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Religion and European Society
Religion and European Society
A Primer
Edited by Benjamin Schewel and Erin K. Wilson
This edition first published 2020 © 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Notes on Contributors xi
Introduction 1
Benjamin Schewel and Erin K. Wilson
I.1 The Varieties of Secularism 3
I.2 Imagining ‘Europe’ 4
I.3 Chapter Summary 5
Note 11
References 11
Part I Conceptual Frameworks 13
1 Religion in European Society: The Factors to Take into Account 15
Grace Davie and Erin K. Wilson
1.1 Cultural Heritage 16
1.2 The Historic Churches 16
1.3 From Obligation to Consumption 18
1.4 Ne w Arrivals 21
1.5 Secular Reactions 22
1.6 The Inf luence of Neoliberalism 24
1.7 Is Europe an Exceptional Case? 25
1.8 ‘Global War on Terror’ and Associated Discourse 26
1.9 Gathering the Threads 27
Notes 28
References 28
2 What’s Wrong with Secularization? 31
Benjamin Schewel
2.1 The Seven Basic Claims Investigated 32
2.2 Conclusion 42
Ke y Points for Researchers and Policymakers 43
Notes 44
References 44
Part II Religion and the Public Sphere in Europe 49
3 Religion’s Place in Ethical and Political Discourse 51
Joseph A. Camilleri
3.1 The Changing European Mosaic 52
3.2 The ‘Islam’ Conundrum: Challenge and Opportunity 54
3.3 Contending Discourses 56
3.4 More Promising Pathways 60 References 65
4 Culture, Conflict, and Constitutional Right: Representations of Religion in the Daily Press 69
Mia Lövheim
4.1 Introduction 69
4.2 A New Visibility of Religion: Post‐Secularity or Mediatization? 70
4.3 Increased Visibility of Religion: Empirical Findings 71
4.4 Framing Religion 73
4.4.1 Conf lict 74
4.4.2 Culture 75
4.4.3 Constitutional Right 75
4.5 Religion, Post‐Secularity, and Mediatization: Interpreting the Findings 78
4.6 Ke y Points and Recommendations for Researchers 79
4.7 Ke y Points for Policy‐Makers 80
4.8 Ke y Points for Media Practitioners 80 Notes 80 References 81
5 Patterns of Regulation of Religion in Europe 83
Paul Rasor
5.1 European Context 83
5.2 Six Examples of Regulation 85
5.2.1 Denmark 85
5.2.1.1 Religion in Schools 86
5.2.1.2 Religious and Clothing and Symbols 86
5.2.2 Poland 86
5.2.2.1 Religion in Schools 87
5.2.2.2 Religious Clothing and Symbols 87
5.2.3 Italy 87
5.2.3.1 Religion in Schools 88
5.2.3.2 Religious Clothing and Symbols 89
5.2.4 Czech Republic 89
5.2.4.1 Religion in Schools 90
5.2.4.2 Religious Clothing and Symbols 90
5.2.5 The Netherlands 91
5.2.5.1 Religion in Schools 91
5.2.5.2 Religious Clothing and Symbols 91
5.2.6 France 92
5.2.6.1 Religion in Schools 92
5.2.6.2 Religious Clothing and Symbols 93
5.3 Conclusion 93
Questions and Suggestions for Researchers and Policymakers 94
Notes 95
References 96
6 Faith‐based Organizations in Europe 99
Jeffrey Haynes
6.1 Introduction: FBOs in Europe 99
6.2 FBOs and the EU: From Marginalization to Significance 100
6.3 FBOs and Welfare Provision in Europe 104
6.4 Conclusion 106
Notes 107
References 108
7 The Religious Dimensions of Contemporary European Populism 111
Renée Wagenvoorde
7.1 The Rise of Populism in Europe 112
7.2 Populism in Public Discourse 112
7.3 Populism in Academic Literature 114
7.4 Populism, Religion, and Identity 115
7.4.1 The Role of Religion in Populist Self‐conceptions 115
7.4.2 Populists’ Rejection of Islam 117
7.5 Good vs Bad Populism 118
7.6 Conclusion 119
7.6.1 Recommendations for Researchers and Policymakers 120 References 120
8 Gender: Religion, Secularism, and Women’s Empowerment 125
Kim Knibbe and Brenda Bartelink
8.1 Introduction 125
8.2 Understanding Religion in Modern Society: Beyond the Secularization Thesis 126
8.3 The G endered Division Between Public and Private 128
8.4 Religion and Gender: Current Research 130
8.5 Majority–Minority Relations 132
8.6 New Research Agendas 133
8.7 Policymakers: Recommendations 134
8.7.1 Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights 134
8.7.2 Public Health Risks: HIV‐ and Homo‐healings 135
8.8 Conclusion 137
Notes 138
References 138
9 Religion and Peacebuilding in the European Union 145
Megan K. Shore and Scott T. Kline
9.1 Religious Conflict Resolution: An Introduction 146
9.2 Religion, Peacebuilding, and Religious Conflict Resolution in Europe 151
9.2.1 Secularization 152
9.2.2 The European Union 153
9.3 Conclusion 154
Note 155
References 155
10 Radicalization and Religion 159
Liam
Stephens and Stijn Sieckelinck
10.1 The Meaning and Use of Radicalization as a Concept 160
10.2 Utilizing Radicalization in Practice 161
10.2.1 Ideology 162
10.2.2 Environment 163
10.2.3 Psychological Processes 164
10.3 Identity and Agency 165
Note 167 References 167
11 Universal Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Reality Check Through the Lens of the EU Guidelines 171
Michael Wiener
11.1 Regional Challenges to the Universal Freedom of Religion or Belief 172
11.1.1 Violence 173
11.1.2 Freedom of Expression 173
11.1.3 Promotion of Respect for Diversity and Tolerance 174
11.1.4 Discrimination 175
11.1.5 Changing or Leaving One’s Religion or Belief 176
11.1.6 Manifestation of Religion or Belief 176
11.2 External–Internal Consistency: A Reality Check Concerning EU Member States 177
11.2.1 Violence 177
11.2.2 Freedom of Expression 178
11.2.3 Promotion of Respect for Diversity and Tolerance 178
11.2.4 Discrimination 179
11.2.5 Changing or Leaving One’s Religion or Belief 180
11.2.6 Manifestation of Religion or Belief 180
11.3 Concluding Remarks 180
Note 181
References 182
12 Between Solidarity and Exclusion: Religious Dimensions of Immigration and Asylum in Europe 183
Kat Eghdamian
12.1 (Mis)Assumptions About Religion and Immigration 184
12.2 Security First: Religion, Immigration, and Geopolitical Hostility 186
12.3 Changing Notions of Us and Them: Immigration, Integration, and Religious Identity 187
12.4 Concluding Remarks and Key Recommendations 190 References 191
13 Southern‐Led Faith‐based Responses to Refugees: Insights for the Global North 195
Elena Fiddian‐Qasmiyeh and Julia Pacitto
13.1 Introduction 195
13.2 Localizing – and ‘Faithing’ – Debates on Southern‐led Responses to Displacement 196
13.3 Hegemonic Humanitarianism Defined and Critiqued 199
13.4 Writing the ‘Other’ into Humanitarian Discourse 201
13.5 Southern State and Civil Society Responses to Syrian Refugees’ Displacement 202
13.6 Humanitarian Refugees: Views from the Thai‐Myanmar Border Camp 203
13.7 Conclusions 205
13.7.1 Recommendations for Researchers 207
13.7.2 Recommendations for Policymakers 207 Notes 207
References 210
Index 215
Notes on Contributors
Brenda Bartelink is Senior Researcher at the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Groningen.
Joseph A. Camilleri is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Latrobe University, Australia.
Grace Davie is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Exeter, UK.
Kat Eghdamian is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Geography at University College London, UK.
Elena Fiddian‐Qasmiyeh is Professor of Migration and Refugee Studies and Co‐Director of the Migration Research Unit at University College London, UK.
Jeffrey Haynes is Professor Emeritus of Politics at London Metropolitan University, UK.
Scott T. Kline is Associate Professor of Religion at the University of Waterloo, Canada.
Kim Knibbe is Associate Professor of Anthropology and Sociology of Religion at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
Mia Lövheim is Professor of Sociology of Religion at Uppsala University, Sweden.
Julia Pacitto is a PhD Candidate in the Department of International Development at the University of Oxford, UK.
Paul Rasor was Professor of Interdisciplinary Studies and Director of the Centre for the Study of Religious Freedom at Virginia Wesleyan College, USA. He is also currently a Unitarian Universalist minister.
Benjamin Schewel is Lecturer and Researcher at the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. He is also an Associate Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia, USA.
Megan K. Shore is Associate Professor of Social Justice and Peace Studies at King’s University College, Canada.
Stijn Sieckelinck is Senior Researcher in the Department of Governance and Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Notes on Contributors
Liam Stephens is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Governance and Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Renée Wagenvoorde is a Fellow at the Centre for Religion, Conflict and Globalization at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
Michael Wiener is a Human Rights Officer at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Switzerland.
Erin K. Wilson is Associate Professor of Politics and Religion in the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
Introduction
Benjamin Schewel and Erin K. Wilson
‘Religion’ is a uniquely fraught subject in many European societies. Much of the public anxiety surrounding religion can be attributed to the influence of the secularist vision of history that arose amongst European intellectuals during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. At the simplest level, this historical vision revolves around the expectation that modernizing forces will cause the general marginalization, decline and eventual disappearance of religion. Those Europeans who have become habituated to this way of viewing the world therefore tend to consider religion a topic of only secondary importance, and see it more as a problematic feature of society that ought to be actively managed and contained than as a perennially dynamic force that can be tapped and channelled towards the creation of important social goods.1 Additionally, the secularist understanding of religion emerged during a time of European dominance in global affairs and of declining Christian influence within Europe (Eberle 2002). Secularization theory thus tends to define religion in terms of European (and American) experiences and characteristics of the Christian tradition (Casanova 1994; Ingersoll and Matthew 1983).
The secularist vision of history seemed, for a time, to be confirmed by events during the twentieth century. Within Europe, educated publics steadily turned away from religion following the Second World War as postwar welfare states began to provide many of the social services that only churches had previously offered. Attendance at religious services declined and more people declared themselves as atheist or with no religious affiliation. More broadly throughout the world, a growing number of postwar societies appeared to be following a similar secularizing course. Particularly noteworthy were the aggressively secular regimes of Russia and China, which actively undermined the public influence of religion by destroying religious infrastructures, killing and oppressing religious leaders, and actively proscribing citizens’ abilities to practise. Yet also significant were the efforts of early postcolonial leaders, such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Habib Borguiba, Gamel Abdel Nasser, and Kwame Nkrumah, to inject Western secular ideals into their newly constituted nation‐states. It was therefore not without reason that many leaders of European policy and thought felt that their hopes of a looming global secular revolution were being actively confirmed.
During the last decades of the twentieth century, however, religion seemed to make something of a comeback in global public life (Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003). The 1979 Iranian Revolution, the rise of religious nationalism in India, Sri Lanka, and Israel, the
Religion and European Society: A Primer, First Edition. Edited by Benjamin Schewel and Erin K. Wilson. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Benjamin Schewel and Erin K. Wilson 2
prominent involvement of Catholicism in the overthrow of Soviet Communism, the emergence of Liberation Theology in South America, the rise of Evangelical conservatism in the United States, the growing role of non‐government, including faith‐based, actors in global civil society and human rights campaigns, and the appearance of violent Jihadism were particularly significant in this regard. In response to such developments, academic researchers began questioning the plausibility of their broader historical vision of secularization, which Casanova (1994: 17) explains was the only academic theory to have achieved ‘a truly paradigmatic status within the modern social sciences’. Yet even within this new, critical discourse on modern secularism, religion was still regarded with suspicion and as problematic, and European secularism was presented as the constant foil to the broader global norm of public religious resurgence.
This perception began to change during the early 2000s. The spectacle of the 9/11 attacks provided the backdrop upon which Europeans interpreted the string of smaller‐scale terrorist attacks that struck their own lands. Thus, when public transport systems were bombed in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005, and the Muhammad cartoon controversy erupted in Denmark in 2005, many Europeans felt as if they were being drawn into the same maelstrom of rising religious tensions that had already struck the United States.
As a result, European public debates began to address more directly the topic of religion, albeit now through the lens of Islam. Was there, many asked, something about the aggressively secular culture of European societies that contributed to the radicalization and alienation of young Muslims? Or was the problem more with Islam itself, the teachings of which might somehow be incompatible with Europe’s Christian heritage, or which might need to undergo a similar Protestant‐like revolution before they could find their proper place in the modern age? Or perhaps the recent spate of attacks simply confirmed the point that religion in general is a dangerous phenomenon that must be actively regulated and contained. The energy of these debates was fanned by the commencement of consultations about the inclusion of Turkey into the European Union in 2005, as well as by debates over whether a reference to God should be included in the preamble to the European Union (EU) constitution (Foret 2009).
The main lines of this largely Islam‐centred conversation persisted throughout the subsequent decade. Yet other topics and perspectives began to emerge. In particular, the continued influx of migrants from regions in which religion plays a prominent public role reignited conversations about the nature and limits of religious freedom in liberal societies, while the commensurate rise of Christian ethnonationalism forced European societies to begin reconsidering the nature, origins, and reach of their political values. Additionally, though often more amongst academics, a nascent conversation took shape around the idea of developing new ways of thinking about the place of religion in public life, often under the rubric of ‘post‐secularism’. This conversation has been marked by a growing awareness of how ‘secularism’ is not neutral and universal, as has long been claimed, but rather constitutes a particular worldview with its own deep‐seated assumptions and guiding ideas.
One imagines that the complexity and stakes of these wide‐ranging conversations, as well as the general scope of the topics prominently considered, will only continue to expand in the years to come. Yet it also seems likely that public conversations on religion will remain plagued by the influence of prejudice, half‐truth, and polarization. It is therefore of the utmost importance to find ways to elevate the quality of the burgeoning European public discourse on religion.
It is in this spirit that the present volume articulates some key developments within the increasingly vibrant academic literature that examines the changing place of religion in contemporary European society. However, the chapters that follow do so, not by rigorously analysing specific policy dilemmas that various European actors face, but rather by clarifying overarching concepts and trends. This approach, it was felt, would protect the volume against the threat of rapid irrelevance that comes from being too closely bound to quickly shifting policy debates, while also providing a greater benefit to readers by offering concepts and ideas that can be used in diverse policy, practitioner, and academic settings. Each of the chapters provides an overview of the discourse surrounding one key dilemma or theme before concluding with a list of recommendations for researchers, policymakers, and practitioners for addressing these topics moving forward.
Before summarizing each of the chapters, it may be helpful to outline a few of the overarching concepts that currently shape how ‘religion’, ‘secularism’ and ‘Europe’ are understood, as these are some of the key concepts that this volume seeks to problematize and address.
I.1 The Varieties of Secularism
Multiple books have been written on the concept of the secular and its many variations. As such, we will not go into immense detail about the concept here. Our purpose is only to highlight how the secular and the religious are not fixed entities, but rather categories that carry different meanings in different contexts. Generally speaking, however, secularist worldviews tend to hold that there is something called ‘religion’ that can be clearly defined, identified and delineated from the secular domains of public life, which encompass government, the market, education, the law, and the media (Habermas 1991). The secular, then, is often defined as everything that is not ‘religion’, everything that may be considered part of the immanent plane of existence, rather than the transcendent (Asad 2003; Hurd 2008; Wilson 2017).
Be that as it may, a more apt reading of secularism sees that it tends to operate in one of two ways, namely, as an ideology or as a form of statecraft (Casanova 2011). Secular ideologies come in various forms. Concerning ideological secularism, Casanova (2011) identifies what he calls ‘political’ secularism and ‘philosophical‐historical’ secularism. The first refers to approaches to managing religion in public life, while the second describes views about the ultimate truth‐value and historical fate of religion. Additionally, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2008) highlights ‘Judeo‐Christian secularism’ and ‘laicite’ (similar to what Kuru, 2009, refers to as ‘passive secularism’ and ‘assertive secularism’) as dominant ideological variants. Judeo‐Christian secular ideologies permit and in some cases encourage the presence and participation of (particular types of) religious actors and institutions in the public sphere. Proponents of this type of secularism have what Philpott (2009) might term a neutral or positive view of religion as beneficial for the public good. In contrast, laicite or assertive secular ideologies actively police the boundaries of the public sphere in order to keep religion out and maintain its privatization. In these types of ‘hostile’ secularisms (Philpott 2009), religion is viewed as a (potentially) disruptive, irrational, and violent influence that potentially undermines peace and order.
Benjamin Schewel and Erin K. Wilson 4
These ideological secularisms often underpin forms of secularism as statecraft. Secularism as statecraft may be understood as the dominant approach to managing the relationship between the government and religious actors or institutions. Thus, within Europe, France arguably represents assertive or hostile secularism, while Italy may be said to represent passive secularism. What is important to remember, however, is that each state’s approach to managing the relationship between religious and political actors can change over time, as well as on different issues and with reference to different religious actors. We would suggest that individual states within Europe are at present undergoing something of a transformation in their secular statecraft, as they grapple with demographic changes around religious observance, brought on by increasing secularization, heightened immigration, the emergence of new religious movements and transformations in more traditional, established religions. Another term for secularism as statecraft is ‘secularity’, and as Monika Wohlrab‐Sahr and Marian Burchardt (2012) highlight, within Europe there are ‘multiple secularities’. Whilst Europe is often spoken of as a homogenous, unified whole, patterns of secularity and religious adherence within Europe are extremely diverse, as is explored in more detail in Chapter 1.
I.2 Imagining ‘Europe’
Dominant understandings of Europe as secular are based on assumptions about the nature of both ‘Europe’ and the ‘secular’ (as well as the ‘religious’), which this volume seeks to challenge. Indeed, one of the central messages of this volume is that ‘Europe’ is a constantly evolving idea and that Europe’s identity as secular is not fixed or even necessarily consistent. Having such a dynamic understanding of what Europe is, especially with reference to debates around religion and secularism, provides, we suggest, an approach that is more fluid, adaptable, inclusive and thus effective for dealing with the challenges that Europe is facing in the twenty‐first century.
The so‐called ‘refugee crisis’ amply demonstrates the degree to which the idea of Europe is constantly being shaped and reshaped in response to changing social and political realities. It is currently unclear whether the values of democracy, human rights, equality, pluralism, diversity, and justice, which are seen to be so embedded in European culture, can withstand a global displacement crisis, the scale and speed of which has never before been seen (UNHCR 2016). It is not just the size and speed of the contemporary movement of populations, but also their origin that contributes to raising questions about the European project. In this regard, Kenneth Roth (2016) has argued that the real source of political opposition to accepting migrants is not about jobs or about burdens on the welfare state: ‘The real reason is that they are Muslim’ (Roth 2016), or at least that they are perceived to be Muslim. This has led many European leaders, in particular from Eastern Europe, to openly declare that they will only accept Christian refugees, indicating that there are apparently limits on the ideal of an open inclusive European society. The so‐called refugee crisis has been accompanied by rising right‐wing populism, characterized by anti‐immigration sentiment and particularly anti‐Islam sentiment (Marzouki and McDonnell 2016; Roy 2016). The increasing influence of right‐wing populism and Islamophobia was particularly visible in the success of the Brexit vote in the UK in June 2016. These developments, we suggest, raise fundamental questions about what Europe is and who is and is not included, questions that are being
contested and debated across multiple areas of policy and practice across the continent, as our contributors explore throughout the volume.
Yet these debates are not only about the meaning of Europe, but also about the place of both religion and secularism within European society as a whole. What exactly does ‘religion’ mean in twenty‐first century Europe? Is it possible to speak of religion in the singular, or should we only speak of particular religions? Debates about religious symbols in public spaces, such as minarets, crosses, crucifixes, headscarves and burkinis also highlight how significant questions of religion are for ideas of European identity. The Dahlab v Switzerland case of 2001, the Swiss minaret ban of 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ruling in the Lautsi v Italy case, the burkini ban furore of the summer of 2016 and the ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2017 which found that employers could restrict the wearing of religious symbols in the workplace all demonstrate the growing salience of these issues. Yet the differences in how some of these cases were ruled, in particular differences across cases involving Christian as opposed to Islamic symbols (for example, the Lautsi case compared with the Dahlab, or minaret ban or ECJ cases), along with differences in how religious institutions and actors are at times reported in the media (Lövheim, this volume) suggest that some religions may be more equal than others in the European public sphere and may hold a privileged place within the context of European society, law, politics, and identity (Beaman 2012).
The question of religious symbols in public spaces is a fraught issue and not one that can be remedied by a generalized one‐size‐fits‐all solution. This is indeed a general point that holds for all questions and topics where ‘religion’ is present within the European public sphere. A key point of this volume is that questions about religion and society within Europe are contextual, as they are everywhere. Religion, secularism and Europe mean different things for different people and in different places. Thus we need to bring more nuance into these conversations. At the same time, however, simply emphasizing the complexity and difficulty of these issues is not enough.
There is as yet no workable alternative framework to the secular as an organizing model for managing relationships amongst diverse and at times conflicting worldviews within democratic societies. Habermasian post‐secularism has been explored from multiple angles by various scholars and actors, yet it does not on the whole escape the shortcomings of the secular (Birnbaum 2015; Pabst 2012). As such, the volume includes several, more conceptual pieces that consider how we can develop conceptual and policy frameworks that enable us to both address the complexity and diversity of the changing European cultural, political, and social landscape and to transcend the limits of dominant secular paradigms. These are topics and questions that are not going to go away any time soon and to which there are no easy answers. Our hope, however, is that this volume provides a useful resource for thinking and rethinking through these issues and questions into the future.
I.3 Chapter Summary
The chapters are divided into three parts. In the first part, the authors provide a conceptual overview and framework for the discussions that follow. In the second part our authors go in‐depth on specific issues internally within Europe, including regulation,
Schewel and Erin K. Wilson
media, and public discourse. In the third and final part, the authors address issues that transcend national and regional boundaries, which are significant both within and beyond Europe and their implications for European internal and foreign policy.
In the first chapter, Davie and Wilson update and expand Davie’s previous work that pinpoints key factors shaping the place of religion in Europe today. Davie’s original framework identified six factors:
1) The historic role of churches in shaping European culture and identity
2) The acknowledgement that these churches – and other religious actors and institutions –still perform important functions in the private lives of many Europeans
3) Observable changes in the religious constituency of Europe
4) The arrival into Europe of groups of people from different parts of the world, most recently the impact of the so‐called refugee crisis
5) The reactions of Europe’s secular elites to the continued presence of religion in public and private life in Europe
6) The realization that patterns of religious life in Europe are not a global prototype. To these, two more important factors are added:
7) The increasing privatization of social services, resulting in faith‐based actors stepping in to provide welfare that had once been the purview of the state
8) The so‐called ‘Global War on Terror’ discourse, in which religion, Islam, violence and immigration become increasingly entangled in public consciousness, shaping the responses of policymakers.
Davie and Wilson address each of these factors in turn, noting historical and recent developments related to each that continue to affect the place and role of religion and religious actors and institutions in European politics and society today. Many of the issues they identify are taken up in greater detail by other contributors to this volume, such as Eghdamian on asylum and migration (Chapter 12), Rasor on patterns of regulation (Chapter 5), and Stephens and Sieckelinck on radicalization (Chapter 10).
In Chapter 2, Benjamin Schewel provides a rich and detailed overview of some of the key conceptual innovations in recent years that have attempted to make sense of the apparent failure of secularization theory and our equal failure to adequately describe and explain developments regarding public religion. Schewel terms this the ‘post‐secular problematic’ – the fact that ‘there is no clear consensus about what kind of story of modern religious change we should alternatively tell’. Schewel identifies no less than seven approaches in recent scholarship that each offer important insights on the condition in which we now find ourselves with regard to religion. Significantly, Schewel emphasizes that none of the approaches is adequate or comprehensive on its own. Each has its strengths and its flaws. As such, we must consider these, and other additional approaches, together, in order to develop more comprehensive understandings of religion in contemporary contexts, especially in Europe.
In Part II of the volume, our contributors explore how public religion is engaged across different institutions and contexts of the European public sphere. Joseph Camilleri’s chapter sets the scene for this section of the volume by sketching important shifts in European public discourse with regard to religion. He notes the significant differences in legal arrangements that affect various states’ respective engagement with religion, as well as the social, political, and demographic changes that have taken place in recent
years that affect perceptions of public religion and especially of Islam. Poor economic performance in recent years, combined with rapid growth of Muslim communities, has contributed to an emergence of public discourses hostile to Islam. Yet, at the same time, the role of Christian churches in providing poverty alleviation in many countries has increased their visibility and opened up new spaces for religious actors and institutions to participate in public debates about the economy, welfare, social, political and moral issues. Exploring the different dimensions of these debates in the broader context of philosophical responses to the apparent return of religion to the public sphere, Camilleri offers possibilities for how public discourse could be taken in new directions to create more egalitarian and inclusive forms of public discourse when it comes to religious and secular actors.
While Camilleri’s chapter focuses on some of the ethical and philosophical considerations raised by the changing place of religion within European public discourse, in Chapter 4 Mia Lövheim explores the practical everyday consequences of these shifts in relation to media reporting and discussion of religion. Lövheim discusses the representation of religion in the European daily press, mainly focusing on studies carried out in the Nordic countries and Britain from the 1980s to 2010. She shows that, despite the differences in cultural and political context, the outcomes of the different studies demonstrate similar tendencies with regard to changes in the representation of religion in the media. Utilizing mediatization and post‐secular theoretical analytical lenses, Lövheim focuses her analysis through an exploration of three emergent themes –conflict, culture, and constitutional rights – which, she argues, are dominant features of contemporary media discourses on religion in Europe. The new visibility of religion in the media over the past decades, she argues, might not mean that religious institutions become more significant as social actors, but rather that religion becomes more significant as a social and political category for public discourse.
An important factor that shapes public discourses on religion, from the social and political that Camilleri analyses to the media discourses outlined by Lövheim, are the specific and highly various constitutional legal arrangements for the regulation of religion across nation‐states within Europe. In Chapter 5, Paul Rasor provides a comprehensive outline of how religion is legally regulated in six European countries – the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Poland, and Italy. As Rasor highlights, regulation of religion within Europe is best conceptualized as a spectrum of positions, ranging from states with established state churches at one end to those that observe a strict separation between religion and state at the other. Obviously, however, there are multiple points and variations along that spectrum. Rasor begins by placing the discussion within the broader European legal context, noting in particular the significant role of the margin of appreciation doctrine in deciding legal disputes at the European level. The margin of appreciation doctrine demonstrates the centrality of nation‐state constitutional and legal arrangements in deciding matters of religion. Rasor then uses three key issues – state funding of religious institutions, religious education in schools, and religious symbols in public spaces – as points of comparison to explicitly highlight the synergies and challenges that arise as a result of the variations amongst the six case study states in how they deal with these issues.
While regulation deals specifically with religious institutions in the European public sphere, there are other religious actors that fall outside the boundaries of legal regulation on such issues who also contribute to shaping public discourse and policy. In Chapter 6,
Benjamin Schewel and Erin K. Wilson 8
Jeffrey Haynes explores the influence of faith‐based non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) within Europe. Haynes canvasses two specific angles of this topic: the influence of faith‐based NGOs on policy within the European Union and the provision of social services by faith‐based NGOs in specific European countries in the wake of the increasing privatization of social services in a broader context of economic crisis and austerity. Despite recognition that Europe is a largely secular environment, Haynes argues that a broader global post‐secular milieu is generating the impetus for faith‐based NGOs to increasingly assert themselves and contribute to public debate on social and political issues. As such, while religion may not be as significant as it once was for Europeans on an individual level, it is becoming an increasingly salient component of policy formulation. Haynes briefly considers the role of faith‐based actors in the EU, followed by a short survey of faith‐based actors and social welfare provision in the UK, Sweden, and Italy. He concludes by considering these national and European‐level dynamics in relation to one another and their implications for researchers and practitioners alike.
The actions and achievements of faith‐based organizations are often unnoticed by the European public. Yet, there are other actors that play a prominent role in the media when it comes to the role of religion in European societies. In Chapter 7, Renée Wagenvoorde explores the religious dimensions of contemporary European populism. By noticing the parallel rise of populism and anti‐Islam rhetoric in European politics over the past decades, Wagenvoorde sheds light on why and how these phenomena are related to each other. After clarifying the different ways in which populism is defined, she examines how populist parties and actors refer to religion and concludes that the importance that populists assign to religion in conceptualizing the identity of ‘the people’, is fluid and strategically deployed. However, when looking at the conceptualization of ‘the other’ (the antagonist of ‘the people’ in populist rhetoric), European populists are unified in expressing their rejection of Islam, a phenomenon that has been adopted by mainstream parties in the past years. Wagenvoorde concludes her chapter by questioning these trends as reflections of the volunté generale and invites scholars, policymakers and practitioners to engage in the ongoing process of political opinion formation between citizens and politicians.
In recent years, gender and sexuality have become an important terrain for controversies and conflicts that involve religion, often intersecting with other identity markers such as migration status, ethnic background, and class (e.g. headscarf debates, the burkini affair, homosexuality). When it comes to issues of women’s emancipation, gender equality and women’s empowerment, religion is often assumed to hold women back, while secularism is associated with championing women’s rights. Within scholarship on gender and religion, this dichotomy is increasingly challenged through post‐secular and postcolonial approaches. In Chapter 8, Kim Knibbe and Brenda Bartelink argue that current ways of opposing religion and secularity in relation to gender produce forms of polarization between religious and secular actors that are undesirable and stand in the way of perceiving and hearing what women may need. Instead, they propose that any analysis of gender relations should take into accounts the relationships of power in which women are embedded, and in particular should take into account the majority/ minority dynamics in which women find themselves whenever policymakers and politicians aim to empower women in minority groups. Concretely, this means focusing on how (religious) women themselves navigate their lives and problematize areas they
want to improve, and the agency and leadership they develop within the gendered power dynamics of their particular religious and social context.
Having focused primarily on dynamics within Europe, the third part of the volume then turns to a consideration of global issues relevant for both European domestic and foreign policy. In Chapter 9, Megan Shore and Scott T. Kline explore approaches to religion and conflict resolution amongst European states. Specifically, they note the dominant tendency amongst European states to respond with military force to violent acts committed on their soil, France’s response to the Paris attacks of November 2015 being a notable example here. Instead, Shore and Kline offer ‘religious conflict resolution’ as an alternative framework for responding to these events. Following a brief introduction to the field of religion and conflict resolution in general, they provide a general overview of religious conflict resolution and its reception to date within the European context and European foreign policy approaches. Shore and Kline argue that this framework can and should be integral to addressing contemporary conflicts, especially those where religious affiliations, narratives, ideas and identities are clearly present as motivating factors, whether in relation to domestic or foreign acts of violence. As such, the chapter provides a useful overview of an approach that offers rich potential as an alternative policy framework for conflict resolution for EU policymakers.
Another global issue, intimately tied to questions of conflict resolution, is violent extremism or ‘radicalization’. Radicalization continues to be a topic that is a central focus of both domestic and foreign EU policy. Yet the concept of radicalization and its usage in public discourse is highly problematic. In Chapter 10, Liam Stephens and Stijn Sieckelinck helpfully canvass the major themes and trends on understandings and usages of the concept of radicalization across academic literature and in public discourse. They highlight immediately the problematic association that has emerged between radicalization and religion, so that ‘for many, the distinction between religious fanaticism and radicalization is thin, if not non‐existent’. Added to that is the dominant assumption that Europe is largely secular, which contributes to policymakers ignoring the possible links to radicalization of so‐called ‘European’ religions, and the assumption that radicalization is largely a problem of ‘outsiders’ and ‘outsider religious traditions’. Numerous problematic assumptions exist across multiple levels here, as Stephens and Sieckelinck make clear. They note two main strands of research and discussion on radicalization. The first is concerned mainly with what radicalization means, problematizing its usage and highlighting logical inconsistencies in how the term is defined and deployed. The second strand focuses more on understanding the phenomenon that is covered by the term ‘radicalization’ and developing and assessing proposals to prevent or reverse it. Throughout the chapter, Stephens and Sieckelinck note how narrow assumptions about both radicalization and religion limit conceptualization and analysis of the issues involved, and thus also inhibit the development of effective responses. If we can broaden our understanding of both, it will open up more possibilities for addressing the underlying issues of identity and agency that are often at the heart of radicalization.
The right to freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) is another issue that is receiving increasing attention at the global level, often in fact connected with counter‐radicalization policy efforts. Using the EU Guidelines on Promoting and Protecting the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief, in Chapter 11 Michael Wiener explores the numerous challenges, both conceptual and practical, that exist regarding FoRB throughout the
Schewel and Erin K. Wilson
world. Focusing on six themes that are emphasized in the EU Guidelines themselves, Wiener notes specific problems with regard to each of these that the EU frequently endeavours to address in its foreign policy relationships and actions. Importantly, Wiener highlights a situation that is not often considered explicitly – the fact that numerous member states within the EU often also fail to meet the standards of the guidelines. This failure on the part of EU member states to uphold their own guidelines can contribute to a sense of double standards when endeavouring to promote FoRB abroad, consequently undermining these efforts. Recognizing the cultural, political, conceptual, legal, and practical challenges to upholding and promoting FoRB that exist both within and beyond Europe is a crucial step in more effective engagement on this issue.
A further issue that is entangled in complex ways with both radicalization and FoRB and where religion has become a key factor is immigration and asylum, highlighted acutely by the recent so‐called ‘refugee crisis’. In Chapter 12, Kat Eghdamian notes the ways in which religion and religious identity are being used to justify the introduction of increasingly harsh exclusionary immigration policies. The arrival of religious ‘others’ in Europe, she notes, tests the very nature and boundaries of Europe’s and the West’s self‐understanding and identity. A politics of fear, in which (mis)understandings of religion are a central component, and indeed, where religion’s importance is often overemphasized and manipulated, provide the dominant contours of contemporary discourses, policies and practices of immigration and asylum in Europe. Key amongst the factors Eghdamian highlights as influential on contemporary European responses to immigration and asylum are: ‘(mis)assumptions held by political actors, humanitarian providers, and social commentators about religion and immigration; the role of national security and geopolitical agendas in shaping immigration debates and policies as they relate to migrant and refugee religious identities; and the ways in which religious identities are changing the nature of integration in response to increased immigration to Europe’. Eghdamian carefully maps the intricate dynamics of each of these factors within the European context and how they shape Europe’s response to this global challenge. She concludes by reiterating the importance of nuance, avoiding reductionist analyses of complex social and political issues and challenges, in particular immigration, and understandings of religion and religious identity that are a crucial part of such phenomenon. Finally, she calls for more careful and explicit consideration of the positive contribution religion can make to policies and processes of immigration and how this can be effectively and meaningfully combined with existing approaches in order to provide the most appropriate and beneficial support for refugees, asylum seekers and migrants as they begin to build new lives in Europe.
The contemporary so‐called refugee crisis is hardly confined to Europe, however. In the 13th and final chapter in this volume, Elena Fiddian‐Qasmiyeh and Julia Parcitto explore the often underrecognized and underresearched mechanisms of South–South humanitarianism. Given that 85% of the world’s displaced population resides in countries within the Global South (UNHCR 2018), such responses are a crucial component of global humanitarian structures. Yet often these programs, initiatives and actors are not considered a part of formal humanitarian governance, for a variety of reasons that Fiddian‐Qasmiyeh and Parcitto unpack in their chapter. Much of the neglect or exclusion of these actors has to do with historical and colonial legacies, often intimately connected with religion. Effectively addressing current mass displacement across the globe will require responses
that go beyond the regional confines of Europe and a rethinking of what humanitarianism is on the part of researchers and policymakers within and beyond Europe. Fiddian‐Qasmiyeh and Parcitto outline three contemporary examples of South–South humanitarianism in Jordan, Myanmar, and along the Thai‐Myanmar border, highlighting the complex geopolitical dynamics affecting these initiatives and their capacity to effectively meet the needs of people on the move. Their chapter reminds us that humanitarianism, far from being neutral and impartial, is always affected by politics. Further, given the immense yet underresearched role of South–South humanitarianism, there is an urgent need for researchers and policymakers alike to engage with these actors in more constructive and collaborative ways.
Note
1 These two approaches may be broadly summarized as the ‘disappearance of religion’ approach, represented by secularization theory, and the good religion/bad religion or ‘Two Faces of Faith’ approach (Hurd 2015).
References
Asad, T. (2003). Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Beaman, L.G. (2012). Battles Over Symbols: The ‘Religion’ of the Minority and the ‘Culture’ of the Majority. Journal of Law and Religion 28 (1): 67–104.
Birnbaum, M. (2015). ‘Exclusive Pluralism: The Problems of Habermas’ Postsecular Argument and the ‘Making of Religion’ . In: Religion as a Category of Governance and Sovereignty (ed. T. Stack, N. Goldenberg and T. Fitzgerald), 182–196. Leiden: Brill. Casanova, J. (1994). Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Casanova, J. (2011). The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms. In: Rethinking Secularism (ed. C. Calhoun, M. Juergensmeyer and J. Vanantwerpen). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Eberle, C.J. (2002). Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Foret, F. (2009). ‘Religion: a Solution or a Problem for the Legitimisation of the European Union?’ Religion. State and Society 37 (1): 37–50.
Habermas, J. (1991). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Hurd, E.S. (2008). The Politics of Secularism in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hurd, E.S. (2015). Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ingersoll, D. and Matthews, R. (1983). The Philosophic Roots of Modern Ideology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Kuru, A.T. (2009). Secularism and State Policies Towards Religion: The United States, France and Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Marzouki, N. and McDonnell, D. (2016). Introduction: Populism and Religion. In: Saving the People: How Populism Hijacks Religion (ed. N. Marzouki, D. McDonnell and O. Roy), 1–12. London: Hurst Publishers.
Pabst, A. (2012). The Secularism of Post‐Secularity: Religion, Realism and the Revival of Grand Theory in IR. Review of International Studies 38 (5): 995–1017.
Petito, F. and Hatzopoulos, P. (2003). Religion and International Affairs: The Return from Exile. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Philpott, D. (2009). ‘Has the study of Global Politics Found Religion?’ Annual Review of Political Science 12: 183–202.
Roth, Kenneth. 2016. ‘A Way for Europe to Remove Chaos from the Migration Crisis’. Human Rights Watch, 1 February. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/ news/2016/02/01/way‐europe‐remove‐chaos‐migration‐crisis (accessed 26 March 2016).
Roy, O. (2016). Beyond Populism. In: Saving the People: How Populism Hijacks Religion (ed. N. Marzouki, D. McDonnell and O. Roy), 185–201. London: Hurst Publishers.
UNHCR. 2016. Global Trends Report 2015. Geneva: UNHCR.
UNHCR. 2018. Global Trends Report 2017. Geneva. UNHCR.
Wilson, E.K. (2017). Power differences’ and the ‘power of difference’: The dominance of secularism as ontological injustice. Globalizations 14 (7): 1076–1093.
Wohlrab‐Sahr, M. and Burchardt, M. (2012). Multiple secularities: towards a cultural sociology of secular modernities. Comparative Sociology 11 (6): 875–909.
Religion in European Society
The Factors to Take into Account
Grace
Davie and Erin K. Wilson1
There are eight different factors, which – taken together – contribute to a better understanding of the place of religion in modern Europe. The crucial point to remember is that they push and pull in different directions, and that they play out differently in the political and cultural contexts of Europe’s very varied states. The eight factors are:
1) The role of the historic churches in shaping European culture and identity.
2) An awareness that these churches still have a place at particular moments in the lives of European people, to varying degrees, though they are no longer able to influence – let alone discipline – the beliefs and behaviour of the great majority of the population.
3) An observable change in the actively religious constituencies of modern Europe, which operate increasingly on a model of choice, rather than a model of obligation or duty, and which display an increasing diversity and individualization, borrowing across traditions and practices to create hybrids of traditional religions, spirituality, and secularism.
4) The arrival into Europe of groups of people from many different parts of the world, and with very different religious aspirations from those seen in the host society, a shift which has accelerated due to the so‐called ‘refugee crisis’.
5) The reactions of Europe’s secular elites to the increasing salience of religion in public as well as private life.
6) The increasing privatization of social services that is contributing to non‐state actors, including churches and faith‐based organizations, becoming key providers of essential services, filling the gaps left by the rolling back of the state.
7) The realization that the patterns of religious life in modern Europe should be considered an exceptional case in global terms – they are not a global prototype.
8) The impact of the ‘Global War on Terror’ discourse in Europe, which creates a complex entanglement of religion (especially Islam), violence, and immigration, rendering religion and secularism increasingly salient categories in both politics and society.
Each of these factors will be taken in turn in the paragraphs that follow. They will be drawn together in a short conclusion highlighting their implications for both scholars and policymakers.
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1.1 Cultural Heritage
The starting point reflects the undisputed role of Christianity in shaping European culture over the long term, remembering that other factors (notably Greek rationalism and Roman organization) must also be kept in mind. One example will suffice to illustrate this fact: the Christian tradition has had an irreversible effect in determining the most basic categories of human existence (time and space) in this part of the world. Both week and year follow the Christian cycle, even if the major festivals of the Christian calendar are beginning to lose their resonance for large sections of the population. Many of them are nonetheless retained as a framework for public holidays. Sunday, moreover, remains distinctive despite the fact that the notion of a ‘day of rest’ has largely been discarded.
The same is true of space. Wherever you look in Europe, Christian churches predominate, some of which retain huge symbolic value for the populations that surround them. Churches, even when no longer used for worship, retain value as objects of ‘cultural heritage’ and significant efforts and funds are put into protecting and restoring these buildings in both Europe as a whole, and its constituent nations. Yet this attention to the cultural heritage of Christianity in Europe is at the same time part of the broader unease about Islam. Cultural heritage has become a useful term for the recategorization of Christian symbols and artefacts in relation to conflicts over symbols in the European public sphere. For example, in Italy and Switzerland, and at the European Court of Human Rights, crosses, crucifixes, and nativity scenes have been reclassified as cultural rather than religious symbols, and are seen as important parts of European cultural heritage. Conversely, headscarves, burkinis, and minarets have been deemed religious or even political symbols that violate the neutrality of public space (see, for example, Beaman 2013; Dahlab v Switzerland 2001; Lautsi v Italy 2012; Garratt 2016; Traynor 2009). Europe’s Christian past and secular present have somewhat paradoxically become the twin lines of argumentation raised by those who wish to make a clear distinction between Europe and Islam, to the extent of suggesting that Islam is incompatible with European society and values (Roy 2016).
Further, on the question of space, Christian cathedrals and houses of worship historically were central points of focus and community life in European cities. Though people may no longer attend church in the numbers they once did, the buildings remain characteristic features of European city skylines. Their architectural uniqueness and their prominent positions make them distinctive. They draw large numbers of tourists every day. They are a highly visible and ever‐present reminder of the significant role that Christian churches and institutions have had in shaping Europe. This is not to deny that in some parts of the continent (notably the larger cities) the skyline is fast becoming an indicator of growing religious diversity, though as we have noted, this change is not occurring without conflict and contestation. Europe is changing, but the legacies of the past remain deeply embedded in both the physical and cultural environment.
1.2 The Historic Churches
The physical and cultural presence of the historic churches is one thing; a hands‐on role in the everyday lives of Europeans is quite another. Commentators of all kinds agree that the latter is no longer a realistic, or indeed a desirable, aspiration. That does not
mean that these institutions have entirely lost their significance as markers of religious identity. But how should we understand their current role? It is here that two concepts developed by Davie (1994, 2000, 2007, 2010) are particularly helpful: the notions of ‘believing without belonging’ and ‘vicarious religion’. Both ideas help us to understand the continuing role of traditional religious institutions in a society that is both increasingly secular and increasingly diverse.
One of the most striking features of religious life in Europe remains the mismatch between different measurements of religiousness. There exists, first of all, a set of indicators that measure firm commitments to (i) institutional life and (ii) credal statements of religion (in this case Christianity). These indicators, moreover, are closely related to each other in so far as institutional commitments – in the form of regular religious practice – both reflect and confirm religious belief in its orthodox forms. The believing Christian attends church to express his or her belief and to receive affirmation that this is the right thing to do. Conversely, repeated exposure to the institution and its teaching necessarily disciplines belief.
No observer of the current religious scene disputes the fact that these dimensions of European religion are interrelated and in serious decline. Fewer Europeans go to church than used to and fewer believe in a credal sense. As a result, the idea of a common narrative (of Christian liturgy or of Christian language and metaphor) becomes more and more tenuous almost by the day. What, then, are the consequences of this situation? The complex relationship between belief in a wider sense and practice is central to this discussion, for it is abundantly clear that a manifest reduction in the hard indicators of religious life has not, in the short term, had a similar effect on the less rigorous dimensions of religiousness. For the time being at least, the latter remain relatively strong though by no means immutable. For example, between half and two‐thirds of Europeans assent to ‘belief in God’ in more general terms, and roughly similar proportions touch base with the institutional churches at some point in their lives, often at times of crisis.
There are obvious difficulties with the concept of ‘believing without belonging’, mainly because it separates one kind of religiousness (belief) from another (belonging), when for many people the two are difficult to disentangle. At the same time, it evokes imperfectly the point already made: namely that both belief and belonging can be hard or soft. The idea of vicarious religion was developed to address this dilemma. By vicarious is meant the notion of religion performed by an active minority but on behalf of a much larger number, who (implicitly at least) not only understand, but appear to approve of what the minority is doing. The first half of the definition is relatively straightforward and reflects the everyday meaning of the term ‘vicarious’ – that is, to do something on behalf of someone else. The second half is best explored by means of examples. It captures rather better than ‘believing without belonging’ the legacy of a historically dominant church.
Religion can operate vicariously in a wide variety of ways. For example, churches and church leaders perform rituals on behalf of others (at the time of a birth or a death for instance); if these services are denied, this causes offence – the more so amongst those who do not attend church with any regularity. Church leaders and churchgoers believe on behalf of others and incur criticism if they do not do this properly. Once again it is, very often, the occasional churchgoer who articulates this disquiet most clearly, and the more senior the church leader, the worse the problem gets. Third, church leaders and churchgoers are expected to embody moral codes on behalf of others, even when those
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codes have been abandoned by large sections of the populations that they serve. This is true particularly with respect to family life and is one reason for the widespread disgust that many Europeans (and indeed others) felt regarding the disclosures of child abuse amongst Catholic priests. Churches, finally, can offer space for the vicarious debate of unresolved issues in modern societies. If the latter were not the case, it is hard to understand the persistent scrutiny of their positions on a wide variety of topical issues, from changing views regarding the nature of sexuality to the difficult moral questions surrounding birth and death – which reflect in turn the meaning of life itself. Yet it is not just churches and church leaders subjected to this level of critique regarding their views on contemporary social and political issues. Other religious leaders, especially Muslims, also receive significant analysis from media and political elites regarding their views on gender equality, sexual and reproductive rights and, of course, violence and terrorism. The analysis directed at church leaders compared with that directed at Muslim leaders is motivated by different agendas. Arguably, moreover, it is secular worldviews that shape these critiques, with religion and religious leaders continually positioned as something separate from other areas of human activity and as continually having to prove their relevance and their compatibility with modern secular life.
An alternative way of illustrating the nature of vicarious religion is to consider the place of religion and the continuing role of religious institutions in European societies when they face the unexpected or the tragic. The reactions provoked by the death of Princess Diana in August 1997 offer a revealing illustration: what happened in Britain in the week following the car accident in Paris cannot by any stretch of the imagination be described as either rational or secular, but nor was it conventionally religious. So what was it? One point is clear: a great deal of the improvised and markedly heterogeneous rituals that emerged at that time took place in the vicinity of centrally placed churches. It was these churches, moreover, that housed books of condolence and facilities for lighting candles – ordinary people queued for hours to make use of these resources – and it was the established church (the Church of England) that took responsibility for her funeral. The centrality of religious rituals and institutions as places of memorial, remembrance, and consolation can be seen equally in the aftermath of the Anders Breivik attacks in Norway, for example, when the cathedral in Oslo became an impromptu site of vigil and the laying of roses (Nordahl 2016).
Even more important, however, is the fact that the reactions to Princess Diana’s death, or to the Anders Breivik shootings, or indeed to attacks in Paris, London, Berlin, Brussels, and Nice, to name but a few, are simply writ‐large versions of what goes on in the everyday lives of individuals and communities all the time. People die, sometimes unexpectedly, and communities suffer, sometimes with little apparent justification. What is to be done on these occasions and who is to do it? Once again the taken‐for‐grantedness of this situation is the crucial point: the presence of the churches and religious leaders and their availability to ordinary people are simply assumed.
1.3 From Obligation to Consumption
Where, though, does this leave Europe’s diminishing churchgoers – those who maintain the tradition on behalf of other people? Here an observable change is clearly taking place, best summarized as a gradual shift from a culture of obligation or duty to a culture
of consumption or choice. What was once simply imposed on substantial sections of the population (with all the negative connotations of this word), or inherited (which has a rather more positive spin), becomes instead a matter of personal choice. Religiously active individuals now go to a church or to another religious organization because they choose to, sometimes for a short period or sometimes for longer, sometimes regularly and sometimes occasionally, but they feel little obligation either to attend that church in the first place or to continue if they no longer want to.
As such, this pattern is entirely compatible with vicariousness: the historic churches need to be there in order that those who wish may attend them if they feel inclined. Their nature, however, gradually alters – a shift that is discernible in both practice and belief, not to mention the connections between them. There is, for example, an easily documentable change in the patterns of baptism in the Church of England. The overall number of baptisms has dropped dramatically in the postwar period, evidence once again of institutional decline. In England, though not yet in the Nordic countries, or indeed in parts of southern Europe, baptism is no longer seen as a ritual associated with birth, but has become increasingly a sign of membership in a chosen voluntary community. In other words, membership of the historic churches is changing in nature. They are becoming more like the growing number of free or independent churches that can be found all over Europe, though more so in some places than in others. Voluntarism is beginning to establish itself de facto, regardless of the constitutional legacies of the church in question.
A second point follows from this. What are the most popular choices of twenty‐first century Europeans when it comes to religious attendance? The answers to this question are doubly interesting in the sense that they not only indicate the strengths and weaknesses of the present situation, but reveal that the predictions of an earlier generation (both scholars and church people) were largely incorrect. In the current period the actively religious are disproportionately drawn to two kinds of religious organization: charismatic evangelical churches on the one hand, and cathedrals or city‐centre churches on the other. The former epitomizes firm commitments, strong fellowship, and conservative teaching, balanced by the warmth of a charismatic experience. The latter allows a much more individual (even anonymous) expression of religious commitment: in cathedral‐type churches the appeal is often associated with the beauty of the building, the quality of the music, and the traditional nature of the liturgy. The important point to grasp is that in both cases there is a noticeable experiential element, albeit very differently expressed.
In the mid‐postwar decades, something rather different was envisaged. Conservative teaching was out of fashion and cathedrals were often classed as ‘dinosaurs’ – less and less relevant to the modern world and disproportionately expensive to maintain. They are still expensive to maintain, but the data indicate that they are increasingly attractive to late‐modern populations, whether they come as regular worshippers, less regular worshippers, tourists, or pilgrims – noting that the lines between these categories are distinctly porous.2
In 2013, cathedrals in the England alone attracted 12 million visitors for both worship and tourism (Bingham 2014; Francis and Muskett 2015). Pittman (2014) also highlights the reemergence and growing popularity of Protestant monastic communities in the second half of the twentieth century. Taizé is an obvious example and representative of the continued significance of sacred spaces, in forms which diverge from more traditional
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institutions. Conversely, rather more liberal forms of Protestantism, noticeably fashionable in the 1960s, have not fulfilled their promise. There are, of course, important exceptions to this rule but by and large the purely cerebral has less appeal in the twenty‐first century than many people thought would be the case.
It is abundantly clear, moreover, that large sections of current religion lie outside the churches altogether – indeed for growing numbers of people, even the word ‘religious’ is considered negatively. A new vocabulary has emerged. Specifically, the many and varied forms of the ‘spiritual’ now present in Europe must be taken into account, as indeed must the increasing tendency towards ‘bricolage’ – that is the building of individual packages (both religious and spiritual), which reflect the diversity of late modern lifestyles rather better than historic forms of religiousness. All over Europe, those who identify as religious have declined, whilst those who identify as spiritual have grown (Barker 2008). In the Netherlands, for example, a recent survey found that nearly 45% out of 2334 respondents identified as ‘spiritual’ as opposed to 40% who indicated that they were ‘religious’ (Berghuijs et al. 2013). There is consequently speculation as to whether religion is declining or rather transforming. And once started, the logic of choice is relentless. It is almost certain to include a range of secular options, which are as diverse as their religious counterparts. No longer are we in a situation where limited forms of religiousness confront their unbelieving alter egos. We find instead an almost infinite range of possibilities spreading along a continuum, which creeps incrementally from the religious or spiritual at one end to the more, rather than less, secular at the other. Taylor (2007, p. 300) refers to this situation as ‘living in a spiritual supernova’, in which religious pluralism increases at an unprecedented speed and scale.
Two recently observed phenomena are particularly interesting for our purposes. First, and occupying a large part of the centre of this continuum, is a grey area characterized by Fox (2004) as ‘woolly‐minded beliefs and non‐committal attitudes’, implying an indifference to religious and spiritual beliefs and practices, rather than particularly strong beliefs one way or the other. Glendinning (2013) has described this as ‘a‐theism’ – i.e. people who are neither steadfastly theistic nor atheistic but rather see the whole question of belief as largely irrelevant.
Second, Becci et al. (2017) highlight ‘religious super‐diversity’ as a key component of the shifting religious landscape in contemporary Europe, relating this both to changes in the landscape of belief, and to changes in the urban environment as such. Intended to capture the diversity produced by religious innovation, religious super‐diversity encompasses three distinct strands: (i) innovations within traditional religious communities to retain and in some cases reassert their place within the spatial as well as religious/ philosophical landscape of cities throughout Europe; (ii) religious diaspora communities taking over former Christian churches as well as abandoned carparks and shopping centres as places of worship; and (iii) new forms of spirituality and religious practices, such as the growing popularity of the Bahá’í Faith, the spiritual but not religious movement, scientology, New Ageism and hybrid religiosities of various sorts.
Religious innovation is understood not as a purely cerebral or belief‐driven phenomenon. It is, rather, intimately related to changes in urban landscapes, the availability of spaces in which to practice religious innovations, and the restrictions and regulations that governments place on religious communities and practices (Becci et al. 2017). They are also affected by the histories of the locations in which they emerge and by the different secular logics in operation. New spiritualities that often combine Buddhist
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political significance, so as to denote nothing whatever besides this beneficent Christian action upon the people. For natural morality and the precepts of the Gospel, for the very reason that they transcend the chances of human existence, must necessarily be independent of any particular form of civil government and adapt themselves to all, so long as there is nothing to conflict with virtue and right. They are, therefore, and remain in themselves, absolutely external to all conflict of parties and vicissitudes of occurrence, so that, under whatever kind of government, people may and ought to abide by these precepts, which bid them love God above all and their neighbors as themselves. This has ever been the morality of the Church: by it Roman Pontiffs have constantly dealt with states whatever might be their executive government. And this being so, the mind and action of Catholics, when devoted to promoting the good of the lower orders, cannot by any possibility aim at embracing and introducing any one form of government in preference to another.
"Just in the same way must Christian Democracy repudiate the other ground of offense, which arises from paying so much regard to the interests of the lower classes as to seem to pass over the higher, who are nevertheless of equal importance to the preservation and development of the State. The Christian law of charity, which we have just mentioned, forbids this. It is large enough to embrace all ranks as the aim and the task of those who would have the common people in a Christian spirit on the one hand suitably relieved, and, on the other, preserved against the contagion of socialism. …
"We have recalled these various topics on which we have before this found occasion to dilate according to our ability, and we trust that all dispute over the name of Christian Democracy may now be laid aside, as well as any suspicion of dangerous signification attaching to it. This trust we rightly cherish. For making exception of the ideas of certain persons regarding
the force and virtue of this kind of Christian Democracy, ideas which are not free from extravagance or error, surely there will be no single person to find fault with an endeavor, conformably to the law of nature and of God, to do merely this, to make the lives of laborers and artisans more tolerable, and gradually to give them the opportunity of self-culture, so that at home and in the world they may freely fulfil the obligations of virtue and religion, may feel themselves to be men, and not mere animals, Christian men, not pagans, and so strive with more felicity and earnestness to attain that 'one thing needful,' that final good, for which we came into the world. This is belonging to one and the same family, the offspring of the same all-beneficent Father, redeemed by one Saviour and called to the same eternal inheritance. …
"God forbid that under the name of Christian democracy should lie the surreptitious aim of throwing off all obedience and turning away from those in lawful authority. The law of nature, no less than that of Christ, enjoins respect for all such as in their several degree hold office in the State, and further enjoins obedience to their lawful commands. This is the only attitude worthy of a man and a Christian, and ought to be taken up heartily and as a matter of duty, 'for conscience's sake,' as the Apostle himself has admonished, when he ordained: 'Let every soul be subject to the highest powers.' …
"We spoke just now advisedly of virtue and religion. For it is the opinion of some, which is caught up by the masses, that the social question, as they call it, is 'economical' merely. The precise opposite is the truth that it is first of all moral and religious, and for that reason its solution is to be expected mainly from the moral law and the pronouncements of religion. … Without the instincts which Christian wisdom implants and keeps alive, without providence, self-control, thrift, endurance and other natural qualities, you may try
your hardest, but prosperity you cannot provide. That is the reason why we have never encouraged Catholics to form associations for the assistance of the poor, or introduce other schemes of the kind, without at the same time warning them that such things must not be attempted without the sanction of religion, without its inclusion and aid. … It is a laudable charity not merely to relieve the temporary needs of the poor, but to have an organized system of relief; this will be a more real and reliable assistance. It must be considered still more laudable to desire to instill into the minds of the mechanic and of the laborer notions of thrift and prudence, so that they may at least in part make provision for their declining years. It is an aim which not only relieves the cost of the wealthy, but it is a moral step for the poor themselves; it encourages them to approve their position, while it keeps them away from temptations, checks self-indulgence and leads them on to virtuous behavior. …
"Finally, we again enjoin with greater insistence that whatever schemes people take up in the popular cause, whether individually or in association, they should remember that they must be entirely submissive to episcopal authority. Do not let them be beguiled by an excessive ardor for charitable enterprise, which, if it induces any relaxation of due obedience, is itself false, unproductive of solid benefit and displeasing to God. Those who please God are those who are ready to give up their own ideas and listen to the bidding of the rulers of the Church, absolutely as to His own."
Catholic Union and Times, February 21, 1901.
{351} PARIS: A. D. 1897. Burning of the Charity Bazaar.
An awful destruction of life was caused on the 4th of May by fire breaking out in a charity bazaar, held in the Rue Jean Goujon, at Paris. Temporary structures had been erected, of wood and other combustible materials, to represent a street of Old Paris shops, and the flames ran through them like wildfire. The place was thronged with people, mostly of the aristocratic class and more than 200 are said to have perished.
PARIS: A. D. 1900 (April-November). Exposition.
See (in this volume)
FRANCE: A. D. 1900 (APRIL-NOVEMBER).
PARIS: A. D. 1900 (September). Gigantic banquet to the Mayors of France.
See (in this volume)
FRANCE: A. D. 1900 (SEPTEMBER).
PARIS, Treaty of (1898), between the United States and Spain.
See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (JULY-DECEMBER).
PARKHURST, Reverend Dr. Charles: His attack on the Tammany administration of New York City.
See (in this volume)
NEW YORK CITY: A. D. 1894-1895.
PARLIAMENT, The British: Ceremonious opening by King Edward VII.
See (in this volume)
ENGLAND: A. D. 1901 (FEBRUARY).
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM, Austrian.
See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1895-1896.
----------PARTIES AND FACTIONS, POLITICAL AND POLITICO-RELIGIOUS: Start--------
PARTIES:
Afrikander Bund, or Bondsmen.
See (in this volume)
SOUTH AFRICA (CAPE COLONY):
A. D. 1881-1888; 1898; 1898(MARCH-OCTOBER); and 1900 (DECEMBER).
PARTIES:
Agrarian Protectionists, German.
See (in this volume)
GERMANY: A. D. 1895-1898.
PARTIES: Anti-Imperialists.
See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).
PARTIES: Anti-Semites.
See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1895-1896, and after; FRANCE: A. D. 1897-1899, and after; GERMANY: A. D. 1898 (JUNE).
PARTIES: Blancos, or Whites.
See (in this volume)
URUGUAY: A. D. 1896-1899.
PARTIES: The Bond.
See above, AFRIKANDER BUND.
PARTIES: Centre (Catholic, of Germany).
See (in this volume)
GERMANY: A. D.1898 (JUNE).
PARTIES: Christian Social party.
See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897.
PARTIES: Clerical party, Austria.
See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897.
PARTIES: Colorados, or Reds.
See (in this volume)
URUGUAY: A. D. 1896-1899.
PARTIES: Deutsch Fortschrittliche.
See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897.
PARTIES: "Fanatics."
See (in this volume)
BRAZIL: A. D. 1897.
PARTIES: "Free Silver" Democracy.
See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER) and 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).
PARTIES: Fuyu-to (Liberals).
See (in this volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1890-1898.
PARTIES: German Democrats.
See (in this volume)
GERMANY: A. D. 1898 (JUNE).
PARTIES: German Liberal party, Austria.
See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897.
PARTIES: German People's party.
See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897.
PARTIES: Gold Democrats.
See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER).
PARTIES: Hintchak, The.
See (in this volume)
TURKEY: A. D. 1895.
PARTIES: Historic Christian party.
See (in this volume)
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1897.
PARTIES: Kai-shin-to (Progressives).
See (in this volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1890-1898.
PARTIES: Kensei-to (Constitutional party).
See (in this volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1898-1899.
PARTIES:
Labor party, French (Parti Ouvrier).
See (in this volume)
FRANCE: A. D. 1896 (APRIL-MAY).
PARTIES:
Liberal Democrats (German).
See (in this volume)
GERMANY: A. D. 1898 (JUNE).
PARTIES: Liberal Unionists (German).
See (in this volume)
GERMANY: A. D. 1898 (JUNE).
PARTIES: Lincoln party.
See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER), SILVER REPUBLICAN.
PARTIES: Little England party.
See (in this volume) LITTLE ENGLAND PARTY.
PARTIES: Middle-of-the-Road Populists.
See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER); and 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).
PARTIES:
National Democratic party.
See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER).
PARTIES:
National Liberals (German).
See (in this volume)
GERMANY: A. D. 1898 (JUNE).
PARTIES:
National party, 1896 and 1900.
See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER); and 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).
PARTIES:
National Silver party.
See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER).
PARTIES:
New Radical party.
See (in this volume)
ENGLAND: A. D. 1896 (MAY).
PARTIES: Old Czechs.
See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897.
PARTIES: Pan-Germanic Union.
See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1901.
PARTIES: Patriotic League.
See (in this volume)
FRANCE: A. D. 1898 (MAY-NOVEMBER).
PARTIES: Polish Club.
See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897.
PARTIES: Progressives (Kaishin-to).
See (in this volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1890-1898.
PARTIES: Progressives (Cape).
See (in this volume)
SOUTH AFRICA (CAPE COLONY): A. D. 1898; and 1898 (MARCH-OCTOBER).
PARTIES: Protestant Anti-Revolutionists.
See (in this volume)
NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1897.
PARTIES: Rikken Seiyu-kai Association of Friends of the Constitution.
See (in this volume)
JAPAN: A. D. 1900 (AUGUST-OCTOBER).
PARTIES: Siah Chai, The.
See (in this volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1895 (AUGUST).
PARTIES: Silver Republicans.
See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER); and 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).
PARTIES: Socialist parties.
See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897; FRANCE: A. D. 1896 (APRIL-MAY); GERMANY: A. D. 1894-1895, and 1898 (JUNE);
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER), and 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).
PARTIES: "Sound Money" Democrats.
See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER).
PARTIES:
United Christian party.
See (in this volume)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).
PARTIES:
United Irish League.
See (in this volume) IRELAND: A. D. 1900-1901.
PARTIES: "Vegetarians."
See (in this volume) CHINA: A. D. 1895 (AUGUST).
PARTIES: Verfassungstreue Grossgrundbesitz.
See (in this volume) AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897.
PARTIES: Volkspartei.
See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897.
PARTIES: Young Czechs.
See (in this volume)
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1897.
PATRIARCHATE: Re-established at Alexandria.
See (in this volume)
PAPACY: A. D. 1896 (MARCH).
PATRIOTIC LEAGUE.
See (in this volume)
FRANCE: A. D. 1898 (MAY-NOVEMBER).
{352}
PAUNCEFOTE, Sir Julian: British commissioner to the Peace Conference at The Hague.
See (in this volume)
PEACE CONFERENCE.
----------PARTIES: End--------
----------PEACE CONFERENCE.: Start--------
PEACE CONFERENCE:
On the 24th of August, 1898, without previous heralding or intimation, Count Mouravieff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, placed copies of the following momentous proposal from the Tsar in the hands of all the foreign representatives attending his weekly reception at St. Petersburg:
"The maintenance of universal peace and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations represent, in the present condition of affairs all over the world, the ideal towards which the efforts of all Governments should be directed. This view fully corresponds with the humane and magnanimous intentions of His Majesty the Emperor, my august Master. Being convinced that this high aim agrees with the most essential interests and legitimate aspirations of all the Powers, the Imperial Government considers the present moment a very favourable one for seeking, through international discussion, the most effective means of assuring to all peoples the blessings of real and lasting peace, and above all of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments. During the last twenty years aspirations towards general pacification have particularly asserted themselves in the consciences of civilized nations. The preservation of peace has been made the aim of international policy; for the sake of peace the Great Powers have formed powerful alliances, and for the purpose of establishing a better guarantee of peace they have developed their military forces in an unprecedented degree, and continue to develop them without hesitating at any sacrifice. All these efforts, however, have not yet led to the beneficent results of the desired pacification. The ever increasing financial burdens strike at the root of public prosperity. The physical and intellectual forces of the people, labour and capital, are diverted for the greater part from their natural application and wasted unproductively. Hundreds of millions are spent in acquiring terrible engines of destruction which are regarded to-day as the latest inventions of science, but are destined to-morrow to be rendered obsolete by some new discovery. National culture, economical progress, and the production of wealth are either paralysed or developed in a wrong direction. Therefore, the more the armaments of each Power increase, the less they answer to the objects aimed at by the Governments. Economic disturbances are caused in great measure by this system of
excessive armaments, and the constant danger involved in this accumulation of war material renders the armed peace of to-day a crushing burden more and more difficult for the nations to bear. It consequently seems evident that if this situation be prolonged, it will inevitably lead to that very disaster which it is desired to avoid, and the horrors of which make every humane mind shudder by anticipation. It is the supreme duty, therefore, at the present moment of all States to put some limit to these unceasing armaments, and to find means of averting the calamities which threaten the whole world. Deeply impressed by this feeling, His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to command me to propose to all Governments who have Representatives at the Imperial Court the meeting of a Conference to discuss this grave problem. Such a Conference, with God's help, would be a happy augury for the opening century. It would concentrate in one powerful effort the strivings of all States which sincerely wish to bring about the triumph of the grand idea of universal peace over the elements of trouble and discord. It would, at the same time, cement their agreement by a united affirmation of the principles of law and equity on which rest the security of States and the welfare of peoples."
Great Britain, Parliamentary Publications (Papers by Command: Russia, Number 1, 1899).
Having allowed his supremely noble proposition to stand before the world for consideration during a period of four months, and having received from almost every governing authority a formal expression of willingness to join in the Conference recommended, the sovereign of Russia pursued his grand design, on the 11th of January, 1899, by the following communication to the foreign representatives at his court:
"When, in the month of August last, my August master instructed me to propose to the Governments which have Representatives in St. Petersburg the meeting of a Conference
with the object of seeking the most efficacious means for assuring to all peoples the blessings of real and lasting peace, and, above all, in order to put a stop to the progressive development of the present armaments, there appeared to be no obstacle in the way of the realization, at no distant date, of this humanitarian scheme. The cordial reception accorded by nearly all the Powers to the step taken by the Imperial Government could not fail to strengthen this expectation. While highly appreciating the sympathetic terms in which the adhesions of most of the Powers were expressed, the Imperial Cabinet has been also able to collect, with lively satisfaction, evidence of the warmest approval which has reached it, and continues to be received, from all classes of society in various parts of the globe. Notwithstanding the strong current of opinion which set in favour of the ideas of general pacification, the political horizon bas recently undergone a sensible change. Several Powers have undertaken fresh armaments, striving to increase further their military forces, and in the presence of this uncertain situation, it might be asked whether the Powers considered the present moment opportune for the international discussion of the ideas set forth in the Circular of the 12th (24th) August. In the hope, however, that the elements of trouble agitating political centres will soon give place to a calmer disposition of a nature to favour the success of the proposed Conference, the Imperial Government is of opinion that it would be possible to proceed forthwith to a preliminary exchange of ideas between the Powers, with the object:
(a.) Of seeking without delay means for putting a limit to the progressive increase of military and naval armaments, a question the solution of which becomes evidently more and more urgent in view of the fresh extension given to these armaments; and
(b.) Of preparing the way for a discussion of the questions relating to the possibility of preventing armed conflicts by the pacific means at the disposal of international diplomacy.
{353}
In the event of the Powers considering the present moment favourable for the meeting of a Conference on these bases, it would certainly be useful for the Cabinets to come to an understanding on the subject of the programme of their labours. The subjects to be submitted for international discussion at the Conference could, in general terms, be summarized as follows:
"1. An understanding not to increase for a fixed period the present effective of the armed military and naval forces, and at the same time not to increase the Budgets pertaining thereto; and a preliminary examination of the means by which a reduction might even be effected in future in the forces and Budgets above-mentioned.
"2. To prohibit the use in the armies and fleets of any new kind of fire-arms whatever and of new explosives, or any powders more powerful than those now in use either for rifles or cannon.
"3. To restrict the use in military warfare of the formidable explosives already existing, and to prohibit the throwing of projectiles or explosives of any kind from balloons or by any similar means.
"4. To prohibit the use in naval warfare of submarine torpedo-boats or plungers, or other similar engines of destruction; to give an undertaking not to construct vessels with rams in the future.
"5. To apply to naval warfare the stipulations of the Geneva Convention of 1864, on the basis of the Additional Articles of 1868.
"6. To neutralize ships and boats employed in saving those overboard during or after an engagement.
"7. To revise the Declaration concerning the laws and customs of war elaborated in 1874 by the Conference of Brussels, which has remained unratified to the present day.
"8. To accept in principle the employment of good offices, of mediation and facultative arbitration in cases lending themselves thereto, with the object of preventing armed conflicts between nations; to come to an understanding with respect to the mode of applying these good offices, and to establish a uniform practice in using them.
"It is well understood that all questions concerning the political relations of States and the order of things established by Treaties, as generally all questions which do not directly fall within the programme adopted by the Cabinets, must be absolutely excluded from the deliberations of the Conference. In requesting you, Sir, to be good enough to apply to your Government for instructions on the subject of my present communication, I beg you at the same time to inform it that, in the interest of the great cause which my august master has so much at heart, His Imperial Majesty considers it advisable that the Conference should not sit in the capital of one of the Great Powers, where so many political interests are centred which might, perhaps, impede the progress of a work in which all the countries of the universe are equally interested."
General assent being given to the suggestions here offered, the next step toward realization of the grand project was taken, by an arrangement with the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, in accordance with which an invitation was addressed from The Hague, in April, to many governments, both the greater and the less of the political world, in the following terms:
"For political reasons the Imperial Russian Government considered that it would not be desirable that the meeting of the Conference should take place in the capital of one of the Great Powers, and after securing the assent of the Governments interested, it addressed the Cabinet of The Hague with a view of obtaining its consent to the choice of that capital as the seat of the Conference in question. The Minister for Foreign Affairs at once took the orders of Her Majesty the Queen in regard to this request, and I am happy to be able to inform you that Her Majesty, my august Sovereign, has been pleased to authorize him to reply that it will be particularly agreeable to her to see the proposed Conference meet at The Hague. Consequently, my Government, in accord with the Imperial Russian Government, charges me to invite [the Government named] to be good enough to be represented at the above-mentioned Conference, in order to discuss the questions indicated in the second Russian Circular of the 30th December, 1898 (11th January, 1899), as well as all other questions connected with the ideas set forth in the Circular of the 12th (24th) August, 1898, excluding, however, from the deliberations everything which refers to the political relations of States or the order of things established by Treaties. My Government trusts, that [the Government named] will associate itself with the great humanitarian work to be entered upon under the auspices of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and that it will be disposed to accept this invitation, and to take the necessary steps for the presence of its Representatives at The Hague on the 18th May next for the opening of the Conference, at which each Power, whatever may be the number of its Delegates, will only have one vote."
Great Britain, Parliamentary Publications (Papers by Command: Miscellaneous, Number 1, 1899, pages 3-4 and 8).
In response to this definite invitation, the governments of
