Introduction
LawandFamilies, 1300–1600
Theperiodcoveredbythisbookwasoneofastoundingdevelopments andevents – inart,culture,intellectuallife,andtheeconomy.Therealities offamilylifewereshakenbythegreatplagues,theconstantspreadof warfare,andtheupsanddownsofeconomicaffairs.Familyprovided muchofthesocialcontextinwhichItaliansmetthesedevelopmentsand attemptedtocopewiththem.Thiswasaperiod,aswell,inwhich awarenessoffamilyandgenderbecamemoreprominent,inandoutof law.The “quarrelaboutwomen” becamealiterarygenre,asdidtracts aboutfamily,aimedespeciallyatfathers.ImagesoftheHolyFamilyand evenscenesofdomesticlifecameintoart.Spurredbyplaguesandother swiftmessengersofdeath,theartofdyingtoobecameatropeandcame toincludemakingprovisionsforone’sproperty,bothforthegoodof one’ssoulandforthesakeofone’sheirs.Coatsofarms,familysurnames, andmoreelaboratedomesticarchitecturecametoframeelitefamilies apartfromothers.Governmentsusedhouseholdsastaxunitsandgeneratedbodiestotendtoorphansanddestitute,towidowsandabandoned wivesandchildren,topoorgirlsunabletomarry,andeventothepolicing ofsexualityandmorals.
Itwasalsoaperiodoftransformationinlaw.Law,whilenotchanging atanythinglikethepaceofeconomicchange(nottomentionthesometimesdizzyingpoliticalchanges),didevolveoverthethreecenturiesunder consideration.Familylawespeciallywasnotstatic.Thevaryinglocal laws,overlaidastheywereuponashared,complex,learnedlegalheritage,wereformativeofdomesticlifeandgeneratedpossibilitiesforlegal actionandtherebyconflict.Therewerebothlocallegislativeinitiatives, especiallywithrespecttowomen’slegalcapacity,and,ifatyetslower
pace,academicdoctrinaldevelopments.Lawsrespondedtotheexigencies ofplaguesanddepressions,warsandpoliticalupheavals.Leadingthis legalresponseandaddressingthecomplexitiesandgapsinthevarious lawsweretheuniversity-trainedexpertswhotookanactiveroleincourt cases,attemptingresolutionstoproblemsthattheybroughtintoview. Lawsregulatingmarriage,dowry,propertyownership,andinheritance underwentdevelopments,whetherfromexternalfactors(e.g.,demographiccollapse)orfrominternal(e.g.,jurisprudentialelaborationof doctrinaltexts),thatfacilitatedcertaindevelopmentsandprecludedor hinderedothers.Continuityandchangeinfamilylaw,andthefactorsthat militatedfororagainstchangeareanimportantfocusofthisstudy.
Thereisnoclaimherethatlawis the keytounderstandingfamilylifein thepast,butitisoneofseveralkeys,andithasbeenmoreneglectedthan respected.Itsetparametersformuchofdailylifeanditwasintegralto shiftingthoseparameters.Itde finedthestatusandagencyofthefamily’s members.Inthatregardlawservedtodistinguishfamilyfromhousehold, whichhadandretainsdistinctfunctionalaswellassymbolicqualities. Andfamilyitselfhadvaryingextensions,horizontalandvertical,metaphoricalandlegal.
Itisalsonecessarytoremainawareofthedifferentpossibilitiesoflaw byclassandregion,althoughitisdif ficulttoplottheminanyexactway. Poorerpeoplehadlessuseforlaw,buttheytoousedit,especiallywhen landandotherrealassetswereatstake.Butanysimpledistinctioninlegal rolesbetweenwealthyandpoorhastoyieldtotherealitythatadebtorin onesituationwasquitelikelyacreditorinanother.Citydwellerswhose wealthlaytoagreaterextentincommercialcapitalandbankassets availedthemselvesofcontractsandotherlegaldevicesinmannersthat variedfromthoseofnobleswithlargeruralestatesand firmclaimsto politicaloffices.Women,ofcourse,haddifferentlegalpotentialsand experiencesfrommen,butalsofromwomeninothercommunities.The trulypoorhadlittletoadjudicate(andcouldnotaffordthecosts).Forthe rest,sometenuousindicatorsmayallowustopegsocialandeconomic circumstancesfromtimetotime.
genderandlaw
TherearestudiesoffamiliesformanyItaliancommunitiesforpartsofthe period 1300 to 1600.Therearesome,aswell,thatarecomparativeand rangeacrossthepeninsula.Theseareenormouslyuseful.Theirutilityis recognizedthroughoutthenotesandbibliographicalentries.Whatthe
presentworkdoesthattheygenerallyhavenotisincorporateanattention togenderandtheexploitationoflegalsources.Toooftenlegalhistorical studiesneglectthedimensionofgenderorsimplyacceptthebiases encodedinlawontheassumptionthattheyworkedoutthatwayinlife.
Wewill fi ndinsteadthatwomenwerecapableofcircumventinglegal limitationsandofusingthelawtotheiradvantageandthatoftheirmale relativesonoccasion.Socialhistoricalstudiesoffamilyhavenecessarily confrontedlaw,atleasttotracetheoutlinesofvitallegalinstitutions, suchasdowryandtestament,butgenerallywithoutawarenessofthe gaps,ambiguities,andcomplexitiesthatriddledthelaws.Thepremise hereisthatlawwasnotbackdrop;itwasformative,anarrayofpossibilitiesforthoselookingtomarry,establishhouseholds,andpassproperty toothers.
Thisbookthusapproachesthehistoricalfeaturesoffamily,kinship, anddomesticlifefromtwoperspectives.Itstressesgender,a “useful category” forhistoricalanalysis,asJoanScottputitthirtyyearsago.1 Gender(asasetofculturallyconstructedmeaningslooselyrelatedtobut distinctfromsexualbiology)wasenacted firstandforemostinthehome intherolesoffathersandmothers,sonsanddaughters.AsCesarina Casanovasays,inanimmenselyusefulstudyofItalianfamiliesinour period, “intheinteriorofthehouse,inwhichtheencountersandaffectionsofeverydayarelived,therealpositionofeachmemberisconfigured astheresultofacontinualnegotiation,inwhichmaleandfemaleconfronteachotherandthereareputintoquestionthevaluesandmodelsof comportmentsociallyimposedonthesexesandthedifferentage groups.”2 Everyaspectoffamilylifestruckmenandwomendifferently. ItisimpossibletounderstandfamilyandkinshipindifferentareasofItaly withoutconsideringthevariantrolesofmenandwomeninthedifferent communities.
Whilesociological,anthropological,andeconomicperspectiveson familyplayarole – astheynecessarilymust,havingbeenattheheartof somuchexistingresearch – itisthemoreneglectedrealmoflawasa secondperspectivethatholdsaprivilegedpositioninthisanalysis.That neglectneedstobeaddressed.AsLloydBonfieldhassaid, Lawgoverningfamilyrelationsseemstoberegardedasaproductoffamily history,andnotaparticipantinshapingeitheritsbiologicalorculturalelements.
1 Scott, “Gender:AUsefulCategoryofHistoricalAnalysis.”
2 Casanova, Lafamigliaitalianainetàmoderna, 148.
Inshort,familylawsurfacesinhistoricalstudiesofthefamilyonlyoccasionally, indirectly,andtangentially,asacollectionofrulestobeobeyedorcircumvented asthecasemaybe;itsoriginsandnature,anditsroleasanintegralpartofthe familyanditsstructurearenotdiscussedinanygreatdetail.3
Lackofattentiontolawasaformativeelementoffamilylifeisallthe moredisturbingassomanyoftheprocessesoffamilylifethathistorians haveexplored,andthedocumentstheyhaveusedtoexplorethem,are legalinform,purpose,andlanguage.Thisisnottosaythatthesources forinvestigationofdomesticlifeintheItalianpastarealllegal,oreven predominantlyso.ForFlorence,perhapsthemostproli ficsiteoffamily historyresearchinItaly,effectiveuseofletters,diaries,domesticaccount books,andcivic fiscalrecordshasbeenvital.Butstudyofprocessesof marriageanddowry,inheritance,guardianship,domesticenterprise,kin membership,andmoreisnotpossiblewithoututilizingrecordsdrawnup inlegalterms,mainlyinthepapersofnotaries.
Yetitisnotsomuchtherecordsofnotariesrecordingthelegalbusiness offamilies,ofmenandwomen,indowries,testaments,emancipations, andmorethatisthefocusofourattention.Itistheverydifferentjudicial recordsthatareofconcernhere.Neglectofjudicialmaterialsandof prevailingandchangingnormscantendtooverplayregularpatternsof familylifeandoverlookordownplayconsistentmomentsofintrafamilial conflictanddisputeresolution.Conflictsanddisputeswerearegular featureoffamilylife,especiallyatpivotalmomentswhenthemembership andfortunesofadomesticgroupwereinplay.François-JosephRuggiu, inoneofthefewstudiesdirectedatinheritancedisputes,wasmovedto speakofthe “banalityofintrafamilialconflicts.”4 Aboveall,inheritance seemstohavebeenregularlydisputed.Marriagewasanotherlegalarea wheredisputeswerecommon.Yetonlyrecentlyhassystematicusebeen madeofecclesiasticalcourtrecordstoseehowsomemarriageswereless thanpeaceful.
Confl ictsinvolvedemotionsandinterestsandcouldtakeformoutside thelegal,buttheyhadtoworkthemselvesoutinlegaltermsandtosome degreeinlegalinstitutions.Thelawisaseparatedomain,a “distinct socialform, ” adistinctformofthoughteventhat,especiallyinearly modernItaliansocieties,wassufficientlyambiguoustogiverisetorecurringissuesindispute.Sociallifeisandwasmessy,andsoisandwasthe law.Lawdoesnotjustregulate;itconstitutessocietywithwholesetsof
3 Bonfield, “DevelopmentsinEuropeanFamilyLaw,” 88. 4 Ruggiu, “Pourpréserverlapaixdesfamilles,” 139.
categoriesandrelationships.Itisawayofunderstandingaswellas manipulatingone’sworld.AndinearlymodernItalytherewasnotone law,butseveral.Inthatmessofmaterialswerevariouswaysofcomprehendingindividualsandfamilies,gender,property,generations,and muchmore.
Thelegaldimensionsofgenderandtheexperiencesofwomeninlaw havealsobeenrelativelyneglected,incontrasttotheattentionthathas beenshowntoothermatters,suchassexualityandmarriage,motherhood,education,religion,andwork.Aseminalessayonwomeninthe Renaissanceentirelyneglectsthelawinfavorofexaminingimagesof womeninliterature.5 Threedecadeslateracollectionof 29 essayson womenintheItalianRenaissanceplaced fiveofthemunderaheading about “legalconstraints,” yetonewasinfactaboutmaritalloveandtwo wereaboutsumptuarylaws.Onlyoneessaytrulyexaminedthelegal contradictionsrevolvingaboutgenderinaparticularcity.6 Evena fine overviewofwomeninmedievalEuropedevotesonlysixpagestolaw, despitethefactthatitnotesthataccesstopropertygavewomenaccessto powerandthatchangesinwomen’srightsofinheritanceandproperty holdingarethe “principalkey” tounderstandingtheirshiftingsocial position.7
Thegeneraldisregardoflawinrelationtogendercanbeattributedto twothings.Forone,thereisanassumptionthatlawwasnotgoodto women.InanaccountofwomenintheRenaissance,RomeoDeMaio devotedachaptertowomen’s “legalinferiority” (infactlargelyrelyingon literarytexts),anddepictedmarriageasthepassageofawomanfromthe prisonofherfather’s patriapotestas (legalpaternalauthority)toher husband’scontrol.Hebemoanedthe “harshillegality,contraryto nature” ofparentallydictatedmarriagechoicesthatincludeddirecting womentoconventsratherthanmarriedlife.8 Hisisfarfromasolitary position.
Closelyrelatedisthesensethatlawitselfwasandisjustnotthat importantinlife(nottosayboring,perhaps).Historyhastakenalinguisticandculturalturn.Ithasembracednarrativeagain.Itispoststructural andpostcolonial.Itisaboutmetaphorandrepresentation.And,afterall, therealitiesofdailylifeandlovedonotproceedthroughlegalities,except
5 Kelly, “DidWomenHaveaRenaissance?”
6 Meek, “WomenbetweentheLawandSocialRealityinEarlyRenaissanceLucca.”
7 Ward, WomeninMedievalEurope 1200–1500, 4–11.
8 DeMaio, DonnaeRinascimento,esp. 95–96.
ofcourseatpivotalmomentslikemarriageorbuyingahouse.And neglectoflawisalsotoadegreethefaultoflegalhistory,oflegal historians,whoseneglectofmoregeneralhistoryandpursuitofarcane detailsandstiltedlanguagecanleavetheirperspectivesasanoutlierin historicalpractice,ratherthaninthemainstream.Anditisundeniable,in ourcontext,thatlookingatwomenandfamilythroughalargelylegal lensmeansthatwewillseeonlyhazyaspectsofthemaswivesand widows,andnothingatallofthemasthinkers,asmidwives,servants, orevenasnunsorprostitutes.Wewillbeconcernedwithproperty andpower.
EquallyitcanbesaidthatearlymodernItalianfamilieswereabout propertyandpower.Theywerecertainlydifferentfromthefamiliesofthe contemporaryWest.Studyingthemputsusinaworldwheremarriages werearrangedandtheireconomicbasescarefullynegotiated.Parental controlovercareerchoiceswasparamount.Andyetparentswerenot themselvesuncontrolled.Testamentshadtorecognizechildrenandleave themanappropriateshare.Testatorswerenotentirelyfreetodowhat theywantedwiththeirbelongingsafterdeath.Kinrelationships,across geographyandacrosstime,providedanindividualwithbothoptionsand constraints,placestoseekhelpbutfromwhichhelpmightalsobesought. Inallofthis,then,lawwasacentralelement.
LawseemstohaveacertainautonomyinwesternEuropeansocieties, includingearlymodernItaly,withitsnumerouslawcourtsrelyingon writtendocumentsandprocedures,indense,dif ficult,andarcanelegal Latin.Butlawcannotbereducedtosimpleapplicationofarule.Law,as theFrenchsociologistPierreBourdieusawit(andhewasnotalone), obscuredrelationsofpowerandcontestsoverit.Thatdoesnotmeanthat lawisthenonlyepiphenomenal.Lawoperatesinthesocialandjudicializesit.Or,intermsofBourdieu’sseminalcontribution,thenotionof habitus,peopleknowhowtoactandsucceedintheparticularhistorical situationthatisthelaw.Thereisacertainplasticityandmotionina fi eld likelaw.9 Therelationshipoflawtopowerisnottobeassumedbut preciselywhatneedstobestudied.10
Totakeacueinsteadfromahistorian,RenataAgo,whonotesthat earlymodernItalianlitigiousnesswastheresultofmorethanafailureto banishallambiguityfromcontracts: “Recoursetothecourtcannot indeedimmediatelybeconsideredasthesignofthefailureofan
9 Bourdieu, “TheForceofLaw:TowardaSociologyoftheJuridicalField.” 10 Engel, “HowDoesLawMatterintheConstitutionofLegalConsciousness?”
agreement.Itratherisseenasameanstointegrateorremediatea defectivesituation. ”11 Whichisnottoignoretheprevailingambiguities inlawregardingownership,agency,person,andfamily.Infamiliesin whichlawwassopivotal,suchambiguitiesbrokeoutinconfl ictwith frequency.
Withregardtowomenandgender,lawisdoublyimportant,forwhile lawtookaleadindefininganddisadvantagingwomen,itisalsotruethat withinlawwomenwereabletodoimportantthingsforthemselvesand others.12 Womencouldturnnotionsoftheirsupposedfrailtyand irrationality,notionsalsoenshrinedinthelaw,totheiradvantagetogain protectionoftheirrightsandpersons.Aboveall,whilelawdefinedgender inpartbyagenciesandabilitiesconcededtomenbutnottowomen, womenstillhadimportantrolesintransmittingandpreservingfamily wealth.Womenandmen,asvariousstudieshaveshown,usedtestaments differently.Thosedifferenceshadtodowithwhatlawsallowedthemto do.Tounderstandsuchmatters,inturn,requiresthatwelookatwhat lawwaslikeinItalybetween 1300 and 1600.
thelawinitaly
ThelawatworkinItalydrewontwotypesofsources,issuingintwo typesoflaw.Therewaswhatwasknownas iuscommune (“common” law).Thiscommonlegalheritageitselfderivedfromseveralsources.Atits simplest, iuscommune wasthebodyoflawgivensophisticationand coherenceandexpoundedinthelawschoolstobefoundinseveralItalian towns(firstofallBologna,butalsoimportantlyinPadua,Perugia,and elsewhere).ItsmajorcomponentswerethetextsofRomancivillaw, excisedandassembledatthebehestoftheemperorJustinianinthesixth century,andcollectivelyreferredtoasthe Corpusiuriscivilis. Therewere alsothetextsofcanonlawoftheChurch,ofmorerecentcreation, assembledandreleasedindifferentformsfromtheearlytwelfthcentury, andknowninparallelasthe Corpusiuriscanonici.Tothesewereaddeda fewfragments,imperialdecrees,andacollectionoftraditionscovering whatiswidelyreferredtoasfeudallaw.Evenmore, iuscommune includedtheglossesandopinionsofjuristswhoreadthetextsintoa coherentsystem,ortriedto. Iuscommune itselfwasnosimplematterof distillationfromRomanandcanonlawtexts.The iuscommune
11 Ago, Economiabarocca,xi–xii.
12 Wiesner, Gender,ChurchandStateinEarlyModernGermany, 82.
constitutedabedrockofinstitutionsandgenerallyvalidnorms(Venice wasanotableexceptiontoitsreach).
Alongside iuscommune,presupposingit,relyingonit,butalsoconsciouslymodifyingorrejectingitinlinewithlocalculturalmodelsand customs(somederivingfromLombardorothertraditions),laythe ius proprium,ormoreproperly iurapropria (plural).Thesewerelocalstatutesandcustoms,compiledsporadicallyineachcommunitylegislating foritself,aswellasinterveningprovisionsandexemptions.Hereiswhere agreatdealofvarietycreptintothelegalsituationontheItalianpeninsula.Thoughmanysimilaritiescanbefoundamongthelawsofvery differentlocalities(andnotablysoinregardtowomen’sdowryand inheritancerights,aswewillsee),notwoplaceswerepreciselythesame (evenwhen,aswithMilan,adominantcity’sstatuteswerethebasisof thoseinnearbysubordinatecommunities).Onenecessarydimensionof thepresentprojectisthuscomparisonofstatutesfromdifferentcommunities,largeandsmall.Thesearenotalwayseasytolocate,anditisvery diffi culttotrackchangesinthemforcommunitiesthatdidnotredactnew versionswithanyregularity(asVenicedidnotafter 1244,orFlorence after 1415).IhavepursuedtheseinalargesamplingofthoseItalian communitystatutesthatareinprint.
Thepluralisticqualityofthelawnecessarilymadeforuncertainties, whichinturnmadethelawintoa fieldofdoubtandargument.Asanoted scholarofItalianfamilyhistoryhasrecognized, “theincongruities betweencommonlawandparticularlawsopenedaspaceofuncertain definitionattheheartofwhicharoseconflictsthatwereresolvedina disparatemanner,dependingonthecourtandthejudge.”13 Thosecalled ontoadjudicatethesecon flictsthusstoodataprivilegedpointwhere meaningandenforcement,lawandculture,werein fl ux.Itistheirwork, andthosemomentsandtypesof fluctuatingmeanings,thatareourfocus.
Inthejuristicculturethatcametomaturityinthemedievaluniversities, whatmatteredwasmasteryofgrammar,rhetoric,andlogic,andunderstandingofthefundamentalelementsofcivil,canon,andfeudallaw. Proficiencyinlocallawwaslefttopractitionerstopickupastheywent. Studentsinthelawschoolsencounteredtheauthoritativeglosses,commentaries,manuals, consilia,andallelsethatcontributedtothe communisopinio (commonposition)onamultitudeofissues,questions,and pointsoflaw.Theylearnedrulesandformsofinterpretation,suchas
analogicalreasoning.Buttheirprofessionaltreatmentoflocallaws,even atmomentswhentheyrestrictedorarguedtovoidthoselaws,servedto enlargetheirweightandthatoftheinstitutionslinkedtothem.
Thelearnedlawwasawrittenlaw(especiallyincontrasttothe GermanicprocedureswidelyusedinnorthernEurope),withlittleinthe wayoforalproceedings,asidefromthetakingofwitnesstestimonywhere appropriate,andlittleofthedramaofanactualtrial.Justaboutevery Italiancitywasteemingwithnotaries,whoforafeewouldrecordinLatin thelegal(attimesalsoillegal)doingsofthecity’sresidents,or,perhaps better,clothetheirdoingsinlegalgarb.Inarealwayitwasthenotaries whoembodiedlaw,atthejunctionof iuscommune withlocalstatutes.
Buttherewereotherlegallyrelevantrecordsaswell.Merchants’ accounts,forexample,werepartofthelegalrecordindebtcases,one reasonaccountingmethodsandprivateaccountsweresorelatively advancedandsophisticatedinItaly.
Thoughthelawoftenbeingappliedconsistedoftextsdecadesand frequentlyevencenturiesold,thatdoesnotmeanthatthelawwasan unchangingbackdroptothelivesofindividualsandtheirfamilies.Itis truethatstatutorylegislating(ortheof ficialamendingofacommune’s statutesasawhole)wassporadic.Buttinkeringwithstatutorylanguage andcraftingexemptionswasacontinualprocessinsomecommunities. Statutesandotherformsoflegislationclearlychanged,annoyinglyso,to judgebyfrequentcomplaintsonthatscore,whichreachedamoresophisticatedlevelatthehandsofFrancescoPetrarca(1304–74)andlater humanists,whowereregularcriticsoflawandlegalprofessionals.But theinterpretationsandusesofeventheoldercanonicaltextsofthe ius commune alsochanged.
Webeginourexaminationaround 1300 becauseofthestateofthe learnedlawbythatpoint.Thegreatglosstothecivillawandtheparts (mostofit)ofcanonlaw,alsoglossed,werecompletedaroundthatpoint. Thecanonicaltextshadbeenseeminglyintegratedintoacomprehensive corpus.Theeraofpost-glossatorsor moderni sawnewandmoresystematicapproachestoareasoflaw.Rolandinode’ Passaggieri(d. 1300)of Bolognaconstructeda summa ofthenotarialart;AlbertodaGandino (1278–1310)pennedatreatiseonstatuteinterpretation;GuglielmoDurante(d. 1295)composedwhatamountedtoaproceduraltreatise, Speculumjudiciale;DinodelMugello(d. 1303)supposedlytalkedPope BonifaceVIIIintoaddingasectiononrulesoflaw(regulaeiuris)asthe finaltitleinhiscompilationofnewdecretalstobeaddedtothebodyof canonlawin 1298.
Theso-called moderni ofthelatethirteenthandearlyfourteenth centuriesbegantolookaswellbeyondthecanonicaltextstothechaotic andoftenill-writtenstatutesofvariouscity-states.Themorelegalobjectionswereraisedincourtsastothemeaningoflocallawsandtheir relationtothe “commonlaw” asafontoflogicandjustice,themore judgeswho fi eldedthosequestionsturnedtolearnedjuristsforhelp.Such juriststhusacquiredrealpowertodecide,oratleastinfl uence,the decisionofactualcases.Themeanstheyusedwastheformallegal opinion,the consilium,whichexaminedargumentsadvancedinlitigation and,relyingoncanonicaltexts,textsoflocallaws,opinionsofgreat academicjurists,and consilia ofothers,offeredaresolution.Fromaround 1300,then,itcantrulybesaidthat “todraft consilia becamethemost relevantjudicialactivityperformedbyprofessors, doctoreslegum,and simplejudges.”14 Thephenomenonwouldgrowthroughouttheperiod andreachitsapogeebetween 1400 and 1550.
Thetransitionrantothegenerationsofcommentatorswhofollowed, beginningperhapswithCinodaPistoia(1270–1336),butencompassing figureslikeRiccardoMalombra(d. 1334),JacopoBottrigari(ca. 1274–1347),OldradodaPonte(d. 1335),AlbericodaRosate (d. 1354) – butmostfamouslyBartoloofSassoferrato(1313–57),his studentsBaldo(1327–1400)andAngelodegliUbaldi(1323–1400),the canonistGiovannid’Andrea(ca. 1270–1348),andlaterPaolodiCastro (1360–1441)andothers,someofwhomwewillencounter.Intheir academiclecturesandintheir consilia,theymadeattemptsatharmonizingdiversetexts,includingthoseoftheirpredecessors,whodetermined the casus ofeachtextandsoughttheunderlyingrule(regula).Itisno accidentthatthewritingsofthesemenwerecitedandtreatedasauthoritative.Theyweresystematic,comprehensiveinmanycases,andlearned. Aspractitionersthemselvestheysharedthesameproblemssomanyother doctorsoflawfaced.
Alsoarisingearlyinthefourteenthcentury,afterthefullelaborationof judiciallydriveninquisitoryprocedures,wasanewsummaryprocedure. Problemsofproceduraldelay,whichhadbecomeapparent,werethus addressedtoadegree.Litigationdidnothavetobesolengthyand expensive.Statutesquicklyadapteditfromcanonlaw.Indeed,oneof theotherlegallyrelevantdevelopmentsinplacebyaround 1300 wasthe factthatitwasaboutthenthatcivicstatutesbegantobeassembledina
Vallerani, “TheGenerationofthe Moderni atWork,” 153.
widespreadfashion.Statutesincludedrulesofprocedureforuseinlocal courts.Theymadeformallitigationpossibleandgaveshapetolocal normsandcustoms,makingtheircomparisonto iuscommune feasible. Indeed,onegoodreasonforthemwastosetoutrulesthatdivergedfrom thecommonlegalheritageandtocoverareasnotin iuscommune (includingpoliticaloffices,guilds,andregulationofpublicspaces).Juriststhemselveshadanactiveroleinthecomposition,compilation,andrevisionof civicstatutesandintheelaborationofjudicialprocedures.Andallthese developmentsaroseintheaftermathofthepopularmovements,successfulatleastmomentarilyinmanycommunities,inwrestingpowerfrom oldoligarchicnobilities,inthecourseofthethirteenthcentury.Jurists, notaries,andtheruleoflawingeneralthrivedontheassertionofpopular perspectivesoncity-statesandcitizenship.
ThemajorexceptiontosuchdevelopmentslayintheMezzogiorno,the ItaliansouthofthekingdomsofNaplesandSicily.Thereeducatedjurists concentratedonquestionsofpractice,includingthosemoregermaneto thesouth,suchasfeudallaw. Consilia andotherpracticalwritingsdrew theirattention,butlittleofthatwaseventuallypublished.Lawthere evolvedonthebasisofmodelsdevelopedtothenorth(andimportant questionswereattimesreferredtonorthernjuristsfortheirinput),but localnormsandpracticesweredifferentforsuchessentialmattersas inheritanceandmaritalproperty.Itisdiffi cult,asaresult,tointegrate thelegalsituationoffamiliesandgenderintoanItaly-widepicture.
Thelearnedlawandthelegalprofessioncontinuedtoevolveafterthe greatfourteenth-centurycommentatorshaderectedtheirimposingand authoritativebodiesofwork.Problemsstillaroseinpracticeandwere discussedinacademicandjudicialfora.Theappearanceoftheprinting pressraisednewopportunitiestospreadandpreserveimportantworks. Consilia couldbegatheredforcirculation,andmajorjuristshadoneeye toaccumulationoftheiropinionsintovolumes,evenastheywrotethem forthedifferentcourtsandlitigants.Courtsthemselvesbegantocompile theirdecisions,especiallyassomecourts,liketheRuotainFlorence,were staffedwithprofessionaljuristsservingforlongorevenopen-ended terms.Suchjudgesbecametheirownsourceofprecedents,eclipsingthe judgmentsandauthorityofthosewhowrote consilia forthem.This processwouldprovokewhathasbeenlabeleda “crisis” forlawinthe sixteenthcentury.Judgesandcourtshadopenedupmoreavenuesto arguefortheweightoflegislation,especiallythatofthegreatEuropean monarchs,butalsothatofmanylesserprincesandcities,againstthe commonlawanditsinterpreters.
Theuseoflawinpracticeandgrowinglitigationalsospurredthe explorationofdifferentareasoflawinmonographictreatisesthatbecame evenmorewidespreadanduseful.Thepublicationin 1584–86 ofan enormouscollectionoftreatisesineighteenvolumes(26 boundbooks), knownasthe Tractatusuniversiiuris,wasanimportantmoment.It markedthematurityofasystemoflawthatarosewiththeprofessor andthejurist,withtheinterpretersoflaw,evenastheirinfl uencewas waninginfavorofthelegislator.Thefuturewouldbelongtothelatter andultimatelytocodesoflegislation.
theinterventionsoflegalexperts
Ourstudyoffamiliesandlawcoincideswiththeheydayof consilia,when juristswerethepivotal figuresinformulatingjudgments.Theyareour mainsourcetounderstandthecomplexitiesofproperty,gender,and family.Thesetextsaredense,diffi cult,andimportant.Theyarewhere the iuscommune,locallaws,andsocialpracticesallmet. Theacademicallytrainedattorneysreliedheavilyonthetextsand premisesof iuscommune thattheylearnedinschool,buttheywereno longerinanacademicsettingwhenactingasa consultor.Theywerenot freetoignorelocalpositivelaw,muchastheymightbeinclinedtomodify andrestrictit.Theywereoperatingandpracticinginandamongcourts runbygovernmentsorjurisdictionalinstitutionssuchasguilds.Their interventionsincasesmadeandkept iuscommune asalivingforcein society,butitwasnottheonlylivingforce.Litigantscouldcrafttheirown compromiseresolutionsthatdidnotconformto,thoughtheymightbe shapedby,anyjudicialresolutionhandedtothembyacourt.Judges couldbeinfl uencedby consilia andattimesboundbylawtofollowthem, buttheycouldalsoreachtheirownconclusions.Itisjustaboutimpossible todeterminewhattheoutcomewasinanyonecase,especiallyifa consilium isoursolesource.But consilia areparticularlyusefuland fruitfulsourcesforstudyoffamilyandgenderbecausetheycanallow ustoseehowmuchlawbothconstrainedandenabledpeoples’ actions. Wecanseewhatpossibilitieslawopenedup.Lawsmadeitpossibleto preservefamiliesandtheirpatrimoniesovergenerations.Lawsmadeit possibletoexploitdifferencesofgenderandalsotoelideorcircumvent them.Lawsdefinedwhowasmarriedtowhomandwhowasnot.Laws definedwhowereheirs.Theyprovidedprocedurestoexamineandresolve disputedquestions.Howexactlytheydidallthatwaswhatjuristshadto figureout.
Tomakealltheforgoingclear,itisperhapsusefuloncetoseea consilium insomedetail.HereintranslationfromtheponderouslegalLatin (makingunfortunatelyforsomeponderousEnglishprose,whichserves heresimplytoimpartsome flavoroftheoriginal)isaportionofthePaduan jurists’ argumentinacasewewillseeinChapter 1.Theproblemisthelegal presumptionofconsentofafathertoason’sbusinesscontracts:
Ijudge[arbitror]thatitshouldberuledtothecontrarybecausethestatute demandsknowledge,consent,andwill.Andknowledgealonewithoutcontradictinganact,accordingtoitspropermeaning,isnotconsentandwill,butasortof middlebetweenwantingandnotwantingsomething, <asin> lex 1,inthe paragraph sitamen andsaid lex 1,theparagraph siisquinavem <intheDigest title> Deexercitoriaactione [D. 14.1.1,22 and 19],andintherule isquitacet of therulesoflawintheLiberSextus[VI. 5.13.44]andplainlybyBartolo <inthe Digesttitle> Solutomatrimonio,the lexQuedotis [D. 24 3 33].Thereforeina municipallawdepartingfromcommonlawthiscaseisnotcovered,giventhat consentwouldappearbymeansofa fiction,asiswellallegedabovebythe lex 3, paragraph hecverba <oftheDigesttitle> Denegotiisgestis [D. 3.5.3,1].For whicharguesthatthestatutespeaksbya[rhetorical]linkage,whichlinksseemto jointhings <asintheDigesttitle> Delegatisiii,the lexeatamenadiectio [D. 32.1.46]anditsnaturemustfallbetweendiversethings,asisnoted <inthe Digesttitle> Deiurisetfactiignorantia initsrubric[D. 22.6].Fittinglytherefore thestatutewasnotcontentwithknowledgealonebutdemandedtrueconsentand expresswill,andasitclearlyappears,thiswastheintentofthestatute,becausein the firstpart,whenasonstandsasmasterorpartner,itwascontentwith knowledge,withoutcontradiction, <but> wherehestandsasfactororapprentice itdemandedmore.15
Ascanbeseen,thejuristcametothisresolutioninaroundaboutand technicalway,butalsoinathoroughandauthoritativeway.Hehad recourserepeatedlytolegaltexts,oncetoajurisprudentialcommentary, andtorulesofgrammar(copulativeexpressions),asheplayedone portionofastatuteagainstanother.Thetextslatchedontoforanalogies concernactivitiesdifferentfrom(thoughattimescloseto)thoseinthe case.Inthiswayhecomprehendedthestatutewithinthetermsof ius commune whileconcedingit,ashehadto,someweight.Hewasbuilding partofanargumenttotheeffectthatafather’sknowledgethathisson wasinabusinessdidnotmeanthatheconsentedtoeverycontractand obligationtheboyenteredinto.
Generallythereweretwotypesof consilia. Consiliasapientis couldbe renderedforhypotheticalcases,inwhichcasetheywereextensionsof
academicexercises.Butbyandlargetheywereproducedattherequestof ajudgeorotherofficial,onhisowninitiativeorattherequestofthe litigants,whousuallyboundthemselvestoabidebythejurists’ sentence. Judges,eventhoseoflearnedbackground,hadlimitedknowledgeoflocal lawsandcouldfeeltheneedforadvice.Citizenjudges,aslegallaymen, mighthavesomedegreeofknowledgeoflocallawsornot – butlittleof theoverarchingframeworkof iuscommune oritsinterpretivemechanisms – andsimilarlycouldfeelimpelledtoseekguidance.Dossierswith copiesofpertinentstatutesanddocuments,anarrationoflegalfacts,and questionsoflawand/orfactthatneededanswering,weresenttooneor morejurists.Asoneexpertindealingwiththesetextshasnicelyputit, equippedwithanalogy-servingpassagesdrawnfromRomanandcanonlawand supportedbyreferencestoiuscommuneauthorities,allheldtogetherbysyllogistic inevitability,jurist-consultorsnimblytraversedtheminefieldofstatutoryindeterminacytofashiondeterminatecaseoutcomesthatenabledjudgesandpublic officialstoapplythecity’slawsexpeditiously.16
Theresult,ifrequestedbyorthroughthecourt,wastypicallyconsidered bindingontheparties.The consilium couldthusprovideasolutionthat hadweightandmightenddisputesandlitigationinasurerandquicker way.Itisimportanttorealizethatlocalgoverningauthorities,including thoseofguildsandothercorporations,createdandstaffedcourtsand issuedproceduralstatutesthatstreamlinedandmodi fiedthefulsome proceduresoutlinedinacademicjurisprudenceandembodiedtoadegree inecclesiasticalcourts.Thesebodieswelcomed consilia fortheirproceduralimpact,althoughtheyalsohadtofacethefactthatthelegal consultantsmightcontestthelegitimacyandjusticeoftherulesand claimsofsuchgoverningbodiesandcorporations.Legislationtoreject jurisprudentialvoidingoflocalstatutes(asFlorencedidin 1388)was oneresult.17
Consilia weregatheredandultimatelythoseofthemostauthoritative juristswereprinted.Others,facedwithsimilarcases,couldminethemfor ideas,terms,citations,andarguments.Butitisimportanttokeepinmind that consilia possessedonly “normativeauthority.” Therewasnosystem ofprecedentbywhichpreviousjudicialdecisionswerebindinginsubsequentsimilarcases.Itcouldalwaysbearguedthatabetteropinionmight comealong,andauthorsof consilia oftensignedtheirworkswitha
16 Kirshner, “ACriticalAppreciation,” 20.
17 Kirshner, “Consilia asAuthorityinLateMedievalItaly:TheCaseofFlorence.”
disclaimershouldabetterargumentarise.18 Legaltheoryremainedintact, moreover,aspracticalexceptionsremainedonthelocallevelanddidnot needtobe “normalized. ”
Infact,mostofthe consilia thusgatheredwereprobablycomposednot atthebehestofthecourtbutforoneofthepartiesinvolvedinor anticipatinglitigation.Theaimofthese consiliaproparte wasnotjuristic truth,butadvancementofoneparty’sclaims.Suchlegalargumentswere deliveredtojudgeswho,however,werenotobligatedtofollowtheir findings(andhowcouldoneiftherewere consilia forbothsidesina dispute?),butclearlywereopentobeinginfl uencedbythemandhavingat handlegalargumentstobackthesubsequentjudicialdecision.Such advocacyofclients’ interestsprovokeddenunciationsof consiliaproparte andconsultingingeneralforobfuscatinganddelayingjustice,evenby juriststhemselves,letalonehumanistsandothervociferouscritics.
Ifanything, consiliaproparte hadtobemorethorough,rehearseboth sidesofaquestion,coveralltherelevantauthorities,andsystematically arguebothproandcontra.Theyhadtobepersuasiveandlegallyauthoritativeinappearance.Suchargumentshadtobefully “motivated” (explainedandtextuallybacked),whereasdecisory consiliasapientis couldbequitesparingandwerewelladvisedtobeso,soastobebeyond challengeinanyparticular.Clothedinthedignityofthelegalprofession andsolemnforms,the consilium,withitsinvocationoftheholyandits subscriptionandwaxsealsintheoriginal,canthusseemratheroracular. Asapracticalmatter,especiallyassurviving consilia,moresoinprint, excisedfactualmaterialinfavorofthejurisprudentialargumentsand references,itisoftenimpossibletodetermineifaparticular consilium was sapientis or proparte,astheywereotherwisesosimilar. Consilia werecitedasauthoritiesandexamples, “arsenalsofpossibilities,” as MarioAscheriputit.Fromthepointofviewofahistorianwhoseinterest issocial,notlegalperse,such consilia retainastubbornanonymityand resistcontextualization.Wewillbeabletosaylittleaboutmostlitigants inthecaseswewillcomeacross.
Still,thetextsfashionedresolutionstothepatchyrelationsbetween statutesand iuscommune.Thejuristswhointerpretedthetexts,doctrinal andstatutory,wereprovidinglawwheretherewasnone(atleastinterms ofastatutoryrule).Wheretherelationsamongtextswereuncertain, wheretheactionsofpeoplethrewfurtherdoubtatthemeaningoftexts,
thejuristssteppedin.Theirvitalaccommodationsmadethemcultural arbitersinawidersense,asintheTrecentoandQuattrocento consilia becameawidelydiffusedmechanism.Bytheneventhesouthernkingdomsbegantoseemoreuseof consilia andtheircollectionfortheuseof laterpractitioners,eventhoughthecourtstherehadjudgeswhoseverdicts carriedsomeprecedentialweight.19
Consilia furnishedwhattheweakpoliticalformationsandtheirinfrequentlegislationcouldnot.Thepluralityofsourcesoflawmadefor uncertainty.The consilia seeminglymadeforcertaintyandconsistency.20
Jurisconsultsthus filledaculturalandpoliticalgap. Consilia generated, bythesecondhalfofthe fifteenthcentury,amoresystematic communis opiniodoctorum tocoverthelacunaebetweenthedifferentsourcesoflaw andbehavior.Thecommonopinionbecameitselfasourceoflaw, embodiedinthegrowingcollectionsof consilia inprint.Deviationfrom thecommonlearnedopinionwasnottoleratedinpractice.Francesco Guicciardini(1483–1540),adoctoroflawsandstatesmanfromFlorence, commentedonthestateoflawinhisday.Whileheinsistedthatthefacts ofthedifferentcasesmadeitimpossibletoapplyrulessimplyandledto theaccumulationofcontraryjuristicopinions,healsolamentedthat thescienceoflawhascometosuchapassthatifonesideofacasepresentsa cogentargumentandtheotherpresentstheauthorityofascholarwhohaswritten onthesubject,moreattentionwillbepaidtotheauthority.Andsopracticing lawyersareforcedtoreadeveryonewhohaswritten,withtheresultthattime whichshouldbedevotedtoreasoningisconsumedinreadingbooks.21
Theresultsofsuchreadingareevidentinthesixteenth-centuryopinions ofamanlikeMarianoSozzinitheyounger,whowillappearin subsequentpages.
Infactlimitationsandexceptionswereconceivableonavarietyof grounds.Opinionstermedcommon,infact,begantomountupinoppositiontoeachotheracrossthesixteenthcentury.Judgesagainhadto exercisediscretion,butbythenmanymoreofthemwerethemselves trainedjurists.Judgesofprestigioustribunalsweremorehighlyregarded thantheteachersoflawintheuniversities.Insum,
19 Ascheri, “Il consilium deigiuristimedievali,” 257;idem, “Il ‘dottore’ elostatuto:una difesainteressata,” Rivistadistoriadeldirittoitaliano 69 (1996): 95-113.
20 Rossi, “Laforzadeldiritto,” 38.
21 FrancescoGuicciardini, MaximsandReflectionsofaRenaissanceStatesman,trans. MarioDomandi(NewYork:Harper, 1965), 94–95.
juridicalscienceinSeicentoItaly,chloroformedbytheuncontestedruleof commonopinions,lackingconcernstoreformitonthepartofpoliticalpower, lockedinrepetitionofamethodwithoutalternatives,standsinexorablyexhaustingitselfintheshrewdbutsterileadministrationofthedoctrinalpatrimony accumulatedinpastcenturies,eveniftheultimateeffectscanonlybeperceived overalongperiod,tototalruinbynowapparent.22
Still,thecommonopinionprevailedbecauseitprovided,inthewordsof anotherlegalscholar,an “endojurisprudentialinstrument ” ofcertainty.23
Itiscertainlynotthecase,asoneprominentItalianlegalhistorianhas it,thatstudiesof consilia (includingmyown) “alldenythe iuscommune anyimportantroleasalawcapableofarealeffectonlocallegalpractice ordoctrine,andtheirhistoriographicalevaluationsunderestimatethe multiplevalencesandcapacitiesofthe iuscommune. ”24 Consilia were notonlyaboutpractice;theywereaboutjurisprudencetoo.Theywere wherelawcouldbebothformativeofpracticesandconfirmatoryofthem. Thatiswhytheywill figureprominentlyandconsistentlyinourexamination.Butwealsohavetoremainalerttothefactthattherewasnota seamlessconnectionbetweenlegaltheoriespropoundedinschools(and undoubtedlytakentoheartbystudentswhoenteredprofessionalpractice)andlegalpracticesinactualcourts(andthereweremanywith competingandoverlappingjurisdictions).Wecanseehowinventive practicesanddoctrinalsolutionstothemwere.Wecanseehowlaw constrainedandattimesfailedtoconstrainbehavior.
planofthebook
Itispossibletousethesurviving consilia ofjuriststounderstandlegal issuesindisputeand,toanextent,thebehaviorsandinterestsofthe litigatingfamiliesorpartiesbehind adispute.Thecoreofthisstudythen istheuseof consilia ,largelyinthesixteenth-centuryprintededitionsof major fi gures,suchasBartoloofSassoferrato,AngeloandBaldodegli Ubaldi,PaolodiCastro,AlessandroTartagniofImola(1424– 77 ), FilippoDecio(1454– 1535 ),GiasondelMaino(1435– 1519 ),BartolomeoSozzini( 1436–1507 ),Pier fi lippodaCorgna( 1420– 92 ),Francesco Corti(d. 1495 ),OldradodaPonte,LodovicoPontano(c. 1409– 39 ), Benedettode ’ Benedetti(Capra)(d. 1470 ),andBartolomeoCipolla
22 Rossi, “Laforzadeldiritto,” 57–58.
23 DiRenzoVillata, “Tra consilia, decisiones e tractatus, ” 54.
24 Bellomo, CommonLegalPast, 81.
(1420– 75 ),aswellaslater fi gureslikeMarianoSozzinijunior (1482– 1556 ),PietroCavallo(d. 1615 ),andMarcantonioPellegrini (1530– 1616 ).CoverageforsouthernItalyandSicilyismoreproblematicforlackofprintededitions,buttheworkofscholarssuchasAndrea RomanoandIgorMineomakespossiblesomepointsofcomparison.
Chapter 1 considersthelegalmeaningsof familia ,house,lineage, parentado, casato (andotherterms),andthedistinctionbetweenthem andhousehold.Theperspectivethereismoreanthropologicalandhistoriographical.Atthecenteroflawforalltheseformsofbelonginglaythe patriapotestas containedin iuscommune.Theboundariesofthis potestas withregardtochildren,inthecommonlawandinstatutes,layatthe heartofChapter 3 (insuchsubjectsasemancipation,adoptionand fostering,andillegitimacy).Butbeforethat,Chapter 2 looksatthelegal dimensionsofgenderanditshistoricaltreatment.Heretootheapproach ismoreanthropological,butwewillalsoinquireintothelegaldepictionof womenastheweakersex,inneedofprotection,subjecttohusbandsand fathers,andyetalsosupposedlythegreediersex,quitecapableofactingin pursuitoftheirowninterests.Perhapsunsurprisingly,itwillemergethat therewasnosingleconsistentandcoherentimageofwomeninlaw.
Thelaterchaptersallowustoseegenderinactioninthecasesof daughters,sisters,wives,andmothersandwidows,andbrothers,cousins, uncles,andsoforth.Chapter 4 considersmarriage,mainlyitsformation butalsoissuesofitsdissolution,andmanydimensionsofdowry.There weconsidertheextensionsandlimitationsofpaternalpowerinrelation todaughtersmarryingoutandthelegalrelationsofhusbandsto theirwives.
Muchhasbeendoneonthelawofmarriage,whichwaslargelya matterofcanonlawandchurchcourts.Wherechurchrulesofmarriage concentratedonmaritalconsent,andthusthemarriageasanaturaland spiritualpartnership,andonitseffectsontheoffspring,locallawlooked totheeconomicpartnership,toitslimitsandliabilities,itsformationand dissolution.Includedinrulesonbothlevelsweregenderexpectations regardingrolesasfathersandmothers,husbandsandwives.Heresome developmentsofdowrylawmayhelpexplaininparttheinflationof dowryvaluesthatmanyhistorianshavepointedto.Thecosts(notjust monetary)ofarrangingmarriages,inturn,canexplaintheincreasing recoursetoclericalalternativestolaymarriedlifeamongthewealthier familiesthroughoutItalyby 1600.
Oneoftheareasofchangeindowrylawconcernsthefateofdowry whenmarriageends,typicallybydeathofaspouse.Children’srightsto
inherittheirmothers ’ dowriesvariedbycitiesandregions,butthefate ofthatpropertywastooimportantforlaworsocialactorstoignore. Thisispartofthewiderissueofpropertydevolutionandinheritance, arguablythemostimportantareaoflawregardingfamily.Itcertainlywas themostcomplex.Legalandsocialinclinationstotreatpropertyasa quasi-corporatefamilypossessionhadtodealwiththecombination, conflation,andconflictofindividuallyascribedpropertyrights.Owners couldbebothsingularandmultipleonthesamepieceofproperty, dependingonone’slegalangleofvision(awoman’sdowrywasjustone example,asbothsheandherhusbandhadrightsonitsimultaneously). Afatherbothownedandcontrolledfamilypropertyandyetwasa stewardofitforcominggenerations,hardlyfreetodowhateverhe wishedwiththewealthinhispossession.Fatherscouldactasmore consciousmanagersofanongoingenterpriseofpeopleandthings,but undertheheavymoral,ifnotalwayslegal,guidanceofhumanistsand othermoralists,whodeviseddialoguesandotherinquiriesintochild raising,propertymanagement,marriage,andfatherhood(onethinkshere especiallyofLeonBattistaAlberti).
Chapters 5 and 6 thusdelveintothemanyandintriguingproblemsof inheritance,the fifthinsomegeneraltermsandininstancesofintestacy, andthesixthinthemorevariableandcomplicatedinstancesoflastwills andtestaments.Thechangesininheritancepractices,andtheirallowance inlaw,thatmarkedwhatmanyseeasagrowingaristocratizationofthe leadingfamiliesofmanycommunities,isaparticularfocusofthesixth chapter.Somenotablechangesininheritancepractices,madepossiblein bothlocallawsandin iuscommune,mostimportantlythe fideicommissum,permittedthosewhowantedtotakeadvantagetolimitinheritance (e.g.,primogeniture)oratleastprecludedivisionandalienationofproperty.Heirs,however,hadbothlegaloptions(suchastherejectionofan estate)andlegalduties,towardtheirancestorsaswellastheirdescendants.Youngheirsfoundthemselvesunderlegalguardianship,andgovernmentstookoversightofguardianstoassuretheinheritanceagainst theirincompetenceormalfeasance.Amongtheguardiansweremothers, whosepresumedlegalincompetenceinotherareasheregavewaytolegal faithintheirdisinterestedpursuitoftheirchildren ’swell-being.
InChapter 7,otherdimensionsofthelegalrelationbetweengovernments,frequentlydepictedinpaternalisticmetaphors,andfamilies,come intoplay.Statepaternalismisoneareamostclearlytraceableinmeasures suchassumptuarylawsandothermoralitylegislation(e.g.,sodomy, prostitution),bankruptcy,andevencriminallaws.Statesalsoprovided
thecourtsinwhichpeoplecouldpursuetheirfamily-basedrightsor complaints,sopaternalismwaseffective,ornot,inthosearenas.Itisin thiscontextthenthatwewillconsidermorepeculiarregionalvariationsof southernItalianlawandculturalvariationwithJewishlawsandpractices.
Theconclusionaimsatmorethanbeingasummaryof findings. Thereareimportantthemesthatneedtobebroughttogether.Thereisa long-standingthemewithinItalianhistoryandingovernmentalpolicies regardingthefailureofeconomicandpoliticaldevelopmentsinthe Mezzogiorno,whichhasbeenlinked(mainlyormostevidentlyby Americanscholars)toanenduringandcomprehensivefamilism,witha consequentlackofcivicinstitutionsandvalues.Ifanything,suchfamilism wouldseemtobemorevibrantintheearlymodernperiod.Beyondany such “amoralfamilism, ” andmorepeculiartoourperiod,therearethe observationsofhistorianswhoseeacrisisintheearlymodernfamilyand itsmaritalandinheritancepatterns.Tothisthemewehavetoaddtherole ofthelawanditsownamorality,ifsuchitcanbecalled.Aboveall, inheritancepracticeswereenabledandcondonedinthelaw.Thestances takenbyjuristsshowanopennessattimestothedesiresofindividuals,in contrasttothefamily,butequallytendenciesintheotherdirection.What becamea “crisis” ofcontinuityandpreservationforonefamilymayonly havebeenasuccessfullyseizedopportunityforanother.Oneproblem withfollowingalegalsourcelike consilia isthatwedonotseethe successes.Weseethetroublecases.
Itisimportanttonote, finally,thattheapproachtakenhere,fromthe perspectiveoflawandfurtherprivilegingconflicts,cases,andjurists’ opinionsandresolutions,leavesoutmuchthatisalsoimportantabout familyandgender.Wedonotconsiderwomenoutsidethefamily – asnuns, forexample,whosefatefollowedfamilydictatesandbecamemorestrictly cloisteredafterTrent.Thereareexcellentworksonthisareaandmore goodworkunderway.Wewillnotlookatthemasmidwives,servants, spinners,orinothercrafts.Wewillnotlookatthemasprostitutes,witches, orcriminals.Ourattentionisonwomen’slivesinafamilialcontext,where genderstereotypeswerelivedanddisregardedattimes,wherewomenwere deeplyengagedinrolesseenastheirsandnot,supposedly,threatening existingorder,butratherembodyingit.Thatmeansalsothatwewillbe viewingmenintheirrolesinrelationtowomeninthefamily.Further,we donottakeintoaccountcriminallawingeneralorareasofpubliclawand citizenshipthatinvolvedmenandtheirfamilyroles.
FamilyinLawandCulture
Atsomepointintheearly fifteenthcentury(before 1415),aFlorentine merchantwenttocourtandinitiatedalawsuittocollectadebt.Itseems hehademployedayoungman,namedGuglielmo,asasortofjuniorclerk (factorseudiscipulus)andhadsenthimofftoGenoaforsometime, duringwhichGuglielmo’sfather,Raimondino,died.Raimondinohad beenwellawareofhisson’snascentcareerandhadnotindicatedany objectionstoit.Hedidnotlivelongenough,however,tolearnthathis sonowedhisemployerthehandsome(butnothuge)sumof 390 florins. ThatwasthedebtthemerchantsoughttorecoverfromGuglielmo ’sthree survivingbrotherswhenhe fi nallywenttocourt – Guglielmohimself unfortunatelyhavingdied,thoughnotuntilafterastintinRomeinthe employofadifferentFlorentinemerchant.
Whystartabookonfamiliesandfamilylawwithaseeminglypedestriansuitoverabusinessdebt?Becausethismerchantbroughtsuitagainst thebrothers,wehavetoconcedethatthiscaseinvolvedfamily.Theywere heirstotheirfatherandbrother;theyheldtheassetsfromwhichthedebt couldbepaid.Thecaseinvolvedfamilythenbecauselaw(beinginthis instancethestatutesofFlorence)saiditdid.
Andtheremaybenomorelikelyproblemforafamilytofacethana controversyoverdebt.Debtwaseverywhere.Mostregulareconomic activitiesweremarkedbydelaysinpayment,byextensionsofcreditin otherwords.Thesecreditsthemselvesentailedfurtherexpensestobe recovered,andbeyondthedirectlyimplicatedpartiestherewasanother categoryofindirectrelations,tothosewhoactedasguarantorsorsureties.Bylawanddefault,thesetoowereoftenkin.Suitsthemselveswere oftenlessamatterofgainingrepaymentthanaboutestablishingthefact
andamountofanobligation(verypressingifonefearedadebtor’s bankruptcyandpossible flight).Itmightthenbeconvertible,albeitata discount.Creditsestablishedinlawweremorethanadiscreteeconomic value; “theyconcernedalsoasocialvalue,representedbytherelation withthedebtor,bytherestraintthusimposedonhisfutureactions,bythe implicitweightofthetrustunderwrittenbyhim.” Still,bankruptcieswere alltoofrequent,andindividualsintheend,nomatterthe fi naljudgments ofcourts,hadtoworkoutwhataccommodationstheycould.1
Apartialrecordofthesuitsurvivesintheformofa consilium,inwhich thereisastatementoffacts(thebasisofthelittlestoryabove),acopyof therelevantFlorentinestatute,andanattorney’sargumentinfavorofthe brothers.2 Whenoneexaminesatextsuchasthis,anumberofcurious featuresspringforth.
OneisthatFlorencehadalawthatheldfathersliablefortheirsons whoopenlypracticedatradeorconductedbusiness.Itpresumedthat fathersknewofsuchpublicactivitiesandconsentedtothem.Other activitiesbysonsforwhichtherewasopenandovertpaternalconsent andwillingnessalso,quiteobviously,incurredpaternalliability.Fathers coulddenythatliability,iftheywantedto,byoneoftwopublicgestures thatthestatuterecognized.Afathercouldgototherelevantguildthat oversawwhatevertypeofeconomicactivityhissonspracticedanddeclare thathedidnotwanttobeheldliableforhisoffspring.Alternatively,he couldgotoanotaryandenactalegalemancipationofhissonfromhis paternallegalcontrol(patriapotestas ),whichdissolvedalllegalliabilities atthatpointandgavehissonthelegalstatusofafullycompetentlegal person(paterfamilias ).Ineithercase,writtenrecordoftheactwas requiredand,withregardtoemancipation,theactevenhadtobe reportedtoandrecordedbythemajormerchants’ tribunalofFlorence, knownastheMercanzia(lateralsotobereportedtothecity’sgoverning body,theSignoria).Anditwasnotjustthefatherwhofacedliability;the grandfatheroreven(howeverunlikelyinfact)thegreat-grandfatherwas alsoliable,as patriapotestas extendedfromandthroughthem.
Inotherwords,Florentinelaw – andFlorencewasnotaloneinthis, thoughitmayhavetakenmoreextremestepsthanotherplacesdid –protectedmarketsandeconomicactivitieswiththeexpressassurancethat familiesandtheirpropertywereonthehookfortheactionsofindividual
1 Ago, Economiabarocca, 58, 104, 148–50.
2 BibliotecaNazionale,Florence,LandauFinaly 98,fols. 309r–20v.
members.Thefamily,throughitshead,wastheresponsiblelegaland economicunit.
InthecaseofthehaplessGuglielmoandhisbrothers,theFlorentine statute’sapplicabilityhardlyseemedindoubt.Raimondinohadnot emancipatedhisson,norhadhedenouncedhimtohisguild.Heknew ofandseeminglycondonedhisson’sactivities.Anditonlyseemednatural andrightthathisliabilitypasstohissonsashisheirs(andtherewere otherstatutesandmoregenerallegalrulesthatproclaimedheirs’ liabilitiesfordebtsontheestatestheyinherited).Moreover,therewasanother Florentinestatutethatquiteexplicitlyboundbrotherslivingtogetherin mutualliability(thoughinourcaseGuglielmohadbeenoutoftownmost ofthetime).Yetthemostinterestingfeatureofthiscaseisthefactthatthe brothersfoundalegalbasistoavoidliabilityandseemedgenerallyto havebeensuccessful.Thesolidarityandonenessofthefamily,atleastas projectedinstatutessuchasthisonefromFlorence,apparentlyhadlimits inpractice.
Thisiswhereasecondfeatureoflawcomesintoplay.Alongsideand behindthestatuteswas iuscommune.Inthestatutethatappliedinthe caseofGuglielmo ’sdebt, iuscommune waspresentinthereferenceto emancipationandthepresumptionof patriapotestas thatlaybehindit, whilelocalpracticewasevidentinthealternativeofdenunciationto aguild.
Fromthe consilium emergesthefactthatthestatutoryrulesofFlorence wereatoddswith iuscommune onsomepoints,notablyonpaternal liability.Anentiretitleinthatpartofthe Corpus knownasthe Codex (C. 4.13)establishedthattherewasnomutualliabilitybetweenafather andanemancipatedson.TheFlorentinestatuterecognizedthateffectof emancipation,whiletryingtoregulateitwithrecordkeeping.Butthe Florentinelawwassaidtobebeyondtherulesofcivillaw(exorbitans) andthereforesubjectbygeneraljuristicrulestowhateverrestrictive readingthelegalexpertswouldfenceitinwith.Indeed,thepresenceof iuscommune inthesociety,inthecourt,andinthemindsofthelegal expertsismostobviousinthenumerouscitationstotextsofthetwomain bodiesofcommonlaw,civilandcanon.Assoonastheattorneysappear, sodothecitations.Buttheydonotsimplyreferencethebasictexts,they alsoreferencethesystematicglossofthecivillaw,knowngenerallyasthe Glossaordinaria,whichwasthecarefullycollectedharmonizationsof different,attimesverycontradictorytexts,devisedbypreviousgenerationsofteachers.Andtheattorneysalsoreferredtomorerecentjurists, renownedteachersoflaw.Inthisinstance,theycitedJacopodeBelviso
(1270–1335),BaldodegliUbaldi(1325–1400),CinodaPistoia (1270–1336),andmainlyBartoloofSassoferrato(1313–57).Oneelementofthesecitations,explicitlyinvokedinthiscase,wasthattherewasa divergenceofviews(varietasopinionum)amongtheexperts,tothepoint ofadmittingthattheauthorityoflearnedexpertswasonly “probable” andnotnecessary.
The iuscommune wasalsoevidentinthepersonsofthethreelegal expertswhocraftedtheintricateargumenttolimitGuglielmo ’sbrothers’ exposure.RaffaeleRaimondidaComo(1387–1427),Prosdocimo Conti(ca. 1370–1427 ),andBenedettodeiDottori(ca. 1385–1448 /54 ) wereprofessorsoflawfromPadua.TheywerenotFlorentines.Their presence(atleastonpaper,becauseitallmayhavebeenhandledfroma distance)istestimonybothtothecosmopolitanqualitiesofthelegal professionandtorelianceonoutsidersasaguaranteeoftheirimpartiality.3 Italiancitiessincethethirteenthcenturyhadreliedonoutsidersin theof fi ceofPodestàandlaterthatofCapitanodelPopolotoactas neutralarbitersofcitizens’ disputes.Simplemediationorarbitrationby thirdpartieswasacommonmeansofdisputeresolution.Finally,that suchdistant fi gurescouldbebroughtintoplayinacasesuchasthiswas innosmallwaytheproductofthelegalprocedurebeingused,bythe factthatitwasawrittenprocedure.
HowthendidGuglielmo’sbrothersescapeliabilityforhisdebts?There wasnoimplicationthatthisdebtwasanythingbutrealandjustifiably owedtothemerchantemployer,whohadbeengrantedaquickand summaryjudgmentagainstGuglielmo.Theproblemlayinextendingthat claimtoeitherGuglielmo’sfatherorhisbrothers.
Fromthefactsofthecaseandthestatutearosetwolegalquestions. Couldthemerchant-employerseekredressfromtheestateofGuglielmo’s father,Raimondino,asadebtagainstRaimondino,inviewofthestatute holdingfathersaccountableforsonsopenlyinbusiness?Secondly,were thethreeremainingsons,whoacceptedtheirfather’spatrimonyinequal thirds,makingnomentionoftheirpredeceasedbrother,liableastheir brother’sheirs?Theattorneywhoenteredpreliminaryargumentsforthe brothersofferedaresoundingnotothe firstquestion.Thefatherwas dead.Thatcircumstancewasnotexpresslycoveredbythestatute.To treatthefatherasifhewerestillalivewastoperpetratea fiction,nota truth.Thestatutewasnottobeconstrued fictively.
3 Kirshner, “ACriticalAppreciation,” 18–19.
Thesecondquestionwastrickier.Ithardlyseemedpossiblethatthe threesurvivingbrotherscouldeachholdathirdofthepaternalestate withoutsubsumingthatfourthleftbytheirbrotherwhenhediedintestate,withoutchildrenofhisown,andneverhavingformallyacceptedhis quarterofthepatrimony.But,justashehadintroducedthedistinction between fictionandtruthintreatingthe firstquestionofthefather’s liability,thisattorneybroughtintheissueofintent(animus).Thethree brotherscouldwellwanttoacquiretheirfather’spropertywithoutinany wayintendingtohavetheestateoftheirbrother(whichhadneverbeen formallycarvedoutoftheestatebythelegalactof aditio).Therewasa legalrulethatanestatenotformallyacceptedwasnottransmitted(hereditasnonaditanontransmittatur)tothenextinlineasthatof(andby rightof)theputativeheir.HeretheauthorityofJacopodeBelvisowas invokedonwhatwasadmittedtobeanareaoflawwheretherewere manydisputes(fueruntmultecontentiones).Thebrotherswerenot Guglielmo ’sheirsandsonotsubjecttotheclaimsofhiscreditors,atleast notbeyondafourthofwhattheyhadclaimedoninheritance.
Onehasnowayoftellingifthatquarterwassufficienttosettlethe 390 florinclaim.Thatwasnotanattorney’sprovince,evenifitwas foremostinthemindsofhisclients.Itdidnotmattereithertothethree Paduanjuristswhowrotetheco-signed consilium ontheissues.They concededthatthelanguageoftheFlorentinestatutehadthefatherdead torightsforhisson’sdebtsat firstglance.Theyintroducedanother fine legaldistinction – thatthefactthatthefatherhadnotcontradictedhisson’s economicactivitieswasnotthesameasconsentingtoorwantingthem(as perthequotationintheintroduction).Ratheritwasa “mediumpoint betweenwantingandnotwanting” (mediumquoddamintervelleetnolle). Amunicipalstatutedepartingfrom iuscommune shouldnotbeaccordeda fictivereadinghereeither.Notjustthefather’sknowledgeofhisson’sacts but “trueconsent” and “expressedwillingness” wererequired,whenason actedinacapacityotherthanasarecognizedmerchantortradesman.The juristsarguedthatthatstandardhadtobemettomakethefather’s obligationinhisperson,asfather,becomeanobligationonhisproperty (inrem).SothethreePaduansdeterminedthattheintentofthestatutes (mensstatuti)wasthatfathers’ heirsnotbeliable,asitdidnotsaythatthey were.AsthebrothershadnotlivedwithGuglielmo,therewasnoquestion ofthembeingliablebyassociationwithhim.
AsGuglielmohadnotformallytakenpossessionofhisquarterofthe patrimony,itsimplyremainedtoenrichthesharesofhisbrothers.Stillit couldbearguedtheycouldnottakethewholeoftheirfather’sestate
withouteffectivelytakingtheirbrother’s,evenifbyanerroroflegal reasoningorevenasaresultof flawedlegaladvicetheythoughtthatthey weresimplytheirfather’sheirs.ThethreePaduanjuristssaiditwas perfectlypossibleforthebrotherstoseethemselvesonlyastheirfather’s heirs;theirfailuretomentiontheirbrothermadeallthemoresenseashis estatewasnobargain(damnosa),anditmademuchmoresensetothink thebrothersactedinerrorthantothinkthattheywouldvoluntarilytake onaburdensomeestateandthrowawaytheirpropertyincoveringits debts.Inkeepingwithwhattheydeclaredwassensible,thejuristswere limitingthedamagestothebrothers,thoughtheywerenotdoingthe creditorsanyfavors.Ifafourthoftheestatedidnotamounttothe 390 florinsowed,thecreditorswereoutsomeportion,possiblymost,of whatwasduethem.
Threethingsstandout.First,whenonereadsthestatutesofItalian communities,one findstheyarerepletewithtermsandinstitutionsof ius commune (e.g.,dowry,matrimony, patriapotestas ,testaments, emancipation).Insomeregardthemedievalcommonlawhadparallels tothecommonlawofEnglandandtheUnitedStates,inthatitwasnot legislatedorcodifiedbutacceptedandcustomary,thoughmodifi edor evenabrogatedbyspecificstatute.Theglaring(butinfactonlypartial) exceptionwasVenice,fortheSerenissimaexplicitlyrejectedtheplayof iuscommune initscourts,optinginsteadforwidejudicialdiscretionbyits nativepatricianjudges.Still,Veniceaccepted iuscommune ascustomary andinheritedlawinitsmainlandpossessions,onceitbeganacquiringits Terrafermaempireinthe fifteenthcentury.Ofcourse,whatVenice rejectedwasnotsomuchtheRomanlaw(partofitsByzantineheritage, afterall)asthemedievalsystematizingofthatlaw,whichemployed variousdevicesoflegalreasoning.
Inanycase,thelawatworkinthiscasewasnotacentralizedsystemof rulesimposedfromabovebysomehigherpoliticalpower.Thelaw, rather,wasapanoplyofnegotiablerulesatworkinavarietyofdiscursive fields,suchasthatofthecaseofRaimondino’ssons.Thewaywasopento legalreasoningtomakesenseoftherules.
Second,legalreasoningintroduced finedistinctionsthatwerenotinthe mindsoflegalsubjectsorthelegislatingbodiesthatdrewupstatutes, oftenpoorlywordedorthoroughlythoughtout.Inourcase,notionsof fictionandintentcameintoplaythroughthelegalexperts.Butitisalso thecasethattheplaintiffhadtobuildacase,andinthisinstancehadnot builtwell.OtherFlorentinestatutesdirectlydealingwithinheritancemay havebeeninvokedtogoodeffect.
Thethirdelementishowthelaw,orthosewhoappliedit,protectedthe family.Thebrothersinheritedandpresumablycarriedontheirlivesand theirhouseholdsdespitethefailuresofGuglielmo.Thesolidarityofthe family,whilepresumedinthestatute,wasnotgoingtobethedevicethat wouldbeitsundoing.Distinctindividualrightsofownershipandagency werenotsubsumed,hereatleast,inthewidercorporatehousehold. Guglielmo ’sdebtswere firstofallhisown,andthejuristslimitedliability forthemtohimandhispropertyintheend.Andfromthecaseitwould seemthatwomenweresosubordinateinthatunitasnottomatter. Daughters,unlikesons,werenotassumedtobeliableforpaternaldebts, norweretheireconomicactionsprojectedtoraiseproblemsforfathersin thewaythatsons’ economicactivitiescould.Itistruethatsomehistorians haveconcludedthatFlorence,atleastinitslegalstructures,ifnotin actualfact,wasamoremisogynisticcitythanothersinItaly.Thatis certainlyasubjecttowhichweneedtoreturn,butforthecaseathandthe legaldisadvantagesheapedonwomenin iuscommune andevenmoreso inlocallawswerenotinplay.
So,letusbrie flyconsideracaseinwhichawoman,orherlegalclaim, wasinvolved.Hereweturntoa consilium ofBaldodegliUbaldi (1327–1400),oneofthemostincisivelegalmindsofthefourteenth century.ThecasearoseatBorgoSantoStepolo;whenitaroseisuncertain.Thefactsrecordedgiveitadegreeofspeci ficity.4 Threebrothers obligatedthemselvesforreturnofthedowryofthewifeofoneofthem. Thedowrywastobepaidbythebride’stwouncles,whomadealegal promisetodoso.Thesewereeverydaycontractssurroundingwhatwas women’smoreimportantandconsistentlegalpropertyrightthroughout Italy,thedowry.Andwhenthecouplewed,thewoman’sunclesdutifully deliveredthepromisedsumof 380 florinstothehusbandwithnomention inthatlegalinstrumentofthetwobrotherswhohadpreviouslybound themselvesforreturnofthatsamedowryupontheendofthemarriage. Whenthehusbanddiedlater,hiswidowsuedhisbrothersforreturnof herdowry,notwithstandingthefactthatithadbeenpaidtoherhusband andnottothem.Baldowasaskedtodetermineifshecoulddoso.He rehearsedacoupleofargumentsforthebrothers,buthethenreversed courseandgavethetruer(verius)contraryopinionthattheywereobligated.Thepaymentfulfi lledtheconditionfortheirobligationtotake effect,eventhoughithadbeenpaidtothehusbandalone.Thefactwas
thatintheinstrumentofdotalpromiseeachbrotherhadobligatedhimself fortheentiresum(insolidum)andnotsimplyforashare(proparte).
Heretheobligationofbrotherswasdirectandvoluntary,notinscribed inastatute,butinanotarialcontract.Andherethedowryrightofthe widowwasclearlybeyondquestion.Theoperativeeffectofthisdecision wasperhapsthemostvitalfeatureofit.Whilethebrotherswereprobably alsoherhusband’sheirs,andthusliableforreturnofthedowryonthat scoreaswell,therewasnoassurancethattherewassufficientvalueinhis estatetoconstitute 380 florins’ worth.ByBaldo’sreckoningthebrothers’ patrimonieswereonthehookforitall.Further,theirobligationwas immediate;itdidnothavetowaitonformalacceptanceoftheestateoran inventoryofitsassetsoranynumberofotherdelays,intheoryatleast.As acreditorintheestate,thewidowcameoffbetterthanthecreditorinthe previouscase.Finally,wehavetonotethatthehusband’sdeath,followed bylegal(actualmightbesomethingelse)retrievalofthewife’sdowry, meantthataputativehouseholdwasdissolved.Thefactofliving together,forbrothersorforspouses,hadlimitedresonance.Household andfamily(inawidersense)weredistinct,ifinextricablyintertwined.
family
ToaskaboutfamilyintheRenaissanceandearlymodernera,throughout EuropeandnotjustinItaly,istoposeafrequentlypursuedquestionto whichtherehavebeennumerousanswers.Whateverwasgoingonin familiesthenhasbeenconsistentlyseenashistoricallysigni ficant.
JakobBurckhardt’sconceptionoftheRenaissanceasmodernmeantto himtheweakeningofextendedkinshipties,asseeninthelargeclansor consorterie thatwereactiveinthefactionalturmoilthatmarkedlifein manynorthernandcentralItaliantownsinthethirteenthcentury.Thereafterhepostulatedaprogressivenarrowingtowardthenuclearfamily householdandthedevelopmentoftheindividualinconsequence.His viewwascontestedalmostimmediately,andespeciallysoforItalyand otherMediterraneanlands.AcenturylaterthelandmarkworkofPhilippeArièspowerfullyrevivedthenotionofalarge,disciplinedpatriarchal familyascharacteristicoftheearlymodernperiod,evenasdemographic studies,notablyatCambridge,producedacontrastingsenseoftheprevalenceofthenuclearhouseholdasthetypicalfamilyresidentialexperience.
Coresidentialpatternshavesincerecededastheprimaryelementof familylifeinhistorians’ estimation,althoughimportanteconomicand demographicstudiescontinuetopointtotheimportanceofhousehold.
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leadership in the field compacted the power of the French throne. The lords who followed the king abroad were less disposed to dispute his authority at home. When the crusades began, as we have seen, the sway of the king was limited to the neighborhood of Paris. During the reign of Louis IX., which witnessed their close, there were ceded to the crown by their feudal lords the section of Toulouse between the Rhone, the sea, and the Pyrenees, Chartres, Blois, Sancerre, Mâcon, Perche, Arles, Forcalquier, Foix, and Cahors, while at the same time England relinquished its claim to Normandy, Anjou, Maine, Touraine, Poitou, and northern Saintonge, thus presenting to the eye almost the present map of France. The various feudal courts, where they still held separate jurisdiction, yielded the right of final appeal to the king before the enforcement of their decisions. Anciently the barons and clergy of France had been accustomed to meet in general assembly for the support of the monarchy. For over a century preceding the first crusade such assemblies had not been held, but when Louis VII. embarked upon the second crusade the great men of all sections resumed these loyal conventions. It may therefore be said that modern France was born amid the throes of the mediæval holy wars. In Germany the case was different. The incessant quarrel of Pope and emperor, to which the various crusading projects gave fuel, weakened imperialism in central and southern Europe. The English throne doubtless profited by the part taken by the people in the foreign adventures, which diverted the ambition of the most restless, who would otherwise have more seriously assailed the sovereign authority. Spain was still occupied largely by the Moors, and was thus prevented from sharing to any great extent in the Eastern wars upon the Infidels; but the engagement of so much of the Moslem energy in defending its distant lands allowed the Spaniards to slowly accrete their strength for the final expulsion of the Moors and the establishment of an undivided Spanish government, two centuries later, under Ferdinand and Isabella.
Another effect of the crusades was the birth of a distinctly European sentiment. Men, however diverse in blood and country, could not live for a generation among common dangers, and be daily actuated by common purposes, without realizing brotherhood. The Celt, the
Frank, the Italian, and the Teuton saw that they were more alike than diverse when facing the Asiatic. The followers of barons from either side the Rhine or the opposite slopes of the Apennines dropped their peculiar war-cries and adopted the universal “Deus vult!” In time the Frankish language, the speech of the greater number of the crusaders, came to be the universal medium of commercial, military, and diplomatic intercourse. It no longer belonged exclusively to the subjects of a French king, but was in a measure continental. The title “Frank” meant anybody from the lands north of the Mediterranean and west of the Greek provinces. The various nations of Europe came to feel less jealousy of the dominant race than fear of the hostile civilization whose armies were massed along the eastern boundaries of the Continent. Thus the project of Hildebrand to unite Christendom by means of a crusade was successful in a way he did not contemplate—the gathering of European peoples into a secular as well as an ecclesiastical unity.
The papal power, however, was that chiefly affected by the crusades, both to its advantage and its disadvantage.
Great wealth came to the Papacy from the many estates which departing crusaders left in either its possession or trusteeship. Thus Godfrey of Bouillon alienated large parts of his ancestral holdings by direct gift to the ecclesiastics. Many returning home from Palestine, broken in health and spirit by their trials, insanely depressed with the “vanity of life,” ended their days in monasteries, which they endowed with the remnant of their estates. The Pope, having acquired charge of and responsibility for the crusading venture, affixed a tax upon the secular clergy and religious houses. This was at first spent legitimately in maintaining the enterprises afield, but the immense revenues were gradually diverted to the general uses of the church. In the year 1115 the great Countess Matilda deeded all her domain to the Pope. This addition to the landed wealth of the Papacy amounted to perhaps one quarter of Italy, and constituted the bulk of the modern temporal possessions of the holy see. To its own local property the Papacy had also added acquisitions in all countries, until it held throughout Europe a large part, if not the greater proportion, of the land.
The political influence of the Pope was at the same time greatly extended by the appointment of papal legates. Heretofore the Holy Father had on occasion delegated representatives, who in his name should investigate causes and settle disputes at a distance from Rome. During the crusades this legatine authority was systematized by the organization of a definite body of men. The Pope was thus impersonated at every court and in every emergency. A controversy in London or Jerusalem was settled by one who on the spot spoke as the Vicegerent of God. If at times the mistakes of legates imperilled faith in the papal infallibility, as a rule they kept the world in awe by the terror of the imagined ubiquity of the divine presence.
Another great advantage accruing to Rome from the crusades was in the establishment of a closer bond between the church and the individual. Urban II. had absolved all crusaders from accountability to their secular lords during their absence at the seat of war. In the enthusiasm of the moment the lords had acquiesced in this as a temporary arrangement; but they soon lamented their unwisdom in this concession. The spirit of ecclesiastical obedience was sedulously cultivated by priest and legate, who pledged temporal and eternal blessings to those who, whatever their attitude to their former masters, were now faithful to the Pope. Loyalty to the secular lord was never restored as of old. In the common thought the pontiff was the great king and the real commandant of armies. Providence was not more omnipresent than the care of the Holy Father, and the judgment-seat of heaven was seemingly transferred to every camp and every home that was accessible to a Roman agent.
The crusades against the Eastern Infidels inspired audacity and presumption in the church, which suggested crusades elsewhere. Whoever was not Catholic was regarded as the Christians’ prey. Preachers authorized by Rome stirred up the faithful in Saxony and Denmark to convert by the sword the pagans living along the shores of the Baltic. An army of one hundred and fifty thousand, wearing upon their breasts a red cross on the background of a circle, symbolizing the universality of Christ’s kingdom, devastated pagan cities and burned idolatrous temples, and after three years secured from the leaders a promise to make their people Christian—a task
more difficult than it had been before, since the half-savage people had now learned that Christianity could be as cruel as their own paganism. Indeed, everything that was not consecrated to Roman Christianity became the lawful spoil of whoever, wearing the cross upon his breast, dared to take it. The crusading zeal became thus a habit of the Christian mind, and led to the horrors of the Inquisition in later days.
While Rome thus profited in many ways by the crusades, it must also be noted that the Papacy failed to maintain to the end the prestige it had acquired in the earlier period of the movement. Pope Innocent III. (1198-1216) carried the Hildebrandian policy to its highest realization. The emperor was forced to accept his crown from the hands of the Holy Father, and also to demit the right he had long contended for of electing the papal incumbent. The entire episcopacy in Europe was in the Pope’s control and wrought his will, even in England. But with Gregory IX. (1227-41) the pile of papal autocracy began to totter. This Pope, notwithstanding he had twice excommunicated the emperor, was ultimately obliged to yield to the secular will. His unchristian hauteur, and the rancor with which his successor, Innocent IV., pursued the emperor, lost the papal chair much of the respect of the Catholic world. Soon the various governments came to resent the absolutism of the throne on the Tiber. In 1253 Robert Grosseteste protested against the papal exactions in England, notwithstanding the king was utterly subservient to Rome, and thus he merited the title, which history has given him, of one of the great fathers of English liberty Twenty-six years later (1279) England enacted the Statute of Mortmain, which forbade the alienation of property to religious bodies without the consent of the secular authority.
A similar sentiment was working in France. Probably what is known as the Pragmatic Sanction of Louis IX. (1268) is not genuine, but the revolt of that royal saint against the assessments of Rome without consent of the throne is undoubted, and Louis may be said to have revived the ancient Gallican liberties, which for a century and a half had apparently been dead. A bull of Boniface VIII. in 1298 caused open rupture between France and Rome.
With Boniface the Papacy was utterly humiliated. In 1309, within eighteen years of the fall of Acre into the hands of the Moslems, the popes were in exile at Avignon, and the government of the church became the foot-ball of secular ambition. Clement V. (1305-12) ascended the papal throne as the creature of Philip the Fair of France, and was forced to lend himself to that monarch’s cruel and unjust persecution of the Templars, which order was abolished and its Grand Master burned at the stake in 1312.
With the diminished prestige of the Papacy came the renaissance of freer thought throughout the world. The failure of the crusades to conquer the Moslem, and the futile experiments of war upon heretical sects like the Waldenses and Albigenses, led to a partial suppression of the epidemic for forceful conversions, and to a healthful recollection of our Saviour’s command to Peter, “Put up thy sword.” In this better condition of the human mind germinated the modern evangelical methods, the first-fruit of which was to appear in the Protestant Reformation.
There was something in the life of the crusaders that was favorable to the growth of a new political sentiment, a popular, not to say a democratic, impulse, which directly conduced to our modern civil liberties. In their long and adventurous marches, in the common camp and fighting together within or beneath the same fortresses, the lord and his retainers came close to one another. The common man saw that his muscles were as strong, his mind as astute, his character as good, as that of his crested superior. Manhood rediscovered itself on those Eastern plains. The returned knight could no longer disdain intercourse with the brave men whose hamlet nestled beneath his castle walls. Their common courage, the many scenes with which both classes were familiar, the dangers they had shared, were repeated in story and song about the castle gate. Aristocratic presumption more than once evoked insurrection among the brawny fellows, who sang:
“We, too, are men; As great hearts have we, And our strength as theirs.”
In their home forays there were to be seen, together with the ensigns of the feudal lords, the popular banners of the parishes. Indeed, the new power of the people came to be the reliance of the king in his contest with rebel lords. Thus everywhere were silently germinated the forces of the commune and of the Third Estate in France, whose first assembly was held in 1302. In 1215 England secured for itself Magna Charta, the central regulation of which was that no freeman should “be taken, imprisoned, or damaged in person or estate but by the judgment of his peers” and “by laws of the land,” a grant to liberty which stood in spite of the fact that the Pope declared it to be null and void. In 1265 there came together the first regular Parliament of England with the House of Commons a constituent branch.
To the crusades we must attribute much of the increased knowledge of men and the quickening of inquiry into every department of human welfare. The crusaders mingled with their enemies in the lull of active warfare, and especially became familiar with the arts and customs of the Greeks, their pseudo-allies. The immense treasures of art secured by the capture of Constantinople, and displayed in every centre of Western population, inspired æsthetic taste. Such buildings appeared as the Palazzo Vecchio, Santa Croce, and the Duomo at Florence (about 1290), Westminster Abbey and Salisbury Cathedral (1220) and Cologne Cathedral (1248). Pisano (died 1270) revived sculpture; Cimabue (1240-1300) was the first of modern painters; the new impulse to scientific study produced Roger Bacon (1214-92). The Troubadours enlarged the romance of the lady’s chamber to that of the field of exploit, where Europe strove with Asia, and were followed by the great poets Dante (1265-1321) and Petrarch (130474). Splendid seats of learning sprang up, like the universities of Oxford (revived in 1200), Paris (1206), Padua (1222), and Cambridge (1229). The march of the soldier prompted the voyage of the peaceful traveller, like Marco Polo, who in 1272 explored the world as far as eastern China. The crusader learned something of the science of government from the Moslem, especially in matters relating to municipalities, for he was compelled to note that Cairo and Damascus were better governed than Paris and London. The wars suggested improvements in military equipment and manœuvre; indeed, the art of handling immense multitudes of men as a single
body was learned by the knights, who, fighting in independent groups, were often overwhelmed by the massed forces of their enemies.
Commerce during this time began to spread its white wings upon all seas. For two hundred years an almost incessant line of vessels passed to and fro between the ports of the eastern and western Mediterranean, conveying supplies to the soldiers. As we have seen, an English fleet transported the army of Richard I. along the Atlantic coast. Men learned how to lade ships with utmost economy of space and to take advantage of all winds in sailing them. Roads were opened which converged to the point of departure from the surrounding country, where the produce was gathered for shipment. Agents were scattered throughout Europe to purchase the needed articles in small quantities, and prepare them in bulk for the voyage. War thus fostered the commercial habit and skill which were utilized in times of peace.
Between 1255 and 1262 the Hanseatic League or Trade Guild of the Baltic maritime cities was formed, and within a century it numbered in its membership a hundred ports and inland towns. The league organized merchants for common defence against pirates, the settlement of disputes by arbitration, and the acquisition of commercial favors in distant parts of the world. Maritime laws were codified during the thirteenth century, under the title of “Il Consolato del Mare,” and were generally enforced along the Mediterranean. According to a tradition, the code called “The Laws of Oleron” was compiled by Richard I. during his expedition to Palestine, but with more probability it may be ascribed to the reign of Louis IX. of France. Bills of exchange were in vogue as early as 1255.
Commerce brought wealth in place of the sordid poverty which had marked castle and cottage in the eleventh century Trade introduced new articles of food and adornment, at first to gratify the palate and eye of the rich, but soon to elevate the scale of living everywhere. Such is the power of habit that luxuries easily acquired quickly become necessities. People learned no longer to look upon “man’s life as cheap as beast’s.” Industries sprang up for the home manufacture of what had originally been brought from abroad.
Invention was stimulated, and the domestic arts took their place in the foremost line of the new civilization. The Dark Ages had given way, and at least the gray light of the dawn of a better era illumined the horizon.
We may note in conclusion the influence of the crusades in staying the progress of that gigantic power which for two centuries had contested with Christendom the possession of western Asia. So rapid had been the rise and spread of the new Mohammedan tide of Turkish invasion that, but for the barrier presented by the crusaders, it would have quickly submerged the Balkan peninsula, as it had already done the plains of Asia Minor; and possibly it would have poured its desolation into central Europe at a time when Europe was not prepared to resist, as it did four hundred years later when the Turks besieged Vienna. The appeal of the Greek emperors for the help of their Western Christian brethren in the eleventh century was warranted by the seriousness of the menace. The empire was then too demoralized to withstand alone the onset of these daring hordes, who possessed superior powers of physical endurance, great mental activity quickened by the enterprises they planned for their swords, and courage as yet undaunted by defeat. What they might have speedily accomplished but for their enforced halt of two hundred years on the eastern shores of the Marmora is suggested by what they did almost immediately after the crusaders withdrew their wall of swords. The same decade that witnessed the fall of Acre saw the founding of the present dynasty of Ottoman Turks in Nicomedia (1299). In 1355 they crossed the sea and planted their first European stronghold at Gallipoli. In the next century (1452) Mohammed II. was enthroned as sultan in Constantinople, where his successors have for four hundred years repelled the arms, and still baffle the diplomacy, of Europe.
INDEX.
Abélard, 8, 162, 163.
Accian, 103, 106, 109; death, 111.
Acre, 123; capture, 148; by Saladin, 190; siege of, 215 sq.; fall, 297; divisions in, 366; final fall, 367.
Adela, 148.
Adhemar of Puy, 83, 105, 113; death, 120.
Afdhal, 135, 137.
Afdhal, son of Saladin, 236.
Aibek, 356, 361.
Albigenses, 298, 322, 375.
Aleppo, 154.
Aletta, 8.
Alexander II., 49.
Alexander III., 15.
Alexander IV., 363.
Alexandria, captured, 180.
Alexius I., 74, 79, 81; treachery, 85; vengeance of Godfrey, 86; character and policy, 88 sq., 244; at Nicæa, 95; refuses help, 113, 139; jealousy, 147.
Alexius III., reply to Innocent III., 254; protests against Venetian invasion, 271; cowardice, 276, 277.
Alexius IV., son of Isaac Angelus, 258, 263; plea, 266; joins Dandolo, 268; at Constantinople, 271, 279; breach with crusaders, 281; imprisonment and death, 283.
Alexius Ducas, 282.
Alfonso VI., 83.
Algazzali, 60.
Alhazan, 60.
Alice, French princess, 222.
Almoadam Turan Shan, 343, 353-355, 361, 362.
Alp-Arslan, 62.
Amalric, 152, 179, 180; death, 182.
Amaury I. See Amalric.
Amaury II., 297.
Amaury de Montfort, 333.
Andrew II., Hungary, 303, 305.
Andronicus, 244, 247.
Angelus, Isaac. See Isaac Angelus
Anjou, Duke of, 355.
Anna Comnena, quoted, 3, 72, 84; picture of Alexius, 88; opinion of crossbow, 92.
Anselm, 7.
Anselm, Archbishop of Milan, 139.
Anselme of Ribemont, 94.
Antioch, siege of, 102 sq.; fall, 108 sq.; conquered by Bibars, 363.
Aragon, King of, 363.
Archambaud, 172.
Arculf, Bishop, 67.
Arkas, 122.
Arnold de Brescia, 163, 198.
Arnold de Rohes, 128, 135.
Arsuf, 138, 141, 145; destroyed by Bibars, 363.
Ascalon, 136; capture, 179, 190.
Assassins, 228, 229.
Assizes of Jerusalem, 142.
Asur, 138, 141, 145.
Athareb, 154.
Atheling, Edgar, 122.
Aude, 20.
Augustine, 66.
Avicenna, 60
Avignon, 375.
Ayoub, 176, 181.
Aziz, son of Saladin, 236.
Bacon, Francis, 11.
Bacon, Roger, 11, 377.
Baldwin I., 83; at Tarsus, 99; quarrel with Tancred, 99; defection, 100; submission to Pope, 142; character, 144; King of Jerusalem, 144 sq.; exploits, 144 sq.; marriage, 148; death, 149.
Baldwin II., 145, 147; succeeds to throne of Jerusalem, 150; character, 150; captured, 150; liberated, 152; died, 152; helps Moslems, 154; Templars, 158.
Baldwin III., 152, 153, 173; against Nourredin, 178, 179; death, 179.
Baldwin IV., 182 sq.
Baldwin V., 184.
Baldwin I., Constantinople, 21; assaults Constantinople, 275;
elected Emperor of Constantinople, 292, 293; strife with Boniface, 293; death, 294.
Baldwin II., Constantinople, 322, 332.
Baldwin du Bourg. See Baldwin II.
Balian d’Iselin, 191.
Baliol, John, 363.
Baneas, 358.
Barbarossa, 34, 198; character, 209; third crusade, 209 sq., 212; treatment of Greeks, 212; death, 213.
Baronius, “Dark Ages,” 6.
Barthelemi, Peter, 114, 118; Ordeal, 119.
Bavaria, Duke of, 140.
Beauvais, Bishop of, 24
Becket, Thomas à, 200.
Beirut, fall of, 148.
Benedict III., 69.
Benedict VIII., 57
Benedict IX., 45.
Ben-Musa, 60.
Berengaria, 222.
Bérenger, 7
Bernard of Brittany, 67.
Bernard of Clairvaux, 8, 23;
against Abélard, 162; second crusade, 164, 166 sq.; failure and death, 177; opinion of Henry II., 201.
Bernard of Clugny, hymn, 1.
Berthier of Orleans, hymn, 1.
Bertrade, 152.
Bertrand, 148.
Bethlehem, 124.
Bibars Bendoctar, 345-347, 353, 362, 363, 365.
Bibliography, v.-ix.
Biblus, fall of, 148.
Blachern, palace of, 250.
Blanche of Castile, 330, 336, 357, 358.
Blondel, 234.
Bohemond of Taranto, 83 sq.; relations to Alexius, 87, 89, 90; at Antioch, 105, 106; treats for sovereignty of Antioch, 108; enters Antioch, 110; quarrel with Raymond, 120, 121; attacks Maarah, 121; submission to Pope, 142, 144, 145; exploits, 147 sq.; death, 148; invades Greek dominions, 247.
Boniface VIII., humiliation of Papacy, 375.
Boniface of Montferrat, 258, 259, 261, 268, 271; assaults Constantinople, 275; plots, 282; emperorship, 292;
disloyalty, 293; death, 294.
Bouvines, battle of, 302
Bozrah, 153.
Brabant, Duke of, 237, 240.
Brunhilde, 24.
Bruno, 60
Bucolion, palace of, 250.
Byron, quoted, 294.
Cæsarea, captured by Baldwin, 145; destroyed by Bibars, 363
Cæsarea on the Orontes, 179.
Cæsarea Philippi, 358.
Cairo, 343.
Calixtus II., 162
Cambray, Bishop of, 68.
Cambridge, University of, 378.
Capitularies of Charlemagne, 35, 48.
Capuano, Peter, 262
Carac, fall of, 214.
Carismians, 324 sq.
Castile, King of, 363.
Celibacy, 48
Cencius, 70.
Charlemagne, 17, 19, 48, 55, 67, 242; capitularies of, 35, 48.
Charles Martel, 56
Charles the Bold, 56.
Chegger-Eddour, 343, 353-355, 361, 362.
Chivalry, rules, etc., 26 sq.
Chosroes, 66, 133
Cid, the, 58, 83.
Cimabue, 377.
Civitat, massacre, 81.
Clarendon, Assizes of, 200
Clement II., 46.
Clement V., 375.
Clermont, Council of, 74.
Cologne Cathedral, 377
Coloman, King of Hungary, 79, 80.
Commune, 377.
Comnena, Anna. See Anna Comnena.
Comnenus, Isaac, 244
Comnenus, John, 152.
Conrad, brother of Boniface, 258.
Conrad, marshal of German empire, 139.
Conrad III., 167, 170; at Jerusalem, 173; Damascus, 145; return, 176.
Conrad IV., 334, 357.
Conrad of Montferrat, 214; at Acre, 216; claims to Jerusalem, 218;
supported by Philip Augustus, 223; plots, 227; assassinated, 228.
Constance, daughter of Philip I., 148.
Constantine, 65.
Constantine, minister of finance, 277.
Constantinople, history of, 242 sq.; great fire, 281; fall, 284 sq.; Latin kingdom, 291 sq.; weakness, 322, 328.
Constantinople, Patriarch of, 287.
Corfu, 268 sq.
Councils, Lateran, 49, 198.
Courçon, Cardinal, 302.
Cross, True, 133.
Crusade, first, 78 sq., 82 sq., 91 sq., 96 sq., 101 sq., 108 sq., 112 sq., 120 sq., 134 sq.; influence, 156 sq., 160 sq.
Crusade, second, cause, 155, 165, 166 sq.
Crusade, third, 206 sq., 215 sq., 219 sq.
Crusade, fourth, 242 sq., 252, 253 sq., 260 sq., 268 sq., 274 sq., 284 sq., 291 sq.
Crusade, fourth, pseudo, 241.
Crusade, fifth, 301 sq.
Crusade, sixth, 313 sq.
Crusade, seventh, 328 sq.
Crusade, eighth, 361 sq.
Crusade, Children’s, 298 sq.
Crusades, fascination of subject, 1; causes, 3 sq.; state of society, 6 sq., 40 sq.; papal policy, 43 sq.; results, 368 sq.
See Crusade, First, Second, etc., Chivalry, Feudalism, Mohammedanism, Peter the Hermit, Pilgrimages, Urban II.
Cyprus, 222, 228.
Dagobert, 142, 144.
Dahir, son of Saladin, 236.
Damascus, Prince of, 152, 153.
Damascus, siege of, 174 sq.; fall, 296.
Damascus, Sultan of, relations to Louis IX., 356, 358. Damasus II., 46.
Damietta, siege of, 305, 306, 309; victory of Louis IX., 338 sq.; surrender, 353 sq.
Dandolo, Henry, 248, 251, 252, 256, 257; perfidy, 260 sq.; attacks Zara, 264; joined by Alexius, 268; diplomacy, 268 sq.; captures Golden Horn, 272; attack on Constantinople, 275; further plots, 280, 282; second attack, 284 sq.; refuses to contest election to kingdom of Constantinople, 291, 292; his choice, 292; death, 294.
“Dark Ages,” according to Baronius, 6
Dârôm, 229.
Domenicho, Michaeli, 151.
Dominic, 19.
Dorylæum, battle of, 96 sq.
Ducas, Alexius, 282.
Du Guesclin, 10.
Duomo, 377.
Edessa, fall of, 154, 155.
Edgar Atheling, 122.
Edmund, prince of England, 363.
Edward, prince of England, 363, 366.
Egypt, caliph of, 105, 122.
Eleanor, Queen, 167, 171; rupture with Louis, 173; divorce, 198; character, 201; released by Richard, 202; appeals to Pope, 233; ransom of Richard, 234.
Eleemon, John, 157.
Elizabeth of Hungary, 316.
Elvira, daughter of Alfonso VI., 83.
Emico, 80.
England, during crusades, 370; Magna Charta, 377; Parliament, 377.
Eremi, 7.
Estate, Third, 377
Eustace, son of Godfrey, 83.
Eustace Grenier, 151.
Evrard des Barras, 172.
Exerogorgo, siege of, 81
Fakr Eddin, 340, 345.
Fatimites, 181.
Feudalism, 32 sq.
Finlay, quoted, 62.
Florine, 104.
Foulcher of Chartres, 110; desertion, 113; scepticism, 115.
Foulque of Anjou, 152, 158.
Foulques the Black, 20, 69
France, effect of crusades on, 161; at close of crusades, 369
Francis of Assisi, 19, 308, 309.
“Frank,” meaning, 371.
Frankfort, Synod of, 49.
Frederick I. See Barbarossa
Frederick II., fifth crusade, 302; sixth crusade, 313 sq.; life and character, 313 sq.; acquires Jerusalem, 319; returns, 321, 323; relations to Innocent IV., 329, 334; generosity, 337;
