 ff.

fromsheeraccidentsandbadluck.Buttopunishisto deliberately bringbadthings about,andthismaysuggestthatpunishmentis,initself,amatterofmakingthe worldworse,notbetter.Thisis,infact,exactlyJeremyBentham’sextraordinarily inﬂuentialpositiononpunishment:“[P]unishmentinitselfisevil,”towhichhe immediatelyaddsthatthereforeitshouldonlybeadmitted(ifatall)when“it promisestoexcludesomegreaterevil.”19 Iwillargueatlengthlater(especiallyin Chapter 3)thattheBenthamitepositionisaswidespreadasitisdeﬁcient.20

Casesinwhichsufferingisdeliberatelyinflictedandthatdonotseemtomakethe worldworseareevidentlyeasytoimagine.TocontinuewiththeLeibnizianmotif, justconsideranymedicalinterventionthatcausessomesufferingbutislikelyto preventmuchgreatersuffering.Orconsideranycaseinwhichapersonoragroupof peopleismadetosufferinordertosparegreatersufferingtoalargergroupofpeople. Theseinflictionsofsufferingdonotreallymaketheworldworse,sincetheyarebest described,oncewebroadenthelensthroughwhichwelookatthem,asoverall diminutions ofsuffering.Manypopularjustificationsofpunishment–suchasthe already-mentionedBenthamiteutilitarianjustificationandtherehabilitative,educational,preventive,ordefensivejustifications–canbeseenasmedicinalin Leibniz’ssense.Proponentsofthesejustificationsseethebadnessofthesuffering thatpunishmentbringsaboutascompensatedbythatbadnesswhich, exhypothesi, punishmentprevents.Andso,intheirview,punishmentactuallymakestheworld better,notworse.

Butsomehavearguedthatthereis,somehow,somethinggood,initself,aboutthe sufferingthatpunishmentinflicts,independentlyofwhetheritpreventsgreater suffering.Leibnizisoneexample;hisuseoftheterm“medicinal”inthiscontext isaput-down:“[T]rueretributivejustice,”hetellsus,goes–becauseit ought togo–“beyondthemedicinal.”21 The“harmonyofthings”thatisessentialtoLeibniz’s theodicydemands“evilintheformofsuffering.”22 Ifthemedicinaljustifications werethewholestory,thenpunishmentwouldnotreallycontributemuchtothe problemofsuffering,foritwouldbeplainthatthesufferingitgeneratesisjust necessarytoavoidgreatersuffering.Wewouldsimplyneedtoensurethatour calculationsarecorrect.Themedicinalapproach–soinfluentialnowadays,as Iwillargue– reduces therealanddeepmoralandpoliticalproblemsassociated withpunishmenttomere“technological”ones,toechoIsaiahBerlin’sinsightful deploymentofthisterm,itselfreminiscentofLeibniz’sdeploymentoftheterm

19 JeremyBentham,“AnIntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation,”in TheWorksof JeremyBentham (JohnBowring,ed.),Vol. 1,NewYork,NY:Russell&Russell(1962), 83

20 Importantly(althoughalsoinaccordancewithstandardusage),unlessotherwisenoted,Iwilluse “Benthamiteutilitarianism,”“classicalutilitarianism,”“hedonisticutilitarianism,” and “utilitarianism”interchangeably.SeeJohnRawls, ATheoryofJustice,rev.ed.,Cambridge,MA:Harvard UniversityPress(1992),especially 19–24;andJuliaDriver,“TheHistoryofUtilitarianism,” TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy (Winter 2014 Edition)(EdwardN.Zalta,ed.):http://plato .stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/utilitarianism-history.

21 Leibniz, Theodicy , 425 22 Ibid

“medicinal.”23 Leibniz–alongwithmyriadotherthinkers–believesthisistoo reductionistbecausethesufferingconstitutiveofpunishmentissometimes intrinsically good,evenifitdoesnotcontributetoreducingfurthersuffering. That problem–i.e.,howpunishmentcanbeinthiswayintrinsicallygood–istheserious, non-medicinal,non-technologicalproblemworthourattention.

Often,however,theodicies–particularlysometheistictheodicies–attemptto solvethisprobleminsuspectways,byascribinginscrutablewisdomtoGod.So,for example,acommonmoveinthesetheodicies–including,inaway,Leibniz’sown–istosuggestthatGod,beingnotonlyall-goodbutalsoall-knowing,knowsthatthe sufferingintheworldthatstrikesusasexcessiveisinfactoptimal.Thingsaretaken tobeinterconnectedinwaysthatmereﬁnitebeingscannotunderstand:attemptsto “eliminate”thisorthatepisodeofsufferingintheworldwouldhaveproducedeven moresuffering–andGod,unlikeus,knowsthis.Asidefromtheirobscurantism, theseapproachesmayperhapsbeguiltyofsimply transferring thereductive approach:itisnothumansthatdothenumbercrunchingbutGod–itisjustthat God’scalculationsaretoocomplicatedforus.Godwouldunderstandhowthe medicineisindeedmedicine,howthetechnologyoperates,butthereductionism could stillbethere,onlyhiddenfromus.Opponentsofthereductionistapproach wouldobjecttomeretransfers:theywouldwanttoensurethatreductionismis clearlyrejected.

Seculartheodiciesfarebetter,astheytendtoemphasizethattheproblemof theodicyistheproblemof meaningful existence;itistheproblemof makingsense of aworldthat,asWebernoted,isﬁlledwith“undeservedsuffering,unpunished injustice,andincorrigiblestupidity.”24 Forobviousreasons,Iwillhereignorethe problemofincorrigiblestupidity;butthetwinproblemsofundeservedsufferingand ofunpunishedinjusticeare,justasobviously,centraltomyaimsinthisbook.

ItisimportanttounderscorethataccordingtoWebersufferingisreallyaproblem forseculartheodiciesonlywhenitisnotdeserved,andinjusticesaremoreof aproblemwhentheyarenotpunished.Thesetwoproblemsarenotmerely calculative,medicinal,ortechnological:aworldinwhichvicewascommonly rewardedandvirtuecommonlypunishedwouldbeproblematic evenif itcouldbe shownthatitcontainedtheminimumamountofsufferingpossible.Anditwouldbe problematic,ﬁrstandforemost,becausethisstateofaffairswouldstrikeusas existentially meaningless.AsWeberputit,“theneedforanethicalinterpretation ofthe‘meaning’ofthedistributionsoffortunesamongmenincreasedwiththe growingrationalityofconceptionsoftheworld.”25

23 IsaiahBerlin,“TwoConceptsofLiberty,”in Liberty (HenryHardy,ed.),Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press(2002), 167

24 MaxWeber,“PoliticsasaVocation,”inPeterLassmanandRonaldSpeirs(eds.), Weber:Political Writings,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress(1994), 362.

25 H.H.GerthandC.WrightMills, FromMaxWeber:EssaysinSociology,NewYork,NY:Oxford UniversityPress(1946), 275

Thissearchformeaningintheworldisparticularlyurgentinthefaceofwhat Webercalled“theincongruitybetweendestinyandmerit.”26 GershonShafir’s insightfulinterpretationofwhat“destiny”and“merit”meanforWeberisilluminating.WithShafir,wecanseethatWeberunderstands“destiny”astheworldview accordingtowhichthedistributionofsufferingintheworldisdisordered,arbitrary, andrandom–and thereby meaningless.“Merit,”incontrast,isforWeberrelatedto aworldviewaccordingtowhichthedistributionofsufferingintheworldissomehow “ordered”–and thereby meaningful.27 WithWeberandShafir,weseethathumans cancreatemeaninginanotherwisemeaninglessworldby“infusingitwith arationalizedethic”soastomake“meritanddestinycoincide.”28

Andwecanthensee,too,thereasonforthepejorativesenseinwhichLeibnizuses theterm“medicinal”torefertosomejustiﬁcationsofpunishment.AsShaﬁr remindsus,Weberalsohad(inthiscontext)anegativeviewofthemedicinal,for althoughmedicine“iscapableofdiminishingsuffering,”“thepointofviewof medicine”is“itselfmeaningless.”29 Needlesstosay,thisisnotsupposedtobean attackonmedicineassuchoronanyothertechnologicalmechanismthatseeksto reducesuffering.Rather,itisbothacriticismofthestrategyof reducing theworldof valuetomeremedicine,tomeretechnology,andareminderoftherelatively tenuousconnectionbetweenmedicinalstrategiesandthelargerstoryconcerning therelationbetweenpunishmentandthemeaningoflife.

Thefactthat,onthisview,distributionsaccordingto merit suffusetheworldwith meaningshallbeveryimportantintheremainderofthebook.Admittedly,meritis nottheonlymeansofinfusingmeaningintotheworld–thoughitsurelyisone importantsuchmeans.30 Tomeritsomethingmeanstodeservesomething;one’s meritisone’sdesert.Thattheseexpressionsareindeedsynonymousisbroughtoutby thefactthatinsomelanguagestheresimplyisnowordfor“desert”otherthan “merit,”inthesensethattotranslatetheEnglishpropositionthat“shedeservesX” onewouldinthoseotherlanguageshavetosay“shemeritsX.”31 Theimportanceof merit–reﬂectednotonlyinLeibnizandWeberbutalsoinmanyotherthinkerswho

26 Ibid.

27 GershonShaﬁr,“TheIncongruitybetweenDestinyandMerit:MaxWeberonMeaningful ExistenceandModernity,” TheBritishJournalofSociology 36.4 (1985): 516–530.

28 Ibid., 521 29 Ibid., 524

30 In TheBookofJobinMedievalJewishThought (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress[2004]),RobertEisen suggeststhatprominentamongthereasonswhy Job hasremainedsofascinatingthroughtheagesis thatitdealswith“oneofhumanity’sdeepestandmostvexingproblems.”Thisproblemisnoneother than“thesufferingoftherighteous”–i.e.,theproblemof undeserved suffering(ibid., 3).Job’s protestationsarepredicatedonthefactthathe(rightly)considershimselfundeservingofsuffering. Inmanyinterpretations(illuminatinglydiscussedbyEisen)JobcomestoacceptthatGod’sdecision toinﬂictundeservedsufferingupontherighteousinorderto testtheirdevotion isanothermeansto infusemeaningintotheworld.Oneneednotagreewiththisothermeansinordertoseethat Job is centrallyconcernedwithﬁndingmeaninginsuffering.

31 ThisisexplicitlythecaseatleastinSpanishandotherRomancelanguages.Comparisonsbetween “ordinary”waysofsayingthingsindifferentlanguagesrevealsobvious–thoughoverlooked–problemsforversionsofthe“ordinarylanguage”approachtophilosophy.Notthattheintimate

havewrittenaboutmoralityandthemeaningoflife–isundeniable.Andyetmanyof theablestcontemporaryphilosophersdoubt(ordeny)theimportanceofdesert (merit)inaffectingthewaywereacttothepossibilityofinﬂictingsuffering.

LeibnizandWeber,then,donotﬁndsuffering assuch sophilosophically problematic:itisspeciﬁcally undeserved sufferingthattheyconsidermeaningless andthereforedeeplyproblematic.32 Notonlyaretheseauthorsbynomeansalonein holdingthisposition,butifWeber’stoweringandwide-ranginghistoricaland sociologicalinvestigationsarecorrect,thisis–andhasalwaysbeen–thetypical positionofordinaryfolk.Thatiswhymanyhaveseenthequintessentially human urgetomakesenseof(meaningless)sufferingas“apsychological,ratherthan adeontic[ornormative]claim.”33

Inthenextchapter,Iwillhavemuchmoretosayabouthowdesertconfers(nonmedicinal)meaningtosuffering.Butletusfirsttakestockofwhatisclearalready: punishmentisincoherentwithoutitbeinganattempttoinflictsuffering,and (undeserved)sufferingisthemainproblemthatgivesrisetotheodicies.Inlightof thesefacts,thescarcityofsystematiceffortstoplacetheproblemofpunishment withintheframeworkoftheodiciesisstartling.Seekingtofillthisgapisalready areasonforwritingthisbook.Buttherearealsotwospecificreasonswhysuch framingislikelytobeparticularlyfecund.

First,thisframingwillallowmetoconnectthediscussionofpunishmenttothe discussionofauthorsnottypicallyregisteringoncontemporarypunishmenttheorists’radars.Thismayalreadybevisible,givenmyengagementwithLeibnizand Weber,buttherewillbemanymoresuchinstancesinthebook.Iwill,ofcourse, engagewiththeworkofleadingcontemporarypunishmenttheoristsandphilosophersoflaw,butIwillalsodiscussauthorsandsourcesnottypicallydiscussedby thesecontemporarypunishmenttheorists.Engagingwiththeseauthorsandsources can,asIhopetoshow,signiﬁcantlycontributetorefreshingandrevitalizingcontemporarydebatesoverthejustiﬁcationofpunishment.

Second,andmoresubstantively,thisframingrevealsthatthefundamentalquestionoftheodicyconcerns values:itconcernsitselfwithwhy theworld isgood(or bad).Theodicyisnotnecessarily(andcertainlynotprimarily)action-guiding,it beingratherconnectedtoourunderstandingandevaluationoftheworldsuchasitis connectionbetweenthesetwotermsislostinEnglish.Theconnectionisfamouslyprominentin AdamSmith,forexample,whounderstood“meritanddemerit”as“thequalitiesofdeservingreward, andofdeservingpunishment.”SeeAdamSmith, TheTheoryofMoralSentiments,London:Bohn (1853): 93 andff.

32 SeealsoBernardWilliams,“UnbearableSuffering,”in TheSenseofthePast:Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress(2007): 331–337

33 TamsinShaw,“The‘LastMan’Problem:NietzscheandWeberonPoliticalAttitudestoSuffering,”in NietzscheasPoliticalPhilosopher (ManuelKnollandBarryStocker,eds.),Berlin:deGruyter(2014): 345–380.Or,asNietzschehimselffamouslyputit:“Whatactuallyarousesindignationoversuffering isnotthesufferingitself,butthesenselessnessofsuffering,”inhis OntheGenealogyofMorality (KeithAnsell-Pearson,ed.),Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress(2006), 44.SeealsoAnsellPearson’suseful“Introduction”tothiseditionofthe Genealogy (xiii–xxx).

(orasitisassumedtobe).34 Thesameistrueofpunishmenttheory.Andyetthis concernwithvalueassuchhasbeenlargelyabsentfromcontemporarydiscussions ofpunishment–inmyopinion,totheirdetriment.AsIwillargueinthenext section,oneoftheconsequencesofthisabsenceisthatithaspreventedcontemporarypunishmenttheoristsfromproperlyunderstandingwhattheythemselves claimisthecentraldebateregardingpunishment.

1.2theaxiologicalandthedeontic

Whilemanyaspectsofthephilosophicaldiscussionofpunishmenthaveformillenniabeentakentobeverydifﬁcult,andhavebeenwidelycontested,thereisatleast oneaspectregardingwhichthereappearstobegreatclarity:thecentraldebate regardingthejustiﬁcationofpunishmentisbetweenretributivismand consequentialism.35 Thestandardinterpretationofthedebategoesroughlyas follows:retributivistsjustifypunishmentbyitsbeing deserved,whereasconsequentialists,incontrast,justifypunishmentbythepositive consequences thatpunishmentis supposed(orknown)tocause.Toputthisinthetermsintroducedpreviously: consequentialistapproaches,seekingtoprevent,deter,incapacitate,rehabilitate, communicate,denounce,andsoon,are medicinal;onlyretributivismisnonmedicinallyconcernedwithjusticeassuch.

Sofar,sogood.Butsince all theserationales–medicinalandnon-medicinal–seemdesirable,awidevarietyofeffortstocombinethemhavebeenofferedandin factenjoywidespreadpopularity.36 Inspiteofthispopularity,however,thesefamous “mixedjustiﬁcations”havegeneratedmoreheatthanlight,andIhaveelsewhere arguedagainstthem.37 ButhereIwishtoputforthanewandmoregeneral explanationfortheirfailure.Iamafraidthat,onﬁrstapproximation,thisexplanation mayperhapssoundtoograndforitsowngood,butIwillattempttoshowthatthe explanationisindeedcorrect.

Themixedjustiﬁcationshavefailedbecausetheirproponentshave misunderstood whatexactlyisbeingopposedtowhatwhenretributivismisopposedtoconsequentialismandwhatexactlyisinvolvedin“justifying”punishment.Thatthedebate

34 Iamherefocusingontheworld,suchasitis,asthelocusofmeaning,conceivablyindependentlyof ourintervention.

35 Asiswellknown,“consequentialism”canreferbothtoageneralmoraldoctrineandspecificallyto ajustificationofpunishment.Unlessotherwisenoted,Iwillthroughoutthisbookuse“consequentialism”inthenarrowsenseof“consequentialismaboutthejustificationofpunishment.”

36 SeetheseminalversionsinA.M.Quinton,“OnPunishment,” Analysis 14 (1954): 133–142;in JohnRawls,“TwoConceptsofRules,”inSamuelFreeman(ed.), JohnRawls:CollectedPapers, Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress(2001): 20–46;andinH.L.A.Hart, Punishmentand Responsibility, 2 ff.

37 Zaibert, PunishmentandRetribution, 10 ff.Forsimilarcriticisms,seealsoTedHonderich, Punishment:TheSupposedJustiﬁcationsRevisited,London:PlutoPress(2005), passim;and(regardingRawls)StanleyCavell, TheClaimofReason:Wittgenstein,Skepticism,Morality,andTragedy, Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress(1999), 292 ff.,especiallyat 302–303

betweenretributivistsandconsequentialistshadbeenhistoricallymisunderstood was,however,therallyingcryofsomeoftheearlyproponentsofthesefamousmixed justificationsthemselves.SoitmayseempuzzlingthatIwouldclaimthattheirviews weresuchfailures.Thepuzzleisnottoodifficulttoresolve,however,formyviewis thatwhilethoseproponentsofmixedjustificationswereformallycorrectinthinking thatthecentraldistinctionhadbeenmisunderstood,theythemselvesweresubstantiallywrong– wildly wrong,infact–astothenatureofthemisunderstanding.

Morethanhalfacenturyago,A.M.Quintonfamouslyproposedthatthe“antinomy”opposingretributivismandconsequentialism“canberesolved”bymaking surethatwehave“properlyunderstood”retributivism.38 ThoughIthinkthatitisnot onlyretributivismthatneedstobeproperlyunderstood–since“consequentialism” tooiscommonlymisunderstood– formally IagreewithQuinton.Butthatiswhere theagreementends:regarding substance IdisagreewithQuintondeeply.Quinton (whoseinfluenceonotherproponentsofmixedjustificationisconsiderable)39 held that“retributivism,properlyunderstood,isnotamoralbutalogicaldoctrine.”40 Briefly,Quintonbelievesthatretributivismreducestotheclaimthatthetalkof punishingtheundeservingevincesignoranceastowhattheword“punishment” means andthatthissemanticpointisallretributivistshaveevercaredabout.

Thisisaseriousmistake.Retributivismisnotalogicalorsemanticthesis–and Iknowofnoretributivistwhohaseverseenherownthesisinsuchareductive fashion.Retributivistscontendthatretributivism is amoraldoctrine:adoctrinethat concernsitselfwiththemoraldefensibilityofinflictingonwrongdoersthepunishmentthattheydeserve.Retributivism,moreover,isaspecialtypeofmoraldoctrine inasensethathasnotbeenhithertosufficientlyrecognized.Iftheapparently straightforwarddistinctionbetweenretributivismandconsequentialismistomake anysense–andifitistobeofanyhelpinadvancingthedebateconcerning punishment’sjustification–itneedstobeproperlyframedwithinthemoregeneral distinctionpertainingtomoralphilosophyadumbratedbyourdiscussionoftheodicy:thedistinctionbetweentheaxiologicalandthedeontic.

By“axiology”I–likeothers–referto“theareaofmoralphilosophythatis concernedwiththeoreticalquestionsaboutvalueandgoodnessofallvarieties,” andIthustakeittobeasynonymfor“valuetheory.”41 By“deontic”Iherereferto considerationsthatleadusto act incertainways.Itisevidentthataxiologicaland deonticconcernsinteractwitheachotherinagreatvarietyofways:forexample,that somethingis(orisnot)goodsurelyhassomerelevanceregardingourdeliberationas towhatweought(oroughtnot)todo.Perhapsweshouldactinsuchwayssoasto

38 Quinton,“OnPunishment,” 134.

39 RawlsacknowledgesthesimilaritiesbetweenQuinton’sviewsandhisownin“TwoConceptof Rules,”fn. 4

40 Quinton,“OnPunishment,” 134.

41 MarkSchroeder,“ValueTheory,” TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy (Summer 2012 Edition) (EdwardN.Zalta,ed.):http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/value-theory/.

bringaboutasmuchgoodnessaspossible;attheveryleastourbeliefthatsomething isgoodprovidesuswithareasonoramotiveforbringingitabout.Butitisnoless evidentthatthetwosortsofconcernsaredifferent:onethingistosay,forexample, thatshowingaffectionisagoodthing,andanotheristosaythatweoughttoshow affection.Toemployabitofcontemporaryjargon:deonticconcernsareessentially “action-guiding,”whereasaxiologicalconcernsarenotessentially,ordirectly,or decisively,“action-guiding.”Someproblems–suchasthetheoreticalproblemof punishmentthatismyfocusinthisbook–canonly,oratleastmoreprofoundly, manifestthemselveswithintheaxiologicalrealm.

Withtheaidofthedistinctionbetweentheaxiologicalandthedeontic,wecan thenbegintoclarifythedistinctionbetweenretributivismandconsequentialism. Retributivism,firstandforemost, should beseenasan axiological doctrine,not adeonticone(andmuchlessamerelylogicalorsemanticone,asQuintonandother “mixedtheorists”wouldhaveit).Retributivistsassertthatthere is valueindeserved suffering itself,inthedeservedsufferingthatisconstitutiveofpunishment itself. (Myemphasison“itself”intheprevioussentenceismeanttounderscore,once more,thatthisvalueisnon-medicinal.)Thefactthatdeservedsufferinghasvalueof courseentersintotheretributivist’sdeonticdeliberationsastowhetherpunishment should,inthisorthatcase,beinflicted–butitdoesnotcommithertoanydeontic position.Thefactthatdeservedsufferingisvaluabledoesnotnecessarilyjustify inflicting it.

BynomeansdoIwishtodenythattherealsoexist“deonticretributivists,”thatis, thinkerswhobelievethatbecausedeservedsufferingisvaluablethenitoughttobe inﬂicted.Asamatteroffact,manyleadingretributivists–withKantattheforefront–oftenpresenttheirpositionasanamalgamationofbothaxiologicalanddeontic elements.

42 Muchconfusionsurroundsthisissue.Theseretributivistssimultaneously(or,asthecasemaybe,intermittently)assertthatretributivismisthe axiological viewthatdeservedpunishmentisintrinsicallygoodandthatretributivismisthe deontic viewthatweoughttopunishthedeserving.43 Andyet,bothfor reasonsIhavediscussedelsewhere44 andforotherreasonsIwillpresentlater (particularlyinChapter 4),deonticversionsofretributivismoughttoberejected. Thisisnotmerestipulation.Thereisonesuccinctandstraightforwardargument (albeitnothithertosufﬁcientlyrecognized)whyretributivismoughttobeseenas essentiallyaxiological.Retributivistscandisagreeastothecomplicatedquestions

42 ImmanuelKant, ThePhilosophyofLaw:AnExpositionoftheFundamentalsPrinciplesof JurisprudenceastheScienceofRight (W.Hastie,trans.),Edinburgh:T.&T.Clark(1887), passim butparticularly 194 ff.

43 TheamalgamationisconspicuousnotonlyinKant’sretributivismbutinitsmostsophisticated contemporarydefense,MichaelMoore’s(seehis PlacingBlame,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress [1997])aswell.IwilldiscussthesemattersinChapter 4

44 SeeZaibert, PunishmentandRetribution, 155 ff.SeealsoDavidDolinko,“Retributivism, Consequentialism,andtheIntrinsicGoodnessofPunishment,” LawandPhilosophy 16 (1997): 507–528

concerningthedeonticimplicationsoftheiraxiologicalcommitments.Butno retributivistcandenytheaxiologicalpointthatdeservedpunishmentisintrinsically valuable.Inthissense,then,thisaxiologicalcommitmentisrevealedasabsolutely essentialtoretributivisminwaysthatnoothercommitmentis.Withoutadheringto thisaxiologicalcommitment,youarenotaretributivist.

Furthermore,itispreciselythisessentialretributivistcommitmentthattheconsequentialistdenies.Itis this disagreement,then,thatallowsustoproperlyunderstand thedebatebetweenretributivistsandconsequentialists.Situatingthediscussionof punishmentwithintheframeworkofthemorefundamentaldistinctionbetweenthe axiologicalandthedeonticgivesusaparticularlycrispandstraightforwardwayof reframingthecontemporarydebateoverthejustificationofpunishment:thedebate canbeseen,inthefirstinstance,asaxiological.Theretributivistassertsthatdeserved punishmentisintrinsicallyvaluable,andtheconsequentialistdeniesit.Notonlyis thiswayofdrawingthedistinctionbetweentheseopposingcampssharperthan traditionalalternatives:italsopacksmuchadditionalexplanatorypower.Thisis particularlytrueinthesensethatsodoingclarifiesthetruenature both ofretributivism and ofconsequentialism.Fortofocusontheconsequentialist’sdenialoftheessential retributivecommitmenttotheintrinsicvalueofdeservedpunishmentallowsustosee herforwhatshereallyis,independentlyofwhateverassuaging,euphemisticwordsshe maychoosetocharacterizeherownposition.

Consequentialistsare,inaveryimportantsense,classicalutilitarians:assuch,they seepunishmentasevil,butasanevilthatcouldnonethelessbe“justiﬁed”(inthe remarkablyhumblesenseof“tolerated”)ifitcanbereasonablyexpectedtoreduce greaterevil.Consequentialistsareclassicalutilitariansatleastinthesensethatthey applytheclassicalutilitarianaxiologytothecaseofpunishment.Admittedly,itis possibletobeaclassicalutilitarianaboutpunishmentandyetnotendorseclassical utilitarianismasacomprehensivemoraldoctrine;or,inotherwords,itispossibletobe aclassicalutilitarianaboutpunishmentbutnotaboutotherthings.Independentlyof thosepossibilities,thepointremains:extantconsequentialistjustiﬁcationsofpunishmentareclassicalutilitarianinthesensejustexplained.

1.3monismandpluralism

Classicalutilitarians,however,arenottypicallyconcernedwithaxiologicalmatters assuch.Typically,theirinterestsarefundamentallydeontic:weoughtonly act (punitivelyandotherwise)whensodoingislikelytobeuseful, a ` la Bentham.This somethingusefulis,afortiori,thediminutionofsuffering(ortheaugmentationof pleasure).

45 Classicalutilitariansareaboveallconcernedwithwhatistobe done:if theycaremuchaboutaxiologicalmatters,itisonlyaboutthosethatareeffectively

45 Thesearenottwodifferentgoods.Unlessotherwisenoted,Iwillthroughoutmean“both”ofthese goodswheneverImentiononeofthem.AsWilliamshaspithilyputit,“veryroughlyspeaking” utilitarianismistheview“thattheonlythingthatultimatelymattersishowmuchsufferingthere

linkedtothediminutionofsuffering,andthisiswhyitisahedonisticdoctrine.But thisisnotbecauseclassicalutilitarians lack anaxiologicalpositionbutbecausethey movebeyondtheiraxiologicalpositionveryquickly.Still,andsincethisfacthas beensosystematicallyneglected,itisworthemphasizingthatthemostfundamental pointofcontentionbetweenconsequentialistsandretributivistsis,atitsroot, axiological.

Indenyingtheessentialaxiologicalcommitmentofretributivism,consequentialists are eoipso puttingforththeirownaxiologicalposition,justasBenthamdid,namely thattherenecessarilyisdisvalueinsuffering(deservedorotherwise):inaccordanceto theirfoundingcredo,“punishment[becauseitnecessarilyinvolvessuffering]initself isevil.”Importantly,thisparticularaxiologicalpositionisnotastapleofallformsof utilitarianism;rather,itischaracteristiconlyofitsclassical,Benthamiteincarnation. Butitisspeciﬁcallythisclassical,Benthamiteutilitarianismthatisoverwhelminglyat playinthecontemporarydiscussionofpunishment.Themuchricher–andmuch morepromising–versionofnon-BenthamiteutilitarianismthatIwilldiscussinthis book(aboveallinChapter 2)isveryrarelyaddressedbycontemporarypunishment theorists.Thecontemporarydebateproceedsasifdistinctionsbetweendifferent versionsofutilitarianismeitherdidnotexistordidnotmatter.46

Independentlyofthehigher-orderproblemswiththedebateitself,whatisimmediatelyclearisthattheaxiologicalworldviewofclassicalutilitarianismisrathersimple: thereisbutonegood,intermsofwhichallotherputativegoodsaretobeexpressedand understood–pleasure(which,asjustexplained,isinthiscontextequivalenttothe absenceofpain).Thisaxiologicalpositionisnotjustsimplebutproblematically simpleminded.Whileevidentlytheword“simpleminded”ismeanttoexpresscriticism, Idonotmeanitacrimoniously:Iuseitthroughoutinasomewhattechnicalsense. InwhatIthinkisthemostenlighteningcriticismofclassicalutilitarianismever (perhapswiththeexceptionofG.E.Moore’s PrincipiaEthica),Williamsdeﬁned simplemindednessas“havingtoofewthoughtsandfeelingstomatchtheworldasit reallyis.”47 ItisexactlyinWilliams’ssensethatIusetheterm“simpleminded” here.48 AsWilliamsalsopointedout,sounderstoodsimplemindednessentails neither“lackofintellectualsophistication”nor“simple-heartedness.”49 Givenits foundationalaxiology,classicalutilitarianismis,forreasonsthatwillbecomeclearer is”–seeBernardWilliams,“TheHumanPrejudice,”in PhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline, Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress(2006): 135–154,at 144.

46 Therearemanyversionsofutilitarianism.Iwillconcentrateonthedistinctionbetweenclassical utilitarianismand ideal utilitarianism(tobedeﬁnedinduecourse).So,Iwillignorethedistinction betweenact-andrule-utilitarianism,andIwillignoretooallotherversionsofthismostmalleableof doctrines.Notwithstandingtheirdifferences,allversionsofutilitarianismacceptthat,absentmedicinalconsiderations,sufferingisinitselfevil.

47 Williams,“ACritiqueofUtilitarianism,” 149

48 IdonotthinkthatWilliams’ssenseof“simplemindedness”shouldevokequitetheideaof“moral clumsiness.”SeeSamuelSchefﬂer, TheRejectionofConsequentialism,Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press(1982), 3

49 Williams,“ACritiqueofUtilitarianism,” 149

asthebookprogresses,accuratelydescribedassimpleminded,foritunhelpfully reduces–andattimescaricaturizes–boththephenomenaitseekstoexplainand thepositionswithwhichitdisagrees.Therearecasesinwhichonemayagreewith thecourseofactionclassicalutilitarianismrecommendsdespiterejectingthe explanationsthatutilitarianswouldadduceforit.Lifejustdoesnotreducetothe perennialdiminutionofsuffering,evenifonmanyoccasionsreducingsuffering maybetherightthingtodo.

Asweshallseeinduecourse,Bentham’sdictumwhereby“punishmentisevil”is repeatedeitherverbatim(oralmostverbatim)orendorsedinspiritbyalarge numberofcontemporaryphilosophers–evenbysomewhodenythattheyare utilitarians,letalone hedonistic utilitarians.Afewofthesecontemporaryphilosophersadmitthatthereisintrinsicvalueinthingsotherthanpleasure.Forexample, acurrentlypopularsuggestionamongpunishmenttheoristsisthatthereisintrinsic valueinthewrongdoer’srecognizingthatshehasdonewrong,inhercomingto termswiththesignificanceofwhatshehasdone,evenifthisrecognitionisnot pleasant.Buttheseauthorsarenottobeseenaspluralistsinmysense,fortwo reasons.First,becausewhenweexaminethedetailsoftheseauthors’theories,we findthattheirdominantsuffering-reducingagendastendtocrowdoutother considerations.Second,becausethepluralismthatIthinkisworthdefendingin ourcontextisonethatcentrallyopposesthevalueofpunishmentandthevalueof forgiveness.Aswillbecomeclearlateron(aboveallinChapter 7),forgivenessis averyspecialformofdiminishingsuffering–andinfactaformofsuffering diminutionthatissurprisinglydifficultforutilitarianstoevencountenance.But acertaindismissaloftheaxiologicalsignificanceofforgivenessgoesbeyondthe utilitarians.Eventhosecontemporarypunishmenttheoristswhoproperlyseethemselvesaspluralistsandwhodonotsuccumbtotheindiscriminatesufferingreductionagendaofutilitarianismfailtotakeforgivenessseriously.

Tobesure,notallformsofutilitarianismareweddedtohedonism.Asweshall seeinfulldetailinthenextchapter, ideal utilitariansexplicitly–andwisely–deny thatpleasureistheonlyvaluablething.Theaxiologyof ideal utilitarianism explainstheotherwiseprobablyconfusing–andhithertoinsufﬁcientlyinvestigated–factthatanidealutilitariancanalsoembraceretributivism.Insofaras idealutilitariansdenythatpleasureistheonlygood,theiradherentscanendorse richer, pluralistic axiologiesthanthesimplemindedaxiologyunderwhosemonolithicheavinessclassicalutilitarianismgroans.(Thisissoeveniftheirpluralism maybenotquitetheoneIdefendhere.)Idealutilitarianscanunproblematically embrace(axiological)retributivism,sincetheirpluralisticaxiologymayallowthem torecognizethatgivingpeoplewhattheydeserve–evenifwhattheydeserveisto suffer–isvaluable.Moreover,idealutilitarianscanalsounderstandthatthevalue offorgivenessisnottobefoundinthefactthatitreducessufferingsimpliciter. Thesearethingsthat,asIwillexplaininduecourse,theimmenselymore inﬂuentialclassicalutilitariansimplycannotdo.

Theprecedingremarkshelpusforegroundfourinterestingandinterrelated characteristicsofthecontemporarydebateconcerningthejustificationofpunishment.First,asitturnsout,thedebateopposesthinkers(theretributivists)who believethat,whateverelsemayberelevant,thefactthatpunishmentisdeserved surelyispartofthestoryofitsjustificationandthinkers(theconsequentialists)who believethat,sincedeservedpunishmentisatbestvalueless,thestoryofpunishment’s justificationshouldsimplybethestoryofoureffortstodiminishsufferinginthe world.Second,althoughthecoreofthedebateisaxiological(torepeat:whetheror notthereisvalueindeservedpunishmentitself),insofarasthehedonisticutilitarian quicklyabandonsherownaxiologicalconcernsandmovestoadvanceherdeontic goals,thedebatetypicallyplaysout–unhelpfully–asaconfrontationbetweenwhat shouldberecognizedasanessentiallyaxiologicaldoctrine(retributivism)and adoctrinethatrecognizesitselfasessentiallydeontic(consequentialism).Atthe veryleast,distinguishingbetweentheaxiologicalandthedeonticdimensionsofthe debateislikelytohelpusexplain–andsometimesexplainaway–someofthevexing problemssurroundingthewayinwhichthedebateoverpunishment’sjustification playsout.Third,bothconsequentialismand deontic retributivismaresimplemindedlymonistic,anditisbetweenthesetwoalternativesthatthecontemporarydebate overthejustificationofpunishmentplaysout.Inthisbook,Iwishtoexplorethe consequencesoftakingaricherandnon-simplemindedpluralisticaxiology(with whichonly axiological retributivismisconsistent)seriously.

Fourth,andasacorollarytothefirstthreecharacteristicsnotedpreviously,Iam heresuggestinganewwayofmappingtherelevantterritory.Ratherthanseeingthe differencebetweenretributivismandconsequentialismascentraltothedebate surroundingthejustificationofpunishment,Iproposethatwerecognizethatthe centraldistinctionisinfactthatwhichopposesmonisticandpluralisticjustifications ofpunishment.Inthisnewmap,manyretributivistjustifications,alongwithmany “mixed”justificationsofpunishment,belong,togetherwithconsequentialistjustifications,underthecategoryof“monistic”justifications.Forexample,underthis newlight,Kant’sretributivismandMichaelS.Moore’sretributivism,justasmuchas Quinton’sandRawls’sandHart’s“mixedjustifications,”arerevealedtobeas monisticasBenthamiteutilitarianism–andtheyarethusallgroupedtogether underthegeneralheading“monism.”50 Thereare,infact,veryfewtrulypluralistic justificationsofpunishment.51

50 Famously,Rawlsdistinguishesbetweenjustificationfromtheperspectiveofajudgeandfromthe perspectiveofthelegislator,andHartdistinguishesbetweenjustificationatthelevelofthe“general justifyingaims”ofpunishmentandatthelevelofits“distribution.”Eachoftheseperspectivesinitself is,however,monistic.SeeRawls,“TwoConceptsofRules,”andHart, PunishmentandResponsibility, op.cit. Quinton’s“mixedjustification”isevenmoreobviously,andmoreunqualifiedly,monistic (sinceitisutilitarianthroughandthrough).

51 ThecontemporaryauthorwhoexplicitlycomesclosesttothetypeofpluralismIdefendis JohnTasioulas,aboveallinhis“PunishmentandRepentance,”andinhis“Mercy,” Proceedingsof theAristotelianSociety 103 (2003): 101–132.IwilldiscusshiminChapter 5

Tosuggestthisnewmapisnottotherebydecreetheabsoluteendof(something like)thedistinctionbetweenretributivismandconsequentialism.Foritispossible thatthisdistinction(oronelikeit)canresurfacedownstream,asitwere.Consider twodifferentpluralisticjustifications,onethatvaluesdesertmuchmoredecisively thanitvaluesmedicinalconsiderationsandonethatvaluesmedicinalconsiderationsmuchmoredecisivelythanitvaluesdesert.Itmaybethoughtusefultoreferto theformerasretributiveandtothelatterasconsequentialist.Iamnotsurethatit would indeedbeusefultocontinueemployingtheselabels(atleastnotwithout importantqualifications),forthismayconfuseratherthanclarify,giventhatthey wouldrefertojustificationsthatwouldstillbeimportantlydifferentfromwhatwe nowcallconsequentialismand(deontic)retributivism.Buteveniftheselabelswere usedinthisway,thedistinctionwouldstillbeoperatingonly within thebroader categoryofpluralisticjustifications(or,asthecasemaybe, within thebroader categoryofmonisticjustifications,sincethepossibilitydiscussedinthisparagraph couldevidentlyalsobeimaginedunderthatotherheading).And,thus,thefundamentalimportanceofthedistinctionbetweenmonisticandpluralisticjustifications thatIamchampioningwouldremainintact.

Thesecharacteristicsofthecontemporaryphilosophicaldebateregardingthe justiﬁcationofpunishment–aboveallthenewmapofthejustiﬁcationsofpunishmentIamproposing–areprobablysurprisingtomany.Attheveryleast,itisplain thatthesecharacteristicsandthisnewmaparenotgenerallyacknowledged,and Isuspectthattheymaybeoutrightrejectedbytheorthodoxyamongpunishment theorists.Butunderstandingwhatthedebatereallyisaboutstrikesmeascrucialto advancingit,andIthinkthatthewayinwhichIframethedebateinthisbookgetsus closertosuchunderstanding.

Whileproposinganewmapisindeedanimportantcontributiontothedebate, mygoalsinthisbookgobeyondthat.Mymoresystematicgoalsaretodefend apluralisticapproachtopunishmentandtoshowaseriesofhithertounderinvestigatedtheoreticalconsequencesthatﬂowfromtakingpluralismseriously. Underthislight,itshouldbeclearthatIamnotinterestedindefendingretributivismassuch:whatmattersmostisthepluralismwithwhichaxiologicalretributivism isconsistent.Retributivism,understoodasanaxiologicalthesis,allowsforaricher andpluralisticaxiology,onethatadmitsthatthereisvalueinbothjustice(inthe formofdeservedpunishment)andforgiveness,understoodasaveryspeciﬁcformof sufferingdiminution.Thisiswhythepluralisticapproachispreferableto consequentialism.

Ofcourse,ifretributivismismerelyconsistentwithapluralisticaxiology,it followsthatitsdefendersoweusanexplanationastothedeonticimportofthe intrinsicvalueofdeservedpunishment.Therearetwopossibleextremes.One extremeistoinsistthataxiologicalconsiderationsarecompletelyindependent fromdeonticconsiderations,sothattheyhavenopracticalsigniﬁcancewhatsoever.Theotherextremeistolinkaxiologicalconsiderationssotightlytodeontic

Another random document with no related content on Scribd:

‘Choked is my stream with dead men!’ it cried, ‘and still thou slayest!’

But when Achilles heeded not, in fierce flood the river uprose against him, sweeping the slain before it, and in furious spate seeking to destroy Achilles. But as its waves smote against his shield, Achilles grasped a tall elm, and uprooting it, cast it into the river to dam the torrent. For the moment only was the angry river stayed. In fear did Achilles flee across the plain, but with a mighty roar it pursued him, and caught him.

To the gods then cried Achilles, and to his aid came Athene, and close to the walls of Troy again did Achilles chase the Trojan men.

From the city walls old Priam saw the dreadful things Achilles wrought.

And when, his armour blazing like the brightest stars of the sky, he drew near, and Hector would have gone to meet him, in grief did Priam cry to his dearly-loved son:

‘Hector, beloved son, I pray thee go not alone to meet this man; mightier far than thou is he.’

But all eager for the fight was Hector. Of all the men of Troy he alone still stood unafraid. Then did the mother of Hector beseech him to hold back from what must surely mean death. Yet Hector held not back, but on his shining shield leaned against a tower, awaiting the coming of the great destroyer.

And at last they met, face to face, spear to spear. As a shootingstar in the darkness so flashed the spear of Achilles as he hurled it home to pierce the neck of Hector. Gods and men had deserted Hector, and alone before the walls of Troy he fell and died.

Thus ended the fight.

For twelve days did the Greek host rejoice, and all through the days Hector’s body lay unburied. For at the heels of swift horses had the Greeks dragged him to the ships, while from the battlements his

mother and his wife Andromache watched, wailing in agony, with hearts that broke.

The shadow of death came down upon Hector (page 116)

Then at length went old Priam to the camp of the Greeks. And before Achilles he fell, beseeching him to have mercy and to give him back the body of his son.

So was the heart of Achilles moved, and the body of Hector ransomed; and with wailing of women did the people of Troy

welcome home their hero.

Over him lamented his old mother, for of all her sons was he to her most dear, and over him wept, with burning tears, his wife Andromache.

And to his bier came Helen, and with breaking heart did she sob forth her sorrow.

‘Dearest of my brothers,’ she said, ‘from thee have I heard neither reproach nor evil word. With kind words and gentle heart hast thou ever stood by me. Lost, lost is my one true friend. No more in Troyland is any left to pity me.’

On lofty funeral pyre then laid they the dead Hector, and when the flames had consumed his body his comrades placed his white bones in a golden urn, and over it with great stones did they raise a mighty mound that all might see where he rested.

Yet still was the warfare between Greeks and Trojans not ended.

To Achilles death came in a shaft from the bow of Paris. By a poisoned arrow driven at venture and at dark midnight from the bow of an outcast leper was fair Paris slain. While winter snow lay white on Ida, in Helen’s arms did his life ebb away.

Then came there a day when the Greeks burned their camp and sailed homeward across the grey water.

Behind them they left a mighty horse of wood, and the men of Troy came and drew it into the city as trophy and sign of victory over those who had made it. But inside the horse were hidden many of the bravest warriors of Greece, and at night, when the Trojans feasted, the Greeks came out of their hiding-place and threw open the gates.

And up from the sea came the Greek host, and in fire and in blood fell the city of Troy.

Yet did not Helen perish. Back to his own kingdom by the sea Menelaus took her, to reign, in peace, a queen, she who had brought

grief and death to so many, and to the city of Troy unutterable woe.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

T’ N:

Quotes have been added on pages 11, 70, 78, 81 and 84, to conform to correct usage

Illustrations have been moved up or down, as needed, to avoid breaking the flow of paragraphs.

All hyphenation and spelling has been retained as typeset.

* END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK STORIES FROM THE ILIAD; OR, THE SIEGE OF TROY *

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will be renamed.

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license, especially commercial redistribution.

START: FULL LICENSE

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE

PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK

To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work (or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project Gutenberg™ License available with this file or online at www.gutenberg.org/license.

Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works

1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg™ electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property (trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in your possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project Gutenberg™ electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.

1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg™ electronic works even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project Gutenberg™ electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.

1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the United States and you are located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg™ works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg™ name associated with the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg™ License when you share it without charge with others.

1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project Gutenberg™ work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any country other than the United States.

1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:

1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg™ License must appear prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg™ work (any work on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, copied or distributed:

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.

1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg™ trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is posted with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™ License for all works posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.

1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg™ License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg™.

1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with

active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project Gutenberg™ License.

1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg™ work in a format other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official version posted on the official Project Gutenberg™ website (www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.

1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™ works unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works provided that:

• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the method you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark, but he has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.”

• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™ License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™ works.

• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of receipt of the work.

• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.

1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.

1.F.

1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment.

1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further opportunities to fix the problem.

1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.

1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.

1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg™ work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any Defect you cause.

Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg™

Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from people in all walks of life.

Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg™’s goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™ collection will remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure and permanent future for Project Gutenberg™ and future

generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.

Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation

The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit 501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws.

The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact

Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation

Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations ($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt status with the IRS.

The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate

While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who approach us with offers to donate.

International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.

Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.

Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg™ electronic works

Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.

Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several printed editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not

necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.

Most people start at our website which has the main PG search facility: www.gutenberg.org.

This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™, including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.