A cknowledgements
The success of this work was possible because of a number of people to whom I am eternally grateful. Space will not permit to express my gratitude to everyone.
First and foremost, I am exceedingly grateful to God for all that he is and has done for and through me.
I cannot fail to express gratitude to Thaddeus Metz for all the support, mentoring and conversations about my career as an African philosopher. Thanks for believing in me! I am truly grateful to have met an individual who is exuding with personhood in the way that you do.
I wish to express special gratitude to Asithandile Zibaya for all the support and love she has given me during the process of writing this book.
I wish to thank Sizwe Koom, Sthembiso Khumalo, Tumi Mohotlane, Xolani Msimango, Sihle Khanyile, Dumisani Mbanyele, Otto Matsapula, Kgomotso Moshugi, Sanele Shabalala, Promise Aphana, Akhona Mafani, Siyabonga Makwetu, Sabata Shongwe, Ps. Gcumeni, Sakhile Nkosi for their unwavering friendship.
I wish also to appreciate the academic brothers that have supported me in this journey. Professor Matolino, Mutshidzi and my brother Dr. Mpofu. The idea of this book was birthed in Matolino’s offce.
This book would not be possible without the generous fnancial support provided by the American Council for Learned Societies. I am proud to be an African Humanities Programme fellow.
I am grateful to my current employer, Wits University, and my colleagues in the department of philosophy for all the support and encouragement.
I thank you all!
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This book is part of the overall project of contributing to the development of the discipline of African philosophy. Specifcally, its contribution will be in the branches of moral and political philosophy. To achieve this goal, I build on those philosophical contributions in African philosophy that focus on the normative idea of personhood. I single out the normative concept of personhood as the foundational moral category to theorise about African moral and political thought. I do so for two reasons: frstly, the idea of personhood is arguably the most salient moral notion in the tradition of African philosophy. This view implies that the idea of personhood is one of the most important indigenous axiological resources; it requires our earnest philosophical consideration if we are to articulate a robust monistic moral and political theory. Secondly, I am attracted to this idea because there are facets of it—specifcally in the moral and political branches of philosophy—that remain under-explored in the literature (details of which, I will provide below). I believe that the philosophical development and elucidation of these facets will contribute to the aim of articulating the robust monistic theory I seek.
This book, therefore, focuses on the under-explored and underdeveloped moral and political facets of the idea of personhood. My ultimate aim is to have the idea of personhood inform a fully fedged moral-political theory.1 I am partially motivated to do so by one of the leading scholars of African philosophy, Kwasi Wiredu’s (2009: 16) observation that:
© The Author(s) 2019
M. Molefe, An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15561-2_1
The philosophical implications of the normative conception of a person are legion, and we will not pursue them here.
In this book, then, I intend to pursue some of the ‘legion’ moral and political implications of the idea of personhood. To give the reader a bird’s-eye perspective of the philosophical issues that constitute the focus of this book, I structure this introductory chapter as follows: since my central focus is the idea of personhood, I begin by providing conceptual clarity regarding the view of personhood relevant to the discussion. I do so because the idea of personhood is ambiguous (see Wiredu 1992; Ikuenobe 2006a). To eschew this ambiguity, I distinguish four distinct concepts of personhood in the literature, which many scholars of African moral thought do not handle with the dexterity characteristic of philosophy. I then proceed to identify some of the interesting and recent developments in the literature on personhood that I deem relevant. I do this literature review for the sake of identifying (some of the) gaps that constitute the focus of this book. Next, I proceed to specify the moral and political issues that constitute the focus of my discussion. I conclude this chapter by outlining the structure of the entire book.
the concepts of personhood in AfricAn philosophy
I identify at least four concepts of personhood in African philosophy. Two of these concepts are metaphysical and the other two normative. The frst metaphysical notion of personhood pertains to facts that constitute a thing called a human being; it is a specifcation of the biological classifcation of human beings as a species—Homo sapiens. For example, imagine that one is hunting, and when about to shoot is notifed: ‘Don’t shoot, that is a person!’2 It is this notion of a person that Kwame Gyekye (1992: 108) seems to have in mind when he makes the following comment:
What a person [human being] acquires are status, habits, and personality or character traits: he, qua person acquires and thus becomes the subject of acquisition, and being thus prior to acquisition process, he cannot be defned by what he acquires. One is a person because of what he is, not because of what he acquires.
Here, Gyekye refers to the notion of personhood in which one is a person (human being) prior to any process of socialisation or acquisition
of habits/character. Since a person (human being), in this sense, cannot be defned by what he acquires, this implies that there are certain ontological facts that constitute a person qua human nature that have nothing to do with any social or cultural factors. Scholars of African thought refer to the philosophical inquiry that speaks to what defnes a person qua human nature in terms of the “ontological” or “descriptive” notion of personhood (Wiredu 1996: 159; Ikuenobe 2016: 144; Oyowe 2014a: 46). The ontological notion of personhood is concerned with specifying the descriptive features that constitute human nature. Commenting on this concept of personhood, Ikuenobe (2016: 118) states that:
A descriptive conception of personhood seeks to analyse the features and ontological make-up of an isolated [human] individual.
Just as philosophers are apt to give metaphysical accounts of the mind, of time, place, God and so on, with regard to this notion of personhood, the task is to specify the ontological properties that constitute human nature. Scholars will differ in terms of whether they take human nature to be a function, entirely, of physical stuff or a combination of physical and spiritual properties (Kaphagawani 2004). For an instructive example of the philosophical debate regarding the metaphysical/ontological conception of personhood in African philosophy, the reader may consider the debate between Kwasi Wiredu (1995) and Kwame Gyekye (1995), where they offer competing conceptions of human nature in the Akan culture.
The second metaphysical notion of personhood involves issues pertaining to the nature of personal identity. The debates in African philosophy regarding the idea of personhood qua personal identity draw their infuence from debates between liberals and communitarians in the Western philosophical tradition. There, the debate pertains to the role, if any, the community plays in accounting for the socialisation and development of personal identity (Neal and Paris 1990). On the one hand, liberals tend to conceive of personhood in terms that de-emphasise the role of social relationships; while, communitarians, on the other hand, tend to accentuate the role of social relationships in accounting for personal identity.
This debate regarding personal identity in the African tradition tends to diverge between (1) those that account for it entirely in terms of social relationships and (2) those that account for it by invoking a combination
of individual and social features. Scholars like John Mbiti (1969) and Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) tend to construe personal identity entirely in terms of social relationships. For example, Menkiti (1984: 171, emphasis mine) commenting on personal identity notes:
… the African view of man denies that persons can be defned by focusing on this or that physical or psychological characteristic of the lone individual. Rather, man is defned by reference to the environing community.
It strikes me as obvious that Menkiti’s reference to the idea of ‘man’ is not referring to the ontological notion of personhood qua human nature. This is the case precisely because the ‘environing community’ is not one of the properties of human nature that one can single out like the body and so on. The ‘environing community’ is a property that is external to human nature. In this light, it is safe to conclude that Menkiti (with Mbiti) is pursuing the notion of personal identity that one acquires by being embedded in a community. Gyekye (1992), on the other hand, in his defence of moderate communitarianism (among other things) offers a conception of personal identity that balances the individual and communal facets—I will say more on this specifc discussion in the next chapter. Both of these accounts of personhood are metaphysical insofar as they specify some descriptive properties (facts) as the basis to account for the respective concepts of personhood under consideration. On the one hand, personhood qua human nature is a function of the body, the spiritual component and any other property that is taken to be constitutive of human nature; and, on the other, personhood qua personal identity specifes internal or external features that are crucial for accounting for socialisation or humanisation (Molefe 2018).
Furthermore, the literature tends to distinguish between two normative notions of personhood in African philosophy. The frst claims that one can assign moral value to some entity in virtue of possessing certain ontological properties that render it morally signifcant. This idea features signifcantly in bioethical contexts and also in political discussions of dignity/rights (Behrens 2013; Toscano 2011). To be called a ‘person’, in this sense, is to be specifed as a moral patient, i.e. a being towards which we owe direct duties of respect (DeGrazia 2008). Another term used to capture this idea of personhood is that of moral status, which specifes things towards which we have direct duties of respect (Molefe 2017a). What is crucial to note with regard to this
notion of personhood is that it invites respect to the entity in question merely because it possesses the relevant ontological properties—be they rationality, consciousness, or sentience—without regard to how one uses them (Singer 2009; Metz 2013a).
The second notion treats talk of personhood as appropriate when praising the agent for being a moral exemplar. Personhood, in this sense, concerns the moral evaluation of the conduct/performance of the agent in the light of some norms/values of a society (Presbey 2002). If the individual performs well, then she counts as a person and if she does poorly, then she is assigned the status of a non-person. In some crucial sense, the ontological status of the humanity of the individual, on this view, is not under scrutiny at all. What is under scrutiny, in this discourse of personhood, is how the agent uses her ontological abilities, to either perfect or defect her humanity. To be called a person is to acknowledge that she has added dimensions of moral virtue to her humanity. And, to be called a non-person is to acknowledge that she has lived below the abilities of her humanity, without denying her humanity and the basic respect due to her merely as a human being (Wiredu 2009).
Environmental ethics expert, Kevin Behrens (2013), aptly distinguishes the two normative notions discussed above. He distinguishes between them in terms of one being patient-centred and the other agent-centred. The patient-centred notion grounds respect on the basis of certain ontological properties; and the agent-centred notion identifes beings that have lived up to the standards of excellence prescribed in their societies. It is the agent-centred notion of personhood that is “dominant” or “germane” or “the pinnacle of an African difference in philosophical theory” (Masolo 2010: 135; Ikuenobe 2006a: 117; Wiredu 2009: 13). So, the central focus of this book is on the agentcentred notion of personhood. It is this notion that is salient in the tradition of African philosophy.
developments in the literAture on personhood
What are some of the interesting developments regarding the notion of personhood in the literature? I divide this literature review regarding personhood into three areas of focus: frstly, I consider the classical debates regarding the notion of personhood; secondly, I look into some of the recent (and salient) contributions in the discourse of personhood; and fnally, I consider criticisms against the idea of personhood.
The classical debate regarding personhood pivots around two infuential African philosophers, Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye (Matolino 2013). The debate in the literature has been between those that defend the radical version of communitarianism and those that defend the moderate one.3 Many scholars take Menkiti as the father of radical communitarianism. The defning feature of radical communitarianism is its (supposed) denial of rights (Menkiti 1984: 181).4 The defning feature of moderate communitarianism is its recognition of the primary status of rights in the plausible characterisation of Afro-communitarianism (Gyekye 1992, 1995). There are some thinkers (myself included) that defend the view that Menkiti is no radical communitarian. In fact, these thinkers tend to think that Menkiti, correctly construed, promises a robust moral-political philosophy—an alternative moral-political vision (Molefe 2016, 2017a; Ikuenobe 2017).5
Opposed to this characterisation, there are those scholars who tend to think that there is no substantive difference between radical and moderate communitarianism insofar as they both ultimately jettison rights (Matolino 2009; Famanikwa 2010). What is not entirely obvious to me—at least from where I am standing—is whether there is any relationship between the normative idea of personhood advocated by Menkiti and the idea of (natural) rights prevalent in the Western moral-political tradition. If Menkiti, in the fnal analysis, is pursuing an analysis of the normative notion of personhood, then one can rightly ask the following question: How did the idea of rights become a central consideration in this philosophical debate about the correct characterisation of Afrocommunitarianism? One of the ideas that I will be defending in this book is the view that the idea of personhood embodies a moral-political theory that takes duties to achieve the common good to be primary. Rights, if they feature at all, will only do so incidentally. In other words, the argument will be that rights are foreign to the axiological system characteristic of personhood (Donnelly 1982). The idea of personhood imagines a good society on its own terms rather than by invoking the idea and discourse of rights.6
It is important to take note of some of the positive developments in the literature regarding the idea of personhood. Bernard Matolino (2014), in his monograph titled ‘Personhood in African philosophy’, intervenes in the debate between radical and moderate communitarianism. Dissatisfed with both positions, Matolino proceeds to defend what he calls limited communitarianism. Limited communitarianism endorses
the foundational status of rights by following the trail of the naturalist interpretation of rights similar to the one defended by Gyekye (see also Matolino 2018a, b; Chemhuru 2018). Matolino, in his contribution to the idea of personhood and communitarianism, does not quite tell us why we should take the idea of rights seriously (Matolino 2009, 2013). He simply assumes the ontological veracity and moral-political universality of the idea of rights.
Another interesting development regarding personhood is by Polycarp Ikuenobe, one of the leading contemporary scholars of the idea (2006a, 2016, 2017). Ikuenobe invokes the idea of personhood to respond to the accusation that the idea of dignity is useless or vague (Macklin 2003). He argues that the idea of personhood offers a plausible conception of dignity. Typically, in both the Western and African tradition of philosophy, dignity is construed in terms of some ontological property (Gyekye 1992; Ilesanmi 2001; Deng 2004). The mere possession of some ontological property, be it rationality on the part of Immanuel Kant or capacity for harmonious relationships on the part of Thaddeus Metz, accounts for dignity (Metz 2010, 2011, 2012). Ikuenobe insists that dignity is a function of how the agent uses their ontological properties, i.e. dignity is a function of developing personhood. He proposes an interesting approach to the discourse of dignity given that the idea of personhood will be used in political contexts to identify beings towards which we owe basic respect. I will develop the idea in this work that the idea of personhood is not suitable to ground the modern idea of dignity since these ideas play two contrasting moralpolitical roles.
Another interesting development with regard to the idea of personhood is in the discourse on development (Klaasen 2017). The move here is to ground the idea of development on the moral resources prevalent in the African cultural context, specifcally, the idea of personhood. This, in many ways, is a novel and promising project, but it does not quite spell out how the idea of personhood could ground a plausible conception of development. One useful way to do this is by comparing it to approaches endemic in the discourse of like development ethics or even the capabilities approach (Goulet 1997; Nussbaum 2011). In this book, I will not consider the idea of development in relation to personhood. Given the space, I would have argued that developed societies are characteristically those that provide the socio-economic and political conditions that make the pursuit of personhood possible.7
In my opinion, Jason Van Niekerk makes a crucial contribution to the discourse on the idea of personhood. Van Niekerk’s (2007) engagement with the idea of personhood begins as a response to Metz’s (Metz 2007a) contribution to the debate regarding a plausible interpretation of African ethics (of ‘ubuntu’).8 Metz (2007a, b) identifes six possible interpretations of African ethics, and he ultimately defends a relational interpretation. Van Niekerk (2007), responds to Metz (2007a: 331) by defending a view that Metz describes in these terms: “This is probably the dominant interpretation of African ethics in the literature”. This dominant interpretation is based on the idea of personhood. Metz (ibid., emphasis mine) points out that “[m]any thinkers take the maxim ‘a person is a person through other persons’ to be a call for an agent to develop her personhood”. Van Niekerk (2007) defends the view that the idea of a person—which he construes as an autocentric approach is no worse than the relational one defended by Metz. In his doctoral thesis, dedicated to African ethics, he jettisons the autocentric interpretation of the idea of personhood for the perfectionist interpretation of this idea (Van Niekerk 2013). In turn, I will take the perfectionist interpretation as a point of departure.9 I will also elucidate the components of this interpretation that do not feature in Van Niekerk’s analysis, such as the humanism and individualism that characterise it.
Recently, a special issue dedicated to the Menkiti-Gyekye debate was published in the journal of Filosofa Theoretica.10 The special issue largely focused on the “individual-community question in African philosophy”, and we are further informed that this issue “is closely tied to the question of personhood” (Agada 2018: 46). Some of the major themes that emerged in the special issue deal with (1) the place and relevance of (personal) autonomy (Chimakonam 2018)11; (2) The use of the Menkiti–Gyekye debate to rethink African political philosophy, particularly in the light of decolonisation (African political) philosophy to rethink some “our ethical outlooks and our social and political theories to accommodate insights … from African philosophy” (Eze 2018: 1); (3) The question of the place, relevance and justifcation of rights also emerged in the special issue12 (Eze 2018; Chimakonam 2018; Matolino 2018a, b); (4) Crucial issues regarding the problematic methodology— parasitic on Western assumptions—employed by both Menkiti and Gyekye also feature (Amato 2018; Chimakonam 2018); The question regarding animals ethics in the light of personhood also receive critical attention (Horsthemke 2018).13
The reader should bear in mind that the burden of this book is interpretative rather than argumentative. The aim is not to argue that the idea of personhood, in and of itself, embodies the most plausible way to think about morality and politics. This comparative task is beyond the scope of this book. At this stage, the aim is to offer an interpretation of personhood and pursue some of its under-explored philosophical themes. To offer only an interpretative book may not satisfy some readers, but this does not mean that we should give up on the project. This project seeks merely to lay a foundation for further comparative and argumentative projects that others can venture into in the future.
We can now turn to some of the criticisms that have been levelled against the idea of personhood in the literature. Three such criticisms stick out for me. Firstly, there is the complaint that the idea of personhood is ‘gendered’ or male-centred, i.e. the idea of personhood is sexist or patriarchal. The idea of personhood is denounced for reducing women to a secondary status (Oyowe 2013, 2014a; Manzini 2018; Eze 2018). I am not entirely moved by this criticism. It is not clear to me whether the criticism is focused on the nature of the concept itself, as an embodiment of moral ideals, or on the sociology of the term—on how the term tends to be used in African societies. It occurs to me that the problem is not intrinsic to the term itself, it is the problem of cultures and academics that are prejudiced by their male-centred societies. My hunch is that the problem is with the practitioners, be it philosophers or cultures of praxis, and not so much with the normative concept of personhood. I believe this idea is open to interpretations that are “gender-neutral” (Oyowe 2014a: 53). Or, at least, I will be using this concept in a gender-neutral way insofar as it embodies moral insights that are true for all genders.
Another crucial criticism against the idea of personhood comes from Mpho Tshivhase (2013). Tshivhase’s major criticism is that the idea of personhood is overly other-regarding. The excessive emphasis on other-regarding features in the discourse of personhood renders it unable to accommodate crucial individualistic features necessary for a robust human life. Specifcally, it neglects autonomy and authenticity, which are important concepts in appreciating the uniqueness of individuals. The individual, on the moral system imagined by this overly otherregarding concept of personhood, is so absorbed in social relationships that her personal life is neglected. It does so in a way analogous to the way, according to Susan Wolf, that Western consequentialist and
deontological accounts produce ‘saints’ that are slaves of morality, with no regard for non-moral interests. The essence of her objection is that this idea of personhood does not and cannot accommodate options—that morality has limits and that we have interests that have nothing to do with morality (McNaughton and Rawling 2006). In Chapter 4, I will defend the view that the idea of personhood, at least as interpreted, can accommodate options.
The third criticism is of a political nature. It argues that the idea of personhood is essentially inegalitarian. As such, the political discourse generated or implied by the idea of personhood will fail to capture the plausible egalitarian features that capture modern political thought (Oyowe 2018). The idea here is that those that have achieved personhood will be treated better in terms of distribution of resources/opportunities than those that have not. In Chapter 7, I will offer what I take to be a plausible construal of the politics embodied by the idea of personhood, which will address Oyowe’s concerns.
themes And structure of the Book
I divide this book into two sections: one focusing on moral issues and the other on political ones. The frst section of the book will deal with the following moral issues: (1) personhood as a moral theory; (2) the meta-ethical debate between partiality and impartiality; and (3) the idea of options in the light of personhood. I will also focus on three political themes in relation to personhood, namely: (1) dignity; (2) rights; and (3) historical injustices.
I structure this book as follows. The second chapter conceptually maps the idea of personhood in African philosophy. In it, I revisit some of the infuential texts and debates on personhood in African philosophy. This mapping is necessary because many of the discussions of the idea of personhood have been characterised by conceptual ambiguity and confusion. If this book is to be a success, it must revisit important texts with regard to the notion of personhood to dispel all conceptual confusion. This chapter is important insofar as it will help the reader to get a sense of how I read extant infuential accounts of the idea of personhood. The third chapter concerns itself with spelling out the idea of personhood as a moral theory. Ultimately, I advocate the humanistic and perfectionist egoistic view of personhood as a moral theory. The fourth chapter focuses on the meta-ethical question of whether personhood is
best construed in terms of partiality or impartiality. I observe there that the idea of personhood embodies partiality. The ffth chapter offers general reasons in support of the supererogatory view that the idea of personhood can accommodate options. The sixth chapter deals with the question of whether the idea of personhood can ground a plausible conception of the idea of dignity. I will note there that personhood cannot ground a plausible conception of dignity. The seventh chapter examines whether personhood is suitable to ground a plausible conception of rights. Here, I will defend a duty-based moral-political view. The eighth and fnal chapter concerns itself with the question of historical injustices. There, I specify the bare minimum criteria that should characterise efforts towards restorative justice.
n otes
1. In pursuing this project, I am indebted to the philosophical foundation laid by Ifeanyi Menkiti on the idea of personhood. In this book, I join the efforts by Kwasi Wiredu (1992, 1996, 2005, 2008, 2009), Polycarp Ikuenobe (2006a, b, 2016, 2017), Bernard Matolino (2009, 2014), Jason Van Niekerk (2007, 2013), and Anthony Oyowe (2014a, b, 2018), among others, who are contributing to the development of moral and political discourse on personhood. My contribution pursues those facets that these scholars have not yet considered.
2. I adopt this particular example from Gyekye (2010).
3. In my opinion (see Molefe 2016), which echoes the position of other scholars like Wiredu (1992, 2004), Metz (2013a), and Ikuenobe (2017), there has been no debate between Menkiti and Gyekye. In fact, the position that is emerging among these scholars is that Menkiti advocated no radical communitarianism; he has just been misunderstood.
4. An accurate representation of Menkiti’s view does not necessarily repudiate rights; instead, he relegates them to a secondary status in relation to our duties to others. To reduce rights to a secondary status, for most scholars of the natural approaches to rights, would be tantamount to their tacit rejection. It is for this reason that Gyekye has understood Menkiti to be rejecting rights.
5. I articulate this alternative moral-political vision in Chapter 7.
6. One of the things that have struck me is that Menkiti (1984: 180) at the end of his discussion of the idea of personhood mentions that rights occupy a secondary status in African philosophy. Menkiti does not elaborate or defend this position, but the response (in the literature) has been to argue for the centrality of rights by his detractors. The literature does
so in ways that are very concerning. On the one hand, the idea of rights is never defned; it is almost (always) taken to be self-evident. Those that attempt to give an account of rights rely on Western conceptions of it. Gyekye takes Kant’s conception of dignity and rights as a point of departure in his defence of moderate communitarianism. No justifcation, be it historical or philosophical, of this move is offered.
7. In a forthcoming article, I defend an African conception of development that I believe gives insights regarding how the idea of personhood accounts for development (Molefe 2019).
8. In this book, I will take the talk of ubuntu to be the same as a talk of personhood. I say so because at the heart of the idea of ubuntu is the idea of personhood. The idea of ubuntu is captured in terms of the maxim—a person is a person through other persons. The italicised word—person— refers to the normative idea of person salient in African philosophy. At the heart of ubuntu is the idea of a human being achieving personhood (see Metz 2007a, 2010, 2013b; Molefe 2017b; Oyowe 2018). As such, the reader should not be shocked at instances where I use these words interchangeably. To say one has ubuntu is the same thing as to say they have achieved personhood, and vice versa.
9. I prefer the perfectionist approach over the autocentric view of personhood for two reasons. Firstly, I agree with all the arguments raised against autocentrism by Van Niekerk. Secondly, the language and analogies employed by scholars of African thought tend to capture personhood as a perfectionist orientation.
10. I am grateful to the reviewer for bringing this literature to my attention, which was not published when I initially submitted my manuscript for review.
11. I do think that one useful way to deal with the question of autonomy in African philosophy is to be mindful of the distinction between the individualistic and relational versions of it. I give some attention to this distinction regarding the concept of autonomy in Chapter 5. I am aware that Ikuenobe (2015) argues that relational autonomy is an intrinsic feature of personhood. I also believe that the discourse of personhood can learn a lot regarding the idea of autonomy in the discourse of care/feminist ethics.
12. The reader should note that I deal with the question of rights in the light of personhood in Chapter 7 of this book.
13. In this book, I do not quite talk to the issue of the environment and animals in the light of the idea of personhood. I am aware, however, that this is one of the criticisms against the idea of personhood. This should not come as a surprise given that I explain in Chapter 2 that the idea of personhood is humanistic, which means it accounts for morality entirely
in terms of some facet(s) of human nature to the exclusion of animals. To make this observation, however, is not tantamount that the idea of personhood has no resources at all to resolve the question of animals (though indirect like in the fashion of Kant). It is not within the scope of this book to refect on the questions of animals and environment in the light of personhood.
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CHAPTER
A Conceptual Mapping of Personhood
introduction
In this chapter, I conceptually map the concept(s) of personhood in African philosophy. That is, I revisit some of the texts that I deem to have played a decisive role in shaping the discourse on personhood in African philosophy. This conceptual mapping is neither exhaustive nor chronological. As a result, I may leave out some texts that some may deem crucial in their own estimation. In this analysis, I focus on the following scholars/texts: I begin by elucidating Menkiti’s analysis of the notion of personhood. I then proceed to consider Gyekye’s criticism of Menkiti’s notion of personhood. I conclude by considering Matolino’s treatment of the concept of personhood in the light of the philosophical disquisitions of it by Dedier Kaphagawani and Ikuenobe.
I am doing this conceptual analysis on personhood to demonstrate two facts. Firstly, I aim to show the reader that the idea of personhood has not been handled with the philosophical dexterity that one would usually expect to characterise the practice of philosophy. Secondly, I do so for the sake of being precise regarding the concept of personhood crucial to this book. Additionally, I do this conceptual exercise to give the reader a sense of how I understand the idea of personhood.
I turn now to consider Menkiti’s treatment of the concept of personhood.
© The Author(s) 2019
M. Molefe, An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15561-2_2
menkiti’s AnAlysis of personhood
Menkiti has penned two essays dedicated to the idea of personhood in African philosophy. The frst essay by Menkiti (1984) is titled ‘Person and Community in Traditional African Thought’ and the second (2004) ‘The Normative Concept of Personhood’. I will focus on the frst essay because it is the one that has been at the centre of major debates in the literature and most scholars—in their disquisition on personhood—tend to focus on it (Asante 2018; Amato 2018). Furthermore, the second one is a restatement and clarifcation of some of the issues that Menkiti thought necessary to correct, but the substance is more or less the same. It is crucial to note that the titles of both essays promise to focus on one specifc concept of personhood. The title of the frst essay is not specifc about which notion of personhood will be under consideration (remember I distinguished four notions of personhood). The second essay does, however, specify that Menkiti is pursuing the normative notion of personhood.
In the frst essay, Menkiti (1984: 170) is very clear that he aims “to articulate a certain conception of the person found in African traditional thought”. The strategy he employs to explicate the philosophically under-explored African notion of a person involves contrasting it against the salient view of personhood in the West. He draws two contrasts between the African and Western term. In the frst place, he indicates that the Western notion of personhood defnes it in terms of some “lone” property of the individual (ibid.). Typically, the Western view invokes some psychological property like consciousness, rationality, memory and so on as the basis for defning personhood. In contrast, the African view defnes it by appeal to the “environing community” (ibid.). What is clear from this contrast is that personhood in the Western tradition is defned in terms of some property internal to the human individual (be it physical or psychological) and the African tradition defnes it (almost entirely) in terms of properties that are external to the individual.
In other words, on the one account, you look inside the individual to assign personhood; and, on the other, you look outside of the individual to account for personhood. Another useful way to capture this way of thinking about these distinct approaches to personhood is in terms of Descartes’ and Mbiti’s formulations of personhood. Descartes formulates personhood in these terms: ‘I think therefore I am’; and Mbiti
as follows: ‘I am because we are, since we are, therefore I am’. So, Descartes reduces personhood to the possession of rational capacity. Mbiti reduces it to the signifcance of social relationships. It occurs to me that this discussion of personhood, contrasting Western and African views, is strikingly a metaphysical one. Under consideration appears to be the question of personal identity. In other words, Menkiti may be reasonably construed to be adumbrating the factors that may be considered crucial to account for the socialisation of individuals (Molefe 2016a). In the West, emphasis is placed on individual properties and less emphasis is placed on social relationships. In Africa, more emphasis is placed on social relationships and less on individual properties.
This interpretation of Menkiti (as elaborating on the metaphysical theme of personal identity) is supported by Menkiti’s (1984: 171) summary of these contrasting approaches:
A crucial distinction thus exists between the African view of man and the view of man found in Western thought: in the African view it is the community which defnes the person as person, not some isolated static quality of rationality, will, or memory.
It is obvious that on this view the community does not defne ‘man’ qua human nature or ‘person’ qua ‘human being’, which is a biological/ ontological fact. However we may defne a ‘person’, it does not take away the ontological fact that they are characterised by certain isolated static qualities of body, rationality, will, or memory. They have these properties independent of the community. As Gyekye (1992: 108) rightly observes, the community discovers these properties—all it does is to nurture them. In other words, these properties are part of what it means to be human qua human nature. What is it then that the community defnes? Menkiti provides an answer to this question. In the light of the Mbiti formulation, Menkiti (1984: 172) says:
…as far as Africans are concerned, the reality of the communal world takes precedence over the reality of individual life histories, whatever these may be.
I think reference to ‘the reality of the communal world’ is the same thing as talk of the ‘environing community’. This talk of ‘the reality of the communal world’ points to the idea that the cultural context serves as a
social incubator within which individuals have to commence and negotiate their own lived experience (see Amato 2018: 38). The point is to emphasise the priority and the inescapability of the social reality that the individual needs in order to be humanised or socialised (Gyekye 1992). In other words, without this social incubator, human experience and possibilities will elude the individual. She will be a lost cause insofar as humanity and all that it promises is concerned. Menkiti (ibid.) continues to comment that:
… the individual comes to see himself as man, and it is by frst knowing this community as a stubborn perduring fact of the psychophysical world that the individual also comes to know himself as a durable, more or less permanent, fact of this world.
It is becoming clear that Menkiti is giving an account of the socialisation of the individual. The idea proposed by Menkiti is that the ‘environing community’ provides the socio-cultural context, with its multiplicity of institutions and social relationships that helps individuals to see themselves as part of the social world. It is these socio-cultural structures that facilitate the development of the human consciousness and make it possible for individuals to see themselves as part of the furniture of the human world. Menkiti is very clear that the “collective facts” play a decisive role in the individual’s acquisition of “language”, which is crucial for cognitive development (what Menkiti (ibid.) refers to as the “constitution of mental dispositions and attitudes”). The acquisition of language and cognitive development are crucial for individuals to understand themselves as members of this or that family or even “specifc human group” (ibid.).
Finally, Menkiti (ibid., emphasis mine) notes: “What is more, the sense of self-identity which the individual comes to possess cannot be made sense of except by reference to these collective facts”. What emerges quite vividly from Menkiti’s assertions is that his reference to personhood, at least in this instance, is tantamount to talk of human socialisation. According to Menkiti, personal development that leads to personal identity (personhood) is best accounted for by appeal to what he refers to as the ‘environing community’, or ‘the reality of the communal world’ or ‘collective facts’. This talk of ‘collective facts’ is virtually the same as the position that construes personal identity entirely in terms
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Na iconographia religiosa ha, atravez as idades, séries determinadas, e assim se póde vêr como os artistas de varias épocas executaram as figuras de Jesus Menino, ou imaginaram os rostos de anjos e seraphins.
Quando ha pouco se agitou a questão do santo sudario de Turim viu-se bem onde póde chegar o interesse d’estes estudos; n’este caso á origem da pintura, e dos seus processos.
Certas imagens, por exemplo, Senhor dos Passos, Senhor Morto, são, na grande maioria, da mesma época; outras são de todas as épocas, a Virgem, o Crucificado, Jesus Menino. Póde reunir-se uma série de imagens da Virgem do seculo XII para cá. E assim do rosto e cabeça do divino Nazareno. É interessante vêr como os artistas, atravez os tempos, trataram de interpretar o aspecto do sublime mestre.
Ha pouco, n’uma estação de banhos dos Cucus, tive occasião de passeiar por Torres Vedras, e andei pelas egrejas a vêr esculpturas e pinturas, inscripções, velharias.
A imagem da Senhora do Sobreiro, no Varatojo, é antiga; segundo a tradição é do seculo XII; póde ser, e todavia não me parece tão antiga como a da Sé de Evora, ou a de Santa Maria da Oliveira, em Guimarães (a primitiva imagem).
Na egreja de S. Pedro vi a imagem de S. Pedro d’Alcantara; rosto, garganta e mãos bem esculpidas, expressão de fervor na oração, arrebatamento; roupagem larga, em grandes pregas; no todo uma estatua elegante, que prende a attenção; talvez de artista italiano.
Na egreja da Graça reparei mais nas estatuas de Santa Monica e Santo Agostinho, que estão em nichos no grande retabulo de obra de talha, do seculo XVII, interessante exemplo de transição do estylo classico para o rococó usado na época de D. João V.
N’essas estatuas de Santa Monica e Santo Agostinho o estofado, ouro sobre branco e vermelho, é accentuado por fino relevo, que dá ás vestes aspecto opulento; a esculptura é muito correcta.
A estatua de S. Gonçalo de Lagos, na sua capella, é elegante: o santeiro fez-lhe a cabeça um tanto pequena, e a cintura delicada; a
roupagem está bem lançada.
Na Misericordia dei mais attenção ao Senhor Morto, porque me parece o mais antigo que conheço; não se repare na encarnação; é uma estatua rigida, hirta, feita com certa rudeza mas com attenção. Parece-me anterior ao seculo XVI.
Em Santa Maria do Castello vi esculpturas boas: um Jesus Menino bem notavel e antigo.
E mais antigas ainda me parecem algumas imagens que vi na ermida da Senhora do Amial, a Senhora do Ó, o S. Vicente, e especialmente a Senhora de Rocamador talvez do seculo XIII.
Será bom reparar n’estas obras d’arte, mórmente agora por causa da invasão franceza de estatuetas e oleographias baratas.
Uma cadeira do seculo XV
A pouca distancia, uns tres kilometros, a poente de Torres Vedras fica o convento do Varatojo; é um bonito passeio a pé, atravessando a varzea, e subindo lentamente a vereda, descobrindo successivamente aquella região de serras e cabeços, em grande parte vestida de vinhedos, agora n’este mez d’agosto, mui viçosos.
Em trem, o caminho é mais longo, por causa de grande rodeio, seguindo pelo campo do Amial, onde ha uma ermida muito antiga e interessante, cortando depois os campos do Paul, e subindo a encosta por estrada um tanto ingrata; a estrada nova cheia de covas e poeira, a antiga coalhada de calhaus.
No convento vi a porta ogival da egreja, tendo aos lados as armas de Portugal, e o rodizio emblema adoptado por Affonso ; o claustro, bem conservado; os portaes da casa chamada dos retratos que são do tempo de D. Manuel; a torre dos sinos de ventanas ogivaes, assim como o portal de um pateo interior; vi pinturas em madeira, um frontal de seda bordada de origem italiana, me pareceu, e, n’uma pequena dependencia da sacristia, entre variados objectos, uma cadeira extraordinaria!
É tradição antiga ter esta cadeira servido a D. Affonso V, quando visitava aquella casa. Como me disseram que ninguem a desenhara eu tirei um rapido esboço. Póde ser de Affonso V, e até anterior; é em carvalho, e está menos mal conservada; algum caruncho, mas mostra-se ainda nitido o relevo decorativo; lembra logo o estylo da Batalha. É uma cadeira do seculo XV, uma joia do mobiliario portuguez. No Havard [2] vem o desenho de um exemplar quasi egual; cadeira de armario ou cofre, de braços, espaldar direito, ornamentação ogival, exactamente como no esplendido movel do Varatojo. Lá se tem conservado a veneravel reliquia e está lá muito bem, ligada pela tradição historica, mas seria bom fazer uma reproducção para o Museu das Bellas-Artes, onde abundam os exemplares de mobiliario portuguez, formando séries importantes; mas falta aquella cadeira—avó, unica, segundo creio, em Portugal.
[2] Dictionnaire de l’ameublement et de la décoration.
Brazões da Villa
Vi em Torres tres brazões antigos:
O da Fonte Nova tem a data 1529.
O que está na escada da Camara Municipal tem a data 1518.
O do chafariz dos Canos é muito mais velho, singelo e hieratico, sem ousadias decorativas; creio que é do seculo XIV.
O da Fonte Nova apresenta duas torres ligadas por um panno de muralha com sua porta: torres de tres andares, com ameias, frestas para jogar virotes e béstas, terminando em cobertura pyramidal, com sua bandeira quadrada e uma estrella sobre a bandeira; entre as torres um escudo real, sem corôa nem castellos, só as cinco quinas com os seus besantes. Infra a data 1529 entre duas siglas, talvez F e R.
O que está na Camara mostra duas torres de cobertura conica, ligadas pela muralha sem porta; tem barbacan, ameias, sobre as torres bandeiras farpadas, sobre estas, estrellas.
Sob a barbacan um festão florido, infra um lettreiro:
Esta casa e quintal he do concelho 1518
Entre as torres o escudo das quinas.
O do chafariz dos Canos tem tres torres eguaes, separadas entre si, uma a meio do escudo mais acima, duas aos lados d’esta, mais abaixo. Cada torre sua janella de volta redonda, e quatro ameias; a ameia formada por um dado ou cubo, sobre este uma pyramide de base quadrada excedendo muito a face do cubo.
Na fonte está outro escudo com o brazão real, as quinas collocadas á antiga, as lateraes com as pontas para dentro.
Este escudo da fonte dos Canos parece-me ser o brazão antigo da villa, o primeiro, o das turres veteres. Depois conjugaram este com o escudo real, tirando a torre média e mais alta para dar logar ás quinas, ao que parece no tempo de D. Manuel, o reformador do velho foral, pois que o brazão que está na escada da Camara tem a data 1518.
Archivos
Camara, Misericordia, Egreja de Santa Maria
Quando estive na interessante villa de Torres Vedras lembrei-me de visitar archivos, que é onde se encontram reunidos mais documentos authenticos da vida local.
Para alguma cousa ha de servir isto de ler lettras antigas, a paleographia; porque vêr archivos e cartorios sem os entender é inutil.
Manuel Agostinho Madeira Torres na—Descripção historica e economica da villa e termo de Torres Vedras—, falla de antigos documentos, e na 2.ᵃ edição da sua obra os editores deixaram
muitas notas em que se referem a velhos pergaminhos e papeis dos cartorios da villa.
A vida antiga, as phases sociaes, as instituições, a evolução historica, tudo apparece nos archivos a quem tiver paciencia de manusear com attenção codices e avulsos arrumados, quantas vezes esquecidos, desprezados, tristes, poeirentos, nos seus armarios.
Agora que tanto se falla de sociologia esses archivos teem ainda maior importancia; antes os estudiosos procuravam especialmente os grandes acontecimentos e as vidas dos grandes vultos, attendese presentemente tambem á evolução das instituições, ao viver dos povos, ás manifestações moraes das classes menos brilhantes. Divaguei, pois, algumas horas pelos archivos de Torres Vedras, e vou escrever, condensando muito, do que vi.
Comecei pelo archivo da Camara Municipal, que está installado em armarios, n’uma casa ampla com muita luz.
Vi lá uma peça de primeira ordem, o Foral da villa, dado por D. Manuel.
O primeiro foral foi concedido por D. Affonso em 1250, e conserva-se na Torre do Tombo.
Do foral de D. Manuel está o original em Torres, e bem conservado, lindamente escripto em pergaminho.
Percorri tambem alguns livros de actas da camara, bella série que começa em tempo d’el-rei D. Sebastião. Estes codices são importantes, porque não se contentaram em lavrar actas, mas incluiram o registo de documentos de maior significação. Ora o municipio e comarca de Torres foram de grande importancia em tempos volvidos, com a especialidade proveniente da preponderancia da Casa das Rainhas. Assim encontrei alli noticias de Santarem, Alemquer, etc., que não esperava achar; assim, por exemplo, foi o corregedor de Torres que em 1640 teve o encargo de regular a segurança e a administração em Cascaes, Alemquer, etc., terminado o dominio hespanhol.
Do tempo dos Filippes estão registados muitos documentos sem duvida valiosos.
Como se vê, o archivo municipal de Torres contém dados de valor para a historia do municipio e para a politica geral do paiz.
E mais, é claro, os que importam á vida municipal, os economicoadministrativos, os que se referem a obras publicas, viação, preços de generos, etc.
Visitei tambem o archivo da Santa Casa da Misericordia.
Se entro sempre com respeito n’um archivo municipal, que é onde está o documento do homem, rico ou pobre, nobre ou plebeu, entro com veneração e amor n’um cartorio de Casa de Misericordia: alli está a vida do pobre, do enfermo, do engeitado, do encarcerado; alli está a meu vêr a instituição mais gloriosa que tem o povo portuguez. A beneficencia moderna nas suas multiplas manifestações não attinge a perfeição d’esse maravilhoso instituto que corresponde perfeitamente ás necessidades sociaes.
O livro mais antigo que vi data de 1608. Vi livros de tombos, accordos, receita e despeza, compromissos, e de enterros. Ha um Tombo grande, que é um formidavel infolio, do tempo de D. João V. Tem medições de propriedades urbanas e ruraes que o tornam precioso. N’este volume está a descripção minuciosa da egreja e Casa da Misericordia, feita em 1730. No termo de Torres havia hospitaes e albergarias na idade média, no Amial, Carvoeira, Turcifal, S. Gião, Ribaldeira, Azueira, S. Mamede e Dois Portos.
É extraordinario o que se fez em Portugal no ramo de beneficencia publica, nos primeiros seculos da monarchia. Creio que foi no seculo XVI, principalmente, que se realisou a concentração nas Misericordias de todas essas pequenas instituições, albergarias, gafarias, etc. De todas vi noticias no archivo da Misericordia.
Finalmente fui vêr, na amavel companhia do Prior, o archivo de Santa Maria do Castello. Esta notavel egreja, antiga capella real, conserva ainda o seu archivo! é caso raro em Portugal. Porque os archivos parochiaes, quasi todos, foram concentrados pelos prelados, e jazem ignorados nos Seminarios, alguns sem a minima
organisação. Este lá está nas suas arcas velhinhas, conservado e limpinho, amado pelo digno parocho. Vi lá pergaminhos do seculo XIV, do bom rei D. Diniz, de 1307 um d’elles, e muitos dos seculos XV e XVI. É bem singular um archivo parochial com os seus velhos livros, amarellecidos pelo tempo, dos que nascem, dos que se casam, dos que morrem; dos que passaram n’este mundo de esperanças, de alegrias, de soffrimentos.
No Varatojo
Na sala do capitulo vi dois lettreiros:
Aqui descansão as cinzas do Ven.ˡ P. F. Antonio das Chagas. Miss. Apost. e instituidor deste Semin.ᵒ faleceu a 20 de outubro de 1682.
Fr. Joaq.ᵐ do Espirito Santo restaurador deste Seminario
Fal. em Santarem 3 d’agosto 1878
Na quadra, perto da porta que deita para a matta: Aqui jáz Felipa do Reguo molher de Nuno de Sampaio... 1530
Reparei na egreja nas seguintes pinturas:
Na capella-mór:
Annunciação
Adoração dos reis
Adoração dos pastores
Noli me tangere.
Na sacristia:
Milagre de Santo Antonio. O burro ajoelhado ante a sagrada particula
Pentecostes.
Na ante-sacristia:
presepe, pequeno quadro em madeira, de trabalho fino, um tanto estragado.
A quadra, arcada e varanda coberta, o travejamento assente sobre columnellos, está bem conservada.
Para esta quadra ou pequeno claustro diz uma casa a que chamam dos retratos, que me parece ter sido uma aula ou casa do capitulo.
O portal desta casa é em manuelino, de trabalho apurado e em boa pedra; é uma peça nitida. Nesta casa está uma pintura em madeira, o Calvario.
A moldura do quadro é de pedra lavrada, tambem em manuelino; pareceu-me uma antiga porta ou janela aproveitada para alli.
Estes trabalhos teem intima relação com os portaes de S. Pedro, de S. Thiago, ediculo dos Perestrellos, etc. Vê-se que em Torres Vedras houve na primeira metade do seculo XVI artistas trabalhando com methodo e gosto.
A porta principal da egreja do Varatojo é ogival, singela, aos lados tem brazões com as armas de Portugal e o rodisio de D. Affonso V.
As ventanas da torre são ogivaes.
E vi n’uma córte contigua um portal antigo tambem de ogiva.
Por isto se vê bem que este antigo edificio soffreu reconstrucções.
A quadra deve ser da primitiva, apezar de não apresentar ogivas; o travejamento é singular; no todo singelo ha uma pureza, uma sobriedade que nos incute ideias de paz e recolhimento; como na matta, de vetusto arvoredo, frescas fontes murmurejantes, e clementes horizontes.
Bello sitio para dulcificar maguas e socegar corações attribulados. Por aqui passeou a sua grande dôr e cruel desesperança um rei, D. João II, depois do desastre de Santarem.
Uma inscripção moderna
Na egreja de S. Pedro, proximo ao pulpito, repousa Luiz da Silva Mousinho d’Albuquerque, sob campa rasa, com o lettreiro:
AQVI IAZ
LVIZ DA SIL
VA MOVSI
NHO DE AL BVQUERQ
QVE FALES
CEO NESTA
VILLA DE TOR
RES VEDRAS
AOS XXVII DE DEZEMBRO DE MDCCCXLVI
REQ. I. PAC.
É singular como em Torres e em pleno seculo XIX se lavrou tal inscripção; mesmo o caracter da lettra é archaico; parece que o entendido que fez o modelo para o lavor do canteiro poz esmero em imitar o antigo, e muito antigo.
Porque n’esta mesma egreja se encontram lettreiros dois seculos mais velhos sem tantos archaismos.
Sinos
Vi os de S. Pedro.
Um tem na fimbria Sanctus Deus e o nome Miguel Delmaco.
Outro: apprehende arma et scutum. Miguel Delmaco, 1673.
Sineta: tem a data 1802.
Quinta das Lapas
A quinta está na branda encosta da serra da Achada. Esta serra e as outras d’estes sitios são grandes collinas mais ou menos declivosas, de 100 a 150 metros d’altura sobre os valles que as separam. Ás vezes as faldas das collinas alastram-se, desdobramse em suaves encostas; em pontos alargam-se os valles em varzeas ferteis. O monte coroado pelas ruinas dramaticas do castello de Torres Vedras está rodeado de varzeas amplas. Nos banhos dos Cucos a chan, onde estão os hoteis, o casino, o jardim, o edificio das thermas, está cercada de montes de forte declive, semelhando uma cratéra, quasi completa, rota apenas por breve chanfro por onde passa o rio e a estrada que leva a Torres, e uma fraca depressão, mais a sul, que vae ter ao caminho de ferro, na visinhança dos pequenos tuneis. O terreno de quasi todas estas chans é de alluvião moderna, feita pelo Sizandro. O solo em que assenta a parte baixa da villa está hoje metro e meio mais alto que no seculo XVI, o que se manifesta em antigas construcções muito soterradas.
As varzes são ferteis e bem cultivadas; nas vertentes agriculta-se tambem, as vinhas ostentam-se viçosas; pinhaes forram grandes
trechos das collinas, apresentando arvores bem desenvolvidas.
E bom seria que mais semeassem ou plantassem; um pinhal é util e agradavel, dá sombra e aroma hygienico; serve a lenha, a rama, a pinha; a moderna medicina com muita razão recommenda o ar do pinhal, e, tem-se visto nos ultimos annos, o córte de pinhaes para combustivel, para construcção, para supportes de galerias mineiras, dá bom dinheiro.
Até parece que dá saude o aspecto de um pinheirinho verde, de fresco avelludado, de perfume resinoso. Por isto pinheiro cortado, pinheiro semeado, e quantos mais pinhaes melhor, por esses montes onde o sol, o solo e a aragem se encarregam de o alimentar; se elle cresce que é um encanto até nos areaes da beiramar onde a rajada do oceano chega a ser um açoute; porque o bom pinho formoso e hygienico não exige cuidados de cultura.
Por entre pinhaes mesclados de algumas vinhas e outras culturas segue a estrada de Torres para as Lapas; a principio do caminho rompe o bucolismo da paisagem a massa alvacenta da villa, e o seu outeiro escuro encimado pelas velhas muralhas do castello, os altos muros negros da sua alcaçova ou palacio, em tragica derrocada. Faz impressão aquella ruina; suggere tempos idos, historias mui velhas.
Torres mais antiga, já condado, Por turdulos se crê ser erigida, Por dote das rainhas, é morgado, E de muitas já foi favorecida, O Beato Gonçalo lá enterrado
Por milagres a faz ser mais luzida, Assim como João a decorou
Nas côrtes que já nella celebrou.
Como diz o bom e patriota Silveira no Côro das Musas
Passa uma curva da estrada, e deixa-se de avistar casaria nova e muralhas velhas; segue o caminho na verde paisagem campesina.
A estrada é boa, pouco frequentada, com aspectos variados, dominando o verde pinhal. De subito uma casaria branca de aldeia, uma egreja, e na encosta o palacio, bem ao sol, com as suas dependencias, os seus jardins, pomares, vinhas e matta de arvoredo alto.
Vê-se uma capella de boa construcção e logo uma entrada monumental, de ampla arcada; entra-se no terreiro; a um e outro lado edificações que são dependencias do palacio, na frente a fidalga residencia com larga escadaria e desafogada varanda. Todavia dá logo a impressão de edificio incompleto.
Á monumental entrada, á elegante escada não corresponde o edificio nobre que parece acanhado e por acabar. Houve alteração no plano, com certeza. A fachada que deita para o jardim é mais harmonica; a mansarda, os frisos azulejados dão-lhe graça.
O palacio, dizem, foi erguido pelo primeiro marquez de Alegrete, Manuel Telles da Silva, conde de Villar Maior. Foi feito marquez por D. Pedro II em 1687 (v. Diario de Noticias, de 17 de junho de 1902).
Provavelmente foi começado, houve demorada construcção, soffreu alterações; a mansarda será do meio do seculo XVIII; é possivel que a escadaria seja da época de D. João V. Para admirar seria que nesses tempos um Telles da Silva, em poucos annos, observando um só plano, conseguisse erguer um palacio, chamados, como eram, os principaes da illustre familia, para altos cargos no reino, no ultramar e no estrangeiro.
Existe na matta uma capella, incompleta, dedicada a Santo André Avelino pelo conde de Tarouca, Fernando Telles da Silva, em 1778. E ha, noutro ponto da matta, uma ermida rustica, com seu alpendre, um pouco mais antiga.
No jardim alegretes e assentos são azulejados, representando scenas de caçadas.
As salas teem tectos de madeira e rodapé alto de azulejos, como as do palacio do Correio-Mór, perto de Loures, e as do casal do
Falcão, perto de Carnide, agora felizmente restaurado, segundo ouvi dizer, sob a direcção do conhecido e estimado architecto sr. Raul Lino.
Nos jardins vi magnificas hortenses e na matta ulmeiros, pinheiros mansos, seculares medronheiros, sobreiros veneraveis. O meu amavel guia disse-me os nomes de algumas arvores, conservados na tradição familiar; o mais antigo é o sobreiro dos quatro irmãos, assim chamado porque a pouca distancia do solo o tronco se divide em quatro pernadas reaes, cada uma d’ellas como uma grande arvore.
Ha uma fonte de agua ferrea na matta, e outra numa alameda de ulmeiros, com um grupo em marmore, veado filado por um rafeiro; no outro extremo d’essa alameda deliciosa fica o jogo da bola.
Essas salas de grande pé direito, de chão ladrilhado, de lambris de azulejo, e tectos de madeira, conservando o ar antigo, não estão vasias ou despidas. Estas, felizmente, teem muito que vêr e respeitar.
Vi moveis antigos, cadeiras d’espaldar com os brazões de familia, grandes leitos de pau preto, com torcidos e lavores.
Os donos da casa fizeram abrir armarios e eu vi desfilar pratas antigas marcadas; ceramicas e crystaes, porcellanas de Sèvres, de Saxe, da India e Japão, de verdade e alto valor. Vi um copo de crystal lapidado com uma vista de Santarem, pintada no crystal, bem interessante: e um dragão de prata, perfumador enorme, trabalho pouco visto, que me disseram ser feito em Moçambique.
Nas paredes retratos de pessoas de familia, e que familia! esta dos Telles da Silva! É vêr ahi nas genealogias as séries de paginas com descendencias e arvores de costado mais frondosas que o sobreiro dos quatro irmãos. Até o venerando D. Manuel Caetano de Sousa escreveu uma obra em dois volumes (Bibliotheca Nacional de Lisboa. Manuscriptos, fundo antigo, C-3-16 e 17. N.ᵒˢ 1048-49), a respeito d’esta familia com o seguinte titulo bem curioso.—Corôa genealogica, historica e panegirica da Excellentissima Casa de Tarouca formada do purissimo ouro dos Silvas, illustrada com a
esplendidissima pedraria dos Menezes, adornada com as augustissimas flores da Magestade, fechada com elevados semi diademas da Heroicidade, terminada na altissima esphera da Soberania, consagrada com a sempre venerada cruz da Santidade, dedicada ao ex.ᵐᵒ sr. D. Estevão de Menezes filho primogenito dos ex.ᵐᵒˢ srs. condes de Tarouca João Gomes da Silva e D. Joanna Rosa de Menezes—.
Pertence effectivamente a esta familia o celebre Beato Amadeu que tão grande fama conquistou na Italia.
Que singular encanto o de ouvir a dona da casa explicando alguns retratos de familia! Que consolação, neste paiz de gente estragada, encontrar um ninho conservado! Que rara impressão no conjuncto, milagroso entre nós, de tantas recordações e tradições, vivas, na mente, na linha, nas feições, na voz da herdeira lidima!
A um marquez de Penalva dizia o Tolentino:
Hontem soube o que podia
Estilo suave e brando
E quanto podeis fallando
Eu o vi na Academia
Nas almas fogo acendia
Vossa discreta oração,
Sobre a minha pretenção
Vos peço que assim oreis,
E que ao principe falleis
Como fallaes á nação.
Pois ainda está representado na familia o estylo suave e a discreta oração, louvados pelo poeta.
Poetas houve tambem nesta familia; poetas e eruditos, homens de guerra e de diplomacia; na Bibliotheca Lusitana estão inscriptos os notaveis nas lettras e sciencias. Por estas salas, jardins e bosques passearam academicos, não faltam sitios para tranquilla meditação. E no bello terreiro desafogado com certeza se trabalhou na nobre arte da cavallaria; talvez se corressem touros e jogassem
cannas; houve tambem na familia cavalleiros notaveis, mestres reconhecidos na equitação, tratadistas na especialidade.
Porque se chama quinta das Lapas? Ha por aqui algumas lapas, grutas, cavernas? Parece que houve lapas a que se attribuiam lendas de mouros. Perto de casa ha uma vinha, um grupo de pinheiros mansos, uma elevação de terreno de poucos metros de altura; ahi umas cavidades consideraveis. Parece que em tempos alguem fez excavações; acharam cacos, louças partidas. Tudo se extraviou.
Seria uma mamunha? Um d’aquelles tumulos prehistoricos, em que as sepulturas eram cobertas por um monticulo artificial? Não sei, o que hoje se vê pouco significa.
Numa construcção ou pavilhão de fresco perto do jardim fui encontrar no embrechado que reveste as paredes interiores alguns exemplares de contas vitreas coloridas de fabrico egual ao das contas de Chellas, da capella (desapparecida) das Albertas, e da cascata da Quinta do Meio. Aqui tambem estas singulares contas são acompanhadas de cylindros, discos, etc., de vidro escuro. Continúa para mim a ser um problema a proveniencia de taes objectos.
O caminho dos Cucos
Pela avenida ampla, arborisada, chega-se á estação do caminho de ferro, que nos fica á direita; está á vista o castello ennegrecido e escalavrado, no seu morro severo destacando entre as collinas; o caminho passa sob a via ferrea; passa a ponte do Rei, sobre o Sizandro; vamos entre vinhas e arvoredos; agora a arcada do aqueducto; á direita uma ermida antiga com umas construcções, ao lado um portão com seus enfeites; era a albergaria de S. Gião, ou Julião. Lá se conservam inscripções que nos dizem que os sapateiros da villa no anno de 1359 (era 1397), construiram o modesto albergue, cuja instituição se incorporou na Misericordia em 1586. Os confrades de S. Gião ahi ouviam missa aos domingos. Um respeitador de antiguidades renovou a inscripção em 1849.
Pouco adiante, á esquerda da estrada, indo para os Cucos, existe uma quinta de construcção vistosa, a quinta das Fontainhas, com seu terraço e jardim, onde se lê um lettreiro, na parede occidental da casa, que diz:
Sua Alteza Real
O sern.ᵐᵒ principe o sr. D. João e a seren.ᵐᵃ princ.ᵃ a sr. D. Carlota Joaquin e o sr. infante D. Pedro Carlos jantaram n’esta quinta no dia 16 d’outubro de 1797.
Este infante D. Pedro Carlos tinha então dez annos. D. Marianna Victoria, filha de D. Maria I, casou com D. Gabriel, infante de Hespanha. Deste casamento nasceu o infante de Hespanha D. Pedro Carlos de Bragança e Bourbon, que foi almirante em Portugal. Nasceu em Aranjuez em 18 de julho de 1787, e falleceu no Rio de Janeiro a 26 de maio de 1813. Este infante casou, no Rio, em 1810, com D. Maria Thereza, princeza da Beira.
Os banhos dos Cucos são conhecidos de ha muito; a virtude singular d’esta agua já em épocas remotas attrahia enfermos.
Ainda existem as casinholas onde se abrigavam os miseros banhistas.
Hoje as installações hydrotherapicas das thermas dos Cucos são boas, feitas com largueza, direi mesmo com generosidade. O edificio das thermas, a casa dos machinismos, o amplo casino, os dois grandes chalets, e outras construcções, rodeiam um grande rocio ajardinado e arborisado. A grande obra começou em novembro de 1890; em julho de 1892 já as thermas funccionavam, provisoriamente; em 15 de maio de 1893 realisou-se a inauguração. Todavia não está cumprido o programma inicial, faltam chalets, e recreios para os banhistas, ou para as pessoas de familia que acompanham os enfermos. O principal está feito, e isto deve-se á coragem do opulento proprietario sr. José Gonçalves Dias Neiva. Á coragem e á generosidade, porque me affirmaram que embora a
frequencia seja grande já, todavia nem 2% rende o capital alli empregado.
Como o estabelecimento thermal fica a dois kilometros de Torres Vedras, muitos banhistas ficam nos hoteis da villa, que são regulares, e em algumas casas particulares.
A villa lucra com isto dezenas de contos annualmente, todavia nem o municipio nem os habitantes se esforçam por tornar a villa aprazivel aos seus hospedes; nem commodidade, nem distracções; nada que realce a natural belleza d’aquelles sitios. Bem lindos são os arredores da villa, convidando a pequenos passeios campestres, mas raras as estradas que prestem, as de macadam cheias de poeira, as primitivas de barrancos e pedregulhos. Uma das questões locaes é o abastecimento de aguas potaveis; esta porém não importa muito aos banhistas, que quasi todos consomem a agua dos Cucos. Eu não bebo d’outra; faz bem e é agradavel, com o seu ligeiro sabôr salgado. Liga-se optimamente com o vinho. É uma excellente agua de mesa que os sãos, não só os enfermos, tomam com agrado. Melhoram o appetite e facilitam a digestão.
Esta agua, que tem o maravilhoso lithio, é muito pura segundo a analyse microbiologica, feita em 1904, pelo illustre chimico Carlos Lepiérre.
Os pobresinhos teem tratamento gratuito nos Cucos; a poucos utilisa esse beneficio porque nos Cucos não encontram albergue ou hospital. Para isto me parece deveria olhar a Camara Municipal e a Misericordia de Torres Vedras; proximo dos Cucos um albergue gratuito para pobres seria um grande bem. E ainda outro de preço muito moderado, uma hospedaria simples, a simplicidade não exclue o asseio e hygiene, de alimentação singela e mobilia barata, onde os menos remediados encontrem agasalho.
Parece facil, isto. Naquelle chanfro do terreno que liga a grande varzea dos Cucos ao sitio dos pequenos tunneis do Caminho de ferro seria facil construir modestos albergues, pequenas moradas de construcção economica.
É generoso o coração do sr Neiva, consideraveis os seus bens de fortuna, e effectivo o seu altruismo, mas em emprezas destas é bom interessar differentes entidades, para que se uma esmorecer, outras continuem a obra, a util obra começada.
Encontrou o sr. Neiva um ajudante dedicado no dr. Justino Xavier da Silva Freire, director medico das thermas. É um clinico sensato, naturalmente lhano, muito accessivel, attencioso aos muitos enfermos. Que longas narrativas das massadoras enfermidades elle escuta com delicada paciencia, conseguindo extrahir das confusas exposições a historia da doença, o fio do caso, os antecedentes do enfermo. Os seus relatorios annuaes das thermas são muito instructivos e tão nitidamente escriptos que qualquer cliente os comprehende, aproveitando com a leitura.
As aguas dos Cucos são chloretadas, sodicas, bicarbonatadas, sulfatadas, lithinicas, etc. Encontram os chimicos nellas o brometo de sodio, o chloreto de sodio, os bicarbonatos de calcio, de estroncio, e de manganez, o chloreto de magnesio. Pois esta complexidade toda produz uma agua limpida, muito potavel, agradavel ao paladar Mas o que lhe dá virtude primacial é o chloreto de lithia que em 1:000 grammas entra por 0,0212.
É isto que torna esta agua preciosa para gottosos e rheumaticos. Faz bem aos intestinos, e combate a obesidade.
Casa dos Clerigos pobres
Junto á egreja de S. Pedro está a casa da irmandade dos Clerigos pobres.
Tem nas paredes quadros em azulejo que estranhei um pouco pela composição artistica. São copias de gravuras; o ingenuo pintor até copiou as assignaturas da chapa
Author Claud. Coell. delin. Fran. Houat. sculp.
que significa Claudio Coelho desenhou e Francisco Houat gravou. No tecto d’esta casa estão pintados em tela os quatro evangelistas.
Acham-se mencionados nas Memorias de Volkmar Machado (pag. 318); são de Bernardo Antonio de Oliveira Goes. O pae d’este, Manuel Antonio de Goes, era pintor de figura e pintou muitos azulejos. Vi outras telas que me pareceram do mesmo pincel na egreja da Graça.
O Asylo da Conquinha
Fica este asylo a breve distancia de Torres, uns vinte minutos de agradavel passeio a pé. Segue-se a estrada da Varzea, entra-se no amplo valle, vestido de culturas, arvoredos fructiferos, bellos vinhedos; ao lado da estrada fica um edificio moderno de aspecto alegre e confortavel, convidativo, é o asylo de S. José; como o sitio se chama a Conquinha, é vulgarmente conhecido por este nome. Santa instituição! Foi este asylo fundado e dotado pela benemerita D. Maria da Conceição Barreto Bastos, fallecida em 21 de maio de 1901. Velhinhos impossibilitados de trabalhar encontram aqui agasalho e sustento, abrigo tranquillo nos seus ultimos annos de vida.
A casa é cercada por ampla quinta bem cultivada com seus jardins floridos, e bellas arvores de fructa. Tudo muito asseiado e confortavel; mais me agradou ainda o ar satisfeito dos asylados, felizes naquelle ninho de caridade. A fundadora instituiu tambem uma escola, na villa, para meninas, com ensino gratuito; a sua memoria deve ser abençoada; o seu nome gravado no marmore dos benemeritos, e no coração de todos os que veneram estes bons exemplos do incondicional altruismo christão. Quando alli estive, visita casual, era gerente ou director do asylo, o sr. conego prior Antonio Francisco da Silva, cujo nome ouvi cercado pelos asylados da Conquinha com palavras de respeito e gratidão.
Ruços, além!
Preparava-se a jornada de Ceuta.
Havia cabeças enthusiastas, e cabeças duvidosas; timidos e prudentes ao lado dos muito ousados. El-rei D. João I estava em Cintra com os infantes; mandou convocar os do Conselho para Torres Vedras; eram o conde de Barcellos, o condestavel D. Nuno, os mestres das ordens de Christo, de Santiago e d’Aviz, o prior do Hospital, Gonçalo Vaz Coutinho, Martim Affonso de Mello, João Gomes da Silva, muitos outros senhores e fidalgos.
Nesses dias Torres Vedras acolheu muitos cavalleiros de espora dourada, os grandes senhores territoriaes e militares do paiz.==El Rey partio de Cintra, e foy folgando por aquella comarca de Lisboa caminho de Torres Vedras (isto conta o Azurara, na Chronica de D. João I, parte 3.ᵃ, cap. 24) e antes disto chegando El-Rei a Carnide, o infante Dom Enrique que muito desejava por seu corpo fazer alguma cousa aventejada, chegou a seu padre e disse: Senhor, primeiro que por estes feitos mais vades adiante, porque com a graça de Deos vem já por tal via, que viram a boa fim, eu vos peço por mercê que me outorgueis duas cousas. A primeira que eu seja hum dos primeiros, que filhe terra quando a Deos prazendo chegarmos davante da cidade de Ceita; e a segunda que quando a vossa escada real fôr posta sobre os muros da cidade, que eu seja aquelle que vá primeiro por ella, que outro algum.
Isto disse em Carnide o infante D. Henrique a el-rei D. João; estranho requerimento para a morte na vanguarda extrema, bem natural ao forte coração do rapaz. Chegou el-rei a Torres Vedras, e logo teve uma falla com o condestavel.
Este approvou o plano e prometteu ao rei a sua influencia favoravel...
Tratou-se logo do corregimento da casa para o conselho a qual era hua sala dianteira, que está em aquelles paços de Torres Vedras, onde está a capella.
Numa quinta-feira o rei e seus filhos ouviram missa do Espirito Santo, naturalmente na egreja de Santa Maria, que era capella real.
Celebrou-se o conselho; foi elrei que publicou o fim da reunião; depois fallou o condestavel approvando a jornada, e o infante D.
