Acknowledgments
Letmethrowoffconventionalittleandbeginbythankingthosetowhom Iowethegreatestpersonaldebts.First,mybiggestthanksareduetoKate,my wife.Shewasusuallythe firsttolistentoanewideaand always the firstto listentoanewproblem.KatesharesmylovesofIndiaandAsiamorebroadly, andhavingherasacompanioninlearningaboutandtravellingthroughthe regionhasbeensuchagift.Myparents,PaulandBreda,havebeenanother constantsourceofemotional(andmaterial)support.Thisbookisasmucha culminationoftheirworkasitisofmine.Icouldnotaskforbetterparents, andsoIdedicatethisbooktothem.
IwouldalsoliketosincerelythankthemembersofmyPhDdissertation committeeunderwhoseguidancethisbooktookitsinitialsteps.Inmyearly yearsofgraduateschool,Iwastoldthat findingadissertationchairwas extremelyimportant.Acommitteeprovidesallkindsofadvice,butthechair istheonewhogivescoherenceanddirectiontoitall.Ididn’tfullyappreciate theadviceatthetime,butI’vecometounderstanditsince.Iwasfortunate enoughthatJimScottagreedtochairmydissertationcommittee.Jimisa remarkablescholarandman.Hehasthatrareabilityamongpeopleofgenius tohaveyouleaveaconversationwithhimfeelingsmarterthanwhenyou started!IhopeIcaneventuallyemulateafractionofJim’sscholarlyachievementsandthatIcandoitwithsuchhumility.Iwasalsoextremelyluckythat StevenWilkinsonjoinedYaleUniversityasIembarkedonmyresearch.As readersofthisbookwillsurelyknow,Stevenisoneofthemostaccomplished scholarsofIndianpoliticaldevelopmentwritingtoday,andmyworkhas benefitedimmenselyfromhisguidanceovertheyears.Ialsoworkedclosely withStathisKalyvasduringmytimeatYale,andalthoughhejoinedmy committeerelativelylateintheday,hisoutsideperspectivehelpedmeto considerthebroaderimplicationsofmywork.Stathispushedmetoseehow myinitialargumentsregardingdemocraticstabilityandpopulismtravelledto LatinAmericaandelsewhere.Ithinkthebookismuchstrongerforthis advice.JakeHackeralsoagreedtobeonmydissertationcommitteeata relativelylatestage,butdespitethiswasalwayswillingtocastanothercritical (althoughalwaysfriendly)eyeonmywriting.Ihadoriginallyhopedtosay moreaboutJake’sareasofexpertise socialpolicyandwelfare inthebook, butassooftenhappens,whatIuncoveredinthe fieldledmeastray.Ihope Icanreturntotheseissuesinfuturework.
DuringmynearlysevenyearsofgraduateschoolatYale,Ibenefitedfrom conversationswithandadvicefrommanyoutstandingacademics.More
importantly,Ialsomadesomefriendsforlifeintheprocess.VivekSharma wasanearlysupporterofmine,andIhopethecompletionofthisbook hasrepaidsomeofthatfaith.KennethScheveandTariqThachilread earlierdraftsofthebookandgavemesomeveryhelpfuladvice.Lessdirectly, IhadmanystimulatingdiscussionswithJuliaAdams,ScottBoorman, KeithDarden,NandiniDeo,EmilyErikson,MattKocher,AdriaLawrence, KarunaMantena,PaulinaOchoaEspe jo,MriduRai,Kalyanakrishnan Sivaramakrishnan(“ Shivi ” ),SusanStokes,andElisabethWood.Someof themostenlighteningdiscussionsw erewithmyfellowgraduatestudents. LeonidPeisakhin,PaulPinto,JuanRebolledo,LuisSchiumerini,JoshSimon, andLukeThompsonareamazingacademicinterlocutorsandgreatfriends. I ’ malsogratefultoGarethNellis,whogavehisexpertfeedbackonpartsof the fi nalmanuscript.
IamalsoappreciativeofthemanyotherscholarsandfriendsI’veengaged withovertheyearsasIformedandreformedthisprojectintotheoneyousee today.Inparticular,PeterBearman,PaulBrass,AlexanderLee,andSourabh Singhprovidedcriticaladvicewhenitwasneeded,before,during,andaftermy fieldworkinIndia.AfterreturningfrominIndiain2011,Ispentayearat NuffieldCollege,OxfordUniversityunderaspecialexchangeagreementwith Yale’sDepartmentofPoliticalScience.Nuffieldwasexactlytheconstructive atmosphereIneededasIattemptedtoturnthreeyearsofsecondaryand primaryresearchintoacoherentwrittenproduct.IainMcClean,JohnDarwin, MyaTudor,andAdamZiegfeldwereengagingdiscussants.IjoinedTrinity CollegeDublinasanAssistantProfessorinSeptember2012anditwasthere thatthebookstartedtotakeits finalform.Ibenefitedgreatlyfromthe stimulatingatmosphereatTrinity.Studentsandcolleaguesalikeshowed greatinterestinmyworkandIappreciatetheirencouragementandadvice. ChristianHouleandKojiKagotaniprovidedhoursofcriticismandadvicethat hashugelyenhancedthequalityofthequantitativeanalysesinthiswork. IhavesincegoneontocollaborateonanumberofprojectswithChristianand someofthatworkisevidentinthebookyouseenow.
ThemanuscriptwasultimatelycompletedattheAustralianNational University,whichIjoinedinmid-2013.TheANU’sCoralBellSchoolofAsia PacificAffairsprovidedtheresourcesforanadditionaltriptothearchives attheBritishLibraryaswellasthetimeto finallyturntheseideasintoa polishedbook.MycolleaguesatANU,EdAspinall,NickCheesman,Greg Fealy,TamaraJacka,MarcusMietzner,CharlieMiller,andSallySargesonall providedvaluablecommentsonanearlierdraftofthemanuscript.DavidEnvall gavesomecriticalinsightsontheJapancasestudy.Ihavebeencollaborating withLiamGammononvariousprojectsonIndonesianpopulismandIam gratefultohimforallowingmetodrawonthatresearchinChapter8.Allison Leyreadthefullmanuscriptandherdetailedcommentshavegreatlyimproved the finalversion.ThanksalsotoMaxineMcArthurwhocarefullyproofread
the finalmanuscript.ThegraduateandundergraduatestudentsI’veworked withatANUimpressmeeverydayandthey’veplayedabigpartinpushingme torefinemyideasandexpressthemmoreclearly.
IpresentedsectionsofthebookattheJointSessionsofWorkshopsofthe EuropeanConsortiumforPoliticalResearch(ECPR)inPisain2016.I’dliketo thankTakisPappasandKirkHawkinsforthatinvitationandparticipantsfor theirfeedback.IwouldalsoliketothankMarcGuinjoanforhisincisive commentsonmypaper.IalsopresentedotherpartsofthebookattheIndia UpdateConferenceatANUinlate2016andwouldliketothankattendeesfor theirobservations.
Noneofthiswouldhavebeenpossiblewithouttheinstitutionaland financialsupportIreceivedfromvarioussources.Inthe firstplace,YaleUniversity anditsassociateddonorsmadethearchivalresearchatthecoreofthebook possible.Inparticular,IwouldliketothankJosephandAlisonFoxfortheir generousendowmentoftheFoxFellowship,whichfundedmyresearchin India.ThanksalsotothanktheFoxFellowshipadministrators,JuliaMuravnik andAnneKellett,foralltheirhelpinorganizing fieldworklogisticsinIndia. IamgratefultoJawaharlalNehruUniversity(JNU)forhostingmeduringmy timeinIndia.IowespecialthankstoJNU’sAmitaSingh,whonegotiatedon mybehalfwiththeinfamousOrwellianbureaucraciesthatpervadethecountry.IspenttwomonthsintheSouthernstateofKerala,whereIwasaffiliated withtheCentreforDevelopmentStudies(CDS).SomanNairwasextremely helpfulingettingmesettledandhelpingmegainaccesstothematerials Ineeded.
Iamhighlydependentonthesupportoflibraryandtechnicalsupportstaff formywork.I’dliketothankStaceyMaplesofYaleUniversityforhispatience inteachingmehowtooperatethemapsoftwareusedtoproducethemapsin Chapters4and5.IntheUnitedStates,IwouldliketothankthestaffofYale UniversityLibrary,especiallyRichardRichie.InIndia,I’mgratefultothestaff attheJNUlibrary,theNehruMemorialMuseumandLibrary,theNational ArchivesofIndia,theCentralSecretariatLibrary,theCDSlibrary,andthe StateArchivesofKerala.Finally,IhavemadeconsiderableuseofANU’ s excellentAsianhistorycollection.
ThankstoKarinaPellingofANUCollegeofAsiaandthePacific ’sCartoGIS,whoproducedhighresolutionversionsofFigures3.1and3.2.Iwouldlike tothanktheDepartmentofPoliticalandSocialChangewhoprovidedfunding forthisandothercostsrelatedtoproductionofthemanuscript.
IwouldalsoliketothankChristopheJaffrelotandHurstPublishersfor permissiontousethedataoncastemembershipoftheLokSabhainFigure5.2.
Lastly,IwouldliketothankDominicByatt,myeditoratOxfordUniversity Press.Dominicbelievedinthepotentialoftheprojectfromitsroughbeginnings.Ireceivedterrificallydetailedreportsfromthreeanonymousreviewers. Addressingtheirconcernshascertainlymadethisastronger finalproduct.
SarahParkerandOliviaWellsassistedwiththeadministrativeprocessof turningthemanuscriptintoabookandI’mgratefultothemformakingthis asmoothprocess.ThankstoMartinNobleforcopyeditingthemanuscript. DataandreplicationcodeforthestatisticalanalysesinChapters2and9are availableontheopenaccessHarvardDataverse(https://harvard.dataverse.edu).
6.India
7.RegionalismandtheRiseofthePopulistFarRightinIndia
8.TestingtheCausalMechanismsinAdditionalCases
ThePuzzleofPopulism
INTRODUCTION
AfterMohandasGandhi’sassassinationin1948,theturbulentpoliticsof India’sindependencemovementwereswiftlycurtailed.Forthefollowing 20years,theJawaharlalNehru-ledCongresspartyengineeredastateof democraticstabilitythroughthedistributionofpatronagetoitspolitical supporters.1 WhileearlypostcolonialeffortsatdemocracyinIndonesia, Pakistan,andelsewherewerefailing,Indiaappearedtohavedefiedtheodds.2 However,withinafewyearsofNehru’sdeathin1964,India’spatronage-based, one-party-dominantsystemdescendedintocrisis.Underaweakenedcentral leadership,factionalinfightingintheCongresspartyledtoaseriesofstate-level electiondefeatsin1967andasplitinthenationalpartyitselfin1969.Prime MinisterIndiraGandhi,Nehru’sdaughter,tookcontrolofthemajorityfaction, refashioningherselfasapopulist.Shesoughttolegitimizeherleadershipby “goingoncemoredirecttothepeople” overtheheadsoftheregionalelites fromwhomshehadsplit.3 MrsGandhipushedthroughaseriesofpopular policiesincludingbanknationalizationandtherevocationof financialsubsidiestothecountry’saristocracy.Buildingonthisrecordandalsoutilizingnew mediatoconnectdirectlywithvoters,MrsGandhi’spopulistmobilization strategyplayedasignificantroleinherparty’selectionvictoryin1971.4
Asitturnedout,governingwithouttheentrenchedmulti-tieredpatronagebasedorganizationoftheoldCongresspartyprovedamoredifficulttaskthan winninganelection.MrsGandhiresortedtoincreasinglyauthoritarianmeans toremaininpower,suspendingdemocracyatthesubnationallevelwith increasingfrequency,andinterferingwiththerunningofnationalbureaucraticandjudicialinstitutions.InJuly1975,MrsGandhi finallyabrogated
1 Kochanek1968;Kothari1964;Morris-Jones1966,1967;Weiner1967.
2 Thisistheexplicitthemeofanumberofrecentbookscomparingthepoliticaltrajectoriesof postcolonialIndia,Pakistan,andotherformercolonies;Oldenburg2010;Spiess2009;Tudor2013.
3 “CanIndiaSurvive?” SpeechbyIndiraGandhiattheIndo-FrenchColloquium,NewDelhi, December13,1969,inGandhi1975:88.
4 SeeChapter6.
democracyatthenationallevel,governingbydecree.Theso-calledEmergency periodwasinfamousforitstotalclampdownonpressfreedom,arbitrary detentions,andalitanyofotherhumanrightsabusesincludingforcedsterilizationsandtorture.
PopulismhasbeenarecurrentfeatureofIndianpoliticseversince,with NarendraModi’ssuccessfulelectoralcampaignin2014onlythemostrecent example.5 Ithasalsobeenaperiodicformofpoliticalmobilizationacross South,East,andSoutheastAsia.JunichiroKoizumiofJapan,ThaksinShinawatra ofThailand,andRodrigoDuterteinthePhilippinesarejustsomeofthebestknownpopulistleadersofrecentyearsinAsia.Yet,therehavebeenfewattempts toexplaintheseIndianandbroaderAsianexperiencescomparatively.Most studiesofpopulisminAsiaareinsteadsingle-countrycasestudiesandthere arefewbook-lengthtreatmentsofthesubject.6 Fromacomparativepolitics perspective,mostofwhatweknowaboutthesuccessofpopulistmovements comesfromthedifferingexperiencesofLatinAmericaandWesternEurope.In thisbook,IdevelopanexplanationofIndia’sturntopopulismthatbuildsintoa generalmodeloftheelectoralsuccessofpopulistleaders.Themodelhas particularapplicabilitytoAsiabutalso explainswhypopulistswinelectionsin statesintheAmericasandbeyond.
ThemeaningofpopulismcontinuestobemuchdisputedandIengagewith thisdebatemorethoroughlyinChapter2.Acentralaspectofthisdebateis whetherpopulismshouldbeunderstoodprimarilyasatypeofpolitical movementorasapoliticalideology.Ifollowtheformerapproach,conceiving ofpopulismasadistinctwayoflinkingpoliticalleadersandsupporters. Populistmovementsareonesinwhichpersonalisticleadersseektoestablish unmediatedlinkswithmassconstituencies,whoareotherwiserelativelyfree ofexistingpartyandinstitutionalties,intheirquesttogainandretainpower.7 Inseekingtomobilizeadiversesupportbaseofunattachedvoters,populists maymakerhetoricalappealstoavirtuous “people” inoppositiontoacorrupt “establishment.” However,asIexplainfurtherinChapter2,thislanguageisa correlateofpopulism,ratherthanbeingdefinitiveofit.8 Infact,pro-people oranti-establishmentrhetoricmaybeaproductoftheorganizational resourcesandelectoralincentivesfacedbypartiesthathavetorelyprimarily ondirectlinksbetweentheleadershipandvotersratherthanondensely institutionalizedpartystructures.9
5 Jaffrelot2013,2015a;McGuireandReeves2003;Subramanian1999,2007;Wyatt2013b.
6 E.g.,Mietzner2015;MizunoandPasuk2009;PasukandBaker2009;Subramanian1999. Forcomparativeanalyses,seeMoffitt2015;Pepinsky2017;Swamy2012;Thompson2016.
7 Weyland2001.
8 ThiscontrastswiththeapproachtakenbyfollowersofMudde2004.E.g.,Hawkins2009, 2010;OliverandRahn2016;Pauwels2011;RooduijnandPauwels2011;RuthandRamírez Baracaldo2015.Forarecentsynthesisandsummary,seeMuddeandRoviraKaltwasser2017.
9 Caramani2017:62.
Populistmobilizationthriveswheretiesbetweenvotersandnon-populist partiesdonotexistorhavedecayed,aspopulists’ abilitytomobilizevoters directlydependsinpartonthelatternotbeingdeeplyembeddedinexisting partynetworks.Understandingpopulistsuccessthusrequiresanexplanation forwhyvotersabandonestablishedparties.
InstudiesofpopulistmovementsinLatinAmerica,researchershavetended tofocusonhoweconomicconditionsaffectvotersatisfactionwithincumbent parties,thusopeningupthespaceforpopulistoutsiders.Theseeconomic factorscanrefertolong-termstructuralchangestotheeconomysuchas industrializationorglobalization,ortoshort-termforcessuchas fiscalcrises ortradeshocks.10 NotablepopulistssuchasAlbertoFujimoriinPeruand HugoChávezinVenezuelacametopowerwiththeirrespectiveeconomic systemsindeepcrisis.Inbothcases, fiscalconstraintsinhibitedtheabilityof incumbentpartiestoretainsupportthroughthedistributionofgovernment patronage.Economicconditionsalsofeatureincomparativeaccountsof populisminWesternEuropeandtheUnitedStates,butdemographicforces, especiallyimmigration,areoftenarguedtohaveplayedasignificantrolein thesecases.11 Theeconomicstagnationofthe1970sandtheneoliberalturnof 1980sand1990sledtothedealignmentofmany programmatic partysystems acrossthecontinent.Manyvotersfoundthatnominallylaborandsocial democraticpartiesnolongerrepresentedtheireconomicinterests.12 Increasingly unattachedvotershaverespondedtotheperceivedfailuretodealwitheconomiccrisesandtheeconomicandculturalthreatofnon-Europeanimmigrationby flockingtoradicalright-wingpopulistpartiesinlargenumbers.13 Similarly,althoughstudyofthe2016USpresidentialelectionisstillatanearly stage,severalobservershavesoughttoexplainDonaldTrump’svictorywith referencetotheswingofwhite,working-classvotersawayfromtheDemocratic partyandtowardthepopulistRepublicancandidate.14 Althoughthereare significantdifferences,thecommonthemeinstudiesofpopulisminWestern EuropeandtheAmericasisthatpopulistsuccessispredicatedontheabsenceor breakdownofmorestableparty–voterattachments.15
TheturntopopulisminIndiathatfollowedNehru’sdeathsupportsthis generalcausalchainofevents:populismbecomesasuccessfulelectoralstrategywhentheextantnationalsystemofparty–voterlinkagesbreaksdown.
10 Longer-termmodelsincludeCammack2000; Germani1978.CrisismodelsincludeDoyle 2011;Roberts2014a,b;Weyland2003,2006.Relatedworkonparty-systemcrises(butnotontherise ofpopulismperse)alsosupportsthisgenerallineofargumentation:Greene2007;Morgan2011.
11 Onthelatterpoint,seeInglehartandNorris2017;Mudde1999.
12 Bornschier2010;DaltonandWattenberg2000;Judis2016;Kriesi2008.
13 KitscheltandMcGann1995;Mouffe2005;Mudde2007,2013.
14 E.g.,NateCohn. “WhyTrumpWon:Working-ClassWhites.” TheNewYorkTimes, November9,2016;Williams,JoanC. “WhytheWhiteWorkingClassVotedforTrump.” HarvardBusinessReview.November18,2016.
15 Bornschier2016.
However,India’sturntopopulism,aswellasthatofotherstatesinAsia, challengesboththesufficiencyandnecessityofparticularfactorslikeeconomiccrisesordemographicchangetopopulistsuccess.Whileeconomic crisesandimmigration-drivenstressesonlabormarketsorthewelfarestate may contribute tothedecayofparty–voterlinkagesinsomecases,thespecific natureofthesepriorlinkagesplaysacriticalbutthusfarneglectedroleinthe successofpopulistcampaigners.
Party–voterlinkagescantakeonanumberofforms,16 andasresult,they experiencedistinctstressesandstrains.Thusthereismorethanonepathwayto party-systemdecayandpopulistsuccess.Democraticpartysystemscanbe classifiedinto programmatic,patronage,and populist types.Programmatic partysystemsarecharacterizedbycompetitionbetweenpartiesthatarelinked withvotersthroughpartymembershipandcivilsocietynetworks;patronage partysystemsarecharacterizedbycompetitionbetweenpartiesthataretiedto supportersthroughthedistributionofparticularisticbenefits,suchascash,jobs, orpork-barrelspending;populistpartysystemsarecharacterizedbycompetition betweenpartiesthatappealtovotersprimarilythroughdirectappealsbasedon thecharismaandpersonalizedresourcesofpartyleaders.Mostdemocraticparty systemsinAsiahavebeen patronage-based,anditisontheparticularsusceptibilityof patronagedemocracies topopulismthatthisbookisfocused.
Inpatronagedemocracies,party-systemstabilityatthenationallevelis contingentonthemaintenanceofacomplexandintermediatedquidpro quo,inwhichmoney,goods,andservices flowfromthepartyincontrolof thecentralgovernmentdownthroughsubordinatebrokerstosupporters, whilevotes flowbackupinreturn.17 Thecriticalfactorinexplainingthecrisis ofpatronage-basedpartysystemsandthesuccessofpopulistalternativesisa ruptureinthenationwidepatronagenetworkthatlinkspartiesandvoters. Economiccrisesmaycontributetothisbreakdown,astheydidinseveralcases inLatinAmerica,buttheyareneithernecessarynorsufficientinamoregeneral sense.Rather,drawingoninsightsfromprincipal–agenttheoryandsocial networktheory,thebookpositsanalternativemechanism.Itarguesthat whensubordinatebrokersbecomeautonomousfromthecentralleadershipin apatronagedemocracy,partycohesionbreaksdown,openingupthespacefor populistappealsfromthecenterdirectlytothepeople,evenintheabsenceof economicordemographiccrises.ThisclaimissupportedbyadetailedinvestigationoftheIndianexperienceaswellasadditionalcomparativeevidencefrom therestofAsiaandthestatisticalanalysisofabroadersetofcases.
16 Kitschelt2000.
17 Thecomparativeliteratureonpatronage-basedmobilizationisvast;e.g.,Chandra2004; Hutchcroft2014;KitscheltandWilkinson2007;Schmidtetal.1977;Scott1972;Stokesetal. 2013;Szwarcberg2015.ForareviewofclientelismseeHicken2011.
Anincreasein brokerautonomy referstoanyprocessthatredistributes politicalpowerawayfromthecentralornationalleadershiptowardintermediarieswhooperateatthelevelbetweennationalgovernmentandgroupsof individualvoters.Itreferstoinstitutionalchangessuchastheintroductionof electionsforsubnationalexecutiveoffice,theadoptionofopenlistvoting systemsatthesubnationallevel,orthedevolutionofcandidateselectionto subnationalpartycommitteesawayfromthecentralpartyleadership,among otherprocesses.Inmoreunitarysystems,suchasJapan,wherenationallevelpoliticiansarethekeybrokersincontrollingthedistributionofpatronage orpork-barrelspending,itcanalsorefertotheincreaseintheautonomyof individualnationalpoliticiansfromcentralcontrol,whetherintermsof obtainingelectoralticketsorcampaign finance.Incaseswheresuchpolitical autonomyalreadyformallyexists,thedevolutionof fiscalauthoritycanhavea similareffectbygivingsubnationalpoliticalactorsdirectcontroloverthe distributionofpatronage.18 Inpatronage-basedsystems, subnationalautonomy and decentralization arethusshorthandtermsforanyprocessthat devolvesmorepoliticalfreedomand fiscalauthoritytoindividualbrokers awayfromthecentralleadership.
Brokerautonomymattersbecauseitcreatestheopportunitystructurefor populistsuccessbyprecipitatingthefracturingofthepartysystem.Insystems wheremultiplelevelsofgovernmentexist,thiscanmeanthecleavingofthe partysystemintodistinctgoverninggroupsatthenationalandsubnational levels.Thisfracturingmaytaketheformofdifferentpartiescomingtopower atthenationalandsubnationallevelsasitdidinIndiafrom1967,butasimilar resultcanbeobtainedevenwhenthesamepartyisinpoweratthenational andsubnationallevelsifthelatterhassufficientdefactoautonomy,ashas beenthecaseinIndonesiainrecentyears.Withgreaterautonomy,political brokersandpartyunitsatthesubnationallevelcanclaimthepoliticalcapital forthedistributionofpatronage.Patronage-basedmobilizationcanpersistat thesubnationallevel,butnationalpartymachinesarenolongerabletotake advantageofit.Thiscleavingofthenationalandsubnationallevelsfragments thenetworkofpatronagetieslinkingthenationalleadershiptovoters,with theresultthatpartyleadersatthenationallevelcannotmobilizesufficient politicalsupporttostayinpower,evenintheabsenceofbroadereconomic downturnsordemographicpressures.Inmoreunifiedsystems,something similarcanhappenwhenthecentralpartyleadershiplosescontroloverits members.Thiscouldleadtofactionalcompetitionwithinthepartyatthe nationallevelorthespillingoveroffactionalcompetitionintopartysplitting. Ineitherscenario,theabilityofthecentralleadershiptogarnervotes anda
18 EthanScheiner(2006)alsonoteshowpatronageandcentralizationcombinetoaffect party-systemstability.However,Scheinerisprimarilyconcernedwith fiscalratherthanpolitical centralization.IdiscusstheJapanesecasefurtherinChapter8.
governingmajority throughthedistributionofpatronagethroughhigh-level brokersisgreatlydiminished.
Inpatronage-baseddemocracies,aspro-systempartiesareunabletomobilize politicalsupportatthenationallevelthroughpatronagealone,populists circumventthebrokers,appealingdirectlytothepeople.Populistsutilize massmobilizationtechniques,relyingheavilyonthemediaaswellaspublic ralliestocommunicatewithvoters.19 Thesupportersofpopulistmovements canbediverse;whatmattersisthattheyarerelativelyunattachedfrom existingpoliticalorganizations.Inpartforthisreason,therhetoricofpopulist leadersistypicallylacedwithreferencestoavaguelydefined ‘virtuous’ people ontheonehandandan ‘illegitimate’ eliteorestablishmentontheother.In somecasesthisoppositionisframedineconomictermswhileinothersitis conceivedofinculturalones.Irrespectiveoftheparticularframing,populism isastrategydesignedtobuildamassofsupporterstogainandretainpower withtheminimumofinstitutionalintermediation.Suchamobilizationstrategy fitswellinthecontextofastrugglingpatronage-basedsystem.Becauseof theirverticallyintegratedorganizationalstructures,patronage-basedsystems tendtoinhibittheformationofclass-basedmovementsandtoprecludethe emergenceofmoreprogrammaticresponses.
Thismakestheeffectofchangesinthedistributionofpoliticalpower betweencentralandsubnationalorperipheralarenasdifferentinpatronagebasedsystemsfromthoseinprogrammaticones.Inthelatter,morepermanent institutionallinkagescontinuetodeliverstateresourcestovoters(e.g.,social securityandpublicutilities),regardlessofdivisionsbetweenthecenterand periphery.Thelogicofpopulistsuccessintheprogrammaticdemocraciesof WesternEuropeandelsewhereisthussomewhatdifferent;therethebreakdowninlinkagebetweenpartiesandvotersoverrecentdecadeshasarguably hadmoretodowithdeindustrialization,deunionization,andthedeclineof thelabor-left,whichhasinturnmadeitpossibleforright-wingpopuliststo appealtoformerlaborvotersonthebasisofprotectionistandanti-immigrant appeals.20 AsIputitpreviouslyinthischapter,thereismorethanonepathway topopulismbecausethereismorethanonepathwaytoabreakdowninparty–voterlinkages.Moreover,thedifferingexperienceofWesternEuropeindicates thatitislessformaldecentralizationorfederalismthanthefragmentationof thepoliticalcapitalearnedfromthedeliveryofpatronagethatisofanalytical concern.Notonlydoesthepresentaccountofpopulistsuccessdoabetterjob ofexplainingtheIndiancaseandothersinAsia,but asanexaminationof somecanonicalcasesinLatinAmerica,andthestatisticalanalysisofanew globaldatasetofpopulistsuccessreveals itprovidesamodelofpopulist electoralperformancewithwideapplicability.
19 Ellinas2010;Mazzoleni2008;Moffitt2016:ch.5.
20 Bornschier2010,2016;Judis2016;Kriesi2014.
Whyshouldwecareabouttheelectoralsuccessofpopulistpoliticians?As IdemonstrateempiricallyinChapter2,populismmattersbecauseofthe implicationsithasforthefunctioningofdemocracy.Itisnotdifficultto imaginethatwhereethnonationalistpopulistsdemonizeminoritiesthereare significantriskstotheindividualrightsnecessaryfordemocracytofunction. However,manypopulistsclaimtorepresent ifnotembody theinterestsof thepeopleagainsttheelite.Therearethusgoodreasonstoexpectsuch populistregimestodowellintermsofenhancingmassparticipationinthe politicalprocessand,arguably,arangeoffurthersocioeconomicoutcomes. Yettherearecountervailingprocessesatworkthatmakeeventhesepopulist regimeslikelytounderperformnon-populistdemocraticregimesinmany respects.Theverylackofinstitutionalizationofpopulistpoliticalmovements, whetheroftheleftorright,prefiguresthelackoftoleranceforinstitutional checksandbalanceontheexecutiveauthorityofpopulistsingovernment.The prioritizationofthe “popularwill” overtheruleoflawmeansthatpopulist regimesaremorepronetotheerosionofthebasicindividualrightsand freedomsweassociatewithliberaldemocracy.RecallingMarx’sfamouslines ontheendofFrenchSecondRepublicdemocraticgovernmentfrom The EighteenthBrumaireofNapoleonBonaparte,quotedintheepigraph,supportersofpopulistleadershaveevenuseddemocracyinordertovoteitoutof existence;contemporaryTurkeywouldseemtobeacaseinpoint.21 Liberalismisofcourseconsistentwithmaintaininganunequalsystemthat favorstheelite.22 Inthissenseadherencetotheruleoflawwouldseemtobea retrogradestep.However,asE.P.Thompsonfamouslynoted,despitethe interestsofthedominantclasses,thelawmay “acquireadistinctidentity, whichmay,onoccasion,inhibitpowerandaffordsomeprotectiontothe powerless ...For ‘thelaw’,asalogicofequity,mustalwaysseektotranscend theinequalitiesofclasspowerwhich,instrumentally,itisharnessedto serve. ”23 Shortofarevolutionaryoverturningofthewholeapparatusofthe modernstate,24 itisdifficulttoconceiveofsocialjusticewithoutdemocracy andtheruleoflawneededtoupholdit.25 Asaresult,becauseofitsopposition
21 E.g.,DiegoCupolo, “TheDeclineandFallofTurkishDemocracy:HowaConstitutional AmendmentcouldgivePresidentRecepTayyipErdoganUndisputedPower,” TheAtlantic,April13, 2017.
22 Losurdo2011. 23 Thompson1975:266,268.
24 HereI’mthinkingofakindofleft-anarchism.Whilethereisplentyofthoughtfulwritingon thesubject,itsverynatureseemstoprecludeaconcretevisionofhowsuchasocietywouldwork; someofthemoreinterestingideascanbefoundinChomsky2005;Holloway2005;Scott2012.
25 Shapiro1999.Eventhen,itisprobablyimpossibletoconstructarelativelyequalsociety withoutalegalorderofsorts;inthemostegalitariannon-statesocieties,rigidsocialnormsare necessarytomaintainorderandpreventtheemergenceofsustainedinequality;numerous historicalcasesaredetailedinFlanneryandMarcus2012.
tothelaw,itisbynomeansclearthatpopulismrepresentsavictoryforthe sociallyandeconomicallymarginalized.
Thesecommentsarenotintendedaspraiseforpatronage-basedpolitical systemsinwhichinequalityremainsentrenchedandgroupsunattachedtothe rulingelitecanbeseverelydisadvantaged.Rather,thepointisthatpopulist ruletypicallyfailsinitspromisetotransformdemocraticgovernmentforthe better.Wheredemocraticgovernmentshavebeenabletoremedytheinequitiesofpatronage-basedlinkageswhileavoidingthepopulisttemptation,this hasusuallybeenachievedbythemoremundaneintroductionandmaintenanceofprogrammaticlinkagesbetweenpartiesandvoters.However,the emergenceofprogrammaticcompetitioninAsiahasbeenslow.InIndia,the successofNarendraModi’sBharatiyaJanataParty(BJP)inthe2014general electionwasavividreminderofthepowerofpopulistappealsinacountry withadeeplyfragmentedpartysystem.Thebooksuggeststhatthedevolution ofauthorityinpatronage-basedsystemsisnotlikelytoaidinthetransition towardmorestableprogrammaticparty–voterlinkages;rather,thisprocess seemsmorelikelytocreateopeningsforpopulistmovementstocometo powerwithdeeplyambiguousimplicationsfordemocracy.Ofcourse,the introductionofprogrammaticparty–voterlinkagescanbeeconomicallyand politicallycostly,especiallyintheshortterm.Moreover,astherecentsuccess ofpopulistmovementsinWesternEuropeandNorthAmericaillustrates, programmaticparty–voterlinkagesthemselvesrequireconstantupkeepif votersarenottoabandonprogrammaticpartiesforpopulistalternatives. Theresultisthatthespecterofpopulismseemslikelytohauntmanystates inAsia,LatinAmerica,andelsewhereinyearstocome.
WHYDOPOPULISTSWINELECTIONS?
Comparativestudiesofpopulistelectoralsuccesshavegenerallybeendivided byregion,mostnotably,LatinAmericaandWesternEurope.Inpart,thisis becausescholarsofpopulismworkingontheserespectiveregionshaveadopted differentconceptualizationsandoperationalizationsofpopulism.However, despitethelackofconsensusovertheprecisemeaningofpopulism,thereis someagreementinthatliteraturethatpopulistsuccessisassociatedwiththe widespreadabandonmentofestablishedpartiesandpoliticalmovementsthat linkvoterstothegovernment.Suchseismicshifts,orrealignments,ofthe politicallandscapeareoftenattributedtodeepcrisesofrepresentative government,26 whichcanbedefinedas “theaccumulationwithinsocietyof
26 O’Donnell1994;PanizzaandMiorelli2009;Roberts1995;Weyland2001.
socialdemandsthatcannotbeproperlyaddressedbyexistinginstitutional arrangements.”27 Researchershavearguedthatinstitutionalarrangements mayfailtosatisfythepublicbecauseof fiscalcrises,politicalconflict,corruption,andimmigrationstressesamongotherprocesses.Oftenlookingwithin (ratherthanacross)particulargeographicalregions,researchershaveposited severaldistinctmodelsofpopulistsuccess.Ianalyzethembrieflyinturn beforeexplainingthealternativeapproachtakeninthebook.
SomeoftheoriginalmodelsofpopulistsuccessinLatinAmericalookedto deepstructuralchangesinsocietyandtheeconomytoexplainthedeclineof establishmentpartiesandtheemergenceofpopulistalternatives.28 Building onworkonWesternEuropeanpartysystems,thisresearchsoughttoidentify thecausesofdealignmentofLatinAmericanpartysystems.Forsomethe causewassocioeconomicmodernization;forothers,themorespecificdynamic ofrural–urbanmigration.Theseprocesses,whichincludedthecreationofa newworkingclassorthesuddeninfluxofvotersunattachedtoexistingparties, disruptedexistingpatternsofparty–voterattachmentandmadethesuccessof populistmobilizersmorelikely.Morerecently,thisstructuralmodelhasbeen revivedinclaimsthattheshifttotherightbypreviouslyleft-leaningpartiesin LatinAmericaduringtheneoliberalturnofthe1990sresultedinmanyleftleaningvoterswithoutapartythatrepresentedtheirinterests.29 Thestrategies ofincumbentsmatter,butthekeydriverstendtobeexogenoussocioeconomic changes.
Againlookingtothebreakdownoflinkagesbetweenpartiesandvoters,a largebodyofresearchhasexaminedtheeffectoftheeconomicandcultural consequencesofglobalizationontheriseoffar-rightpopulistpartiesespousingananti-immigrantplatform,whichhaveobtainedsubstantialvoteshares acrossWesternEuropeinrecentyears.InWesternEurope,asprogrammatic linkagesbetweenpartiesandvotershavebrokendown,thefarrighthasgained significantvotesharesfromtraditionallaborpartyconstituenciesbypainting immigrantsasbotheconomicallyandculturallythreatening.30 Thisprocess hasledtotheriseofadistinctlyethnonationalistformofpopulistmobilization.However,whilethismodelofparty-systemdealignmentworksreasonablywellforWesternEurope,wherepartisanpoliticalcleavagesalong economicpolicywererelativelyclearandstable,31 thislogicislessapplicable tomostLatinAmericancases,wheremainstreampartiestypicallyhavebeen
27 Peruzzotti2013:67.
28 Conniff1999a;DiTella1965;Germani1978;Mouzelis1985.
29 Roberts2013a.
30 TheliteratureontheelectoralperformanceofthefarrightincontemporaryEuropeisvast. NotablecontributionsincludeArzheimer2009;ArzheimerandCarter2006;Golder2003a,b; InglehartandNorris2017;Ivarsflaten2008;KitscheltandMcGann1995;Knigge1998;Lubbers etal.2002.
31 Bornschier2010;Kriesi2008.
indistinguishableinpolicyterms.32 Thatis,dealignmenttheorycanworkwell whereprioralignmentsarethemselvesclear,i.e.,inprogrammaticdemocracies,butnotinpatronagedemocracies.
ThenowpredominantsetoftheoriesofpopulistsuccessinLatinAmerica maintainsthatvotersabandonestablishedpartiesforpopulistalternatives followingacuteeconomiccrises.Adownwardturninthebusinesscycle negativelyaffectsthepopularityofexistingparties.33 Especiallyinlowerandmiddle-incomecountries,wherestatesareunabletoadequatelycompensateforslowdownsintheprivatesector,basiclivelihoodsarethreatened.Itis undersuchconditionsthatthepopulistoppositiontoexistinginstitutional arrangementshaswidespreadappeal.KurtWeylandsumsuptheessenceof thisview,writingthateconomiccrises:34
delegitimatetheestablished “politicalclass” andpavethewayforoutsiders; weakenintermediaryorganizations,especiallypartiesandinterestgroups,and thusopenupopportunitiesforpersonalisticleaders;andinducemanycitizensto runconsiderablerisksbysupportinguntestednewcomerswholackapromising trackrecordandwhosepromisesofsalvationarethereforeshroudedinuncertainty.
Accordingtothisview,theclassicalpopulismofthe1930s,theneoliberal populismofthe1990s,andtheNewLeftpopulismofthelastdecadewereeach duetothedeepstructuraleconomiccrisesthatprecededtheseperiods.35
Thefailureofmainstreampartiestoprovidemateriallyforcitizenscertainly formsareasonablebasisfortheirrejectionbythepeople.Severalprominent casesofpopulistsuccessinLatinAmericahavebeenprecededbysevere economiccontractions.Forinstance,ArgentinawasmiredinahyperinflationarycrisisontheeveofCarlosMenem’selectionin1989.Thecrisis conditionsinVenezuelathatbrought firstRafaelCalderatopowerin1993and thenHugoChávezafterhimin1998hadpersistedfornearlytwodecades.In Asia,too,populistssuchasJunichiroKoizumiinJapan,ThaksinShinawatra inThailand,JosephEstradainthePhilippines,andRohMoo-hyuninSouth Koreacametopowerafterperiodsofeconomiccrisis.Wecouldaddfurther examples.
However,therelationshipbetweeneconomiccrisisandpopulistsuccesshas significantempiricalshortcomings.First,incasesliketheonesjustnoted,the proximityofthedownturntotheelectoralsuccessofapopulistcampaigner varieswidely.ThePhilippineswasrightinthemiddleofthe1997–98Asian financialcrisiswhenEstradawonpower,whileSouthKoreawasalready recoveringbythetimethatRohwaselectedin2003.Itisthusunclearwhat
32 Coppedge1994.
33 Remmer1990,1991;Weyland2003.ForanapplicationofthismodeltoAsia,seeDeCastro 2007.
34 Weyland2006:14. 35 Conniff1999b;Roberts2013b.
kindoflagbetweeneconomicdownturnandpopulistsuccessshouldbe expected.Giventhenatureofeconomiccycles,itislikelythatsomecrisis canbefoundpriortoanygivenpopulistvictoryifthetimeframeiswide enough.Second,selectingoncasesinwhichpopulistsaresuccessfulfailsto takeintoaccountthemanyinstancesinwhichsevereandsustainedeconomic crisesdidnotleadtotheembraceofpopulistcandidates.36 Infact,inprevious quantitativestudiesofalargernumberofcases,nocorrelationbetween economiccrisisandpopulistsuccessemerges.37
Othershavearguedthatwhilemacroeconomicconditionsaloneareinsufficientasacauseofpopulism,thecrisismodelstillhasanalyticaltraction.In thePeruviancase,theeconomicdeclineofthe1980scoincidedwithamajor securitythreatintheformoftheSenderoLuminoso,aMaoist-inspired guerrillamovementinthehighlands.Becauseestablishmentpartiesfailedto dealwiththegrowingsecuritythreat,Tanakaarguesthatthisdualcrisisof governabilitywasamajorcauseofthecrisisofthepartysystemandthe electionofAlbertoFujimori.38 SimilarlyinColombia,thechronicinsecurity thatresultedfromoneofthelongest-lastinginsurgenciesintheregionwasa motivatingfactorintheturnawayfromtheestablishedpartiestowardÁlvaro UribeVeliz,whoranasanindependent,promisingatoughstanceagainst theFuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia(FARC)andotherinsurgentorganizations.39 ThismodelalsohaspotentialapplicationtoAsiawith Thailand,thePhilippines,andIndonesiaamongothersexperiencingsubstantialinsurgenciesinrecentdecades.However,evenifweallowforthisbroader qualifiedconceptualizationofacrisis,empiricaldifficultiesarise.Aswith economiccrisesalone,severedualeconomicandsecuritycrisesdonotseem sufficienttobringaboutpopulistsuccess.Forinstance,dualcriseshavebeena persistentfeatureofCentralAmericanstatessincethereturntothedemocracy,yetpopulismhasremainedonthemargins.Inyetothercases,neither economicnorsecuritycriseshavebeennecessarytoproducethesuccessofa populistcampaigner.Aswiththepureeconomiccrisismodel,thisseemstobe acaseoftheorizingbasedonafewexceptionalcases.
Anothercommonapproachistoarguethatitistheinterpretationofa crisis,ratherthanthecrisisperse,thatresultsinpopulistsuccess.Forinstance, severalscholarshavearguedthatparty-systemcrisesonlyresultwhenthe partiesmakinguptheestablishedsystemareperceivedtohavebroughtabout acrisisbecauseoftheirowncorruptandself-servingbehavior.Corruption breaksvoters’ perceivedattachmenttoasystemofdistributionfromwhich
36 Onmethodologicalproblemsassociatedwithselectiononthedependentvariable,see Geddes1990.
37 Doyle2011;Remmer2011.InthestatisticalanalysisinChapter9,Ialso findnoevidenceof arelationshipbetweeneconomiccrisesandpopulistelectoralsuccess.
38 Tanaka1998. 39 BejaranoandPizarro2005.
theywouldhopetobenefit.JasonSeawrightwritesthat “votersabandonparty systemsbecausecorruptionscandalserodepatternsofpartyidentification, andbecausepoorideologicalrepresentationthenprovidesamotiveforturningtooutsidercandidates.”40 Moralisticappealstothepeoplearethestockin tradeofthepopulistpoliticiansosuchcrisesconditionsappearripefor exploitation.
However,itisproblematictoconcludethatpopulistsuccessisactually caused bycorruptioncrises(ortheperceptionofthem).Thegeneralproblem withrelyingonthepopularinterpretationofacrisistoexplainthatcrisis’ s politicalconsequencesisthatitbordersonthetautological,i.e.,wehaveno wayofknowingwhetheracrisisissufficientlyserioustobringaboutapopulist reactionuntilitdoesso.Highlycorruptdemocraciesareoftenextraordinarily stable.Insomecases,corruptionscandalsdodamagetheimageofthe incumbentparty,buttypicallydonotbringaboutaparty-systemcollapse. Muchofthetime,partiescanrideoutcorruptionscandalswithlittleapparent lossinsupport.Forexample,inBrazil,whilePresidentCollorresignedin1992 onthebackofaninfluence-peddlingcorruptionscandal,theimproperuseof governmentresourcesinthevote-buyingMensalãoscandalin2005hadonlya minorimpactonthepopularityofPresidentLulaandtherulingPartidodos Trabalhadores(PT);amidyetanothercorruptionscandal,Lula’sPTsuccessor, DilmaRousseff,wasimpeachedin2016.IntheIndiancase,corruption scandalswerecommonduringNehru’speriodofrule,yetvotersremained loyaltotheCongress.SimilarlyinJapan,corruptionhasbeensuchapersistent concernthatitisimpossibletoexplainthetimingofKoizumi’selectionwith referencetoitalone.Indeed,corruptionscandalsmaybepartlyendogenousto thepopularityofrulingparties,makingcausalidentificationespeciallychallenging.InItaly,forexample,althoughvotersultimatelyabandonedthe ChristianDemocratic(DC)partyinthewakeoftheTangentopoli or “bribecity”—affair,thetimingofthescandalwaspartlytheresultofadecline inthecohesionoftheDCitselfthatwasalreadyunderway.41 Moregenerally,it seemsthatthereisnowaytopredictexantewhichcorruptionscandalswillbe sufficienttobringaboutapoliticalcrisisortodeterminewhetheracorruption scandalisanexogenouscauseofadeclineinincumbentpartysupport.
A finalsetofexplanationsareconcernedwithwhatmightbebroadly groupedasdemographicoridentitycrises.Inthesecases,populistmobilizationisseenasaresponsetonewchallengestoamajoritypoliticalcommunity, typicallydefinedinethnonationalistterms.Bothimmigrationandmore entrenchedlinguisticandreligiouscleavageshavebeenimplicatedintherise ofpopulistmovements.Immigrationhasthepotentialtodisrupttheethnic andclassbasesofexistingpoliticalcommunities,andcanthusbringabout
40 Seawright2012:11. 41 KennyandCrepaz2012.
Another random document with no related content on Scribd:
lapse of time has inevitably drawn a line between the intellectual atmosphere in which those famous authors moved, and the current of modern thought. The same problems are with us to-day, but their appeal to us is made under new conditions; these Essays respond to an ever-present need for the wisdom of ages, but arrayed in the guise of 1915.
THE CAPTURE OF DE WET.
By P. J. SAMPSON.
With Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.
The rebellion in South Africa is one of the very few chapters in the history of the war which are already completed. It is a story in itself, somewhat apart from the main current of events, and even, curiously enough, from the story of the conquest of German South-West Africa to which it formed a preliminary. To people in England reading of it at the time in disconnected fragments in the newspapers, the whole thing was not only distressing but perplexing and unintelligible. It is well that they should be given a consecutive narrative of it, in its true perspective, by one who was on the spot, and familiar with the strangely diverse currents of feeling that animate the heterogeneous population of South Africa. The tale of the fighting—brisk, and full of movement—forms a striking contrast to the trench warfare of Western Europe, but it is the psychological rather than the military interest which predominates throughout the book. The protagonists reveal themselves with extraordinary vividness: on the one ride are the “slim” Germanized Beyers, and Christian de Wet, fanatical and irreconcilable to the last, a pitiful, tragic figure; on the other Botha plays the fine part with which we are already familiar; but probably few of us have realized, as this book enables us to realize, all that we owe to the hard-headed efficiency and clear-sighted sense of honour of General Smuts.
FROTH AND BUBBLE.
By MONTY HARBORD.
Illustrated. 10s. 6d. net.
“Froth and Bubble” is the light-hearted and breezy record of the life of a rolling stone. Mr. Harbord was young and athletic, a fine horseman, and fond of outdoor life, and went to Canada to look for experiences and adventures in the wild and woolly West. He encountered some of the rubs which are the lot of the tenderfoot, but was ready to take on any job that was going, and held his own well in any company. We next encounter him in Rhodesia, where he arrived just in time to take an active part in the Matabele Campaign. He remained in South Africa till the outbreak of the war. Such a man was sure to do his share, and a bit more, and Mr. Harbord’s modest narrative of his doings with the Imperial Light Horse well deserves lo be preserved. Finally he found his way to British East Africa, and— need we say?—did some big-game shooting.
GOD AND FREEDOM IN HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
A Study of Degrees of Reality.
C D L Y 1913-14, U D .
By the Right Rev. CHARLES F. D’ARCY, D.D., B D .
One Volume. 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.
The principle of Degrees of Reality has been coming to light more and more clearly in many recent developments of philosophical thought. The purpose of this work is to exhibit the principle in its relation to ordinary and scientific experience, and to apply the results so obtained to some of the fundamental problems of Theology.
HUMAN IMMORTALITY AND PRE-EXISTENCE.
By D . J. ELLIS M’TAGGART, F T C , C .
Crown 8vo. Cloth. 2s. 6d. net.
At the request of many friends, Dr. M’Taggart has reprinted the interesting chapters on Human Immortality and Pre-Existence from his well-known work “Some Dogmas of Religion,” in order to bring them within the reach of those readers who found the expense of the larger book a bar to its purchase. The author is recognized as one of the most distinguished exponents of Philosophy in the present day, and the subject of this little volume is of such vital importance that his carefully-thought-out propositions cannot fail to be of great interest.
A SURGEON IN BELGIUM.
By H. S. SOUTTAR, F.R.C.S.,
L S - -C B F H .
Popular Edition, Paper Cover, 2s. net. Cloth, 2s. 6d. net.
“This is one of the most impressive books that the war has yet produced; it should be read by everyone who wants to regard the struggle in its true perspective.”—Daily Telegraph.
“An excellently written book.”—Pall Mall Gazette.
“Admirably written and readable from beginning to end.”— Morning Post.
“Mr. Souttar is a surgeon with a gift for vivid writing. His book is a quite fascinating record of his experience.”—Daily News.
“Among the multitude of books on the war this must surely hold a foremost place.”—Westminster Gazette.
STORIES FROM “THE EARTHLY PARADISE.”
By WILLIAM MORRIS.
Retold in Prose by C. S. EVANS. Illustrated. Crown 8vo. 6s.
It is through our natural love of a story that we are led to appreciate the highest and best in literature. This is Mr. Evans’s justification for his collection of stories from William Morris’s most characteristic work, just as it was Charles Lamb’s for his famous tales from Shakespeare. Morris based most of his poems upon legends well known in other versions—some of the world’s best stories indeed—and it is hoped that the book will be read with interest for the stories themselves, and that it may also serve as an introduction to the work of the poet. With the latter object in view, Mr. Evans has reproduced, as far as possible, the poet’s own imagery, and has not been dismayed by the fact that, in the change from poetry to prose, that imagery may seem sometimes disproportionate and high-flown.
The stories included are “Atalanta’s Race,” “The Son of Crœsus,” “The Man Born to be King,” “The Love of Alcestis,” “The Land East of the Sun and West of the Moon,” “The Man Who Never Laughed Again,” “The Proud King,” “The Writing on the Image,” “The Story of Rhodope,” “Ogier the Dane,” “The Doom of King Acrisius,” and “The Lady of the Land.”
AT THE DOOR OF THE GATE.
By FORREST REID,
A “F D ,” “T B ,” “T G L ,” . Crown 8vo. 6s.
This is the most elaborate and finished piece of work its author has yet given us. The history of a young man’s life, it begins with his schooldays and follows him through the years of early manhood and of marriage, the picture being presented largely through his relations
with three women, each of whom reflects the principal character from a different point of view. The study of middle-class life, in its aspects of alternate comedy and tragedy, is painted on a broader canvas than the author has hitherto employed, but the central theme is followed closely, for from the first the hero is confronted by a spiritual reality which, while perpetually eluding him, seems ever about to come within his grasp. And in the last chapters it is this which gives a meaning to all that has gone before, so that we leave him, if not at the end of his journey, at least with the open door within sight, and the light shining beyond.