1 SpeechActs
TheContemporaryTheoreticalLandscape
DanielW.Harris,DanielFogal,andMattMoss
Speech-acttheorywasbornofacentralinsight:languageisamediumformanykinds ofaction,butitssuperficialuniformitytendstomaskthisfact.1 Consider(1): (1)Heshouldbeherebynow.
Thepointofuttering(1)couldbetoassertthatsomeoneshouldbeherebynow, tocommandsomeoneelsetogethim,toassignblameforhislateness,tothreaten, toactoutaroleinaplay,tolodgeaformalcomplaint,andsoon.Withoutaclear understandingoftheseandotherkindsofspeechacts,wewouldhavenohope ofunderstandinghowhumansuselanguage.Norwouldwehavemuchhopeof understandingthemanyactivitiesinwhichspeechplaysacentralrole.Thisiswhy speech-acttheoryhasbecomeessentialtosomanyareaswithinphilosophyandthe cognitiveandsocialsciences.
Unlesswesayotherwise,wewilluse‘speechact’toreferto illocutionary acts.Thisis acategoryfirstsingledoutbyJ.L.Austin(1962;1970).Thereisnotheory-neutralway ofsayingwhatmakesforanillocutionaryact,butitisrelativelyuncontroversialthat paradigmcasesincludeasserting,requesting,commanding,questioning,promising, testifyingincourt,pronouncingmarriage,placingsomeoneunderarrest,andsoon. Insinglingoutillocutionaryactsfortheoreticalattention,Austindistinguishedthem from locutionary acts,whicharemereutterancesofmeaningfulexpressions,and perlocutionary acts,whichareactsofproducingeffectsthatarecausallydownstream fromillocutionaryacts.Twoutterancesof(1)maybeutterancesoftheverysame sentencewiththeverysamesemanticproperties.Yet,ononeoccasion,theutterance mayconstituteacomplaint,onanother,amereobservation.Thisraisesthecentral questionofspeech-acttheory:whatmakesitthecasethatanutteranceconstitutesan illocutionaryactofagivenkind?Answerstothisquestion—i.e.,theoriesofspeech
1 WefindearlyarticulationsofthisinsightinAustin’sdiscussionofthedescriptivefallacy(1962,1–3), inGrice’stheoriesofspeakermeaningandimplicature(1957,1961,1975),inearlyversionsofmetaethical expressivism(Ayer,1936;Hare,1952;Stevenson,1937),andinvariousguisesintheworkofWittgenstein— mostpoetically,perhaps,inhiscomparisonoflinguisticexpressionstoacollectionofhandleswhose functionsareheterogeneous,butthat“all[look]moreorlessalike.(Thisstandstoreason,sincetheyareall supposedtobehandled.)”(Wittgenstein,1953,§12).
danielw.harris,danielfogal,&mattmoss
acts—haveproliferated.Ourmaingoalinthispaperistoclarifythelogicalspaceinto whichthesedifferenttheoriesfit.
Webegin,in§1.1,bydividingtheoriesofspeechactsintofivefamilies,each distinguishedfromtheothersbyitsaccountofthekeyingredientsinillocutionary acts.Arespeechactsfundamentallyamatterofconventionorintention?Orshould weinsteadthinkofthemintermsofthepsychologicalstatestheyexpress,interms oftheeffectsthatitistheirfunctiontoproduce,orintermsofthenormsthat governthem?In§1.2,wetakeupthehighlyinfluentialideathatspeechactscanbe understoodintermsoftheireffectsonaconversation’scontextor“score”.Partofwhy thisideahasbeensousefulisthatitallowsspeech-acttheoristsfromthefivefamilies toengageatalevelofabstractionthatelidestheirfoundationaldisagreements.In §1.3,weinvestigatesomeofthemotivationsforthetraditionaldistinctionbetween propositionalcontentandillocutionaryforce,andsomeofthewaysinwhichthis distinctionhasbeenunderminedbyrecentwork.In§1.4,wesurveysomeofthe waysinwhichspeech-acttheoryhasbeenappliedtoissuesoutsidesemanticsand pragmatics,narrowlyconstrued.
1.1WhatMakesforaSpeechAct?TheFiveFamilies
1.1.1Convention
OneofthetwotheoriesofspeechactstobearticulatedinpostwarOxfordisconventionalism,whichoriginatesintheworkofJ.L.Austin(1962;1963;1970).According toAustin,anillocutionaryactisa“conventionalprocedure”whoseperformanceis amatterofbehavinginaccordancewithacollectionof“felicityconditions”,which arethemselvesamatteroflocalizedsocialconventions.Violatingsomeofthese felicityconditions,asinmakingapromisethatonedoesn’tintendtofulfill,results inaninfelicitousact—i.e.,aperformancethatisnormativelydefectiveinsomeway. Violatingotherfelicityconditions,asonewoulddoinattemptingtopronouncea couplemarriedwithoutpossessingtherequiredstatusofanofficiant,resultsina “misfire”—i.e.,nonperformance,afailedattempttoperformtheact.Inillustrating histheory,Austinfocusesonhighlyritualizedexamplesofillocutionaryacts,suchas officiatingamarriageceremony,christeningaship,andwillingproperty(1962,5)— actswhoseperformanceisimpossibleoutsidethecontextofestablishedcustoms, socialinstitutions,orlegalframeworks.Nonetheless,hisconventionalistanalysisis intendedtoapplytoallillocutionaryacts.Toperformanillocutionaryact,according toAustin,requiresfirstbeinginacontextinwhichtheconventionisineffect,and thenactinginaccordancewithit.
Althoughconventionalismmakessenseofritualizedandinstitutionalizedacts likemarriage,itstruggleswiththeillocutionaryactsthatmakeupourbasiccommunicativerepertoire,includingasserting,askingquestions,andmakingrequests. Unlikemarriage,asserting,asking,andrequestingneedn’tbeperformedrelativetothe “jurisdiction”ofanyparticularsetofinstitutionsorconventions:itispossibletoassert andaskquestionsacrossinternationalborders,butnottomarryortestifyincourt,for example.Andwhereasthenatureofmarriagevarieswidelybetweensocieties,sothat marriageis,atbest,alooseclusterconcept,asserting,asking,andrequestingseemto
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bepartofhumans’cross-culturaltoolkitforsocialinteraction(evenifthemeansof performingthemvarybetweenlanguages).Itisalsostrikingthateveryknownhuman languageincludesclause-typeswhosefunctionistoperformassertion-like,questionlike,andrequest-likeacts(Zanuttinietal.,2012),suggestingthattheirpresencein ourillocutionaryrepertoireisnotitselfamatterofconvention.Andwhereasthere aresocietiesinwhichmarriageceremonieslastyearsandinvolvecomplexexchanges ofproperty,itisdifficulttoimagineritualsofthiskindbeingnecessaryto,say, askwhattheweatherislike.Itisthereforetemptingtorecognizeacategoryof communicative illocutionaryactsthatfunctioninadifferent,andlessconventional, waythantheessentiallyconventionalillocutionaryactsonwhichAustinfocused (BachandHarnish,1979,chs.6–7).
Considerationslikethesehaveledmostcontemporaryconventionaliststohold thattheconventionsthatdefineactslikeasserting,questioning,andrequestingare linguistic conventions,ratherthansocialconventionsofthekindemphasizedby Austin.Toassert p,onthisview,istoproduceanutterancethatconformstothe linguisticconventionsforasserting p inthelanguagebeingused; mutatismutandis forasking,requesting,andsoon.Aviewofthiskindseemstobewidelyassumed, thoughithaslessoftenbeenexplicitlydefended.Aninfluentialdefenseoflinguistic conventionalism—albeitaversionthatincorporateselementsfromvariouscompetingviewstobedescribedbelow—canbefoundinSearle’s1969book, SpeechActs.The mostnotablerecentdefensecanbefoundinErnieLeporeandMatthewStone’s2015 book, ImaginationandConvention,whichtacklesmanyofthestandardobjections thathavebeenraisedagainstSearleandotherearlierconventionalists.
Linguisticconventionalismfacesavarietyofseriouschallenges.2 Onemajorchallengeistoaccountforsemanticunderdetermination—thefactthatthespeechact oneperformsisrarely,ifever,fullydeterminedbythelinguisticmeaningsofthe expressionsoneusestoperformit.Consider(2):
(2)Canyoulendmeahandtomorrow?
Inuttering(2),forexample,aspeakermayberequestingtheaddressee’shelp,or merelyaskingwhetheritwillbeavailable.Thecontentof(2)willvarydependingon whotheaddresseeis,theflavorofthemodal‘can’,andwhetherthespeakerisusing ‘lendmeahand’withitsidiomaticsenseor(inthemacabrecase)withitsunidiomatic, fullycompositionalsense.Thelinguisticconventionsgoverning(2)wouldseemtobe neutralbetweentheseforcesandcontents;ifso,somethingotherthanconventions willhavetodotheworkofdeterminingparticularanswersonparticularoccasions. Analogouspointscanbemadeaboutawiderangeoflinguisticexpressions,andall (ornearlyall)natural-languagesentences,evenwhentheyarebeingusedtoperform directandliteralspeechacts.Manyhavethereforegiventhespeaker’sintentions aroletoplayindeterminingwhatissaidwithanutterance.3 Whenindirectand
2 Forsomeobjectionstoconventionalism,seeBachandHarnish(1979);Davidson(1979a);Harris (2016);Starr(2014);Strawson(1964);Unnsteinsson(2016).
3 Bach(1987,1992);Carston(2002);Heim(2008);Kaplan(1989);King(2013,2014);Michaelson (2013);Neale(2004,2005,2007);Schiffer(1981,2003);SperberandWilson(1995).
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nonliteralspeechactsareconsidered,thecaseagainstconventionalismseemseven morepressing(BachandHarnish,1979).
LeporeandStonemixtwostrategiesforrespondingtotheseworries.First,they arguethatmanyallegedinstancesofillocutionaryacts,includingthoseinvolving metaphor,insinuation,andmanycasesofindirectspeech,shouldnotbeconsidered illocutionaryactsatall,sincetherecanbenowell-definedconditionsforsuccessfully communicatingbymeansofthem.Thereisnoclearproposition p suchthatcommunicationwouldsucceedifoneweretotakeRomeotobeasserting p inuttering ‘Julietisthesun’,forexample,andmanycasesofindirectspeechseemtofacethesame issue.4 Ineffect,LeporeandStoneholdthatthesephenomenaarebetterunderstood asperlocutionaryactsratherthanasillocutionaryacts:thespeaker’sgoalisnotto communicateaspecificcontent,butmerelytocauseanopen-endedchainofthoughts intheaddressee.LeporeandStone’ssecondstrategyistodrawonrecentworkin dynamicsemantics,discourserepresentationtheory,anddiscoursecoherencetheory inordertoarguethatmanypurportedinstancesofsemanticunderspecificationand indirectspeechactuallyarisefromcomplexbutconvention-governedinteractions betweenutterancesanddiscoursecontexts.Duetothehitherto-unappreciatedcomplexityofcontextsandlinguisticconventions,LeporeandStoneargue,manymore speechactsturnouttobeamenabletoconventionalisttreatmentthanhadpreviously beenthought.Theircontributiontothisvolume,whichwewill?discussin§1.2, appliesthisstrategytoindirectspeechacts.
1.1.2Intention
Theotherclassicaltheoryofspeechactsisintentionalism,whichPaulGricebeganto developinparalleltoAustin’sviewswhiletheywerebothatOxfordinthe1940s.The centralclaimofintentionalismisthatperformingacommunicativeillocutionaryact isamatterofproducinganutterancewithaspecialsortofintention,normallycalled a‘communicativeintention’,a‘meaningintention’,oran‘m-intention’.Thenatureof communicativeintentionsisamatterofdebate,butthecrucialideaisthatperforming acommunicativeactisamatterofproducinganutteranceintendingboth(a)forone’s addresseetohaveaspecifiedresponse,and(b)forone’saddresseetorecognizethat thisresponseisintended.
Onevirtueofthisviewisthatitcorrectlypredictsathree-waydistinctionamong thesuccessconditionsforspeechacts.Tosucceedin performing anillocutionaryact requiresmerelyproducinganutterancewithacommunicativeintention;nothing onthepartoftheaddresseeisrequired.Tosucceedin communicating viaone’sact requiresthattheaddresseerecognizewhatkindofresponseoneistryingtoproduce. Actually producing thisresponse,ontheotherhand,constitutesafurtherkindof perlocutionarysuccess.Accordingtoasimpleintentionalistaccountofassertion,for example,asserting p requiresutteringsomethingwithacommunicativeintentionfor one’saddresseetobelieve p.Communicationhappenswhentheaddresseerecognizes thatthisiswhatoneintends.Actuallyconvincingthemof p isanothermatter.
4 LeporeandStone(2015).Itisworthnoting,however,thatthisissuearisesformostliteralanddirect speechactsaswell(Buchanan,2010;Harris,2016).Thisargument’sprototypeisgiveninLeporeandStone (2010),whichisinfluencedbyDavidson(1979b).
speechacts:thecontemporarytheoreticallandscape
Differentkindsofcommunicativeactaredistinguished,onthisview,bythe differentkindsofresponsesthattheyareintendedtohave.Todirectsomeoneto φ —to requestorcommandthatthey φ ,forexample—istocommunicativelyintendforthem torespondby φ ing(orbyforminganintentionto φ ).Questions,accordingtomost intentionalists,compriseasub-categoryofdirectiveswhoseaimisfortheaddresseeto respondbyanswering.Althoughintentionalistshavetypicallyfocusedonthesethree categories,otherkindsofcommunicativelyintendedresponsesareeasytothinkof, andGriceconsideredsomeothers.
MostofthispictureisalreadyvisibleinGrice’searlyworkonspeakermeaning (1957;1968;1969),thoughGriceavoidsmostofthevocabularyofspeechacts,which heseemstohaveregardedasproprietarytoAustin’scompetitorview.Laterintentionalists,includingStrawson(1964),Schiffer(1972,ch.4),andBachandHarnish (1979),showhowtotranslateGrice’sideasintothestandardterminologyofspeechacttheory,constructdetailedtaxonomiesofillocutionaryactsbycarvingupthe differentkindsofresponsesatwhichthey’reaimed,andextendGrice’sviewsinsome otherways.
NointentionalistclaimsthatthisviewappliestoallofwhatAustincalledillocutionaryacts.Onecan’tgetmarriedortestifyincourtjustbyspeakingwithcertain intentions,forexample;variousculturalorinstitutionalbackgroundconditionsmust alsoobtain.Intentionaliststypicallyarguethat,unliketheseconstitutivelyconventionalacts,communicativeillocutionaryactsneedn’tbeperformedrelativetoany particularculturalorinstitutionalbackground(BachandHarnish,1979,chs.6–7). Allthatisrequiredtoperformanassertionorarequest,ortosuccessfullyinterpret one,onthisview,isthatonebeacreaturewithanadvancedcapacitytorepresent otheragents’mentalstates.5 Itisthereforeopentointentionaliststoholdthatthe categoriesofspeechactsinwhichthey’reinterestedarenaturalkinds—definedin termsofcognitiveendowmentssharedbynearlyallhumans—unlikethelocalized andcontingentsocialkindsonwhichAustinfocused.Partlyforthisreason,intentionalismhasbeenaninfluentialviewamonganthropologists,cognitiveethologists, andcognitivescientistswhostudythepsychologicalunderpinningsandevolutionary originsoflanguageandcommunication.6
Aninfluentialkindofobjectiontointentionalismaccusesitofbeingtoounconstrained,inpartbecauseitminimizestheroleoflinguisticconventioninlimiting whichspeechactscanbeperformed.Asimpleworryofthiskindstemsfromthe accusationofHumptyDumptyism:itseemstofollowfromintentionalism,asjust
5 Theideathatcommunicationrequiresadvancedmindreadingcapacitiesisanempiricalprediction thatsomehavesoughttofalsify.Forexample,thefactthatthree-year-oldscanuselanguagebutroutinely failexplicitfalse-belieftaskswaswidelythoughttoposeapotentialcounterexample(e.g.,Breheny,2006) untilnewexperimentalmethodssuggestedthatinfantsdetectothers’goalsandfalsebeliefsmuchearlier (Carey,2009;Carruthers,2006;OnishiandBaillargeon,2005;Tomasello,2008).Someautisticadultspose asimilarproblem,andasimilardialectichasemerged(forasummary,seeGoldman,2012).Ontheother hand,someaccountsofboththephylogeneticandontogeneticdevelopmentofhumanlanguageholdthat advancedmindreadingcapacitiesplayacrucialrole(Bloom,2000;Hacquard,2014;Scott-Phillips,2014; Tomasello,2008).Theseviewssitnicelywithintentionalism.
6 Csibra(2010);Moore(2015,2017);Scott-Phillips(2014);Sperber(2000);SperberandWilson(1995); Tomasello(2008).
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stated,thatanyutterancecanbeusedtoperformanykindofspeechact,solongasthe speakerhastherequisiteintentions.But,accordingtothecritics,wecan’tsayanything wechoosewithanywordsweplease;theconventionsgoverningtheexpressionswe useplacestrictconstraintsonwhatwecanusethemtomean(see,e.g.,Searle,1965; 1969).Intentionaliststypicallyrespondtothislineofthoughtbypointingoutthat,at leastifwearerational,whatweintendisconstrainedbywhatwebelieve.Youcan’t rationallyintendtoeatanentireherdofcattletodaybecausethepossibilityofdoing soisruledoutbyyourbeliefs.Likewise,ifyouthinkitisimpossibletocommunicate theentirecontentofthePentagonPaperswithawinkofaneye,youcan’trationally formacommunicativeintentiontodoso.Onthisview,one’sappreciationoflinguistic conventionsconstrainswhichspeechactsonecanperformbyconstrainingwhatone canrationallyintendtogetacrossbyspeaking.7
Ofcourse,itdoesfollowfromintentionalismthatspeakerscansometimesperform speechactsthatbearnoconventionalrelationshiptotheexpressionstheyutter.Given theexistenceofindirectandnonliteralspeechacts,mostintentionaliststakethistobe awelcomeconsequenceoftheirview.Thecounterintuitivecorollaryisthatitisalso possibleforaspeakertoperformspeechactsthatbearnoconventionalrelationship totheexpressionstheyutter,eveniftheydon’tintendtospeakindirectlyornonliterally,providedthattheyaresufficientlydelusionalorirrational.Ifaspeakercomes tomistakenlybelievethat‘it’swarminhere’is,accordingtolocalconventions,agood waytoassertthatit’scoldinhere,thentheycanindeeddoso.Thebestresponse availabletotheintentionalistmaybethat,althoughitisindeedunintuitivetosaythat suchspeakersareperformingthepredictedassertions,that is whatahearerwould havetointerpretthemasdoinginorderforcommunicationtotakeplace.And, indeed,ifthehearerisawareofthespeaker’sdelusion,thismayverywellhappen. Supposingthatanillocutionaryactisthatwhichmustbecorrectlyinterpretedinorder forcommunicationtosucceed,intentionalismseemstomaketherightpredictionsin suchcases.
Afinalnoteworthyconsequenceofintentionalismisthatthatcommunicativeillocutionaryactsturnoutnottobeessentiallylinguisticinnatureorform.Gricemakesit clearthatby‘utterance’hemeansanyobservablebehavior,linguisticorotherwise,that canserveasavehicleforspeakermeaning.Thisincludeslinguisticutterances,butalso variousotherkindsofbehaviors,asseveralofhisoriginalcasestudiesdemonstrate. ConsiderGrice’sexampleofdrawinga“pictureofMr.Y[displayingunduefamiliarity toMrs.X]andshow[ing]ittoMr.X”inordertomean“thatMr.Yhadbeenunduly familiar”(1989,218).Thereisnoconventionatworkhere,butmerelyalooseiconic relationshipbetweenthepictureanditssubjectmatter,whichthe“speaker”exploits inordertoguideMr.Xtoacorrecthypothesisabouttheircommunicativeintention. Butforanintentionalist,thespeakerhereisperformingessentiallythesamekindof communicativeactastheywouldhaveiftheyhadsaid,‘Mr.Yhasbeenundulyfamiliar withMrs.X’.Whatdistinguishesthetwocasesismerelythekindofevidencethat thespeakeroffersoftheircommunicativeintentions.Semantics,onthisview,canbe thoughtofasthestudyofasystembywhichlanguageusersencoderichlystructured,
7 OnthisresponsetoHumpty-Dumptyworries,seeDonnellan(1968);Grice(1969);Neale(2004).
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butmerelypartialevidenceoftheircommunicativeintentions(Neale,2004,2005; Schiffer,2003;SperberandWilson,1995).Thisviewhasinterestingconsequences forthenatureofassertion,amongotheracts.Foralthoughwecancontinuetouse ‘assertion’todenotecommunicativeactsperformedwithlanguage,thiswouldmake thecategorysomewhattheoreticallyuninteresting.If‘assertion’picksoutanatural kind,thenitisakindthatbringstogetherbothlinguisticandnonlinguisticactsthat areunitedbythesortsofintentionswithwhichthey’reperformed.
1.1.3Function
Thefamilyofviewswe’llcall‘functionalism’iseasiesttounderstandasanalternative tointentionalism.Bothperspectivesmaintainthataspeechactischaracterizedby theeffectthatitistheact’spurposetohave.Butwhereasintentionaliststhinkthata communicativeact’spurposederivesfromtheintentionwithwhichitwasperformed, functionaliststhinkthataspeechactatleastsometimeshasapurposethatderives fromsomeother,lessagentialsource.Forexample,Millikan(1998)arguesthat,inat leastsomecases,thepropertiesofaspeechactareamatterofits properfunction,and thatagivenkindofspeechactacquiresitsproperfunctionthroughaprocessakinto naturalselection.Millikanholdsthatcausingbeliefistheproperfunctionofcertain assertions.Assertionswillhavethisfunctionbecauseprioriterationshavecaused similarbeliefs,and,crucially,thesepastsuccesseshaveplayedacrucialcausalrole intheirreproduction.Millikanarguesthatthesefunctionsattachtogrammatically individuatedutterance-types,suchasclausetypes:
Thus,aproperfunctionoftheimperativemoodistoinducetheactiondescribed,andaproper functionoftheindicativemoodistoinducebeliefinthepropositionexpressed.(2005,157)
Millikan’sviewiscomplicatedbythefactthatshealsobaseshertheoryofconvention aroundthenotionofproperfunction.Hertheorycouldthereforebecategorized asacompromisebetweenintentionalismandaversionofconventionalism:what definesaspeechactisitspurpose,whichmayderivefromeithertheintentionorthe convention(i.e.,properfunction)behindit,orperhapssomecomplexcombinationof thetwo.However,sinceMillikanleavesopenthepossibilitythatanact-type’sproper functionmayhavebeenselectedfornotjustduringthelanguage-learningprocess butalsoduringbiologicalevolution—itmaybe,forexample,thatthefunctionsof certaingrammaticalfeaturesareinnateanduniversaltohumans—herversionof conventionalismdiffersfrommostoftheothersonthemarket.
BuildingonMillikan’sinfluence,arelatedversionoffunctionalismaboutcommunicativeactshasdevelopedaroundthestudyofsignalinggamesinthetheory ofreplicatordynamics.8 AsinbothGrice’sandMillikan’stheories,thisviewtakes communicationtobeawayofinfluencingothers’thoughtsoractions.Wecan thinkofeachinstanceofpotentialcommunicationasasignalinggameinwhicha senderperformsanactionandareceiverrespondsinsomeway.Bymakingminimal assumptionsaboutagents’sharedinterestsandcapacitiestoreplicatebehaviorsthat
8 Replicatordynamicsisthestudyofevolutionaryprocessesusingthetheoryofiteratedgames.Foran overviewofapplicationstocommunication,seeHarms(2004a)andSkyrms(2010).
havetendedtoservethoseinterestsinthepast,onecanshow,bymeansofprecise game-theoreticmodels,thattheywillreachequilibriainwhichsendersreliably produceadvantageousresponsesinreceivers.Thiscanbeseenasatheoryoflinguistic convention,andasatheoryofhowdifferentkindsofillocutionaryacts,which functiontoreliablyproducedifferentkindsofeffectsinaddressees,couldentera population’srepertoire.However,asinMillikan’stheory,replicator-dynamicmodels abstractawayfromquestionsaboutwhetherthekindofreplicationinquestionisa kindoflearningorakindofbiologicalevolution.Forthisreason,suchmodelshave becomeimportanttoolsinthestudyofanimalcommunication(see,e.g.,Bradbury andVehrencamp,2011,ch.1).
Thefactthatfunctionalistmodelsofcommunicationhavebeenappliedtoorganismsvaryinginsophisticationfrombacteriatohumansgivesrisetointeresting questions.Forexample:whataretheconditionsinwhichsignalswithdifferentkinds ofillocutionaryforcecanbesaidtoexistinsignalingsystemsofthiskind?Millikan (1984;2005)arguesthatsimpleorganismsandtheirsignalingsystems(aswellas,e.g., thehumanautonomicnervoussystem)shouldbeunderstoodintermsof“pushmi–pullyurepresentations”,which“atthesametimetellwhatthecaseiswithsomepartof theworldanddirectwhattodoaboutit”(2005,87).Similarly,Harms(2004b)argues thatonlyakindof“primitivemeaning”,withnodifferentiationbetweenassertoric anddirectiveforce,canemergeinpopulationsofpsychologicallyunsophisticated organisms.9
Arebacteriacommunicationandhumancommunicationreallysosimilarthat theycanbemodeledinthesameway?Therearesomeconcretereasonstothink not.Inordertohaveacertaincommunicativefunction,asignal-typemusthave ahistoryofdifferentialreproduction.Buthumansoftencommunicatewithnovel signaltypes.Mostlinguisticutterances,whichinvolvesentencesneverbeforeuttered, giveusonekindofexample.Itmaybethatthisproblemcanbesolvedbyshowing howsentences’properfunctionsaredeterminedcompositionallyfromtheproper functionsoftheirsub-sententialparts.10 However,nonlinguisticcommunicativeacts, indirectspeechacts,andspeechactsperformedwithcontext-sensitivevocabulary seemtobeimprovisationalanddependentonhumans’richcognitivecapacitiesin waysthatresistthistreatment.Intherightcontext,itispossibletouseasentenceto implicatesomethingthatithasneverbeenusedtoimplicatebefore,forexample,and agradableadjective(e.g.‘tall’)canbeusedincontexttoliterallyanddirectlyexpress anovelproperty(tall,bythestandardsofthemarathonrunnersinthisrace).This suggeststhathumancommunicationisthoroughlyinfusedwithgreaterflexibility thanfunctionalistmodelscanaccountfor.
Inpractice,manytheoristshavethereforesoughttocombinefunctionalistand intentionalistmodels,withtheformeraccountingforanimalcommunicationand
9 Criteriafordistinguishingassertoricanddirectiveforceiniteratedsignalingmodelsareproposedby BlumeandBoard(2013);Franke(2012);Huttegger(2007);Zollman(2011).MurrayandStarr(thisvolume) useworkinthefunctionalisttraditiontodrawfine-graineddistinctionsbetweenkindsofillocutionary force.
10 ThisiswhatMillikansuggestsinherdiscussionof“semanticmappingfunctions”(Millikan,2005, ch.3).
speechacts:thecontemporarytheoreticallandscape perhapssomesimplecasesofhumancommunication,andthelatteraccountingfor flexibleandcognitivelydemandinginstancesofhumancommunication.11
1.1.4Expression
We’llusethelabel‘expressionism’foranotherfamilyofviewsthathaveoftenbeen advocatedaslessintellectuallydemandingalternativestointentionalism.12 Theories ofthiskindarebasedontheideathatperformingaspeechactisfundamentallya matterofexpressingastateofmind,andthatdifferentkindsofillocutionaryacts expressstatesofdifferentkinds.Expressionismisacloserelativeofintentionalism, sinceitgroundsthepropertiesofillocutionaryactsinfactsaboutspeakers’mental states.Whereasintentionalistscategorizespeechactsintermsofthepsychological responsestheyareintendedto produce inaddressees,however,expressionistscategorizespeechactsintermsofthedifferentkindsofstatesinthespeaker’smindthatthey express.So,forexample,whereasasimpleintentionalismwillsaythataspeechactis anassertionbecauseitisperformedwiththeintentionofgettingthe addressee toform abelief,asimpleexpressionismwillsaythatanactcountsasanassertionbecauseit isanexpressionofthe speaker’s belief.
Severalargumentsforpreferringexpressionismoverintentionalismrestonthe premisethatintentionalismover-intellectualizestheperformanceofspeechactsby requiringspeakerstohavecomplex,higher-orderthoughts.Somehavedoubted thatsuchcomplexcognitivestatesarenecessaryforlanguageuse,orthattheyare presentinmanyhumanlanguageusers.Othershavearguedthatintentionalism’srich psychologicalcommitmentsobscureimportantpointsofcontactbetweenspeechacts andcloselyrelatedcategoriesofcommunicativeaction.Green(2007b)arguesthat expressionismmakesbettersenseofthecontinuitiesbetweenillocutionaryacts,on onehand,andbehaviorsthatareexpressiveofthoughtinlesscontrolledorvoluntary ways,ontheother.Inasimilarvein,Bar-On(2013)arguesthatexpressionismdoes betterthanintentionalismatexplainingthecontinuitiesbetweenhumancommunicationandthekindsoflesscognitivelysophisticatedcommunicationemployedby ournon-humanancestors.13
Thecrucialingredientinanyversionofexpressionismistherelationof expressing astateofmind.Differentversionsofexpressionismcashoutthisrelationindifferent ways.Someaccountsoftheexpressingrelationareepistemic.AccordingtoDavis’s account(1992;2003),toexpressathoughtistodosomethinginorderto indicate i.e.,togivestrongbutdefeasibleevidence—thatonehasthethought.Pagin(2011) articulatesanalternativeepistemicrelationbetweenassertionsandthoughtcontents thathecalls‘primafacieinformativeness’.Green(2007b)combinesexpressionism
11 E.g.,Green(2007b);Millikan(1998);Scott-Phillips(2014).
12 Notethattheterm‘expressionism’shouldnotbeconfusedwith‘expressivism’.Althoughsomeversions ofexpressivismassumethatspeechactsareindividuatedbythekindsofmentalstatestheyexpress,so that,forexample,moralclaimsaredistinguishedfromfactualassertionsbythefactthattheyexpressnoncognitivestatesofmindratherthanbeliefs,otherversionsofexpressivismhavebeenconstructedtofitwith othertheoriesofillocutionaryacts.We’llsaymoreaboutthisin§§1.2–1.3.
13 ForarejoindertoBar-On’slineofthought,seeScott-Phillips(2014,§2.7),whoarguesthathuman communicationisdiscontinuouswithallknownnon-humancommunicationpreciselybecauseoftherole playedbycommunicativeintentions.
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withintentionalisminholdingthatperformingaspeechactisamatterofintentionally andovertlymakingone’sthoughtsmanifest,butarguesthatitisalsopossibleto expressmentalstatesinwaysthatdon’tpresupposeintentionalcontrol.Otherexpressionistaccountshavebeenspelledoutintermsofrelationsthatarecausalratherthan epistemicinnature(Rosenthal,1986;Turri,2011),includingsomewhohaveappealed totheideathatitistheproperfunctionofcertainbehaviorstoexpresscertain kindsofthoughts,thusblurringthelinesbetweenfunctionalismandexpressionism (Bar-On,2013;Green,2007b).Moreoften,theideathatitistheroleofspeechto “expressthought”hasbeenpresentedasaplatitudeorasapretheoreticdatum,without aseriousattempttoelucidatethenotionofexpressinginvolved(e.g.Devitt,2006,§8.2; Fodoretal.,1974).
Oneadditionalchallengeforexpressionismistofindadifferentkindofthought toindividuateeachtheoreticallyinterestingkindofspeechact.Itisacommonplace amongexpressioniststhatassertionsexpressbeliefs(or,alternatively,knowledge; seeTurri,2011).Butwhataboutotherkindsofspeechacts?Onemethodological tacticforansweringthisquestionrevolvesaroundMoore’sparadox.Assertionsof sentencesoftheform p,butIdon’t[believe/know]thatp ,suchas(3)and(4),are alwaysinfelicitousinsomeway,althoughtheircontentsareneithercontradictorynor necessarilyfalse.
(3)Ihavetwohands,butIdon’tbelievethatIhavetwohands.
(4)I’mdoingphilosophy,butIdon’tknowthatIamdoingphilosophy.
Somehavearguedthatinfelicityofthiskindarisesbecause,forexample,someonewho uses(3)literallywouldbeexpressingabeliefthattheyhavetwohands(withthefirst conjunct)whilealsoreportingthattheylackthisbelief(withthesecondconjunct).14
So,althoughthecontentofaMoore-paradoxicalassertionisnotcontradictory,there isclearlysomethingirrationalaboutperformingsuchanassertion.Thesubsequent lineofthoughtisthatwemaybeabletousevariationsonMoore’sparadoxtodiagnose thementalstatesexpressedbyotherkindsofspeechacts.Forexample,Condoravdi andLauer(2012)arguethatsentencesoftheform φ ,butIdon’twantyouto φ ,such as(5),areMoore-paradoxical.
(5)Takethetrain,butIdon’twantyoutotakeit.
Partlyonthebasisofthisevidence,CondoravdiandLauerconcludethatthespeech actswecanonicallyperformwithimperativesareexpressionsof“effectivepreference”, whichtheytaketobeaspeciesofdesire.
Expressionismissometimespreferredtointentionalismonthegroundsthat,by removingtheaddresseefromthepicture,itcanaccountforspeechactsthatlackan addressee(e.g.Davis,1992,239).However,thisfeaturecanalsobeabug.Removing theaddresseefromthepictureisproblematicbecauseasingleutterancesometimes
14 E.g.Black(1952);DeRose(1991,2002);Green(2007a);Rosenthal(1986);Slote(1979);Turri(2011); Unger(1975);Williamson(2000).TheoriginsofthiswayofthinkingaboutMoore’sparadoxcanbefoundin thelateworkofWittgenstein(e.g.1953,§§87ff.).Ofcourse,proponentsofeachoftheotherfamiliesofviews aboutspeechactshaveproposedalternativeaccountsofMoore’sparadoxaswell,andsoitiscontroversial whetherMoore’sparadoxgivesanysupporttoexpressionismassuch.
seemstobeusedtoperformtwodistinctspeechactswithdistinctaddressees.Touse aslightlysillyexample,imagineaharriedWallStreettradershouting,‘Sell!’while holdingaphonetoeachsideofhisface—oneconnectinghimtostockbrokerA, whohandleshisApplestock,andtheotherconnectinghimtostockbrokerB,who handleshisGooglestock.Aplausibledescriptionofwhatisgoingonherewouldbe thatthetraderistellingAtosellhisApplestockandtellingBtosellhisGoogle stock—twodistinctdirectives,aimedatdifferentaddressees,performedbymeans ofasingleutterance.Althoughthiscaseissomewhatartificial,avarietyofrealworldanaloguesarepossible.Egan(2009)considersdistributedreadingsofmultipleaddresseeassertionsanddirectivesinwhichadifferentcontentisexpressedrelativeto eachaddressee,forexample.Itisquiteplausiblethatasimilarphenomenonisatwork whenapoliticalsatiristmanagestocomeacrossasendorsingapolicytoaright-wing audiencewhilesimultaneouslymockingthataudienceandtheproposaltoaleft-wing audience.Thesamesortofphenomenonisfrequentlyexhibitedbypoliticiansand otherpublicfigureswhentheyemploydogwhistles—speechactsthatcommunicate aliteralmeaningtothepublicwhilealsocommunicatingsomemorecontroversial messagetoasubsetofthepublicwhoareintheknow.
Themostobviousaccountsoftheseandotherhighlynuancedcommunicative phenomenadrawontheresourcesofintentionalism:onecanperformtwospeechacts addressedtotwoaudienceswithasingleutterancebecauseonecancommunicatively intendtoaffecttwoaddresseesindifferentwaysatthesametime.JenniferSaul(this volume)givesroughlythiskindofaccountofwhatshecalls‘overtdogwhistles’.In asimilarvein,ElisabethCamp(thisvolume)arguesthatinsinuationisaspeechact thatismadepossiblebycommunicators’highlynuancedappreciationofoneanother’s beliefs,intentions,andcommitments.Anyversionofexpressionismorfunctionalism thatwishestoavoidappealingtointentionalistresourceswillhavetosaywhatis goingoninsuchcases.Inpractice,manyexpressionistsandfunctionalists do appeal tospeakers’intentions,ifonlytoexplainwhatmakessuchcasessomuchmore sophisticatedthanrun-of-the-millspeech(Green,2007b;Millikan,1998).
1.1.5Norm
Afinalfamilyoftheoriesholdsthatspeechactsarefundamentally normative phenomena.Aninfluentialversionofthisideaholdsthattheactofassertingisconstitutively normative—thatatleastpartofwhatmakesanactanassertionisthattheactis governedbyaspecialnorm.Althoughnormativeaccountsofassertionhavebeen aroundfordecades(Dummett,1973;Unger,1975),theviewhasrecentlybeen revivedandinfluentiallydefendedbyTimothyWilliamson(2000),whoarguesthat theknowledgenormistheconstitutivenormofassertion.
(1)theknowledgenorm
Onemust:assert p onlyifoneknowsthat p.(Williamson,2000,243) Itisimportanttoseparateouttwoclaimshere.First,itisrelativelyuncontroversial thatassertionisgovernedbysomeepistemicnormorother.Wesubjectspeakers towarrantedcriticismforsayingthingsthattheydon’tbelieve,thataren’ttrue,for whichtheylackevidence,orthattheydon’tknow.ItistemptingtothinkthatMooreparadoxicalclaimsoftheform p,butIdon’t[believe/know/haveevidence]that p
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arenotmerelyinfelicitous,butnormativelydefective—apointthatWilliamsonuses todefendtheknowledgenorm.Muchofthedebateaboutnormsofassertionhas revolvedaroundwhetherthenormofassertionshouldbeformulatedintermsof knowledge,belief,truth,justification,orsomeothernotion.15
Asecond,muchmorecontroversialclaimisthatbeingsubjecttoanepistemic normofthiskindiswhat makes anactanassertion—i.e.,thatthereisa constitutive normofassertion.FewofWilliamson’sargumentsseemtobearonthisissue, andfewothersintheliteratureonknowledgenormshavetakenitupeither.But, forthepurposeofunderstandingthenatureofspeechacts,thisisthecrucialissue. Afterall:anintentionalist,conventionalist,functionalist,orexpressionistcouldagree thatassertionisgovernedbyanepistemicnorm,butarguethatthisfollowsfrom theirparticularaccountofassertiontogetherwithbroaderfactsaboutthenorms governingsocialinteractionmoregenerally.Certainnormativeconsequencesfollow fromSearle’s(1969)accountsofvariousspeechacts,forexample,butheholdsthat thisisaconsequenceoftheconventionsgoverningspeechacts’sincerityconditions. Likewise,anintentionalistmightarguethatassertionisgovernedbyanepistemic normbecauseitisgovernedbythemaximofquality,whichisjustonemanifestationof Grice’scooperativeprinciple,whichgovernsallcooperativeactivities.Onthisview, argumentsovertheformulationoftheknowledgenormmightbestbeunderstood asargumentsoverwhichformulationofthemaximofqualityfollowsfromthe cooperativeprinciple.16
Asecondworryabouttheideathatassertionisconstitutedbyanepistemicnorm isthatitishardtoseehowsuchanaccountwouldextendtootherspeechacts.How, forexample,wouldwefillinthegapsin(2)–(4)inordertogiveconstitutiveaccounts ofquestioning,requesting,andadvising?
(2)Onemust:asksomeonewhether q onlyif
(3)Onemust:requestthatsomeone ψ onlyif
(4)Onemust:advisesomeoneto ψ onlyif
Noattempthasbeenmadetoanswerthesequestions,ortosaywhatwouldcountasa generaltheoryofspeechactsinthespiritofanepistemic-normaccountofassertion. However,theideathatweshouldtreatassertionastheoreticallydisjointfromother speechactsisbizarre.AsMcGlynnputsthepoint,knowledge-normaccountsof assertionthreatentorepeatthemistakethatspeech-acttheorywasfoundedinorder toaddress,sincetheyignore“theworrythatmanyphilosophershadfetishizedthe
15 ProponentsofsomeversionoftheknowledgenormincludeAdler(2002);Benton(2011,2012a,b); DeRose(2002);Engel(2008);Hawthorne(2004);Reynolds(2002);Schaffer(2008);Stanley(2005);Turri (2010,2015);Unger(1975);Williamson(1996,2000).Othershaveargued,instead,thatknowledgeis governedbynormsofknowledge-transmissibility(García-Carpintero,2004;Hinchman,2013;Pelling, 2013),belief(Bach,2008),rationalbelief(Douven,2006,2009),reasonablebelief(Lackey,2007),supportive reasons(McKinnon,2015),justification(Kvanvig,2009,2011),evidence-responsiveness(Maitraand Weatherson,2010),epistemiccertainty(Stanley,2008),andtruth(MacFarlane,2014;Weiner,2005).For overviewsofthisliterature,seeWeiner(2005)andPagin(2016,§6.2).
16 TheideaofreducingthenormofassertiontoaGriceanmaximhasbeensuggestedbyCappelen (2011);Goldberg(2013);Montgomery(2014);Sosa(2009).Benton(2016)arguesthatthissortofreduction fails.Ball(2014)arguesthatthenormativepropertiesofspeechactsfollowfromtheirnaturalisticproperties bygivinganaccountthatdrawsonbothGrice’sandMillikan’sideasaboutspeechacts.
speechactofassertion,andignoredalltherest”(2014,82).Thispresumablyplaysa roleinexplainingwhyinterestinepistemic-normaccountshasbeenstrongeramong epistemologiststhanamongphilosophersoflanguageorlinguists.
Adifferentkindofnormativeaccountisbuiltaroundtheideathatperforminga speechactis,fundamentally,amatterofdoingsomethingthatgivesrisetocertain rights(orentitlements)andobligations(orcommitments).Aninfluentialdefenseof thisideaisduetoBrandom(1983;1994;2000),whoarguesthattoassert p istodo somethingthatentitlesparticipantsintheconversationtomakeacharacteristicrange of p-relatedinferencesandresponses,andthatcommitsthespeakertojustify p and relatedclaimsgoingforward.17 MacFarlane(2011;2014)defendsasimilaraccount, onwhichasserting p isunderstoodintermsofapubliccommitmentto p’struthas assessedinthecontextofutteranceaswellasacommitmenttoretract p shouldit cometolightthat p isnottruerelativetoanewcontextofassessment.18
AlthoughBrandomandMacFarlaneignorespeechactsotherthanassertion,Kukla andLance(2009)andLanceandKukla(2013)havedevelopedarelated,normative treatmentofarangeofotherillocutionaryacts,andseveralauthorshaveargued thatnormativelyrichaccountsofspeechactscanhelpustounderstandspeechacts ofurgentsocialconcern.Kukla(2014)drawsonanaccountofthiskindinorder toarguethataspeaker’ssocialstatuscancontravenetheirintentions,alteringtheir act’sillocutionaryforce—forexample,bydemotingitfromacommandtoarequest. LynnTirrellhasusedanormativepragmaticframeworktounderstandthehate speechthattypifiesthebuilduptoactsofgenocide(2012).Inaseriesofpapers, MaryKateMcGowanhasarguedthatawiderangeofspeechacts,includingregular communicativeactsbutalsopornographyandhatespeech,shouldbeunderstoodas having“covertexercitiveforce”:theychangewhatispermissibleinanorm-governed socialactivitygoingforward(2003;2004;2009a;2009b;2012;thisvolume).
Howshouldweunderstandtheclaimthatspeechactsofagivenkindenact norms?Thiscouldbeafundamentalfactaboutthespeechact—partofwhatmakes itthekindofspeechactitis.Brandom,MacFarlane,andKuklaandLanceclearly wishtobeunderstoodinthisway,andsotheirtheoriesmustbeunderstoodas competingwiththeotheraccountsofspeechactsoutlinedhere.Adeflationary alternativewouldbetoconcedethatthespeechactsinquestionsometimes,normally, orevenalwayshavetheeffectofenactingnormativefacts,buttoholdthatthisisa mereconsequenceofsomenot-essentially-normativeaccountofthespeechactitself, togetherwithfactsaboutthewidernormativesceneinwhichspeechactsaresituated. Promising,forexample,wouldseemtobeanorm-enactingspeechactifanyis,sincea felicitouspromiseischaracterizedbythecreationofwhatisoftencalleda“promissory obligation”—thespeaker’sobligationtokeepthepromise.Theoriesthattakespeech actstobefundamentallynormenactingwouldseemtohaveaheadstartonexplaining thisphenomenon.However,therearealternativeoptions.InSearle’s(1969,ch.3)
17 Brandomsaysthathistheoryofassertion“islargelyafootnotetoSellars’[1956]seminaldiscussion of endorsement”(1983,fn.14).Sellarscanalsobeseenasamajorinfluenceonfunctionalisttheories. ForandiscussionofSellars’differinginfluencesonMillikanandBrandom,seeMillikan(2005,ch.4).
18 Krifka(2014)alsoendorsesacommitment-theoreticaccount,ofillocutionaryforce,butwithout fleshingoutthefoundationaldetails.
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influentialaccountofpromising,whichservesasthetemplateforhisaccountofother illocutionaryacts,enactingnewcommitmentsisindeedpartofwhatitistomakea promise.However,forSearle,thisoutcomeofpromisesis,liketherestofhistheoryof speechacts,ultimatelyamatteroflinguisticconvention.Likewise,anintentionalist,a functionalist,oranexpressionistcouldholdthatpromissoryobligationresultsfrom theexpectationsthattendtoresultfromsuccessfullycoordinatingone’sintentions withothers—aviewthatcanbemadetofitwitharangeofnormativetheories(see, e.g.,Norcross,2011;Scanlon,1990;1998,ch.7).Likewise,thecommitmentsengenderedbyassertionmightbeunderstoodasconsequencesofintentionalismplus Grice’scooperativeprinciple:roughly,asserting p commitsonetojustify p,andto retract p shoulditsfalsitycometolight,becauseitwouldbeuncooperativetointend forone’sactionstoproduceabeliefin p ifonedidnotundertakecommitmentsofthis kind.19
1.2DiscourseContextandConversationalScore
Muchrecentworkonspeechacts,includingmostoftheworkcollectedinthisvolume, isbasedontheideathatconversationsareorganizedaround contexts.Inthetechnical senseatissuehere,contextsaresharedandevolvingrepresentationsofthestateofplay inaconversationthatbothshapethequalitiesofspeechactsandareinturnshapedby them.20 FollowingLewis(1979),ithasbecomecommontodiscusscontextthrough themetaphorof“conversationalscore”.Justastheactivitiesinabaseballgameare dictatedbythecurrentstateofitsscore—thecurrentinningandnumberofruns,outs, balls,strikes,etc.—aconversation’sscoredictateshowcontext-sensitiveexpressions canbeusedandinterpreted.Andjustasplaysinabaseballgamefunctiontochange oneormoreelementsofthescore,movesinalanguagegame—i.e.,speechacts— functiontochangethestateofthecontext.
1.2.1ScoreandtheFiveFamilies
Score-theoreticaccountsofspeechactsaresometimestreatedasanalternativeto thefivefamiliesoftheorydiscussedin§1.1.Infact,however,talkofcontextand conversationalscorehasbeenvariouslyinterpretedsoastobecompatiblewith theoriesofallfivekinds.Asaresult,manydebatesincontemporarysemanticsand pragmaticsappeartobeframedintermsofsharedassumptionsaboutconversational score,butthisframingoftenmasksfoundationaldisagreements.
Accordingtooneinfluentialview,originatingwithStalnaker(1978),thecontext ofaconversationreducestothesharedpropositionalattitudesofitsparticipants. Toperformaspeechactistodosomethingwithanintentionofchangingthese sharedattitudes.Thisamountstoaversionofintentionalismthatsubstitutesshared, publicmentalstatesfortheprivateonesthatGricetooktobethetargetsofspeech
19 Severalauthorshavedefendedsimilarlinesofthoughtaimedatshowingthatthenormativityof bothspeechacts(and,insomecases,alsothoughts)isnotamongtheirfundamentalfeatures(Ball,2014; Boghossian,2003;Glüer,2001;GlüerandWikforss,2009;Wikforss,2001).
20 Contexts,thusconceived,havetraveledundervariousaliases:“commonground”and“context set”(Stalnaker,1978,2014),“discoursecontext”(Stalnaker,1998),“scoreboard”(Lewis,1979),“files” (Heim,1982,§3.1.4),“conversationalrecord”(Thomason,1990),“informationstructure”(Roberts,2012), “informationstate”(Veltman,1996),“conversationalstate”(Starr,2010,ms),andsoon.
acts.21 Inhercontributiontothisvolume,CraigeRobertsarticulatesadetailedtheory ofthiskindthataccountsforassertions,questions,anddirectives.Robertsfollows Stalnakerintakingassertionstobeaimedataddingtheircontenttothecommon ground—thesetofpropositionsthattheparticipantsinaconversationcommonly acceptforthepurposesoftheconversation.Questionsanddirectivesaimtoalter othercomponentsofthecontext,eachofwhichreflectsparticipants’publiclyshared goals.Adirective’saimistoaddtotheaddressee’s domaingoals—theperhapsextraconversationalgoalstowhosesatisfactionparticipantsarepubliclycommitted.The aimofaquestionistomakeitthenew questionunderdiscussion (QUD)—thequestion thatitiscurrentlytheparticipants’conversationalaimtoanswer.Roberts’version ofintentionalismresemblesGrice’s,exceptthattherolesheassignstobeliefsand intentionsare,forher,playedbytheinterlocutors’sharedinformationandgoals. Atthislevelofabstraction,RobertsagreeswithPortner(2004;2007;2012),who arguesthatassertionsareproposalstochangethecommonground,questionsare proposalstochangetheQUD,anddirectivesareproposalstochangetheTo-DoList, whichhethinksofasthe“publicandinteractional”counterparttoagents’desiresor intentions,justascommongroundisthepublicandinteractionalcounterparttotheir beliefs(2004,242).
It’seasytoseethatafunctionalistaboutspeechactscanadoptasimilarapproach bypositingthesamecomponentsofcontext,groundedinthesamewayinagents’ propositionalattitudes.Thedifferencewouldbethatwhatmakesitthecasethatan utteranceofacertainkindisaspeechactofacertainkindisthat,inatleastsome cases,utterancesofthatkindhavetheproperfunctionofchangingthecontextina givenway.
Eachoftheforegoingviewspresupposespsychologismaboutcontext—theview thatfactsaboutcontextaresomehowgroundedinfactsaboutthementallivesof theparticipantsinaconversation.Butthereareseveralalternativeconceptionsof themetaphysicsofconversationalscore.Forexample,Brandomarguesthatspeech acts“alterthedeonticscore,theychangewhatcommitmentsandentitlementsitis appropriatetoattribute,notonlytotheoneproducingthespeechact,butalsoto thosetowhomitisaddressed”(Brandom,1994,142).22 Onthisview,factsabout scorearedeeplynormative,andmayfloatfreeofparticipants’opinionsaboutwhat thescoreis.Intheircontributionstothisvolume,bothMcGowanandCampargue thatatleastsomecomponentsofthescoremustbeobjectivelynormativeinthissense. McGowan’sreasonisthatanobjectivenotionofscoreisneededtomakesenseof covertexercitives—speechactsthatchangepermissibilityfactsinwaysthatmaygo unacknowledgedbytheparticipantsinaconversation.Camparguesthatanormative
21 AlthoughStalnakeroftenframeshisviewasaversionofintentionalism—includinginhispiecefor thisvolume—hesometimesinsteadreferstospeechactsas“proposals”tochangethecontextwithout furthercashingoutthistalkofproposalsintermsofthespeaker’sintentions.Andinatleastoneplace, heexpressesdoubtaboutwhethereverysuchproposaltochangethecontextmustbeintendedtochange thecontextinthewayproposed(1999,87).
22 ForalucidcomparisonofBrandom’sviewstothoseoforthodoxdynamicsemanticists,seeNickel (2013).
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accountofscoreisneededtomakesenseofthewayinwhichinsinuationcangiverise tounacknowledgedcommitmentsonthepartofthespeaker.
Campalsoarguesthatatleastsomeaspectsofthescoreare“essentiallylinguistic”, inthat“thekindofcommitmentoneundertakesbyanutterancedependsinparton thelanguagegameinwhichitisgenerated”(thisvolume,p.63).Thisideapresents anothersortofalternativetopsychologismaboutcontext.Onthisconventionalist approach,conversationalscoreistheproductoftheconventionsgoverningeither languageuseitselforsocialinteractionmorebroadly.Thiswayofthinkingissuggested byLewis’s(1979)analogywithbaseballscore.Thefactthatbaseballinvolvesbothballs andstrikesisduetonothingdeeperthantheconventionsofbaseball.Perhapsthe factthatcontextsincludeboth,say,acommongroundandaTo-DoListissimilarly duetonothingdeeperthantheconventionsgoverningourlanguagegames.Imagine that,halfwaythroughabaseballgame,everyoneinvolvedisovercomebyacollective delusion:althoughthehometeamhasscoredonlytworuns,everyonecomesto commonlybelievethattheyhavescoredthree.Nonetheless,thisdelusionwould notmakeitthecasethatathirdrunhasbeenscored.Thereareobjective,mindindependentfactsaboutwhatabaseballgame’sscoreisatagivenmoment.These factsaredeterminedbytheconventionalrulesgoverningthekinematicsofbaseball— therulesbywhichgamesmayunfoldovertime—togetherwithfactsaboutwhathas alreadytakenplaceinthegame.Inprinciple,everyonecouldbewrongaboutthe score.AccordingtoDeVaultandStone(2006),weshouldunderstandconversational scoreasbeing“objectiveandnormative”injustthissense.Conversationalscore isdeterminedbytherulesoflanguage,togetherwiththefactthatcertainother moveshavebeenmadeupuntilnowinthediscourse.Althoughparticipantsshould attempttotrackthescorewiththeirsharedattitudes,thescoreisnotjustwhatever interlocutorstakeittobe.Thechiefadvantageofthisconceptionofscore,according toDeVaultandStone,isthatitallowsustomakebettersenseofdiscoursesthatturn ontheparticipants’confusionaboutwhathasalreadytakenplaceinaconversation.
Aconventionalistapproachtoconversationalscorefitsnicelywithdynamicsemanticapproachestosentencemeaning.23 Onviewsofthiskind,themeaning ofasentenceisits context-changepotential—afunctionthatdeterminesaunique outputcontextforeverycontextinwhichthesentencecanbefelicitouslyuttered. Onthisview,providedthatparticipantsarespeakingliterally,theseriesofpast conversationalmovestogetherwiththesemanticsofthelanguagebeingspokenwould fullydeterminethescoreatagivenmoment.
ThisisthesortofsystemthatDeVaultandStone(2006)present,andthat LeporeandStone(2015;thisvolume)defend.Atthecenteroftheirapproachis anattempttorespondtoaseriousproblemforconventionalistapproachesbuilt
23 Note,however,thattheconnectionbetweendynamicsemanticsandconventionalismaboutconversationalscoreissomewhatloose.Anintentionalistcouldadoptdynamicsemantics,takingeachsentence’s context-changepotentialtobeevidenceofhowaspeakerwhousedthesentenceliterallywouldbeintending toaffectthecontext.Likewise,conventionalismaboutcontextdoesnot,strictlyspeaking,entaildynamic semantics:astaticsemanticscouldbepairedwithpragmaticrulesgoverningthekinematicsofscore,but thesepragmaticrulescouldbeconstruedasultimatelyamatterofsocialconvention.Thelatteroption woulddependonsomeexplanationofwhyweshoulddistinguishthesemanticconventionsfromthe pragmaticconventions,butthepositionisacoherentone.
aroundconversationalscore,stemmingfromtheobservationthatthecontextofa conversationoftenseemstoevolveinwaysthataren’twhollygovernedbyconvention. Someaspectsofconversationalscorecanbemanipulatedbymeansofindirectspeech acts,whosecontentandforceseeminglyaren’tamatterofconvention.Leporeand Stonereplythatthesesupposedlynon-conventionalspeechactsfallintooneof twocategories.Somearen’treallyillocutionaryactsatall:sinceit’simpossiblefor interlocutorstoagreeontheprecisewayinwhichmanyindirectspeechactsare intendedtoupdatethescore,theymustn’tbeattemptstodoso.Ontheotherhand, somegenuineexamplesofindirectspeechactsshouldbeunderstoodassemantically encoded.Intheirpaperforthisvolume,LeporeandStonedevelopthisapproachby givingadynamic-semantictreatmentoftheindirect-requestreadingofsentences like‘Canyoupassthesalt?’.Ontheirview,thissentencehasareadingonwhichits semanticvalueisacontext-changepotentialthatspecifiestwosuccessiveupdatesto thecontext,thefirstaquestionandthesecondarequest.Ifanaccountofthiskind canbegeneralizedtomakesenseofotherindirectspeechacts,conventionalismwill haveansweredoneofitsmostsignificantobjections.
Furtherchallengeslurk,however.Onewayforittobecomecommongroundthat thereisagoatintheroomisforsomeonetoassertthatthereisagoatintheroom; anotherwayisforagoattowanderintoourmidstandforusalltonoticeit(and noticeeachothernoticingit,etc.).Importantly,eachoftheseeventscaninfluence thefutureoftheconversationinsimilarways.Forexample,eithereventlicensesthe useofapronoun(‘it’,orperhaps‘he’or‘she’)todiscussthegoat.Roberts(2002; 2003;2005)arguesthatthisisnocoincidence:definitenounphrasesaresensitiveto factsaboutthecontext,butdon’tcarewhetherthecontextgotthatwaybylinguisticor nonlinguisticmeans.Robertsthusadvocatesakindof“dynamicpragmatics”onwhich therulesbywhichconversationalscoreevolvesislargelyamatterofpragmatic,rather thansemantic,factors.OtherdefendersofdynamicpragmaticsincludeKarenLewis (2011;2012;2014),Portner(2004;thisvolume),andStalnaker(2014;thisvolume). Stalnaker’scontributiontothisvolume,inparticular,isaimedatchallengingboth conventionalisttheoriesofcontextanddynamicapproachestosemantics;heargues thatweshould“representthestructureofdiscourseinawaythatisindependent ofthelinguisticmechanismsbywhichthepurposesofthepracticeofdiscourseare realized”(p.384).
1.2.2Speech-ActTaxonomyandTheStructureofContexts
Theoriesofspeechactsthatarespelledoutintermsofcontextorconversationalscore suggestthefollowingapproachtotaxonomizingspeechacts:identifythecomponents ofcontext(score)thatwehavereasontoposit,identifythedifferentwaysinwhich thosecomponentscanbemanipulatedbyspeaking,andindividuatespeech-act categoriesintermsofthesedifferentwaysofmanipulatingthedifferentcomponents ofscore.24 Aswehavealreadyseen,RobertsandPortnereachpursueaversionofthis strategytoaccountforthedifferencebetweenassertions,questions,anddirectives.
24 InfluentialearlystatementsonofthisideaincludeCarlson(1982);CohenandPerrault(1979);Gazdar (1981);Hamblin(1971);Heim(1982,1983);Kamp(1981);Lewis(1979);Stalnaker(1978).Theideais
Butofcourse,thesethreearen’ttheonlyinterestingcategoriesofspeechact.There arealsovariousothercategories,andthereareapparentlyalsosub-categorieswithin thesecategories.Thelatterpointismostobviousinthecaseofthespeechactsthat wetendtoperformwithimperativesentences,whichincludedistinctsub-categories ofdirectives,suchasrequestsandcommands,aswellasweaker,non-directiveacts, suchaspermissions,acquiescences,wishes,anddisinterestedadvice.25
(5)Bringmemyscepter!command/order (6)Passmethehammer.request (7)Haveacookie.permission/offer (8)(Goahead:)Eattherestofmysandwich.acquiescence (9)Getwellsoon!wish (10)Takethesixtrain.disinterestedadvice/instruction
Variousstrategiesfordrawingthesedistinctionshavebeenpursued.Oneideais thatthedifferentusesofimperativesinvolvedifferentkindsofindirectspeechacts eitherinadditiontoorinsteadofthemainspeechact.CondoravdiandLauer(2012) defendaversionofthisviewonwhichimperativesliterallyencodeanexpression ofdesire,andonwhichvariousflavorsofdirectiveforceariseduetofeaturesof thecontext.Harris(2014)arguesthatimperativesencodeneutraldirectiveforce, butfollowsSchiffer(1972)inthinkingthatbothindividualflavorsofdirectiveforce andnon-directiveusesresultfromindirectspeechactsthatcommunicatethereason forwhichthespeakerexpectstheaddresseetoact.vonFintel(1994)andCharlow (thisvolume)arguethat some indirect-speech-actaccountmustbecorrect,without supplyingone.
Portner(2007;2012)defendsadifferentpragmaticaccountofimperatives’illocutionaryvariability.Onhisview,imperativesarealwaysusedtoupdatetheaddressee’s To-DoList,buteachTo-DoListcontainsdifferentsub-listscorrespondingtothe differentkindsofreasonsthatagentshaveforacting.Whereasacommandproposes anupdatetothepartoftheTo-DoListthatcorrespondstotheaddressee’sduties, arequestproposesanupdatetothepartoftheTo-DoListthatcorrespondsto thespeaker’sdesires.Inhiscontributiontothisvolume,Portnerfurtherelaborates thispicturebydistinguishingtheTo-DoListsthatrepresentsinterlocutors’mutual commitmentsfromthosethatpubliclyrepresenttheirindividualcommitments.In effect,thisgivesPortnerawayofmodelingtheideathatwhereasdirectiveacts(such asrequestsandcommands)proposecoordinationonanewsharedcommitmenton thebasisofthespeaker’spreferences,weakusesofimperatives(e.g.permissionsand acquiescences)proposecoordinationonanewsharedcommitmentonthebasisof theaddressee’spreferences.
nowtoowidespreadtocomprehensivelycite,thoughsomeinfluentialrecentcontributionsthatfocuson thenatureofcommunicativeactsincludeBeaver(2001);CondoravdiandLauer(2012);FarkasandBruce (2010);Ginzburg(2012);Gunlogson(2001);Murray(2014);MurrayandStarr(ms);Portner(2004,2007, 2012);Roberts(2004,2012);Starr(ms,2010,2014);Thomason(1990);Veltman(1996);Yalcin(2007,2012).
25 Stalnaker(thisvolume)suggeststhatthesameissuesarisefordeclaratives,andthatwhatmany philosophersthinkofasassertionsshouldbethoughtofasanepistemicallydistinctivesub-genreofwhat Stalnakercategorizesasassertions.
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10. What suggestions can you make for the prevention of existing delays in the administration of justice?
Topics for Debate
1 The power of the Supreme Court to declare laws unconstitutional should be taken away
2. Trial by jury should be abolished in civil cases.
3. The loser in a law suit should not be compelled to pay all the winner’s costs, including his lawyer’s fees.
CHAPTER XVII
NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION
The purpose of this chapter is to show what nature has done for the United States, and to explain the relation between national prosperity and natural resources.
The source of America’s greatness:
The Things that Make a Nation Great. Three things have contributed greatly to the upbuilding of the American nation. The first is the wide extent, the richness, and the varied character of American territory. The United States is not only a vast country, surpassed in area by very few other countries of the world, but it possesses great natural advantages. It contains, as will be seen presently, extensive regions which are wellsuited for almost every form of human activity, including agriculture in all its branches, manufacture, mining, forestry, transportation, and trade. It is abundantly provided with natural harbors and waterways. In soil and climate there is great variety. No other country of the world can produce so many different things under such favorable conditions.
1. The land and its resources.
2 The initiative and industry of its people.
But it is not enough that a country shall have natural resources. It must have a people with initiative and industry to develop them. The American people have spent three centuries at the task of making the land yield its increase and they have much to show for it. Originally, for the most part, of Anglo-Saxon stock, the population has been enriched by the addition of immigrants from every country of the old world. This mingling of many races into one people has given the nation vigor and versatility It has helped to develop among
the American people that alert and progressive spirit which is one of their most valued characteristics; it has also given strength to democratic ideals.
3. The national deals.
The enduring greatness of a nation does not depend, however, upon its material achievements alone. It cannot be measured by figures of population and wealth. What a nation contributes to the progress and permanence of civilization depends not only upon its economic prosperity but in an even greater degree upon its spiritual and intellectual strength. This vast land, so richly endowed by nature and with its riches so fully utilized by man, has won and can retain its foremost place among the nations of the world by promoting justice and contentment among its people, upholding the reign of law, diffusing education among all, and holding true to the ideals of democratic government.
Importance of the soil
The Land.—Soil is the fundamental resource of any country. Its fertility determines, in large measure, the size of the population that can be supported. It is probable that more than thirty per cent of the American people are today engaged in earning their living from the soil; at any rate the whole population is in one way or another dependent upon it. From the soil comes almost our entire food supply.
The land of the country is privately owned.
Outside the original thirteen states practically the entire area of the country has been at some period in the hands of the national government as part of the public domain.[154] By far the greater part of it, however, has been sold or granted into private ownership. In the course of this disposal many corporations and individuals managed to obtain large tracts of land for very little outlay, because careful attention was not always given to the administration of the land laws; nevertheless the policy of selling land cheaply and giving it free to settlers helped to build up the great Western territories. Out of a public domain which at one time or another included nearly two-thirds of the entire United States only six hundred million acres now remain in the federal government’s hands. Most of this is desert, mountain land, or land that is otherwise unfit for cultivation.
Some examples of wasted wealth
The Need of Conservation.—So long as land remained plentiful and natural resources seemed to be abundant, very little thought was given to the possibility that some day both of these things would become scarce. The land in some parts of the country was exhausted by wasteful methods of cultivation and then abandoned. There are thousands of abandoned farms in the New England states. Coal, iron, and copper were mined in ways that permitted enormous wastage. Through negligence much of our forest wealth was destroyed by fire. By the beginning of the twentieth century it began to dawn upon the people that the natural resources of the country were rapidly melting away, that practically all the good land was gone, while the natural resources in the way of coal and timber were being so wastefully used that they would both be exhausted within relatively few decades unless something were done to conserve them. Accordingly a movement for the conservation of natural resources was started and since 1900 it has made considerable progress both in securing the passage of laws and in the education of the public to the urgency of the situation.
SCIENCE REVEALING THE TREASURES OF THE EARTH
By Edwin A. Abbey
From a mural painting in the Pennsylvania State Capitol at Harrisburg.
In this picture the artist portrays an open coal mine into which several mine-workers are descending. They are stalwart, young, artless pioneers, eager for discovery. They impart dramatic energy and realism to the picture.
Science is pointing the way. She is accompanied by Fortune, the latter blindfolded and tiptoeing on her wheel. Grasping Fortune’s right hand is Abundance, with an overflowing cornucopia, or horn of plenty, on
The artist portrays a great truth. Human labor, wisely guided by science, has found fortune and abundance in the mines and quarries of the earth.
SCIENCE REVEALING THE TREASURES OF THE EARTH.
By Edwin A. Abbey
Copyright by Edwin A. Abbey. From a Copley Print, copyright by Curtis & Cameron, Boston. Reproduced by permission.]
1 Retention Conservation means three things: her shoulder. These mythological figures lend the picture its symbolism.
1 Retention
What Conservation Means.—Conservation means three things: First, that public lands still in the hands of the nation and the states shall not be thoughtlessly turned over to private corporations and individuals for their own profit, but shall be administered so far as practicable by the public authorities for the benefit of the whole country; second, that such portions of our timber, coal, oil, and mineral
3. Replacement.
resources as have already passed into private hands shall be so regulated by law as to prevent their wasteful exploitation; and third, that the government shall do its best to encourage the replacement of such natural resources as can be replaced (for example, by the reforesting of land and the restocking of lakes with fish).
Coal and iron
The Mines.—No country can ever become great in industry unless it has ready access to minerals, especially iron and coal. It was the possession of iron and coal in great quantities that served to make England during the nineteenth century the industrial leader of Europe. Various regions of the United States possess these great stores of mineral wealth and have made good use of them. There is one great difference between mineral resources and other natural resources, namely, that when minerals are once taken from the earth there is no way of renewing them. Soil can be replenished, and forests regrown; but minerals form an endowment which, when once drawn from the bowels of the earth, can never be replaced. Hence the urgent need for a policy of conserving these important sources of national wealth. Coal and iron, while they are the natural resources upon which the growth of industry mainly depends, are not the only forms of wealth drawn from below the surface of the ground in this country. In the mining of silver and gold the United States is one of the foremost among the various producing countries. Copper, lead, oil, zinc, aluminum, quicksilver, and other natural materials are also taken from the earth in large quantities each year.
Other minerals.
The earlier practice.
The Conservation of Coal, Oil, and Minerals.—Until about fifty years ago, land containing coal or other mineral resources was sold and granted by the government like any other lands. The individual or corporation became the owner of whatever wealth might happen to lie beneath the surface. In this way an enormous amount of wealth was practically given away. It was not until a few years ago that the government decided to reserve for itself all coal and minerals which might be discovered in lands given to settlers. But this action came too late, for most of the
The present coal situation.
coal-bearing lands had already passed into private ownership. By its failure to take due thought for the morrow the government had sold, for a few dollars per acre, what might have been a source of enormous revenue. If the practice of reserving the right to all coal, oil, and minerals in granted lands had been adopted in 1810 instead of in 1910 the value of these rights today would be greater than the entire national debt.
A large and steady supply of coal is of the utmost value to industry; in fact modern industry depends upon it. Yet when coal is once taken out and burned it cannot be replaced; there is only so much of it in the country and when that is gone there will be no more. It took nature many millions of years to produce the coal that is there now. At the present rate of increase in yearly consumption all the coal that is known to exist in the United States will be gone in about one hundred and fifty years. Some saving can be made by the use of oil and water power. Some economies in mining and in the use of coal are also possible. But these will hardly avail to prevent the ultimate exhaustion of the supply. At best we can only set that day a bit further off.
Conservation of oil
Speaking of oil, the amount of crude petroleum or fuel oil now actually known to be available in the United States will be exhausted in less than fifty years if the present rate of consumption is maintained. There is every likelihood that this rate of consumption will be increased owing to the greater use of gasoline and kerosene for motor power. Large quantities of oil, however, are, available in Mexico. Within recent years it has been hoped that, with the progress of mechanical appliances, it will be practicable to obtain oil from shale rock.
The wastage of our forest wealth
The Forests.—When the first European settlers came to America, the colonists depended heavily upon the forests. From the woods they obtained timber for their houses and barns, wood for fuel and, by hunting, a considerable part of their food supply In all stages of civilization men have depended upon the forests to satisfy many of their diversified wants. Nowadays steel has taken the place of timber in the construction of buildings and ships; coal and oil have largely replaced wood as fuel; the days when men subsisted by hunting are
past; and mankind is no longer so heavily dependent upon the forests as in the olden days. Yet the forests of America are still a great source of wealth even though the timber resources have been heavily drawn upon during the past hundred years. This is one of the natural resources which has been wastefully used and it is only in recent years that attention has been given to conserving what is left of it. The forests are needed, not only as a source of timber supply, but in order to preserve the fertility of the soil and to retain in it the moisture which is otherwise evaporated or run off.
The earlier practice
The Conservation of Timber.—In the days when so much of the land was covered with timber the chief concern was to get it out of the way so that the ground could be used for agriculture. No one seemed to realize that the day would ever come when forest land would be more valuable than corn land. Before 1878 the national government sold off many million acres of valuable forest land at low prices to individuals and corporations and they, in turn, used it in whatever ways would yield the largest profit to themselves. By the Timber and Stone Act of 1878, however, it was provided that only a limited area of government land containing timber or stone could be sold to any one person or corporation and then only at a higher price than agricultural land. But even this did not prove a sufficient measure of waste-prevention, and in 1891 Congress adopted the policy of withdrawing large areas of government forest land from the market altogether. These tracts were set aside as national forest reservations and today there are about one hundred and fifty million acres set apart to ensure the country’s future supply of timber. The national government is also permitted to buy from private owners forest lands in the watersheds of navigable streams in order to protect the natural flow in such waterways. The administration of all the forest reservations is in the hands of the United States Forest Service, which forms part of the Department of Agriculture.
The Timber and Stone Act, 1878.
Forest reserves
Forest policy of the states
The area of timber land owned by the states, by corporations, and by individuals is very much greater than that contained in the national reservations. It is here, moreover, that the greatest amount of waste is taking place. Forest
Harbors, lakes, and waterways fires, most of which are due to carelessness, burn up enormous quantities of timber every year. The states which still possess considerable forest resources, such as New York, Minnesota, and California, are also adopting the policy of creating reservations and everywhere more effective measures are being taken to prevent destruction by forest fires. These measures include the maintenance of fire patrols, the construction of fire-breaks on the ridges of hills, the clearing out of underbrush, and the stricter supervision of camping parties.
Timber, fortunately, is a natural resource which can be replaced. Lands which have been cut-over can be reforested and used to supply timber for future generations. Large trees take a long time to mature, however, and the lands which are being planted with seedlings today will not be yielding material for the sawmill until the middle of the twentieth century has faded into the past. Both the national and state governments are now reforesting on a large scale. To some extent private corporations and individuals have followed their lead.
Other Natural Resources.—All the nation’s wealth does not come, however, from the fields, the mines, and the forests. In fisheries America leads the entire world. The harbors and the waterways of the country are as important to commerce as the soil is to agriculture. No other country is better provided with natural harbors, lakes, and navigable rivers than the United States. All the largest cities are located upon them, and were it not for the waterways, we would not have the great cities. Run over in your mind the ten or fifteen largest cities of the United States and see if you can name any that are not situated on one of the oceans, the Great Lakes, the great navigable rivers, or on the Gulf of Mexico. It is not a mere accident that none of the great industrial centers are without facilities for trade by water. Geography, not man, determines for the most part the situation of all great industrial communities. Water power is another natural heritage. From the giant Niagara to the smallest cataract, thousands of these water powers have been harnessed and made to function as the servant of man, running factories and generating electricity. Water power does the work of
Water power
coal.[155] Its presence has often determined the location of large industries.
How geography determines a nation’s progress.
Geography and the Future.—From what has been said in the last four sections it will thus be seen that natural resources are a great factor in determining the progress and prosperity of a nation. No amount of intelligence and industry on the part of the people will ensure rapid economic progress if they occupy a country which lacks a fertile soil, is devoid of minerals, possesses no forests or fisheries, and is deficient in natural harbors and waterways. Man can do much, but his powers are limited without the aid of nature. Animals and plants can be carried from one part of the world to another and made to thrive in their new environment; but mineral resources were laid down many millions of years ago in certain definite places and there they have stayed. A country which has no mineral resources cannot create them by the genius or industry of its people. On the other hand, if great natural resources are at hand, progress becomes merely a question of applying human intelligence and industry to these resources. The rise of the American nation to its present position, therefore, is not surprising, although it has taken a relatively short period of time. It is the joint result of nature’s bounty and man’s efficiency. To which of these we owe the larger share of the nation’s progress no one can say. If the country had lacked either, it could not have progressed in any such measure during the past three hundred years.
The energy of man cannot replace the bounty of nature.
Natural resources and national power.
The same things have been true of other countries. England, during the greater part of the nineteenth century, was the leading industrial country of the world. This was unquestionably due not only to the enterprise of Englishmen but to the great natural resources of the country in coal and iron. When Germany defeated France in 1870 she took away from the French certain territories which were rich in minerals. With the aid of these materials Germany in the course of fifty years was able to become a great industrial power. Now, as the result of the World War, the French have recovered these territories and we may look for a marked revival in the industries of France. During the
peace negotiations more importance was attached to small areas of coal and mineral lands than to whole provinces of agricultural land.
As the mineral resources of older countries become exhausted it is altogether likely that industrial supremacy will pass with them. New countries, which today have unexplored possibilities in coal and iron, will then have their turn in industrial prominence. Who knows where the balance of industrial power will be lodged a hundred years hence. China, for aught we know, may be the chief manufacturing country of the world in the twenty-first century. If we knew exactly how long the natural resources of Europe and America will hold out, and if we knew also just how much mineral wealth there is in the Far East, we could predict these things with reasonable certainty.
How geography will influence the future progress of America.
Certain it is, at any rate, that the past history of America has been determined, in no small degree, by geographical conditions. The same factors are likely to influence the future. The country is becoming less agricultural, less dependent upon the soil. As it becomes more industrial our dependence upon its other natural resources, upon coal, iron, oil, copper, timber, and water power must necessarily increase. The commerce of the country keeps on growing, and with this growth the reliance of the nation upon its harbors and waterways will inevitably become greater. As population expands there will be a heavier demand upon the food supply and the time will doubtless come when the United States will have no food for export. Indeed the day may arrive when agricultural products will have to be imported from outside. All this points to the need for emphasis upon conservation. It means that we should avoid all wastage of natural resources. The fertility of the soil should be preserved by scientific methods of agriculture. The mineral wealth of the country should be utilized in such a way as to give the greatest advantage over the longest period of time. We must reforest our unused lands. Harbors and waterways should be developed to aid commerce. If these things are done, America can face the future with confidence.
General References
G , K , and B , Physical and Commercial Geography of the United States, pp. 252-350;
A P B , Geographic Influences in American History, especially pp 70104;
E C S , Influences of Geographic Environment, pp 51-71;
O W P , The Land We Live In, pp 99-138;
N S S , Man and the Earth, pp 1-19;
C R V H , The Conservation of Natural Resources in the United States, especially pp 263-306;
T. N. C , Sociology and Social Progress, pp. 174-270 (The Influence Exerted by Physical Laws over the Organization of Society and the Character of Individuals, by T. H. B ); Ibid., Principles of National Economy, pp. 3-14; 123152;
C. A. B , American Government and Politics, pp. 405-416; Ibid., Readings in American Government and Politics, pp. 368-374;
P. S. R , Readings in American Federal Government, pp. 538-589;
M. H. G , Checking the Waste, pp. 42-85; I L , Economic Development of the United States, pp. 149-182. I B , The New World: Problems in Political Geography (see index).
Group Problems
1. The civilization of the future as determined by the exhaustion and development of natural resources. When European and American resources in coal, oil, and iron give out, what substitutes can be used and to what extent? What countries have the resources to enable them to forge ahead when that time comes? Show the connection between industrial progress and each type of natural wealth. Consider whether there is any way in which a country may keep its industrial supremacy despite the exhaustion of natural wealth. References: Encyclopedia Britannica; Statesman’s Year Book; G , K , and B , Physical and Commercial Geography, especially pp. 252-350; 384-394; C. R. V H , The Conservation of Natural Resources in the United States, especially pp. 359-379; H. T. B , History of Civilization in England, Vol. I (1868 edition), pp. 39-151; I B , The New World, passim.
2. Conservation and its apostles, especially President Roosevelt. References: H R B , American Economic Life, pp 101-108; C R V H , The Conservation of Natural Resources in the United Stales, pp 1-14; 359-379; E , H , L , and C , Foundations of National Prosperity, pp 19-20; G P , The Fight for Conservation, pp 40-70; T R , Autobiography, pp 408-436
3. The coal industry: its past, present, and future. References: W. J. N , The Story of American Coal; P R , The Anthracite Coal Industry, pp. 3-16; 212-227; E , H , L , and C , The Foundations of National Prosperity, pp. 191-209.
