Cooperation in the European Union
How Trust and Administrative Culture Matter for Crisis Management
Sten Widmalm
Department of Government
Uppsala University
Uppsala, Sweden
Thomas Persson Department of Government
Uppsala University
Uppsala, Sweden
Charles F. Parker Department of Government Centre of Natural Hazards and Disaster Science (CNDS)
Uppsala University
Uppsala, Sweden
ISSN 2524-7263
ISSN 2524-7271 (electronic)
European Administrative Governance
ISBN 978-3-030-02857-2 ISBN 978-3-030-02858-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02858-9
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Preface
A major challenge for the EU, since its creation, has been to forge agreement amongst its members and to persuade them to cooperate in effective and legitimate ways. In recent years, recurrent crises have made meeting this challenge tougher than ever. The economic and financial crisis brought some member states to the brink of bankruptcy, while others continued to prosper. The crisis over Ukraine then plunged the Union into a sharp conflict with Russia, even as certain member states continued to depend on good relations with Moscow. The subsequent refugee crisis led to further divisions between member states, over questions of solidarity and shared responsibility. In light of these events, the UK’s decision to leave the EU might be interpreted as the ultimate failure for European cooperation and integration. Nonetheless, the remaining member states seem to be determined to continue with the integration process. They persist in trying to make the internal market more efficient, while consolidating democracy and making the Union safer and more secure.
Other challenges facing the Union are more immediate, and they can appear in dramatic ways. We refer to these as crises, since they constitute an immediate threat to the EU’s ability to protect its citizens. While many of these events only affect individual member states, some of them are transboundary in character, meaning that they may affect at least two countries. Disasters of this kind are therefore best handled in cooperation with other member states. Moreover, economic, juridical, and political ties bind the member states together, such as the EU’s Solidarity Clause. The members of the Union thus share responsibility for coping with these emergencies. That is essentially what this book is about. We study how cooperation at
the level of the Union works in civil protection and crisis management, and we seek to identify the factors which make cooperation in this area effective and legitimate at the national and EU levels.
The impetus for this book came from a call for research put out by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) in 2013. A better understanding was needed, MSB declared, of the conditions under which cooperation within the Union could advance in the area of civil protection. Recent experiences with crises in the EU—among them the outbreak of avian influenza, the ash-cloud crisis, numerous forest fires and floods, and recurrent terrorist attacks—clearly underlined the need for closer cooperation. When the MSB announced its call for research proposals, we saw an opportunity to participate in this endeavour by combining our knowledge of crisis management, of EU governance, and of the factors that are needed to facilitate cooperation. In particular, we felt that an important element was missing in this field of research: namely, a more thoroughgoing focus on software factors like social capital and administrative culture. Such a focus, we believed, could advance our common understanding of the requisites for effective and legitimate cooperation at the EU level in this area. We have sought to further this understanding by carrying out research within the so-called Persona project, and by presenting the findings thereby gained in this book.
When we started the project, we expected crises of the above-mentioned type to be what people primarily thought of when discussing cooperation in the field of civil protection. However, man-made conflicts changed this outlook quite rapidly. What was first believed to be a temporary and limited increase in the flow of refugees into the EU, in 2014, soon turned out to be the largest movement of refugees in Europe since the Second World War. A large part of the discussion on civil protection and crisis management then got entangled in the debate on the refugee situation, in a way that was unprecedented and unforeseen. The sheer suffering and tragedy that then unfolded cannot be described here in any way that does it justice. When you read this book, please keep this stark fact in mind. The practical and political challenges following the refugee crisis have naturally impacted upon our results. Take for example our own country: Sweden. During the last four years, Sweden has received some 300,000 applicants for asylum, in a country of ten million. Austria, Hungary, and Sweden are among the top recipients of asylum applications in the Union per capita; while France, Germany, and Italy have received the highest number in
absolute terms. Quite naturally, all of those involved in civil protection in Europe have had the effects of this crisis in mind.
However, we do want to emphasize that most of the officials with whom we spoke were by no means focused solely on the challenges arising from the refugee crisis. These came up, naturally, in many discussions—as will become clear in the course of this book. However, these officials were also (and even largely) focused on all the duties their agencies had to perform that had no relation to the ongoing refugee crisis. These included protection against forest fires, floods, terrorist attacks, cybercrimes, accidents, pandemics, and so on. While we must acknowledge, then, that our study was carried out under special circumstances due to the refugee crisis, there were plenty of other crises to be handled as well.
Inevitably, any efforts at providing civil protection take place in a context that poses unique challenges, due to the special traits and features of crises. Fortunately for us, the highly professional officials in the agencies we visited were used to dealing with more than one crisis at a time. Consequently, our study reflects their assessments, opinions, and judgements on far more than just one particular emergency operation. Our study gives, then, a fairly comprehensive picture of civil-protection cooperation in Europe.
Uppsala, Sweden Sten Widmalm
Uppsala, Sweden
Charles F. Parker
Uppsala, Sweden Thomas Persson
acknowledgements
Our first thanks go to all those individuals who participated in our study as survey respondents and as interviewees, and who generously shared their views on civil protection and crisis management. We also wish to thank all the officials who helped us carry out the study in civil-protection institutions in Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, as well as at the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO).
We are also very grateful to the MSB, for providing financial support for the research that we report in this book. Several people at the MSB have given us valuable support and crucial advice along the way. Here we want in particular to mention Helena Lindberg, Nils Svartz, Camilla Öngörur, Johan Berglund, Marie Norrby, Bodil Lundberg, Björn Kerlin, Sara Myrdal, Arya Honarmand, and Anneli Bergholm Söder.
Nor would this study have been possible without support from the Department of Government at Uppsala University, which has served as our host. We give special thanks to our colleagues at the department who helped us with generous support and advice: Sverker Gustavsson, Christer Karlsson, Frederike Albrecht, Shirin Ahlbäck Öberg, and Daniel Nohrstedt. In addition, Anna Michalski, Niklas Nilsson, and Niklas Bremberg supported the publication of our chapter in the annual yearbook of the Swedish Network for European Studies; we are grateful for the opportunity this afforded us to disseminate our research.
We also want to give special thanks to Arjen Boin, Paul t’ Hart, Annika Brändström, Daniel Tarschys, Fredrik Bynander, Tom Christensen, and Bo Rothstein, as well as to the members of the research seminar at Gothenburg University, for providing valuable input and comments at various stages of this project that helped improve the final result.
This project has furthermore benefitted from the hard work of a number of research assistants who took part in the project at various stages. Many thanks to August Danielson, Axel Dalman, Ana Covaciu, Carina Portin, and George Kyroglou. Peter Mayers has scrutinized our text— both in its content and in its language—in a manner for which we are immensely grateful. We are thankful as well to Bernard Vowles, who also helped us to improve the text, and to the Royal Society of Arts and Sciences in Uppsala, which provided support in the final phase of the project. We further want to mention and to say thank you to the members of the Survey Gizmo support team, who helped us to solve certain challenges of survey design. We are also in debt to the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. Finally, we wish to thank the series editors, Tom Christensen and Sophia Vanhoonacker, as well as the patient and supportive editors at Palgrave Macmillan, Jemima Warren and Oliver Foster, for their expertise and assistance in making this book a reality.
On the personal front, all three of us owe a debt of gratitude to our families, who were extremely patient with us as we barnstormed 20 European capitals and spent endless hours working on this book. We could not have completed this project without their love and support.
Fig. 2.1 Share of women in the survey 46
Fig. 2.2 Experience of working with DG-ECHO (or similar) and training in the EU 47
Fig. 3.1 Level of cooperation with EU institutions in crisis situations 73
Fig. 3.2 Reliance on personal trust over formal protocols 75
Fig. 3.3 Emphasis on hierarchy at the work-place 77
Fig. 3.4 Freedom of speech at the workplace 78
Fig. 3.5 Relationship between trust in people at workplace and trust in people at EU institutions 80
Fig. 3.6 Relationship between trust in people at workplace and workplace hierarchy 81
Fig. 3.7 Relationship between trust in people at workplace and GDP per capita 82
Fig. 3.8 Relationship between reliance on trust over protocol and GDP per capita 83
Fig. 3.9 Relationship between workplace hierarchy and GDP per capita 84
Fig. 3.10 Relationship between workplace fairness and GDP per capita 85
Fig. 3.11 Relationship between workplace openness and workplace fairness
Fig. 3.12 Relationship between workplace meritocracy and GDP per capita
Fig. 3.13 All edges, and node sizes representing degree of prestige
Fig. 3.14 Strong edges representing degree of prestige
Fig. 3.15 Relationship between GDP per capita/democratic age, hierarchy and trust
Fig. 3.16 North/West and South/East divide in social capital and administrative cultures
Fig. 4.1
Fig. 4.2
Confidence intervals for one general indicator of effectiveness at national level, and at EU level; and balance between national and EU levels; mean estimate per country 109
Confidence intervals for effectiveness index at national level, and at EU level; and balance between national and EU levels; mean estimate per country 111
Fig. 4.3 Confidence intervals for public-administration structure (PAS), public-administration culture (PAC) respectively, and crosstabulation of both indices; mean estimate per country 113
Fig. 4.4
Confidence intervals for generalized trust, for trust in people working in civil-protection institutions at national level, and for trust in people working in such institutions at EU level; mean estimate per country 115
Fig. 4.5 Bivariate relationship between public-administration structure and effectiveness of institutions at the national level, respectively; mean estimate per country 117
Fig. 4.6 Bivariate relationship between public-administration culture and effectiveness of institutions at the national level, respectively; mean estimate per country 118
Fig. 4.7 Bivariate relationship between interpersonal trust in people at workplace and effectiveness of national civil-protection institution; mean estimate per country 119
Fig. 4.8 Bivariate relationship between generalized trust and effectiveness of national civil-protection institution; mean estimate per country 120
Fig. 4.9 Bivariate relationship between public-administration structure and effectiveness of EU civil-protection institutions, respectively; mean estimate per country 121
Fig. 4.10 Bivariate relationship between public-administration culture and effectiveness of EU institutions, respectively; mean estimate per country 122
Fig. 4.11 Bivariate relationship between interpersonal trust in people at workplace and effectiveness of EU civil-protection institutions; mean estimate per country 123
Fig. 4.12 Bivariate relationship between generalized trust and effectiveness of EU civil-protection institutions; mean estimate per country 124
Fig. 4.13 Bivariate relationship between interpersonal trust in people working in EU institutions and effectiveness of EU civilprotection institutions; mean estimate per country 125
Fig. 5.1 Confidence intervals for institutional trust at national level, and at EU level; and balance between national level and EU level; mean estimate per country 142
Fig. 5.2 Confidence intervals for public-administration autonomy, transparency, and professionalism at EU level; mean estimate per country
Fig. 5.3
Fig. 5.4
Fig. 5.5
Fig. 5.6
Fig. 5.7
Bivariate relationship between trust in national civil-protection institutions and trust in EU-level civil-protection institutions
Bivariate relationship between generalized trust and trust in EU-level civil-protection institutions
Bivariate relationship between particularized trust in people working in EU-level civil-protection institutions and trust in EU-level civil-protection institutions
Bivariate relationship between autonomy of officials in EU-level civil-protection institutions and trust in EU-level civilprotection institutions
Bivariate relationship between transparency of EU-level civilprotection institutions and trust in EU-level civil-protection institutions
Fig. 5.8 Bivariate relationship between professionalism in EU-level civilprotection institutions and trust in EU-level civil-protection institutions
144
146
147
148
149
150
151
Table 2.1 Number and share of respondents in central authorities responsible for civil protection and crisis management 40
Table 3.1 Indicators of social capital at national workplace and EU civilprotection/crisis-management institutions
Table 3.2 Indicators of administrative culture 69
Table 3.3 Trust and networks between surveyed countries 91
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of one indicator of effectiveness, national and EU-level
Table 4.2 Determinants of effectiveness in crisis-management institutions at national level
Table 4.3 Determinants of effectiveness in crisis management institutions at EU level
Table 5.1 Determinants of trust in EU-level institutions
CHAPTER 1
The Road to a Europe That Protects: Civil Protection, Trust, and the Culture of Public Administration in the EU
The EU and its member states have committed themselves to the protection of their citizens, and a Europe that protects must be able to respond effectively when disaster strikes. The expression of this goal can be found in the solidarity clause in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which establishes a legal obligation for the EU and its member states to assist each other when an EU country is the object of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster. To this end, the EU has created a civil-protection mechanism and an accompanying operational hub in the form of the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) which coordinates the response of the participating countries in the event of a crisis. Because the EU’s civil protection mission speaks to the EU’s entire project and is one of the most visible manifestations and tangible instruments of European solidarity, we treat it as a crucial case for investigating which factors—such as trust, public-administration culture, and publicadministration structure—facilitate or hinder effective EU cooperation.
The many crises faced by the EU today, from terrorist attacks to secession movements, put the EU at a crossroads. In fact, how well the EU is able to handle its crises will help determine the future health of the EU. The very idea of the EU is today being questioned more than it has ever been since 1951. If the EU is able to manage its crises through cooperation and solidarity, a more unified EU can emerge. However, if the current crises—financial, refugee related, and those relating to increasingly severe weather events and extreme climate related phenomena—
© The Author(s) 2019
S. Widmalm et al., Civil Protection Cooperation in the European Union, European Administrative Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02858-9_1
1
overwhelm the EU’s ability to solve problems and protect its citizens from harm, divisions will grow and the legitimacy of the EU will be called into question.
This book explores the challenges the EU and its member states face in order to achieve more effective cooperation in the quest to better protect its citizens, namely in the critical field of civil protection. It provides insights to what kind of cooperative structures exist in Europe in this issue area—in single countries, between countries, and at the EU level—and what role trust, shared norms, cooperative networks, and administrative culture play in how well the system functions. The book utilizes fieldvisits, interviews, and a large EU-wide survey among officials at civilprotection agencies throughout Europe and provides unique data on what aspects of civil protection are working well and what challenges lie ahead in areas that are more problematic.
We generate new empirical evidence on the actual functioning of EU civil-protection cooperation gathered through interviews conducted at the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Operations (DG ECHO) and in nineteen member states and through an extensive survey of 670 officials working with civil protection in seventeen member states. We then analyse this material through the prisms of administrative culture and social capital. We are able to provide evidence on the patterns of civil-protection cooperation in the EU, the effectiveness of EU civil-protection cooperation, and on the views of officials concerning the legitimacy of the EU’s efforts in this area. Prior to this study, little was known about how much trust practitioners working with civil protection actually placed in the EU’s efforts in this area or what mechanisms explain how they view the EU.
Institutions for civil protection are special. On the one hand they are supposed to coordinate multiple actors under extremely stressful conditions, such as natural disasters, pandemics, and terrorist attacks. On the other hand, they are supposed to prepare for crises and foresee new threats and challenges to the safety of citizens. Consequently, part of the time they are expected to behave like many other public administration institutions which carry out long term strategies in a relatively foreseeable way. But intermittently they are also expected to respond rapidly and appropriately to a variety of crises and transboundary events, such as natural disasters, environmental threats, major emergencies, epidemics, terrorism, migration, and the breakdown of critical infrastructure that demand that they act as a coherent emergency response team.
When we look at the EU, it is clear that there is great variation in how civil-protection institutions are structured. Civil protection involves a large variety of organizations and because there is no single model for how best to organize civil-protection activities, particularly in the EU context, we examine the different practices, traditions, relationships and cultures that shape civil-protection institutions and responses to crises in the EU. These differences pose challenges since crises so often have little or no respect for borders. Coordination between different actors will always be a challenge.
Within the context of the EU however it is natural to assume that coordination at the EU level should be the solution to such challenges. However, it is one thing to simply observe that cooperation is needed when there is an ash cloud, when rivers flood, when there is a forest fire, or when extremists attack innocent citizens. But bringing about such cooperation and making it work well is a major challenge. Sometimes the challenge lies in the nature of the crisis. However, more often, the challenge lies within the civil-protection institutions themselves. This means investigating the vital “software” factors of social capital and publicadministration culture rather than simply examining the “hardware” factors of formal structures, functional capacities, and technical equipment. It is this challenge that is the focus of this book, and this is why the objects of analysis for this study are the lead agencies responsible for civil protection and crisis management in civil society in the EU member states and the central EU-coordinated institutions DG ECHO and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC). In particular, we investigate the role of the revised Civil Protection Mechanism in facilitating cooperation between the civil-protection agencies in the EU and with DG ECHO, including the central role played by the ERCC; thereby, allowing us to generate insights into the effectiveness and legitimacy of cooperation between national and EU-level authorities.
It is noteworthy that our research for this book was conducted after some very important post 2013 changes and developments that have taken place regarding the EU’s civil-protection cooperation, which due to timing could not be fully captured by past research in the field. Our interviews and surveys were carried out at an opportune time, from 2015 to 2017, which means our investigation is able to capture attitudes informed by early assessments of the revised EU Civil Protection Mechanism legislation, which was adopted in December 2013, the functioning of the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), which was launched
in May 2013, and the strengthened European Emergency Response Capacity, which was adopted in October 2014. It is also notable that this research was carried out during a very trying time for the EU. In recent years, the EU has been buffeted by a number of crises, such as the Eurozone financial crisis, Brexit, and the refugee and migration crisis, all of which have proved challenging to the EU’s ability to solve problems and cooperate.
Our points of departure come from past research on crisis management in the EU context. In this chapter we briefly describe the scholarly debate and explain how our study contributes to current research in the field and specify the concrete research questions our study will address. Our main starting point is that traditional crisis management studies have not sufficiently addressed what is known as “software factors”, such as the central role of public-administration culture and social trust for achieving civilprotection cooperation. Inspired by other researchers in this field (Boin et al. 2013; Bossong and Hegemann 2015), we therefore suggest that the way forward is to combine knowledge from crisis management studies (Ansell et al. 2010; Comfort et al. 2010) with insights from public administration (Christensen et al. 2016a, b; Painter and Peters 2010; Peters 2010; Persson et al. 2017) and social capital studies (Putnam 1993, 2000; Rothstein 2011; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). By bringing together insights from all three fields we find the conceptual tools that inform our empirical study.
Specifically this book addresses the three following research objectives. First, we investigate the main divides and unifying patterns of cooperation that exist among the countries in our study and report which countries are the most trusted and by whom. Second, we investigate which factors promote effectiveness in civil protection and crisis management both at the national and EU-level. In doing so we examine whether structural and cultural factors are strongly related to perceptions of effectiveness of crisis management within national agencies and to what extent these factors are associated with perceptions of effective crisis management at the EU level. Finally, we investigate the factors that foster trust in national and EU civil protection governance. We examine how trust in EU institutions is linked to trust in national institutions and explore the mechanisms behind confidence in EU governance among civil protection officials.
By studying crucial aspects of civil protection and crisis management in the EU, we should be able to provide insights on proposals and policies to improve responsiveness and to help ensure that crises are met with
appropriate measures. We move beyond case studies and a technical analysis of formal institutional structures here, in an effort to uncover the values, principles, norms, and cultures that characterize civil-protection and crisis-management institutions in the Union. The broader question we ask is what traits of administrative agencies—traits that mostly remain hidden beneath the official descriptions of such bodies—serve to facilitate or to hinder cooperation when well-functioning crisis-management and civilprotection institutions are needed the most.
If we understand why and why not cooperation occurs, and what the informal structures are that govern civil-protection and crisis-management institutions, then there is a better chance that our decisions about future strategies will actually guide the EU in directions that sustain and promote its legitimacy.
It is often said that, due to the many crises it faces today, the EU finds itself at an important crossroads. Crises are repeatedly putting the Union in a situation where ‘the response’ or ‘the next move’ is seen as ‘crucial’. But many times, when there is a crisis of some kind, it is not so clear which road should be taken to improve or solve the situation. When Alice met the Cheshire cat in Wonderland, she asked which road she should take, and the cat responded by asking where she wanted to go. Alice then replied that she did not care, to which the cat said: ‘Then it doesn’t much matter which way you go.’ We hope this book will prove far more helpful than the Cheshire cat. We must not forget, however, that the cat is very clever. He points out the obvious need to understand one’s purpose and context. So, we begin this first chapter by discussing just those things. This book is not just a general contribution to the discourse on how means and methods of cooperation can evolve so as to respond to crises more effectively. It investigates more specifically the enabling and constraining factors upon which EU cooperation depends and provides evidence on the extent to which states are more inclined to work out their own national solutions or to make use of the Union’s supranational institutions in the crucial field of civil protection.
EU CoopEration: thE historiCal ContExt and CUrrEnt ChallEngEs
If we want to examine what options are available to the EU in crisis situations, then we need to understand the overall objectives of this organization. We can thereby learn about the obstacles and challenges that lie
S. WIDMALM
ahead, and what resources and opportunities may be available. The most challenging part here is to appreciate that the purposes of the Union have changed over time. The contexts in which crises arise vary too.
The original purpose of European integration was to bring an end to war amongst the states of Europe. And almost immediately, economic cooperation became the primary tool to achieve it. Post-war policy-makers and political elites in the West were immensely influenced by the modernization school, which declared not only that a common market would preserve peace; economic growth would also stabilize and preserve democracy—the only regime type under which a humane and common future was possible, as had been evident since the grim and cruel consequences of communism and national socialism had made themselves known. For more than three decades the EEC expanded, gaining greater legitimacy all the while, as it provided for the three goals at the same time: peace, economic growth, and democracy. Although the expansion of the Union was slow, the incremental nature of the changes that took place over time facilitated the cumbersome task of building up trust and synchronizing different administrative traditions (Widmalm et al. 2018). The legitimacy of the EU was thus preserved and nurtured, and new paths forward were incrementally prepared. The end goal, of course, was the creation of a real union.
After dramatic changes in the political climate in the 1980s and the fall of the Berlin wall, this understanding of the EU became less obvious and established. Neo-liberal economic reforms placed economic growth at the top of the agenda for many states. The break-up of the Soviet Union also led to a rapid expansion in the number of EU member states. The logic of geopolitics took over, making other goals less relevant. Democracy, for instance, was put on the back burner in several respects. European integration first, full democracy later—that was the main strategy. Otherwise the newly free and independent states in the East would run the risk of being pulled back into Russia’s gravitational field. Terror attacks after 2001 combined with refugee disasters to favour demands for a less inclusive EU, and priority were given in many policy areas to security concerns. In addition, natural disasters—some considerably worsened by the bad side of man-made ‘development’—put strains on the whole EU system. And so, a paradoxical situation revealed itself. The more challenges the EU project encountered, the more obvious it became that working together collectively was needed to meet them. At the very same time, however, the prospects for cooperation were growing dimmer, due to austerity policies,
strains resulting from migration and the influx of refugees, and certain side-effects arising from the operation of the common labour market (Widmalm et al. 2018). In this problematic new environment, populist movements thrived. Various crises related to security, the environment, and the economy either exposed existing wedges between member states or drove in new ones. So when the EU finally, and quite recently, decided to push for more cooperation in crisis management and civil protection, the challenges were to say the least considerable. Instead of revealing the need for cooperation, collective action, and shared responsibility, the Union’s efforts in this area revealed deep cleavages and free-rider behaviour—and likely led to further problems besides. One question became evident immediately: how can the Union develop such common institutions as are needed to solve the increasing threats in this area? The research project on which this book is based emanated from such concerns.
If Brexit, terror attacks, the refugee crisis, and the economic crisis of 2008 have created an ‘EU crisis’, can the Union then be expected to be the place for member states to go in order to solve crises? Can we expect joint solutions and cooperation for civil protection and crisis management to emerge from something which today, according to its harshest critics, looks more and more like the raft of the Medusa? Or is it exactly this kind of context which will forge unity and a stronger EU that understands the importance of a modicum of unity and the value of tackling challenges jointly? In order even to begin to answer such questions, we need to understand the fabric which holds—or may hold—the EU together, and the gravitational forces which divide it. Therefore, whilst this study focuses on traits and characteristics of crisis management and civil protection in the EU, it also addresses the broader issue of how the EU might act more inclusively for common purposes. From a political perspective, the capacity to cooperate and coordinate is often portrayed as the Holy Grail—a chalice that needs to be filled with legitimacy. From a crisis-management, a civil-protection, and more generally an administrative point of view, such a capacity is often portrayed as highly desirable. But if only certain actors can cooperate, or wish to, then that may also say something about internal divisions or differences of interest. We hope therefore to clarify what facilitates cooperation, and what conditions cooperation from the perspective of the member states. We also need at least to touch on the political: what unifies some actors and what divides them. To do this, we must focus and narrow the scope of the investigation (especially if we include a majority of EU member states in the study, which we do).
Joint Civil protECtion and Crisis ManagEMEnt in thE EU: prEConditions and FoCal points
Previous studies have already furnished important insights into what makes cooperation possible, and what makes it difficult to achieve in times of crisis. Many of these have highly focused, however, on hardware factors such as the nature and content of formal agreements, legal frameworks, and functional capabilities. Clearly, we need a better understanding of these institutional actors from within. We need to know more about how values, virtues, trust, traditions, culture, and the like motivate actors and how these factors influence the quality of cooperation among them. High profile events like the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, the tsunami disaster in 2004, the bird flu in 2005–2006, the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014, and earlier food-supply crises like ‘mad cow disease’, have had the catalytic effect of spurring the EU to become more and more involved in crisis management and civil protection (Widmalm et al. 2018). Lately, moreover, the Union’s responsibilities as a civil-security actor have expanded—and quickly (Kirchner et al. 2015). The Civil Protection Mechanism, for instance, is designed to help the Union and its member states cope with crises like fires, floods, extreme weather, landslides, volcanoes, earthquakes, and complex accidents and emergencies (European Commission 2017a). Terrorism in Paris and Brussels in 2015–2016 further encouraged cooperation amongst EU agencies in this area. Common efforts now include actions against terrorist financing, measures against weapons smuggling (including stronger cooperation amongst different police forces), the collection of passenger data on flights, and the reinforcement of controls at the outer borders of the Union (including biometric information checks). To be sure, a kind of responsiveness on the part of the Union is evident here: new directives have been issued; new laws have been passed and implemented. It is less clear, however, whether these are furthering unity within the EU. Are they forging stronger bonds amongst the member states?
The main responsibility in the immediate aftermath of a disaster or emergency, according to the EU, rests with the country where it takes place. Nevertheless, the Union recognizes that extreme events can exceed the capacity of any one country to cope, making outside assistance necessary. In today’s complex and interdependent world, moreover, crises that start in one country can spread quickly to others, increasing the risk of far-reaching regional or even global damage. The member states have
agreed, accordingly, that an extreme event may become much too serious for the afflicted country to handle without outside assistance.
The migration and refugee crisis, which became an acute problem in 2015 and 2016, is a vivid example of a challenging and divisive transboundary crisis. Mirjana Milenkovski, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, described the refugee crisis as the most extensive seen in Europe since the Second World War (Cerni and Savic 2015). It has led, moreover, to serious divisions within and between the member states. Survivors fleeing war and terror find themselves in a Union badly divided over how to accommodate them. The situation is highly unstable. Efforts are made at coordination; refugee quotas are resisted; political factions clash with one another. The refugee crisis and migration within the Union were important factors in the strong support gained by champions of Brexit (Wilkinson 2016). As migrants and refugees poured into Europe, the EU tried to cope, amongst other things by offering support to countries like Hungary. In the Hungarian case, however—according to those we interviewed for this study (see Chap. 3)—the offer was rejected, save for some tents, coats, and blankets for the refugees. The member states differ enormously in their views on the refugee crisis. It is clear there is no consensus on the nature of the challenges to the Union in this area, and no single direction forward.
However, not all crises have this effect. Some actually reveal clear common interests. Take the Icelandic ash cloud in 2010. It occasioned no dramatic divisions within the Union; quite the contrary. It was a textbook example of a cascading crisis, and it had a major negative impact throughout Europe, disrupting air traffic massively and paralysing European aviation. A coordinated EU response was needed to resolve it (Parker 2015). And its effect was to push the EU forward in a common direction.
Crises of this type, which exceed the capacity of any single country to resolve on its own, are among the main reasons the Union has taken on a more prominent role in managing crises. The Treaty of Lisbon has thus been furnished with a Solidarity Clause (Article 222 TFEU), which obligates the Union to assist member states in the event of natural or manmade disasters. However, EU ef forts in this area face important ‘hardware’ challenges: e.g., creating a coherent legal framework; establishing properly functioning formal structures; developing a robust response capability; and making sure that sufficient resources and technical equipment are available in times of need. Yet the ‘software’ challenges may be even more important: leadership; training; networks; and trust in the people involved
and in the systems and procedures that have been built up (Boin and ‘t Hart 2010; Ansell et al. 2010). In this book, we focus to some extent on the interaction between hardware and software factors. Our main emphasis, however, is on the latter, which has received less focused attention by past research. Our work builds on the insights of scholars of crisis management that have shown an increasing interest in social capital, and in how effective crisis management can be both enabled and undermined by trust, shared norms, and a strong esprit de corps (Moynihan 2008; Boin and ‘t Hart 2010; Ansell et al. 2010; Boin et al. 2014; Persson et al. 2017).
Increasingly, crises are crossing boundaries of organization and sector (Boin et al. 2006, 2010). Many organizations, therefore, feel the need to coordinate their efforts more and more. Such coordination takes place on various levels of administration, at times periodically and at other times permanently. Clearly, therefore, the Union can play a productive role. If it is to do so, however, it must overcome some challenges. As Arjen Boin and Paul ‘t Hart point out, research has shown that hardware factors tend to be ascribed too much importance (Boin and ‘t Hart 2010). As they see it, such a focus can divert attention from efforts in the software area, which are often more important and cost-effective.
This suggests that trying to build a perfect organization—by adjusting rules, regulations, operational procedures, etc.—is not likely to improve crisis management very much. According to Boin and ‘t Hart, the critical thing here is not formal structures but the quality of communication and coordination within and across the rescue services of the individual countries. As Charles Parker, Eric Stern, and their colleagues have shown, coordination and cooperation problems were central to the suboptimal outcomes seen when warning-response systems failed in connection with the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Parker and Stern 2002) and Hurricane Katrina (Parker et al. 2009). There is thus much to suggest that software factors often make the biggest difference.
It is very important, to be sure, to take an institutional perspective on the Union’s crisis-management capacity (Boin et al. 2013). But we take things a step further in this book, by considering more closely the oftoverlooked importance of social tr ust and public-administration culture in different member states. The question of trust is particularly interesting in connection with the EU, where crisis management is increasingly shared among member states and supranational agencies. We will soon dig deeper into the software factors and how they interact. However, a brief overview of some of the hardware factors concerning the institutional setup of civil-
protection cooperation within the EU is necessary in order to appreciate the context of the study.
thE EvolUtion and institUtional sEtUp oF CivilprotECtion CoopEration in thE EU
The Union Civil Protection mechanism, which is the responsibility of DG ECHO, was created to coordinate the response to natural and man-made disasters at the EU level and was first established in 2001. The legal basis for EU action in the field of civil protection is predicated on Article 196 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU also known as the Treaty of Lisbon). Article 196 calls on the EU ‘to improve the effectiveness of systems for preventing and protecting against natural or man-made disasters’ says that EU action should aim to ‘promote swift, effective operational cooperation within the Union between national civilprotection services’ as well as ‘promote consistency in international civilprotection work’. The UCPM is also designed to contribute to the implementation of Ar ticle 222 of the TFEU, the so-called solidarity clause, which obligates the EU and its member states to come to the aid of any member state that is overwhelmed by a natural disaster, terrorist attack, or other major man-made crisis. The Lisbon Treaty also calls on the Union to provide assistance and protection to victims of natural disasters or manmade disasters around the world (Ar ticle 214).
The civil-protection legislation was revised in late 2013. The EU was motivated to do so by the increasing frequency and severity of natural and man-made disasters. According to the EU, future disasters, due to climate change and possible interaction effects between several natural and technological systems, are likely to be increasingly extreme and more complex with potentially devastating consequences (European Parliament and Council 2013). To bolster an integrated European wide approach to disaster management and better promote solidarity, in late 2013 the EU adopted a strengthened civil protection mechanism to better ‘support, complement, and facilitate the coordination of Member States’ actions in the field of civil protection with a view to improving the effectiveness of systems for preventing, preparing for and responding to natural and manmade disasters’ (European Parliament and Council 2013).
The EU clearly sees the UCPM as a high profile, and high priority, manifestation of its commitment to European solidarity and has explicitly embraced the mission of ‘ensuring a practical and timely contribution to
prevention of and preparedness for disasters and the response to disasters and imminent disasters’ (European Parliament and Council 2013). By reinforcing the UCPM with new legislation, European leaders hope to improve cooperation at the EU level in connection with disaster prevention, preparedness and planning, and response time (European Commission 2013).
The revised Civil Protection Mechanism went into effect on 1 January 2014 and the specific components that now comprise the structure of the UCPM are the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS), and the European Emergency Response Capacity (EERC) (European Parliament and Council 2013).
The ERCC, which was established in May 2013, is the operative hub and the heart of the UCPM. The ERCC is the EU’s main crisis monitoring and coordinating platform and it disseminates information, provides early warning, and coordinates responses from the participating countries in the event of a crisis. The ERCC offers a full 24/7 capacity to monitor disasters, to provide real-time information about them, and to respond to them by providing needed data, updates, expertise, financial assistance, and resources from the voluntary pool (European Commission 2013: 2). The ERCC is supported in its work by CECIS, which is a web-based alert and notification system that allows for real time information sharing among participating states and the ERCC.
The revised civil-protection legislation led to the creation of the European Emergency Response Capacity (EERC), which consists of a voluntary pool of pre-committed capacities from the Member States, including trained experts, relief teams, and equipment (European Parliament and Council 2013). To guarantee that committed resources are of high quality, DG ECHO subjects all assets to a dedicated certification process (European Parliament and Council 2013). The voluntary pool of precommitted capacities was one of the new additions designed to address the weaknesses in the previous mechanism and was created to move away from the reactive and ad hoc coordination the reigned prior to 2014, to ‘a preplanned, prearranged and predictable system’ (European Court of Auditors 2016: 9; European Commission 2017b: 4). The voluntary pool creates a response capacity and range of assets that can be tapped immediately when needed. Since the EERC’s establishment in October 2014, 20 participating states have committed over 90 resources and response capacities, such as search and rescue teams, medical teams, high-capacity
pumping units, water purification equipment, evacuation teams, and forest firefighting teams, which are available to be deployed in the EU and worldwide (European Commission 2017c). Collectively, the Civil Protection Mechanism, ERCC, CECIS, and the EERC’s voluntary pool are designed to be the concrete manifestations of European solidarity in the field of civil protection.
Since its inception in 2001, the Civil Protection Mechanism has monitored more than 400 disasters worldwide. It has been activated more than 250 times (European Commission 2017d), among other things in connection with the in Haitian earthquake of 2010, the Japanese nuclear disaster of 2011, the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014, the earthquake in Nepal in 2015, and the floods in Peru in 2017 (European Commission 2017b: 5, 2017e, 2018). Inside the EU from 2001–2017 there has been 102 requests for assistance and activations in Europe include the floods in the western Balkans in 2014, a forest fire in Sweden in 2014, and the migration and refugee crisis in Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Serbia, and Slovenia in 2015 (European Commission 2017b: 5–6; 2018). In response to the widespread forest fires in 2017, the UCPM was activated to assist southern European countries and Albania, France, Italy, Montenegro, and Portugal received help from the UCPM in the form of firefighting airplanes, fire-fighters and vehicles.
Disasters across Europe proved extremely costly in recent years both in terms of human lives and in economic damage. The EU has noted that 200 people lost their lives due to natural disasters in 2017 alone and nearly €10 billion in economic losses were suffered in 2016 (European Commission 2017c, f). In response, the EU, in November 2017, has proposed to strengthen civil-protection action and cooperation once again with its rescEU initiative to create a new system for an enhanced collective European response to disasters (European Commission 2017g). Specifically, the EU called a reserve of new civil protection capabilities managed by DG ECHO, the boosting of national civil protection capacity, and enhanced disaster prevention and preparedness (European Commission 2017f, g).
As these developments show, the EU is pushing forward. It is enabling more joint crisis management, and encouraging greater cooperation for civil protection. It is doing this by building common institutions and trying to enhance capacities at the EU level. Common institutions, however, may be necessary but not sufficient for facilitating cooperation. As they build up an institutional framework in this area, the Union and its member
states are confronting a number of important software challenges relating to trust, culture and legitimacy that are integral to the quality of coordinated action and crisis response. If the new arrangements are to improve the management of future disasters and crises, it is critical that these challenges be overcome.
thE iMportanCE oF soCial Capital and adMinistrativE
CUltUrE: soFtwarE rEqUirEMEnts For EFFECtivE Crisis
ManagEMEnt
As Boin and ‘t Hart amongst others have observed (2010), researchers on civil protection and crisis management have focused too much on formalities and technicalities—what they call ‘hardware’ factors. Scholars in the field will be well-advised, therefore, to look more at leadership, networkbuilding, education, training, and organizational culture.
Recent studies of crisis management in the Union have done just that (Persson et al. 2017; Christensen et al. 2016a; Kuipers et al. 2015). Two approaches in particular would seem especially rewarding here. One is the scholarship on social capital, with its stress on the importance of norms, networks, and trust. The other is the research on administrative culture, which in a number of ways intersects with that on social capital. We will explain why these approaches are valuable, and how they can enhance crisis-management research (particularly as regards the EU’s capacities).
Let us begin with social capital, which has drawn massive attention from researchers for more than two decades now. Earlier social scientists recognized the centrality of social capital for favourable social development, even if they did not use the term. In his study of democracy in America, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville (de Tocqueville 1835 and 1840, reprinted in 1994) singled out the customs and practices of the new country as the key to its democratic stability. A century later, in The Civic Culture (Almond and Verba 1963, reprinted in 1989), Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba drew much the same picture. Robert Putnam, finally, hammered home the same message a few decades after that. In Bowling Alone and Making Democracy Work (Putnam 1993), he showed the importance of social capital for both economic growth and democratic progress. He issued a warning as well, however: social capital in the United States had steadily eroded in the years since the Second World War. There is evidence to suggest, furthermore, that this warning applies as well to
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them well between cloths; and make a pickle of the following ingredients:
Six eschalots, minced
White peppercorns 2 oz.
Mace, bruised 1½ oz.
Nutmeg, sliced 1½ oz.
Common table salt 6 oz.
White-wine vinegar 5 pints
Skim this well, boiling it fifteen minutes, and, filling jars with the fruit, pour the liquor and spices equally upon them, when about new milk warm, and tie bladder over the jars.
-
Pickled beet-roots which have both fine colour and flavour to recommend them are seldom to be met with, particularly in the provinces. If this method is tried, it will most certainly recommend them. Take half a dozen roots of the deepest blood-red colour, put them into a pail of cold water, and with a soft brush scour and wash them well, and without breaking the skin in the least. Put them into a saucepan of boiling water, and let them boil gently until tender, and no longer, then take them up, wipe dry, and leave them until the next day. Now peel them nicely, and cut them across in slices a quarter of an inch thick, not using the extremities. You may cut the slices into various ornamental and grotesque figures, and lay them in openmouthed jars, and make the following pickle:
Mace 1 oz.
Cloves, bruised 2 oz.
Peppercorns 2 oz.
Bay salt, pounded 4 oz.
Ginger, sliced 2 oz.
Horseradish, sliced 1 oz.
Best vinegar ½ gallon
Boil these ten or fifteen minutes, skimming well, and, when cold, pour over the roots. Replenish the next day what pickle may have been absorbed, and cover the jars with bladder and leather. This pickle is ready in a month, and is very good. It makes a beautiful garnish with fish at dinner, &c. &c.
, .
Pick out expressly for this purpose a couple of quarts of fresh gathered button mushrooms, cut the stalks out closely, and wipe them singly with a piece of soft flannel dipped in moistened bay salt, place them apart on dishes and scatter a little finely beaten salt amongst them. Put them into a roomy saucepan along with Mace, slightly bruised ½ oz.
White peppercorns, slightly bruised ¾ oz.
Bay leaves, shred ½ oz. Cloves, bruised ¼ oz. and let them simmer gently and until all their juice is taken up. Take the pan from the fire, and when cooled a little add to them four or five glasses of good white wine, agitate the mushrooms in the pan, replace it on the fire and bring it to the boil for one minute, then add three pints of the best pale vinegar and boil for ten minutes slowly. Now put the mushrooms into glass or stone jars that are clean and perfectly dry, and when cold make secure with corks or bladder, and keep them in a dry cool room. This is an estimable pickle, and will be appreciated duly by lady-cooks, who best know its usefulness and the various ways in which both the mushrooms and their pickle may be made available. The wine should be good old Madeira, and the quantity may be increased with great advantage.
.
Take fresh green curled parsley just at maturity, pick out the most handsome sprigs and put them into salt and water strong enough to
float an egg, and let remain so for five or six days; set them to drain on a sieve, and then immerse them in another fresh pickle of the same strength for ten days longer, changing the brine twice. Then drain them again, and put them into pure cold spring water for two days, changing the water daily, and when again drained scald them in boiling water until they are of a nice green, and dry them between soft cloths. Make, then, the following pickle of Mace ½ oz.
Nutmeg, sliced 1 oz.
Eschalots, minced 1 oz.
Horseradish, sliced 2 oz.
White-wine vinegar 3 pints which must be boiled ten or twelve minutes and well skimmed. Put the parsley branches lightly into jars and pour the pickle over, covering well. Fill up again with pickle the next day, and cover that again with pure olive oil to the thickness of an inch or thereabouts. Cover close with wetted bladder, and over that, when dried, with soft leather, and keep in a dry airy room.
.
When walnuts have attained maturity, and are being deprived of the outside green shells by the fruiterers, take half a peck of these husks, put them into a jar, and pour on them as much cold strong pickling vinegar as will quite cover them; bung up the jar, and so let them remain three months. Then press out the liquor upon a sieve, and to every gallon of it take
Port wine lees 1½ quart
Anchovies 8 oz.
With all these boil up the liquor of the walnuts, and let them simmer twenty minutes, skimming well the whole time, then put it aside for two days and boil it again until reduced one-third part. When cold, you may put it in bottles, which cork well and seal with wax. It will be an excellent catsup, and will be greatly improved by long keeping.
.
Throw large black flap mushrooms into a vessel, and crush them with the hands well, throwing in a large handful of common salt to each peck, and let them so lie for two days. Then put them into a crock of earthenware, and let them be macerated in a cool baker’s oven for six hours or so, and, when cold, press out the juice, which boil with the following, to each gallon of the liquor:
The simmering and skimming must be continued as long as any filth rises, and let it then be put away for a day or two, and boiled up again, being kept well up to the boiling point until reduced to half its original quantity. When cold it may be put into bottles and firmly corked and waxed.
When tomatoes are fully ripe take two dozen of fine, large, sound ones, put them into jars and bake until they are tender; strain off the
water from them, and pass the pulp through a sieve, then add to every pound of the pulp,
Eschalots, shred 1 oz.
Garlic, shred ½ oz.
Bay salt ¼ oz.
White pepper, finely powdered ¼ oz.
Chili vinegar 1 pint
Boil them together until the whole is quite soft, and pass it again through a sieve. Now, to every pound of the pulp add the juice of two lemons, and one large Seville orange, boil it again until it has attained the consistence of thick cream, and when cold bottle it; cork and seal well.
, .
Open and wash thoroughly clean a fine head of celery, wipe dry, and cut it across into a basin, add to it two ounces of some good rich old cheese sliced thinly, a teaspoonful of mustard mixed as for the table, a tablespoonful of best olive oil, the same quantity of vinegar, with pepper and salt to your taste. Mix all well together.
- .
Pick out all the stalks from a peck of fresh elder flowers and put them into a vessel with two gallons of white-wine vinegar, set them under the influence of bright sunbeams for fourteen days and upwards, or at a short distance from a continuous fire, and then filter the vinegar through a new flannel bag; fill bottles, which must be well corked and sealed.
.
Take the leaves of tarragon just before it blossoms, put a pound of them to three quarts of the best white-wine vinegar in a stone jar,
and let them infuse sixteen days. Then drain it and strain through a flannel bag; add for every two gallons a quarter of an ounce of isinglass dissolved in sherry wine, and let it be agitated briskly in a large stone bottle two days. Leave it a month to get fine, then draw it off into clean dry glass bottles, which cork well and seal.
- .
Vinegars should be made at home if you wish to rely upon their quality. This will be superior to any white-wine vinegar, “so called at the shops,” and as such will be extremely serviceable in all large establishments and families. Choose fruit of the lightest colour you can get when fully ripe, mash it with a wooden mallet or potato beetle. To every peck of the fruit put two gallons of water, stir them well for an hour and let them ferment three weeks, repeating the stirring daily. Then strain off the liquor and add for every gallon: Loaf sugar 1 lb.
Yeast, thick and fresh 1 tablespoonful
Treacle 1 tablespoonful
Let it work for three or four days, then put it into a sweet barrel of convenient size, and stop it down for twelve months.
’ , .
This elegant syrup is thus made:
Blanch the almonds, dry them perfectly and pound them in a mortar with the sugar, adding gradually two thirds of the water; strain through linen, and wash the almonds on the strainer with the remainder of the water, and dissolve the sugar in the strained liquor by a gentle heat. Pour the syrup into an earthenware vessel, remove
the scum, and, when nearly cold, add two ounces of orange-flower water. Put it into clean clear glass bottles, cork well, and seal effectually.
- .
Turmeric
Coriander seeds
2 oz.
6 oz.
Ginger ½ oz.
Cinnamon
Cayenne pepper
Black pepper
Mace
2 drachms
6 drachms
½ oz.
1 drachm
Fenugreek 1½ oz.
Pimento
Cloves
Nutmeg
2 drachms
1 drachm
½ oz.
Pound all the above separately in a mortar, mix thoroughly for twenty minutes, then sift and again pound the returns, which, when in finest powder, mix with bulk; put into dry bottles, cork them well and seal. Some persons prefer more turmeric and less coriander. Others add two ounces of the best Durham mustard (scorched). Others, half an ounce of cardamoms or two ounces of cummin. The colour should be light yellow—brown, not bright yellow.
.
It has been incontestably proved by Baron Liebig and other Professors of Chemistry, that the albumen and gelatine constitute the leading nutritive ingredients in the different kinds of flesh and fish used as food; and I have arrived at the conclusion, that any mode of curing which deprives them of these valuable properties, is opposed
to facts in science and to common-sense, and cannot therefore be tolerated.
On the nutritive properties of animal food, Professor Brande writes: “When the muscular parts of animals are washed repeatedly in cold water, the fibrinous matter which remains, consists chiefly of albumen, and is, in its chemical properties, analogous to the clot of blood.”
In mutton, the albumen or fibrin amounts to as much as twentytwo per cent., and of gelatine to seven per cent., giving a total of twenty-nine per cent. of nutritive matter In beef, the albumen is twenty, and the gelatine six per cent., yielding a total of twenty-six per cent. of nutritive matter.
When a piece of meat is covered with salt, or immersed in brine, the salt penetrates the whole fibre of the flesh, and the juices contained within are drawn out, and mix with the brine; the salts of potass contained in it, are exchanged and superseded by those of soda, derived from the salt with which it has been cured; now, as a constant supply of potass is required in the system to renew the muscular fibre, it is quite clear that the want of it must be attended with some derangement of the health; and hence the benefit derived from the taking of vegetables, which by supplying potass, make up for the want of this alkali in the meat.
Albumen is coagulated by heat, and is drawn out by cold water; this fact is referred to in Note, No. 11.
No. 1. The coating of small articles, of the better sorts, excludes the air. It is a mixture of gelatine with treacle, applied when hot, and which when exposed to the air becomes hardened, yet elastic as india-rubber. See Note, No. 12.
No. 2. The smoking with different sorts of fuel exerts a considerable influence on the flavour and preservation of the articles so treated; for example, the mutton of the Ardennes forest, Belgium, which owes its superiority to the juniper bushes with which it is dried and smoked. And again, kippered salmon smoked with cedar-wood,
at the request of some of our wealthy Jew families, is excellent, though rather expensive.
No. 3. The spicing of bacon was adopted some years since, and chiefly in Ireland, to hide the inferior quality of the meat.
No. 4. Bay salt is far preferable to common salt for curing meats and fish, but the expense deters many persons from using it, except in small quantities. The rock, or mineral salt of Cheshire, is equal in all respects to the bay salt of commerce, and I have long used it with the greatest success. Common salt leaves a bitter smatch on all food cured with it after being long kept. See Note, No. 12.
No. 5. There is no remedy for over-salted provisions. You may, indeed, cut them into slices and lay them in water, but this only affects the outsides of large pieces, as hams, &c. If I had a ham that I suspected of being over salted, I should put it in an old bag, and bury it in my garden for a week or more, according to size.
No. 6. Rubbing large joints of meat over with a profusion of common salt, and letting them lie, to “draw out the blood,” as it is termed, is contrary to all reason, for away goes the chief part of the flavour and nutriment.
No. 7. Sprats are so different in their animal construction as to be easily detected from genuine fish—Gorgona anchovies. The Armenian bole, often made use of to colour the sauce, has very properly been exposed and condemned.
No. 8. Pure olive oil will preserve meat and fish, after it has been cured, for a long time; but oils drawn from lard and other spurious imitations, will not fail to hasten their decay. The oil should never be heated, when used for this purpose.
No. 9. Subjecting meats to a water-bath is not to be resorted to. I was shown a specification previous to the taking out of a patent (in France, by a French gentleman) to cure the more expensive sorts of fish. The first part of the process proposed, was subjecting the fish to a water-bath, first for three hours, and, changing the water, then to two hours further immersion in warm water. I, of course, entered my protest against such unreasonable treatment. I am sure I could not
conjecture what became of both flavour and nutriment after so long immersion.
No. 10. Meats to be boiled, and particularly fish, must be put into boiling water, and after being kept up to the boiling point fifteen minutes or so, let them only simmer until done.
No. 11. The albumen is drawn out from both meat, fish, and vegetables by cold water; how, then, can we reconcile ourselves with the foolish old practice of laying the heads, for instance, and other parts, in pails of water, and leaving them for hours in that state, to lose all their goodness. Vegetables for pickling, too, are often treated in this way. Lying in water cannot possibly clean anything. Wash well, and hang up to dry, is more reasonable.
No. 12. A very effective coating for small cured articles is made thus: To four pounds of hard, compact gelatine, add as much soft or rain-water as will just cover it, and stir it about occasionally for six hours. When it has stood twenty-four hours, and all the water is absorbed, submit it to the action of heat in a water-bath, and the gelatine will be quickly dissolved. Take it off the fire as soon as the froth is perceived to rise, and mix with it three and a half pounds of molasses, which has previously been made thoroughly hot. Stir the composition well together while in the water-bath over the fire, not suffering it to boil. After it has been thus subjected to heat for half an hour, and well stirred all the time, it should be taken off the fire and allowed to cool a little; it is now ready for use, and to be applied to the article of food with a soft brush. Set it in a current of air to harden quickly. A second paying-over with the composition may be done with advantage sometimes. For larger articles, as hams, &c. &c., the best transparent glue may be used instead of gelatine, adding to the composition, when a little cooled, a few drops of essence of nutmegs or pimento. If when cold the coating is found to be not firm enough, the proportion of gelatine or glue must be slightly increased, and when, on the contrary, it is too brittle, the quantity of molasses may be increased.
No. 13. For the accommodation of parties residing at a distance, peat or bog-earth, rock salt from the Cheshire mines, charcoal, &c.
&c., may be had, ready for immediate, use, on application to Mr Robinson, provision curer, Runcorn, Cheshire, and on very moderate terms.
INDEX.
A red herrings, 55
Anchovies, British, 59
— Gorgona, to feed, 59
— Gorgona, smoked, 63
— essence of, 129
Apparatus for drying, smoking, &c., 1
Asparagus, pickled, 155
B , choice breakfast, 7
— Leicestershire spiced, 23
Barberries pickled, 154
Bath chaps, 24
Beef as hare, potted, 120
Beef’s heart, potted, 123
Beef, hung, Shropshire sirloin, 6
— Melton hunt, 8
Beef’s heart, smoked, 10
Beef, Ulverston red flank, 11
— hams, 13
— Hambro rough, 13
— Breslau, 14
— Whitehaven corned, 15
— Dutch, 25
Beetroots, pickled, 167
Bloaters, 50
Black puddings, Jersey, 90
Birmingham and Oxford tripe, 75
Boar’s head smoked, 19
Brawn, calf’s head, 77
Bucaning meats, described, 1
Bucaned beef kidneys, 80 — udder, 81 — calf’s liver, 82 — beef skirts, 83
C , red, pickled, 145
Catsup, tomato, 130 — mushroom, 171 — walnut, 170
Cauliflowers, pickled, 146
Caveach herrings, 74
Caviare brown, 70 — white, 71
Cavis of mackerel, 72
Celery, pickled, 151 — crab salad, 173
Charcoal, preservative quality, 4
Chetna, Bengal, 131
Coating composition, to make, 180 — to apply, 180
Codlins, pickled, 154
Coated turbot fins, 60 — river eels, 62 — conger eels, 68 — young pig, 114
Collared salmon, 43
— side of venison, 109 — young pig, 112
Crabs potted, 107
Crab salad, 173
Conger eels, 69
Currants red, pickled, 151 — preserved for tarts, 135
Curry powder, excellent, 175
D M , as in the Ardennes, 29 — breast of mutton as venison, 33
Dried Ulverston red flank of beef, 11 — Conger eels, high flavoured, 69
Digby herrings, 55
E , conger, smoked, 66 — collared, 68 — dried, 69 — potted, 118
Elder-flower vinegar, 173
Essences to make, 1
Essence of lobsters, 127 — shrimps, 128 — anchovies, 129
F , nutriment in (Dr. Davy), 36 — sauce, excellent, 131
Foots of sugar, to be preferred, 4
Fuel for smoking and drying with, 3
G , , 79
German saveloys, 89
Gherkins, pickled, 156
Grapes, „ 152
Goose, a perpetual (beef’s heart), 34
Green West India ginger, preserved, 134
H ’ P , for beef and pork, 31
Hams, Westphalia, 19 — eclipsed, 20
Hare, potted, 114
Haunch of mutton as venison, 26
Herrings, marinated, 103
I C , 65
J B P , 90
K H , 52 — superior, spiced, 53 — salmon, superior, 40
L , pickled, 159
Lemon pickle, 160
Lemons, preserved, 139
Lobsters, essence of, 127 — pickled, 102 — potted, 106
M K , 45 — (May-fish), 46 — superior pressed, 47
Maltcooms, to keep cured goods in, 4
Mangoes, pickled, 161
Marinated herrings, 103
— eels, 99
— high flavour, 100
— salmon, 92
— sprats, 104
— shrimps, 96
— salmon roes, 127
— tench and carp, 93
— trout and grayling, 97
— veal, 125
— another method, 126
Marmalade, raspberry, 144
Moor-game, potted, 115
Morello cherries, jam of, 144
Mushroom catsup, 171
— buttons, pickled, for pies and sauces, 168
Mutton, dried as in the Ardennes, 29
— breast of, collar as venison, 33
— haunch as venison, 26
— thigh of l’Diable, 27
— Welsh hams, 28
N , pickled, 166
Neats’ tongues, potted, 121
— pickled, 16
— high flavoured, 17
— to pickle, 30
O M , to rectify, 178
P V ,
— asparagus, 155
— barberries, 154
— beetroots, 167
— cauliflowers, 146
— currants, red, 151
— celery, 151
— codlins, 154
— gherkins, 156
— golden pippins, 165
— grapes, 152
— mushrooms, white, 147
— mangoes (lemon), 159
— lemon pickle, 160
— mangoes (cucumber), 161
— nasturtiums, 166
— mushroom buttons, 168
— peaches and nectarines, 165
— piccalilli, 157
— parsley (green), 169
— onions, silver, 148
— walnuts, green, 163
— „ white, 164
— samphire, 146
P M F ,
— herrings, 73
— smelts, 101
— lobsters, 102
Pickle for pork, 31
— superior, 32
— a preservative (excellent), 32
— the Hambro’, for beef and pork, 31
Pig, a young one collared, 112
Polony, Russian, 87
Provocative, a, 132
Portable soup, 78
— much richer, 78
Porker’s head, smoked, 23
Preservatives, 4
Potted beef’s heart, 122
— crabs, 107
— hare, 114
— eels, 118
— lobsters, 106
— Moor game, 115
— ox cheek, 84
— neat’s tongue, 121
— beef as hare, 120
— pigeons, 86
— snipes and woodcocks, 116
— shrimps, 119
— „ l’Diable, 85
— trout, 117
— venison, 124
P
— apricots, 140
— barberries, 142
— cucumbers, 137
— golden pippins, 143
— greengage plums, 138
— damsons, 140
— Hambro’ grapes, 142
— lemons, 139
— Morello cherries, 141
— peaches and nectarines, 138
— tomatoes, 136
S M ,
— beef’s heart, 10
— beef hams, 13
— „ Breslau, 14
— boar’s head, 19
— calf’s head brawn, 76
— Dutch beef, 25
— geese, smoked, 78
— goose, a perpetual, 34
— Hambro beef, 13
— hung beef, 6
— Leicestershire spiced bacon, 23
— Melton hunt beef, 9
— mutton, as in the Ardennes, 29
— neats’ tongues, high flavour,17
— Norfolk chine, 21
— porker’s head, 23
— polony, Russian, 87
— German saveloys, 89
— venison, side of, 111
— Whitehaven corned beef, 15
— Westphalia hams, 19
— „ eclipsed,20
S F ,
— eels, river, 62
— „ conger, 66
— Gorgona anchovies, 63
— herrings, bloaters, 50
— „ kippered, 51
— Mackerel, kippered, 45
— „ May-fish, 46
— „ superior, 47
— salmon, Welsh, 37
— „ Dutch, 39
— „ superior kipper, 40
— „ American, 48
— „ collared, 43
— herrings, Digby, 55
— „ Aberdeen reds,55
— speldings, 56
— sprats, 56
Smelts, pickled, 101
— potted, 105
Snipes and woodcocks, potted, 116
Sprats, marinated, 104
Shrimps, essence of, 128
Sausage spice (French), 132
Syrup for preserving fruit, to prepare, 132
Samphire, green, pickled, 146
Silver onions, pickled, 148
Syrup d’Orgeat (French), 174
T C , marinated, 93
Tomatoes paste, 129 — catsup, 130
172
Tripe, Birmingham and Oxford, 75
Trout and grayling, marinated, 97 — potted, 117
Turbot fins, 60
V M , 125
126
Vinegar, elder flower, 173 — tarragon, 173 — white gooseberry, 174
W , pickled, 164 — preserved, 149 — green, pickled, 163 — catsup, 170
Y P P , 74
