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R EASONAND R ESPONSIBILITY
ReadingsinSomeBasicProblemsofPhilosophy
JOELFEINBERG
LateofUniversityofArizona
RUSSSHAFER-LANDAU
UniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill
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BasicProblemsofPhilosophy,16th Edition
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g CONTENTS
PREFACEviii
JOELFEINBERG(1926 – 2004):INMEMORIAMxii
PARTI
IntroductiontotheNatureandValueofPhilosophy1
1.JOELFEINBERG: ALogicLesson 1
2.PLATO: Apology 8
3.BERTRANDRUSSELL: TheValueofPhilosophy 22
PARTII
ReasonandReligiousBelief 27
CHAPTER1:THEEXISTENCEANDNATUREOFGOD31
1.1ANSELMOFCANTERBURY: TheOntologicalArgument,from Proslogion31
1.2GAUNILOOFMARMOUTIERS: OnBehalfoftheFool 33
1.3WILLIAML.ROWE: TheOntologicalArgument 36
1.4SAINTTHOMASAQUINAS: TheFiveWays,from SummaTheologica47
1.5SAMUELCLARKE: AModernFormulationoftheCosmological Argument 49
1.6WILLIAML.ROWE: TheCosmologicalArgument 50
1.7WILLIAMPALEY: TheArgumentfromDesign 59
1.8MICHAELRUSE: TheArgumentfromDesign 65
1.9DAVIDHUME: DialoguesConcerningNaturalReligion 76
CHAPTER2:THEPROBLEMOFEVIL112
2.1FYODORDOSTOEVSKY: Rebellion 112
2.2J.L.MACKIE: EvilandOmnipotence 118
2.3PETERVANINWAGEN: TheArgumentfromEvil 126
2.4MICHAELMURRAYANDMICHAELREA: The ArgumentfromEvil 136
2.5B.C.JOHNSON: GodandtheProblemofEvil 147
CHAPTER3:REASONANDFAITH151
3.1W.K.CLIFFORD: TheEthicsofBelief 151
3.2WILLIAMJAMES: TheWilltoBelieve 155
3.3KELLYJAMESCLARK: WithoutEvidenceorArgument 164
3.4BLAISEPASCAL: TheWager 169
3.5LAWRENCEA.SHAPIRO: MiraclesandJustification 172
3.6SIMONBLACKBURN: Infini Rien 180
PARTIII
HumanKnowledge:ItsGroundsandLimits 185
CHAPTER1:SKEPTICISM193
1.1JOHNPOLLOCK: ABraininaVat 193
1.2MICHAELHUEMER: ThreeSkepticalArguments 195
1.3ROBERTAUDI: Skepticism 201
CHAPTER2:THENATUREANDVALUEOFKNOWLEDGE210
2.1PLATO: KnowledgeasJustifiedTrueBelief 210
2.2EDMUNDGETTIER: IsJustifiedTrueBeliefKnowledge? 215
2.3JAMESCORNMAN,KEITHLEHRER,ANDGEORGEPAPPAS: AnAnalysisofKnowledge 217
2.4GILBERTRYLE: KnowingHowandKnowingThat 219
2.5PLATO: Meno 223
2.6LINDAZAGZEBSKI: EpistemicGoodandtheGoodLife 224
CHAPTER3:OURKNOWLEDGEOFTHE EXTERNALWORLD232
3.1BERTRANDRUSSELL: AppearanceandRealityandthe ExistenceofMatter 232
3.2RENÉDESCARTES:MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy240
3.3JOHNLOCKE: TheCausalTheoryofPerception 274
3.4GEORGEBERKELEY:Ofthe PrinciplesofHumanKnowledge282
3.5G.E.MOORE: ProofofanExternalWorld 290
CHAPTER4:THEMETHODSOFSCIENCE293
4.1DAVIDHUME:AnInquiryConcerningHuman Understanding293
4.2WESLEYC.SALMON: AnEncounterwithDavidHume 320
4.3KARLPOPPER: Science:ConjecturesandRefutations 340
4.4PHILIPKITCHER: BelievingWhereWeCannotProve 344
PARTIV
MindandItsPlaceinNature 355
CHAPTER1:THEMIND–BODYPROBLEM359
1.1BRIEGERTLER: InDefenseofMind–BodyDualism 359
1.2FRANKJACKSON: TheQualiaProblem 372
1.3DAVIDPAPINEAU: TheCaseforMaterialism 376
1.4PAULCHURCHLAND: FunctionalismandEliminative Materialism 382
CHAPTER2:CANNON-HUMANSTHINK?391
2.1ALANTURING: ComputingMachineryandIntelligence 391
2.2JOHNR.SEARLE: Minds,Brains,andPrograms 400
2.3WILLIAMG.LYCAN: RobotsandMinds 407
CHAPTER3:PERSONALIDENTITYANDTHESURVIVAL OFDEATH413
3.1JOHNLOCKE: ThePrinceandtheCobbler 413
3.2THOMASREID: OfMr.Locke’sAccountofOur PersonalIdentity 416
3.3DAVIDHUME: TheSelf 419
3.4DEREKPARFIT: DividedMindsandtheNatureofPersons 421
3.5SHELLYKAGAN: WhatMatters 427
3.6JOHNPERRY: ADialogueonPersonalIdentityand Immortality 432
PARTV
Determinism,FreeWill,andResponsibility
CHAPTER1:LIBERTARIANISM:THECASEFORFREEWILL ANDITSINCOMPATIBILITYWITHDETERMINISM459
1.1RODERICKM.CHISHOLM: HumanFreedomandtheSelf 459
1.2ROBERTKANE: FreeWill:AncientDispute,NewThemes 467
CHAPTER2:HARDDETERMINISM:THECASEFOR DETERMINISMANDITSINCOMPATIBILITYWITHANY IMPORTANTSENSEOFFREEWILL481
2.1JAMESRACHELS: TheCaseagainstFreeWill 481
2.2DERKPEREBOOM: WhyWeHaveNoFreeWillandCanLive WithoutIt 491
CHAPTER3:COMPATIBILISM:THECASEFORDETERMINISM ANDITSCOMPATIBILITYWITHTHEMOSTIMPORTANT SENSEOFFREEWILL504
3.1DAVIDHUME: OfLibertyandNecessity 504
3.2HELENBEEBEE: CompatibilismandtheAbility toDoOtherwise 510
CHAPTER4:FREEDOMANDMORALRESPONSIBILITY521
4.1GALENSTRAWSON: LuckSwallowsEverything 521
4.2HARRYFRANKFURT: AlternatePossibilitiesandMoralResponsibility 528
4.3THOMASNAGEL: MoralLuck 534
4.4SUSANWOLF: SanityandtheMetaphysicsofResponsibility 542
PARTVI
MoralityandItsCritics 553
CHAPTER1:CHALLENGESTOMORALITY561
1.1JOELFEINBERG: PsychologicalEgoism 561
1.2PLATO: TheImmoralist’sChallenge 574
1.3FRIEDRICHNIETZSCHE: MasterandSlaveMorality 580
1.4RICHARDJOYCE: TheEvolutionaryDebunkingofMorality 589
CHAPTER2:PROPOSEDSTANDARDSOFRIGHTCONDUCT597
2.1RUSSSHAFER-LANDAU: EthicalSubjectivism 597
2.2MARYMIDGLEY: TryingOutOne’sNewSword 610
2.3ARISTOTLE: VirtueandtheGoodLife 613
2.4THOMASHOBBES:Leviathan622
2.5PLATO: Euthyphro 628
2.6IMMANUELKANT: TheGoodWillandtheCategoricalImperative 638
2.7JOHNSTUARTMILL:Utilitarianism645
2.8W.D.ROSS: WhatMakesRightActsRight? 660
2.9HILDELINDEMANN: WhatIsFeministEthics? 663
CHAPTER3:ETHICALPROBLEMS670
3.1KWAMEANTHONYAPPIAH: WhatWillFutureGenerations CondemnUsFor? 670
3.2PETERSINGER: Famine,Affluence,andMorality 672
3.3JOHNHARRIS: TheSurvivalLottery 678
3.4JAMESRACHELS: ActiveandPassiveEuthanasia 683
3.5MARYANNEWARREN: OntheMoralandLegalStatusofAbortion 687
3.6DONMARQUIS: WhyAbortionIsImmoral 696
CHAPTER4:THEMEANINGOFLIFE702
4.1EPICURUS: LettertoMenoeceus 702
4.2RICHARDTAYLOR: TheMeaningofLife 705
4.3RICHARDKRAUT: DesireandtheHumanGood 711
4.4LEOTOLSTOY: MyConfession 720
4.5SUSANWOLF: HappinessandMeaning:TwoAspectsofthe GoodLife 726
4.6THOMASNAGEL: TheAbsurd 739
GLOSSARY747
g PREFACE
ABOUT REASONANDRESPONSIBILITY
Theconvictionunderlyingthisvolumeisthatintroducingthecollegestudentto philosophybymeansofafewrepresentativeproblemsexaminedingreatdetailisfar preferabletoofferinga “littlebitofeverything,” witheachbranchofphilosophy,each major “ism,” andeachmajorhistoricalperiodrepresentedwithscrupulousimpartiality,eventhoughthearticlesmayhavelittlerelevancetooneanother.Accordingly, articleshavebeenselectedfrombothclassicalandcontemporarysourcesonsuch topicsasreligion,skepticism,mind,personalidentity,freedom,responsibility,moral duty,andthemeaningoflife.Theproblemsthatconcernphilosophersunderthese headingsarenotmereidleriddles,butratherquestionsofvitalinteresttoanyreflectiveperson.Eachsetofproblemsisplumbedinconsiderabledepthinessaysexpressing different,oftenopposing,views.Thehopeisthatexposuretothisargumentativegiveand-takewillencouragestudentstotakepartintheprocessthemselves,andthrough thispracticetodeveloptheirpowersofphilosophicalreasoning.
NEWTOTHISEDITION
Thisneweditionof ReasonandResponsibility hasbeenstrengthenedbytheaddition ofseventeennewselections.Wehaveretainedthepolicyofsecuringtheverybest availableEnglishtranslationsforforeignworks.Wehavetriedtostrikeagoodbalance betweenclassicworksandrelativelynewmaterialonthesesubjectsofenduringphilosophicalinterest.OtherthantheintroductorymaterialsinPartI,eachpartofthis workhasbeenupdatedandexpanded.
NewtoTheText
• PartII, “ReasonandReligiousBelief,” nowcontainsnewtranslationsofAnselm andGaunilo’sclassicexchangeontheontologicalargument,aswellasanew translationofAquinas’s “FiveWays.” Italsoincludestwonewworkswritten expresslyforthiseditionof Reason&Responsibility.Thefirst,byphilosopherand historianofscienceMichaelRuse,isapresentationandanalysisofvariousimportantversionsoftheargumentfromdesignforGod’sexistence.Thesecond,by LawrenceA.Shapiro,setsoutanextendedcritiqueofjustifiedbeliefinmiracles. MichaelMurrayandMichaelReaalsocontributeanewentrytothisPart;theirsis asystematicpresentationandsympatheticreconstructionofvarioustheodiciesand defensesofGod’sexistenceinthefaceoftheproblemofevil.
• PartIII, “HumanKnowledge:ItsGroundandLimits,” isstrengthenedbythe additionoftwonewentries.Thefirstisawide-rangingexplorationofskepticism, offeredbyRobertAudi.Thesecondisalovelyexplorationofthevalueoftruth, truebelief,andknowledgebydistinguishedphilosopherLindaZagzebski. – viii –
• PartIV, “MindandItsPlaceinNature,” nowincludesanewdefenseofmaterialismaboutthemindbyDavidPapineau,andanintriguingdiscussionofsurvival afterdeathbyShellyKagan,whoarguesthatonmanyconceptionsofpersonal identity,post-mortemsurvivalisn’tallit’scrackeduptobe.
• PartV, “Determinism,FreeWillandResponsibility,” containsthreenewselections.Thefirst,byphilosopherJamesRachels,presentsanengagingargument thatputspressureontheideathatweevermakefreechoices.Asecondpiece, writtenespeciallyforthiseditionof Reason&Responsibility,isHelenBeebee’s efforttoexplainhowwecanmakefreechoices,andonesforwhichwearemorally responsible, evenif determinismistrue.Alsonewinthissectionisanelegantpiece byGalenStrawson,whopresentsinaveryaccessiblewaythemasterargument thathehasbeendefendingformanyyearsnow.Thatargumentisdesignedto showthatwecannotbemorallyresponsibleforanythingweeverdo,sincethe essentialconditionsofsuchresponsibilitycanneverbemet.
• PartVI, “MoralityandItsCritics,” containssevennewselections.Thefirst,by MaryMidgley,raisestheproblemsforethicalrelativismbymeansofanespecially forcefulexample:thatofthesamuraiethicalcodethatrequiresthetestingofa newswordbyusingittokillaninnocentperson.KwameAnthonyAppiah’sentry invitesustoreflectonwhatfuturegenerationswillcondemnusfor,usingthisasa testtoidentifyflawsinconventionalwisdomaboutwhatisrightandwrong.Peter Singerchallengesustogivemuchmorethanwecurrentlyaredoingtorelievethe sufferingofthelessfortunate.MaryAnneWarren’sinfluentialdefenseofaprochoicepositionisnowincludedhere.RichardTayloroffershisviewaboutthe meaningoflife namely,thatevenaSisyphus,condemnedtorollahugerockup ahillforeternity,canhaveameaningfullifeifheisdoingwhathereallywantsto do.RichardKrautrejectsthisview,andoffersanelegantpresentationofthe reasonswhygettingwhatyouwantisnotallit’scrackeduptobe.Finally,Susan Wolfoffersthebasicsofherinfluentialviewregardingthemeaningoflife.The bumpersticker: “whensubjectiveattractionmeetsobjectiveattractiveness.” On heraccount,alifeismeaningfultotheextentthatweareinvestedinandtake pleasurefromactivitiesandprojectsthatareobjectivelyvaluable.
New ReasonandResponsibility 16th EditionMindTap
AlsonewtothiseditionisMindTapfor ReasonandResponsibility.Afullyonline, personalizedlearningexperiencebuiltuponCengageLearningcontent,MindTap combinesstudentlearningtools readings,multimedia,activities,andassessments intoasingularLearningPaththatguidesstudentsthroughtheircourse.
Inadditiontoofferingsatthepartandthebooklevels,eachchaptercontainsan arrayofactivitiesrelatedtothechaptercontent.
Atthepartandbook-level:
• TheKnowNOW!PhilosophyBlog,accessibleinthePartopeners,providesa succinctphilosophicalanalysisofmajornewsstories,alongwithmultimediaand discussionquestions.
• Questia,availableatthebooklevel,providestwoadditionalprimarysource readingsforeachchapteraswellasaccesstoQuestia’sfullonlinelibraryand researchpaperwritingresources.
Atthechapterlevel:
• AReader’sGuidepertainingtoeachreadingandthatincludescomprehension questionsandcriticalthinkingquestions
• Avideofollowedbytworeflectionquestions,toelicitfurtherresponsefromthe studentonthetopicbroachedinthechapter
• Apliacontentandactivities
• Essayquestionsonaselectedreading
• Quizzingonaselectedreading
MindTapgivesstudentsampleopportunitiesforimprovingcomprehensionandfor self-evaluationtoprepareforexams,whilealsoprovidingfacultyandstudentsalikea clearwaytomeasureandassessstudentprogress.FacultycanuseMindTapasa turnkeysolutionorcustomizedbyaddingYouTubevideos,RSSfeeds,ortheirown documentsdirectlywithintheeBookorwithineachchapter’sLearningPath.The productcanbeusedfullyonlinewithitsinteractiveeBookfor ReasonandResponsibility,orinconjunctionwiththeprintedtext.
WHY,ANDHOWTO,USETHISTEXT
Thisvolumecurrentlycontainseightmajorclassics:threethatarecomplete(Descartes’ Meditations,andPlato’s Apology and Euthyphro);onethatispresentedinvirtual totality(Hume’s Dialogues);andfourthatappearinverysubstantialsections(Berkeley’s Principles,Hume’s Enquiry,Mill’s Utilitarianism,andKant’s Groundwork).In addition,thereareshorterselectionsfromeighteenmoreclassictexts:thoseauthored byAnselm,Gaunilo,Aquinas,Clarke,Paley,Pascal,W.K.Clifford,WilliamJames, BertrandRussell,G.E.Moore,Locke,Hume,Plato,Nietzsche,Aristotle,Hobbes, Ross,andEpicurus.Thisbookcanbeusedtoteachanintroductorycoursebased solidlyonareadingoftheseclassics;morerecentarticlescanbeseenasakindof dividend.Thebookcontainsmanyarticlesbycontemporaryphilosophers,including eleventhatareaddressedspecificallytobeginningstudentsandthatwerewritten expresslyforthisbookbyWilliamRowe,MichaelRuse,LawrenceShapiro,Wesley Salmon,JohnPerry,BrieGertler,HelenBeebee,RobertKane,RichardJoyce,and botheditors.
Thereisnosingle “necessaryandnatural” orderinwhichtoreadthesematerials. Thebookbeginswiththephilosophyofreligionbecausemanybeginnersarefamiliar withitsproblems.Butitisjustas “natural” tobeginwithPartIII,becausethe questionofourknowledgeofGodpresupposesthequestionofthe “groundsand limitsofhumanknowledge” generally.Similarly,thereisnoreasonwhyonecould notbeginwiththemind-bodyproblem(PartIV)ortheproblemofdeterminismand freewill(PartV).Indeed,manyprofessorshavesaidthattheyprefertobeginwith ethics(PartVI)andworktheirwaytowardthefrontofthebook.
ACNOWLEDGMENTS
Manyfinephilosophersofferedgenerousadviceabouthowtoimprovethislatest editionof ReasonandResponsibility.I’dliketothankMatthewMangum,PaloAlto College;LucaFerrero,UniversityofWisconsin,Milwaukee;AnthonyCarreras,Lone StarCollege,Kingwood;DavidStegall,ClemsonUniversity;DavidGodden,Old DominionUniversity;KenHochstetter,CollegeofSouthernNevada;DanielMittag, AlbionCollege;JacobCaton,ArkansasStateUniversity;andSenemSaner,California StateUniversity,Bakersfield.Andaspecialnoteofthankstomyresearchassistant,Ben Schwan,whoupdatedmostoftheonlinematerialsandhelpedtoidentifylikelycandidatesfornewselectionsinthisedition anddiditallwithefficiencyandgoodcheer. Iwelcomeadviceonhowtoimprovetheformatandcontentofsubsequent editionsof Reason&Responsibility.Thosewithsuchadviceareverywelcometoemail meatRussShaferlandau@gmail.comwiththeirsuggestions.
RussShafer-Landau ChapelHill,NorthCarolina
JOELFEINBERG INMEMORIAM
g
JOELFEINBERG(1926–2004)wasabrilliantphilosopher,certainlyoneofthemost importantsocialandpoliticalphilosophersofthelasthalfcentury.Hewasalsoaverykind, humbleman.Andhewasanextremelyconscientiousteacher.Thegreatcareandpreparationthathedevotedtohisteachingisevidenthere,intheplanandformatof Reason& Responsibility.Joeldevelopedthefirsteditionofthistextbooknearlyfiftyyearsago,dissatisfiedwithexistingoptions,andintentonprovidingcoverageofthoseareasofphilosophythatstruckhimasdeeplyimportantanddeservingofeverystudent’scarefulstudy.
MostofyoureadingthiswillknowJoelFeinbergonlyastheeditorofabook you’vebeenassignedtoread.Ifyouhaveachance,yououghttoseekoutoneofthe manyexcitingworksthatJoelpennedduringhisprolificcareer.Hewasaphilosophicalwriterofraretalent.Hewroteaboutthingsthatmatter,anddidsoinawaythat everyonecouldunderstand.Hewasclear,hewaselegant,alwaysreadywiththetelling example,thewell-chosenreferencetoliteratureorhistory,droppedintoplacewitha lighttouch.Openanyoneofhismanybooksandreadatrandom–youcan’thelpbut beimpressedbythehumanism,theclarity,theoriginalityand,certainly,thewisdom oftheviewsthatreceiveexpressionthere.
Joelwasalsoamanofgreatcommonsenseanddiscernment.Oneofthemost desirablethingsinlifeistohaveapersonofintegrityandgenuinelysoundjudgmentto relyonforadvice,companionship,and,ifoneisespeciallyfortunate,forfriendship.Iwas luckyenoughtostudywithhimforfiveyears,towriteadissertationunderhisdirection, andlatertoworkwithhimasacollaboratoronthisbookforjustoverdecadepriorto hispassing.Hissuggestionsduringourcollaboration,bothaboutsubstantivemattersof contentandaboutthemoremundane,practicalmattersofthepublishingworld,epitomizedhispracticalwisdom.Hewasamanwhosejudgmentyoucouldtrust.
Joelwascurious,interestedinthewholerangeofhumanexperience,attentiveto relevantdetail,appreciativeofsalientdistinctions,aloveroftaxonomiesand,atthe sametime,abletoresistthepressurethatsuchtaxonomiesimpose–pressuretofalsify thephenomenaandstraitjacketitintocategoriesthatgeneratemisunderstanding.Itis averyraretalent,tobesoanalyticallymindedandyetsobroadinone’soutlook,to appreciatesystemandyettobesensitivetothefinedetailthatmustconstrainits development.Joelpossessedsuchtalent,toadegreethatwasalmostunrivalled.There wereveryfewinhisleague.
Joeldiedin2004afteralongstrugglewithParkinson’sdiseaseanditscomplications.ThoughIhaveoverseenthisbookinthedecadesincehisdeath,hisinfluenceon itscontentsremainsverysubstantial.Moregenerally,heleftusagreatandvaluable legacy,bothpersonalandprofessional.Itwasatruehonortohaveknownhim,tohave learnedfromhim,andtohavecountedhimafriend.
R.S.L. ChapelHill2016
g PART I IntroductiontotheNatureand ValueofPhilosophy
1.ALogicLesson
JOELFEINBERG
CORRECTANDINCORRECT REASONING
Logicistheintellectualdisciplinethatdistinguishescorrectfromincorrectreasoning.Correctrulesoflogicareindeeduseful.Itstaggers theimaginationtopictureaworldinwhichthey havenoauthority.Buttheirutilityderivesfrom theircorrectness,nottheotherwayaround. Theyareasclearmodelsof objective truth,or objective “correctness,” asanythatwehave.
DEDUCTIVEANDINDUCTIVE REASONING
Asweshallsoonsee,thedirectconcernoflogic with “correctreasoning” ismorepreciselyaconcernwithgoodandbad arguments.Allargumentsfallintooneortheotheroftwobasic types:deductiveandinductive.
Deductiveargumentsclaimnotmerelyto givesupportbuttogive conclusive or decisive
supporttotheirconclusion.Theyclaimto prove or demonstrate thattheirconclusionistrue,that itstruth necessarilyfollows fromitspremisesso that,ifthepremisesaretrue(amattertobeinvestigatedindependently),thentheconclusion mustbetrue. Adeductiveargumentmayhaveanynumberofpremises,butweshallfollowpedagogical customandadopt,asourmodelofastandard deductiveargument,onethathastwopremises andaconclusion.Whenwesayofagivenargumentthatitspremisesarefalse,weshallmean simplythat atleastone ofitspremisesisfalse.
Aninductiveargumentisbestdefinedsimplyasagenuineargumentthatisnotdeductive. Theterms “valid” and “invalid” arenormally appliedtodeductiveargumentsonly.Inductive argumentsaresubjecttodifferenttermsof evaluation,good-bad,strong-weak,andsoon. Unlikethetermsofinductiveevaluation (“highlyprobable,”“moderatelyprobable,” “improbable,” etc.),thetermsofdeductive
evaluation, “valid” and “invalid,” arenotsubject todegrees.Adeductiveargumentiseither wholly,unqualifiedlyvalid,ornotvalidatall.It cannotbejust “alittlebitinvalid.” Neithercanit bethecasethatoneargumentcanbemoreor lessvalidthananother.
Aninductiveargument,then,isanargumentwhoseconclusionisclaimedtofollow fromitspremises,notwithnecessity,butonly withprobability.Oneconclusionmaybe renderedmoreprobablethananother,and thereforebeabetterorstrongerinductive argument.
ARGUMENTS
Anargumentisasetofpropositions,oneof which(theconclusion)issaidtobetrueonthe basisoftheothers(thepremises).TheconclusionisoftensignaledinordinaryEnglishbythe term “therefore.” Inlogic,thetraditionalsymbolfor “therefore” isatriangleofdots[\]. Thereare,however,manydifferentwaysofindicatingwhichpropositionistheconclusion: “Itfollowsfrompthatq,”“p,consequently q,”“becausepistrue,qistrue,”“thereason forqisp.” Premisesareoftensaidtobe reasons or evidence fortheirconclusions.Premisessupport,imply,entail,orrequiretheirconclusion. Thenatureofthatsupportispreciselywhatthe disciplineoflogicstudies.
LOGICALNECESSITYVERSUS PSYCHOLOGICALCERTAINTY
Apersonmaystandinanynumberofpossible relationstoaproposition.Shecanbeabsolutely confidentthatpistrue,havingnotraceof doubt,reasonableornot.Itiseasytoconfuse thispsychologicalcertaintywithlogicalnecessity. Anargumentoftheform “Ifpthenq;p;thereforeq” isvalidquiteindependentlyofanybelief thatanypersonmighthavetowardit.Giventhe truthofitspremises,itsconclusionmustbetrue. Evenindividualpropositions,asweshallsee below,aresometimesnecessarilytrue(when theyare “analytic,” ortautologies,or “trueby
definition”).Similarly,propositionsthathave theformoflogicalcontradictions must befalse; theycannotbetrue.Itcannotbetrueevenofan infinitelypowerfuldeitythatHebothexistsand doesnotexistatthesametime.Toassertalogicalcontradictionistosaysomethingoftheform “pandnotp,” andallstatementsofthatform arenecessarilyfalse.Arationalpersonmaybelievepandanotherrationalpersonmightbelieve notp.Butnorationalpersoncouldbelieveboth pandnotp.
POSSIBLETRUTHVALUE COMBINATIONS
Whenwedonotknowwhetheragivenpropositionistrueorfalse,itisconvenienttosaythatwe donotknowits “truthvalue.” Thisisauseful termofartthatenablesusconvenientlytopose someimportantquestionsaboutvaliddeductive arguments.Variouscombinationsoftruthvalues arepossible.Eachpremisewillhaveatruth value,andtheconclusionwillhaveatruthvalue, inbothcaseseithertrueorfalse.Theoverallvalidityoftheargumentwillvary,leadingtoa largercombinationofpossibilities.Itisessential tounderstandthesecombinationsandexamples ofeach.Donotforgetthat avalidargumentcan haveafalseconclusionandaninvalidargument canhaveatrueconclusion.Variousothercombinationsarepossible.Therulesfordetermining validityremainconstant,butindividualpropositionsinpremiseorconclusionwillbetrueor falsedependingonthefacts.Andsometimes (infactmosttimes)thebestwayofdetermining thefactswillbetogooutandlookattheworld. Herearesomesamplesoftruthvaluecombinationsinthepremisesandconclusionsof validandinvalidarguments.
1.Truepremises;trueconclusion;valid argument: Allhumansaremortal.(True) Feinbergishuman.(True) Therefore,Feinbergismortal.(True) (VALID)
2.Falsepremises;falseconclusion;valid argument:
Allmammalshavewings.(False)
Allreptilesaremammals.(False)
Therefore,allreptileshavewings.(False) (VALID)
3.Alltruepremises;trueconclusion:invalid argument:
ChicagoisnorthofDallas.(True)
Feinbergismortal.(True)
Therefore,allbirdshavewings.(True) (INVALID)
4.Alltruepremises;falseconclusion;invalid argument.(Bytheverydefinitionof “valid,” argumentsofthisform cannotbevalid.)
IfBillGatesownedallthegoldinFort Knox,thenhewouldbewealthy.(True)
BillGatesdoesnotownallthegoldin FortKnox.(True)
ThereforeBillGatesisnotwealthy. (False) (INVALID)
5.Falsepremises;trueconclusion;valid argument:
Allfisharemammals.(False)
Allwhalesarefish.(False)
Therefore,allwhalesaremammals. (True) (VALID)
6.Falsepremises;trueconclusion;invalid argument:
Alldogshavewings.(False)
Allpuppieshavewings.(False)
Therefore,allpuppiesaredogs.(True) (INVALID)
Insummary,adeductiveargumentmayhaveany ofthefollowingtruthandvaliditycombinations:
Illustrationshavebeengivenofargumentsin severalofthesecategories.Allcombinationsare possibleexceptone: Anargumentcannothave truepremisesandafalseconclusionandstillbe valid. Butavalidargumentcangofromfalse tofalse,fromtruetotrue,orfromfalseto true,andaninvalidargumentcanbeinanyof thesecategories,withoutrestriction.
VALIDITYANDSOUNDNESS
Afinalbitoflogicalterminologywillbeuseful. Thephilosopherswho “dologic” neverspeakof statementsorpropositionsas “valid” or “invalid.” Theseevaluativetermsapplytoarguments,notto thepropositionsoutofwhichargumentsareconstructed.Speakingverygenerally,validarguments arelogicallycorrectarguments,havingpremises andconclusionsastheirconstituentparts.
Aparticularpropositionistrueorfalsedependingonwhatthefactshappentobe.Ifyou aretryingtoclassifyagivenargumentandyou wouldliketoknowwhether “somefishhave wings” isTorF,youmustlookatbooksabout fishorotherwiseconsultbiologists.Logiccan onlytellyouwhetheragivensetofpremises hasacertainrelationship logicalvalidity to thebiologicalproposition.
Ideally,whatweneediflogicistobepracticalareargumentsthatarebothvalidandhave true premises.Theconclusionofsuchanargumentcannotbefalse.Logicianscallsuchanargument “sound.” Wecanthusdefinesoundness asvalidityplustruth(ofthepremises).Oneof
themostcommonwaysinwhichphilosophers criticizeoneanotheristoconcedethattheother person’sargumentislogicallyimpeccablebutto insistthatsomeorallofherpremisesarefalse.
Propositionscontainingthe “if…then…” relationarealsocommonlycalled “conditional statements” or “hypotheticalstatements.” The partofthecompoundnormallyfollowingthe “if” iscalledthe “antecedent.” Thepartfollowing the “then” iscalledthe “consequent.” Aconditionalstatementassertsthatthetruthoftheantecedentisaguarantee,or “sufficientcondition,” forthetruthoftheconsequent:that if theantecedentistrue,thentheconsequentistrue. Anotherwayofsayingthisisthattheantecedent “implies” or “entails” theconsequent,orthatthe consequent “follows” fromtheantecedent.
NECESSARYANDSUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
Wecanuseconceptsofnecessaryandsufficient conditionstorelatepropositionstooneanother. Thuswecansaysuchthingsas “ifitrainsany moretonight,thenthefootballfieldwillbe muddytomorrowatgametime,” whichmeans thatmorerainwillbesufficienttobringabout moremud;wecouldalsosaythat “thelightwill comeononlyifsomeonepullstheswitch,” whichmeansthatpullingtheswitchisnecessary forlightingtheroom.Itisusuallythecasethat manyconditionsarenecessaryforsomeresult;if thesenecessaryconditionsare all satisfied,then thatwillbesufficienttoproducetheresult.
Therearemanyequivalentwaysofsaying thatonethingisnecessaryforanother.We sometimesspeakofpreconditions,requirements, orprerequisites.Lawyersspeakofnecessaryconditionsas “butforconditions,” thatis,conditions butforwhich aneventtobeexplained wouldnothaveoccurred.SometimeslawyersresorttotheancientLatinexpression, conditiosine quanon, “aconditionwithoutwhichnot.”
Itshouldbenotedcarefullythat ifpisnecessaryforq,thenqissufficientforp. Thus,
Anairplanefliesonlyifthereisgasinits tank.
isequivalentto
Ifthisairplaneflies,thenthereisgasin itstank.
Imagineyourselfattheairport.Youhavebeen veryworriedthatyourvisitingfriends’ planeis outofgas.Youareconvincedthatgasinthe tankisnecessaryifheistoflyhome.Whenyou gettotheairport,heclimbsintotheplaneand takesoff.Youcouldsay wouldyounot? that “Theremusthavebeengasinthetank.Thefact thattheplaneisflyingissufficienttoshowthat therewasgasinthetank.”
Ingeneral, ifpisasufficientconditionforq, thenqisanecessaryconditionforp.Notethatp canbesufficientforqwithoutalsobeingnecessaryforq.Heavycigarettesmokingmaywellbe sufficienttocauselungcancer,butitisnotnecessary,becausenonsmokerssometimesgetlung cancertoo.Andpcanbenecessaryforqwithout alsobeingsufficientforq.Oxygenisanecessary conditionforafire,butisnot,byitself,enough tocreateone.
VALIDDEDUCTIVEARGUMENT FORMS:ASAMPLER
Determiningthevalidity,orinvalidity,ofadeductiveargumentisamatterofform,notof content.Anumberofwell-studiedlogicalpatternsexhibittheformsoftheleadingcategories ofdeductivevalidity.Letusbeginabriefsketch oftheseformalpatternswiththosethathavea conditionalstatementasapremise.
Strictlyspeaking,anysetofpropositions whosepremisesaresimplyirrelevanttoitsconclusionisaninvalidargument.Soanyargument properlysymbolizedas(p,q,thereforeg)isinvalid.Whateverthetruthvaluesofpandqand g,theyhavenologicalbearingononeanother. Soifpistheproposition “Allmammalsare quadrupeds,” andqistheproposition “Some millionairesareneurotic,” thenpandqhave norelationtooneanother.Theyarenoteven talkingaboutthesamething.Thenifgisthe proposition “Objectsattractoneanotherwitha forcethatisdirectlyproportionaltotheir
masses,” wehaveanargumentthatconsistsof threetruepropositionstotallyirrelevanttoone another.Thepremisescangivenosupporttothe conclusion,sothatifweinterpretanargument asaclaimthatsuchsupportisgiven,thatclaim mustberejectedandtheargumentdeclaredinvalid.Itisthesortofargumentcommonlycalled a “nonsequitur” (“notfollowing”).
Themoreinterestingfallacies(invalidarguments)havecomponentpropositionswhosetruth valuesareindeedrelevanttooneanotherbut whoserecognizableformsdeterminethattheconclusionnecessarilydoesnotfollowfromthepremises.Bycontrast,someofthestandarddeductive argumentformsarevalid,guaranteeingthatany actualargumentthathasthatformisvalid ifits premisesaretruethenitsconclusioncannotbe false.Needlesstosay,itisimportanttolearn howtorecognizetheseformsandlearnhowto distinguishatfirstsightthealwaysvalidonesfrom thefallacies,justasinmushroomhunting,itis importanttoknowhowtodistinguishthefatally poisonousspecimensfromtheinnocuousones.
Letusbegin,then,withapairofstandard validformsandthepoisonouscounterpartsoften confusedwiththem.Thefirstofthesewasgiven theLatinname modusponens bymedievallogicians,anamestillused.Anargumenthasthis formwhenitscomponentpropositionsarerelatedasfollows:
Ifp,thenq p Therefore,q
Itisnotdifficulttoseeintuitivelythatthisargumentformisalwaysvalid.Ifanargumentofthis formhastruepremises,asissometimesthecase, thentheconclusionmustbetrue.Forexample:
Ifthishorse’slegisbroken,thenhewill bemercifullyshot.
Thishorse’slegisbroken.
Therefore,thishorsewillbemercifully shot.
Ifthepremisesofthisargumentaretrue(asthey couldeasilybe,dependingonwhatthefacts
are),thenitislogicallynecessarythattheconclusionistruetoo.Iftheconclusionisfalse,thenit mustbebecauseoneormorepremiseisfalse. Amorerevealingnamefor modusponens is “theassertionoftheantecedent.” Anargument thatqualifiesforthatdescriptionisalwaysvalid. Similarly,theargumentwhosetraditional Latinnameis modustollens employsaconditionalstatementasakeypremiseandconsists inthedenialoftheconsequent.Itsformis:
Ifp,thenq
Notq
Therefore,notp
Thealternative(English)nameofthisperfectly validformis “denyingtheconsequent.” Allactualargumentsofthisformmustbevalid.
Butnowwecometothemasqueradeball,at whichcounterfeitsfor modusponens and modus tollens poseasvalidarguments,thoughinfact theyarestandardfallacieswithstandardnames, andalwaysinvalid.Thenamesaregiventhistime onlyinEnglish,namely affirmingtheconsequent and denyingtheantecedent.Theformer isrenderedasfollows:
Ifp,thenq q Therefore,p
Forexample:
IfGatesownsallthegoldinFortKnox, thenheisrich.
Gatesisrich.
Therefore,Gatesownsallthegoldin FortKnox.1
Notethattheexamplehastruepremisesanda falseconclusion,andthereforemustbeinvalid. Thesecondfallaciousargumentformmentionedaboveis “denyingtheantecedent.” Itcan beformulatedasfollows:
Ifp,thenq Notp
Therefore,notq
Forexample
IfGatesownsallthegoldinFortKnox, thenheisrich.
GatesdoesnotownallthegoldinFort Knox.
Therefore,Gatesisnotrich. Therearevariousotherformsofdeductiveargumentinwhichacrucialpremiseisaconditional statement(ifpthenq).Forexample,thereisthe intuitivelyobviousvalidformcalledthe hypotheticalsyllogism.Thenamenodoubtderives fromtheprominentroleplayedinitbyhypothetical(thatis,conditional)propositions.Argumentsofthistypecanbeformulatedthus
Ifp,thenq
Ifq,thenr
Therefore,ifp,thenr Notethatallthreecomponentpropositionsare conditional.Anexample
IfWitherspoonwinsthenextprimary election,thenhewillwinthenomination. IfWitherspoonwinsthenomination, thenhewillwinthepresidentialelection. Therefore,ifWitherspoonwinsthenext primaryelection,thenhewillwinthe presidency.
Argumentsofthisformarealwayslogicallyvalid.
INFORMALFALLACIES
Wecanmeanbytheword “fallacy” anyinstance ofincorrectreasoning.Thatwouldincludean enormousmiscellanyofreasoningerrorsthat havenoparticularformexceptthattheirpremises areirrelevanttotheirconclusions.Butsomeinvalidargumentshaveaclear,recognizableform, easytosymbolize,thatpermitsustotreatthemas aparticularstandardizedmistake.Thisgroupof “informalfallacies,” astheyaresometimescalled, includes,amongmanyothers,thefollowing.
Thestandardname argumentumad baculum isappliedtoanefforttopersuadeby
threateningforce: “IfyoudonotsaywhatI wantyoutosay(orbelieveordowhatIwant youtobelieveordo,asthecasemaybe),then Iwillbeatthehelloutofyou,” isobviouslynot anargument.Ifitwere,Isupposeitwouldhave tohavethefollowingform:
Ifyoudonotadmitthatp,thenIwill beatyouup.(solepremise) Therefore,p.
ItmaybethatyourthreatgivesmeagoodreasonforsayingthatIbelievethatp,butthatis quiteanotherthingfromsayingthatthecredibilityofyourthreatisevidenceforp,orthatit impliesorentailsorprovesthatp.Infactitis whollyirrelevanttop.Apersonofordinaryprudencewhoispersuadedbyfearofthethreatener’ssuperiorsize,strength,andpugilistic prowessmayadmit,atthemomenttheblows begin,thathehasjustbeengivensome “reasons,” evensomegoodreasons,foractingasdemanded,thoughhehasbeengivennoreason thatsupportsp,noreasonforchanginghisbelief totheonedemanded,evenifitwerepossibleto doso.
Anothersetof “arguments” confusingpersuasiveefficacywithvaliditybearstheLatin name argumentumadmiseracordium,anditis everybitasmuchaninformalfallacyasthe argumentumadbaculum.Considertheundergraduatestudentintearswhocomplainstoher professoraboutthe “unfairness” ofhergrade. ThegradeofBinhiscourse,shesays,didnot doherjustice.ShedeservedanAgiventhespecialcircumstancesthatshehasappliedtomedical school,andifsheisnotadmitted,thedisappointmentwillruinherlifeandbreakherparents’ hearts. Therefore shedeservesanA,andher professorhasthedutyofchangingherpresent gradetoanA.Theword “Therefore” isthesign thataconclusionisabouttobestated,andsupportedbyreasonsstatedinthepremises.Ineffecttheargumentsays: “YouowemeanA, becauseIandotherswillbedisappointedand heartbrokenifyoudonotmakethechange Iambeggingyoufor.” Theverdict:invalid!
SOMEINDUCTIVEINFERENCES, GOODANDBAD
Therearenumeroustasksinlifethatrequirereasonablepersonsto “givereasonsfor” ratherthan prove,demonstrate,orrendercertain.Law courtsareafamiliarexample.Inthecriminal law,forinstance,adefendantcannotbeconvictedunlessthejurybelievesthatshebehaved aschargedandbelievesfurtherthatherguilt, whileneitherlogicallynecessary,norpsychologicallycertain,isneverthelesssupportedbypretty strongevidence,sostrongthatitis “beyonda reasonabledoubt.” Andyettheargumentinthe mindofthejurydoesnotinvolveexclusiveuseof deduction.Inductivearguments,too,cancarry conviction.Insteadoflogicalnecessity,theinductiveargument(bydefinition)purportsto showtheprobabilityofcertainvitalpropositions thatwouldleadareasonablepersoninthedirectionofbelief.Inotherbranchesofthelaw,the requiredevidenceissomewhatweakerbutstill strong,forexample,reasonsthatare “clearand compelling” andconclusionsthatare “highly probable,”“moreprobablethannot,” or “plausible.”
Inductivearguments,however,arenomore immunefrommistakes,andalthoughinductive mistakesarelesscommonlylabeled “fallacies,” theycanbeasdestructivetothereasoningprocessesasthosemistakesthat are calledfallacies. Afewsampleswillsuffice.
Inductiveargumentsplayanimportantpart inascriptionsofcausationtoevents,inexplanations,predictions,andopinionsurveys,among otherthings.Whereinductivereasoninggives ustheopportunitytogorightintheseactivities, itusuallyofferstheopportunitytogowrong. Considerthefamousargument posthocergo propterhoc (“afterthefact,thereforebecauseof thefact”).Onecommitsthismistakeinreasoningwhenoneattributesthecauseofagiven eventtoanothereventthatcameearlier,for thesoleapparentreasonthatit did comeearlier. Thismistakeismadesofrequentlyinpolitical debatesthatonemightalmostcallitthebasic argumentofdemocraticpolitics,exceptforthe
factthatitisalmostalwaysusedagainsttheincumbentcandidate,holdinghimresponsiblefor whathashappened “duringhiswatch.” Didthe OhioRiverfloodduringhispresidency?Thenhis electionorthepolicieshepursuedmusthave beenthecause.Itisenoughtoshowthatprices onthestockmarketfellduringhistermofoffice toshow(allegedlywithhighprobability)thathis policiescausedthedecline.Wereweatpeace beforeheassumedofficeandatwarlater?It mustbebecausehisactionscausedit.Butincumbentscananddousethisweakargument too.Areyoubetteroffnowthanyouwereunder thepreviouspresident?Ifso,thatshowsthatthis president’spolicieshaveworked.Actuallywhat factsofthissort “prove” isthatthespeaker’s inductivelogicisnottobetrusted.
BEGGINGTHEQUESTION
Medievallogicians,whowroteinLatin,had theirownfancynameforournextfallacy:a “petitioprincipii ” Englishspeakerstoohaveother namesforit a “circularargument” and “beggingthequestion.” Technically,acircularargumentcanbedefinedasanargumentthat assumesinitspremisestheconclusionitclaims tobeproving.Thatproceduremakesthereasoner’staskaltogethertooeasytodoheranygood. Shearguesinacirclewhensheusesherpremises toprove(orotherwisesupport)herconclusion, andusesherconclusionintheproofofoneof herpremises.Thecircularityfallacybringsto mindthetwopersons,Mr.AandMs.B,who applyatabankforaloan.FirstMr.Aasksfora loan.Thebankeraskshimifthereisanyonewho cantestifytohishonestyandtrustworthiness.At thatpointMr.AintroduceshisfriendMs.Bto thebanker.Ms.BthenrecommendsMr.A,declaringhimtobeabsolutelytruthfulandtrustworthy. “Verygood,” saysthebankertoMr.A. “YourfriendMs.Bhasgivenusaverygood testimonialinyourbehalf.Nowallweneedto knowiswhetherMs.Bisherselftruthfuland trustworthy.Whocanrecommendher? “No problem,” repliesMr.A. “I willrecommend her.” Andsowehaveacircle.WelearnthatA
canbetrustedontheauthorityofB,whocanbe trustedontheauthorityofA.
Inphilosophyacircularargumentoften takesthesameform.Aconclusionissupported onsomeone ’sauthority,andthatauthorityis derivedlogicallyfromanargumentoneof whosetacitpremisesistheveryproposition thatismeanttobeproved.Thestandardexampleinlogictextsisaparticularkindofreligious fundamentalism. “ WecanknowthatGodexists,” theargumentproceeds, “ becausethebibletellsusso. ”“ Yes,buthowdoyouknowthat thebibleistrue?” asksthecriticofthisparticularargument. “ Noproblem,” theproof-giver replies, “ Thebiblemustbetruebecauseitis thewordofGod. ” Theproof-giverhasbegged thequestion.
Putmoreformally,anargumentisofferedto provep.Akeypremiseinthatargumentisq.So theargumentatthispointisq,thereforep.Let ussupposethatthisisavalidargument,butthat wecannottellwhetheritissounduntilwelearn whetheritspremise,q,istrue.Sowecomeup withanothervalidargument:p,thereforeq.So
nowwehavecompletedtwoarguments,one provingp,ourimmediateobjective,andthe otherprovingq,whichisapremiseintheargumentforp.Buttheargumentforqusespasa premiseinitsownproof.Inordertoshowthatp istrue,wehavetoassumethatpistrue!
Aninterestingthingaboutcircularargumentsisthatalthoughtheyarefallaciesinthe verybroadsenseof “mistakenreasoning,” they arenotfallaciesinthenarrowsenseof “invalidity.” Infact,acircularargumentisactuallya valid argumentinthelogician’stechnical senseof “valid.” Assumingitselfinitsownproof maymakethecircularargumentapoorargument,butnomorean invalid onethananyargumentoftheformp,thereforep.Anargument ofthissortwillnotadvanceourknowledge. Beggingthequestionisabadwaytoreason.
NOTE
1.IborrowthisalluringexamplefromIrvingM. CopiandKeithBurgess-Jackson, InformalLogic (UpperSaddleRiver,NJ:Prentice-Hall,1995) thirdedition,p.55.
2.Apology
PLATO
Plato(427?–347BCE)livedandtaughtinAthens.Mostofhissurvivingworkshavetheform offictitiousdialoguesbetweenSocrates(whohadbeenhisteacher)andotherGreek contemporaries.
Idonotknow,menofAthens,howmyaccusers affectedyou;asforme,Iwasalmostcarriedaway inspiteofmyself,sopersuasivelydidtheyspeak. Andyet,hardlyanythingofwhattheysaidis true.Ofthemanyliestheytold,oneinparticular surprisedme,namelythatyoushouldbecareful nottobedeceivedbyanaccomplishedspeaker likeme.Thattheywerenotashamedtobe immediatelyprovedwrongbythefacts,whenI showmyselfnottobeanaccomplishedspeaker atall,thatIthoughtwasmostshamelessontheir part unlessindeedtheycallanaccomplished speakerthemanwhospeaksthetruth.Ifthey meanthat,IwouldagreethatIamanorator, butnotaftertheirmanner,forindeed,asIsay, practicallynothingtheysaidwastrue.Fromme
FromPlato, FiveDialogues,trans.G.M.A.Grube(Hackett2002),pp.2–18,22–44.Reprintedby permissionofHackettPublishingCompany,Inc.Allrightsreserved.
youwillhearthewholetruth,thoughnot,by Zeus,gentlemen,expressedinembroideredand stylizedphrasesliketheirs,butthingsspokenat randomandexpressedinthefirstwordsthat cometomind,forIputmytrustinthejustice ofwhatIsay,andletnoneofyouexpectanythingelse.Itwouldnotbefittingatmyage,asit mightbeforayoungman,totoywithwords whenIappearbeforeyou.
OnethingIdoaskandbegofyou,gentlemen:ifyouhearmemakingmydefenseinthe samekindoflanguageasIamaccustomedtouse inthemarketplacebythebankers’ tables,where manyofyouhaveheardme,andelsewhere,do notbesurprisedorcreateadisturbanceonthat account.Thepositionisthis:Thisismyfirstappearanceinalawcourt,attheageofseventy;I amthereforesimplyastrangertothemannerof speakinghere.JustasifIwerereallyastranger, youwouldcertainlyexcusemeifIspokeinthat dialectandmannerinwhichIhadbeenbrought up,sotoomypresentrequestseemsajustone, foryoutopaynoattentiontomymannerof speech beitbetterorworse buttoconcentrateyourattentiononwhetherwhatIsayisjust ornot,fortheexcellenceofajudgeliesinthis,as thatofaspeakerliesintellingthetruth.
Itisrightforme,gentlemen,todefendmyselffirstagainstthefirstlyingaccusationsmade againstmeandmyfirstaccusers,andthen againstthelateraccusationsandthelateraccusers.Therehavebeenmanywhohaveaccused metoyouformanyyearsnow,andnoneoftheir accusationsaretrue.TheseIfearmuchmore thanIfearAnytusandhisfriends,thoughthey tooareformidable.Theseearlierones,however, aremoreso,gentlemen;theygotholdofmostof youfromchildhood,persuadedyouandaccused mequitefalsely,sayingthatthereisamancalled Socrates,awiseman,astudentofallthingsin theskyandbelowtheearth,whomakesthe worseargumentthestronger.Thosewhospread thatrumor,gentlemen,aremydangerousaccusers,fortheirhearersbelievethatthosewho studythesethingsdonotevenbelieveinthe gods.Moreover,theseaccusersarenumerous, andhavebeenatitalongtime;also,theyspoke
toyouatanagewhenyouwouldmostreadily believethem,someofyoubeingchildrenand adolescents,andtheywontheircasebydefault, astherewasnodefense.
Whatismostabsurdinallthisisthatone cannotevenknowormentiontheirnamesunless oneofthemisawriterofcomedies.Thosewho maliciouslyandslanderouslypersuadedyou whoalso,whenpersuadedthemselvesthenpersuadedothers allthosearemostdifficultto dealwith:onecannotbringoneoftheminto courtorrefutehim;onemustsimplyfightwith shadows,asitwere,inmakingone’sdefense, andcross-examinewhennooneanswers.I wantyoutorealizetoothatmyaccusersareof twokinds:thosewhohaveaccusedmerecently, andtheoldonesImention;andtothinkthatI mustfirstdefendmyselfagainstthelatter,for youhavealsoheardtheiraccusationsfirst,and toamuchgreaterextentthanthemorerecent. Verywellthen,menofAthens.Imustsurely defendmyselfandattempttouprootfromyour mindsinsoshortatimetheslanderthathas residedtheresolong.Iwishthismayhappen, ifitisinanywaybetterforyouandme,and thatmydefensemaybesuccessful,butIthink thisisverydifficultandIamfullyawareofhow difficultitis.Evenso,letthematterproceedas thegodmaywish,butImustobeythelawand makemydefense.
Letusthentakeupthecasefromitsbeginning.Whatistheaccusationfromwhicharosethe slanderinwhichMeletustrustedwhenhewrote outthechargeagainstme?Whatdidtheysay whentheyslanderedme?Imust,asiftheywere myactualprosecutors,readtheaffidavitthey wouldhavesworn.Itgoessomethinglikethis: Socratesisguiltyofwrongdoinginthathebusies himselfstudyingthingsintheskyandbelowthe earth;hemakestheworseintothestrongerargument,andheteachesthesesamethingstoothers. YouhaveseenthisyourselfinthecomedyofAristophanes,aSocratesswingingaboutthere,saying hewaswalkingonairandtalkingalotofother nonsenseaboutthingsofwhichIknownothing atall.Idonotspeakincontemptofsuchknowledge,ifsomeoneiswiseinthesethings lest
Meletusbringmorecasesagainstme but,gentlemen,Ihavenopartinit,andonthispointI calluponthemajorityofyouaswitnesses.Ithink itrightthatallthoseofyouwhohaveheardme conversing,andmanyofyouhave,shouldtell eachotherifanyoneofyouhaseverheardme discussingsuchsubjectstoanyextentatall.From thisyouwilllearnthattheotherthingssaidabout mebythemajorityareofthesamekind.
Notoneofthemistrue.Andifyouhave heardfromanyonethatIundertaketoteach peopleandchargeafeeforit,thatisnottrue either.YetIthinkitafinethingtobeableto teachpeopleasGorgiasofLeontinidoes,and ProdicusofCeos,andHippiasofElis.Eachof thesemencangotoanycityandpersuadethe young,whocankeepcompanywithanyoneof theirownfellowcitizenstheywantwithoutpaying,toleavethecompanyofthese,tojoinwith themselves,paythemafee,andbegratefulto thembesides.Indeed,IlearnedthatthereisanotherwisemanfromParoswhoisvisitingus,for Imetamanwhohasspentmoremoneyon sophiststhaneverybodyelseputtogether,Callias,thesonofHipponicus.SoIaskedhim he hastwosons—“Callias,” Isaid, “ifyoursons werecoltsorcalves,wecouldfindandengage asupervisorforthemwhowouldmakethem excelintheirproperqualities,somehorse breederorfarmer.Nowsincetheyaremen, whomdoyouhaveinmindtosupervisethem? Whoisanexpertinthiskindofexcellence,the humanandsocialkind?Ithinkyoumusthave giventhoughttothissinceyouhavesons.Is theresuchaperson,” Iasked, “oristhere not?”“Certainlythereis,” hesaid. “Whois he?” Iasked. “Whatishisname,whereishe from?Andwhatishisfee?”“Hisname,Socrates, isEvenus,hecomesfromParos,andhisfeeis fiveminas.” IthoughtEvenusahappyman,ifhe reallypossessesthisart,andteachesforsomoderateafee.CertainlyIwouldprideandpreen myselfifIhadthisknowledge,butIdonot haveit,gentlemen.
Oneofyoumightperhapsinterruptmeand say: “ButSocrates,whatisyouroccupation? Fromwherehavetheseslanderscome?For
surelyifyoudidnotbusyyourselfwithsomethingoutofthecommon,alltheserumorsand talkwouldnothavearisenunlessyoudidsomethingotherthanmostpeople.Telluswhatitis, thatwemaynotspeakinadvisedlyaboutyou.” Anyonewhosaysthatseemstoberight,andI willtrytoshowyouwhathascausedthisreputationandslander.Listenthen.Perhapssomeof youwillthinkIamjesting,butbesurethatall thatIshallsayistrue.Whathascausedmyreputationisnoneotherthanacertainkindofwisdom.Whatkindofwisdom?Humanwisdom, perhaps.ItmaybethatIreallypossessthis,while thosewhomImentionedjustnowarewisewith awisdommorethanhuman;elseIcannotexplainit,forIcertainlydonotpossessit,and whoeversaysIdoislyingandspeakstoslander me.Donotcreateadisturbance,gentlemen, evenifyouthinkIamboasting,forthestoryI shalltelldoesnot’ originatewithme,butIwill referyoutoatrustworthysource.Ishallcall uponthegodatDelphiaswitnesstotheexistenceandnatureofmywisdom,ifitbesuch. YouknowChaerephon.Hewasmyfriend fromyouth,andthefriendofmostofyou,as hesharedyourexileandyourreturn.Yousurely knowthekindofmanhewas,howimpulsivein anycourseofaction.HewenttoDelphiatone timeandventuredtoasktheoracle asIsay, gentlemen,donotcreateadisturbance he askedifanymanwaswiserthanI,andthePythianrepliedthatnoonewaswiser.Chaerephonis dead,buthisbrotherwilltestifytoyouabout this.
ConsiderthatItellyouthisbecauseIwould informyouabouttheoriginoftheslander. WhenIheardofthisreplyIaskedmyself: “Whateverdoesthegodmean?Whatishisriddle?IamveryconsciousthatIamnotwiseatall; whatthendoeshemeanbysayingthatIamthe wisest?Forsurelyhedoesnotlie;itisnotlegitimateforhimtodoso.” ForalongtimeIwasat alossastohismeaning;thenIveryreluctantly turnedtosomesuchinvestigationasthis;Iwent tooneofthosereputedwise,thinkingthatthere, ifanywhere,Icouldrefutetheoracleandsayto it: “ThismaniswiserthanI,butyousaidIwas.”
Then,whenIexaminedthisman thereisno needformetotellyouhisname,hewasone ofourpublicmen myexperiencewassomethinglikethis:Ithoughtthatheappearedwise tomanypeopleandespeciallytohimself,buthe wasnot.Ithentriedtoshowhimthathe thoughthimselfwise,butthathewasnot.Asa resulthecametodislikeme,andsodidmanyof thebystanders.SoIwithdrewandthoughtto myself: “Iamwiserthanthisman;itislikely thatneitherofusknowsanythingworthwhile, buthethinksheknowssomethingwhenhe doesnot,whereaswhenIdonotknow,neither doIthinkIknow;soIamlikelytobewiserthan hetothissmallextent,thatIdonotthinkI knowwhatIdonotknow.” AfterthisIapproachedanotherman,oneofthosethought tobewiserthanhe,andIthoughtthesame thing,andsoIcametobedislikedbothby himandbymanyothers.
AfterthatIproceededsystematically.Irealized,tomysorrowandalarm,thatIwasgetting unpopular,butIthoughtthatImustattachthe greatestimportancetothegod’soracle,soI mustgotoallthosewhohadanyreputation forknowledgetoexamineitsmeaning.Andby thedog,menofAthens forImusttellyouthe truth Iexperiencedsomethinglikethis:Inmy investigationintheserviceofthegodIfound thatthosewhohadthehighestreputationwere nearlythemostdeficient,whilethosewhowere thoughttobeinferiorweremoreknowledgeable.ImustgiveyouanaccountofmyjourneyingsasiftheywerelaborsIhadundertakento provetheoracleirrefutable.Afterthepoliticians, Iwenttothepoets,thewritersoftragediesand dithyrambsandtheothers,intendingintheir casetocatchmyselfbeingmoreignorantthan they.SoItookupthosepoemswithwhich theyseemedtohavetakenmosttroubleand askedthemwhattheymeant,inorderthatI mightatthesametimelearnsomethingfrom them.Iamashamedtotellyouthetruth,gentlemen,butImust.Almostallthebystanders mighthaveexplainedthepoemsbetterthan theirauthorscould.Isoonrealizedthatpoets donotcomposetheirpoemswithknowledge,
butbysomeinborntalentandbyinspiration, likeseersandprophetswhoalsosaymanyfine thingswithoutanyunderstandingofwhatthey say.Thepoetsseemedtometohavehadasimilarexperience.AtthesametimeIsawthat,becauseoftheirpoetry,theythoughtthemselves verywisemeninotherrespects,whichthey werenot.SothereagainIwithdrew,thinking thatIhadthesameadvantageoverthemasI hadoverthepoliticians.
FinallyIwenttothecraftsmen,forIwas consciousofknowingpracticallynothing,andI knewthatIwouldfindthattheyhadknowledge ofmanyfinethings.InthisIwasnotmistaken; theyknewthingsIdidnotknow,andtothat extenttheywerewiserthanI.But,menof Athens,thegoodcraftsmenseemedtometo havethesamefaultasthepoets:eachofthem, becauseofhissuccessathiscraft,thoughthimselfverywiseinothermostimportantpursuits, andthiserroroftheirsovershadowedthewisdomtheyhad,sothatIaskedmyself,onbehalf oftheoracle,whetherIshouldprefertobeasI am,withneithertheirwisdomnortheirignorance,ortohaveboth.TheanswerIgavemyself andtheoraclewasthatitwastomyadvantageto beasIam.
Asaresultofthisinvestigation,menof Athens,Iacquiredmuchunpopularity,ofa kindthatishardtodealwithandisaheavyburden;manyslanderscamefromthesepeopleand areputationforwisdom,forineachcasethe bystandersthoughtthatImyselfpossessedthe wisdomthatIprovedthatmyinterlocutordid nothave.Whatisprobable,gentlemen,isthatin factthegodiswiseandthathisoracularresponse meantthathumanwisdomisworthlittleor nothing,andthatwhenhesaysthisman,Socrates,heisusingmynameasanexample,asif hesaid: “Thismanamongyou,mortals,iswisest who,likeSocrates,understandsthathiswisdom isworthless.” SoevennowIcontinuethisinvestigationasthegodbademe andIgoaround seekingoutanyone,citizenorstranger,whomI thinkwise.ThenifIdonotthinkheis,Icome totheassistanceofthegodandshowhimthat heisnotwise.Becauseofthisoccupation,Ido
nothavetheleisuretoengageinpublicaffairsto anyextent,norindeedtolookaftermyown,but Iliveingreatpovertybecauseofmyserviceto thegod.
Furthermore,theyoungmenwhofollow mearoundoftheirownfreewill,thosewho havemostleisure,thesonsoftheveryrich, takepleasureinhearingpeoplequestioned; theythemselvesoftenimitatemeandtryto questionothers.Ithinktheyfindanabundance ofmenwhobelievetheyhavesomeknowledge butknowlittleornothing.Theresultisthat thosewhomtheyquestionareangry,notwith themselvesbutwithme.Theysay: “Thatman Socratesisapestilentialfellowwhocorruptsthe young.” Ifoneasksthemwhathedoesandwhat heteachestocorruptthem,theyaresilent,as theydonotknow,but,soasnottoappearata loss,theymentionthoseaccusationsthatare availableagainstallphilosophers,about “things intheskyandthingsbelowtheearth,” about “notbelievinginthegods” and “makingthe worsethestrongerargument”;theywouldnot wanttotellthetruth,I’msure,thattheyhave beenprovedtolayclaimtoknowledgewhen theyknownothing.” Thesepeopleareambitious,violent,andnumerous;theyarecontinuallyandconvincinglytalkingaboutme;they havebeenfillingyourearsforalongtimewith vehementslandersagainstme.Fromthem Meletusattackedme,andAnytusandLycon, Meletusbeingvexedonbehalfofthepoets, Anytusonbehalfofthecraftsmenandthepoliticians,Lycononbehalfoftheorators,sothat,as Istartedoutbysaying,Ishouldbesurprisedif Icouldridyouofsomuchslanderinsoshorta time.That,menofAthens,isthetruthforyou. Ihavehiddenordisguisednothing.Iknowwell enoughthatthisveryconductmakesmeunpopular,andthisisproofthatwhatIsayistrue,that suchistheslanderagainstme,andthatsuchare itscauses.Ifyoulookintothiseithernowor later,thisiswhatyouwillfind.
Letthissufficeasadefenseagainstthe chargesofmyearlieraccusers.AfterthisIshall trytodefendmyselfagainstMeletus,thatgood andpatrioticman,ashesaysheis,andmylater
accusers.Astheseareadifferentlotofaccusers, letusagaintakeuptheirsworndeposition.It goessomethinglikethis:Socratesisguiltyof corruptingtheyoungandofnotbelievingin thegodsinwhomthecitybelieves,butinother newspiritualthings.Suchistheircharge.Letus examineitpointbypoint.
HesaysthatIamguiltyofcorruptingthe young,butIsaythatMeletusisguiltyofdealing frivolouslywithseriousmatters,ofirresponsibly bringingpeopleintocourt,andofprofessingto beseriouslyconcernedwiththingsaboutnone ofwhichhehasevercared,andIshalltryto provethatthisisso.Comehereandtellme, Meletus.Surelyyouconsideritofthegreatest importancethatouryoungmenbeasgoodas possible? IndeedIdo.
Comethen,tellthesemenwhoimproves them.Youobviouslyknow,inviewofyourconcern.Yousayyouhavediscoveredtheonewho corruptsthem,namelyme,andyoubringme hereandaccusemetothesemen.Come,inform thesemenandtellthemwhoitiswhoimproves them.Yousee,Meletus,thatyouaresilentand knownotwhattosay.Doesthisnotseem shamefultoyouandasufficientproofofwhat Isay,thatyouhavenotbeenconcernedwithany ofthis?Tellme,mygoodsir,whoimprovesour youngmen? Thelaws.
ThatisnotwhatIamasking,butwhatpersonwhohasknowledgeofthelawstobegin with? Thesejurymen,Socrates.
Howdoyoumean,Meletus?Aretheseable toeducatetheyoungandimprovethem? Certainly.
Allofthem,orsomebutnotothers? All ofthem.
Verygood,byHera.Youmentionagreat abundanceofbenefactors.Butwhatabouttheaudience?Dotheyimprovetheyoungornot? Theydo,too.
WhataboutthemembersofCouncil? TheCouncillors,also.
But,Meletus,whatabouttheassembly?Do membersoftheassemblycorrupttheyoung,or dotheyallimprovethem? Theyimprove them.
AlltheAthenians,itseems,maketheyoung intofinegoodmen,exceptme,andIalonecorruptthem.Isthatwhatyoumean? Thatis mostdefinitelywhatImean.
Youcondemnmetoagreatmisfortune.Tell me:doesthisalsoapplytohorses,doyouthink? Thatallmenimprovethemandoneindividual corruptsthem?Orisquitethecontrarytrue,one individualisabletoimprovethem,orveryfew, namely,thehorsebreeders,whereasthemajority,iftheyhavehorsesandusethem,corrupt them?Isthatnotthecase,Meletus,bothwith horsesandallotheranimals?Ofcourseitis, whetheryouandAnytussaysoornot.Itwould beaveryhappystateofaffairsifonlyoneperson corruptedouryouth,whiletheothersimproved them.
Youhavemadeitsufficientlyobvious, Meletus,thatyouhaveneverhadanyconcern forouryouth;youshowyourindifference clearly;thatyouhavegivennothoughttothe subjectsaboutwhichyoubringmetotrial.
AndbyZeus,Meletus,tellusalsowhetherit isbetterforamantoliveamonggoodorwicked fellowcitizens.Answer,mygoodman,forIam notaskingadifficultquestion.Donotthe wickeddosomeharmtothosewhoareever closesttothem,whereasgoodpeoplebenefit them? Certainly.
Anddoesthemanexistwhowouldrather beharmedthanbenefitedbyhisassociates? Answer,mygoodsir,forthelawordersyouto answer.Isthereanymanwhowantstobe harmed? Ofcoursenot.
Comenow,doyouaccusemehereofcorruptingtheyoungandmakingthemworsedeliberatelyorunwillingly? Deliberately. Whatfollows,Meletus?Areyousomuch wiseratyouragethanIamatminethatyou understandthatwickedpeoplealwaysdosome harmtotheirclosestneighborswhilegoodpeopledothemgood,butIhavereachedsucha pitchofignorancethatIdonotrealizethis, namelythatifImakeoneofmyassociates wickedIruntheriskofbeingharmedbyhim sothatIdosuchagreatevildeliberately,as yousay?Idonotbelieveyou,Meletus,and
Idonotthinkanyoneelsewill.EitherIdonot corrupttheyoungor,ifIdo,itisunwillingly, andyouarelyingineithercase.NowifIcorrupt themunwillingly,thelawdoesnotrequireyou tobringpeopletocourtforsuchunwilling wrongdoings,buttogetholdofthemprivately, toinstructthemandexhortthem;forclearly,if Ilearnbetter,IshallceasetodowhatIamdoing unwillingly.You,however,haveavoidedmy companyandwereunwillingtoinstructme, butyoubringmehere,wherethelawrequires onetobringthosewhoareinneedofpunishment,notofinstruction.
Andso,menofAthens,whatIsaidisclearly true:Meletushasneverbeenatallconcerned withthesematters.Nonethelesstellus,Meletus, howyousaythatIcorrupttheyoung;orisit obviousfromyourdepositionthatitisbyteachingthemnottobelieveinthegodsinwhomthe citybelievesbutinothernewspiritualthings?Is thisnotwhatyousayIteachandsocorrupt them? ThatismostcertainlywhatIdosay. Thenbythoseverygodsaboutwhomwe aretalking,Meletus,makethisclearertome andtothesemen:Icannotbesurewhether youmeanthatIteachthebeliefthatthereare somegods andthereforeImyselfbelievethat therearegodsandamnotaltogetheranatheist, noramIguiltyofthat not,however,thegods inwhomthecitybelieves,butothers,andthat thisisthechargeagainstme,thattheyare others.OrwhetheryoumeanthatIdonotbelieveingodsatall,andthatthisiswhatIteachto others. ThisiswhatImean,thatyoudonot believeingodsatall.
Youareastrangefellow,Meletus.Whydo yousaythis?DoInotbelieve,asothermendo, thatthesunandthemoonaregods? No,by Zeus,gentlemenofthejury,forhesaysthatthe sunisstone,andthemoonearth.
MydearMeletus,doyouthinkyouareprosecutingAnaxagoras?Areyousocontemptuousof thesemenandthinkthemsoignorantoflettersas nottoknowthatthebooksofAnaxagorasof Clazomenaearefullofthosetheories,andfurther,thattheyoungmenlearnfrommewhat theycanbuyfromtimetotimeforadrachma,
atmost,inthebookshops,andridiculeSocratesif hepretendsthatthesetheoriesarehisown,especiallyastheyaresoabsurd?Isthat,byZeus,what youthinkofme,Meletus,thatIdonotbelieve thatthereareanygods? ThatiswhatIsay,that youdonotbelieveinthegodsatall.
Youcannotbebelieved,Meletus,even,I think,byyourself.Themanappearstome, menofAthens,highlyinsolentanduncontrolled.Heseemstohavemadethisdeposition outofinsolence,violence,andyouthfulzeal.He islikeonewhocomposedariddleandistryingit out: “WillthewiseSocratesrealizethatIam jestingandcontradictingmyself,orshallIdeceivehimandothers?” Ithinkhecontradicts himselfintheaffidavit,asifhesaid: “Socrates isguiltyofnotbelievingingodsbutbelieving ingods,” andsurelythatisthepartofajester!
Examinewithme,gentlemen,howheappearstocontradicthimself,andyou,Meletus, answerus.Remember,gentlemen,whatIasked youwhenIbegan,nottocreateadisturbanceif Iproceedinmyusualmanner.
Doesanyman,Meletus,believeinhuman activitieswhodoesnotbelieveinhumans? Makehimanswer,andnotagainandagaincreateadisturbance.Doesanymanwhodoesnot believeinhorsesbelieveinhorsemen’sactivities? Orinflute-playingactivitiesbutnotinfluteplayers?No,mygoodsir,nomancould.Ifyou arenotwillingtoanswer,Iwilltellyouandthese men.Answerthenextquestion,however.Does anymanbelieveinspiritualactivitieswhodoes notbelieveinspirits? Noone.
Thankyouforanswering,ifreluctantly, whenthesegentlemenmadeyou.Nowyousay thatIbelieveinspiritualthingsandteachabout them,whetherneworold,butatanyratespiritualthingsaccordingtowhatyousay,andtothis youhavesworninyourdeposition.ButifIbelieveinspiritualthingsImustquiteinevitably believeinspirits.Isthatnotso?Itisindeed.I shallassumethatyouagree,asyoudonotanswer.Dowenotbelievespiritstobeeithergods orthechildrenofgods?Yesorno? Ofcourse.
ThensinceIdobelieveinspirits,asyouadmit,ifspiritsaregods,thisiswhatImeanwhenI
sayyouspeakinriddlesandinjest,asyoustate thatIdonotbelieveingodsandthenagainthat Ido,sinceIdobelieveinspirits.If,ontheother hand,thespiritsarechildrenofthegods,bastard childrenofthegodsbynymphsorsomeother mothers,astheyaresaidtobe,whatmanwould believechildrenofthegodstoexist,butnot gods?Thatwouldbejustasabsurdastobelieve theyoungofhorsesandasses,namelymules,to exist,butnottobelieveintheexistenceofhorses andasses.Youmusthavemadethisdeposition, Meletus,eithertotestusorbecauseyouwereat alosstofindanytruewrongdoingofwhichto accuseme.Thereisnowayinwhichyoucould persuadeanyoneofevensmallintelligencethatit ispossibleforoneandthesamemantobelieve inspiritualbutnotalsoindivinethings,andthen againforthatsamemantobelieveneitherin spiritsnoringodsnorinheroes.
Idonotthink,menofAthens,thatitrequiresaprolongeddefensetoprovethatIam notguiltyofthechargesinMeletus’ deposition, butthisissufficient.Ontheotherhand,you knowthatwhatIsaidearlieristrue,thatIam veryunpopularwithmanypeople.Thiswillbe myundoing,ifIamundone,notMeletusor Anytusbuttheslandersandenvyofmanypeople.Thishasdestroyedmanyothergoodmen andwill,Ithink,continuetodoso.Thereis nodangerthatitwillstopatme.
Someonemightsay: “Areyounotashamed, Socrates,tohavefollowedthekindofoccupationthathasledtoyourbeingnowindangerof death?” However,Ishouldberighttoreplyto him: “Youarewrong,sir,ifyouthinkthataman whoisanygoodatallshouldtakeintoaccount theriskoflifeordeath;heshouldlooktothis onlyinhisactions,whetherwhathedoesisright orwrong,whetherheisactinglikeagoodora badman.” Accordingtoyourview,alltheheroes whodiedatTroywereinferiorpeople,especially thesonofThetiswhowassocontemptuousof dangercomparedwithdisgrace.Whenhewas eagertokillHector,hisgoddessmotherwarned him,asIbelieve,insomesuchwordsasthese: “Mychild,ifyouavengethedeathofyourcomrade,Patroclus,andyoukillHector,youwilldie
yourself,foryourdeathistofollowimmediately afterHector’s.” Hearingthis,hedespiseddeath anddangerandwasmuchmoreafraidtolivea cowardwhodidnotavengehisfriends. “Letme dieatonce,” hesaid, “whenonceIhavegiven thewrongdoerhisdeserts,ratherthanremain here,alaughingstockbythecurvedships,aburdenupontheearth.” Doyouthinkhegave thoughttodeathanddanger?
Thisisthetruthofthematter,menof Athens:whereveramanhastakenaposition thathebelievestobebest,orhasbeenplaced byhiscommander,therehemustIthinkremain andfacedanger,withoutathoughtfordeathor anythingelse,ratherthandisgrace.Itwould havebeenadreadfulwaytobehave,menof Athens,if,atPotidaea,Amphipolis,andDelium, Ihad,attheriskofdeath,likeanyoneelse,remainedatmypostwherethoseyouhadelected tocommandhadorderedme,andthen,when thegodorderedme,asIthoughtandbelieved, tolivethelifeofaphilosopher,toexaminemyselfandothers,Ihadabandonedmypostforfear ofdeathoranythingelse.Thatwouldhavebeen adreadfulthing,andthenImighttrulyhave justlybeenbroughtherefornotbelievingthat therearegods,disobeyingtheoracle,fearing death,andthinkingIwaswisewhenIwasnot. Tofeardeath,gentlemen,isnootherthanto thinkoneselfwisewhenoneisnot,tothink oneknowswhatonedoesnotknow.Noone knowswhetherdeathmaynotbethegreatest ofallblessingsforaman,yetmenfearitasif theyknewthatitisthegreatestofevils.And surelyitisthemostblameworthyignoranceto believethatoneknowswhatonedoesnotknow. Itisperhapsonthispointandinthisrespect, gentlemen,thatIdifferfromthemajorityof men,andifIweretoclaimthatIamwiser thananyoneinanything,itwouldbeinthis, that,asIhavenoadequateknowledgeofthings intheunderworld,soIdonotthinkIhave.Ido know,however,thatitiswickedandshamefulto dowrong,todisobeyone’ssuperior,behegod orman.Ishallneverfearoravoidthingsof whichIdonotknow,whethertheymaynot begoodratherthanthingsthatIknowtobe
bad.Evenifyouacquittedmenowanddidnot believeAnytus,whosaidtoyouthateitherI shouldnothavebeenbroughthereinthefirst place,orthatnowIamhere,youcannotavoid executingme,forifIshouldbeacquitted,your sonswouldpracticetheteachingsofSocrates andallbethoroughlycorrupted;ifyousaidto meinthisregard: “Socrates,wedonotbelieve Anytusnow;weacquityou,butonlyonconditionthatyouspendnomoretimeonthisinvestigationanddonotpracticephilosophy,andif youarecaughtdoingsoyouwilldie”;if,asIsay, youweretoacquitmeonthoseterms,Iwould saytoyou: “MenofAthens,IamgratefulandI amyourfriend,butIwillobeythegodrather thanyou,andaslongasIdrawbreathandam able,Ishallnotceasetopracticephilosophy,to exhortyouandinmyusualwaytopointoutto anyoneofyouwhomIhappentomeet:Good Sir,youareanAthenian,acitizenofthegreatest citywiththegreatestreputationforbothwisdomandpower;areyounotashamedofyour eagernesstopossessasmuchwealth,reputation, andhonorsaspossible,whileyoudonotcarefor norgivethoughttowisdomortruth,orthebest possiblestateofyoursoul?” Then,ifoneofyou disputesthisandsayshedoescare,Ishallnotlet himgoatonceorleavehim,butIshallquestion him,examinehim,andtesthim,andifIdonot thinkhehasattainedthegoodnessthathesays hehas,Ishallreproachhimbecauseheattaches littleimportancetothemostimportantthings andgreaterimportancetoinferiorthings.Ishall treatinthiswayanyoneIhappentomeet,young andold,citizenandstranger,andmoresothe citizensbecauseyouaremorekindredtome.Be surethatthisiswhatthegodordersmetodo, andIthinkthereisnogreaterblessingforthe citythanmyservicetothegod.ForIgoaround doingnothingbutpersuadingbothyoungand oldamongyounottocareforyourbodyor yourwealthinpreferencetoorasstronglyas forthebestpossiblestateofyoursoul,asIsay toyou: “Wealthdoesnotbringaboutexcellence,butexcellencemakeswealthandeverythingelsegoodformen,bothindividuallyand collectively.”
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Sinclair's luck
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Title: Sinclair's luck
A story of adventure in East Africa
Author: Percy F. Westerman
Release date: January 10, 2024 [eBook #72673]
Language: English
Original publication: United Kingdom: S.W. Partridge & Co, 1923
Credits: Produced by R.G.P.M. van Giesen, thank you Ru!
START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SINCLAIR'S LUCK ***
[Illustration: cover art]
SINCLAIR'S LUCK
BOYS' EMPIRE LIBRARY TITLES UNIFORM WITH THIS VOLUME
T B R P
"S ! S !"
S R S
Rowland Walker Sydney Horler
Rowland Walker
T F F D
Rowland Walker
"P " L F
Rowland Walker
T T !
S ' L !
Tom Bevan
J R ' A
C ' N ' T
T S M
Percy F. Westerman
Hugh St. Leger
Robert Leighton
Tom Bevan
T A D L
George Manville Fenn
T T T M
George Manville Fenn
S. W. PARTRIDGE & Co. 4, 5 6 S S , L , W.1
{Illustration: "SUDDENLY DESMOND FELL WITH A LOUD THUD" [p.241}
SINCLAIR'S LUCK
A STORY OF ADVENTURE IN EAST AFRICA
BY
PERCY F. WESTERMAN
AUTHOR OF "BILLY BARCROFT, OF THE R.N.A.S." "THE DREADNOUGHT OF THE AIR," "THE RIVAL SUBMARINES," ETC., ETC.
{Illustration: logo}
S. W. PARTRIDGE & CO. 4, 5 & 6, SOHO SQUARE, LONDON, W.1
Readers of the adventures in East Africa of the two heroes, Colin Sinclair and Tiny Desmond, as narrated in the pages of this book, will be greatly interested in their school life, before leaving for the Dark Continent, which is splendidly told in the story entitled "The Mystery of Stockmere School." MADE
BRITAIN
published 1923 Frequently reprinted
Illustrations Illustrations
"SUDDENLY DESMOND FELL WITH A LOUD THUD"
Facing page
Frontispiece
"HE FIRED TWO SHOTS IN QUICK SUCCESSION" 42
"HIS FOOT CAUGHT IN THE TRAILING TENDRIL AND HE CRASHED HEAVILY"
"WE'VE DONE IT, BY JOVE!'"
174
SINCLAIR'S LUCK
CHAPTER I
THE TWO CHUMS
"M last term, Tiny, old son," announced Sinclair dismally.
"What? Never!" replied "Tiny" Desmond, who, at the age of sixteen years and three months, had attained the height of six feet one inch. "Your last term at Stockmere? You're trying to pull my leg."
"Wish I were," rejoined Colin. "But it's a fact. My governor wrote to Dr. Narfield a week ago."
"Why?" inquired Desmond, linking arms with his sturdy, athleticallybuilt chum. "Tell me all about it. Chuck it off your chest."
It was the first day of the summer term. Stockmere was in a state of commotion that is usually associated with the commencement of a new session. There were boys promoted to higher forms, boys remaining in a state of "as you were," new boys wandering about aimlessly like strangers in a strange land, fearful the while lest by word or deed they should transgress the moral and social side of their new school-fellows. There were boys seeking old chums; boys casting about for fresh ones. Housemasters and formmasters were discussing boys; the Head and the Matron were doing likewise. In short, the topic was "Boys."
"Let's get out of this crush," continued Tiny "Lorrimer and Perkins are cackling away in our study. You know what they are. I vote we push off up on the moors. I'll ask Collier."
The housemaster, recently placed in charge of the Upper Sixth, gave the required permission.
"Very good, Desmond," he replied in answer to Tiny's request. "Back at four, mind. How's that cough of yours, by the bye? Lost it yet?"
"Nearly, sir," replied Tiny, flushing.
"H'm, about time," rejoined Mr. Collier. "All right, carry on."
The two sixth-formers touched their caps and walked away.
"Wish he wouldn't harp on that cough," murmured Desmond. "It's really nothing much; a bit of a bother first thing in the morning. Now, Colin, what's this stunt?"
Sinclair told his story simply and without hesitation. There were no secrets between the two chums. They shared their pleasures, their, for the most part trivial, troubles, their perplexities, and their worldly goods (as far as their school belongings went) whole-heartedly.
"Fact is," said Colin, "my governor has been losing a lot of money since the War, and he can't afford to keep me at Stockmere after this term. I found out quite accidentally that the pater had been pretty badly hit for some time. I ought to have left a year ago, only he kept it dark and managed to let me stay on. He was hoping for things to improve financially only they didn't. So that's that."
"Hard lines!" ejaculated Desmond sympathetically.
"That's why the governor didn't come up to the sports," resumed Sinclair. "He simply couldn't run to it. And he's sold his car and cut
down a lot of things, but he's losing ground, so to speak. His pension was quite all right once upon a time, but now it goes nowhere."
"And what are you going to do?" asked Tiny.
"I hardly know," replied his chum. "Of course, my idea of going to an engineering college is off. After all's said and done, it means earning nothing until a fellow's well over twenty-one, and then he's lucky if he makes as much as a miner or a bricklayer. At any rate, I've got to do something—to earn something. In fact, I don't think I ought to have come back this term."
"Well, what are you going to do?" asked Desmond.
Colin shook his head.
"I hardly know," he replied. "Anything to help things along. I've got thirteen weeks to think over it. By that time—but, I say, Tiny, you won't say a word to any of the other fellows?" he added anxiously.
"'Course not," declared Desmond.
"Right-o!" rejoined Sinclair, then, as if he had put the matter out of his mind, he drew himself up, stretched his arms, and sniffed appreciatively at the keen, bracing mountain air.
"My word," he exclaimed, "isn't it tophole? I'll race you to the crest of Shutter Pike."
It was a distance of about four hundred yards to the summit of the hill known as Shutter Pike—a gentle gradient for two-thirds of the way, ending up with a fairly stiff ascent.
For the first fifty yards Tiny led, but gradually Colin recovered the initial advantage his companion had gained, and before the last fifty yards he had drawn up level. Then, putting his whole energy into the race, Sinclair dashed ahead and flung himself upon the grassy knoll
at the summit. To his surprise, Tiny had stopped and was holding his hands against his ribs and coughing violently.
"Buck up, man!" Sinclair shouted. "I'm a bit out of training .... Why, what's the matter? Anything wrong?"
Desmond shook his head, but made no attempt to move. His companion jumped to his feet and ran down the slope.
"Did you fall?" he asked anxiously, for the bluish-grey pallor on his chum's face rather took him aback.
"No," spluttered Tiny. "Stitch, or something ... nothing much."
He sat down abruptly, endeavouring to stifle the fit of coughing. At length he succeeded.
"You're not up to the mark, that's evident," said Colin. "What have you been doing these hols? You're right out of condition. You'll have to train, my festive."
"I will," replied Desmond. "I've been slacking a bit, but I'll soon get into form. I say, it's close on four. Let's get a move on."
Hardly a word was exchanged as the pair made their way schoolwards.
"Don't say anything to Collier," said Tiny, as they passed the lodge gates. "About this little cough of mine, I mean."
"'Course not," declared Colin. "Why should I?"
Tea over, Desmond and Sinclair went to the rooms they shared with Lorrimer and "Polly" Perkins. Here everything was in a state of disorder. The furniture had only just been removed from their last term's den; their boxes and trunks, half unpacked, were piled upon the table and chairs, while an assortment of bats, tennis rackets, fishing rods, nets, and other articles inseparable with schoolboys filled every available corner of the room.
"You're a nice pair!" exclaimed Lorrimer "Mooching off and leaving Polly and me to square things up."
"And a fine square up you've made of it," replied Tiny. "Hullo, what's this? My razor! Polly, you are the absolute limit."
Perkins received the intelligence with as good grace as possible when discovered in the act of using another fellow's razor for the purpose of cutting rope.
"Sorry, old man," he replied apologetically. "But what do you do with your razor, by the bye? Half a mo', Tiny, before you start scrapping. The Head's been looking out for you."
"Honest?" inquired Desmond.
"Honest," assented Polly.
At Stockmere that word was sufficient. No fellow ever doubted the genuineness of an assertion thus expressed. Desmond picked up his cap and made his way to Dr. Narfield's study.
The summons did not surprise him. Coupled with the fact that he was one of the head boys, and that this was the first day of a new term, it was not unusual for a youth in Desmond's position to be called to the Head's study.
Dr. Narfield was standing with his back to the empty fireplace in a characteristic attitude, his mortar-board on the back of his head and his hands clasped under the tails of his gown:
"You sent for me, sir?"
"Yes, Desmond," replied the Head, looking at the lad over the top of his spectacles. "I thought, Desmond, that you, a head boy, would be above a senseless practical joke."
He paused. Tiny regarded the doctor dumfoundedly. And then that irritating cough made itself known again.
Dr. Narfield waited until the fit was over
"Perhaps, Desmond," he resumed, "you will kindly explain why this was found in your handbag?"
He pointed to a large dish on a side table. On it, writhing gently, was an eel, about ten inches in length.
"That—er—pet," continued the Head, "nearly frightened the housekeeper into hysterics when she opened your bag. You are, of course, aware that pets are permitted at Stockmere, but there are limits in the choice of a selection. Now, Desmond, please explain."
Desmond hesitated. The affair wanted some explanation, but he wasn't at all sure that his elucidation was a correct one.
"I can't exactly explain, sir," he replied. "I didn't put it into my bag, and I certainly didn't intend to frighten Mrs. Symonds or anybody."
"Then how did it get into your bag?" asked the Head patiently. Previous experiences had taught him the advisability of a patient hearing and not to judge by circumstantial evidence. He knew perfectly well the best way to detect a guilty culprit was to let him tell his story without comment until he had made the fatal error of condemning himself.
"It was like this, sir," explained Desmond. "The train was crowded, and I rode in the guard's van. In the van, amongst other things, was a large box labelled 'Eels—Perishable.' It had a small crack in it, and very soon I saw an eel's tail appear. Then somehow other tails found their way through and the box began to open."
Dr. Narfield nodded. He knew from personal experience that eels have frequently been known to force open heavy boxes in which they are packed for transit.
"Go on, Desmond," he said gravely. Tiny, finding that the Head did not ridicule his tale, plunged into his narrative without further
hesitation.
"I told the guard," he continued, "but he was busy writing in a book, and told me it wasn't his business. It wasn't mine, so I just watched. And before we got to Little Porton the eels had forced open the box and were wriggling all over the place—hundreds of them, sir. The guard got the wind up then—I mean, sir, he was in a bit of a funk. I didn't exactly care for it myself, although it was a topping rag to watch. So we both sat on some luggage and kept our feet up, although at every station the guard had to get out. And a crowd of eels got out, too. There were dozens of them left on every platform, and by the time we got to Colbury Monkton the van was almost empty. I must have left my bag unfastened—in fact, I remember closing it when I got out—so I suppose one of them wriggled in."
The Head smiled.
"That explanation is quite satisfactory, Desmond," he remarked. "You may go."
CHAPTER II
"MEETING THE CASE"
A dinner that evening, a rather informal meal, at which the Head and the housemasters discuss the wholly absorbing topic of boys, Dr. Narfield related his interview with Desmond.
"By the way," he continued, addressing Mr. Collier, who sat next to him, "have you noticed anything peculiar about Desmond?"
"He hasn't seemed quite up to the mark for some time," replied Mr Collier. "A rather troublesome cough——"
"Precisely," interrupted the Head. "That was the fact to which I was going to refer. He's a big fellow obviously outgrowing his strength. I don't like that cough. It's strange his people didn't notice it. Some parents never do. However, Collier, without frightening the lad, send him over to the sanatorium to-morrow morning and get Dr. Anderson to run over him. I believe I mentioned that Sinclair was leaving this term?"
"Yes, indeed," replied the sixth form housemaster. "And I'm very sorry to hear it. We'll miss him in the next inter-school sports."
Dr. Narfield sighed. Even years of experience of this sort of thing— of promising pupils leaving just as they were doing sterling work for the good and honour of the school—had not made him indifferent to the continual changes that are inevitable.
"And just as he was showing promise of gaining his Matric," he added gloomily. "Case of financial difficulties, I am informed. It's a strange England nowadays, Collier All ups and downs, and goodness only knows what things are coming to. Yes, I'm sorry for Sinclair."
"Now hold your breath ... count ten ... say, 'Ah.'"
Dr. Anderson tapped Desmond with his stethoscope.
"Again .... Cough."
Tiny Desmond tried to cough, but without success. That irritating cough of his had a nasty habit of asserting itself at very inconvenient times, but now, when the doctor wanted him to cough, he simply couldn't.
"All right, Desmond. Get your clothes on. I'll make you up a little medicine. For the present I must keep you here."
"In the sanny, doctor!" exclaimed the astonished Tiny. "Why, sir, is there anything very much wrong with me?"
The doctor smiled.
"You want to go into dock for a slight overhaul and refit, Desmond," he replied. "Nothing much, but if neglected, your cough will develop into something serious. You've been maintaining a full head of steam in a boiler with defective tubes. Those tubes haven't blown out yet, but they might. You understand what I mean? Very well, then. It's merely a matter of going slow, taking reasonable precautions, and undergoing a sort of treatment, and we'll soon have you fit again."
Tiny Desmond nodded gravely. He was not deceived by the kindly doctor's words. What he imagined was wrong with him for some time past—he had tried over and over again to treat it lightly—was no illusion. It was lung trouble.
"I ran over young Desmond this morning, Dr. Narfield," reported Dr. Anderson. "It's no use mincing matters, although I tried, ineffectually, I fear, to bluff the lad. One lung is badly affected; the other shows signs of pulmonary weakness. The best thing to be done is to send that youngster abroad—to a warm, dry climate. It will mean you losing a promising pupil, but that's an assured thing in any case. If he does go abroad there's a thundering good chance that he will make a complete recovery. If he doesn't—well——"
Dr. Anderson turned his thumbs down. There was no mistaking the significance of the act.
"I'll write to his parents at once," declared the Head. "I don't suppose for one moment they have noticed Desmond's condition. Parents rarely do; they trust implicitly to the school physician.