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Fallibilism:EvidenceandKnowledge

Fallibilism: Evidenceand Knowledge

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Preface

Formuchofthetwentiethcentury,mostnon-scepticalepistemologists embracedafallibilistviewonwhichonecanknowapropositiononthe basisofevidencewhichdoesn’tguaranteethetruthoftheproposition known.However,morerecently,infallibilistwaysofthinkinghavebecome increasinglypopular.Moreover,manycontemporaryinfallibilistsinsist thattheycanavoidscepticism.Thisbookexaminestheprospectsfor non-scepticalinfallibilism.Inparticular,itfocusesonthepossibilityofa non-scepticalinfallibilismwhichrejectsanykindofshiftyviewofknowledge,whethercontextualist,relativist,orsubject-sensitiveinvariantist.

Theavailabilityofanon-shiftynon-scepticalinfallibilismseems todependonwhethersuchaviewcandefendagenerousenoughconceptionofevidencetoallowustohavetheknowledgeweordinarily takeourselvestohave.Inparticular,suchaninfallibilistneedstoallow thatourevidenceextendswellbeyondhowthingsseemtousinour experienceandincludesclaimsabouttheexternalworld.Thus,the infallibilismwhichisthefocusofthisbookiscommittedtoagenerous conceptionofevidence.Moreprecisely,Iarguethatitiscommittedto thefollowingclaimsaboutevidenceandevidentialsupport:ifoneknows thatp,thenpispartofone’sevidence,andpisevidenceforp.However, Iarguethattheseclaimsaboutevidenceandevidentialsupportare problematic.Furthermore,Iarguethatfallibilismcanovercomethe mostseriousobjectionslevelledatit.So,Iconcludethatepistemologists whoaimtoavoidbothscepticismandashiftyviewofknowledgeshould befallibilists.

Assomereadersmaybeinterestedindifferentpartsofthebook, inwhatfollowsIgiveabriefsketchofitscontents.(Amoredetailed descriptionofeachofthechapterscanbefoundattheendofchapter1.)

Chapter1setsthestageforthesubsequentdiscussion.Idistinguish betweenfallibilismandinfallibilism,andoutlinesomeoftherecent motivationsforinfallibilism.Iexplainthebook’sfocusonnon-shifty versionsofinfallibilismanddefendtheentailmentdefinitionofinfallibilismusedthroughoutthebook.

Inchapter2,Iconsidertheconceptionofevidenceandevidential supporttowhichanon-shiftyinfallibilistiscommittedifsheistoavoid scepticism.Iarguethatsheiscommittedtoafactiveconceptionof evidenceonwhichknowledgeissufficientforevidence.Further,Iargue thatsheiscommittedtothefollowingclaimaboutevidentialsupport:if oneknowsthatp,thenpispartofone’sevidenceforp.Thosealready convincedthatanon-shiftyinfallibilisthasthesecommitmentsmaywant toomitchapter2,andmovedirectlytochapters3and4inwhichIargue thattheseclaimsaboutevidenceandevidentialsupportareproblematic.

Chapter3criticizestheviewthatifoneknowsthatp,thenpispartof one ’sevidenceforp.Iarguethatthisviewcannotexplainwhyitis typicallyinfelicitoustociteapropositionwhichisevidenceasevidence foritself,whetherbyappealtopragmaticsoranerrortheory.

Chapter4criticizesafactiveviewofevidenceonwhichknowledgeis sufficientforevidence.Asiswell-known,thisviewhasthecounterintuitiveresultthatcertainpairsofsubjectswhoareintuitivelyequally justified,e.g.apersonandaBIV,arenotequallyjustified.However, defendersofthisviewofevidencehaveattemptedtoreplytothis objectionbydistinguishingwhetherabeliefisjustifiedfromwhetherit isblameless.Theyendorsetheknowledgeviewofjustificationaccording towhichabeliefisjustifiedifandonlyifknown.Iargueagainstthe knowledgeviewofjustificationthatithasdifficultyexplainingthepropositionalandgradedsensesofjustification.Inaddition,Iarguethatit failstoprovideanadequateaccountofblamelessbelief.

Afterarguingthatinfallibilismfacesseriousproblems,Iturntoconsider objectionslevelledatfallibilism.Inchapters5and6,Iconsiderthe objectionthatfallibilismunderminesclosureforknowledge.Inreply,it’ s beenarguedthatclosurefailsforreasonsquiteindependentlyofthe fallibilism–infallibilismdebate,specificallybecauseofdefeat.Ifthat’ s right,thenclosureprovidesnoreasontopreferinfallibilismoverfallibilism.However,theveryideaofdefeathascomeunderrecentattack.Thus, themostsubstantialcontributionofchapters5and6istoprovidean extendeddefenceofavarietyofkindsofdefeatincludingrebutting, undermining,andhigher-order.Thus,Iconcludethatclosureprovides noreasontofavourinfallibilismoverfallibilism.

Inchapter7,Iarguethatwhile,at firstsight,fallibilismmightseem tohaveparticulardifficultieswithpracticalreasoningandconcessive knowledgeattributions,infactfallibilismandinfallibilismfacesimilar

puzzlesandhavethesamebroadoptionsofresponse.Asaresult, practicalreasoningandconcessiveknowledgeattributionsdon’tprovide reasontorejectfallibilism.

Iconcludethatthoseofuswhowanttorejectscepticismwithina traditionalnon-shiftyviewofknowledgeshouldembracefallibilism.To avoidscepticism,anon-shiftyinfallibilistiscommittedtoproblematic claimsaboutevidenceandevidentialsupport.Bycontrast,objections tofallibilismoftenthoughtdevastatingcanbeanswered.Giventhe pre-theoreticalattractivenessoffallibilism,weshouldbefallibilists.

Ihavebeenthinkingabouttheissuesdiscussedinthisbookformany years.AFellowshipattheInstituteofAdvancedStudyatDurhamin 2016enabledmetobringthematerialtogetherintotheformofabook. ThankyoutotheInstituteanditsDirector,ProfessorVeronicaStrang, forthiswonderfulopportunity.

Ihavepresentedmaterialfromthebookinalargenumberofdifferent venues,includingtalksatthe2016Epistemeconference,SouthAfrica; the2016APACentralDivisionmeetinginChicago;the2015Epistemic NormsconferenceatLeuvenUniversity;the2015TempletonScience ofIntellectualHumilitysummerseminaratPasadena,andCapstone conferenceatCatalinaIsland;theworkshopsEvidenceandReasons, andRationalityandKnowledgeatGeneva(2014,2015);theEvidence workshopatKent(2014);theAimsandNormsworkshopinOslo(2013); togetherwithseminarsatDurham,Edinburgh,Oxford,Princeton, Rutgers,StAndrews,andSheffield.Iwouldliketothankallthephilosopherswhohaveprovidedusefulfeedbackonthesetalksaswellasdraft chapters.Therearetoomanytolist,butIwouldliketoparticularly mentionmycolleaguesatStAndrews,aswellasCohen,Comesana, Douven,Dutant,Engel,Gerken,Goldberg,Goldman,Graham,Dan Greco,Hawthorne,Kelp,Lackey,Lasonen-Aarnio,Littlejohn,McGrath, McGlynn,Nagel,Pryor,Rysiew,Schaffer,Schechter,Schellenberg, Schnurr,Schoenfield,Sillins,Simeon,MartinSmith,Sosa,Vogel,Weatherson,Weisberg,andWilliamson.Further,IwanttothankRamNeta andBaronReedwhoprovideddetailedcommentsonthedraftofthe wholebook.

Severalchaptersofthebookdrawonpreviouslypublishedwork.In particular,thethirdchapterdrawssubstantiallyontwoofmypreviously publishedarticles(Brown, “Infallibilism,evidenceandpragmatics” , Analysis 2013;andBrown, “Evidenceandepistemicevaluation” , Oxford

StudiesinEpistemology volume5,2015).Thefourthchapteremploys somematerialfrommy2017articlein Episteme , “Blameandwrongdoing”.The firsthalfofchapter6drawsheavilyonmy2008, Noûs article, “Subject-SensitiveInvariantismandtheKnowledgeNormforPractical Reasoning”.Iwanttothanktheeditorsofthesejournalsforpermission toreusematerialfromthesearticlesinthisbook.

Finally,thankstoPeterMomtchiloffatOxfordUniversityPressfor allhisefficiency,goodadvice,andsupport.

1 HumanFallibilityand FallibilismaboutKnowledge

1.1Introduction

Thischaptersetsthescenefortherestofthebook.Idistinguishfallibilismandinfallibilism,andoutlinethemainmotivationsforeachposition (sections1.2and1.3).Iexplainhowcontemporaryinfallibilistsargue thattheycanavoidscepticism,eitherbyappealtoashiftyviewofknowledgesuchascontextualism,and/orbyappealtoagenerousconceptionof evidence.Iexplainwhythebookfocusesonthesecondoption the availabilityofanon-scepticalinfallibilismwhichrejectsashiftyviewof knowledgeandacceptsagenerousconceptionofevidence(section1.4). Ialsodefendtheentailmentdefinitionofinfallibilismusedinthebook fromalternativeaccounts(section1.5).Attheend,Isketchthecontentsof theremainingchapters.

1.2FallibilismandInfallibilism

Weclaimtoknowmuchabouttheworld,includingclaimsabout materialobjectsaroundus,theexistenceofotherpeoplewithvarious mentalstates,claimsaboutthefuture,andclaimsaboutthepast.But thereoftenseemstobeagapbetweenourevidenceandwhat’sknownin thesensethatourevidencedoesn’tguaranteethetruthofwhatisknown. Forexample,evenifIcanknowfromtheweatherforecastthattomorrow willbesunny,thattheforecastsaysitwillbesunnydoesnotguarantee thatitwillbesunnytomorrow.

Scepticsattempttoexploittheapparentgapbetweenourevidenceand whatweclaimtoknowtounderminekeytypesofknowledge,whether abouttheexternalworld,otherminds,thepast,orthefuture.For

example,theyarguethatarecentlyenvatted 1 brain(orBIV)couldhave justthesameexperiencesasapersoneventhoughtheBIV’sexperiences radicallymisrepresentitsenvironment.So,thatI’mnowhavinganexperienceasoftypingonacomputerdoesnotguaranteethatIamtypingon acomputer.Instead,ImightbeahandlessBIVmerelybeingstimulated tohavesuchexperiences.Thus,ifone’sperceptualevidencejustconsists inclaimsabouthowthingsseemtooneinexperience,thenhowdoes oneknowthatone’sapersonratherthanaBIV?

Whilescepticshopetousetheapparentgapbetweenevidenceand whatweclaimtoknowforscepticalends,mostcontemporaryepistemologistsdrawadifferentconclusion.Theyclaimthatonecanknoweven ifonelacksevidencewhichguaranteesthetruthofwhat’sknown.They embrace ‘fallibilism’:onecanknowthatpeventhoughone’sevidence doesnotguaranteethetruthofp.Bycontrast, ‘infallibilism’ istheview thatonecanknowthatponlyifone’sevidenceguaranteesthetruthof p.Fallibilismwasthedefaultviewinepistemologyformuchofthe twentiethcentury.For,manythoughtthatendorsingfallibilismwasthe onlywaytoavoidscepticismaboutknowledge.Further,fallibilismseems initiallyplausible.Formanyimportantkindsofknowledge,what’sintuitivelyone’sevidencedoesnotguaranteethetruthofwhatoneknows.

Despitethehistoricpopularityoffallibilism,infallibilismisundergoing acontemporaryrenaissance,withcharacteristicallyinfallibilistideasbeing defendedbyarangeofphilosophers.Thereareseveralmajorsourcesof thiscurrentinterestininfallibilism.Onesourceiscontextualismabout knowledge-ascriptions,especiallythatinspiredbytheworkofDavid Lewis.Lewis(1996)startshisexplicationofhiscontextualistviewby saying, ‘Iproposetotaketheinfallibilityofknowledgeasmystarting point.’ Heexplicitlymotivateshisversionofcontextualismasawayto avoidwhatheseesasthetwinperilsoffallibilismandscepticism,saying: Betterfallibilismthanscepticism;butitwouldbebetterstilltododgethechoice. Ithinkwecan.Wewillbealarminglyclosetotherock[offallibilism],andalso alarminglyclosetothewhirlpool[ofskepticism],butifwesteerwithcare,we can justbarely escapeboth.(550)2

1 Throughoutthebook,Iassumethatthebrainhasbeenrecentlyenvattedasthisletsus setasidetheworrythat,duetocontentexternalism,apersonandanalwaysenvattedbrain wouldhavedifferentmentalstatesinvirtueoftheirrelationstodifferentenvironments. Ileavethisassumptionimplicitintherestofthebook.

2 Lewis-stylecontextualismisdefendedin, interalia,Neta(2011),Schaffer(2005),and Blome-Tillmann(2009).Neta(2011)endorsesaformofinfallibilismonwhich ‘forSto

Asecondmajorsourceofcontemporaryinfallibilistclaimsistheincreasingpopularityofgenerousconceptionsofevidenceonwhichone’ s evidencedoesn’tonlyincludeclaimsaboutone’sexperiences,butalso claimsabouttheexternalworld.Suchagenerousconceptionofevidence makesiteasiertobeaninfallibilistandyetavoidscepticism.Suchgenerous conceptionsofevidencehavebeendefendedbyarangeofphilosophers includingepistemologicaldisjunctivists,aswellasthosewhoendorse Williamson’sidentificationofone’sevidenceandone’sknowledge.

Disjunctivistsaboutexperienceholdthatthestateofitslookingtoone asifpmaybeconstitutedeitherbyone’sseeingthatporit’smerely appearingtooneasifp(e.g.Snowden1980andMcDowell1982).3

McDowellarguesthatsuchadisjunctivistapproachcanallowfora characteristicallyinfallibilistapproachtoknowledge.Hecriticizeswhat hecallsa ‘criterialview’ which ‘envisage[s]ascribingknowledgeonthe strengthofsomethingcompatiblewiththefalsityofwhatissupposedly known’.Hecomments, ‘itisaseriousquestionwhetherwecanunderstandhowitcanbeknowledgethatisproperlysoascribed’ (1982:372). Aftercriticizingthewaysofthinkingwhichhesuggestsleadtothe criterialview,hesuggestsanalternativeconceptionofexperienceon which,whenthingsaregoingwell, ‘theappearancethatispresentedto one isamatterofthefactitselfbeingdisclosedtotheexperiencer’.So understood,whenthingsaregoingwell,thereisnogapbetweenthe sensoryappearanceandthefactknownfortheappearanceconsistsin therelevantfactbeingmadeperceptuallymanifesttoone(386–7).Thus, McDowellmotivateshisdisjunctivismaboutappearancesbyappealtoa recognizablyinfallibilistwayofthinkingofknowledge.

knowthatp,SmusthavereasonsforbelievingthatpwhicharesuchthatScanknow,by reflectionalone,thatshehasthosereasons,andthatshecouldnotpossiblyhavethose reasonsifpisnottrue’ (658).Schaffer(2005)describeshiscontrastivistformofarelevant alternativesstyleofcontextualismas ‘restrictedinfallibilism’.Onhiscontrastiveapproach, theapparentlybinary ‘Sknowsthatp’ isimplicitlyofthecontrastiveform:Sknowsthatp ratherthanq.Hesays ‘Sknowsthatpratherthanqifandonlyif1)p,2)Shasproofthatp ratherthanq,and3)Siscertainthatpratherthanq,onthebasisof2)’.Thisis ‘infallibilist insofarasitrequiresproof,whichisconclusiveevidence,evidencethatcouldnotpossibly obtainwithoutpbeingtrue.Butitisrestrictedinsofarasthespaceofpossibilitiesopento disproofisrestrictedto:{p}U{q}’ (255).

3 WhileSnowden(1980)alsodefendsadisjunctiveconceptionofexperience,hismain concernseemstobewiththenatureofperception,ratherthanwithepistemological concerns.Seetheusefuldistinctionbetweenexperientialandepistemologicaldisjunctivism inHaddockandMacPherson2008.

Williamson(2000)providesadifferentwayofdefendingagenerous conceptionofevidence,namelybyhisequationofevidenceandknowledge.WhileWilliamsondoesnotmotivatehisviewofevidencebyappeal toinfallibilism,aninfallibilistapproachtoknowledgeseemstobemade availablebyhisequationofevidenceandknowledge.Ifone’sevidencejust isone’sknowledge,thenwheneveroneknowsthatp,pispartofone’ s evidence.So,ifoneknowsthatp,one’sevidenceentailsthatpandgives itprobability1.

Beforeexaminingsomeofthemotivationsforthisinfallibilistrenaissance,it’susefultosayalittlemoreabouthowtodefinefallibilismand infallibilism.Sofar,I’veroughlydescribedthesepositionsintermsof whethertheyholdthatknowledgerequiresevidencewhichguarantees thetruthofwhat’sknown.However,ifwewanttotightenupthisinformal notionofa ‘guarantee’ oftruth,weneedtotakeastandontheontologyof evidence.Ifoneacceptsthewidespreadviewthatevidenceispropositional, thenonecanunderstandthenotionofaguaranteeintermsofentailment. Thus,wecanunderstandtheinfallibilistasholdingthatoneknowsthatp onlyifone’sevidenceentailsthatp.Bycontrast,ifevidenceneednotbe propositional,wecannotunderstandinfallibilismintermsofarelation, suchasentailment,thatobtainsonlybetweenpropositions.Thus,toget beyondtheroughintuitivestatementofthedebate,weneedtotakeastand ontheontologyofevidence.Iwillbeassumingthroughoutthebookthat evidenceispropositional,andIwillformulatethedebatebyappealtothe notionofentailment.4 Thus,Iwilltakeitthattheinfallibilistholds,and thefallibilistdenies,thatknowingthatprequiresevidencewhichentails thatp.WhileIformulateinfallibilismasanentailmentclaimformost ofthebook,inthisintroductorychapterIsometimestalkofwhether knowledgethatprequiresevidencethatrulesouteverynot-ppossibilityto describetheviewsofsomeinfallibilistswhodenythatevidenceispropositional,suchasLewis.Inaddition,insection1.5,IexplainwhyIprefer theentailmentformulationofthedebatetosomeotherrivalformulations.

4 Forsomeinfluentialargumentsthatevidenceispropositional,seeWilliamson2000. ExamplesoftheentailmentdefinitionofinfallibilismcanbefoundinFeldman1981:266–7, Cohen1988:91,Pryor2000:520,Reed2002:144,ConeeandFeldman2004:chapter12, Stanley2005a:127,DoughertyandRysiew2009,andLittlejohn2011:603.Othersmention theentailmentviewbeforegoingontosuggestalternativedefinitionsofinfallibilism includingHetherington1999,Reed2002,andFantlandMcGrath2009.

Inthenextsection(1.3),Isketchsomeofthereasonsrecentlygiven forinfallibilism,beforeexamininghowcontemporaryversionsofinfallibilismclaimtoavoidscepticism.Mychoiceofmotivationsforinfallibilism isselectiveanddesignedtofocusonthosemotiveswhichareavailable withinthedominantexternalistapproachtoepistemologywhichholds thattheepistemicstatusofabeliefcandependonfactorsofwhichoneis ignorant,suchasthereliabilityoftheprocessbywhichthebeliefwas formed,ortheabsenceofGettierfactors.5

1.3MotivationsforInfallibilism

Infallibilismisoftenmotivatedbythethoughtthatthereseemssomething contradictoryorproblematicinafallibilistconceptionofknowledge.It seemsproblematictosimultaneouslyclaimknowledgeandadmitthe possibilityoferror.Forinstance,considertheinfelicityofthefollowing statements: ‘IknowthatIhavehandsbutImightbeahandlessbrainin avat’ ,or ‘AnneknowsthatBeatricestolethecookies,butitmight insteadhavebeenChristina’.Theinfelicityofsuchso-calledconcessive knowledgeattributions6 seemstoposeproblemsforthefallibilist.Forit mightbethoughtthatiffallibilismistrue,thenconcessiveknowledge attributionswouldbeliterallytrue.Afterall,ifitispossibletoknowthatp eventhoughone’sevidenceiscompatiblewithvariousnot-ppossibilities thensurelyitshouldbetruetoclaimknowledgeandsimultaneouslyadmit thepossibilityoferror?Forinstance,Lewis(1996)says, ‘Ifyouarea contentedfallibilist,Iimploreyoutobehonest,benaive,hearitafresh. “Heknows,buthasnoteliminatedallpossibilitiesoferror.” Evenifyou’ ve

5 Thus,I’msettingasidemotivationsforinfallibilismwhicharisewithinaninternalist approach,includingcertainmotivationsgivenbyMcDowellandNeta.Inrejectingthe fallibilistideathatonemighttrulyascribeknowledgeonthestrengthofsomething compatiblewiththefalsityofwhatisknown,McDowellsays, ‘ one ’sepistemicstanding onsomequestioncannotbeintelligiblyconstituted,eveninpart,bymattersblankly externaltohowitiswithonesubjectively.Forhowcouldsuchmattersbeotherthan beyondone’sken?Andhowcouldmattersbeyondone’skenmakeanydifferencetoone’ s epistemicstanding?’ (1982:390).However,suchexpressionsofinternalismwillhavelittle purchaseonthosealreadypersuadedofanexternalistapproach.Neta(2011)arguesfora formofinfallibilismfromwhathedescribesasthe ‘Cartesian’ claimthatSknowsthatp onlyifShasanepistemicreasonrforbelievingthatpsuchthatScanknowbyreflection alonethatshehasrandthatrisareasonforbelievingthatp(658).Mostexternalistswould rejecttheCartesianpremiseofthisargument.

6 ThistermisfromRysiew2001.

numbedyourears,doesn’tthisovert,explicitfallibilism still soundwrong?’ (550).7 Sotheinfelicityofconcessiveknowledgeattributionshasbeen takentobeevidenceforinfallibilism.

Inadditiontotheconcernaboutconcessiveknowledgeattributions, fallibilismfacestheso-calledthresholdproblem.Accordingtoinfallibilism,onecanknowthatponlyifone’sevidenceentailsthatp.Ifone’ s evidenceentailsthatp,thentheconditionalprobabilityofponone’ s evidenceis1.Thus,theinfallibilistholdsthatonecanknowthatponlyif theprobabilityofponone’sevidenceis1.Bycontrast,thefallibilistholds thatonecanknowthatpevenifone’sevidencedoesnotentailthatpand eveniftheprobabilityofponone’sevidenceislessthan1.However, thefallibilistwouldholdthatonecannotknowthatpunlesspishighly likelyonone’sevidence.So,thefallibilistpresumablyholdsathreshold viewaccordingtowhichonecanknowthatponlyifitsprobabilityon one ’sevidenceexceedssomethreshold,t,wherethatthresholdishigh butlessthan1.Butthisraisesthequestionofwherethethresholdisset. Forinstance,supposethatthefallibilistsuggeststhatthethresholdis 0.92.Anysuchchoiceseemsarbitrary:whynot0.93or0.91ratherthan 0.92?Bonjour(2002)comments, ‘itissimplyunclearwhatsortofbasis orrationaletheremightbefor fixingthislevelofjustificationinanonarbitraryway’ (43).8

Afurtherworryisthatwhereverthethresholdisset,ifitislessthan1, thencertainnon-knowledgebeliefscanmeetthethreshold.Forinstance, manyholdthatonecannotknowthatone’slotteryticketisaloserbefore thedrawisannouncedmerelyonthebasisoftheprobabilities.Butby increasingthesizeofthelotteryonecanmaketheprobabilitythatone’ s ticketisaloserashighaspossible,shortof1.So,thebeliefthatone’ s ticketisaloserwouldmeetanyplausiblethresholdshortof1.

Bycontrastwiththefallibilist,theinfallibilistmightseemtohave anadvantage.Theinfallibilist’sviewthatknowledgerequiresprobability

7 Somefallibilistsagreethatfallibilismhastheupshotthatconcessiveknowledge attributionsareliterallytruebutattempttoofferanexplanationofwhytheyarenonetheless infelicitous(e.g.DoughertyandRysiew2009,andFantlandMcGrath2009).Othersargue thatfallibilismdoesnothavethisupshot(seeStanley2005a).Seechapter7forfurther discussion.

8 Somefallibilistsappealtopragmaticencroachmenttoprovideanon-arbitraryaccount ofthethreshold(e.g.FantlandMcGrath2009).However,Isetasideshiftyviewsincluding pragmaticencroachmentinsection1.4below.

1mightseemlessopentothechargeofbeingarbitrary.1seemstobea naturalratherthananarbitrarythreshold.Furthermore,appealtoprobability1canbeusedtoexplainwhyonelacksknowledgethatone’ s lotteryticketisaloserbeforethedrawhasbeenannounced.Inaddition, ifknowledgerequiresprobability1thenthismayhelptoexplainthe valueofknowledge.Ifphasprobability1onone’sevidence,thennot-p hasprobability0.Thus,theinfallibilistcanexplainthevalueofknowing thatpasconsistinginthefactthatitrequiresevidencewhichrulesout thepossibilitythatnot-p.Aswewillsee,theinfallibilistmightappealto thefactthatknowledgehasprobability1toexplainwhatshetakestobea furtherimportantpropertyofknowledge,namelythatitisclosedacross knownimplication.

Theideathatknowledgeisclosedacrossknownimplicationcanbe initiallyformulatedastheideathatifoneknowseachofp1-n,andcomes tobelievethatqbycompetentlydeducingqfromp1-n,thenoneknows thatq.Closureforknowledgehasseemedveryattractivetomany.9 For,it mightsimplyseemtobeaformalizationoftheideathatwecangain knowledgebydeductiveinference.Butfallibilismseemstothreatenthe closureofknowledgeacrossdeductiveinference.Imaginethat,aswe’ ve supposed,thefallibilistendorsesthethresholdconceptiononwhich knowledgethatprequiresthattheprobabilityofponone’sevidence exceedsathreshold,t,wheretislessthan1.Asiswellknown,this thresholdconceptionmaygiverisetothefailureofclosureforknowledge. Foronecouldmeetthethresholdconditionforknowingthepremises ofsomevalidinference,cometobelievetheconclusionbycompetent deductionfromthepremises,andyetnotmeetthethresholdcondition forknowingtheconclusion.Althoughforeachpremiseindividually considered,thechanceoferroriscompatiblewithone’sknowingit,the chanceofriskaccumulatesacrosstheinferencesothatthechanceistoo greatforonetoknowtheconclusion.Asaresult,onemightknowthe premisesofthededuction,cometobelievetheconclusionbycompetent deductionfromthepremises,andyetnotknowtheconclusion.

9 Recentdefendersinclude, interalia,Cohen1988,DeRose1995,Kaplan1998, Williamson2000,Hawthorne2004and2005,andSchaffer2004.Well-knownopponents includesensitivitytheorists(e.g.Nozick1981),somerelevantalternativestheorists(e.g. Dretske1970),andthosedefendingathresholdconditionontherelevantepistemicstatus (e.g.Christensen2004).

Thepointcanbevividlyillustratedwiththeprefaceparadox.10 Supposethateachpremiseofanargumentcorrespondstoaclaimmadeina verylargebookofhistoryandtheconclusiondeducedistheconjunction ofalltheseindividualclaims.Mostactualbooksofhistorycontainafew errors.However,let’ssupposethattheauthorofthisparticularbook doesknoweachoftheclaimscontainedwithinit.So,shemeetsthe fallibilist’sthresholdconditionforknowingeachpremise.Nonetheless, evenifshededucesfromtheseclaimstheconclusionwhichistheir conjunction,shedoesnotmeetthefallibilist’sthresholdconditionfor knowingtheconclusionfor,intuitively,theriskoferroristoogreat. Afterall,sheiswellacquaintedwiththefactthatmosthistorybooks containafewerrors.Indeed,everyotherbookshehaseverreadhas containedafewerrors,andshehasnoreasontothinkthatshe’ san exceptiontothisgeneralrule.So,sheshouldthinkthatit’sverylikely thatthereissomeerrorinherbook.Thus,evenifshedoesinfactknow eachoftheclaimsinthebook,shedoesn’tknowtheconjunctionof theseclaims.

Sincetheproblemfallibilismfacesinaccommodatingclosurefor knowledgearisesfromallowingthatthethresholdofprobability requiredforknowledgemaybelessthan1,infallibilismseemstoavoid theproblem.Supposethatoneknowsthepremisesofavalidargument andcomestobelievetheconclusionbycompetentdeductionfrom thesepremises.Assuminginfallibilism,ifoneknowsthepremisesof theargument,eachofthesepremiseshasprobability1onone’sevidence. Giventhis,andthefurtherfactthatthepremisestakentogetherentailthe conclusion,itfollowsthattheconclusionhasprobability1onone’ s evidence.Thus,ontheinfallibilistview,therecannotbeacasein whichoneknowsthepremisesofavalidinferenceandyettheconclusion ofthatinferencefailstohaveprobability1onone’sevidence.Thus,

10 Analternativeillustrationisprovidedbythelotteryparadox.Supposethereisalarge lotterysuchthatforeachticketindividuallyconsidered,theprobabilityontheevidencethat itwillloseexceedsthethreshold,t.Nonetheless,theprobabilityontheevidencethatevery ticketwillloseislessthantherequiredthreshold.Ifthefallibilistsupposesthatanytrue beliefmeetingthethresholdconditionisknowledge,thenthisprovidesacounterexampleto closureforknowledge.However,theprefaceisamoreusefulexampleofclosurefailure sinceitisarguablethatonedoesnotknowthepremisesofthelotteryparadox.Indeed,a fallibilistcanacceptthisifshedeniesthatitissufficientforatruebelieftobeknowledgethat itmeetsthethresholdcondition.

unlikefallibilism,theprobabilisticconditionimposedbyinfallibilism aboutknowledgeisclosedacrossknownimplication.11

Thefactthatfallibilismallowsonetoknowwithouthavingevidence whichentailswhatisknownisalsorelevanttodebatesaboutpractical reasoning.It’sbecomerecentlypopulartoarguethatknowledgeisthe normofpracticalreasoninginthesensethatoneisinagoodenough epistemicpositiontorelyonpinone’spracticalreasoningifandonlyif oneknowsthatp(e.g.HawthorneandStanley2008).But,accordingto fallibilism,knowingthatpiscompatiblewithp’shavingaprobabilityon one ’sevidenceoflessthan1.But,asthestakesinvolvedinactingonp rise,thepossibilitythatnot-pisofincreasingimportance.Atsomelevel ofrisk,oneshouldnolongeractonpevenifonestillknowsthatp.So,it canseemthatfallibilismconflictswiththeknowledgenormforpractical reasoning.

Inlaterchapters,Idiscussindetailhowthefallibilistshouldrespond tothesechallengesconcerningconcessiveknowledgeattributions,closure,practicalreasoning,andthethresholdproblem.But,fornow,what’ s importanttonoteisthattheseissuesmaybethoughttomotivatean infallibilistconceptionofknowledge.Further,recentdevelopmentsin epistemologyseemtooffertheinfallibilistawaytoavoidscepticism. Takentogetherwiththemotivationsforinfallibilism,thismightseemto constituteastrongcaseforinfallibilism.So,letusnowexaminethemain infallibiliststrategiesforavoidingscepticism.

1.4InfallibilistStrategiesforAvoiding Scepticism

Aninitialintuitiveworrythattheinfallibilistmayhavedifficultiesavoidingscepticismmightarisefromthethoughtthathumansareobviously falliblecreatures.Thereismuchweareignorantof,andperhapscannot possiblyunderstandgivenourlimitedcognitiveandconceptualcapacities. Weoftenmakemistakesandhavefalsebeliefs.Thatwehavefalsebeliefsis unsurprisingwhenwereflectonthefallibilityofsuchprocessesofbeliefformationasformingbeliefsabouttheworldviaperceptualexperience,

11 Thattheprobabilisticconditioninfallibilistsplaceonknowledgedoesnotgenerate closurefailuredoesnotshowthatnothingelsegeneratesclosurefailureontheinfallibilist view.Idiscussthisissueinchapter5,andarguethatclosurefailsduetodefeat.

testimony,orapparentmemory.For,thatonehasaperceptualexperience asofpdoesnotentailthatp,thatoneapparentlyremembersthatpdoes notentailthatp,andthatsomeonetestifiesthatpdoesnotentailthatp. Howeverinfallibilismiscompatiblewithourobviousfallibility.The infallibilisthasnoneedtodenythatthereismuchweareignorantof,or thatweoftenhavefalsebeliefs.Herclaimconcernsthepositionof someonewhoknows,notsomeonewholacksknowledgeeitherthrough lackingbelief,orfailingtobelievethetruth.Furthermore,sheneedn’t denythat,oncertainwaysoftypingbelief-formingprocesses,theyare fallible.Forexample,sheshouldacceptthatbeliefsformedviaapparent memory,apparentperception,ortestimonycanleadtofalsebelief. Whethershecanarguethatthereareotherwaysoftypingbelief-forming processesonwhichtheyarenotfallibleisafurtherquestionthatwewill examinelaterinchapter2.But,fornow,themainpointtonoteissimply thatthereisnoobviouscontradictionbetweentheinfallibilistclaim aboutthestrengthoftherelationbetweenevidenceandknowledge whenonehasknowledge,andthefactthathumansoftenfailtoknow thetruth,andthatonsomewaysoftypinghumanbelief-forming processes,theycanleadtofalsehood.

Whileinfallibilismisnotinconsistentwiththeobviousfactsofhuman fallibility,amoreseriousworryiswhethertheinfallibilistcanclosethe apparentgapbetweenourevidenceandwhatweknow.Forinstance,that onehasanexperienceasofhandsdoesnotentailthatonehashands; thatoneapparentlyremembersthatpdoesnotentailthatp;andthat someonetestifiesthatpdoesnotentailthatp.Sothechallengeforthe infallibilististoshowhowwecanhavethekindofknowledgewe ordinarilytakeourselvestohaveevenontheinfallibilistconceptionon whichknowingthatprequireshavingevidencethatentailsthatp.

Contemporaryepistemologyoffersinfallibiliststwomainstrategies totrytoavoidscepticismaboutknowledgeevenwhileholdingthat knowledgethatprequiresevidencerulingouteverynot-ppossibility. Theycouldemployeitherashiftyviewaboutwhatitistohaveevidence whichrulesoutallnot-ppossibilitiesoramoregenerousviewabout whatone’sevidenceis.Totheextentthatrulingoutallnot-ppossibilities isashiftymatter,orone’sevidenceisricher,theeasieritistoshowthat infallibilistsneednotbesceptics.Inowconsidereachofthesetwo strategiesinturn,arguingthattheinfallibilistisbestadvisedtoset asidethe firstshiftystrategy,tofocusonthesecondstrategyofbeing

generousabouttheevidence.Ofcourse,notallofthosedefendingeither ashiftyaccountofknowledgeoragenerousconceptionofevidence wouldregardthemselvesasinfallibilists,orwanttousetheseviewsto defendinfallibilism.Nevertheless,bothshiftyaccountsofknowledge andgenerousaccountsofevidenceofferapotentialwaytodefend non-scepticalinfallibilism.

Accordingtocertainshiftyviewsofknowledge,itistrueforasubject toclaimknowledgeonlyifshehasevidencewhicheliminatesorrules outeverynot-ppossibility.Giventherequirementthataknowercan eliminateeverynot-ppossibility,theviewcouldbeconsideredtobe broadlyinfallibilist.12 Yet,defendersoftheseshiftyviewsallowthatone cantrulyclaimtoknowthatpevenifone’sevidencedoesn’truleout everylogicallypossiblealternative.Instead,therequirementismerely thatonerulesouteverynot-ppossibilitythatisrelevant,wheretheseare asubsetofthelogicallypossiblealternatives.13 Whileinprinciplesuch ashiftyinfallibilistviewcouldtaketheformofanyofcontextualism, relativism,orpragmaticencroachment,it’sbeendevelopedinmostdetail forcontextualism.14 So,I’llfocusonhowcontextualismofferstheinfallibilistawaytoavoidscepticism.

Lewis(1996)arguesthataknowledgeascriptionoftheform ‘Sknows thatp’ istrueifandonlyifS’sevidenceeliminateseverypossibilityin whichnot-p.However,itturnsoutthatwhatcountsasapossibility dependsonthecontext.Asaresult,eventhoughLewisidentifiesone ’ s evidencewithone’sexperiences,hiscontextualismallowshimtoclaim

12 HereI’mtakingamoreinformalnotionofinfallibilismthantheentailmentview whichwillbethebook’sfocus.For,defendersofshiftyviewsdon’trequireevidenceto eliminateeverylogicallypossiblealternative,andsomerejectpropositionalviewsof evidence.

13 Bycontrast,invariantistversionsofrelevantalternativestheoriesdonotseemproperlytermedinfallibilistfortheyallowthatinasinglecontextitmaybetruetosay ‘Iknow thatIhavehandsalthoughIcannotruleoutthepossibilitythatI’maBIV’.OnLewis’ s contextualism,suchstatementscannotbetruesinceonceapossibilityismentioned,itis relevantandsounderminesthetruthoftherelevantknowledgeascription.

14 Theseviewsdifferbothoverwhether ‘knows’ alwaysexpressesthesamepropertyin differentcontextsandoverwhatdetermineswhichpossibilitiesarerelevant.Contextualists claimthat ‘knows’ expressesdifferentpropertiesindifferentconversationalcontexts;on relativismandpragmaticencroachment, ‘knows’ expressesthesamepropertyindifferent conversationalcontexts.Forthecontextualist,it’stheconversationalcontextofthose attributingknowledgethatdetermineswhichpossibilitiesarerelevant;fortherelativist,it isthestandardsofthoseassessingknowledgeattributions;andonpragmaticencroachment views,itisthestakesforthesubjectoftheknowledgeattribution.

that,ordinarily,onecantrulyclaimtoknow,e.g.thatoneistypingona computer.For,one’sexperienceasoftypingonacomputereliminates thealternativesordinarilyrelevant,suchasthatonehaslostone’shands inanaccidentandonlyhasstumps.Inthesituationinwhichonehaslost one ’shandsonewouldn’tbehavingtheexperienceasoftypingona computer. 15 Ofcourse,havingthatexperiencedoesnotruleoutsome logicalpossibilities,suchastheBIVpossibility,buttheBIVpossibilityis notordinarilyrelevant.

Thus,shiftyviews,suchascontextualism,offeronepotentialwayto defendnon-scepticalinfallibilism.However,contextualismandother shiftyviewsarehighlycontroversial.Inparticular,it’snotclearthatthe kindofdataabouttheshiftinessofknowledgeascriptionsstandardly usedtomotivateshiftyviewsdoinfactmotivatethem,asopposedto moretraditionalnon-shiftyviewsofknowledge.First,thereisnowa livelydebateinexperimentalphilosophyaboutpreciselywhatarethe datathatneedtobeexplained(e.g.seeBuckwalter2010,Feltzand Zarpentine2010,KnobeandSchaffer2012,Pinillos2011,Buckwalter 2012,andMayetal.2016).Second,thereisarangeofnon-shifty explanationsofthedataincludingexplanationsthatappealtotraditional requirementsforknowledgesuchasthebeliefcondition(e.g.Bach2005, Nagel2010);explanationsthatappealtothesemantics-pragmaticsdistinction(e.g.Rysiew2001and2007,Brown2006),andexplanationsthat appealtoavarietyoferrortheories(e.g.Williamson2005,Nagel2008, Gerken2013andforthcoming).Indeed,thereisaninternecinedebate betweendifferentshiftyviewsaboutwhichisbestabletoexplainthe shiftinessinknowledgeascriptions(see, interalia,Hawthorne2004, MacFarlane2005a,Stanley2005b,FantlandMcGrath2009,and DeRose2009).Third,particularshiftyviewsfacespecificobjections. Forinstance,contextualismfacestheproblemof findingasuitable semanticmodelfortheshiftinessof ‘knows’ (e.g.Schiffer1996,Stanley 2005b).Onpragmaticencroachment,whetheroneknowsdependson thestakesforthesubjectinawaymany findproblematic.Pragmatic encroachmentviewsalsofacedifficultieswithvariousembeddedand modalclaims(Hawthorne2004:166–7,Stanley2005b:113–14,Fantl andMcGrath2009:208–10,andDeRose2009chapter6).Questions

15 OnLewis’sview,anexperienceeliminatesacertainpossibilitywhenonedoesn’thave thatexperienceinthatpossibility.

havealsobeenraisedabouthowavarietyofshiftyviewscandealwith theinterpersonalroleofknowledgeintestimonyandmemory (Hawthorne2004,MacFarlane2005b,Williamson2005,Schaffer2006, andBlaauw2008).

Evensettingasidetheseobjectionstoshiftyviewsperse,onemight questiontheextenttowhichtheytrulyofferanon-scepticalversionof infallibilism.First,theirveryshiftinessmeansthattheyallowthatit canbetruetosaythatasubjectknowsthatpevenifherevidence doesnotruleouteverylogicallypossiblealternativetop,butonly thosewhicharerelevant(whetherrelevantintheconversationalcontext, giventheassessor ’sstandards,orgiventhesubject’sstakes).Sothey mightequallybeseenasfallibilist,ratherthaninfallibilist,views.Indeed, somehavedefendedshiftyviewsasthebestwayofdefendingfallibilism (e.g.Cohen1988,FantlandMcGrath2009).Second,itisdebatable whetheratleastsomeshiftyviews,e.g.contextualism,offeranon-sceptical viewratherthansimplygivingintoscepticismatleastincertainconversationalcontexts.

Giventheseobjections,adefenceofinfallibilismwhichemploysa shiftyviewinvolvesthelargetaskofdefendingtherelevantshiftyview fromobjections.Ratherthantakingonthistask,Iwouldpreferto investigatetheprospectsforinfallibilismwithinanon-shiftyviewof knowledge.Soanon-shiftydefenceofinfallibilismwillbethefocusof thisbook.Whileshiftyviewsattempttodefendnon-scepticalinfallibilismbyallowingthattherangeofalternativesone’sevidenceneedsto eliminateinordertotrulyclaimknowledgeshifts,non-shiftyviewsdeny this.Instead,theyclaimthatoneknowsthatponlyifonehasevidence whichrulesouteverylogicallypossiblealternativetop.Todothis, wewillseethattheyneedtoappealtoagenerousconceptionofevidence.

Althoughthebookwillfocusonanon-shiftyversionofinfallibilism whichemploysagenerousconceptionofevidence,thediscussionshould nonethelessbeofsomeinteresttothosewhopreferashiftydefenceof infallibilism.First,totheextentthatagenerousconceptionofevidenceis independentlyplausible,thedefenderofashiftyviewmightwishto adoptsuchaconceptionherself.Thus,shemaybeinterestedinseeing howfaragenerousconceptionofevidencecanhelpdefendinfallibilism. Indeed,somehavecombinedthetwostrategiesofadoptingashiftyview andagenerousconceptionofevidencetodefendinfallibilism(e.g.Neta’ s (2003)versionofcontextualism).Second,totheextentthatitturnsout

tobedifficulttodefendinfallibilismbyanon-shiftystrategy,thiscould betakentomotivateashiftyversionofinfallibilism.Indeed,theoverall conclusionofthebookwillbethatthenon-shiftystrategyfails.So, defendersofshiftyviewsmaytakethistosupporttheiroverallposition.

Thebookwillfocus,then,ontheprospectsforanon-sceptical infallibilismwhichappealstoagenerousconceptionofevidenceon whichone’sevidenceincludesclaimsabouttheworld(e.g.McDowell 1982,Williamson2000).So,one’sevidencedoesn’tjustincludethat, e.g.itseemstooneasifoneistypingonacomputer,butthatoneisdoing so.Sounderstood,one’sevidenceexcludesthepossibilitythatoneisa handlessBIVwhoisbeingstimulatedtohavetheexperienceasoftyping onacomputer.For,thatoneistypingonacomputerentailsthatone isnotahandlessBIV.

Theideathatone’sevidenceincludesclaimsabouttheexternal world knownasa ‘non-psychologicalconceptionofevidence ’—can seemplausiblewhenwereflectonhowweordinarilytalkaboutevidence. Whenaskedforourevidenceforvariousclaims,wedon’tfeelcompelled torestrictourselvestoclaimsabouthowthingsseeminexperience. Instead,wefreelyciteasevidenceclaimsabouttheexternalworld.For instance,evidenceforclimatechangemightincludefactsaboutrecent globaltemperaturesortheretreatofArcticseaice.Evidencethatthe accusedisguiltyofthemurdermightincludefactsabouttheDNAfound onthemurderweapon,factsaboutwheretheaccusedwasjustbeforethe murder,orfactsabouttheaccused’srelationshipwiththevictim.

We’veseenthataninfallibilistcandiminishthethreatofscepticism byappealingtoanon-psychologicalconceptionofevidence.However, whileanon-psychologicalconceptionofevidencestartstomakeroom forthepossibilityofanon-scepticalinfallibilistview,itdoesn’tsettlethe issueofwhetheraninfallibilistcanavoidscepticismaboutimportant kindsofknowledge.For,merelyestablishingthatone’sevidenceincludes someclaimsabouttheexternalworldisnotyettoestablishthat,forany kindofknowledgeonetakesoneselftohave,one’sevidenceentails what’sknown.Forinstance,thatone’sevidenceincludesclaimsabout theexternalworld,saythebehaviourofbodiesaroundone,doesnot showthatknowledgeofothermindsmeetsthecriterionthatwhatone knowsisentailedbyone’sevidence.For,thatabodybehavesinacertain waydoesn’tentailthatit’sinacertainmentalstate,saybeinginpain.So, toestablishwhetheraninfallibilistcanavoidscepticismweneedto

examineevidenceinmuchmoredetail.Thisisthetopicofchapter2,in whichIexaminetheconceptionofevidenceandevidentialsupportto whichtheinfallibilistiscommitted.

1.5OtherNotionsofInfallibilism

Sofar,I’vesetupthedebatebetweenfallibilismandinfallibilismina standardwaywhichfocusesontherelationshipbetweenone’sevidence andwhat’sknown.Onthisview,fallibilistsandinfallibilistsaredivided overthequestionofwhatrelationshipmustobtainbetweenone’sevidenceandwhat’sknown.Inparticular,theydisagreeoverwhetherone canknowthatponlyifone’sevidenceentailsthatp,orhasprobability 1onone’sevidence.16 However,someauthorshaverecentlycriticized thestandardwayofdrawingthedistinctionbetweenfallibilistand infallibilistpositionsandrecommendedalternativewaysofunderstandingthedistinction.Soitisusefultoexaminearangeofotherpossible accountsofthedistinction.

Oneworrywiththestandarddefinitionisthatitsetsupthedebatein termsofwhetherknowledgerequiresevidenceofacertainkind.But someauthorsallowthatonecanhaveknowledgewithoutevidence.For example,someexternalistsallowthatonecanknowthatpsolongas one ’sbeliefistrueandwasproducedbytherightkindofprocessevenif onenowhasnoevidencethatp.Thispossibilitymaybedefendedby appealtoso-calledcasesofforgottenevidenceinwhichoneinitially acquiresknowledgethatpinvirtueofhavingevidenceforp,butlater forgetstheevidencewhileretainingthebelief(e.g.Goldman1999,Sosa 1999c).Ononemainstreamviewofsuchexamples,theyshowthatone canknowthatpatatimewithoutthenhavingevidenceforp.Ifonecan knowthatpwithouthavingevidenceforp,itfollowsthatonecanknow thatpwithouthavingevidenceforpwhichentailsthatp.So,ontheway Ihavesetupthedebate,suchexternalistscountasfallibilists.And, intuitively,thisseemstobetherightclassi ficationoftheirposition.17

16 Itreatthesetwodefinitionsasequivalent.However,theymaycomeapartif,for example,oneallowsthatevidenceneednotbecertain.Inthatcase,one’sevidencemight entailthatp,andyetpnothaveprobability1(e.g.Dougherty2011:140).Isetasidethis possibility.

17 Consideringcasesofforgottenevidencecallsattentiontothedistinctionbetween havingevidenceandhavingevidenceforahypothesis.Ofcourse,afterforgettingtheinitial

Adifferentcriticismoftheentailmentdefinitionofinfallibilismisthat ittriviallyhastheresultthatknowledgeofnecessarypropositionscounts asinfalliblewhen,intuitively,sometimessuchknowledgeisfallible. Wherepisanecessarilytrueproposition,pisentailedbyanysetof propositionswhatsoever.18 Thus,ifoneknowsthatpwherepisa necessarilytrueproposition,itfollowstriviallythatone’sevidence,e, entailsp.But,intuitively,knowledgeofnecessarytruthscanbefallible. Comparetwosubjectswhobothknowsomenecessarytruth,p,saya mathematicaltheorem.Oneofthesubjectsisaworld-renownedmathematicsprofessorwhoknowsthatpbyprovingthatp.Bycontrast,the othersubjectisamathematicalnovicewhoknowsthatpinvirtueofthe testimonyofafellowstudentofmathematics,buthasnoideahowp mightbeproved.Thestandarddefinitioncountsboththemathematics professorandthenoviceashavinginfallibleknowledgethatp.But thismightseemthewrongresult.Inparticular,itmightseemplausible that(atleast)thenovice’sknowledgethatpisfallible.Thereareseveral waystocashoutthisintuition.

Onemightappealtoacomparisonbetweenthestrengthofthe epistemicpositionofthemathsprofessorandthenovice.Intuitively, themathsprofessorisinastrongerepistemicpositionwithrespecttop thanthemathematicalnovice.Afterall,theprofessorcanprovideavalid proofofthetheoremwhereasthenovicehasnoideahowonewouldgo aboutprovingit.Plausibly,thedifferenceinthestrengthoftheepistemic positionofthemathsprofessorandthenovicemightshowupinaction. Perhaps,thereisagamblewhichonlythemathsprofessorbutnotthe noviceshouldtake.Forinstance,perhapsinagameshow,themaths professorbutnotthenovicewouldberationaltostake£10,000onp.Or, ifbothwouldberationaltostake£10,000onp,perhapsthereissome higheramount,suchas£100,000or1millionpoundswhichonlythe mathsprofessorbutnotthenovicewouldberationaltogamble.Oneway tounderstandthedifferenceintheactionsitseemsrationalforthemaths professorandthenovicetoundertakemightbetoappealtothenotionof

evidenceforthehypothesisp,onemightstillhaveevidenceforotherhypotheses.Iexamine thedistinctionbetweenevidenceandevidenceforahypothesisinchapter2,andarguethat infallibilistsarenotonlycommittedtocertainclaimsaboutevidencebutalsocertainclaims aboutevidentialsupport.

18 Inaddition,onstandardBayesianviews,logicaltruthshaveprobability1onone’ s evidenceregardlessofwhatone’sevidenceincludes.

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boots not to inquire, with the beautiful daughter of the Laird o’ the Haugh. I felt it through every vein of my body, and every fibre of my heart, and I fondly imagined from sundry stealthy glances and sweet suggestive smiles that the dear creature had perceived and reciprocated my attachment. The golden silence of love is the highest eloquence, and the most entrancing song. As good luck and favouring fortune would have it, I had no sooner left the dining-hall than the object of my adoration came tripping down stairs alone. In looking over the drawing-room window a rich flower from her lustrous hair had fallen to the ground, and the lovely creature was now hastening to secure the lost treasure. Here was an opportunity little anticipated, but long remembered. It was impossible that I could be so ungallant as allow her to search for the fallen flower by herself, and we therefore went out into the open air together. There was no moon, but the stars were shining full and brilliant in the firmament. Tall holly bushes and other shrubs surrounded the house within the outer circle of trees. The only two sounds I distinctly heard were the beating of my heart, and the humming sound of the minister’s voice as he narrated the incidents of his pilgrimage to the Eternal City. I blessed the good man for his unconscious kindness in granting me this opportunity. Jessie and I proceeded to the place where the flower was supposed to be. I saw it at once, and she saw it at once; but both of us pretended that we had not seen it, and so the sweet search continued. Need I describe, O amiable reader! how in searching and stooping I felt the touch of her ringleted hair, the warmth of her breath, the delicate softness of her cheek, and imbibed the honey-balm of her lips? At last the flower was found,—I blessed it unaware,—and, under the starlight, replaced it on that lovely head from which it had not been untimely plucked, but had most opportunely fallen.

We returned to the house undiscovered. The Laird, I knew, was in that pleased and placid state when he could have listened for many hours to the Man of the Moon describing the incidents of his celestial travels and the wonders he had seen from his specular tower. I parted with Jessie at the foot of the staircase, pressed her soft warm hand, and re-entered the room which I had rather unceremoniously left. The minister had got upon the Pope, and all the symptoms of “tired nature” were apparent on the faces of most of the listeners. They had the look of a congregation when the thirteenth “head” is

being propounded with due deliberation from the pulpit. The Laird had not seen me depart, but he saw me enter. He evidently placed in me the most implicit reliance, and there was no suspicion in his look.

“Hae ye been snuffin’ the caller air, doctor?” he inquired.

I answered in the affirmative with a look of perfect innocence, and then the Laird added, wishing apparently to cut short the minister’s harangue, “Ay, weel, let’s join the leddies noo.”

After that evening I was a frequent and welcome visitor at the Haugh. Prince Charlie soon knew the way to his own stall in the Laird’s stables. Some golden opportunities occurred when the Laird was absent for interviews and conversations with Jessie. We plighted our mutual troth, and were devoted to each other heart and soul. The one grand difficulty in the way of our happiness was the removal of the Laird’s scruples with regard to the marriage of his daughter. At last, when jogging leisurely homeward to Oakbank one evening, I hit upon a scheme which ultimately resulted in complete success, and gave me possession of the being whom I loved dearer than life.

A wealthy and winsome widow lady resided in the neighbourhood of St Dunstan, and the project entered my brain to make her believe that Laird Ramsay had some notions of her, and also to make him believe that she had a warm side of her heart to him. If I could only get the Laird to marry the widow, I knew that Jessie would soon thereafter be mine. The Laird was open to flattery; he was fond of what Mr Barlas called “butter;” and I did not despair of being able to make him renew his youth. Tact was required in such a delicate undertaking, and I resolved to do my spiriting gently. I began with the Laird first one evening when he was in his mellow after-dinner state. I praised the graces and winsome ways of Mrs Mackinlay, and drew from the Laird the confession that he thought her a “very gude and sociable-like leddy.” I then tried a few dexterous passes before hinting that she had a warm side to the Laird o’ the Haugh.

“Ye dinna mean to say that Mrs Mackinlay is castin’ a sheep’s e’e at me, do ye, doctor?”

“I can assure you, Mr Ramsay,” I rejoined, “that she speaks of you always with great respect, and seems to wonder why you do not honour her with a visit occasionally.”

“Ay, doctor, it’s queer what way I never thocht o’ that. She’s a sensible leddy after a’, Mrs Mackinlay. I think I could do worse than look ower at her hoose some o’ these days.”

“It’s the very thing you ought to do, Mr Ramsay,” I replied. “You will find her company highly entertaining. She has an accumulated fund of stories and anecdotes.”

“Has she, doctor?—has she? Weel, I’ll gang; but what would Jessie say, I wunner?”

I had now put the Laird on the right scent, and I tried my best also with Mrs Mackinlay. I made her aware of the Laird’s intended visit, and hinted tenderly its probable object. After a lengthened conversation, in which I exercised all the ingenuity I possessed, I left her with the impression on my mind that Laird Ramsay’s addresses when he called would be met half-way. The meeting did take place— it was followed by another and another—and the upshot of the matter was that the eccentric Laird and the wealthy widow were duly wedded, to the astonishment of the whole district. I allowed six months of their wedded bliss to slip past before I asked the Laird’s consent to have Jessie removed from the Haugh to Oakbank. A sort of dim suspicion of the whole affair seemed to cross the Laird’s mind when I addressed him. A pawky twinkle lit up his eye as he replied, “Ah, ye rogue!—tak her, an’ my blessin’ alang wi’ her. Ye ken whaur to look for a gude wife, an’ I daursay ye’ll no mak the warst o’ gudemen.” Thus I won the Laird’s daughter, and the paradise of Oakbank, in the village of St Dunstan, was complete in happiness.

MOSS-SIDE.

B P W.

Gilbert Ainslie was a poor man; and he had been a poor man all the days of his life, which were not few, for his thin hair was now waxing gray. He had been born and bred on the small moorland farm which he now occupied; and he hoped to die there, as his father and grandfather had done before him, leaving a family just above the more bitter wants of this world. Labour, hard and unremitting, had been his lot in life; but, although sometimes severely tried, he had never repined; and through all the mist and gloom, and even the storms that had assailed him, he had lived on from year to year in that calm and resigned contentment which unconsciously cheers the hearthstone of the blameless poor. With his own hands he had ploughed, sowed, and reaped his often scanty harvest, assisted, as they grew up, by three sons, who, even in boyhood, were happy to work along with their father in the fields. Out of doors or in, Gilbert Ainslie was never idle. The spade, the shears, the ploughshaft, the sickle, and the flail, all came readily to hands that grasped them well; and not a morsel of food was eaten under his roof, or a garment worn there, that was not honestly, severely, nobly earned. Gilbert Ainslie was a slave, but it was for them he loved with a sober and deep affection. The thraldom under which he lived God had imposed, and it only served to give his character a shade of silent gravity, but not austere; to make his smiles fewer, but more heartfelt; to calm his soul at grace before and after meals, and to kindle it in morning and evening prayer.

There is no need to tell the character of the wife of such a man. Meek and thoughtful, yet gladsome and gay withal, her heaven was in her house; and her gentler and weaker hands helped to bar the

door against want. Of ten children that had been born to them, they had lost three; and as they had fed, clothed, and educated them respectably, so did they give them who died a respectable funeral. The living did not grudge to give up, for a while, some of their daily comforts for the sake of the dead; and bought, with the little sums which their industry had saved, decent mournings, worn on Sabbath, and then carefully laid by. Of the seven that survived, two sons and a daughter were farm-servants in the neighbourhood, while two daughters and two sons remained at home, growing, or grown up, a small, happy, hard-working household.

Many cottages are there in Scotland like Moss-side, and many such humble and virtuous cottagers as were now beneath its roof of straw. The eye of the passing traveller may mark them, or mark them not, but they stand peacefully in thousands over all the land; and most beautiful do they make it, through all its wide valleys and narrow glens—its low holms, encircled by the rocky walls of some bonny burn—its green mounts, elated with their little crowning groves of plane-trees—its yellow corn-fields—its bare pastoral hill-sides, and all its heathy moors, on whose black bosom lie shining or concealed glades of excessive verdure, inhabited by flowers, and visited only by the farflying bees. Moss-side was not beautiful to a careless or hasty eye; but, when looked on and surveyed, it seemed a pleasant dwelling. Its roof, overgrown with grass and moss, was almost as green as the ground out of which its weather-stained walls appeared to grow. The moss behind it was separated from a little garden, by a narrow slip of arable land, the dark colour of which showed that it had been won from the wild by patient industry, and by patient industry retained. It required a bright sunny day to make Moss-side fair, but then it was fair indeed; and when the little brown moorland birds were singing their short songs among the rushes and the heather, or a lark, perhaps lured thither by some green barley-field for its undisturbed nest, rose ringing all over the enlivened solitude, the little bleak farm smiled like the paradise of poverty, sad and affecting in its lone and extreme simplicity. The boys and girls had made some plots of flowers among the vegetables that the little garden supplied for their homely meals; pinks and carnations, brought from walled gardens of rich men farther down in the cultivated strath, grew here with somewhat diminished lustre; a bright show of tulips had a strange beauty in the midst of that

moorland; and the smell of roses mixed well with that of the clover, the beautiful fair clover that loves the soil and the air of Scotland, and gives the rich and balmy milk to the poor man’s lips.

In this cottage, Gilbert’s youngest child, a girl about nine years of age, had been lying for a week in a fever. It was now Saturday evening, and the ninth day of the disease. Was she to live or die? It seemed as if a very few hours were between the innocent creature and heaven. All the symptoms were those of approaching death. The parents knew well the change that comes over the human face, whether it be in infancy, youth, or prime, just before the departure of the spirit; and as they stood together by Margaret’s bed, it seemed to them that the fatal shadow had fallen upon her features. The surgeon of the parish lived some miles distant, but they expected him now every moment, and many a wistful look was directed by tearful eyes along the moor. The daughter who was out at service came anxiously home on this night, the only one that could be allowed her; for the poor must work in their grief, and servants must do their duty to those whose bread they eat, even when nature is sick—sick at heart. Another of the daughters came in from the potato-field beyond the brae, with what was to be their frugal supper. The calm, noiseless spirit of life was in and around the house, while death seemed dealing with one who, a few days ago, was like light upon the floor, and the sound of music, that always breathed up when most wanted; glad and joyous in common talk—sweet, silvery, and mournful, when it joined in hymn or psalm. One after the other, they all continued going up to the bedside, and then coming away sobbing or silent, to see their merry little sister, who used to keep dancing all day like a butterfly in a meadowfield, or, like a butterfly with shut wings on a flower, trifling for a while in the silence of her joy, now tossing restlessly on her bed, and scarcely sensible to the words of endearment whispered around her, or the kisses dropped with tears, in spite of themselves, on her burning forehead.

Utter poverty often kills the affections; but a deep, constant, and common feeling of this world’s hardships, and an equal participation in all those struggles by which they may be softened, unite husband and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, in thoughtful and subdued tenderness, making them happy indeed, while the circle round the fire is unbroken, and yet preparing them every day to bear

the separation, when some one or other is taken slowly or suddenly away. Their souls are not moved by fits and starts, although, indeed, nature sometimes will wrestle with necessity; and there is a wise moderation both in the joy and the grief of the intelligent poor, which keeps lasting trouble away from their earthly lot, and prepares them silently and unconsciously for heaven.

“Do you think the child is dying?” said Gilbert, with a calm voice, to the surgeon, who, on his wearied horse, had just arrived from another sick-bed, over the misty range of hills, and had been looking steadfastly for some minutes on the little patient. The humane man knew the family well, in the midst of whom he was standing, and replied, “While there is life there is hope; but my pretty little Margaret is, I fear, in the last extremity.” There was no loud lamentation at these words; all had before known, though they would not confess it to themselves, what they now were told; and though the certainty that was in the words of the skilful man made their hearts beat for a little with sicker throbbings, made their pale faces paler, and brought out from some eyes a greater gush of tears, yet death had been before in this house, and in this case he came, as he always does, in awe, but not in terror. There were wandering and wavering and dreamy delirious fantasies in the brain of the innocent child; but the few words she indistinctly uttered were affecting, not rending to the heart, for it was plain that she thought herself herding her sheep in the green silent pastures, and sitting wrapped in her plaid upon the lown and sunny side of the Birk-knowe. She was too much exhausted—there was too little life, too little breath in her heart—to frame a tune; but some of her words seemed to be from favourite old songs; and at last her mother wept, and turned aside her face, when the child, whose blue eyes were shut, and her lips almost still, breathed out these lines of the beautiful twenty-third Psalm:—

The Lord’s my shepherd, I’ll not want.

He makes me down to lie

In pastures green: He leadeth me

The quiet waters by.

The child was now left with none but her mother by the bedside, for it was said to be best so; and Gilbert and his family sat down round the kitchen fire, for a while, in silence. In about a quarter of an

hour, they began to rise calmly, and to go each to his allotted work. One of the daughters went forth with the pail to milk the cow, and another began to set out the table in the middle of the floor for supper, covering it with a white cloth. Gilbert viewed the usual household arrangements with a solemn and untroubled eye; and there was almost the faint light of a grateful smile on his cheek, as he said to the worthy surgeon, “You will partake of our fare, after your day’s travel and toil of humanity?” In a short silent half-hour, the potatoes and oat-cakes, butter and milk, were on the board; and Gilbert, lifting up his toil-hardened but manly hand, with a slow motion, at which the room was as hushed as if it had been empty, closed his eyes in reverence, and asked a blessing. There was a little stool, on which no one sat, by the old man’s side. It had been put there unwittingly, when the other seats were all placed in their usual order; but the golden head that was wont to rise at that part of the table was now wanting. There was silence—not a word was said— their meal was before them—God had been thanked, and they began to eat.

While they were at their silent meal a horseman came galloping to the door, and, with a loud voice, called out that he had been sent express with a letter to Gilbert Ainslie; at the same time rudely, and with an oath, demanding a dram for his trouble. The eldest son, a lad of eighteen, fiercely seized the bridle of his horse, and turned its head away from the door. The rider, somewhat alarmed at the flushed face of the powerful stripling, threw down the letter and rode off. Gilbert took the letter from his son’s hand, casting, at the same time, a halfupbraiding look on his face, that was returning to its former colour. “I feared,”—said the youth, with a tear in his eye,—“I feared that the brute’s voice, and the trampling of the horse’s feet, would have disturbed her.” Gilbert held the letter hesitatingly in his hand, as if afraid at that moment to read it; at length he said aloud to the surgeon:—“You know that I am a poor man, and debt, if justly incurred, and punctually paid when due, is no dishonour.” Both his hand and his voice shook slightly as he spoke; but he opened the letter from the lawyer, and read it in silence. At this moment his wife came from her child’s bedside, and, looking anxiously at her husband, told him “not to mind about the money, that no man who knew him would arrest his goods, or put him into prison. Though, dear me, it is cruel to be put to thus, when our bairn is dying, and

when, if so it be the Lord’s will, she should have a decent burial, poor innocent, like them that went before her.” Gilbert continued reading the letter with a face on which no emotion could be discovered; and then, folding it up, he gave it to his wife, told her she might read it if she chose, and then put it into his desk in the room, beside the poor dear bairn. She took it from him, without reading it, and crushed it into her bosom: for she turned her ear towards her child, and thinking she heard it stir, ran out hastily to its bedside.

Another hour of trial passed, and the child was still swimming for its life. The very dogs knew there was grief in the house, and lay without stirring, as if hiding themselves, below the long table at the window. One sister sat with an unfinished gown on her knees, that she had been sewing for the dear child, and still continued at the hopeless work, she scarcely knew why; and often, often putting up her hand to wipe away a tear. “What is that?” said the old man to his eldest daughter. “What is that you are laying on the shelf?” She could scarcely reply that it was a riband and an ivory comb that she had brought for little Margaret, against the night of the dancing-school ball. And at these words the father could not restrain a long, deep, and bitter groan; at which the boy, nearest in age to his dying sister, looked up weeping in his face; and, letting the tattered book of old ballads, which he had been poring on, but not reading, fall out of his hands, he rose from his seat, and, going into his father’s bosom, kissed him, and asked God to bless him: for the holy heart of the boy was moved within him; and the old man, as he embraced him, felt that, in his innocence and simplicity, he was indeed a comforter. “The Lord giveth, and the Lord taketh away,” said the old man; “blessed be the name of the Lord!”

The outer door gently opened, and he whose presence had in former years brought peace and resignation hither, when their hearts had been tried even as they now were tried, stood before them. On the night before the Sabbath, the minister of Auchindown never left his manse, except, as now, to visit the sick or dying bed. Scarcely could Gilbert reply to his first question about his child, when the surgeon came from the bedroom, and said—“Margaret seems lifted up by God’s hand above death and the grave: I think she will recover. She has fallen asleep; and, when she wakes, I hope—I—believe—that the danger will be past, and that your child will live.”

They were all prepared for death; but now they were found unprepared for life. One wept that had till then locked up all her tears within her heart; another gave a short palpitating shriek; and the tender-hearted Isobel, who had nursed the child when it was a baby, fainted away. The youngest brother gave way to gladsome smiles; and calling out his dog Hector, who used to sport with him and his little sister on the moor, he told the tidings to the dumb irrational creature, whose eyes, it is certain, sparkled with a sort of joy. The clock for some days had been prevented from striking the hours; but the silent fingers pointed to the hour of nine; and that, in the cottage of Gilbert Ainslie, was the stated hour of family worship. His own honoured minister took the Book,—

He waled a portion with judicious care, And, “Let us worship God,” he said, with solemn air.

A chapter was read—a prayer said; and so, too, was sung a psalm; but it was sung low, and with suppressed voices, lest the child’s saving sleep might be broken; and now and then the female voices trembled, or some one of them ceased altogether; for there had been tribulation and anguish, and now hope and faith were tried in the joy of thanksgiving.

The child still slept; and its sleep seemed more sound and deep. It appeared almost certain that the crisis was over, and that the flower was not to fade. “Children,” said Gilbert, “our happiness is in the love we bear to one another; and our duty is in submitting to and serving God. Gracious, indeed, has He been unto us. Is not the recovery of our little darling, dancing, singing Margaret, worth all the gold that ever was mined? If we had had thousands of thousands, would we not have filled up her grave with the worthless dross of gold, rather than that she should have gone down there with her sweet face and all her rosy smiles?” There was no reply, but a joyful sobbing all over the room.

“Never mind the letter, nor the debt, father,” said the eldest daughter. “We have all some little thing of our own,—a few pounds,— and we shall be able to raise as much as will keep arrest and prison at a distance. Or if they do take our furniture out of the house, all except Margaret’s bed, who cares? We will sleep on the floor; and

there are potatoes in the field, and clear water in the spring. We need fear nothing, want nothing; blessed be God for all His mercies!”

Gilbert went into the sick-room, and got the letter from his wife, who was sitting at the head of the bed, watching, with a heart blessed beyond all bliss, the calm and regular breathings of her child. “This letter,” said he, mildly, “is not from a hard creditor. Come with me while I read it aloud to our children.” The letter was read aloud, and it was well fitted to diffuse pleasure and satisfaction through the dwelling of poverty. It was from an executor to the will of a distant relative, who had left Gilbert Ainslie £1500.

“The sum,” said Gilbert, “is a large one to folks like us, but not, I hope, large enough to turn our heads, or make us think ourselves all lords and ladies. It will do more, far more, than put me fairly above the world at last. I believe that, with it, I may buy this very farm, on which my forefathers have toiled. But God, whose providence has sent this temporal blessing, may He send us wisdom and prudence how to use it, and humble and grateful hearts to us all.”

“You will be able to send me to school all the year round now, father,” said the youngest boy. “And you may leave the flail to your sons, now, father,” said the eldest. “You may hold the plough still, for you draw a straighter furrow than any of us; but hard work for young sinews; and you may sit now oftener in your arm-chair by the ingle. You will not need to rise now in the dark, cold, and snowy winter mornings, and keep threshing corn in the barn for hours by candlelight, before the late dawning.”

There was silence, gladness, and sorrow, and but little sleep in Moss-side, between the rising and the setting of the stars, that were now out in thousands, clear, bright, and sparkling over the unclouded sky. Those who had lain down for an hour or two in bed could scarcely be said to have slept; and when about morning little Margaret awoke, an altered creature, pale, languid, and unable to turn herself on her lowly bed, but with meaning in her eyes, memory in her mind, affection in her heart, and coolness in all her veins, a happy group were watching the first faint smile that broke over her features; and never did one who stood there forget that Sabbath morning on which she seemed to look round upon them all with a gaze of fair and sweet bewilderment, like one half conscious of having been rescued from the power of the grave.

MY FIRST FEE.

A C A A.

“Fee him, father, fee him.”

Seven long yearning years had elapsed since, with the budding anticipation of youthful hope, I had assumed the lugubrious insignia of the bar. During that dreadful time, each morn, as old St Giles told the hour of nine, might I be seen insinuating my emaciated figure within the penetralia of the Parliament House, where, begowned and bewigged, and with the zeal of a Powell or a Barclay, I paced about till two. These peripatetic practices had well-nigh ruined me in Wellingtons, and latterly in shoes. My little Erskine was in pawn; while my tailor and my landlady threw out unmistakable and ominous hints regarding their long bills and longer credit. I dared not understand them, but consoled myself with the thought, that the day would come when my tailor would cease his dunning, and my landlady her clamour.

I had gone the different circuits, worn and torn my gown, seated myself in awful contemplation on the side benches, maintained angry argument on legal points with some more favoured brother, within earshot of a wily writer. In fine, I had resorted to every means that fancy could suggest, or experience dictate; but as yet my eyes had not seen, nor my pocket felt—a Fee. Alas! this was denied. I might be said to be, as yet, no barrister: for what is a lawyer without a fee? A nonentity! a shadow! To my grief, I seemed to be fast verging to the latter; and I doubt much whether the “Anatomie vivant” could have stood the comparison—so much had my feeless fast fed on my flesh!

I cannot divine the reason for this neglect of my legal services. In my own heart, I had vainly imagined the sufficiency of my tact and subtlety in unravelling a nice point; neither had I been wanting in attention to my studies; for Heaven and my landlady can bear witness, that my consumption of coal and candle would have sufficed any two ordinary readers. There was not a book or treatise on law which I had not dived into. I was insatiable in literature; but the world and the writers seemed ignorant of my brain be-labouring system, and sedulously determined that my fee-ling propensities should not be gratified.

Never did I meet an agent either in or out of Court, but my heart and hand felt a pleasing glow of hope and of joy at the prospect of pocketing a fee; but how often have they turned their backs without even the mortifying allusion to such a catastrophe! How often have I turned round in whirling ecstacy as I felt some seemingly patronising palm tap gently on my shoulders with such a tap as writers’ clerks are wont to use; but oh, ye gods! a grinning wretch merely asked me how I did, and passed on!

Nor were my non-legal friends more kind. There was an old gentleman, who, I knew (for I made it my business to enquire), had some thoughts of a law-plea. From him I received an invitation to dinner. Joyfully, as at all times, but more so on this occasion, was the summons obeyed. I had laid a train to introduce the subject of his wrongs at a time which might suit best, and with this plan I commenced my machinations. The old fox was too cunning even for me; he too had his plot, and had hit upon the expedient of obtaining my opinion without a fee—the skinflint! Long and doubtful was the contest; hint succeeded hint, question after question was put, till at last my entertainer was victorious, and I retired crestfallen and feeless from the field! By the soul of Erskine, had it not been for his dinners, I should have cut him for ever! Still I grubbed with this one, cultivated an acquaintance with that, but all to no purpose; no one pitied my position. My torments were those of the lost! Hope (not the President) alone buoyed me up; visions of future sovereigns, numerous as those which appeared to Banquo of old, but of a better and more useful kind, flitted before my charmed imagination. Pride, poverty, and starvation pushed me on. What! said I, shall it be hinted that I am likely neither to have a fee nor a feed? Tell it not in the First

Division; publish it not in the Outer House! All my thoughts were riveted to one object—to one object all my endeavours were bent, and to accomplish this seemed the ultimatum of bliss.

Often have I looked with envy upon the more favoured candidates for judicial fame—those who never return to their domicile or their dinner, but to find their tables groaning with briefs! How different from my case! My case? What case? I have no case! Not one fee to work its own desolateness! Months and months passed on, still success came not! The hoped-for event came not; resolution died within me; I formed serious intentions of being even with the profession. As the profession had cut me, I intended to have cut the profession. In my wants, I would have robbed, but my hand was withheld by the thought that the jesters of the stove might taunt me thus: “He could not live, so he died, by the law.” I have often thought that there is a great similarity between the hangman and the want of a fee; the one is the finisher of the law, the other of lawyers!

Pondering on my griefs, with my feet on the expiring embers of a seacoal fire, the chair in that swinging position so much practised and approved in Yankee-land,—the seat destined for a clerk occupied by my cat, for I love everything of the fe-line species,—my cogitations were disturbed by an application for admittance at the outer door. It was not the rat-tat of the postman, nor the rising and falling attack of the man of fashion, but a compound of both, which evidently bespoke the knockee unaccustomed to town. I am somewhat curious in knocks; I admire the true principles of the art, by which one may distinguish the peer from the postman—the dun from the dilettante —the footman from the furnisher. But there was something in this knock which baffled all my skill; yet sweet withal, thrilling through my heart with a joy unfelt before. Some spirit must have presided in the sound, for it seemed to me the music of the spheres.

A short time elapsed, and my landlady “opened wide the infernal doors.” Now hope cut capers—(Lazenby, thou wert not to blame, for of thy delicacies I dared not even dream!)—now hope cut capers within me! Heavy footsteps were heard in the passage, and one of the lords of the creation marched his calves into the apartment. With alacrity, I conveyed my corpus juris to meet him, and, with all civility, I requested him to be seated. My landlady with her apron dusted the arm-chair (I purchased it at a sale of Lord M——’s effects,

not causes,—expecting to catch inspiration). In this said chair my man ensconced his clay.

I had commenced my survey of his person, when my eyes were attracted by a basilisk-like bunch of papers which the good soul held in his hand. In ecstasy I gazed—characters were marked on them which could not be mistaken; a less keen glance than mine might have discovered their import. My joy was now beyond all bounds, testifying itself by sundry kickings and contortions of the body. I began to fear the worthy man might think me mad, and repent him of his errand; I calmed myself, and sat down. My guest thrust into my hands the papers, and then proceeded to issue letters of open doors against his dexter pocket. His intentions were evident; with difficulty could I restrain myself. For some minutes he “groped about the vast abyss,” during which time my agitation increased so much that I could not have answered one question, even out of that favourite chapter of one of our institutional writers, “On the Institution of Fees.” But let me describe the man to whom I owe so much.

He was a short, squat, farmer-looking being, who might have rented some fifty acres or so. Though stinted in his growth upwards, Dame Nature seemed determined to make him amends by an increase of dimension in every other direction. His nose and face spoke volumes—ay, libraries—of punch and ale; these potations had also made themselves manifested lower down, by the magnitude of the belli-gerent powers. There was in his face a cunning leer, in his figure a knowing tournure, which was still further heightened by his dress; this consisted of a green coat, which gave evident signs of its utter incapability of ever being identified with Stultz; cords and continuations encased the lower parts of his carcase; a belcher his throat; while the whole was surmounted by a castor of the most preposterous breadth of brim, and shallow capacity. But in this man’s appearance there was something that pleased me; something of a nature superior to other mortals. I might have been prejudiced, but his face and figure seemed to me more beautiful than morning. Never did I gaze with a more complacent benevolence on a breeches-pocket. At last he succeeded in dragging from its depths a huge old stocking, through which “the yellow-lettered Geordie’s keeked.” With what raptures did I look on that old stocking, the

produce, I presumed, of the stocking of his farm. It seemed to possess the power of fascination, for my eyes could not quit it. Even when my client (for now I calculated upon him) began to speak, my attention still wandered to the stocking. He told me of a dispute with his landlord about some matters relating to his farm, that he was wronged, and would have the law of the laird, though he should spend his last shilling (here I looked with increased raptures at the stocking). On the recommendation of the minister (good man!), he had sought me for advice. He then opened wide the jaws of his homely purse—he inserted his paw—now my heart beat—he made a jingling noise—my heart beat quicker still—he pulled forth his two interesting fingers—oh, ecstasy! he pressed five guineas into my extended hand—they touched the virgin palm, and oh, ye gods! I was F’!!!—Edinburgh Literary Journal.

THE KIRK OF TULLIBODY.

The parish of Tullibody, in Clackmannanshire, now united with Alloa, was, before the Reformation, an independent ecclesiastical district. The manner in which it lost its separate character is curious. In the year 1559, when Monsieur D’Oysel commanded the French troops on the coast of Fife, they were alarmed by the arrival of the English fleet, and thought of nothing but a hasty retreat. It was in the month of January, and at the breaking of a great storm. William Kirkaldy of Grange, commander of the congregational forces, attentive to the circumstances in which his enemies were caught, took advantage of this situation, and marched with great expedition towards Stirling, and cut the bridge of Tullibody, which was over the Devon, to prevent their retreat. By this manœuvre, the French found themselves completely enclosed. They were driven to an extremity which obliged them to resort to an extraordinary expedient to effect their escape. They lifted the roof off the church of Tullibody, and laid it along the broken part of the bridge, by which means they effected a safe retreat to Stirling.

Such a dilapidation of the church caused the Tullibodians to proceed to the adjacent kirk of Alloa, and in a short time the parish ceased to be independent. The burying-ground round the ancient place of worship, now repaired, still remains; and on the north side of it, where there had been formerly an entry, there is a stone coffin, with a niche for the head, and two for the arms, covered with a thick hollowed lid like a tureen. The lid is a good deal broken, but a curious tradition is preserved of the coffin. It is related that in early times a young lady of the neighbourhood had declared her affection for the minister, who, either from his station or want of inclination, made no returns. So vexed was the lady on perceiving his indifference, that, in a short while, she sickened, and at last died of

grief. While on her deathbed, she left it as her last request, that she should not be buried in the earth, but that her body should be placed in a stone coffin, and laid at the entry to the church; which was done, and to this day, the stone retains the name of the “Maiden’s Stone.”— Chambers’ Edinburgh Journal, 1832.

THE PROGRESS OF INCONSTANCY; OR,

THE SCOTS TUTOR

.

“Sweet, tender sex! with snares encompassed round, On others hang thy comforts and thy rest.” H.

Nature has made woman weak, that she might receive with gratitude the protection of man. Yet how often is this appointment perverted! How often does her protector become her oppressor! Even custom seems leagued against her. Born with the tenderest feelings, her whole life is commonly a struggle to suppress them. Placed in the most favourable circumstances, her choice is confined to a few objects; and unless where singularly fortunate, her fondest partialities are only a modification of gratitude. She may reject, but cannot invite: may tell what would make her wretched, but dare not even whisper what would make her happy; and, in a word, exercises merely a negative influence upon the most important event of her life. Man has leisure to look around him, and may marry at any age, with almost equal advantage; but woman must improve the fleeting moment, and determine quickly, at the hazard of determining rashly. The spring-time of her beauty will not last; its wane will be the signal for the flight of her lovers; and if the present opportunity is neglected, she may be left to experience the only species of misfortune for which the world evinces no sympathy. How cruel, then, to increase the misery of her natural dependence! How ungenerous to add treachery to strength, and deceive or disappoint those whose highest ambition is our favour, and whose only safety is our honesty!

William Arbuthnot was born in a remote county of Scotland, where his father rented a few acres of land, which his own industry had reclaimed from the greatest wildness to a state of considerable

fertility. Having given, even in his first attempts at learning, those indications of a retentive memory, which the partiality of a parent easily construes into a proof of genius, he was early destined for the Scottish Church, and regarded as a philosopher before he had emerged from the nursery. While his father pleased himself with the prospect of seeing his name associated with the future greatness of his son, his mother, whose ambition took a narrower range, thought she could die contented if she should see him seated in the pulpit of his native church; and perhaps, from a pardonable piece of vanity, speculated as frequently upon the effect his appearance would have upon the hearts of the neighbouring daughters, as his discourses upon the minds of their mothers. This practice, so common among the poorer classes in Scotland, of making one of their children a scholar, to the prejudice, as is alleged, of the rest, has been often remarked, and sometimes severely censured. But probably the objections that have been urged against it, derive their chief force from the exaggerations upon which they are commonly founded. It is not in general true that parents, by bestowing the rudiments of a liberal education upon one of the family, materially injure the condition or prospects of the rest. For it must be remembered that the plebeian student is soon left to trust to his own exertions for support, and, like the monitor of a Lancastrian seminary, unites the characters of pupil and master, and teaches and is taught by turns.

But to proceed with our little narrative. The parish schoolmaster having intimated to the parents of his pupil, that the period was at hand when he should be sent to prosecute his studies at the university, the usual preparations were made for his journey, and his departure was fixed for the following day, when he was to proceed to Edinburgh under escort of the village carrier and his black dog Cæsar, two of the eldest and most intimate of his acquaintance. Goldsmith’s poetical maxim, that little things are great to little men, is universally true; and this was an eventful day for the family of Belhervie, for that was the name of the residence of Mr Arbuthnot. The father was as profuse of his admonitions as the mother was of her tears, and had a stranger beheld the afflicted group, he would have naturally imagined that they were bewailing some signal calamity, in place of welcoming an event to which they had long looked forward with pleasure. But the feelings of affectionate regret, occasioned by this separation, were most seasonably suspended by

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