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Biological Determinism, Free Will and Moral Responsibility Insights from Genetics and Neuroscience SpringerBriefsinEthics Moreinformationaboutthisseriesathttp://www.springer.com/series/10184
ChrisWillmott DepartmentofMolecularandCellBiology
UniversityofLeicester
Leicester UK
ISSN2211-8101ISSN2211-811X(electronic) SpringerBriefsinEthics
ISBN978-3-319-30389-5ISBN978-3-319-30391-8(eBook) DOI10.1007/978-3-319-30391-8
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2016933111
© TheAuthor(s)2016
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Formyparents,PeterandAnn, intheyearoftheirgoldenwedding
Preface Itisasadrealitythatweliveinaworldinwhichpeoplecommitcrime.Everyday, ineverycity,ineverycountry,theactionsofoneindividualwillimpactdetrimentallyonthepersonorthepropertyofsomebodyelse.
Aspartofthecommitmenttolivingincivilisedsociety,thoseaccusedofcarryingoutantisocialbehaviourofsufficientgravitaswillhavetheevidenceagainst themconsideredinacourtoflaw.Iffoundguilty,theywillberequiredtofulfil somesuitablepunishment.
Suppose,foramoment,thatitcouldbeshownthatthepersonwhohadperpetratedacrimehadbeenliterallyunabletoavoidcarryingitout.Undersuch circumstances,woulditstillbeappropriatetopunishthemfortheiractions?As detailsregardingtheinfluenceofbothgeneticcharacteristicsandbrainneurochemistryonhumanbehaviourarebeinguncovered,somescientistsandphilosophersareclaimingthattraditionalnotionsoffreewill,ofmoralresponsibilityand, therefore,ofaccountabilityforone’sactionsneedtobere-evaluated.
Inordertoinvestigatethelegitimacyofthesepropositions,itisnecessaryto undertakeasurveyofvariousrelevantdiscourses.First,weneedtoreflectupon philosophicalconsiderationsoffreewillanddeterminacy.Are,forexample,free willanddeterminismmutuallyexclusive,ormighttherebesomewayinwhich biologicaldeterminismandmoralresponsibilitymightco-exist?ThiswillbeconsideredinChap. 1.
Second,itisimportanttohaveanappreciationofthecurrentlegislationregarding responsibilityforone’sactions.ThiswillbethefocusofChap. 2.Buildingon thesephilosophicalandlegalfoundations,itwillthenbetimeinChap. 3 toinvestigatethescienti ficdiscoverieswhichareleadingsomecommentatorstoquestionthe existenceoffreewilland/ormoralresponsibility.Evidencedrawnfrombothgenetic analysisandbrainsciencewillbeconsidered.
Thepastdecadehasseenanexplosionofinterestinthepotentialrelevanceof suchbrain-relatedscienceinlegalcases,andtheemergenceofanew fieldof “neurolaw”.Asurveyofexamplesinwhichgeneticandneuroscienti ficdata havealreadybeenusedincriminaltrials(Chap. 4)willprecedea finaldiscussion
(Chap. 5)inwhichthesedisparatethreadswillbeinterwovenintoreflectionsonthe validityofbiologicaldeterminismasaninfluenceinhumanbehaviour,andthe appropriatenessofsuchgeneticandbrainimagingevidenceincurrentandfuture criminalproceedings.
Acknowledgements ThankstoTrevorStammersandMatthewJamesforreadinganearlierversionof thisbook.IamgratefultoSallyCunninghamforhelpfulcriticismofChap. 2 on legislationassociatedwithmentaldisorders,andtoJonScottandBlairGrubbfor checkingSect. 3.1 onbrainarchitecture.Allerrors,ofcourse,remainmyown. Thanksalsotomyfamily,particularlytoAnne,forherfaithfulsupport.
1FreeWillandDeterminism
2ExistingLegislationonMentalDisordersandCriminalCases
2.1.1TheM
2.1.2InterpretationoftheM
3.2.2Non-codingRNAs(NcRNAs).....................27
3.2.3Genes
3.3NeurophysiologyofSelf-initiatedActionandtheImplications
3.3.1StudiesInvolvingElectroencephalography............31
3.3.2StudiesInvolvingBrainImaging...................32
3.3.3InvestigationsattheNeuronalLevel................32
3.3.4PhilosophicalandMoralImplicationsofThese Experiments.................................33
3.4BrainInjury:ExamplesofAlteredBehaviourArisingfrom ChangesinBrainStructure............................35
3.4.1Trauma....................................35
3.4.2Tumour....................................36
3.4.3Atrophy....................................37 References...........................................37
4UseofGeneticandNeuroscientificEvidenceinCriminal Cases:ABriefHistoryof “Neurolaw” ......................41
4.1TheEmergenceofNeurolawintheUSAandBeyond.........41
4.2ThePlaceofScientifi cEvidenceinCriminalTrials...........42
4.3GeneticsFactors...................................44
4.3.1MolecularGeneticsinCriminalCases...............47
4.4UseofBrainImaginginCriminalCases...................50
4.4.1BrainImagingasaToolforLieDetection andKnowledgeofCase-RelatedInformation..........55
4.4.2BrainPhysiologyandtheCulpabilityofMinors........58 References...........................................62
5AreWeReadyforanExpandedUseofNeuroscienti fic EvidenceintheCourtroom? ..............................65
5.1IstheGeneticandBrainImagingEvidenceonBehaviour Scientifi callyRobustand,ifso,DoestheScienceSupport aDeterministicWorldview?...........................66
5.1.1Neuroscience................................66
5.1.2Genetics....................................70
5.2ShouldtheScienceBeUsedinCourtand,ifso, inWhatWays?....................................71
5.2.1TheLegalApplicabilityofBiologicalEvidence.........77
5.2.2AchievingaJustOutcomeinTrialsEmploying NeurobiologicalEvidence........................79
5.3Conclusion.......................................81 References...........................................82
Summary Recentinvestigationshaveshedlightontherolesplayedbygeneticsandneuroscienceinhumanbehaviour.Theseobservationshaveledsomecommentatorsto adoptamodelofbiologicaldeterminisminwhichtheroleoffreewillisdownplayedorentirelyexcluded.
Followinganoverviewofphilosophicalaspectsoffreewillanddeterminism, andasurveyofcurrentlegislationrelatingtoresponsibility,theevidenceforbiologicalcontributionstobehaviourisreviewed.Whilsttheimportanceofgenetics andneurobiologytobehaviourisgenerallyendorsed,itisconcludedthatthis connectiondoesnotcurrentlysubstantiateadeterministicviewinwhichmoral responsibilityforone’sactionsisundermined.
Currentandpotentialfuturerolesforbiologicalevidenceincriminalproceedings areconsidered.Despitethefactthatgeneticorbrainimagingdatahavealreadybeen citedinsomecourtcases,itisarguedthatexpansionofthisusageatthepresent timewouldbepremature.Asfurtherdataisgathered,however,apointmaybe reachedatwhichbiologicalinformationwouldhavearoletoplayasmitigation duringthesentencingphaseoftrials.
Chapter1 FreeWillandDeterminism Abstract Inthisopeningchapter,webeginbyoutliningwaysinwhichphilosophershavesoughttoresolvethe “freewillproblem”.Thatistosay,howcanthe apparentexistenceofindividualfreewillbereconciledwithevidencethatsuggests theuniverse(orelementswithinit)arepredetermined?Avarietyofdifferentmodels areintroduced,includingLibertarianism(whichholdsthatlifeisnotdetermined andwedohavefreewill),Harddeterminism(inwhichlifeisdeterminedandfree willisillusory)andCompatibilism(inwhichroommustbemadeforthecohabitationoftheexistenceofbothfreewillanddeterminism).Inthecontextoftherest ofthebookitisharddeterminism,andparticularlybiologicaldeterminism,which presentsthegreatestchallengetotheattributionofmoralresponsibilityandlegal recompense.Ifaspectsofmygeneticsormybrainhasdeterminedacourseof action,andIwasnotthereforeatlibertytodootherwise,canIbeheldculpablefor thatbehaviour?Thisisanissuewewillunpackinlaterchapters.
Keywords Alternativepossibilities Compatibilism Determinism Folk intuitions Freewill Incompatibilism Libertarianism Moralresponsibility Self-formingactions Ultimateresponsibility
1.1FolkBeliefsAboutFreeWill
Overrecentyears,academicsintheemergingdisciplineof “experimentalphilosophy”1 haveusedavarietyofapproachestoinvestigate “folkintuitions” aboutfree will,thatistosaytheinnatebeliefsordinarypeoplewouldholdonthesubject (Sommers 2010).Thesestudieshavefoundstrongsupportforthenotionthat humandecisionmakingisanintegralcomponentoffreewill.
Forexample,whengiventheopportunitytoarticulatetheirunderstandingofthe conceptoffreewillintheirownwords,65%ofundergraduatessurveyedmade
1Experimentalphilosophyischaracterisedbyconducting fieldworktoendorsephilosophical claims,incontrasttomoretraditionalphilosophywhichistermed “armchairphilosophy” by practitionersofthemoreempiricalpersuasion.
© TheAuthor(s)2016
C.Willmott, BiologicalDeterminism,FreeWillandMoralResponsibility, SpringerBriefsinEthics,DOI10.1007/978-3-319-30391-8_1
referencetotheabilitytomakeadecisionorchoice(MonroeandMalle 2010). Whenthesamecohortwaschallengedwiththesuggestionthatneuroscientists believedfreewilltobeanillusion,49%refutedthisproposalandafurther25% prevaricated.
Inaseparate,questionnaire-based,studyparticipantswerepresentedwithtwo theoreticaluniverses;adeterministicone,inwhich “everythingthathappensis completelycausedbywhateverhappenedbeforeit” andanindeterministuniverse, inwhich “almost everythingthathappensiscompletelycausedbywhateverhappenedbeforeit.Theoneexceptionishumandecisionmaking. ” (NicholsandKnobe 2007:bothquotesfromp.669).Over90%oftherespondentsfeltthattheindeterministuniversewasmoreakintoourown.2
Thisshouldnotcomeasasurprise.Ourcapacityforfreewillseemsintuitive. WhenIgotupforbreakfastthismorningitseemsthatIwasentirelyatlibertyto chooseCornFlakesinsteadofmuesli(orindeedtohaveskippedstraighttotoast) anditwouldappearnonsensicaltosuggestthatsomeotherforcesintheuniverse hadinfluencedmetotheextentthattheyhadeffectivelymadethatselectiononmy behalf.Howcouldthey?Whywouldthey?Similarly,wasitnotmyfreechoiceto spendseveralmonthsresearchingandwritingthisbookratherthan fillingmytime indifferentways?
1.2TheologicalObjectionstoFreeWill Historically,theprincipalobjectionstothenotionofhumanfreewillweretheologicalinnature.If,ithasbeenargued,Godisallpowerful(omnipotent)andall knowing(omniscient)canwebesaidtobetrulyfree?DartmouthCollege philosopherAdinaRoskieshasneatlysummarisedthepredicament: “God’ s omnipotencemeansthathecouldcontrolouractionsifhesowished,butthat humanfreedomispreservedbecauseherefrainsfromcontrollingus.However, God’somnisciencepresentsafurtherproblemforhumanfreedom,forevenifGod doesnotcontrolouractions,ifheknowsnowhowwewillactbeforeweact,then wearenotfreetodootherwise foreknowledgeseemstoforeclosethepossibilityof freedomofthewill,forouractionsarepredetermined. ” (Roskies 2006:p.419).
Furtherdiscussionoftheologicalconsiderationofpredestinationversusfreewill isbeyondthescopeofthispresentbook,thoughinterestedreadersarereferredto DivineForeknowledge:FourViews (BeilbyandEddy 2002).
2Thestudyisactuallymuchricherandmorenuancedthanthisboldstatementimplies. Nevertheless,noneoftheir findingscontradictstheobservationnotedhere,whichissufficientto supportthekeypointbeingaddressedinthisintroductorystatement.
1.3PhilosophicalConsiderationsofFreeWill andDeterminism At fi rstglance,notionsofindividualfreewillandadeterministicviewofthe universewouldseemtobeirreconcilable;ifmyactionshavebeenentirelydecided byexternalfactors,inwhatwaycanIbesaidtohavechosentodosomething worthyofblame(or,indeed,praise)?However,philosophersthroughoutthecenturies,goingbackatleastasfarasChrysippusinthethirdcenturyBCE,have expendedsubstantialeffortdemonstratingthat(someformof)freedomorautonomy and(someformof)determinismcancoexist(Bobzien 2001).3 Variousargumentsin supportofthispositionwillbeconsideredbelow.
Iffreewillanddeterminismarenotdirectopposites,then “Doesfreewillexist?” and “Istheuniversedeterministic?” arethereforeseparateanddistinctquestions.In consequence,itbecomespossibletodrawupamatrix,suchastheonegivenin Table 1.1,tomapouttheprincipalpositionsheldbydifferentphilosophers.
Theviewthat “freewill” andadeterministicuniversecanbebroughttogetheris knownas “compatibilism” (or “softdeterminism”,inordertodistinguishitfrom “harddeterminism”,discussedbelow).Compatibilism(seeSect. 1.3.1)isaview heldwidelybothbyindividualswhohavegiventhequestionoffreewillalotof thought,andbythoseactingmoreinstinctivelytotryandreconciledifferentaspects oftheirexperienceofbeinghuman.
Ifsomeoneisnotpersuadedthatfreewillandadeterministicuniverseare compatiblethenitfollowsthattheyarean “incompatibilist ”.Asisevidentfrom Table 1.1,however,anincompatibilistpositionmightbeheldforoneoftwo divergentreasons.Firstly,iftheycontendthatthestrengthofthecaseforfreewill rulesoutadeterministicuniverse(and/orthecaseforindeterminismisconsidered sooverwhelming)thenthepersonisaLibertarian4 (seeSect. 1.3.2).Ihavetermed thisIncompatibilism.1.Alternatively,theweightofevidenceforadeterministic universemightbeconsideredsostrong(and/ortheargumentforfreewillsoweak) thatthereisnoroomleftforfreewill;thiswouldbea “harddeterministic” viewpoint(or,asIhavelabelledit,Incompatibilism.2,seeSect. 1.3.3).
Since “thefreewillproblem” remainsoneoftheliveliestdebatesincontemporaryphilosophy,therehaveinevitablybeenmanygallonsofinkspiltonthe topic.Foreachoftheseviewpoints(compatibilism,libertarianism,harddeterminism)therearemultiplenuancedpositions,eachsubstantiated(andrebutted)bya varietyofclosely-reasonedarguments.Withintheconstraintsofthecurrentbookit willonlybepossibletopaintdescriptionsofthemajorschoolsofthoughtonfree willanddeterminismwithrelativelybroadbrushstrokes,reserving finerdetailfor
3StrictlyspeakingChrysippussoughttoreconcileaversionof ‘agentautonomy’ withadeterministicuniverseandmadenoreferenceto ‘freewill’ perse.Neverthelesshisreflectionsareheld tobeoneoftheearliestattemptsata ‘compatibilist’ solutiontotheconundrum.
4Ofcoursethereisadistinct,political,meaningofLibertarianism.Thediscussionhereislimitedto themetaphysicaluseoftheterminthecontextoffreewillandmoralresponsibility. 1.3PhilosophicalConsiderationsofFreeWillandDeterminism3
Table1.1 Summaryofmajorphilosophicalpositionsregardingdeterminismandfreewill (AdaptedfromRoskies 2006, 2012)
Universeisdeterministic?
YesNo
Wepossess freewill?
YesCompatibilism (softdeterminism)
NoHarddeterminism (Incompatibilism.2)
Libertarianism (Incompatibilism.1)
Randoma
aWhatistobemadeofthefourthsectorinTable 1.1,i.e.theviewthattheuniverseis nondeterministic and thatthereisnosuchthingasfreewill?Inonesensethisisanadmissionthat everythingisrandom.Roskies(2012)includesanadditionalclassification “Hardincompatibilism” whichwouldspanbothbottomboxesofthegrid.Adherentsofthisview,sheargues,believefree willandmoralresponsibilityarenotpossible,regardlessofwhetherornotdeterminismistrue(i.e. itwouldsubsumeIncompatibilism.2withinalessdefinedgrouping).Myviewisthatthis definitionaddsnothingtothoseincludedhereandhenceithasbeenomitted
placeswheregreaterdepthisnecessaryinconsiderationofthesignificanceof currentdevelopmentsingeneticsandneuroscience.
1.3.1Compatibilism Asnotedabove,compatibilismhasalonghistoryandremainspopularwith philosophers.Itseemstobethenaturalwaytoreconcileourapparentabilityto decidebetweenmorethanonepossibleactionandtherevelation,broughttothe forebyIsaacNewton,thatweliveinaworldgovernedbyrepeatableandpredictablelaws.
FreewillisdiscussedmorefullyinthecontextofLibertarianismbelow (Sect. 1.3.2).Inbrief,however,weneedtonoteherethatfreewillhastraditionally beenseenashavingtwofundamentalcharacteristics.Firstly,therewasarequirementfortwoormorepotentialoutcomes,withthecapacityfortheagenttochoose betweenthem.Inotherwordsthereneededtobe “alternativepossibilities ”,such thattheagent “couldhavedoneotherwise”.Aswillbeseen,thisnecessityhasbeen broughtintoquestionduringmorerecentdiscussions.Secondly,theremustbean internalsourceforthedecision;responsibilityneededtobetheagent’schoice,not anoutcomeimposeduponthembyexternalforces(Kane 2011a).
Attheriskofgrossoversimpli fication,compatibilistscanbedividedintoclassicalcompatibilists(andtheirheirs,theconditionalistcompatibilists)andnew compatibilists(McKenna 2009).Forclassicalcompatibilists,whoincludedThomas HobbesandDavidHumeamongsttheirnumber,reconciliationbetweendeterminismandfreedomisachievedbyinvokinghypotheticalorconditionalalternative possibilities.Thismightbesummarisedintheview “nothingwouldhaveprevented youdoingdifferentlyifyouhadchosentodoso,butyoudidn’t” .
1.3PhilosophicalConsiderationsofFreeWillandDeterminism5
Morerecently,philosophershavequestionedwhethertheprincipleofalternate possibilitiesisnecessaryindeterminationofmoralresponsibility.5 Inaseminal paperof1969,HarryFrankfurtconductedthoughtexperimentsthatdroveavital wedgebetweenmoralresponsibilityandtheneedforalternativepossibilities (Frankfurt 1969).Supposing,Frankfurtargues,anagent(Jones)madeawilful decisiontocarryoutaparticularaction.BeforeJonesacts,someoneelseintervenes coercinghimintodoingtheverysameactthatJoneshadalreadydecidedtodo. WhenJonessubsequentlyfollowsthroughandcarriesoutthisaction,ishemorally responsibleforsodoing?
Frankfurttakesusfurtherwithasecondthoughtexperiment.HereJoneshasto decidebetweenActionAandActionB.Inthissecondcase,Jonesissubjecttothe authorityofacontroller,Black.BlackhastheabilitytoinfluenceJonessuchthat, whateverinitialdecisionJonesmakes,Blackwillensurethat his choice,ActionB, iscarriedoutbyJones.JonesmaydecideonhisowntocarryoutActionB,in whichcaseBlackwilldonothing.However,ifJonesdecidesuponActionA,then BlackwillintervenetoensurethatJonesdoesActionBinstead.Frankfurtargues thatifJonesdecidedindependentlytocarryoutActionBthenhe is morally responsible,eventhoughheliterallycouldnothavedoneotherwise,sinceBlack wouldhaveintervened.
Thesescenariosmayseemcontrived,buttheirlogicremainsrobustand,in consequence,theyprovidedtheopportunityforschismbetweenmoralresponsibilityandthenecessityforalternativepossibilities.Insubsequentyears,many similarFrankfurt-typethoughtexperimentshavebeenconductedtosupportthis overallposition.
1.3.2Libertarianism Alibertarianstandpointmust,ofnecessity,establishpositiveevidenceforthe existenceoffreewill,butitisrequiredtodomorethanthis.Tobedistinctfrom compatibilism(Sect. 1.3.1),itisalsoessentialforlibertarianismtodenydeterminismand/ortodenythatdeterminismandfreewillarecompatible.Furthermore, themodeloffreewillthatemergesfromthisprocessmust fitinacoherentmanner withanindeterministicworld.
Beforemovingontoelaborateargumentsinfavouroflibertarianism,itis importanttoconsiderwhyindeterminismmaybewarranted.Ononelevel,asimple failuretojustifyadeterministicviewoftheworldleavesindeterminisminthe ascendance.Someadvocatesoflibertarianism,however,maintainthatpositive evidenceinfavourofindeterminismcanbederivedfromquantummechanics(see,
5Notethattheseargumentseffectivelyside-stepthenotionoffreewill,jumpinginsteadtothe connectionbetweendeterminismandmoralresponsibility,thelatterbeingtheconsequencewhich wouldhavegivenrelevancetofreewillitself.
forexample,Hodgson 2011).Theunpredictabilityofthebehaviourandlocationof subatomicparticles,itisargued,showsusthatatamostfundamentallevelthe universeisnotdetermined.Thus,thelogiccontinues,anyphilosophicalposition requiringdeterminismmustbeincorrect.
Notallcommentatorsarepersuadedabouttherelevanceofquantummechanicsto thefreewilldebate.AsRandolphClarkehasobserved “Quantumtheoryisindeed verywellconfirmed.However,thereisnothingapproachingaconsensusinhowto interpretit,onwhatitshowsuswithrespecttohowthingsareintheworld” (Clarke 2008:p.19).Somehavearguedthateventsatthemicrophysicallevelareineffective ininfluencingmacro-levelprocesses.Furthermore,ifquantumleveleventswere showntohaveaneffectonbrain-levelprocessesthiswouldnotnecessarilyofferany endorsementoffreewill,sinceuncertaintyandfreedomarenotsynonymous.
RobertKane,oneofthemostinfluentiallibertarianthinkersofthepasthalfcentury, drawsadistinctionbetween “freedom” and “freewill”.Thereare,Kanenotes,many versionsoffreedomcompatiblewithdeterminism.Hisaimistosubstantiatethe existenceofindeterminist “freewill”,definedas “thepowertobetheultimatecreator andsustainerofone’sownendsorpurposes” (Kane 2011b:pp.382–383).
Asdiscussedabove(Sect. 1.3.1),freewillisgenerallyheldtoinvolveboththe existenceofalternativepossibilities(AP)andidentificationofprocessesinternaltothe agentasbeingthesourceofanyresultingaction.Stressingthat freedomofwill ismore thanmere freedomofaction,Kaneplacesgreatestemphasisonthissecondcriterion, whichhelabels “ultimateresponsibility” (UR).ThisisnottorenderAPasunnecessaryforfreewill.KaneacceptsFrankfurtmaybecorrectthatforcertaindecisions thereisanabsenceofAP,howeverheisinsistentthatforcrucial,character-forming, eventsinlife eventsKaneterms “self-formingactions” (SFAs) thenalternatives musthavebeenpossible.NotallactsneedtobeSFAsor “will-setting”,theimportanceoffreewilldoesnotmeanthatallactionshavetobeundetermined,butforthose thatare,thecrucialthingiswhethertheagenthadmorethanoneoptionwhichthey couldchoose “voluntarily,intentionallyandrationally” (Kane 2011b:p.385).During thecourseofone’slifetime,anindividualwillexperienceanincreasingnumberof SFAs,leadingtotheformation(andpotentiallyreformation)ofcharacter.6
Overmanyyears,libertarianshavehadtofacetheaccusationthatalackof determinism,ofnecessity,collapsesintomerechance.Thisisachallengewhich theyfeelabletodefeat.Imagineascenarioinwhichanagentisfacingconflict betweenmorethanonemutuallyexclusivedesireandmustmakeasplit-second decisionbetweenthem(Kanetakestheexampleofawomanonherwaytoa meetingwhichwillcruciallyinfluencehercareer,whobecomesthewitnesstoan ongoingcrimeandfeelsamoraldutytointervene).
Thecriticwouldsaythattheagent’sdecisionisamatterofchance,butchance means “outofmycontrol”.Thelibertarianarguesthatthisisnotthecase.Thereare indeterministicfactorsinfluencingselectionbetweenthetwo,whichwecan
6Acriticismmadeofthismodelpicturesthetheoreticalscenarioinwhichanagentneverfacesa genuineSFAintheirlives.Doesthismeanthattheyarewithoutfreewill?
perceiveasrivalneuralpathways.Indeterminismmightactonthosepathways,but itiswrongtothinkthatchancedetermineswhichoneeventuallyreachesanactivationthreshold.IfonefollowsElizabethAnscombeandothersinpicturing indeterministicinfluencesas hindrances ratherthan causes ofdecisionsthen,for example,anagentmight overcome theinfluencesofafactorthatwasleadingthem topursueActionBandinsteadstillchooseActionA.
Whatremainscrucialistheabilityoftheagent “tobringabout whichever ofthe optionstheywill, when theywilldoso,forthe reasons theywilldoso, onpurpose ratherthanbymistakeoraccident,withoutbeingcoercedorcompelledindoingso, orotherwisecontrolledbyotheragentsormechanisms”.(Kane 2011b:p.389, emphasisinoriginal).Theabilitythathumanshavetomakesuchdecisionsasa resultofinternalprocesses,itisargued,distinguishusfrombrutecreaturethatare tiedtorespondingtotheinfluenceofgenesandotherbiologicalfactors(acrucial pointtowhichwewillreturnlater,Chap. 5).
1.3.3HardDeterminism Accordingtoharddeterminism,thesecondversionofincompatibilism,theillogicalityoffreewillanddeterminismco-existingwouldberevealedviaanargument ofthefollowingkind(McKenna 2009).(1)Anagentactsonhisownfreewillifhe couldhaveactedotherwiseand/orifhewasultimatelyresponsibleforthedecision todoso7;(2)Butifdeterminismistrueitisnotpossibleeithertoactinotherways ortobetheultimatesourceofadecisiontoactinthisway;(3)Thusifdeterminism istrue,ouragentcannotbeactingonthebasisoffreewill.
Fortheharddeterminist,therefore,thereisagenuinebinarychoice;either determinismisreal,orfreewillisreal youcannotlegitimatelyholdontoboth.The evidencepresentedinfavourofdeterminismisfrequentlybasedonscientificdiscoveries.Superficially,thisseemstocontradicttheargumentmadeabove,whereit wasnotedthat indeterminists liketocitedevelopmentsinsciencetoendorsetheir position.Itiscertainlytruethattheencouragementsan18thor19thCenturydeterminist8 wouldhavedrawnfromtherevelationsofNewtonianphysicshavebeen somewhatunderminedbyinsightscomingfromquantummechanics.However,in manyotherareasofscience genetics,behavioural,cognitiveandneuroscience itis arguedthatmountingevidenceappearstoshowthatourresponsesareundergreater influenceoffactorsoutsideourconsciouscontrolthanhadpreviouslybeenimagined.9
7i.e.thetraditionalcriteriaforfreewillwhichwehaveseenalreadyinSect. 1.1. 8Thoughtheywouldmorelikelyhavelabelledthemselvesas “necessitarians” thanasdeterminists. 9InSect. 3.2,Iwillhoweversuggestthattheverylatestdiscoveriesinbiologicaldisciplinesare actuallyquestioningonceagainthedegreeofdeterminisminhumannature.Thepointinthe currentchapteristorehearsetheargumentsusedbyharddeterministsnot,necessarily,toreflect theviewsofthepresentauthor.
Theimplicationsthatstemfromthesescientificdiscoveries,whichwemight collectivelylabelbiologicaldeterminism,areunnerving.AsNobelPrizewinner FrancisCrickfamouslystated: “TheAstonishingHypothesisisthat “You” ,your joysandyoursorrows,yourmemoriesandyourambitions,yoursenseofidentity andfreewill,areinfactnomorethanthebehaviourofavastassemblyofnerve cellsandtheirassociatedmolecules.AsLewisCarroll’sAlicemighthavephrased it: “You’renothingbutapackofneurons. ” (Crick 1994:p.3).
Inthecontextofthepresentbook,itistheconsequencesofharddeterminismfor societythatofferthegreatestchallenge.Iffreewilltrulyisillusory,thennotionsof moralresponsibility,praiseandblameareeffectivelyeroded.
References Beilby,J.K.,andP.R.Eddy(eds.).2002. Divineforeknowledge:Fourviews.Carlisle:Paternoster Press.
Bobzien,S.2001. Determinismandfreedominstoicphilosophy.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Clarke,R.2008.Incompatibilist(nondeterministic)theoriesoffreewill.In Stanfordencyclopedia ofphilosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories.Accessed25Aug 2015.
Crick,F.1994. Theastonishinghypothesis.London:SimonandSchusterLtd. Frankfurt,H.G.1969.Alternatepossibilitiesandmoralresponsibility. TheJournalofPhilosophy 66:829–839.
Hodgson,D.2011.Quantumphysics,consciousness,andfreewill.In TheOxfordhandbookof freewill,2nded,57–83.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
Kane,R.2011a.Thecontoursofcontemporaryfree-willdebates(part2).In TheOxfordhandbook offreewill,2nded,3–35.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
Kane,R.2011b.Rethinkingfreewill:newperspectivesonanancientproblem.In TheOxford handbookoffreewill,2nded,381–404.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
McKenna,M.2009.Compatibilism.In Stanfordencyclopediaofphilosophy. http://plato.stanford. edu/entries/compatibilism .Accessed25Aug2015.
Monroe,A.E.,andB.F.Malle.2010.Fromuncausedwilltoconsciouschoice:Theneedtostudy, notspeculateaboutpeople’sfolkconceptoffreewill. EuropeanReviewofPhilosophy 1: 211–224.
Nichols,S.,andJ.Knobe.2007.Moralresponsibilityanddeterminism:thecognitivescienceof folkintuitions. Noûs 41:663–685.
Roskies,A.2006.Neuroscienti ficchallengestofreewillandresponsibility. TrendsinCognitive Sciences 10:419–423.
Roskies,A.L.2012.Howdoestheneuroscienceofdecisionmakingbearonourunderstandingof moralresponsibilityandfreewill? CurrentOpinioninNeurobiology 22:1–5.
Sommers,T.2010.Experimentalphilosophyandfreewill. PhilosophyCompass 5:199–212.
Chapter2 ExistingLegislationonMental DisordersandCriminalCases Abstract Havingconsideredphilosophicalaspectsoffreewillanddeterminismin thepreviouschapter,weturnheretoreflectionsontheexistinglawsregarding mentaldisordersandcriminalresponsibility.Wewillseethatlegislationandcase lawintheEnglish-speakingworldhaveresultedinmuddledandcounter-intuitive verdicts.Rulesfordeterminingthesanityofthedefendantatthetimeofthealleged crimearederivedfromthe19thcenturyM’Naghtencaseandplaceemphasison whetherheorshewassufferingfroma “diseaseofthemind”.Itisapplicationof thisphrasewhichhasmostfrequentlyruncontrarytostraightforwardinterpretation. Sensiblerecommendationsforoverhaulofthelawoncriminalliabilityandmental healthhaverecentlybeendrafted,butareunlikelytobeenactedintheforeseeable future.
Keywords Automatism Criminalliability Diminishedresponsibility Disease ofthemind Insanity Mensrea M’Naghtenrules
Beforereflectinguponthe(limitedbutincreasing)usesofbiologicalevidencein criminalcasestodate(Chap. 4),andthepotentialforbroaderapplicationsofbrain scienceinfuturecases(Chap. 5),itisimportanttoestablishthepresentlegislation regardingmentaldisordersandcriminalresponsibility.Theemphasiswillprimarily beonthesituationinEnglandandWales,althoughthelegacyofcolonialismmeans thatmanycountriesshareacommoncoreofregulation.Wewillnot,here,be consideringthegrowingapplicationofDNAandotherforensicevidencerelatingto thecrimeitself(actusreus).Instead,thefocuswillbeentirelyuponthementalor fault-element(mensrea)foranoffencethathasbeenperpetrated. Dependinguponboththenatureofthecrimeandtheallegedcauseofmental disorder,therearethreedefencesthatmightcurrentlybeoffered;insanity,diminishedresponsibilityandautomatism(seeTable 2.1).Itisimportanttonotefromthe outsetthattheseprevailingdefinitionsare legal not medical.This,aswillbecome apparentinsubsequentsections,isonlyoneofmanyproblematicaspectsinthe currentapplicationoftheserules.
© TheAuthor(s)2016
C.Willmott, BiologicalDeterminism,FreeWillandMoralResponsibility, SpringerBriefsinEthics,DOI10.1007/978-3-319-30391-8_2
Table2.1 Summarycomparisonofinsanity,diminishedresponsibilityandautomatism(updateda fromJefferson 2009:p.389)
InsanityDiminishedresponsibilityAutomatism
DefencetoAlloffencesMurderAlloffences CauseMustbeinternalMustarisefromarecognised medicalcondition Mustbe external
Definition requires
DiseaseofthemindAbnormalityofmental functioning Lossof consciousness BurdenofproofOntheaccusedOntheaccusedOnthe prosecution
Standardof proof Balanceof probabilities BalanceofprobabilitiesBeyond reasonable doubt
Outcomeifplea successful Notguiltyby reasonofinsanity (specialverdict) (Voluntary)manslaughterAcquittal
aCriteriaforapleaofdiminishedresponsibilitywereoriginallydescribedintheHomicideAct 1957s2.ThiswasamendedbytheCoronersandJusticeAct2009s52
2.1Insanity Someonemightbedeemedinsaneatthetimeoftheirtrial,andtherefore “unfi tto plead” (LawCommission 2010).1 Alternatively,theymightbeconsideredsaneat thetimeofthetrial,butwithoneormoresidesinthecasearguingthattheywere insaneatthetimethecrimewascommitted. 2 Itisthislatterscenario,inwhichthe socalled “specialverdict” of “notguiltybyreasonofinsanity” wouldbegiven,that isofgreaterinterestinthecurrentcontext.
Insomesenses,insanityisboththebestplaceandtheworstplacetostarta considerationoflegalapproachestomentaldisordersandculpability.Itisthebest placesincemanyoftherulesgoverningthedefinitionofinsanityareessentially unalteredsincetheM’Naghtencaseof1843.3 Itistheworstplacebecauseitisonly infrequentlyusedasadefenceintheUK,fewerthan fivetimesperyearthroughout mostofthe1970sand1980s(Jefferson 2009).FollowingtheCriminalProcedures (InsanityandUn fitnesstoPlead)Act1991,thisnumberhasrisento20–30special verdictsperyear;stillasmalldropintheoceanofabout90,000peopleperannum triedintheCrownCourt(LawCommission 2012).Itisalsoapoorplacetostart
1Theevolutionof “unfitnesstoplead” isnicelysummarisedinaconsultationpaperproducedby theLawCommission 2010.
2Onehighprofileexampleofthesanityofthedefendantwasquestionedoccurredduringthe2012 trialinNorwayofAndersBreivikwhowasresponsibleforthemurderof77peopleinthesummer of2011.Interestinglyitwastheprosecutiononthisoccasionthathadsoughttoshowhewas insane;Breivikhimselfhadwishedtobedeclaredsanetosupporttheargumentthathisactions werepoliticallymotivatedandnottheworkofadeludedmind.
3M’Naghten’sCase8ER718,[1843]UKHLJ16. 102ExistingLegislationonMentalDisordersandCriminalCases
sincetherulesoutlinedbythepresidingjudgeLordTindalCJ(seeSect. 2.1.1)have beeninterpretedincontradictorywaysduringthesubsequent170years.
2.1.1TheM’NaghtenCase In1843,ScottishwoodturnerDanielM’Naghtenwasputontrialforthemurderof EdwardDrummond,butwasfoundnotguiltybyreasonofinsanity.Thejudgment mighthavepassedunnoticedexceptthattheintendedtargetwasnotDrummond, butratherhisboss,PrimeMinisterRobertPeel.Notforthelasttime,the metaphoricalproximityofanationalpoliticalleadertothecrimeledtoposthoc questioningoftheruling.
ThematterwasreferredtotheHouseofLordsandadebateontheconceptof insanity.Duringthediscussion,LordTindalobservedthat: “thejurorsoughttobe toldinallcasesthateverymanistobepresumedtobesane,andtopossessa sufficientdegreeofreasontoberesponsibleforhiscrimes,untilthecontrarybe provedtotheirsatisfaction;andthattoestablishadefenceonthegroundof insanity,itmustbeclearlyprovedthat,atthetimeofthecommittingoftheact,the partyaccusedwaslabouringundersuchadefectofreason,fromdiseaseofthe mind,asnottoknowthenatureandqualityoftheacthewasdoing;or,ifhedid knowit,thathedidnotknowhewasdoingwhatwaswrong ” (quotedbyClarkson etal. 2010:p.378).
Thereareseveralrelevantpointstonote.Firstly,thereisthepresumptionof sanityand,inconsequence,responsibility.Secondly,insanityisstatedasoriginatingwith “diseaseofthemind”,whichthirdly,causes “defectofreason” atthe timeofthecrime.Fourthly,thisdefectofreasonismanifestasalackofdiscernmentregardingeitherthenatureandqualityoftheact,orthatitwaswrong. Becauseofthisemphasisonknowingrightfromwrong,thishassubsequentlybeen referredtoasa “cognitivetest” ofcriminalresponsibility(incontrasttoa “volitionaltest”,whichwewillmentionlater).
2.1.2InterpretationoftheM’NaghtenRules PivotalwithintheM’Naghtenrulesisthenotionof “diseaseofthemind”.Itisthis phrase,morethananyother,whichhasprovenproblematicintheapplicationofthe rulesbothintheUKandoverseas.Italsohasimplicationswhenwemoveonto considerthepotentialrelevanceofemergingbiologicalunderstandingaboutthe workingsofthebrain(Chap. 3).
Caselawhasshownthatthe “diseaseofthemind” neednotbeamentalillness, norindeedadiseaseatallinastrictmedicalsense.Probablythemostimportant demarcationtoemergehasbeenthedistinctionbetween “internalcauses” and “externalcauses”.Foradefenceofinsanity,thecausemustbeinternal;ifthecause
isexternalthenitisconsideredacaseofautomatism(Sect. 2.3).Thisdistinctionhas ledtoaseriesofjudgmentswhich,whenseensidebyside,lookmostpeculiar;none moresothaninregardtodiabeticdefendants.
Adiabeticwhowasinvolvedinacriminalincidentasaconsequenceofgoing hypoglycaemic,thatistheyhadexcessivelylowbloodsugar,wasfoundtobe exhibitingautomatism(becausetheconditioniscausedbytakinginsulin,which wasdeemedtobeanexternalcause),4 whereasanotherdiabeticwhowenthyperglycaemic(i.e.theyhaveexcessivelyhighbloodsugar,thenaturaloutcomeifthey havenottakeninsulin)wasfoundtobeinsane.5 AsClarksonandcolleaguesnote “weareleftwithalawunderwhichsomediabeticswillbeabletosecurea completeacquittalwhileotherswillberegardedasinsane.Suchapositionis absurd” (Clarksonetal. 2010:p.383).Atothertimesepilepsy,6 atherosclerosis (hardeningofthearteries) 7 andsleepwalking8 haveallbeenclassi fiedasdiseasesof themindleadingontothespecialverdict.
Anomaliesofthesekindshavebeenoffered,overmanyyears,asevidencein callstoreformlegislationinthisarea(seeSect. 2.4:Reformofthelaw).In2012, theUKLawCommissionconductedaconsultationonInsanityandAutomatism (LawCommission 2012),withtheirrecommendationsreportedthefollowingyear (LawCommission 2013a).TheirproposalsareoutlinedinSect. 2.4 (whereitwill alsobeexplainedwhytheseareunlikelytobeenactedinthenearfuture).Asit stands,therefore,thedefinitionofinsanityremainslargelyunalteredfrom M’Naghten.
Therehave,nonetheless,beensomedevelopmentsinthepotentialconsequences ofbeingfound “notguiltybyreasonofinsanity”.Asoriginallydrafted,asuccessful defenceofinsanitywouldhaveledtodetentioninasecurehospital,possibly “with restrictions”,i.e.untiltheHomeSecretarydeemeditappropriateforthemtobe released.Thisisclearlyinappropriateforadiabeticwhofailedtoremembertotake theirinsulin,oranepilepticwhocausesharmwhilsthavingaseizure.Ifthecrime wasmurder,thenhospitalisationforlifewasmandatory.
SincetheCriminalProcedures(InsanityandUnfitnesstoPlead)Act1991came intoforce(in1992)andwassubsequentlyamendedbytheDomesticViolence, CrimeandVictimsAct2004,judgeshavebeengrantedmorediscretionregarding sentencing.Ajudgecannowdecideonthebasisofmedicalevidencefromtwo doctors,whethersheconsiderstheaccusedisunfittoplead.If,afterthisassessment, thejudge does electtogoforwardtotrial,thena “trialofthefacts” ensues,inwhich theprosecutionmustconvinceajurybeyondreasonabledoubtthatthedefendant didcarryoutthecrimeforwhichtheystandaccused.Ifthejury findagainstthe 4Quick[1973]QB910. 5Hennessy[1989]1WLR287. 6Sullivan[1984]AC156. 7Kemp[1957]1QB399. 8Burgess[1991]2QB92,thoughthereismorerecentevidencethatsomnambulismismorelikely nowtobetreatedasacaseofautomatism.
defendantthenthejudgecanchoosefromarangeofsentencesfromdetentionina psychiatrichospital,withrestrictions,downtoanabsolutedischarge.
2.2DiminishedResponsibility Withoutbeingassusceptibletocontradictoryinterpretationsastheruleson insanity,thereremainanumberofcomplicationsregardingthedefenceofdiminishedresponsibility.Mostsigni ficantly,diminishedresponsibilityisonlyapplicable incasesofmurder(orassistinginmurder,but not attemptedmurder).9
Historically,thiswasappropriate;thedefencestemsfromanerawhenthe punishmentformurderwouldhavebeenexecution.10 Itisreallya partial defence; pleadingdiminishedresponsibilitywasdefactoanadmissiontohavingkilled someone,butofferedanavenueforreducingthesentenceto,forexample,life imprisonmentincircumstanceswheresomeexplanationfortheactionsofthe defendantmightbeoffered.Sincewearenolongerinthehabitofapplyingdeath sentences,atleastnotintheUK,somehavearguedthatdiminishedresponsibility shouldeitherbebroadenedtocoverothercrimesaswellorabandonedasadefence (particularlyifthepunishmentformurderisreducedfromthecurrentmandatorylife sentence).Inthechessgameoflegislation,claimingdiminishedresponsibilityisnot withoutitsrisks.Asuccessfulappealonthesegroundsleadsinevitablytobeing foundguiltyofmanslaughterandmaystillresultinalongperiodofincarceration.
Theoriginaldescriptionofapersonsufferingfromdiminishedresponsibilityin theHomicideAct1957requiredthatheexhibited “substantiallyimpaired mental responsibility” causedby “abnormalityofmind” . 11 Asaconsequenceofthe CoronersandJusticeAct2009,thishasbeenchangedto “abnormalityofmental functioning”.Thecauseofthisabnormalitymustbearecognisedmedicalcondition whichsubstantiallyimpairedthedefendant’sabilitytounderstandthenatureof theirconduct,toformarationaljudgement,and/ortoexerciseself-control.12
2.3Automatism Automatismhasbeendefinedas “aninvoluntarymovementofthebodyorlimbsof aperson[following]acompletedestructionofvoluntarycontrol” 13 Asuccessful pleaofautomatismmustdemonstratethatatthetimeoftheallegedoffence,the
9ThedefenceofdiminishedresponsibilitywasintroducedviatheHomicideAct1957.
10This,ofcourse,remainsapotentialsentenceinthemajorityofUSstates(seeChap. 4).
11HomicideAct1957s2.
12CoronersandJusticeAct2009s52.
13WinnJ,inWatmorevJenkins[1962]2QB572,587. 2.1Insanity
accusedwasoutofcontrolasaconsequenceofan “external” influence,not somethingthattheymightreasonablybeenexpectedtopredict.A findinginfavour ofthedefendantleadstoanoutrightacquittal.
Awell-knowncasehasbearingforthelaterdebateregardingthecurrent understandingofneuroscience.Aman,Charlson,invitedhissontolookoutofthe windowataratintheriverbelow,whereuponhehithissonontheheadwitha malletandthrewhimoutofthewindow.14 Thismaylooksuper ficiallylikea clear-cutcaseofinsanity,butitwasdecidedthathewassufferingfromautomatism whenitwasrevealedthatthemanhadabraintumour.
Thisverdicthasbeencontroversialonseveralgrounds.Firstly,itclearly involvesaphysicalabnormalitywithintheman’sbrain,butwasconsideredan “external” influenceandnota “diseaseofthemind”.Secondly,themanhad committedaviolentassaultyeteffectivelywalkedfree,despitethefacthemayhave remainedadangertoothers.
Thecaseisthereforeareminderthattheremaybeseveralconflictingreasonsfor adecisionregardingthefateofadefendant.Ithasvariouslybeensuggestedthat sentencingcanserveasameanstowardsretributionagainstthedefendant,toactas adeterrenttoothersortoprotectsociety(EastmanandCampbell 2006).Thislatter reasonisthemostprominentincasesofhospitalisationinasecureunit,alongside potentialtreatmentandrehabilitationofthedefendant.
2.4ReformoftheLaw Asnotedabove,theLawCommissionrecentlypublishedtheirrecommendations forrevisionofEnglishLawconcerningcriminalliability(LawCommission 2013a). Thespecificsoftheirproposalswillbeoutlinedbelow(Sect. 2.4.1).Connoisseurs ofthehistoryofthis fieldwillnot,however,beholdingtheirbreathwhilstthey awaitimplementationofanychanges.Eruditesuggestionsforreformhavebeen madeonmanyoccasionsbutthemajorityhavefailedtomakeitontothestatute books.
CriticismoftheM’Naghtenrulesgobackalmostasfarastherulesthemselves. Publicexpressionsofdissatisfactionhavebeenmorepronouncedsince1953,when theRoyalCommissiononCapitalPunishmentcondemnedthe “manifestabsurdity oftheM’Naghtentest” andrecommendedthattherulesbeabolished.15 Thisdidnot happen,buttheCommissiondidleadontotheHomicideAct1957andtheintroductionofthedefenceofdiminishedresponsibility.Asecondproposeddefence thatof “irresistibleimpulse”—wasnotincludedintheAct(Jefferson 2009).
14Charlson[1955]1AllER859.
15RoyalCommissiononCapitalPunishment,Cmnd8932(1953),p104.
TheReportoftheCommitteeonMentallyAbnormalOffenders1975,usually referredtoastheButlerCommittee,16 proposedanewverdictof “notguiltyon evidenceofmentaldisorder”.Theyalsosoughttodefineamentaldisorderina muchmorenaturalwaythantheM’Naghtenrulessuggested.Regardingissuesthat wereclearlybrain-related(lastingimpairmentofintellectualfunction,lasting alterationofmood,delusionalbeliefs,delusionalmisinterpretationofevents)there wouldbeabroadeningofthedefinition,buttheanomaliesthrownupbycaselaw (diabetes,epilepsy,sleepwalking)wouldnotbeincluded.
TheButlerCommitteerecommendationshaveinformeddiscussion,andbeen widelypraised,inseveralsubsequentreports,butthemajorityofchangeshavenot beenimplemented.Somechanges,suchasdiversi ficationofthesentencingoptions afteraspecialverdict have beenenacted(Sect. 2.1),butatthecoretheM’Naghten rulesstillcarryundueimportanceinEnglishcourts.
Overrecentyears,otherjurisdictionsintheEnglish-speakingworldhaveacted toamendtheirlawsonmentaldisordersandcriminalresponsibility.Theseinclude Canada(1985),17 Ireland(2006),18 andScotland(2010).19 Hereisnottheplaceto discusseachoftheseindetail.Beforereturningtolookatrecentdevelopmentsin England,andinlightoftheprominencethatAmericancaseswillplayinChap. 4,it ishoweverappropriatetopausebrieflyinordertoelaborateontheevolutionofthe insanitydefenceintheUnitedStatesofAmerica,andparticularlyontheimpactof thetrailofJohnHinckleyupontheevolutionoflegislationintheUSA.
IncommonwiththeUK,thelawsgoverningcriminalresponsibilityandthe insanitydefencehavetheirrootsintheM’Naghtencase.Atvarioustimes,asfar backas1887,20 therehavebeenconcernsthatthedefinitionofinsanityofferedby theM’Naghtentestwastoonarrow.Theemphasisonthecognitivedimension, meantthepotentialcriminalisation,itwasalleged,ofindividualswho knew what theyweredoingwaswrongbut,forwhateverreason,wereunabletostopthemselvesactingontheimpulsetodowrong.Therewasthereforecallsforinclusionof avolitionaltest;tobroadenthedefinitionofinsanitytocoverthoseindividualsfor whom “diseaseofthemind” hadimpairedtheirabilitytoresistanactionratherthan knowledgethattodosowouldbewrong.
Thevolitionalandthecognitivedimensionsofinsanitydefencewereformally broughttogetherintheAmericanLawInstitute’sModelPenalCode(MPC)of 1962.TheMPCstated “Apersonisnotresponsibleforcriminalconductifatthe timeofsuchconductasaresultofmentaldiseaseordefecthelackssubstantial capacityeithertoappreciatethecriminality[wrongfulness]ofhisconductorto 16ReportoftheCommitteeonMentallyAbnormalOffenders(Butler)Cmnd6244(1975).
17CriminalCode,R.S.C.,1985,c.C-46,asamended.
18CriminalLaw(Insanity)Act2006.
19CriminalJusticeandLicensing(Scotland)Act2010. 20ParsonsvState,2So.854(Alabama1887).
conformhisconducttotherequirementsofthelaw” 21 Thesestandardswere adoptedbytheDCCourtofAppealin1972.22
SeveralaspectsoftheMPCpromptedopposition.Inparticular,therewere concernsthattheprosecutionwerecalledupontoprovebeyondreasonabledoubt thatthedefendantwasnotinsane.Coupledwiththelackofatesttounambiguously distinguishan inability toavoidanactionfroman unwillingness todoso.These concernscameintosharpreliefwiththecaseofJohnHinckley.23
InMarch1981,HinckleyattemptedtoassassinatetheAmericanPresident RonaldReagan.Athistrialthefollowingyear,Hinckleywasfoundnotguiltyby reasonofinsanity(theattackhadbeenhisattempttoimpresstheactressJodie Fosterwithwhomhewasbesotted).
TheHinckleyverdictcausedwidespreadoutrageintheUSA.Inconsequence, Congress,andhalfoftheindividualstatestightenuptheirrules,withmany becomingmuchclosertotheM’Naghtenrulesthanhadpreviouslybeenthecase.
2.4.12013LawCommissionDiscussionPaper ThediscussionpaperCriminalLiability:InsanityandAutomatism(Law Commission 2013a)representsasignifi cantattempttochartanappropriatecourse forrevisionofthelawinEnglandregardingmentaldisordersandcriminal responsibility.Unsurprisingly,theauthorswerescathingabouttheinadequaciesof thecurrentregulations.Theyproposeabolitionofthedefenceofinsanity,and signifi cantalterationtothedefenceofautomatisminthelightofotherchanges.In theirplace,themaindefencewouldbecome “notcriminallyresponsiblebyreason ofrecognisedmedicalcondition” . Thereareseveralpointstonoteregardingthephraseologyofthenewdefence. Firstly,thenotionof “guilt” isreplacedby “criminalresponsibility” to fitan ambitiontoensurethatpeopleareonlypunishedongroundsforwhichtheyare appropriatelyaccountable.Secondly,emphasison “recognisedmedicalconditions” tidiesuptheanomaliesthathavearisenfromcaselawinterpretationof “diseaseof themind”.Indeed,thenewwordingwouldbroadenthedefi nitionofunderlying causestoincludephysicalaswellasmentalconditions,andwouldnaturally encompasscaseswherelossofcontrolarosefromdiabetes,epilepsyandsleep disorders.Thirdly, “recognisedmedicalconditions” makesitimmediatelyapparent thatwearenowworkingwithappropriatemedicaldefinitions,notquasi-medical legaldefinitions,ofdisease.Italsobuildsinprovisionforevolutionofour understandingoftheunderlyingcausesofconditions.
21ModelPenalCode(ProposedOfficialDraft1962).
22UnitedStatesvBrawner,471F.2d969(D.C.Cir.1972). 23UnitedStatesvHinckley,672F.2d115(D.C.Cir.1982). 162ExistingLegislationonMentalDisordersandCriminalCases
Ifthischangewasbroughtin,therewouldbeacorrespondingre-de finitionofthe defenceofautomatism.Thelatterwouldnowberestrictedtosituationsinwhich therewasa “totallossofcapacitytocontrolone’sactionswhichisnotcausedbya recognisedmedicalcondition” (LawCommission 2013b,para118).Greyareas arisingfromthedefinitionofinternalfactorsvexternalfactorswouldthusbe removed.
TheauthorsoftheLawCommissionDiscussionPaperemphasisethatexisting medicalconditionspersedonotnecessarilyprovideautomaticexemptionfrom prosecution.Forexample,ifsomeonewitharecognisedsleepingdisordercausedan accidentwhilstdriving,havingchosentoignoretell-talesignsoftheirincreasing drowsiness,thentheyexhibit “priorfault”.Similarly,lossofcapacityarisingfrom voluntaryintoxicationwouldnotbelegitimatedefence.
Overall,theLawCommissionrecommendationsarelogical,thoroughandavast improvementonthepresentlegislations.Aswithearlierrecommendations,however, itremainshighlyunlikelythatthesenewproposalswillbeenactedanytimesoon.
Historyhasshownthatchanges cancomespeedilywhenpoliticiansrecognise somevestedinterest.TheoriginalestablishmentoftheM’NaghtenrulesintheUK wasmotivated,atleastinpart,bythefactthatthePrimeMinisterwastheintended target.IntheUSA,thefactthatthePresidentwasthevictimpromptedthetighteningofinsanityrulesfollowingtheacquittalofJohnHinckley.
AtothertimesthelackofpoliticalwilltogiveaBillthenecessarytimein parliamenthasseenpotentiallyvaluableamendments flounder.AuthorsofCriminal Lawtextbooks(e.g.Clarksonetal. 2010;Jefferson 2009)writewistfullyof opportunitiesmissedwiththefailuretoseeenactedthesuggestionsofvarious reports,particularlytheButlerCommittee1975andtheDraftCriminalCode(Law Commission 1989).
Inthecaseofthe2013LawCommissionDiscussionPaper,theauthorsthemselvesrecognisethatthereareactuallymorepressingchangeswithinEnglishLaw thatneedtobemade.Inparticular,theypointtoconcernsregardingmiscarriagesof justicearisingfromadefendant’smentalhealthatthetimeoftheirtrial.
Despite,orperhapsbecauseof,theobvious flawsinlegislationoninsanityand automatismwhenacrimeisperpetrated,lawyershavedevelopedeffectivework aroundsthatlimitharmspotentiallyarisingduetotheseidiosyncrasies.Difficulties inthefairtreatmentofdefendantswhoare,orshouldhavebeen,identifiedas “unfit toplead” attrialareseenasaprioritybecausetheymayaffectalargernumberof peopleandwould ‘filterdown’ toinfluencecaseswherethementalwell-beingofa defendantatboththetimeofthecrimeandthetimeofthetrialareindoubt.
Itisinterestingtonote,however,thatshouldthechangesrecommendedinthe LawCommissiondiscussionpaperonInsanityandAutomatismbeenacted,the emphasisona “recognisedmedicalcondition” mightcreateroomforgreaterconsiderationoftheroleplayedbydeeperknowledgeofbiologicalfactorsincriminal behaviour.BeforereturningtothatissueinChaps. 4 and 5,letus fi rstmoveonto considersomeoftheemergingdataongeneticandneuroscienti ficaspectsof behaviour.
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Thermometrical Journal kept at Kano.
Thermometrical Journal kept at Sackatoo.
N . The observations of the height of mercury in the barometer were mostly discontinued at Kouka, partly from the illness of Dr. Oudney, who took charge of the instrument, and partly from the uncertainty of its accuracy At Tripoli it was regularly registered three times a day for about three months, the mean height during that period being 30,39 inches About the middle of the desert, and indeed most of the way from Mourzuk to the Yeou, it generally stood about 28,50, and at Kouka from 28,72 to 29 inches
THE END.
LONDON: PRINTED
BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS
From Sketches by Major Denham. Etched by E. Finden.
FIG. 1. QUIVER OF ARROWS OF THE MUNGA NATION; FIG. 2. ONE OF THE ARROWS; FIG. 3. CAP OF THE QUIVER.
FIG. 4. BOW OF THE MUNGA NATION.
FIG. 5. 6. & 7. JAVELINS OF CENTRAL AFRICA.
FIG 8. CASE SUSPENDED FROM THE SADDLE, TO RECEIVE THE POINTS OF THE JAVELINS.
(Large-size)
Published Feb 1826, by John Murray, London
From Drawings by Major Denham. Engraved by E. Finden.
FIG. 1. SADDLE AND SABRE-TASCHE OF THE PRINCE OF BEGHARMI.
FIG. 2. DOUBLE-HEADED LANCE OF THE CAVALRY OF BEGHARMI.
FIG. 3. LANCE OF THE BODY-GUARD OF THE SHEIKH OF BOURNOU.
FIG. 4. JAVELIN OF CENTRAL AFRICA.
(Large-size)
Published Feb 1826, by John Murray, London
From Drawings by Major Denham. Engraved by E. Finden.
FIG. 1. & 2. FRONT VIEW AND PROFILE OF A CHANFRON USED BY THE CAVALRY OF BOURNOU.
FIG. 3. & 4. HAND-BILLS CALLED BY THE NATIVES HUNGA-MUNGAS, USED BY THE INFANTRY TO THROW AT A RETREATING ENEMY
FIG. 5. BATTLE-AXE SUSPENDED FROM THE SADDLE-BOW
FIG. 6. & 7. DAGGER AND ITS SHEATH, CONSTANTLY WORN ON THE LEFT ARM BY THE CHIEFS.
FIG. 8. & 9. FRONT AND BACK OF AN IRON CUIRASS, WORN BY THE CHIEFS OF BOURNOU.
(Large-size)
Published Feb 1826, by John Murray, London
Transcriber's note:
An entry for the Prefatory notice by John Barrow has been added to the table of contents.
pg xvi-xvii (footnote 1) Changed: poor in the grusses to: grasses
pg liii Changed: Mahomet ben Kaml to: Raml
pg lv Changed: a bowl of libau to: liban
pg 105 Changed: hung round ther necks to: their
plate 16 (caption) Changed: ATTACH IN MUSFEIA. to: ATTACK ON MUSFEIA.
pg 220 (in table, row: Ear) Changed: 2[ft.] 2 by 2 6[in.] to: 2 by 2[ft.] 6[in.]
(changed as seen in French transl of this edition, 1826)
pg 268 (footnote 52) Changed: flows near Darpoor to: Darfoor After Denham's Narrative:
pg 77 Changed: expedition under Abdecachman to: Abderachman
pg 152 Changed: named Fair (Tyrwhit) to: Tair
pg 162 Changed: Amoug the provinces to: Among
pg 194 Changed: S. albovittalus to: albovittatus
pg 231 Changed: universall exist in to: universally
List of plates Changed: Salt Lake Tegishy to: Salt Lake at Tegerhy
The list of plates has been moved from the end of the book to after the table of contents.
Minor changes in punctuation and fixes of typographical errors have been done silently
Other spelling inconsistencies have been left unchanged.
New original cover art included with this eBook is granted to the public domain. For the highest resolution version of the General map, the reader is referred to the French translation of this edition (publ. Arthus Bertrand, 1826, Atlas vol.) available at Gallica/Bibliothèque nationale de France.
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