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Normativity:EpistemicandPractical

Normativity: Epistemicand Practical

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Acknowledgements vii ListofContributors ix Introduction1

ConorMcHugh,JonathanWay,andDanielWhiting

1.PuttingFallibilismtoWork12 CharityAnderson

2.PragmaticApproachestoBelief26 JessicaBrown

3.TheRelevanceoftheWrongKindofReasons47 UlrikeHeuer

4.DirectivesforKnowledgeandBelief68 DavidHunter

5.HowReasonsAreSensitivetoAvailableEvidence90 BenjaminKiesewetter

6.EvidenceandItsLimits115 ClaytonLittlejohn

7.TheExplanatoryProblemforCognitivismaboutPracticalReason137 ErrolLord

8.PragmaticEncroachment:ItsProblemsAreYourProblems!162 MatthewMcGrath

9.WhyOnlyEvidentialConsiderationsCanJustifyBelief179 KateNolfi

10.PracticalInterestsandReasonsforBelief200 BaronReed

11.TwoThesesabouttheDistinctnessofPracticalandTheoretical Normativity221 AndrewReisner

12.ReasoningwithReasons241

DanielStar

13.EpistemicInstrumentalism,Permissibility,andReasonsforBelief260

AsbjørnSteglich-Petersen

Acknowledgements

Thisvolumeemergesfromatwo-yearresearchproject, Normativity:Epistemic andPractical,basedattheUniversityofSouthampton.Weareverygratefulto theArtsandHumanitiesResearchCouncilforfundingthisproject(grant numberAH/K008188/1).WearealsogratefultoourcolleaguesinPhilosophy atSouthamptonforsupportingitinmanydifferentways,including,butnot limitedto,participatingintheproject’svariousactivities.Mostofthecontributionstothisvolumearedescendantsorrelativesofpaperspresentedinthe seminars,workshops,andconferencesaccompanyingtheproject.Thankstoall thosewhotookpartintheseevents,notleastthecontributorsthemselves. Finally,thanksofdifferentsortstoOxfordUniversityPress,especiallyPeter Momtchiloff,forencouragingandoverseeingthepublicationofthisvolume,and toSophieKeelingforpreparingtheindex.

ListofContributors

C HARITY A NDERSON ,BaylorUniversity,Texas

J ESSICA B ROWN ,UniversityofStAndrews

U LRIKE H EUER ,UniversityCollegeLondon

D AVID H UNTER ,RyersonUniversity,Ontario

B ENJAMIN K IESEWETTER ,HumboldtUniversityofBerlin

C LAYTON L ITTLEJOHN ,King’sCollegeLondon

E RROL L ORD ,UniversityofPennsylvania

M ATTHEW M C G RATH ,UniversityofMissouriandUniversityofStAndrews

C ONOR M C H UGH ,UniversityofSouthampton

K ATE N OLFI ,UniversityofVermont

B ARON R EED ,NorthwesternUniversity,Illinois

A NDREW R EISNER ,UppsalaUniversity

D ANIEL S TAR ,BostonUniversity,Massachusetts

A SBJØRN S TEGLICH -P ETERSEN ,AarhusUniversity

J ONATHAN W AY ,UniversityofSouthampton

D ANIEL W HITING ,UniversityofSouthampton

Introduction

1Introduction

WhatshouldIdo?WhatshouldIthink?Traditionally,ethiciststacklethe first question,whileepistemologiststacklethesecond.Thisdivisionoflabourcorrespondstoadistinctiontheoristsdrawbetween practical and epistemic normativity,wherenormativityisamatterofwhatoneshouldormaydoorthink,what onehasreasonorjustificationtodoortothink,whatitisrightorwrongtodoor tothink,andsoon,notsimplyofwhatoneinfactdoesorthinks.1

Thetendencyistoinvestigatetheissueofwhattodoindependentlyofthe issueofwhattothink,thatis,todoethicsindependentlyofepistemology,and viceversa.Butthereisagrowingawarenessthattreatingthetwoseparatelyleads todistortions,omissions,andmisunderstandings.Debatesoverepistemicnormativityhavefailedtotakeonboarddevelopmentsonthepracticalside;those discussingpracticalnormativityoftenmakegeneralclaimswhoseimplicationsin theepistemiccaseremainunexplored.

Severalconsiderationsseemtosupportadoptingamoresynopticapproachto mattersnormative.First,weuseparadigmaticnormativetermssuchas ‘ought’ , ‘right’,and ‘justification’ whenspeakingbothofactionandofbelief:forexample, ‘Yououghtnottosmoke’ and ‘Yououghtnottobelieveeverythingthetobacco companiestellyou’.Thereisnoobviousambiguityhere.Second,epistemic normsappeartogovernactionsofcertainsorts,forexample,assertingpropositionsorgatheringevidence,whilepracticalnormsappeartogovernthinkingof

1 Foreaseofpresentation,wewillspeakprimarilyofactionandbelief.But,ofcourse,practical attitudeslikeintentionarealsosubjecttonorms,andepistemicnormsgovernotherattitudes,such ascredences.Feelingsarealsosubjecttonorms.Theconnectionbetweenthosenormsandthe normsthatgovernactionandbeliefisaninterestingandimportantone,butnotthefocusofthis volume(althoughsee McGrath’scontributioninChapter8forsomediscussion).

certainsorts,forexample,practicalreasoning.Finally,thequestionofwhattodo oftenseemscloselytiedtothatofwhattothink.Forexample,itwouldbesurprising ifitweretoturnoutthattheissueofwhethertogiveapersonchocolatewerewholly independentoftheissueofwhethertothinkthatsheisdiabetic.

Theaimofthisvolumeistoexaminethenormswhichconcernusasagents alongsidethenormswhichconcernusasinquirers.Morespecifically,itisto exploresubstantiveandexplanatoryconnectionsbetweenpracticalandepistemic norms,toconsiderwhetherthesenormsareatsomelevelunified,andtoask whatthatmightmean.Theaimofthisintroductionistoprovideanoverviewof some bynomeansall ofthoseissuesandtoindicateinwhichcontributions theyappear.

2SubstantiveConnections

Inthissectionwewillconsidersomeofthewaysinwhichepistemicandpractical normativitymightbethoughttobesubstantivelyconnected.Aplacetobeginis thesuggestionthatthereis pragmaticencroachment onknowledge,thatwhether apersonknowsapropositiondoesnotdependonlyon,say,whetherherevidence supportsthatproposition,butalsoonbroadlypracticalconsiderations,suchas whatisatstakeinbelievingit.2 Toillustrate:

LOWOnFriday,Karendrivespastthebank.Shehasachequetodeposit thoughthereisnourgentneedtodoso.Karenwonderswhethershecould comebacktomorrowandrecallsthatthebankwasopenonSaturdaytwo weeksago.Sheconcludesthatthebankwillbeopentomorrow,too,andso decidestocomebackthen.ItturnsoutthatKarenisright thebankisopen tomorrow.

HIGHLikeLOWexceptthatthereisanurgentneedforKarentodepositthe cheque.ShehasamortgagepaymenttomakebySunday,whenthebankis closed,andherhousewillberepossessedifshefailstomakeit.3

ManyareinclinedtojudgethatinLOWKarenknowsthatthebankisopen.In contrast,manyareinclinedtojudgethatinHIGHshedoesnotknowthis.In bothcases,paradigmaticallyepistemicfactors,suchasthelevelofevidential

2 SeeFantlandMcGrath2002,2009;Hawthorne2004;Stanley2005.

3 LOWandHIGHarevariantsonthe ‘Bank’ casesofDeRose1992.Theoriginalversionsofthose casesinvolveexplicitattributionsordenialsofknowledge,andwereintendedtosupport,not pragmaticencroachment,buttheviewthatthetruth-conditionsofsuchattributionsdependon thepracticalcontextinwhichtheyaremade.

support,thereliabilityofthebelief-formingmechanisms,andsoon,arethesame. TheonlydifferenceisthatKarenhasmoretoloseinHIGHthaninLOW.

Manyofthosewhohavetheaboveinclinationsarealsoinclinedtosaythatin LOWKarenisjustifiedinbelievingthatthebankisopen,whileinHIGHsheis not,atleast,notfullyor flat-out.4

Suchcases,then,lendintuitivesupporttotheideathatpracticalconsiderations bearonwhetherapersonknowsorisjustifiedinbelievingaproposition. (McGrath defendstheideainChapter8,while Anderson and Reed opposeit (Chapters1and10,respectively);seealso Brown (Chapter2).)5 Lyingbehind thoseintuitionsmightbealinkingprinciplelikethefollowing:

Ifapersonisjustifiedinbelievingthatp,sheisjustifiedinactingonthebasis thatp.

Ofcourse,thisisjusta firstpass.Theideaitseekstocaptureisthat,ifabeliefis notanappropriatebasisforaction,ifitisnotappropriatetoactonthatbelief ’ s content,itisnotappropriatetohaveit.6 Thisistosaythatthereisasubstantive connectionbetweenthenormsgoverningactionandthosegoverningbelief.(For discussionofthisidea,independentofthedebateoverpragmaticencroachment, see Littlejohn’sChapter6and Star’sChapter12.)

Ifaprinciplelikethisholds,itexplainstheverdictsinHIGHandLOW.Itis appropriateforKareninLOWtousethecontentofherbeliefthatthebankis openasapremiseinherpracticalreasoningastowhethertocomeback tomorrow.ButitisnotappropriateforKareninHIGHtodothesame.Hence, inHIGHKarenisnotjustifiedinbelievingthatthebankisopen.Hence,shedoes notknowthis.

Theproponentofpragmaticencroachmentmaintainsthatinsomeway practicalconsiderations,specificallythecostsoferror,bearonwhethertobelieve aproposition.Aninterestingquestion(which Reed discussesinChapter10)is howthisrelatestoamoretraditionalformofpragmatism,accordingtowhich thecostsandbenefitsofbelievingcanprovidereasonsforandagainstdoing so.Suppose,forexample,thatarepresentativeofanunscrupulousoilcompany

4 See,forexample,FantlandMcGrath2009.

5 Forfurthercriticaldiscussion,seeAnderson2015;Brown2008;Levin2008;Reed2010.

6 Theauthorscitedinn2advancesomeversionofthisidea(seealsoHawthorneandStanley 2008).Forcriticaldiscussion,seeBrown2008;Gerken2011;McKinnon2011;Neta2009;Smithies 2012;WhitingForthcoming.

Arelated,butdistinct,principleisthat,ifapersonisjustifiedinbelievingthatsheisjustifiedin performingsomeact,thensheisjustifiedinperformingthatact.Fordiscussionanddefenceof principlesinthisballpark,seeGibbons2013;KiesewetterForthcoming;Littlejohn2012;Wayand Whiting2016.

offersyoua financialrewardforbelievingthatglobaltemperaturesarefalling. Theofferisnotevidencefortheproposition.So,onemightsay,itisnotan epistemicreasonforbelievingit.Buttheoffernonethelessseemstomanyto countinfavourofbelief;itis,theysay,apracticalorpragmaticreasonfor believing.7

Iftherearepracticalreasonsforbeliefinadditiontoepistemicreasons,this raisesthequestionofhow,ifatall,theyweighagainsteachother.Ifthepractical considerationsweighinfavourofbeliefbuttheevidentialconsiderationsweigh againstit,whatshouldapersonbelieveoverallorall-things-considered?Itis difficulttoknowhowtoanswerthisquestion.Thatmightsuggestitisabadone toask.Perhapsthereissomethingthatapersonshouldbelievefromanepistemic pointofviewandsomethingthatsheshouldbelievefromapracticalpointof view,butnothingthatsheshouldbelieve fullstop.(Fordiscussion,see Reisner’ s Chapter11.)

Thedistinctionbetweenepistemicandpracticalreasonsforbeliefseemstobe aninstanceofamoregeneraldistinctionbetweenwhataresometimescalled reasonsoftherightkind and reasonsofthewrongkind forattitudes.8 Supposethat theoilcompanyrepoffersyouarewardforintendingtodrivetowork.Togetthe reward,youdonothavetodrivetowork youonlyhavetointendtodoso.The offeris,onemightthink,areasonforhavingtheintentionbutitisareasonofan unorthodox(wrong)sort.Toseethis,supposethatdrivingtoworkisquicker thanwalking.Thisisareasonofanorthodox(right)kindtointendtodrive it revealsorindicatessomethinggoodaboutwhatyouintend.Buttherep’soffer doesnotinthesamewayrevealorindicateanythinggoodaboutwhatyou intend;instead,itindicatessomethinggoodabout intending it,abouthaving thatattitude.

Thisraisestheissueofhowexactlytodistinguishreasonsofthewrongkind fromreasonsoftherightkind.Inturn,itraisestheissueofwhetherthewayin whichwedrawthedistinctioninthecaseofbeliefcarriesovertothecaseof intentionorotherpracticalattitudes.Ifso,thismightrevealsomeimportant unitybetweenthenormsgoverningeachattitude;ifnot(as Heuer arguesin Chapter3),itmightcastdoubtonwhetherthereisanysuchunity.

Thesuggestionthatpracticalconsiderationsbearinsomewayontheepistemic statusofabeliefseemslikeachallengeto evidentialism.Astandardwayof characterizingthisisastheviewthatwhetherapersonisjustifiedinbelieving

7 Foranoverviewofthisissue,andextensivereferences,seeReisnerForthcoming.

8 Forsomeinfluentialdiscussionsofthisdistinction,seeHieronymi2005;Rabinowiczand R nnow-Rasmussen2004;Schroeder2012.

apropositionisdeterminedbyherevidence.9 Onewaytounderstandthisisto thinkthatwhetherapersonisjustifiedinperformingsomeactorhavingsome attitudeisingeneraldeterminedbythereasonsshepossesses.Thereasonsshe possessesforbelievingapropositionareprovided(only)byevidentialconsiderations,thatis,considerationsthatindicateormakelikelythatthatpropositionis true.Onthisaccount,thequestionofwhattobelieveissettledbyaperson’ s evidenceandherevidencealone.(InChapters4and6, Hunter and Littlejohn criticizethisviewindifferentways.)

Evidentialistsdenythatpracticalconsiderationsoftheabovesortprovide reasonsforbelieving.10 (Iftheyarerighttodoso,theproblemofhowtoreconcile theapparentdemandsofsuchreasonswiththedemandsofevidentialconsiderationsdoesnotarise.)Somedenymoregenerallythatreasonsofthewrongkind arereasonsatall;theyholdthattheyarereasonsonlyinname.Indoingso,they oftenappealtoaprinciplealongthefollowinglines:

Thatpisareasonforapersonto φ onlyifshecan φ forthereasonthatp.11

Asstated,thisprincipleappliesinboththeepistemicandpracticaldomains.If true,itmightseemtoruleoutreasonsofthewrongkind.Itseemsthatyou cannotbelievethatglobaltemperaturesarefallingforthereasonthatbyso believingyouwillgetareward.Norcanyouintendtodriveforthereasonthat bysointendingyouwillgetareward.12 (Fordiscussion,see Heuer’sChapter3.)

Theaboveisa motivational constraintonreasons.Consideralsothis epistemic constraint:

Thatpisareasonforapersonto φ onlyifsheisinapositiontoknowthatp.13

Thisisasubstantiveprinciplewhichalsoappliesinboththeepistemicand practicaldomains.Accordingtoit,onlyfactswithinaperson’skenprovide

9 SeeConeeandFeldman2004.

10 Morecarefully,somedenythis.Othersmakethemoremodestclaimthatonlyevidential considerationsbearonwhetherabeliefpossessesthekindofjustificationnecessaryforknowledge, thatis,for epistemic justification.

11 Williams1981isaninfluentialproponentofthisprinciple.Fordiscussionandfurther references,seeWayForthcoming-b;WayandWhitingForthcoming.

12 Forversionsofthisargument,seeKelly2002;Shah2006,2008.Fordoubtsabouttheclaims aboutwhatwecanbelieveandintendthatitrelieson,seeFrankish2007;Pink1991;Schroeder2012; Sharadin2016;WayForthcoming-b.Fordefence,seeArcherForthcoming;ShahandSilverstein 2013.

13 ProponentsofepistemicconstraintsofthissortincludeDancy2000;Gibbons2013;Lord 2015;Raz2011;and Kiesewetter (Chapter5,thisvolume).

reasonsforhertoactortothink.14 Thisistosay,whetherafactisareasonfora persondependsonherepistemicstatuswithrespecttothatfact.

Themotivationalconstraintmightbetakentosupporttheepistemicconstraint.Theidea,inshort,isthatifapersonisinnopositiontoknowareason, sheisnopositiontoactonit.15

Anepistemicconstraintoftheabovesortbearsonthedebatebetween objectivists and perspectivists aboutwhatissometimescalledthe deliberative ought,the oughtinplaywhenapersonasksherself,withtheaimofmakingadecision, ‘WhatoughtItodo?’16 Objectivistsmaintainthatwhatapersonoughtinthis sensetodoisdeterminedbythefacts,withoutrestriction.Perspectivists,incontrast, maintainthatwhatapersonoughtinthedeliberativesensetodoisdeterminedby herperspective.Whatconstitutesaperson’sperspective?Differentanswerstothis questionresultindifferentversionsofperspectivism.Forpresentpurposes,suppose thataperson’sperspectiveisconstitutedbyherevidence,understoodasincluding onlywhatsheisinapositiontoknow.Inviewofthis,consider:

Apatienthasatreatabledisease.Ifleftuntreateditwillleadtodeath.Allofthe doctor’sevidenceindicatesthatdrugAwillcureherpatientanddrugBwillkill her.Infact,drugAwillkillthepatientanddrugBwillcureher.

(cf.Jackson1991:462–3)

Accordingtoobjectivists,thedoctorinthiscaseoughttogivedrugB.According toperspectivists,thedoctoroughttogivedrugA.Ontheassumptionthata person ’sreasonsdeterminewhatsheoughttodo,theepistemicconstrainton reasonsaccordswiththeperspectivist’sverdicts(defendedinChapter5by Kiesewetter).Perspectiviststhusgiveepistemicfactorsacrucialroleinthe substantivedeterminationofcentralnormativefactsinthepracticalrealm.

3ExplanatoryConnections

Weturnnowfromsubstantiveconnectionsto explanatory ones.Theseinclude waysthatepistemicnormsmightbethoughttobeexplainedintermsofthe practical,orviceversa,aswellasunifyingexplanationsofboth.

Supposethatevidenceforapropositionjustifiesorprovidesareasonfor believingit.Whatmightexplainthis?Astandardanswerinepistemologyis

14 Onemight,ofcourse,proposealternativeprinciplesbyappealtoadifferentepistemicstatus thanthatofbeinginapositiontoknow.

15 Lord2015arguesatlengththattheepistemicconstraintfollowsfromthemotivationalone,at leastwhenthesearerestrictedtodecisivereasons.

16 Forsomefurthercontributionstothisdebate,seeGraham2010;Kiesewetter2011;Mason 2013;Zimmerman2014.

teleological.Havingtruebeliefs(andavoidingfalsebeliefs)isanend.Ifaperson hasevidenceforaproposition,thisindicatesthat,inbelievingit,shewillrealize orsecurethisend.Hence,suchevidenceisorprovidesareasonforsobelieving.17

Inwhatwayisbelievingwhatistrueanend?One nottheonly wayto understandthisisasanaimthatpeoplehaveinformingandrevisingbeliefs.18 Thisproposalrepresentsepistemicnormativityasaspeciesof instrumental normativity,whichisoftentakentobeaparadigmaticformofpracticalnormativity.Ifapersonaimstobakeacake,instrumentalrationalityinsomeway requireshertotakethemeanstosatisfyingthisaim,say,bybuyingtheingredients.Inasimilarfashion,whenapersonaimstobelievethetruth,instrumental rationalityinsomewayrequireshertotakethemeanstosatisfyingthisaim,say, byfollowingherevidence.(Steglich-Petersen defendssuchanaccountofepistemicnormativityinChapter13.)

Anotherproposaltakesofffromthethoughtthatbeliefsprovidethebasisfor actionortheinputtopracticalreasoning.Forexample,whenapersonbelieves thatthereciperequireseggs,shemightonthatbasisfetchsome.Thisproposal canalsobedevelopedinabroadlyteleologicalway.Onemightthinkthatitisthe functionorpurposeofbelieftoservethisrole.Inturn,onemightseektoexplain whyevidenceprovidesareasonforbeliefbyappealtothatfunctionorpurpose. Evidenceforabeliefindicatesthatitisanaccurateguideforaction,hence,thatit is fitforinclusioninpracticaldeliberation.Hence,suchevidenceisorprovidesa reasonforbelief.19 Itisaninterestingquestionwhetherthisexplanationcompeteswithorcomplementstheprecedingone.(Nolfi defendsaproposalofthis sortinChapter9,while Brown challengestheideathatbeliefshouldbeunderstoodintermsofitspracticalroleinChapter2.)

Theseareexamplesofhowonemighttrytogroundepistemicnormativityin practicalnormativityorconcerns.(Formoreexamples,see Reed’sChapter10.) Inthisway,wemight findexplanatoryconnectionsbetweentheepistemicand practicaldomains.Ofcourse,suchexplanatoryconnectionsmightruninthe otherdirection.Consideragaininstrumentalrationality.Hereisaroughformulationofanormofinstrumentalrationality:

Youmustintendto ψ ifyouintendto φ andbelievethat φingisanecessary meansto ψing.

17 Foley1987givesaclassicdevelopmentofsuchanapproach;foramorerecentdefence,see Ahlstrom-VijandDunn2014.InfluentialcriticsincludeBerker2013andKelly2003.

18 Foraninfluentialdiscussionofthisidea,seeVelleman2000.SeealsoMcHugh2012-a,2012-b; ShahandVelleman2005;Steglich-Petersen2006.

19 Forotherwaysofdevelopingthisidea,seeCôté-Bouchard2015;Whiting2014.

Supposethatintendingtodosomethinginvolvesbelievingthatyouwilldoit.In thatcase,theabovenormmightseemtofollowfromarequirementof epistemic rationality:

Youmustbelievethatyouwill ψ ifyoubelievethatyouwill φ andbelievethat youwill φ onlyifyouwill ψ.

So,giventhe ‘cognitivist’ assumptionthatintentionsinvolvebeliefs,onemight trytogroundacertainsortofpracticalnorminacertainsortofepistemic norm. 20 (Forcriticismofthisapproach,see Lord’sChapter7.)

Analternativewaytogroundthepracticalintheepistemicistoofferan accountofsomenormativeproperty,suchasthatofbeingareason,which appealstoanepistemicproperty.Considertheproposalthatareasonfora personto φ isevidencethatsheoughtto φ. 21 Forexample,thatapersonisin painisevidencethatyououghttohelpher.Hence,onthisview,itisareasonfor doingso.Thisaccount(which Star defendsinChapter12)explainspractical reasonsintermsofacentralepistemicproperty,thatof evidence

Itisarguablyanattractivefeatureofthisviewthatitoffersa unified account ofreasons,onethatappliestoreasonsforbeliefaswellasreasonsforaction.Reasons ofallkindsareevidence;epistemicreasonsareevidencethatapersonoughtto believeapropositionwhilepracticalreasonsareevidencethatapersonoughttoact. Ofcourse,itisnottheonlyviewofthisunifyingsortonthemarket.Consider theviewthatreasonsarefactsthatexplainwhyapersonoughtto φ,where φing mightbeactingorbelieving.22 Orconsidertheviewthatreasonsarepremises ofgoodreasoning,whethertoatheoreticalconclusion,abelief,orapractical conclusion,anintentionoraction. 23 Theteleologicalproposalnotedabove mightalsobeunderstoodinthisway:reasonsto φ whether φingisbelieving oracting areconsiderationswhichhelpexplainwhy φingpromotesone ’ s aims(desires,wants,etc.).24,25

Despitetheirdifferences,theseaccountsofwhatitistobeareasonassumethat aunifiedexplanation thatis,onethatappliestobothreasonsforbeliefand reasonsforaction ispossible.Suchanaccountisattractive,insofarasit

20 Foranearlystatementofthiskindofview,seeHarman1976.Formorerecentdefences,see Setiya2007;Velleman1989;Wallace2006.Forcriticism,seeBratman1999:ch.13;Brunero2009.

21 SeeKearnsandStar2009;Thomson2008. 22 Forthisview,seeBroome2013.

23 Forversionsofthisview,seeSetiya2014;WayForthcoming-a.

24 Schroeder2007expressessympathyforthisview.SeealsoFinlay2006.

25 Unlikesomeoftheviewsdiscussedearlierinthissection,theseviewsaretypicallypresentedas analysesofreasons thatis,accountsofwhatitistobeareason ratherthansimplyasaccountsof whatgroundsreasonsorofwhatexplainsreasons.Forarecentdiscussionoftherelationship betweenanalysesandgrounds,seeRosen2015.

promisestoexplainthesimilaritiesbetweenreasonsforbeliefandaction.Nonetheless,onemight,ofcourse,doubtthatanysuchaccountispossible.Perhaps reasonsforbeliefarejustverydifferentbeastsfromreasonsforaction(as Heuer suggestsinChapter3).Perhaps,inturn,oughtsastheyapplytobeliefarevery differentbeastsfromoughtsastheyapplytoaction.Moregenerally,perhapsthe normsgoverningbeliefareentirelyindependentofthenormsgoverningaction. Ontheseviews,thedomainofthenormativeisfragmentedor,rather,thereisnot onesuchdomainbutanumberofthem.Suchviewswouldalsohavetheir attractions forinstance,theymightexplainwhyitishardtomakesenseof weighingpracticalreasonsagainstepistemicreasons.(Fordiscussion,seealso Reisner’sChapter11.)

4Conclusion

Theaboveprovidesanoverviewofsomeofthethemeswhichthecontributionsto thiscollectionexplore.Wemakenopretencethattheoverview,orforthatmatter thecollectionitself,isexhaustive.Thequestionofhowpracticalnormsand epistemicnormsrelateraisesmanymoreissuesthananyonevolumecancover. Thehopeisthatthecollectionasawholedemonstratestheimportanceandinterest ofaskingthatquestionandthemanylinesofinquirythatleadfromit.

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PuttingFallibilismtoWork

CharityAnderson

1Introduction

Aconnectionbetweenknowledgeandreasonsforactionisdefendedinrecent literatureasfollows:whenoneknows p oneisinagoodenoughepistemic positiontotreat p asareasonforaction(hereafter, Sufficiency).1 Sufficiency orsomenuancedversionofit isusedtomotivatepragmaticencroachment:the viewthatpragmaticfactorsarerelevanttowhetherasubjecthasknowledge.2 Whencombinedwithfallibilism thewidelyacceptedideathatknowledgeis compatiblewithanepistemicchanceoferror Sufficiency resultsinarather counterintuitivepicture.3 Namely,itresultsintherejectionofpurism,theview thatpragmaticfactorsareirrelevanttoknowledge.4 Fallibilism,purism,and Sufficiency eachhavesubstantial primafacie intuitivesupport;andyetthethree seemtoformaninconsistenttriad.

Toseewhythesethreehavebeenthoughttoformatrilemma,considertwo agentswiththesameratherstrongepistemicpositionforaproposition.Suppose thepracticaldetailsaresuchthatoneagentoughttoact,buttheotheroughtnot

1 Aknowledge-reasonsconnectionhasalsobeendefendedintermsofanecessaryprinciple: oneisappropriatetotreat p asareasonforactiononlyifoneknows p.Thischapterisneutral withrespecttothisprinciple.

2 SeeFantlandMcGrath(2002,2007,2009),Hawthorne(2004),Stanley(2005),andHawthorne andStanley(2008).

3 Fallibilismisatechnicaltermandalthoughthereisnoagreed-upondefinition,thereisacore ideathatisoftenexpressedintermsofthecompatibilityofknowledgewithachanceoferror.In Section3,Iofferaglossonthenotionofepistemicchanceoferrorthatprovidesawaytounderstand fallibilismwhilealsomaintainingaknowledge-firstframework.

4 Alsoknownas intellectualism,thisviewissometimescharacterizedastheideathattwosubjects withthesamestrengthofepistemicpositionfor p areinthesamepositiontoknow p.Itisnot entirelyclearwhichfactorscountas ‘epistemic’ andwhichdonot,butonepointofagreementthat tendstoguidediscussionisthatpracticalfactors,suchasthecostofbeingwrongabout p,arenot epistemic.

toact,forsomeaction(oftenthisisdonebypositingthatoneagentisina ‘highstakes’ settingandtheotherina ‘low-stakes’ setting).Assumingfallibilism,it’ s naturaltothinktheagentinthe ‘low-stakes’ settingknows.Giventhisassumption,wecanseewhy Sufficiency andpurismcannotbothbeaffirmed:if Sufficiency istrue,thentheagentthatoughtnotactdoesnotknowtherelevant proposition.Sincethedifferencebetweentheagentthatknowsandtheagentthat doesn’tknowisduetosomenon-epistemicfactor(theagent’spracticalsituation),purismisviolated.(Ifweinsteadstartbyholdingpurism fixed,wegetthe resultthat Sufficiency isviolated.)5

Forbetterorworse(inmyopinion,forbetter),fallibilismhasearnedthestatus ofanindispensablecommitmentofcontemporaryepistemology.Fromthis vantagepoint,theproblemcouldbestatedasadilemmaforfallibilists:fallibilists mustchoosebetweenpurismand Sufficiency. 6 Onegoalofthischapteristoshow thatthereisafallibilistoptionthatcanavoidthetrilemma.

Myprimarygoal,though,istoargueagainstpragmaticencroachmentby arguingagainst Sufficiency.Thestructureofthischapterisasfollows:in Section2,Ichallengetheaccountofreasonsthatunderliesoneprominentway ofarguingfor Sufficiency andthenproposeanalternativeaccountoftherelationshipbetweenknowledgeandreasonsforaction. Section3examinesthe trilemmabetweenpurism,fallibilism,and Sufficiency anddelineatesaposition thatcanmaintainallthree.Thus,thereisawayoutofthetrilemma.Iconclude witha finalconsiderationinsupportofmypreferredresolutionofthetrilemma: rejectionof Sufficiency.

2Against SafeReasons andKJ

2.1Unpackingtheprinciples

Theknowledge-actionlinkshavebeenformulatedinavarietyofnuancedways. Iwillfocushereonthefollowingconceptionof Sufficiency,defendedatlengthby JeremyFantlandMatthewMcGrath(2009):

(KJ)Ifyouknowthat p,then p iswarrantedenoughtojustifyyouin ϕ-ing, forany ϕ. 7

5 SeeFantlandMcGrath(2009:84–6)foradetailedexplanationofthetrilemma.

6 FantlandMcGrath(2009:lastchapter)discussinfallibilismasatenableoption,thoughtheydo notgoasfarastorecommendthatwerejectfallibilism;onthecontrary,theyseemtostronglyfavor maintainingfallibilism.

7 AlternativewordingsofKJreplace “p iswarrantedenoughtojustifyyouin ϕ-ing,forany ϕ” withotherphrases,suchas “oneisinagoodenoughepistemicpositiontorelyon p inpractical

ThecentralargumentFantlandMcGrathoffertomotivateKJinvolvesa frameworkthatconnectsknowledgeandrationalactionviareasons.Theircase forKJisbasedonthefollowingtwoprinciplesaboutreasons:

(KR)Ifyouknowthat p,then p iswarrantedenoughtobeareasonyouhave to ϕ,forany ϕ.(2009:69)

(SafeReasons)If p isareasonyouhaveto ϕ,then p iswarrantedenoughto justifyyouin ϕ-ing,forany ϕ.(2009:77)8

InwhatfollowsIwillarguethatSafeReasonsisfalse.Ifmyargumentsucceeds, onemotivationforKJisundermined.ThesamelineofreasoningIofferagainst SafeReasonscanbeadvancedagainstKJdirectly,showingKJtobefalse.

Afewpreliminarypointsareinorder.First,therearemultiplewaysapropositioncouldfailtojustifyyouin ϕ-ing;epistemicproprietyisjustonedimension alongwhichwecanevaluatereasonsforaction.Theseprinciplesspeakonlyto theepistemicproprietyof p forjustifiedaction.To fixonhowepistemicpropriety comesapartfromotherkindsofpropriety,considerasettingwherefreedoughnutsarebeinggivenoutjustoutsideyouroffice,butyouhavenoideathatthis isthecase.Youfailtobeintherightkindofepistemicpositiontowardsthe proposition therearefreedoughnutsoutsideyouroffice thatisrequiredforyouto bejustifiedintreatingthispropositionasyourreasonforsteppingoutside.

Alternatively,apropositioncouldfailtojustifyyouin ϕ-ingbecause,despite havingstrongwarrantfortheproposition,thepropositionfailstobeconnected intherightwayto ϕ-ing.Forexample,evenifIhavetop-gradewarrantforthe proposition Iexist,thispropositiondoesnotjustifymeinwalkingmydog becauseitfailstobeconnectedintherightwaytotheaction.Nevertheless,the proposition Iexist is warrantedenough tojustifymeinwalkingmydog.Inthis case,somethingotherthanepistemicproprietyprevents Iexist fromjustifying meinwalkingmydog.

reasoning” (Brown2012:155)and “itisappropriatetotreat p asareasonforacting” (Hawthorne andStanley2008:578).Thedifferencesinwordingwillnotbesignificantformypurposes:the difficultiesIraiseforKJcanbeextendedtotheseversionsoftheprinciple.InSection3,Idiscussa wayofunderstandingHawthorneandStanley’sprinciplethatdoesnotequateitwithKJ.

8 Theargumentdependsonafurtherconnectingprinciple: (ConnectingPrinciple):If p iswarrantedenoughtobeareasonyouhavefor ϕ-ing, then p iswarrantedenoughtojustifyyouin ϕ-ing,forany ϕ. IwillfocusmydiscussiononSafeReasonsratherthantheConnectingPrinciplefortworeasons: first,itistheprinciplethatplaysacentralroleinFantlandMcGrath’sdiscussion;andsecond,the locutionofa ‘reasononehas’ mapsontoordinarylanguagemoreeasilythanthe ‘warrantedenough tobeareasononehas.’ ButnotethattheargumentIlevelagainstSafeReasonsisalsoa counterexampletotheConnectingPrinciple.

Thediscussioninthischapterconcernswhenweaknessinone’sepistemic positionmakesitinappropriatetotreatapropositionasareasonforaction.In FantlandMcGrath’spreferredterminology,thesearesituationswhereweakness inepistemicposition ‘standsintheway’ ofapropositionjustifyingaction.9 To identifywhenweaknessinepistemicpositionstandsinthewayofaproposition justifyingaction,Iintroducethefollowingtest:

Strengtheningtest:whatSoughttodoisthesameaswhatSoughttodo conditionalon p.

Whenwhatoneoughttododiffersfromwhatoneoughttodoconditionalon someproposition,onefailsthestrengtheningtestforthatproposition.Whenone failsthetest,epistemicweaknessstandsinthewayofappropriatelytreatingthat propositionasareasontoact.10 Thestrengtheningtestisnaturallyappliedina decisiontheoryframework,wherewhatoneoughttodoisthetoprankedaction onanorderinggivenbyone’sepistemicpositionandutilities.11 Whatoneought todoconditionalonsomepropositionistheactionthatrankstopconditionalon thatproposition.12

Thestrengtheningtestplaysanimportantroleintheprinciplesabove.Passing thestrengtheningtestisanecessaryconditiononapropositionbeingareason onehasto ϕ (bySafeReasons).Inthesameway,KJmakespassingthestrengtheningtestanecessaryconditiononknowledge.Iwillargueagainstbothofthese principles.MydiscussionleavesKRuntouchedasaplausibleconnectionbetween knowledgeandreasonsforaction.ThepictureIaminclinedtowardsisone wherebywhenoneknowsapropositionthepropositionisareasonone has toact, butwherebeingareasononehasdoesnotentailthatoneisappropriatetotreat

9 SeeFantlandMcGrath(2009:67–8).

10 Passingthestrengtheningtestisnotasufficientconditionforone’sepistemicpositiontobe warrantedenoughtojustifyactionbecauseonemightpassthetesteventhoughone’sepistemic positionisveryweak.Plausiblythereissomeminimalthresholdrequired,inadditiontopassingthe strengtheningtest,inorderfor p tobewarrantedenoughtojustifyaction.

11 Thenotion ‘epistemicposition’ is flexiblewithrespecttovariousinterpretations;asIuseit here,itissubjecttoafewconstraints: first,itexcludesnon-epistemicfeaturesofone’ssituation; second,itisexternalist one ’sepistemicpositiondoesnotsuperveneonone’sinternalmentalstate. Third,one’sepistemicpositionisnottobeconstruedasincludingone’stotalknowledge,asonsuch apictureonewillautomaticallypassthestrengtheningtestforeachpropositionknown.See Section3forfurtherdiscussionandforarelaxingofthislastconstraint.

12 Someadvocatesoftheknowledge-actionprinciplesmayobjecttoatestthatreliesondecision theory.Formypurposeshere,thehelpfulnessofthetestreliesononlybasicandrelativelyharmless featuresofdecisiontheory.ThestrengtheningtestbearsstrongsimilaritytotheslogantestthatFantl andMcGrathoffer(2009:68),whichisasfollows: “ifmerelystrengtheningyourepistemicposition canmakeadifferenceastowhether p justifiesyouin ϕ-ing,thenweaknessesinyourepistemic positionstandinthewayofitssojustifyingyou.”

thepropositionasareasontoact thus,beingareasononehastoactdoesnot requirepassingthestrengtheningtest.13 Ourepistemicpositionforreasonswe haveisnotalwaysstrongenoughtopassthestrengtheningtest.(Thisshouldbe unsurprising,givenfallibilism.)14

Finally,weneedtomakeitclearthat,accordingtoSafeReasons,reasonsyou haveareabletojustify any availableaction.AsFantlandMcGrath(2009:77) state:if p isa “reasonyouhave,thenthechancethat[p]isfalsecan’tstandin thewayof[p]justifyingyouindoinganything.”15 SafeReasonsclaimsthat when p isareasononehasto ϕ, p iswarrantedenoughtojustifyyouin any availableaction.16 Hence,thestrengtheningtestisanapttest,asittestsall availableactionssimultaneously.Ifoneoughttoxandy,butconditionalon p oneoughttoxand~y,thenonefailsthestrengtheningtest.Onecannotpass thestrengtheningtestforaparticularavailableactionwhilefailingforother availableactions:failingforoneactionisfailingforall.

Byrequiringthatonepassthestrengtheningtest,SafeReasonsplacesa stringentrequirementonbeingareasononehas.KJlikewiseplacesastringent testonknowledge.Whether p isareasononehasto ϕ andwhetheroneknows p, onthispicture,willdependonwhatactionsareavailableinanygivenscenario.In situationswheretherearemultipleavailableactions,for p tobewarranted enoughtojustifySin ϕ-ing,itmustbethatforallactionsavailabletoS,what SoughttododoesnotdifferfromwhatSoughttodoconditionalon p.Pisnota reasonShasto ϕ if p isnotwarrantedenoughtojustifySin ψ-ing.Thismaystrike someasaparticularlydemandingrequirementonreasonsonehas.InSection2.2, wewillseehowthisfeatureplaysoutincounterintuitiveways.

13 Thereisanexpansiveliteraturediscussing ‘reasonsonehas.’ Thediscussioninthischapteris limitedtotheepistemicpositionrequiredfor p tobeareasononehas itisneutralwithrespectto otherrequirements,andinparticularitisneutralwithrespecttotheconditionsunderwhich p isan objectivereasonto ϕ.ThroughoutthechapterIwillspeakasthoughknowledgeissufficienttomake p areasononehas,butofcourseknowing p isnotsufficientfor p tomeettheobjectiverequirements onbeingareasononehas,iftherearesuchrequirements.SeeSchroeder(2008)forahelpful discussionofobjectiveandsubjectivereasons.

14 AlthoughI findtheknowledge-reasonsconnectionrepresentedbyKRattractive,theargument offeredinthischapterdoesnotcommitonetoKR.Rather,itleavesopentheoptiontorejectKR.See Brown(2011)fordiscussionofthisroute.

15 AnexplicitformulationofSafeReasons,asFantlandMcGrathintendittobeunderstood,is therebyasfollows:forallS, p, ϕ,if p isareasonShasto ϕ,thenforall ψ, p iswarrantedenoughto justifySin ψ-ing.

16 AlthoughFantlandMcGrathdonotqualify ‘anyaction’ asany available action,asIdohere, thisseemstobetheirintendedmeaning.In(2009:67)theyusespecificationssuchas ‘inacertain situation’ or ‘merelystrengtheningyourepistemicposition’ holding fixedotherfactors(suchasthe agent’sstakes).Inholding fixedasubject’sstakes,Itakeitthatwehold fixedwhatactionsare availabletotheagent(thatthesubjectisnotfacingahigh-stakesbet,etc.).Theadditionof ‘available’ merelymakesthisevident.SeealsoFantlandMcGrath(2009:224–9)forrelevantdiscussion.

2.2Againstsafereasons

Considerthefollowingcase:

Dinner

AllitellsherhusbandTimthatsheisgoingoutfortheeveningandwon’tbe homeuntillate.Onthebasisofhertestimony,Tim’sepistemicpositionforthe proposition Alliwillbehomelate (hereafterHOMELATE)isverystrong.Tim decidestomakepizzafordinner.Allihatespizza,soheonlyhaspizzafor dinnerwhensheisout.Heconsidersinvitinghisbrotherovertoplaychess, butdecidesnottosinceAllirecentlyhadahugedisagreementwithhisbrother andshemadeitcleartoTimthatshedoesnotwanttoseehimforawhile.17

Tim’sepistemicpositionforHOMELATEisverystrongbutnottoplevel.Given hisepistemicposition,heisjustifiedinmakingpizzabutheshouldn’tinvitehis brotherover.AlthoughAllialmostnevercomeshomeearlywhenshegoesoutfor theevening,ifshedidshewouldbeveryupsettorunintoTim’sbrother.Wecan imagineTimsayingtohisbrotheronthephone: “I’mmakingpizzafordinner tonight Alliisn’tgoingtobehomeuntillate.I’dinviteyouovertoplaychess, butifshecamehomeearlythat’dbeadisaster;Iwouldn’twantyouguystorun intoeachother.” Timoughtnotinvitehisbrotherover,eventhoughstrengtheninghisepistemicpositionforHOMELATEmakesitsuchthatTimoughtto invitehisbrotherover thatis,conditionalonHOMELATE,Timoughttoinvite hisbrotherover.Timfailsthestrengtheningtest.

ItisnaturaltothinkthatHOMELATEisareasonTimhastodocertain actions,andinparticular,itisnaturaltothinkHOMELATEisareasonTimhas tomakepizza.ButHOMELATEisnotwarrantedenoughtojustifyTimin any availableaction.Sometimesone’sepistemicpositionisstrongenoughtojustify oneactionwhilesimultaneouslynotstrongenoughtojustifyanotheraction.

Considerthefollowingstatements:

(1)HOMELATEisareasonTimhastomakepizza.

(2)HOMELATEisareasonTimhastoinvitehisbrotherover.

(3)Timoughttomakepizzaandoughtnotinvitehisbrotherover.

(4)HOMELATEiswarrantedenoughtojustifyTiminmakingpizza.

(5)HOMELATEisnotwarrantedenoughtojustifyTimininvitinghis brotherover.

(6)ConditionalonHOMELATE,Timoughttoinvitehisbrotherover.

17 Thiscase firstappearsinAnderson(2015).

Eachof(1)–(6)areplausiblethingstosayaboutthiscase.But(1),(5),and(6)are jointlyincompatiblewithSafeReasons.Twopointsdeserveemphasishere.First, (1)is primafacie veryplausible:Tim’sepistemicpositionforthepropositionis verystrongandmakingpizzaistherationalthingforhimtodo.Inthisway, denialof(1)isacost.ButaccordingtoSafeReasons,(1)isfalse.Second,the reasontheproponentofSafeReasonsmustdeny(1)issurprising:theadvocateof SafeReasonsmustdeny(1) because (5)and(6)aretrue.Butintuitively,whether HOMELATEisareasonTimhastomakepizzashouldnotdependonwhether HOMELATEiswarrantedenoughtojustifyTimininvitinghisbrotherover.Safe Reasonsforcesthiscounterintuitiveresult.

Itmightbetemptingtothinkthattheproblemcouldbeavoidedbyintroducingprobabilities.Theenvisionedstrategyclaimsthatthepropositionavailableto functionasTim’sreasontomakepizzais ProbablyAlliiscominghomelate (hereafter,HOMELATE*).TheideaisthatifHOMELATE* isareasonTimhas foraction,ratherthanHOMELATE,thenHOMELATE* canexplainwhyTimis justifiedindoingoneactionbutnottheother.

The firstthingtonoteaboutthisstrategyisthatifAllicomeshomelateand asksTimwhyhemadepizzafordinner,hewon’tgiveashisreasonthatshe probablywascominghomelate.Hisreasonformakingpizzaisthatshewas cominghomelate.Propositionsaboutprobabilitiesdonotalwaysprovideplausiblealternativeswhenitcomestothereasonsthatactuallymotivateus.

Furthermore,inatleastsomecases,theshifttoHOMELATE* willmerelypush theproblembackastep.ConsiderthataccordingtoSafeReasons,ifHOMELATE* isareasonTimhasto ϕ,thenHOMELATE* iswarrantedenoughto justifyTimin ϕ-ing,forany ϕ.ButassumethatTimhasaverystrongbutless thantop-levelepistemicpositionforHOMELATE*.Wecanconstructthedetails ofthecaseinsuchawaythatTimisrationaltomakepizza,butisnotrationalto invitehisbrotherover,eventhoughconditionalonHOMELATE* heisrational toinvitehisbrotherover.WhenHOMELATE* failsthestrengtheningtest,by SafeReasons,HOMELATE* isnotareasonTimhastodoanyaction.Thereis nothingspecialaboutpropositionsaboutprobabilitiesthatmakethemresistant tocounterexamplesofthekindin Dinner. 18

18 Thestrategycanberepeatedathigherlevels.TheadvocateofSafeReasonsmightsuggestthat Tim’sreasonisonly probablyHOMELATE*.Butthereisnoreasoninprinciplewhythecounterexamplecannotbeconstructedaroundthisalternativeproposition.Foreachiterationtherewillbe caseswhere,givenfallibleknowledgeoftherelevantpropositionandtherightdetailsofthecase,the replacementpropositionwilljustifyoneactioneventhoughweaknessinepistemicpositionfor thepropositionstandsinthewayofanotheraction.Ofcourse,themoreiterationsthatareadded,the lessplausibleitwillbethatweactuallytreatthesuggestedpropositionasourreasonforacting.

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in the Fortieth. The influences, brought to bear on members were as likely to be operative upon them in the future as in the present, and were so intended. Mr. Ames and Mr. Brooks have both continued members of the House to the present time, and so have most of the members upon whom these influences were sought to be exerted. The committee are, therefore, of opinion that the acts of these men may properly be treated as offenses against the present House, and so within its jurisdiction upon the most limited rule.

Two members of the committee, Messrs. Niblack and McCrary, prefer to express no opinion on the general jurisdictional questions discussed in the report, and rest their judgment wholly on the ground last stated.

In relation to Mr. Ames, he sold to several members of Congress stock of the Credit Mobilier Company, at par, when it was worth double that amount or more, with, the purpose and intent thereby to influence their votes and decisions upon matters to come before Congress.

The facts found in the report as to Mr. Brooks, show that he used the influence of his official positions as member of Congress and Government director in the Union Pacific Railroad Company, to get fifty shires of the stock of the Credit Mobilier Company, at par, when it was worth three or four times that sum, knowing that it was given to him with intent to influence his votes and decisions in Congress, and his action as a Government director.

The sixth section of the act of February 26, 1853, 10 Stat. United States, 171, is in the following words:

“If any person or persons shall, directly or indirectly, promise, offer, or give, or cause or procure to be promised, offered, or given, any money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or any promise, contract, undertaking, obligation, or security for the payment or delivery of any money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or any other valuable thing whatever, to any member of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, after his election as such member, and either before or after he shall have qualified and taken his seat, or to any officer of the United States, or person holding any place of trust or profit, or discharging any official function under or in connection with any Department of the Government of the United States, or under the

Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, after the passage of this act, with intent to influence his vote or decision on any question, matter, cause, or proceeding which may then be pending, or may by law, or under the Constitution of the United States, be brought before him in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or profit, and shall thereof be convicted, such person or persons so offering, promising, or giving, or causing or procuring to be promised, offered, or given, any such money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or any promise, contract, undertaking, obligation, or security for the payment or delivery of any money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or other valuable thing whatever, and the member, officer, or person who shall in anywise accept or receive the same, or any part thereof, shall be liable to indictment as for a high crime and misdemeanor in any of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction for the trial of crimes and misdemeanors; and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not exceeding three times the amount so offered, promised, or given, and imprisoned in the penitentiary not exceeding three years; and the person so convicted of so accepting or receiving the same, or any part thereof, if an officer or person holding any such place of trust or profit as aforesaid, shall forfeit his office or place; and any person so convicted under this section shall forever be disqualified to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.”

In the judgment of the committee, the facts reported in regard to Mr. Ames and Mr. Brooks would have justified their conviction under the above-recited statute and subjected them to the penalties therein provided.

The committee need not enlarge upon the dangerous character of these offenses. The sense of Congress is shown by the severe penalty denounced by the statute itself. The offenses were not violations of private rights, but were against the very life of a constitutional Government by poisoning the fountain of legislation.

The duty devolved upon the committee has been of a most painful and delicate character. They have performed it to the best of their ability. They have proceeded with the greatest care and deliberation, for while they desired to do their full duty to the House and the country, they were most anxious not to do injustice to any man. In forming their conclusions they have intended to be entirely cool and

dispassionate, not to allow themselves to be swerved by any popular fervor on the one hand, or any feeling of personal favor and sympathy on the other.

The committee submit to the House and recommend the adoption of the following resolutions.

“1. Whereas Mr. Oakes Ames, a Representative in this House from the State of Massachusetts, has been guilty of selling to members of Congress shares of stock in the Credit Mobilier of America, for prices much below the true value of such stock, with intent thereby to influence the votes and decisions of such members in matters to be brought before Congress for action: Therefore,

Resolved, That Mr. Oakes Ames be, and he is hereby, expelled from his seat as a member of this House.

2. Whereas Mr. James Brooks, a Representative in this House from the State of New York, did procure the Credit Mobilier Company to issue and deliver to Charles H. Neilson, for the use and benefit of said Brooks, fifty shares of the stock of said company, at a price much below its real value, well knowing that the same was so issued and delivered with intent to influence the votes and decisions of said Brooks, as a member of the House, in matters to be brought before Congress for action, and also to influence the action of said Brooks as a Government director in the Union Pacific Railroad Company: Therefore,

Resolved, That Mr. James Brooks be, and he is hereby, expelled from his seat as a member of this House.

The House, after much discussion, modified the propositions of the committee of investigation, and subjected Oakes Ames and James Brooks to the “absolute condemnation of the House.” Both members died within three months thereafter.

The session was full of investigations, but all the others failed to develop any tangible scandals. The Democrats demanded and secured the investigation of the New York custom-house; the United States Treasury; the use of Seneca sandstone; the Chorpenning claim, and the Navy Department, etc. They were, as stated, fruitless.

The “Salary Grab.”

At the same session—1871–’73, acts were passed to abolish the franking privilege, to increase the President’s salary from $25,000 to $50,000, and that of Senators and Representatives from $5,000 to $7,500. The last proved quite unpopular, and was generally denounced as “The Salary Grab,” because of the feature which made it apply to the Congressmen who passed the bill, and of course to go backward to the beginning of the term. This was not new, as earlier precedents were found to excuse it, but the people were nevertheless dissatisfied, and it was made an issue by both parties in the nomination and election of Representatives. Many were defeated, but probably more survived the issue, and are still enjoying public life. Yet the agitation was kept up until the obnoxious feature of the bill and the Congressional increase of salary were repealed, leaving it as now at the rate of $5,000 a year and mileage.

A House committee, headed by B. F. Butler, on Feb. 7th, 1873, made a report which gave a fair idea of the expenses under given circumstances—the increase to be preserved, but the franking privilege and mileage to be repealed. We quote the figures:

Saving to the Government, according to the official statement of the Postmaster-General, per annum, by the abolition of the franking privilege $2,543,327

The House passed a bill for the abolition of mileage, but in the Senate it was referred to the Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment, and not again heard from. So that the increased pay no longer obtains, the franking privilege only to the extent of mailing actual Congressional documents, and mileage remains.

The following curious facts relating to these questions we take from Hon. Edward McPherson’s admirable compilation in his “Hand-Book of Politics” for 1874.

Statement of Compensation and Mileage.

Drawn by U. S. Senators under the various Compensation Acts.

Mr. Gorham, Secretary of the Senate, prepared, under date of January 3, 1874, a statement, in answer to a resolution of the Senate, covering these points:

I.—The several rates of compensation fixed by various laws, and the cases in which the same were retroactive, and for what length of time.

1. By the act of September 22, 1789, the compensation of Senators and Representatives in Congress was fixed at six dollars a day, and thirty cents a mile for traveling to and from the seat of Government. This rate was to continue until March 4, 1795. The same act fixed the compensation from March 4, 1795, to March 4, 1796, (at which last named date, by its terms, it expired,) at seven dollars a day, and thirty-five cents a mile for travel. This act was retroactive, extending back six months and eighteen days, namely, to March 4, 1789.

2. The act of March 10, 1796, fixed the compensation at six dollars a day, and thirty cents a mile for travel. (This act extended back over six days only.)

3. The act of March 19, 1816, fixed the compensation at $1,500 a year, “instead of the daily compensation,” and left the mileage unchanged. This act was retroactive, extending back one year and fifteen days, namely to March 4, 1815. (This act was repealed by the act of February 6, 1817, but it was expressly declared that no former act was thereby revived.)

4. The act of January 22, 1818, fixed the compensation at eight dollars a day, and forty cents a mile for travel. This act was retroactive, extending back fifty-three days, namely, to the assembling of Congress, December 1, 1817.

5. The act of August 16, 1856, fixed the compensation at $3,000 a year, and left the mileage unchanged. This act was retroactive, extending back one year, five months, and twelve days, namely, to March 4, 1855.

6. The act of July 28, 1866, fixed the compensation at $5,000 a year, and twenty cents a mile for travel, (not to affect mileage accounts already accrued.) This act was retroactive, extending back one year, four months, and twenty-four days, namely, to March 4, 1865.

7. The act of March 3, 1873, fixed the compensation at $7,500 a year, and actual traveling expenses; the mileage already paid for the Forty-Second Congress to be deducted from the pay of those who had received it. This act was retroactive, extending back two years, namely, to March 4, 1871.

N.—Stationery was allowed to Senators and Representatives without any special limit until March 3, 1868, when the amount for stationery and newspapers for each Senator and Member was limited to $125 a session. This was changed by a subsequent act, taking effect July 1, 1869, to $125 a year. The act of 1873 abolished all allowance for stationery and newspapers.

II.—Names of Senators who drew pay under the retroactive provisions of the several laws, amounts drawn, and dates of same.

A 1789.—The records of my office do not furnish the exact information desired under this head concerning the First Congress, the compensation of which was fixed by act of September 22, 1789. It appears, however, that the account of each Senator was made up, and that each received the amount allowed by law. The following is a copy from the record:

January 19, 1790.—That there is due to the Senators of the United States for attendance in Congress the present session, to the 31st of March inclusive, and expenses of travel to Congress, as allowed by law, as follows, to wit:

Messrs. Richard Bassett, $496.50; Pierce Butler, $796; Charles Carroll, $186; Tristram Dalton, $612; Oliver Ellsworth, $546.50; Jonathan Elmer, $414; William Few, $833.50; John Henry, $596.50; Benjamin Hawkins, $615; William S. Johnson, $544; Samuel

Johnson, $534; Rufus King, $522; John Langdon, $618; William Maclay, $585; Robert Morris, $430.50; William Paterson, $514.50; George Read, $195; Caleb Strong, $575.50; Philip Schuyler, $571.50; Paine Wingate, $616.50.

A 1816.—The record contains no showing as to the amount paid to Senators under the retroactive provision of the act of March 19, 1816. The following, taken from the books, shows the amount of compensation paid to each Senator for the entire Congress, exclusive of mileage:

Messrs. Eli P. Ashmun, $920; James Barbour, $2,850; William T. Barry, $2,080; William W. Bibb, $2,070; James Brown, $2,980; George W. Campbell, $2,950; Dudley Chace, $3,000; John Condit, $2,980; David Daggett, $3,000; Samuel W. Dana, $2,640; Elegius Fromentin, $3,000; John Gaillard, President, $6,000; Robert H. Goldsborough, $2,840; Christopher Gore, $1,940; Alexander Contee Hanson, $530; Martin D. Hardin, $900; Robert G. Harper, $1,450; Outerbridge Horsey, $3,000; Jeremiah B. Howell, $3,000; William Hunter, $2,930; Rufus King, $2,660; Abner Lacock, $3,000; Nathaniel Macon, $2,946; Jeremiah Mason of New Hampshire, $2,680; Armistead T. Mason of Virginia, $2,360; Jeremiah Morrow, $3,000; James Noble, $920; Jonathan Roberts, $3,000; Benjamin Ruggles, $3,000; Nathan Sanford, $2,720; William Smith, $540; Montfort Stokes, $810; Charles Tait, $3,000; Isham Talbot, $2,730; John Taylor of South Carolina, $1,990; Waller Taylor of Indiana, $920; Thomas W. Thompson, $2,850; Isaac Tichenor, $3,000; George M. Troup, $830; James Turner, $2,060; Joseph B. Varnum, $3,000; William H. Wells, $2,610; John Williams, $3,000; James J. Wilson, $3,000.

A 1818.—Under the retroactive provision of the act of January 22, 1818, the following named Senators drew the amounts for compensation and mileage opposite their respective names: Messrs. Eli P. Ashmun, $668; James Barbour, $520; James Burril, $762; George W. Campbell, $1,008; John J. Crittenden, $1,007.20; David Daggett, $690.40; Samuel W. Dana, $283.20; Mahlon Dickerson, $628.80; John W. Eppes, $584; James Fisk, $848; Elegius Fromentin, $1,393.60; John Gaillard, $880; Robert H. Goldsborough, $483.20; Outerbridge Horsey, $485.60; William Hunter, $543.20; Henry Johnson, $1,273.60; Rufus King, $627.20;

Abner Lacock, $649.60; Walter Leake, $1,384; Nathaniel Macon, $600; David L. Morril, $876; Jeremiah Morrow, $776; James Noble, $918.40; Harrison Gray Otis, $792.80; Jonathan Roberts, $564.80; Benjamin Ruggles, $688; Nathan Sanford, $616; William Smith, $774.40; Montfort Stokes, $745.60; Clement Storer, $875.20; Charles Tait, $952; Isham Talbot, $872; Waller Taylor, $1,080; Isaac Tichenor, $784; George M. Troup, $952; —— Van Dyke, $380.80; Thomas H. Williams of Mississippi, $1,433.60; John Williams of Tennessee, $861.60; James J. Wilson, $568.

A 1856.—Under the retroactive provision of the act of August 16, 1856, the following named Senators drew the amounts opposite their respective names:

Messrs. Stephen Adams, $2,243.77; Philip Allen, $2,202.79; James A. Bayard, $2,088.03; James Bell, $1,083.93; John Bell, $2,268.36; J. P. Benjamin, $2,210.99; Asa Biggs, $2,161.81; William Bigler, $1,594.24; Jesse D. Bright, president pro tempore, $6,772.40; R. Brodhead, $2,251.97; A. G. Brown, $2,251.97; A. P. Butler, $2,202.70; Lewis Cass, $2,251.97; C. C. Clay, jr., $2,251.97; J. M. Clayton, $2,292.95; J. Collamer, $2,219.18; J. J. Crittenden, $2,243.79; H. Dodge, $2,292.95; S. A. Douglas, $2,268.36; C. Durkee, $2,235.56; J. J. Evans, $2,121.70; W. S. Fessenden, $2,276.56; H. Fish, $2,237.28; B. Fitzpatrick, $2,194.59; S. Foot, $2,292.94; L. F. S. Foster, $2,112.62; H. S. Geyer, $2,276.56; J. P. Hale, $887.10; H. Hamlin, $1,989.68; J. Harlan, $2,268.36; S. Houston, $2,292.95; R. M. T. Hunter, $2,210.99; A. Iverson, $2,210.99; C. T. James, $2,210.99; R. W. Johnson, $632.21; G. W. Jones, $2,235.58; J. C. Jones, $2,047.05; S. R. Mallory, $2,276.56; J. M. Mason, $2,170; J. A. Pearce, $2,194.59; T. G. Pratt, $2,129.02; G. E. Pugh, $2,096.21; D. S. Reid, $2,235.58; T. J. Rusk, $2,292.95; W. K. Sebastian, $2,137.22; W. H. Seward, $2,292.95; John Slidell, $2,276.56; C. E. Stuart, $2,292.95; C. Sumner, $2,292.95; J. B. Thompson, $2,235.57; John R. Thomson, $2,022.46; Robert Toombs, $2,006.07; Isaac Toucey, $2,292.65; L. Trumbull, $2,251.97; B. F. Wade, $2,202.79; J. B. Weller, $2,251.97; H. Wilson, $2,178.20; W. Wright, $2,120.82; D. L. Yulee, $2,194.59.

A 1866.—Under the retroactive provision of the act of July 28, 1866, the following named Senators received the amounts opposite their respective names:

Messrs. H. B. Anthony, $2,805.56; B. Gratz Brown, $2,805.56; C. R. Buckalew, $2,805.56; Z. Chandler, $2,805.56; D. Clark, $2,805.56; J. Collamer, $1,366.15; J. Conness, $2,805.56; E. Cowan, $2,805.56; A. H. Cragin, $2,805.56; J. A. J. Creswell, $2,805.56; G. Davis, $2,805.56; J. Dixon, $2,805.56; J. R. Doolittle, $2,805.56; W. P. Fessenden, $2,805.56; S. Foot, $2,136.76; L. F. S. Foster, President pro tempore, $261.93; J. W. Grimes, $2,805.56; J. Guthrie, $2,805.56; I. Harris, $2,805.56; J. B. Henderson, $2,805.56; T. A. Hendricks, $2,805.56; J. M. Howard, $2,805.56; T. O. Howe, $2,805.56; R. Johnson, $2,805.56; H. S. Lane, $2,805.56; J. H. Lane, $2,710.49; James A. McDougall, $2,805.56; E. D. Morgan, $2,805.56; L. M. Morrill, $2,805.56; J. W. Nesmith, $2,805.56; D. S. Norton, $2,805.56; J. W. Nye, $2,805.56; S. C. Pomeroy, $2,805.56; A. Ramsey, $2,805.56; G. R. Riddle, $2,805.56; W. Saulsbury, $2,805.56; J. Sherman, $2,805.56; W. M. Stewart, $2,805.56; C. Sumner, $2,805.56; L. Trumbull, $2,805.56; P. G. Van Winkle, $2,805.56; B. Wade, $2,805.56; W. T. Willey, $2,805.56; G. H. Williams, $2,805.56; H. Wilson, $2,805.56; W. Wright, $2,805.56; R. Yates, $2,805.56; J. Harlan, $350; L. P. Poland, $1,361; John P. Stockton, $2,131.20; S. J. Kirkwood, $2,361.10; G. F. Edmunds, $666.66; E. G. Ross, $180 40.

A 1873.—Under the retroactive provision of the act of March 3, 1873, the following named Senators received the sums set opposite their respective names:

Messrs. A. Ames, $2,840; J. L. Alcorn, $2,312.39; J. T. Bayard, $4,865.60; F. P. Blair, $3,761.60; A. I. Boreman, $4,514; W. G. Brownlow, $4,588; A. Caldwell, $2,647.60; S. Cameron, $4,856; M. H. Carpenter, $3,887.60; E. Casserly, $970.40; Z. Chandler, $3,906.80; P. Clayton, $2,600; C. Cole, $970.40; H. Cooper, $3,760; H. G. Davis, $4,635.20; O. S. Ferry, $4,652; T. W. Ferry, $3,920; J. W. Flanagan, $2,000; A. Gilbert, $3,680; George Goldthwaite, $3,924.80; M. C. Hamilton, $2,480; Joshua Hill, $4,083.20; P. W. Hitchcock, $2,852.80; T. O. Howe, $3,689 60, J. W. Johnston, $4,705.60; John T. Lewis, $4,804.40; John A. Logan, $3,800; W. B. Machen, $552.98; L. M. Morrill, $4,190; J. S. Morrill, (draft in favor of the treasurer of the State of Vermont,) $4,386.80; T. M. Norwood, $4,169.60; J. W. Nye, $2,076.80; T. W. Osborn, $3,440; J. W. Patterson, $4,280; S. C. Pomeroy, $3,320; John Pool, $4,620.80; M.

W. Ransom, $4,817.60; B. F. Rice, $3,200; T. J. Robertson, $4,374.80; F. A. Sawyer, $4,294.40; George E. Spencer, $4,106; W. Sprague, $4,508; W. M. Stewart, $1,486.40; J. P. Stockton, $4,790; T. W. Tipton, $3,358; Lyman Trumbull, $3,980; G. Vickers, $4,880; J. R. West, $2,468 80.

III.—Names of Senators who covered into the Treasury amounts due them under retroactive provisions of law, with date of such action.

There is no record in my office showing that any Senator covered into the Treasury any money to which he was entitled by the retroactive provisions of either of the acts of September 22, 1789, March 19, 1816, January 22, 1818, August 16, 1856, or July 28, 1866.

The following Senators covered into the Treasury the amounts due them under the retroactive provision of the act of March 3, 1873, namely:

1873.—May 26, H. B. Anthony, $4,497.20; June 23, W. A. Buckingham, $4,553.60; May 21, R. E. Fenton, $4,184; June 2, F. T. Frelinghuysen, $4,644.80; May 19, H. Hamlin, $4,136; August 14, O. P. Morton, $3,922.40; April 9, D. D. Pratt, $4,121.60; August 25, A. Ramsey, $3,041.40; March 28, C. Schurz, $3,761.60; May 9, John Scott, $4,733.06; July 11, John Sherman, $4,336.40; May 2, C. Sumner, $4,445.60; May 22, A. G. Thurman, $4,359.20; March 28, Henry Wilson, $4,448; September 6, George G. Wright, $3,140 80.

N.—Several of these Senators, as well as others who have not either drawn or covered into the Treasury the amounts due them under the retroactive provision of the act of 1873, expressed to me their intention to allow the money to lapse into the Treasury by the ordinary operation of law, which they supposed would occur July 3, 1873. After learning that it could not be covered in, except by their order, before July 3, 1875, some gave me written instructions to anticipate the latter date. I am unable to furnish from any information in my office the names of Senators who themselves paid into the Treasury salary drawn under the act of 1873 or previous acts. I have not furnished the names of Senators who have left increased salary undrawn, as this information was not called for in the resolution.

IV.—A Comparative Statement.

Total compensation and allowance of Senators, under act of July 28, 1866, from March 4, 1871, to March 3, 1872: Compensation, $370,000; mileage, $37,041.20; stationery and newspapers, $9,250; total, $416,291.20; average per Senator, $5,625.55–²³⁄₃₇.

Under same act, from March 4, 1872, to March 3, 1873, during which year members of the Senate received mileage for attending the special session of the Senate, held in May, 1872, the following amounts were paid: Compensation, $370,000; mileage, $59,002.80; newspapers and stationery, $9,250; total, $438,252.80; average per Senator, $5,922 23–¹⁹⁄₃₇.

Total compensation and allowance of Senators under act of March 3, 1873: Compensation, $555,000; traveling expenses, based upon the certificates of forty-six Senators, (twenty-eight having presented none,) amounting to $4,607 95, giving an average of $100 17×74=$7,412.58; total, $562,412.58; average per Senator, $7,600 17.

In connection with this were statements, prepared by the Secretary of the Senate, and laid before that body by Senator C, January 9, 1874, of the amounts of mileage paid in dollars (cents omitted) at particular dates under the acts of 1856 and 1866, are given. The act of 1856 fixed mileage at forty cents per mile each way, and the act of 1866 fixed it at twenty cents per mile each way.

Returning Boards.

At the second session of the 42d Congress that body, and the President as well, were compelled to consider a new question in connection with politics—an actual conflict of State Governments. There had always been, in well regulated State governments, returning boards, but with a view the better to guard the newly enfranchised citizens of the South from intimidation, the Louisiana Republicans, under very bold and radical leaders, had greatly strengthened the powers of her returning boards. It could canvass the votes, reject the returns in part or as a whole of parishes where force or fraud had been used, and could declare results after such revision. The Governor of Louisiana had made several removals and appointments of State officers for the purpose mainly of making a friendly majority in the returning board, and this led to the appointment of two bodies, both claiming to be the legitimate returning board. There soon followed two State governments and legislatures, the Democratic headed by Governor John McEnery, the Republican by Governor Wm. Pitt Kellogg, later in the U. S. Senate. Kellogg brought suit against the Democratic officers before Judge Durell, of the Federal District Court, and obtained an order that the U. S. Marshal (S. B. Packard, afterwards Governor), should seize the State House and prevent the meetings of the McEnery legislature. Then both governments were hastily inaugurated, and claimed the recognition of Congress. The Senate Committee reported that Judge Durell’s decision was not warranted, but the report refused a decisive recognition of either government. A bill was introduced declaring the election of Nov. 4, 1872, on which this condition of affairs was based, null and void, and providing for a new election, but this bill was defeated by a close vote. Later on, Louisiana claimed a large share in National politics. Somewhat similar troubles occurred in Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas, but they were settled with far greater ease than those of Louisiana. The correspondence in all of these cases was too

voluminous to reproduce here, and we shall dismiss the subject until the period of actual hostilities were reached in Louisiana.

The Grangers.

So early as 1867 a secret society had been formed first in Washington, known as the Patrons of Husbandry, and it soon succeeded in forming subordinate lodges or granges in Illinois, Wisconsin, and other States. It was declared not to be political; that its object was co-operation among farmers in purchasing supplies from first hands, so as to do away with middle-men, but, like many other secret organizations, it was soon perverted to political purposes, and for a time greatly disturbed the political parties of the Western States. This was especially true of the years 1873–74, when the Grangers announced a contemplated war on railroad corporations, and succeeded in carrying the legislatures of Illinois and Wisconsin, and inducing them subsequently to pass acts, the validity of which the Supreme Courts of the State, under a temporary popular pressure which was apparently irresistible, could not sustain. The effect of these laws was to almost bankrupt the Illinois Central, theretofore wealthy, to cripple all railroads, to interfere largely with foreign exports, and to react against the interests of the people of the States passing them, that the demand for repeal was soon very much greater than the original demand for passage. As these laws, though repealed, are still often referred to in the discussion of political and corporate questions, we give the text of one of them:

Illinois Railroad Act of 1873.

An Act to prevent extortion and unjust discrimination in the rates charged for the transportation of passengers and freights on railroads in this State, and to punish the same, and prescribe a mode of procedure and rules of evidence in relation thereto, and to repeal an act entitled “An act to prevent unjust discrimination and extortions in the rates to be charged by the different railroads in this State for the transportation of freights on said roads,” approved April 7, A. D. 1871.

S 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, If any railroad corporation, organized or doing business in this State under any act of incorporation, or general law of this State now in force, or which may hereafter be enacted, or any railroad corporation organized or which may hereafter be organized under the laws of any other State, and doing business in this State, shall charge, collect, demand, or receive more than a fair and reasonable rate of toll or compensation for the transportation of passengers or freight of any description, or for the use and transportation of any railroad car upon its track, or any of the branches thereof, or upon any railroad within this State which it has the right, license, or permission to use, operate, or control, the same shall be deemed guilty of extortion, and upon conviction thereof shall be dealt with as hereinafter provided.

S. 2. If any such railroad corporation aforesaid shall make any unjust discrimination in its rates or charges of toll, or compensation, for the transportation of passengers or freight of any description, or for the use and transportation of any railroad car upon its said road, or upon any of the branches thereof, or upon railroads connected therewith, which it has the right, license, or permission to operate, control, or use, within this State, the same shall be deemed guilty of

having violated the provisions of this act, and upon conviction thereof shall be dealt with as hereinafter provided.

S. 3. If any such railroad corporation shall charge, collect, or receive for the transportation of any passenger, or freight of any description, upon its railroad, for any distance within this State, the same or a greater amount of toll or compensation than is at the same time charged, collected, or received for the transportation, in the same direction, of any passenger, or like quantity of freight of the same class, over a greater distance of the same railroad; or if it shall charge, collect, or receive at any point upon this railroad a higher rate of toll or compensation for receiving, handling, or delivering freight of the same class and quantity than it shall at the same time charge, collect, or receive at any other point upon the same railroad; or if it shall charge, collect or receive for the transportation of any passenger, or freight of any description, over its railroad a greater amount as toll or compensation than shall at the same time be charged, collected, or received by it for the transportation of any passenger or like quantity of freight of the same class, being transported in the same direction over any portion of the same railroad of equal distance; or if it shall charge, collect, or receive from any person or persons a higher or greater amount of toll or compensation than it shall at the same time charge, collect, or receive from any other person or persons for receiving, handling, or delivering freight of the same class and like quantity at the same point upon its railroad; or if it shall charge, collect, or receive from any person or persons for the transportation of any freight upon its railroad a higher or greater rate of toll or compensation than it shall at the same time charge, collect, or receive from any other person or persons for the transportation of the like quantity of freight of the same class being transported from the same direction over equal distances of the same railroad; or if it shall charge, collect, or receive from any person or persons for the use and transportation of any railroad car or cars upon its railroad for any distance the same or a greater amount of toll or compensation than is at the same time charged, collected, or received from any person or persons for the use and transportation of any railroad car of the same class or number, for a like purpose, being transported in the same direction over a greater distance of the same railroad; or if it shall charge, collect, or receive from any person or persons for the use and

transportation of any railroad car or cars upon its railroad a higher or greater rate of toll or compensation than it shall at the same time charge, collect, or receive from any other person or persons for the use and transportation of any railroad car or cars of the same class or number, for a like purpose, being transported from the same point in the same direction over an equal distance of the same railroad; all such discriminating rates, charges, collections, or receipts, whether made directly or by means of any rebate, drawback, or other shift or evasion, shall be deemed and taken against such railroad corporation as prima facie evidence of the unjust discriminations prohibited by the provisions of this act, and it shall not be deemed a sufficient excuse or justification of such discriminations on the part of such railroad corporation, that the railway station or point at which it shall charge, collect, or receive the same or less rates of toll or compensation for the transportation of such passenger or freight, or for the use and transportation of such railroad car the greater distance than for the shorter distance, is a railway station or point at which there exists competition with any other railroad or means of transportation. This section shall not be construed so as to exclude other evidence tending to show any unjust discrimination in freight and passenger rates. The provisions of this section shall extend and apply to any railroad, the branches thereof, and any road or roads which any railroad corporation has the right, license, or permission to use, operate, or control, wholly or in part, within the State: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent railroad corporations from issuing commutation, excursion, or thousand mile tickets, as the same are now issued by such corporations.

S. 4. Any such railroad corporation guilty of extortion, or of making any unjust discrimination as to passenger or freight rates, or the rates for the use and transportation of railroad cars, or in receiving, handling, or delivering freights shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) for the first offense; and for the second offense not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000;) and for the third offense not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) nor more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000;) and for every subsequent offense and conviction thereof shall be liable to a fine of

twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000:) Provided, That in all cases under this act either party shall have the right of trial by jury.

S. 5. The fines hereinbefore provided for may be recovered in an action of debt in the name of the people of the State of Illinois, and there may be several counts joined in the same declaration as to extortion and unjust discrimination, and as to passenger and freight rates, and rates for the use and transportation of railroad cars, and for receiving, handling, or delivering freights. If, upon the trial of any case instituted under this act, the jury shall find for the people, they shall assess and return with their verdict the amount of the fine to be imposed upon the defendant, at any sum not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000,) and the court shall render judgment accordingly; and if the jury shall find for the people, and that the defendant has been once before convicted of a violation of the provisions of this act, they shall return such finding with their verdict, and shall assess and return with their verdict the amount of the fine to be imposed upon the defendant, at any sum not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000,) and the court shall render judgment accordingly; and if the jury shall find for the people, and that the defendant has been twice before convicted of a violation of the provisions of this act, with respect to extortion or unjust discrimination, they shall return such finding with their verdict, and shall assess and return with their verdict the amount of the fine to be imposed upon the defendant, at any sum not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) nor more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000;) and in like manner for every subsequent offense and conviction such defendant shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.) Provided, That in all cases under the provisions of this act a preponderance of evidence in favor of the people shall be sufficient to authorize a verdict and judgment for the people.

S. 6. If any such railroad corporation shall, in violation of any of the provisions of this act, ask, demand, charge, or receive of any person or corporation, any extortionate charge or charges for the transportation of any passengers, goods, merchandise, or property, or for receiving, handling, or delivering freights, or shall make any unjust discrimination against any person or corporation in its charges therefor, the person or corporation so offended against may

for each offense recover of such railroad corporation, in any form of action, three times the amount of the damages sustained by the party aggrieved, together with cost of suit and a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be fixed by the court where the same is heard, on appeal or otherwise, and taxed as a part of the costs of the case.

S. 7. It shall be the duty of the railroad and warehouse commissioners to personally investigate and ascertain whether the provisions of this act are violated by any railroad corporation in this State, and to visit the various stations upon the line of each railroad for that purpose, as often as practicable; and whenever the facts in any manner ascertained by said commissioners shall in their judgment warrant such prosecution, it shall be the duty of said commissioners to immediately cause suits to be commenced and prosecuted against any railroad corporation which may violate the provisions of this act. Such suits and prosecutions may be instituted in any county in the State, through or into which the line of the railroad corporation sued for violating this act may extend. And such railroad and warehouse commissioners are hereby authorized, when the facts of the case presented to them shall, in their judgment, warrant the commencement of such action, to employ counsel to assist the Attorney-General in conducting such suit on behalf of the State. No such suits commenced by said commissioners shall be dismissed, except said railroad and warehouse commissioners and the Attorney-General shall consent thereto.

S. 8. The railroad and warehouse commissioners are hereby directed to make for each of the railroad corporations doing business in this State, as soon as practicable, a schedule of reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of passengers and freight and cars on each of said railroads; and said schedule shall, in all suits brought against any such railroad corporations, wherein is in any way involved the charges of any such railroad corporation for the transportation of any passenger or freight or cars, or unjust discrimination in relation thereto, be deemed and taken, in all courts of this State, as prima facie evidence that the rates therein fixed are reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of passengers and freights and cars upon the railroads for which said schedules may have been respectively prepared. Said commissioners shall, from time to time, and as often as circumstances may require,

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