ListofTables
2.1.AmountandTypeofFertilizerUsedinGermanagriculture, 1890and1913.68
2.2.EstimatesofOfficialGermanRationsofBasicFoodstuffsfrom 1916to1918ExpressedasaPercentageofpeace-time consumptionlevels.78
3.1.DietsBasedonBMRperIndividualHouseholdin1917.116
3.2.DietsBasedonBMRperIndividualHouseholdin1918.118
3.3.DietsBasedonBMRperIndividualHouseholdin1919.120
3.4.DietsBasedonBMRperIndividualHouseholdin1920.121
4.1.RobustOLSRegressionStraßburg,DependentVariable: Heightcm.160
4.2.RobustOLSRegressionStraßburg,DependentVariable: Weightkg.162
4.3.RobustOLSRegressionStraßburg,DependentVariable:HAZ.163
4.4.RobustOLSRegressionStraßburg,DependentVariable:WAZ.164
5.1.OLSRegressionFemaleStature,Germany1914–1924, DependentVariable:Height,cm.183
5.2.OLSRegressionMaleStature,Germany1914–1924,Dependent Variable:Height,cm.184
5.3.OLSRegressionFemaleWeight,Germany1914–1924,Dependent Variable:Weight,kg.186
5.4.OLSRegressionMaleWeight,Germany1914–1924,Dependent Variable:Weight,kg.187
5.5.OLSRegressionHeight-for-AgeZ-Scores,Germany 1914–1924,DependentVariable:HAZScore.189
5.6.OLSRegressionWeight-for-AgeZ-Scores,Germany 1914–1924,DependentVariable:WAZScore.191
6.1.FishingYieldsinGermanyPriortotheFirstWorldWar.217
6.2.USFoodExportstoEurope.237
7.1.FoodDeliveriestoGermanyDuringArmistice 266
8.1.FoodDraftOptionsandPrices,1920.278
8.2.SwissSoupKitchensinSouthernGermany,fromtheendof 1923throughtheSpringof1924.294
8.3.SwissPatronStateswiththeGermanCitiestheySupported.294
8.4.AidtoGermanyinSwissFrancs,byType.295
8.5.YearlyExpendituresforSavetheChildren,FiscalYear EndingApril30.316
8.6.USEstimationofGermanCostsTowardsChildFeeding.331
Plate9.1. TitlepageofscrapbookgiventoQuakerAFSCMissionaryMary HannuminAugust1921.Theinscriptionreads ‘SincereThanksAmerica’.This scrapbookwasdonatedtotheAFSCbyElseFernsier,herselfarecipientofthe Quakerfeedingin1919–1920.ElsereceivedthebookfromMaryFayeHannum Glass,anieceofQuakermissionaryMaryHannum.(Takenfromatyped, undatedletteratbeginningofthealbum.)AFSCArchives.
Plate9.2. PhotosfromthePhotoBookgiventoJamesG.Vail.Plate9.2a:the photoisofawarehousefullofAFSCfoodstorageinHamburg.Plate9.2b:the photodepictswomencookingmealsforGermanchildreninalargecentralized kitchen.AFSCArchives.
Plate9.3. WatercoloursofschoolboysgettingfoodwithpassagesfromtheNew Testament.Folder ‘Kinderspeisung.WittelsbacherGymnasium,1924’.AFSC Archives.
Plate9.3. Continued.
Plate9.4. WatercolourofAngelandChristmastreewiththankyouletterbyJosefaHermann.Fromacarvedwoodenboxcontaining booksofthankyoulettersandpicturesfromchildreninAugsburg.AFSCArchives.
Plate9.5. Pencilsketchoftablesetwithcrossandpoemorprayer.Box ‘Thankyoudrawings,photographs,lettersfromGermanSchool Children.1920s’,Folder ‘Thankyoudrawings,photographs,lettersfromGermanSchoolChildren.1920s,3’ .
Plate9.6. WatercolourofboybeforeandaftertheQuakerscametoGermany,andcrestofAmericanandGerman flagswithbellontop andStarofDavidbeneath.Box ‘3AFSCAlbumGermany1921–1924,1937(Thankyouletters,photographs,etc.)’,Folder ‘Zur ErinnerungandieKinderhilfs-Mission’.AFSCArchives.
Plate9.7. LetterfromDorotheaRankerttotheInternationalRedCross, 6December1924.OUISE-015,MissionàBerlin(Allemagne):correspondence générale,piecesno769à842,1922-01-11 1924-07-15.ArchivesoftheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross.
Plate9.8. Beforethefeeding duringthefeeding afterthefeeding.Box ‘3 AFSCAlbumGermany1921–1924,1937(Thankyouletters,photographs, etc.)’,Folder ‘ZurErinnerungandieKinderhilfs-Mission’.AFSCArchives.
Plate9.9. Beforeandafterfeeding,withweightsandsportsbar.Folder ‘Kinderspeisung.WittelsbacherGymnasium,1924’.AFSCArchives.
Plate9.10. Boysinlineforfoodwithboyonscalesatback.Folder ‘Kinderspeisung. WittelsbacherGymnasium,1924’.AFSCArchives.
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Stein, 282, 389, 443 n.
Stentoris, Lake, 218
Stesenor, 106
Stesilaos, 190
St. George Island, 371 f., 375, 384, 386, 405
Strabo, 23, 52, 106 n., 113, 215, 283, 335 n., 525
Strategic questions, Artemisium, 318, 331 f.
Attica. 440, 445
Bœotia, 544
Cyprus, 105
Eubœa, 265
General, 113, 124, 153, 157, 266 f., 267 n., 298 f., 321, 351, 359 ff., 365, 406, 409 f., 413, 415, 416, 422, 432, 437, 449 ff., 462, 522, 524, chap. xiii. passim
Greece, 159, 171 f. (Marathon), 178, 179 ff., 185, 193, 226
Hellespont, 530
Isthmus, 378
Kithæron-Parnes, 445–448, 450, 451
North Greece, 268
Œne, 447
Peloponnesian, 270 ff.
Peloponnesus, 345, 444
Persian, 344 f.
Platæa, 473 ff., 476 n., 488, 492, 510, 511
Platæa town, 446
Salamis, 352, 380 f., 386
Thebes, 347
Thermopylæ, 263 ff., 269, 298, 316
Thermopylæ and Artemisium, 543
Thessaly, 230 n., 232, 541
Thracian Chersonese, 531
West Asia, 7, 13, 90, 96, 105, 112
Strattis, 433
Stryme, 220
Strymon, 66 ff., 72, 120, 136, 139, 212, 220, 221
Stylida, 259, 327 n.
Styreans, 320, 354 n., 469 n.
Suidas, 179 n., 183 n., 184 n.
Sunium, Cape, 181 ff., 190, 376
Susa, 69, 72, 75, 76, 102 f., 109, 121, 141, 149, 243, 537
Sybaris, 133 f., 369 n.
Syloson, 37
Synetos, 229 n.
Syracuse, 244 ff., 421–428
Syria, 219
Syrtis, Greater, 255
TTabalos, 30
Tacitus, 62, 63, 149 n.
Tactics and equipment, 92, 126, 129 f.; Marathon, 183 ff., 193, 195, 208, 269 n., 270 f., 297, 299, 322, 334 and n.; Salamis, 386, 394, 396, 399, 400, 425–427, 437, 441, 442, 462, 473 ff., 477, 478, 500, 501, 502, 508, 510, 512 ff., 525, 528, chap. xiii. passim
Tanagra, 448, 449, 451 n.
Tanais, 52
Tarentum, 73
Taurus Mountains, 7 f., 12, 15, 24, 426
Tearos, 51
Tegea, Tegeans, 273, 306, 468, 469 n., 471, 494, 500, 502, 509
Tempe, Vale of, 221, 228 and n. and ff., 231 f., 235, 252, 253 ff., 257, 271 n., 279, 294, 541, 571
Tenedos, 141, 146
Tenos, 161, 374, 389
Teos, 125
Terillos, 246, 254 n.
Thasos, 137, 139, 141, 152, 220
Thaumaki, 258 f., 279, 298, 453
Thebes, 179, 273, 293; attitude at Thermopylæ, 294–296, 306, 308 f., 313, 314, 347, 356, 439, 445, 447, 448, 451, 456, chap. xi. passim (especially 476, 505, 512, 516 ff., 518 n.), 527, 546
Thebes in Pthiotis, 258, 279
Themistocles, 203 ff., 229 n., 231, 236, 238 f., 270, 328 ff., 337 ff., 343, 352 and rest of chap. ix. passim (especially 358, 359 ff., 368, 369 n., 391). 411 ff., 417, 419 f., 431, 543 ff., 561 ff.
Theomestor, 401
Theopompos, 156
Therma, town sand gulf, 151, 221, 228, 319, 320 n., 321 f., 327 n., 331
Thermopylæ, 128, 163, 223, 227, 229, 232, chap. vii. passim; description, 277 ff., 318 ff., 320 n., 323, 328 f., chap. viii. passim. 345 ff., 351, 374, 441, 514, 516, 541 ff., 568; sources, 569 n., 576
Thero, 246, 254 n., 423
Thespiæ, 273, 293, 306, 308 f., 313, 314, 356, 460
Thesprotis, 287
Thessaly, 207, 221, 223, 226 f., 229 n., 239, 252, 257 f., 271, 272, 276, 287, 298, 299, 346 ff., 347 f., 359, 369, 384, 410, 417, 419, 437, 439, 450, 453, 472, 516 f., 518, 541, 546, 566
Thirlwall. 55
Thrace, Thracians, 50, 60, 64 ff., 69, 93 f., 118, 120, 136, 141, 145 ff., 218–220, 418, 450, 532, 551
Thracian Chersonese, 49, 54, 65, 145 f., 218, 531
Thriasian Plain, 166, 441, 447, 452 n.
Thucydides, 116, 161 n., 174 n., 241, 261, 264 n., 273, 298, 333 n., 345, 360 ff., 459 n., 460 n., 465, 466 n., 493 n., 498, 555
Thurii, 369 n.
Thyreatic Plain, 444
Tigranes, 525
Timegenides, 475, 517
Timo, 197
Timodemos, 420
Timon, 236
Tithorea, 348
Tmolos, Mt., 94
Torone, 429
Trachis, 260, 264 n., 277 ff., 280; site, 281 f., 286, 293, 300, 348 n.
Trade questions, 53, 94, 97 n.., 105, 120, 134, 198, 241, 249, 367, 369 n., 434, 435, 523, 529, 530, 552
Trœzen, 320, 321, 353 and n., 354 n., 469 n., 528
Tyrants (Greek), 52, 54 ff., 86, 87, 91, 124 ff., 148, 169, 202, 247 f., 252
Tyras, 52
Tyrodiza, 212
Tyrrhenians, 131
Valerius Maximus, 335 n.
Vergutiani Spring, 456, 472, 485, 520
Villa, 446 n.
Vischer, 481 ff., 487
Vrana, 164
War, the great, issues, 1 ff., 21
Woodhouse, W. J., 467 n.
WXanthippos, 198, 431 f., 531 ff., 548 f., 551 f.
Xenophon, 188 n., 297, 299, 446, 487, 542
Xerxes (special references), 205 f., 214, 398, 403, 408, 509
ZZanklé, 134
THE END.
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PASS OF THERMOPYLAE
London: John Murray, Albemarle Street. Stanford’s Geographical Establishment, London.
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London: John Murray, Albemarle St Stanford’s Geographical Establishment, London Footnotes.
See note at the end of the Preface.
2
It would be misleading to claim any exact accuracy for the chronology of this period. All that can be said is that the dates given are nearly correct. It is, therefore, undesirable to use the preposition “in” when the preposition “about” represents in reality the extent of our knowledge.
3 Herodotus, speaking probably of the earlier part of the reign, mentions twenty. The Behistun inscription enumerates twenty-three; the inscription of Naksh-i-Rustem twenty-eight.
4
Any date after 511 is highly improbable, because in that year Hippias was driven out of Athens and retired to Sigeum. Had the expedition taken place after his arrival there, it is almost certain that he would have accompanied Darius. Other considerations tend in the same direction.
5 Herodotus says seven hundred thousand men and six hundred ships. This would imply that somewhat more than the ordinary general levy of the Empire was called out for the expedition. The numbers are almost certainly exaggerated.
The number of ships, viz. six hundred, as stated by Herodotus, is somewhat suspicious. The Persian fleet at Ladé is stated to have been six hundred (H. vi. 9). At Marathon it is the same (vi. 95). These may be mere vague calculations without any real foundation; it may be that six hundred was the ordinary official number of vessels that belonged to the Persian war fleet, and that Herodotus has assumed that on each of these occasions the whole fleet was employed. In the present instance, he does not mention any save the Greek contingents. It is extremely unlikely that the Greeks could furnish six hundred vessels. They could only raise three-fifths of that number at the time of the battle of Ladé. Still, Herodotus knows so little about the present expedition, that his omission to mention other contingents, if not a mere oversight, may be due to the want of information.
6 As it is important to note the exact nature of the traceable evidence on which Herodotus bases the various details he gives of the
campaign, it may be pointed out in the present case that he states that Darius set up pillars with bilingual inscriptions at the point of crossing, and that the Byzantians removed them to their city, and used them for the altar of the temple of Artemis Orthosia. One stone, covered with Assyrian letters, was left in the temple of Dionysus.
This is apparently the statement of one who has seen them there; and the sentence which follows, in which Herodotus gives his own view as to the position of the bridge, tends to confirm this impression.
Those who have seen the terrific current off Seraglio Point at Constantinople will understand that the bridge could hardly have been constructed opposite Kalchedon.
Herodotus’ residence at Samos would enable him to obtain some sort of information with regard to the work of a Samian architect. He must have seen, too, the picture of the bridge, with the accompanying inscription, dedicated by Mandrocles, the engineer, in the temple of Hera.
7 Probably further up, since there are great marshes on the north side of the river near the mouths of the Sereth and Pruth. It is more probable that it was between Tchernavoda and the great bend to the Delta.
8 An examination of the map will show that this point, though its exact identification has not yet been satisfactorily ascertained, must have been on or close to the direct route from Byzantion northwards.
9 It may seem strange to suppose for one moment that the words could apply to those cities whose subjection to Persia is certainly implied in the earlier part of the account of the Scythian expedition. It must be remembered, however, that Herodotus never mentions the circumstances or even the fact of their previous reduction.
0 I take it that the Lake Prasias of Herodotus is to be identified with the lower of the two lakes of the Strymon, and not with the Upper, as in Kiepert’s recent Atlas.
Οὐκ ... ἀρχὴν Translation very uncertain, vide Liddell & Scott’s Lexicon. May mean “not originally,” or even “not at all.”
2 I would refer those who wish to examine it in detail to the excellent notes on the subject in Macan’s “Herodotus,” vol. i p. 162, ff.
3 Macan, ad loc. cit.
4 Manuscript text ἄνεως or ἄνεος gives no sense. Restorations proposed ἄνεσις or ἀνανέωσις. Vide Macan, note, vol. i. p. 170.
5 In attempting to write the history of the revolt, I have been immensely aided and considerably influenced by the acute analysis of that section of Herodotus’ history which is contained in Mr. Macan’s edition of H. iv., v., vi. I have not in all cases, as will be seen, adopted his conclusions in detail. The very excellence of Mr. Macan’s work renders it all but impossible to avoid plagiarism in matter if not in actual words. But if I am guilty, I am guilty of the sincerest form of flattery.
6 Cf. H. v. 96, ad fin. and 97, where Herodotus clearly implies that the demand had been made no long time before Aristagoras arrived at Athens, which was, of course, after the events at Naxos, and after the die of revolt had been cast.
7 As Macan points out, the story was in all probability a celebrated story of the period; and “the man with the tattooed head” played the same part in Greek legend as “the man with the iron mask” in that of later days.
8 Vide Macan, “Herod.”
9 Cf. H. v. 49. Ὡς
0 The detail of the “guides” is improbable. The road the expedition followed was the high road from Ephesus to Sardes.
The ἐβοήθεον
in H. v. 102 is a somewhat remarkable expression. It might have been thought that it was Artaphernes,
cooped up in the citadel of Sardes, who would be first in the thoughts of the Persian commanders. Did the Lydians still remember against the Greek the betrayal of Crœsus? Or had Persia been favouring the Lydian against the Greek trade, and so forwarded the conspiracy of revolt? It appears as if we have a faint trace of one of those numerous lost motives of the history of the fifth century.
2 The προπυνθανόμενοι indicates that they had early information of the attack. It cannot, however, have reached them prior to the landing near Ephesus, for Artaphernes was caught unprepared, and it cannot be supposed that he received later intelligence than the commanders farther inland.
3 Another possible cause may have been a change in the preponderance of political parties at Athens during this year.
4 Cf. opening words of v. 103.
5 Mr. Macan attributes the spread of the revolt from Cyprus to Byzantion to the autumn of 498 (vol. ii. p. 69). I do not understand his reasons for so doing. Herodotus (v. 103) seems to cite the expedition to Byzantion as an example of the energy which the Ionians threw into the revolt in spite of the refusal of the Athenians to give further aid, a refusal which must be attributed to the winter of 498–97.
6 I am fully aware of the significance of the words ὡς καὶ τοὺς Ἴωνας ἐπύθετο ἀπεστάναι. But I would suggest that, reading them with their context, they point to the beginning of a plot of revolt, rather than to its actual outbreak.
7 Mr. Macan proposes an Athenian origin for this tale of the events at Susa. Yet the Athenians were not likely to suggest to the world that they had brought on Greece all the trouble of the period of the great war. Herodotus may have simply reproduced, with additions by himself, a pan-Hellenic version of a famous tale.
8 Herodotus applies the name to a promontory, but Strabo, 682, says that the Keys are two islands off the east coast of Cyprus.
9
To show the utter confusion of Herodotus’ narrative in this respect, it is only necessary to point out that he implies that Daurises immediately (v. 116) after the battle near Ephesus proceeded to reduce part of the Hellespontine district, which, if his previous account of the course affairs is to be credited (v. 103) did not revolt until months after the battle. Moreover, Daurises (v. 117) wins rapid successes in this region, and then is recalled by the revolt in Caria, which cannot have been brought about (v. 103), at the most moderate calculation, within six months of the battle near Ephesus.
0 My view, stated briefly, is that the events recounted in H. v. 116, ff., cannot be earlier than 496.
2 Not the celebrated stream of the Marsyas legend.
3 Herodotus mentions Pixodaros of Kindys, a son of Mausolos, as proposer of the first of those alternative plans. The connection of the name Mausolos with Halikarnassos a century later, 377–353 (vide Macan), suggests the possibility that this man had also a connection with Herodotus’ native town, and that the story, like those tales of Artemisia in the narrative of the campaign of 480, is a part of the historian’s work which can be definitely assigned to a Halikarnassian source.
4 H. v. 120, Μιλήσιοι
cannot mean a PanIonian force. The nearness of Labraunda seems to have encouraged the Milesians and their nearest neighbours to venture on an attempt to save Caria. The other Ionians, in all probability, had their attention occupied by a Persian army sufficiently large to make it necessary for them to stay and guard their homes.
5 On the manifest improbability of Hecatæus having proposed anything of the kind, vide Macan, vol. i., note on p. 267.
6 Ἐπιστάμενος seems to be used emphatically.
7
I think it best to postpone the discussion of the evidence on this point until, taken in its chronological order, it is complete.
8
The taking of Miletus is evidently assumed by Herodotus to have occurred in the same campaigning season as the battle of Ladé. There is no trace of a winter intervening between the battle and its capture. Cf. H. vi. 18.
9 Ἀγνωμοσύνῃ
0 Chapter 17.
The existence of such a tale in Herodotus suggests the possibility that his anti-Ionian bias was founded on something more than Halikarnassian or Dorian prejudice; that it was, indeed, largely based upon the colouring given to the story of the revolt by those sections of the populations of the Ionian towns who were dissatisfied with the way in which the operations were carried on, or whose conduct had been such as to excite the criticism of those insurgents who had shown a more persistent courage.
2 Cf.
3
“In column,” probably a detail in accordance with Herodotus’ previous statement as to the “manœuvre of cutting the line;” in fact, a conjecture of the historian’s own. The Chians are described as “διεκπλέοντες” in the course of the battle. Had Dionysios of Phokæa, then, so convinced them of the value of this manœuvre that they practised it, in spite of the fact that they had forty marines on board each vessel, i.e. were prepared for a wholly different form of tactics?
4 As Macan and others point out, this dedication was probably made after Mykale.
5 H. vi. 23, 24.
6 The emphatic mention of these Lesbians in this passage has suggested the idea that this attack on Chios was an act of spite on the part of the Æolian Lesbians against the Ionian Chians.
Those who maintain this view seem to leave out of account two difficult questions which it must raise:
(1) What conceivable object can the Lesbians have had
(a) In making such an attack for such a motive; (b) In running the great risk it involved at a time when the victorious Phœnician fleet was within a few hours’ sail of Chios?
(2) Taking Herodotus’ tale as it stands, who are the Ionians (Chap, xxviii., ad init.) who accompany Histiæus and the Æolians in their attack on Thasos, if they are not from Chios?
7 Vide Kiepert’s most recent map of Asia Minor.
8 Artaphernes there, and therefore campaigning season probably over.
9 Like many other geographical names of ancient and modern times, this was used in both a wider and a narrower sense. It is applied by Herodotus in some passages to the whole region from the Pontus to the Hellespont; in others to the immediate neighbourhood of the Hellespont. It is used here in the wider sense.
0 The practical difficulties of the history are rendered all the greater by the uncertainty of the interpretation of the text in the opening of H. vi. 40.
The all but complete absence of any details of Miltiades’ life between the time of the Scythian expedition and the end of the Ionian Revolt seems to me to support the view that there is very little documentary evidence underlying Herodotus’ history, save that of inscriptions and of other official documents, demonstrable instances of whose use are rare. Had the historian made large use of private memoirs, supposing such existed, it is unlikely that he would have omitted to have recourse to the records of the Philaid family.
2 The significance of this last assertion is very striking. The reference is to the Ionian towns especially, which, on the indication of purely
general evidence, might be supposed to have been tributary to Athens at the time to which Herodotus refers.
The question raised belongs obviously to a period much later than 479 . ., and must be left for discussion in a work dealing with the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.
Meanwhile I would refer English students of Greek history to the long note on the subject in Macan, “Herod.” iv., v., vi., vol. i. p. 302.
3 E.g.. Strattis of Chios., H. viii. 132.
4 Cf. H. vi. 43.
5 The employment of Mardonios on this political business, in a case in which Artaphernes might have been expected to be the agent for the carrying out of this particular act of policy, suggests that Darius had in his mind considerations similar to those which are described by Tacitus as having influenced the Roman Government in the settlement of Britain after the revolt of the Iceni: “Missus igitur Petronius Turpilianus tanquam exorabilior et delictis hostium novus, eoque pœnitentiæ mitior” (Tac. Agric. xvi.).
6 It has sometimes been assumed that this was, on the part of Athens, a direct recognition of Sparta, not merely as the chief power in Greece, but as exercising some sort of control over Athens itself. The assumption is possible, but not necessary.
7 The second part of the objection seems inconsistent with Herodotus’ own statement, v. 75, that a law had been made some years before in Sparta to the effect that the two kings might not both accompany a military expedition. It is, however, possible that this law applied merely to the command of the army in time of war (cf. the circumstances under which it was made), and that when other important Government business abroad was on hand, the custom of the Spartan constitution provided that both kings should take part in it, that each might act as a check upon the other. It is evident in this instance that Kleomenes was not in a position to enforce his
demands, and even on the second occasion there is no suggestion of armed interference.
8 It is not a part of the design of this chapter to discuss in detail either (a) the various palpably unhistorical references to incidents of the campaign made by the orators of the fourth century, as well as by later classical authors;
or (b) the numerous and varied reconstructions of the history of the time which have been attempted by modern writers.
The policy thus adopted with regard to the latter is not due to want of respect, but to want of space. Any full discussion of these theories would make a book in itself.
They are very fully explained and discussed in
(1) Busolt’s “Griechische Geschichte;”
(2) Macan, Herod. iv.–vi, vol. 2, Appendix 10, (3) Hauvette’s “Hérodote;”
and to these I would refer any student who wishes to survey the whole field of possible and impossible theory.
I owe much to these able summaries of critical discussion, as well as to other papers which I have read at different times in various German periodicals.
A very valuable article on the constructive side of the history of the campaign is that by Mr. J. A. R. Munro, in the Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. xix., Part II., 1899.
With respect to the ancient authorities, the majority of modern critics seem to be in agreement that the amount of reliable evidence outside Herodotus is very small.
The topographical details observable at the present day which have a bearing on the history of the actual fight are few, though important.
9 It must at the same time be pointed out that the statement is not above suspicion in certain respects. Herodotus says, for instance,
Cf. H. vi. 96.
that “many of the continentals” and “all the islanders” gave earth and water. Did Naxos give “earth and water”? It is a very remarkable exception. Who were these “continentals”? Of all the states only one is mentioned by name—Ægina. Did Ægina really Medize at this time, or was it merely that Athens feared she might do so, or might, at any rate, take the opportunity afforded by a Persian attack to pay off old scores?
0 The same number as on the Scythian expedition, and at Ladé; and therefore not on this account very reliable.
Cf. H. vi. 94:
2 Various exaggerated estimates of these numbers are given in later historians. Modern authorities have formed estimates varying from 30,000 to 50,000.
6400 Persians fell at Marathon, when the Persian centre must have been almost wiped out, but when not more than half the Persian army was engaged in the battle. This would suggest 20,000 as the number of Persians at Marathon, and about 40,000 as the number of the whole expedition.
3 Thuc. ii. 8 is, of course, irreconcilable with this statement. I do not propose to discuss a question which really does not admit of any certain solution. There is, of course, a mistake somewhere, but we cannot pretend at the present day to say where it lies. For discussion, vide Macan, vol. i. p. 353.
4 The tale, or, at any rate, certain elements of it, manifestly originate in a source at Chalkis.
5 I adopt Stein’s suggestion that κατέργοντες is used intransitively, as being the most probable of the suggestions which have been made with regard to the translation or amendment of this doubtful passage.
6 Vide “Zur Topographie von Marathon” in the Mittheilungen des Deutschen Archæologischen Instituts, i. pp. 67–94 (1876).
7 H. vi. 124: ἀνεδέχθη
8 Sparta, doubtless, would not act with the Alkmæonidæ.
9 As represented in some histories of Greece.
0 As the object of this chapter is not to refute the theories of others, but to examine and explain the evidence bearing on the campaign, I do not propose to point out defects in theories which differ from my own. I am most nearly in agreement with Mr. J. A. R. Munro. I had formed my opinions on the main questions of the campaign before I read his article, but it has supplied me with arguments of an important character which certainly had not occurred to me before I read it.
In the accepted text of Herodotus the name is Pheidippides, which is almost certainly a textual error.
2 These chronological details are important, as they enable us to construct a diary of events, which is not without its significance in the narrative of the truce.
3 It is impossible to say how far this excuse for delay was genuine.
4 The Persian dead are still unburied when the Spartans visit the field. They leave Sparta on the 15th, and arrive at Athens on the 17th. A period of several days intervened between the arrival of the Athenians at Marathon and the battle.
H. vi. 120.
Plutarch (De Herod. Malign. 26) asserts that the battle took place on the 6th of Boedromion. He accuses Herodotus of suppressing the fact that the Athenians held a festal procession in honour of the battle on the 6th of this month.
It is true that the festival did take place on this date; but the day was chosen, not because it was the date of the battle, but because it was the festival of Artemis Agrotera, to whom a vow had been made in case of success, probably before the army started from Athens.
5 Cf. (Arist.) Athen. Polit. 22.
6 The original passage in which this is mentioned is the scholion on Aristophanes, Knights, 778: ἐν Μαραθῶνι:
Suidas, a very late author in the 10th and 11th centuries of our era, reproduces the information, drawing it evidently from the abovementioned source.
7 The fact that the Persians were in battle array seems to invalidate the theory which has been put forward, that the Persians, when the Greeks rushed upon them, were marching towards the lower road, with intent to reach Athens that way. If that had been so, it is not possible to imagine that the battle could have been the set battle which it appears to have been according to Herodotus’ description. His description of the main incidents of the fight seems the most absolutely reliable part of his narrative.
8 In the late author Suidas there is a note which gives a positive support to this negative fact of Herodotus’ silence. He says that the expression χωρίς ἱππεῖς had become a proverbial expression, originating from the fact that when Datis invaded Attica, the Ionians who were with him informed the Athenians that the cavalry were away, and so Miltiades attacked and won the victory.
9 The total loss of the Persians is given by Herodotus at 6400. This is not likely to be an understatement in that 6400 must have been included the greater part of the Persian centre, which seems to have been all but annihilated, if the circumstances of the battle be taken into consideration. It is thus against probability that more than 20,000 Persian troops took part in the engagement.
The comparative smallness of the Persian numbers is further indicated by the words which tradition attributed to Miltiades. He is said in the course of his appeal to Kallimachos (ch. 109) to have spoken confidently of success in case the Greeks took the offensive. There is no reason to insist on such words having been actually used by Miltiades. The important historical point is that in the tradition of the battle which Herodotus followed such language was attributed to him, language which could not conceivably have been used had the Persians very greatly outnumbered the Greeks.
0 Numbers varying from 100,000 to 500,000 are given by various later authors.
Cornelius Nepos, Justin, Suidas, give estimates of from 9000 to 10,000 Athenians, and 1000 Platæans. Herodotus (ix. 28, 29) gives the Athenian numbers at Platæa as 8000 hoplites and 8000 lightarmed, and this at a time when many citizens were serving on the fleet at Mykale. The number 10,000 at Marathon is probably an understatement, though not one of a gross character.
2 The Persian position is indicated by three circumstances:—
(1) The position of the “Soros,” which would presumably be situated where the majority of the Athenians must have fallen, i.e. in the centre of the line; and where, too, the decisive blow of the battle was struck.
(2) The fact, expressly mentioned by Herodotus, that the Greek centre was (Chap. 113) driven inland (ἐς τὴν μεσόγαιαν).
(3) The fact that (Chap. 115) the barbarians who escaped seem to have reached their ships without difficulty.
Hauvette, in assuming the Persians to have been in a position close to the Charadra, parallel to it, and south of it, ignores these three points, and places the Persians in about the most disadvantageous position they could have chosen in the whole plain.
3 This seems the most probable translation of the word δρόμῳ. Apart from the physical impossibility of a heavy-armed infantryman
