American indians and the trouble with sovereignty: a turn toward structural self-determination kousl
American Indians and the Trouble with Sovereignty: A Turn Toward Structural Self-Determination Kouslaa T. Kessler-Mata
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With tribes and individual Indians increasingly participating in American electoral politics, this study examines the ways in which tribes work together with state and local governments to overcome significant governance challenges. Much scholarship on tribal governance continues to rely on a concept of tribal sovereignty that does not allow for or help structure this type of governance activity. The resulting tension that emerges in both theory and practice from American Indian intergovernmental affairs is illuminated here and the limits of existing theory are confronted. Kessler-Mata presents an argument for tribal sovereignty to be normatively understood and pragmatically pursued through efforts aimed at interdependence, not autonomy. By turning toward theories of federalism and freedom in the republican tradition, the author provides an alternative framework for thinking about the goals and aspirations of tribal self-determination.
Kouslaa T. Kessler-Mata is Associate Professor at the University of San Francisco. Prior to this position, Kouslaa served as a legislative fellow with the National Congress of American Indians in Washington DC and sat on the Board of Trustees for California Indian Legal Services. She is yak tityu tityu Chumash and Yokut, two tribes from Central California, and Irish American.
American Indians and the Trouble with Sovereignty
Structuring Self-Determination through Federalism
KOUSLAA T. KESSLER-MATA
University of San Francisco
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Kessler-Mata, Kouslaa T., author.
Title: American Indians and the trouble with sovereignty : structuring self-determination through federalism / Kouslaa T. Kessler-Mata.
Description: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017035746 | ISBN 9781108415866 (hardback : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Indians of North America—Legal status, laws, etc. | Indians of North America—Government relations. | Indians of North America—Politics and government. | Self-determination, National—United States. | Tribal government—Law and legislation— United States. | Sovereignty.
Classification: LCC KF8205 .K47 2017 | DDC 342.7308/72—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017035746
ISBN 978-1-108-41586-6 Hardback
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Chaan-hee,
Pismono, and Doowan, In memory of Tamra
Preface
The change of an Administration. The stroke of a pen. The appointments to federal bureaucracies and changes in congressional chairmanships. The 2016 Presidential election is a stark reminder of the political vulnerability of tribes and the ease with which tribal power can be tested, if not up-ended entirely. This despite treaties, executive orders, federal laws, and many, many political operatives focused on increasing the political power of tribes. How can this still be?
The origin of this book is in the uncomfortable fit I found between my training as a political scientist and the practical political world at play in and around Indian Country. As a California Indian person (Chumash and Yokut), I had already experienced my share of uncomfortable fits in college. For example, my first readings of Vine Deloria Jr’s works, while inspirational and often aspirational, relied heavily, for example, on treaty references and the experiences of plains Indian tribes. In fact, most of the foundational readings in Indian law and politics relied on these. However, as a California Indian from two tribes (one federally recognized, one not), I was confused by the overdetermined way in which treaties were taken to be the basis for tribal sovereignty. There were, after all, only eighteen treaties signed in California in the 1850s, and yet it is a state that currently boasts over 109 federally recognized tribes. Moreover, those treaties were never ratified, and therefore even signatory tribes to the documents did not have their sovereignty acknowledged through that form. For me, then, the basis of sovereignty is not, was not, and will never be in the recognition of tribes as inherent sovereigns, captured through treaty agreements.
Nevertheless, I acknowledged and adopted many of the basic precepts of federal Indian law no matter their apparent lack of application to my own specific tribal context. I continued to work in the field during college and into graduate school, first with a federally funded legal services organization, California Indian Legal Services (CILS) in Oakland, and, later, in Washington, DC with the National Congress of American Indians. As I found in my work for CILS,
some of the most acute challenges to advancing tribal self-governance claims (particularly around matters of federal recognition) on behalf of tribes were due to the historic mismatch of federal Indian law as applied to the California context. Lack of recognition as extant sovereigns aside, the impact of not having acknowledged treaty-based rights for California tribes meant that everything from having a recognized land-base to receiving basic provisions and protections were not met. Not in the nineteenth century, nor in the twentieth. The impact of California’s genocidal policies (to say nothing of the prior enslavement of our people by the Spanish) also meant that we were depleted in number. Having neither land nor a sizable population, we existed in oblivion, invisible to large national Indian organizations, to say nothing of non-Native ones. We had little to no standing in the political discourse going on within the Indian law and policy communities, as well as within federal and state communities, all of whom were otherwise busy forming and implementing their own policy priorities. The record shows that there were a few short-lived moments when attention was drawn to the condition of Indians in California, and today a bit more incorporation into the relevant institutional and decision-making centers has occurred, particularly in light of tribal gaming enterprises in the Southern half of the state, and the power that such economic activities enable. Nevertheless, we remain at the margins.
I mention the context and case of California Indians because I want to ensure that future conversations about Indian law and policy do not revolve exclusively around concepts that emerged from the narrow and specific history that is the story and evolution of federal Indian law. Or, at the very least, to explain that my particular concern is not with preserving the foundation that has heretofore served to define the tribal–federal relationship. This is not an unfamiliar notion. The recent proliferation of activities in indigenous politics at the United Nations is evidence that many people are thinking about how to secure rights in the face of continued domination by settler states. Similarly, I intend to offer up an approach to tribal sovereignty that rests on realizing the goals of tribes as self-determining polities within a federalist framework that institutionally supports those goals, and which does not default to a reliance on concepts developed in and for European nation-states, namely sovereignty. In this work, I do not make headway into international redress of indigenous rights, though that is certainly another avenue to accomplishing similar goals. Indeed, the approaches may work well together in a comprehensive program for securing Indian rights.
This last point on sovereignty as defined by its treaty-origin is where I fear the greatest misinterpretation of my work may occur. My goal is not to pick a fight with the many federal Indian law lawyers working in the field. I know better than that. I am not a lawyer and prefer to “stay in my lane,” which so happens to be political theory. I admit that I will likely need to seek atonement for the varied transgressions of federal Indian law that occur in this book. And yet I hope that this work will be taken as intersecting two fields that have
overlapped only minimally, and more often for the purpose of explanation than for systematic analysis and critique. I do not claim this to be an intersectional work, though I do discuss forms of domination, nor do I take myself to be engaged in producing a feminist critique of Indian law (though that, too, would be of interest). There are many things that this work does not do and many modes of analysis not utilized. Rather, I am simply taking to task the foundational concept for federal–tribal relations and claiming it is too limited to do what we claim it does and suggest that there may be readily available frameworks that can be applied to modify the foundation that better achieve desired outcomes. To the extent that this is a paradigmatic shift, it may likely receive a fair deal of criticism, some founded and some not.
There are, in fact, strong claims that even I find difficult to posit at times. But I bring them forth anyway, not out of recklessness, but out of genuine concern that failure to think through the implications and significance of decisions made at all levels and by all parties involved, may result in regrettable outcomes that work against tribal self-determination. Moreover, acknowledging the limits of the path that we are on and/or, in some cases, acknowledging that the path is not mutually beneficial for all tribes, means that we can have a moment to clarify what exactly we are aiming toward and self-consciously chart the path to get there. Of course, there are various paths leading to the same outcome, and cases in Alaska and on the Canadian-US border are testament to the viability of such alternatives.
For my part, there are two important and related critiques to lodge at this book that I find most compelling (though I am sure more will be raised). First, I think that the most significant deficit is that I am not knowledgeable enough to draw on traditional indigenous principles of intergovernmental relations and cannot bring them to bear meaningfully in this discussion. My graduate studies were an introduction and intensive acclamation to law and political theory of the West, and the particular disciplinary approach of political science also colors the way I think about power relations between and among people and polities. Second, I am dismissive of a reliance on sovereignty not only because I do not find it applicable, but also because it is a concept that emerges out of Western political theory, and yet I do the same thing: I look to alternative concepts within the same context. That said, I believe the approach to restructuring sovereignty as constitutive is an effort to identify applicable principles, though they be at least partly Western, that inform the process of institution-building, as well as enhance and protect freedom for tribal peoples. Thus, it is my intention that this book should intersect practice, law, and theory in the context of speaking about the place of American Indian tribes in the United States. To the extent it accomplishes anything proximate to that, I will be satisfied.
Acknowledgments
It goes without saying – and yet must still be explicitly stated – that my ability to complete this work is as much a function of the effort and commitment of others as it is of my own doing. This is so much the case that any attempt to take exclusive credit for the completion of this work would be false and without merit. About the only thing I did on my own was to type these characters onto the page; their order, meaning, and direction are all a function of engagements and observations made in concert with others far more knowledgeable and experienced than me, and the time to put it together also came at the expense of others. The content of the work is, of course, not something I can assign credit or blame to others for, as much as I may want to, and thus is mine to own.
I will first acknowledge several of the intellectual contributors to this work. As much of this book is based on my dissertation project at the University of Chicago, I will highlight individuals who helped me generate new ways of looking at the existing political landscape, and who at the same time also pushed and challenged me to defend my own ideas. Michael Dawson, Jacob T. Levy, Iris Marion Young, Gerald Rosenberg, Robert Gooding-Williams, and my cohort of peers in the PhD program were instrumental in this process. Rosenberg was instrumental in supporting me to cast a potentially controversial claim that runs the risk of offending the very communities that I am a part of and which I seek to engage. This is something he himself sought to do in The Hollow Hope (Chicago University Press, 1991). Dawson, like Young, stretched the expanse of my thinking to consider the range and types of activities that myriad actors play in the work. Levy and Gooding-Williams provided keen insights into the matters at hand and both served as inspiration and antagonist at various points in the manuscript’s development. Lastly, my peers, who have gone on to become professors and researchers themselves: Mara Marin, Deva WoodlyDavis, Jennifer Anne London, Vanessa Tyson, Victor Muniz-Fraticelli, Melvin Schut, and many others. Our intellectual development together has left a lasting mark on my thinking and most certainly on my approach to the subject matter.
It is the Chicago strain, well infused in my blood, which allows me to proffer up the central thesis of this book. I take the power of the strain to be the constant critique of prevailing discourse with a push against tacit acceptance of conceptual parameters and norms. I further take the strain to require a robust defense of a new thesis even if such a defense raises more questions than answers, as is the case herein. The faculty members mentioned here and my cadre of colleagues never held back and I appreciate them for their insistence, persistence, and camaraderie in engaging me on matters of tribal sovereignty. As an intellectual exercise, this book’s roots are defined by my experiences in Chicago’s political science department and I am forever indebted to the individuals and the institution.
Straddling both intellectual and personal contributions to the completion of this work, my husband, Doowan Lee, deserves particular recognition. Doowan, also a graduate of the political science program and perhaps much less cynical than me, can always be counted on for framing and structuring complex matters into manageable forms. The intellectual power and might of his processor is far stronger than most and most certainly stronger than mine. I benefit greatly from having him near to bounce ideas off and also for the express purpose of figuring out how to structure those ideas. Moreover, as my partner in life, Doowan has shared the logistical burden of this book by providing steadfast support of my professional endeavors. From coordinating ever-changing childcare and school pick-ups for our children, to proofreading proposals and drafts, Doowan has served double-duty as father and coconspirator over the past several years. Additionally, Doowan’s parents, Junghee Han and Byunghyuck Lee, provided significant emotional and financial support throughout our time together and in support of our work and family. We are forever grateful for their unwaivering commitment to us. For his part, Doowan is perhaps the least visible, and yet most important influence on this work.
The initial inspiration for this book came when I worked for California Indian Legal Services as a public policy fellow in their Washington, DC office. Then Executive Director Michael Pfeffer gave me full reign to integrate myself into the DC Indian network and to help facilitate education and outreach around issues impacting California tribes. I was also just starting my graduate work in political science. It was during this period that I began to question the relevance and application of political science to the world of Indian affairs as I saw the limits of the existing subfields of theory and American politics. These observations were even more pronounced when I later returned to DC as a legislative fellow for the National Congress of American Indians. There, I worked under the exceptional leadership of Jacqueline Pata and her legislative director, Heather Dawn Thompson. Both of these organizations allowed me to see the way in which political actors operate at the federal level, directly impacting the lives of individual Indian people throughout the country as well as the scope and depth of tribal governmental powers. I am grateful to both of these organizations for helping me in innumerable ways, most significantly
in providing exceptional access to their knowledge and resources, all of which inform this work.
There are several other key supporters who must not go unrecognized. Particularly, Anne Terry Straus (a retired anthropologist from the University of Chicago) provided exceptional and unconditional support of my efforts, though not always of my ideas, for which I am also grateful. As my “Chicago mom,” Terry supported me as my sounding board, introduced me to the local native community, made sure I never drowned in my sorrows (which can happen to a Californian enduring those long Midwest winters), and even helped cover the costs for rehabilitation when, as a graduate student, I struggled with debilitating carpal tunnel and tendonitis. Years before Terry, however, I met with and was inspired by a young, newly minted PhD in political science, Joely Proudfit (De La Torre). As a faculty member at San Francisco State University, Joely was the first California Indian professor I had ever met, and certainly the first in political science. She is the reason I went to graduate school in the discipline, and her mentorship is the reason I became a professor. She is an outstanding, brilliant woman whose capacity to fight back no matter the challenge still amazes me to this day. She is a trailblazer in many ways and while I have little doubt she, too, may disagree with some of my positions in this book, my capacity to take those positions at all is in part a reflection of her courage.
The institution and community of scholars at the University of San Francisco has supported more recent efforts to complete this book. From travel funding for conferences to discuss individual chapters, to an early sabbatical to complete revisions, the faculty union and Deans Marcelo Camperi and Pamela Balls-Organista in the College of Arts and Sciences have provided safe cover for me to make successive improvements to the work. Additionally, the faculty of the sociology and politics departments has provided incredible mentoring, guiding me as I sought to find balance between the professional pillars of teaching, research, and service, and the most important purpose of all: family life. To this end I owe the following individuals a debt of gratitude for their love and support in this process: Stephanie Sears, Hwaji Shin, James Lance Taylor, Shalendra Sharma, Jay Gonzalez, Annick Wibben, and Brian Weiner.
My children were both born during the writing of this book. I lost my mother after her fourth battle with cancer right as the book entered the revisions process, and gained a niece who will carry my own name just as the final manuscript was submitted for publication. I have moved four times and packed and unpacked boxes of books in two different offices, baked a million cookies and at least ten birthday cakes for the kids, adopted a fierce guard dog and snake, mentored countless students and helped them navigate their college life, and have finally found recluse living two-and-a-half hours away from work (four hours with traffic) in a nature preserve on the coast of Central California. It’s been a busy and fruitful time, filled with loss and love, and finally contentment just at the moment that we enter a new period of uncertainty in American politics.
Anyone who knows me well knows my “first” tribe is “California Indian” because to explain the story of my family lineage means to talk about the mission system, unratified treaties, unrecognized tribes, internal tribal dynamics around enrollment, and so forth. So while my bloodline is yak tityu tityu Chumash from the Avila and Pismo Beach areas, and Tachi Yokut, much of my family and life is centered in and around the Yurok and Karuk communities where I was born. Having moved closer to my familial homeland in recent years, I can appreciate the amazing and fantastic work that is going on in the region in an effort to ensure cultural survival and maintenance in the absence of political recognition and basic tribal rights. The hard work of unrecognized tribes to provide a place and space for community and culture is accomplished through unrelenting commitment and a great deal of love and caring by a handful of individuals who dedicate their lives to it. While my work focuses on the political dynamics of tribes, their daily work is focused on ensuring a vibrant cultural life for current and future generations. In many ways, the purpose of political recognition is to secure such a space for tribes. For her exceptional leadership in recovering, fostering, and sharing her love of our people’s culture, I want to particularly thank my cousin Leah Mata Fragua for her contributions to building our community.
With deep gratitude to my families and communities, Kouslaa
The Conceptual Limits of Tribal Sovereignty
The primary goal and need of Indians today is not for someone to feel sorry for us and claim descent from Pocahontas to make us feel better. Nor do we need to be classified as semi-white and have programs and policies made to bleach us further. Nor do we need further studies to see if we are feasible. We need a new policy by Congress acknowledging our right to live in peace, free from arbitrary harassment . . . What we need is a cultural leave-us alone agreement, in spirit and in fact.
– Vine Deloria, Jr1
How do we create a policy that protects and enables Indian freedom? Writing in 1969, Deloria makes it clear that such a policy had not yet taken hold. Indians remained vulnerable to the actions of others and no “cultural leave-us alone” policies or agreements had been crafted at the federal level to better protect tribes. In the more than three decades that have passed, has Deloria’s call for such a change been met? Do Indians enjoy this vision of freedom today? No. In spite of a clear shift in federal-level policy toward support for Indian self-determination, Indian tribes do not enjoy the freedom from arbitrary interference that Deloria sought. In this book, I will argue that Indian freedom cannot, in fact, be procured through modest – or even robust – policy changes at the federal level. At least not yet and not in the form Deloria calls for. Rather, what must change first is the theoretic framework that defines what freedom for Indians is, and second the related issue of the vehicle through which it can be actualized. And that vehicle is not a claim for sovereignty in the form of its usual invocation. In the account of many scholars, Deloria included, freedom for Indians (and sovereignty for tribes) is synonymous with independence and autonomy from others. As I will show, this form of freedom is untenable as it relies too heavily on the benevolence of federal actors while retaining the
1 Custer Died for Your Sins, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988.
structural imbalances in power that are already in place and that provide little remedy or recourse for arbitrary harassment. Instead, I will turn toward theories of federalism and republicanism in this text to proffer a more secure foundation upon which to construct relations of interdependence. It will be known as the constitutive theory of tribal sovereignty.
Interdependence ought to define both the normative and pragmatic limits of freedom and sovereignty for any state or political entity, including tribal governments. To start by talking about limits to freedom may seem counterintuitive, but let me be clear that this book aims to secure the space for community and culture that Deloria seeks through the incremental incorporation of tribes as domestic political entities – or subunits – in the US federation. I believe that joining the federal matrix is the best way to secure a stable position from which tribes can enjoy freedom from arbitrary interference by others. What constitutes arbitrary interference and the best ways to bind it from impeding the freedom of Indian communities, political and cultural, is at the heart of this book. At their best, arrangements made available through federalism can offer tribes protections from incursion and mitigate interactions with the states and federal entities in a way that the current framework does not allow for. At its worst, federalism can be made to work against tribes by structuring domination. I incorporate republicanism as a frame to explicitly counter conditions of domination that may emerge in a federal arrangement. Freedom to do anything, including the practice of culture in daily life, cannot be procured and maintained under the current conditions where tribal authorities are constantly under attack by federal and state actors, in many and varied forms. Reliance on antiquated notions of what freedom and sovereignty are ensures that tribes will remain vulnerable to outsiders. In short, and perhaps ironically, an effective “cultural leave-us alone agreement” cannot be achieved without abandoning the precept of sovereignty as it is commonly understood. This is as true for nation-states now engaged in federation-building at the level of international governance as it is for tribes, whose position is notably weaker.
The Recent History of Federal Indian Policy
Since the era of Indian self-determination began under President Nixon, tribal governments have received increasing federal funding and policy support to build their capacity for self-governance. As a matter of policy, this era marked a transition from overarching federal control and administration in Indian Country to acknowledging and empowering tribes to assert authorities and serve governance functions that had gone untapped for some time. From a tribal perspective, this new era ushered in both the recognition of their capacity for self-governance and an opportunity to exercise powers that had been heretofore stymied by the federal government’s bureaucratic malaise, conflicting federal court decisions, and congressional policies.
At nearly the same time, the federal government (first under Nixon and continuing under President Reagan) began taking steps to devolve much of its administrative capacity for federal programs and grants to state governments.2 As a matter of course, these twin efforts – which, on the one hand recognized tribal rights of self-government, and, on the other, decentralized many federal functions to state governments – resulted in increased regulatory and jurisdictional conflict between tribes and states. Importantly, the federal government’s long-standing position as the shield and protector of tribes against state incursions was not revisited in the context of these changes. The guardian role, which had been established in treaties and their subsequent interpretation, remained at the heart of federal Indian law. It is the reason the federal government has the capacity to act at all in Indian affairs. But it had not anticipated the effect that these shifts in policy would have on the relationships between tribes and states, and the federal government has seen its role as guardian begin to change.
This new era of increased engagement between tribes and states is termed “the era of forced federalism” by Jeff Corntassel and Richard C. Witmer in their work of the same name, Forced Federalism: Contemporary Challenges to Indigenous Nationhood. 3 Lamenting the diminished role of the nation-to-nation model of engagement as understood as an exclusive relationship between tribes and the federal government, Corntassel and Witmer suggest that tribes are becoming increasingly subject to the whims of non-Indian public opinion, which is in turn being manipulated by states to secure political gains in their tussles with tribes. This “politics of perception” has forced tribes to focus their attention on combating non-Indian perceptions of tribes and individual Indians, and to invest significant resources into US electoral politics. According to this account, tribes become little more than interest groups subject to the political agenda of non-Indians and, in many ways, are mere observers to their political fortunes.
Corntassel and Witmer clearly articulate the expected paradigm in Indian law and policy that tribes should in fact and principle only engage the federal government (and, if necessary, international political bodies). Any deviation from this expectation is considered a potential threat to tribal sovereignty, and should be entered into only with great caution. The increasing engagement with states is a particularly troubling threat for tribes as states are, by definition, not sovereigns in the way that tribes consider themselves to be. Moreover, states all share a long history of aggression toward Indian people and tribal sovereignty. From Corntassel and Witmer’s perspective, one of the biggest threats to tribal sovereignty today is the role the perceptions of non-Indians play on what tribes
2 For a cursory overview of this phenomenon, see Chapter 1 in Jeffrey S. Ashley and Secody J. Hubbard, Negotiated Sovereignty: Working to Improve Tribal-State Relations, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004.
3 Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008.
can and cannot do. And indeed, it does appear that non-Natives are impacting tribal politics, often only indirectly, through pressure on their own state and local elected officials. But should non-Native populations’ perspectives be inconsequential to tribal decision-making processes?
This matter of the relationship between tribes and their non-Native neighbors will be taken up throughout this book. I intend to redirect Corntassel and Witmer’s concerns by focusing on the state and local government structures as vehicles for the expression of local non-Native anxieties toward tribes. Ironically, perhaps, it is the recognition and exercise of tribal governing powers that brings tribes to the attention of non-Natives, and their governments. I believe that federalism is the best tool to structure interactions between tribes and non-Natives such that the interests of each can be taken seriously. Sorting through these relationships is largely taken up in Chapters 2 and 3.
Definitions: Self-Governance, Self-Determination, and Tribal Sovereignty
This book takes seriously the ways in which the activities and goals of tribal self-determination and self-governance are bound up with those of state and local polities. The nature of self-governance generally, and economic development activities particularly, carry implications not just for tribal polities, but for non-tribal polities as well.4 Cooperation, responsiveness, and communication with state and local governments become increasingly important for the attainment of tribal self-sufficiency, self-governance, and future-oriented self-determination.
The role of the federal government as the guardian of tribes has yet to undergo sufficient scrutiny in the self-determination era. Re-examining the role of the federal government shows that tribal polities remain in an ambiguous structural position where federal actors are permitted to interfere arbitrarily and exercise domination over tribes. Self-determination, therefore, remains elusive. The federal government’s hold on plenary authority over Indian affairs does more harm than its role as guardian does good, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. So long as these conditions remain, I argue, tribes will lack the ability to be self-determining and self-governance is likely to be short-lived, if lived well at all. I propose that the systematic and institutional disadvantages plaguing tribes can largely be relieved through the recognition of tribes as subunits within the US federal matrix. This may be the only way to bind Congress’s plenary power and to structure meaningful political and institutional power for tribes. I will elaborate on these points shortly.
4 For an example of how increased economic activity and economic independence may result in attacks on tribal “political autonomy,” see Jessica R. Cattelino’s discussion of the Seminole nation in High Stakes: Florida Seminole Gaming and Sovereignty, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008.
I construct sovereignty, self-governance, and self-determination as separate and distinguishable concepts. I take self-governance to be the practices and activities of day-to-day governing, the limits of which are usually demarcated along jurisdictional lines recognized by other self-governing entities. As an ideal, tribal self-governance would be marked by the authority of tribes to determine their own internal policies in balance with the needs and demands placed on them by externally located polities. This does not mean that any particular non-tribal polity exercises authority over, or even a veto power against, internal tribal decision-making that may impact them. Rather, self-governance is intended to denote those areas of internal decision-making that may be subject to direct negotiation between polities. The concept of self-governance, then, structures responsiveness to others in recognition of relations of dependency between subunits.
Self-determination, on the other hand, regards the ability of tribes to construct and pursue their own goals with the reasonable expectation that they will not be subject to arbitrary interference from other polities. It is distinct from self-governance in two ways: first, self-determination is future-orientated and concerned with the capacity of tribes to develop a vision for their community. Second, self-determination does not demand a measure of responsiveness to externally located actors, as is the case with self-governance. In other words, self-determination is the internal processes of tribal creation and planning for the future. It is a space for constructing meaning and purpose without the direct input and consideration of others. It is not necessarily a governmental process at all and rather it regards the internal dialogue of the tribe. While it is likely that tribes engaged in long-term visioning for their communities will consider the relative positions of others, self-determination does not demand such responsiveness. Self-governance regards the process of negotiating mutually recognized legal boundaries, while self-determination regards the conditions necessary for self-development and visioning. The primary condition that enables self-development and visioning is the absence of arbitrary interference. Selfdetermination, then, is a form of freedom from arbitrary interference for tribes. Yet another distinction exists between self-governance and self-determination. Tribal self-governance may result in the protection and securing of culture, but cultural distinctiveness is not a prerequisite for, nor is it dependent on, the existence of a tribal polity. Tribes with few distinctive or uniquely “Indian” characteristics exercise self-governance in ways akin to those tribes with considerably more “traditional” Indian characteristics; and both do so through recognized institutions, which are more often than not democratic institutions. As a normative matter, I believe self-governance should not be dependent upon the degree of cultural distinctiveness of the tribe, though this is not a universally accepted position among scholars in Indian studies.5
5 The right of self-governance is brought into question by some non-Indian observers who have confused the political right as a cultural right, arguing that because some tribal peoples appear, at least materially, to have become “non-Indians,” they have, therefore, lost the right to maintain
Self-determination, on the other hand, should establish a protected space for cultural development. No doubt, one of the primary purposes for securing self-governance is to promote and live within the cultural community of the tribe. However, self-governance regards the institutional capacities of the tribe, not necessarily the cultural elements. It is within the confines of the concept of self-determination for indigenous peoples that I propose we discuss the degree of cultural flourishing.
It is the case, of course, that the institutions of government impact and reflect the internal operations of tribal cultures. Leading Native scholar Taiaiake Alfred states that the “great hope” for pursuing self-governance is that the new systems will “embody the underlying cultural values of the communities” and that – by the same token – “the great fear is that they will simply replicate non-indigenous systems.”6 In his work, Alfred articulates a vision of what Native self-governance ought to look like, with a particular emphasis on its “non-European-ness.” To be clear, my project is not entirely interested in the content of tribal self-governance, but the relationships of governments to one another within the context and conditions of tribes in the United States. A consequence, however, of bringing tribes into greater federation with states, is some degree and standardization of practices for their interaction, which may reflect a “non-indigenous” approach (a form of institutional assimilation). I address the consequences of increasing federation at a later point in this book. Indigenous cultures face numerous obstacles to their flourishing in the face of dominant non-indigenous cultures, and this is particularly acute without a secure political sphere in which to exist. That said, the starting point for this work takes the majority of tribes in the United States to have already secured a legal (albeit amorphous) right to self-governance, as recognized since the founding of the nation and continuing today. I will not enter debates about whether tribes ought to have a right to self-government, or the related debate over whether such a right is dependent on the existence of tribal cultures. I accept, acknowledge, and support the right of tribes to self-government and tackle, instead, the ways in which that self-governance and self-determination are unnecessarily constrained.
What, then, is tribal sovereignty? While Chapter 2 discusses the concept in much greater depth, what follows is a brief description differentiating the concept from self-governance, self-determination, and other conceptions of tribal sovereignty. As I have suggested above, tribal sovereignty has to date been largely understood as a slightly modified version of nation-state sovereignty, where modifications include things such as the capacity of tribes to engage in external relations with any government other than the federal government.
their existence within a separate political space. See also Cattelino’s discussion of the relationship between cultural production and economic enterprises, ibid.
6 Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power and Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto, Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press, 1999.
In these accounts, tribal sovereignty is different from nation-state sovereignty insofar as its diminishments have come about through treaty agreements. These agreements denote the geographic boundaries of the tribes and the responsibilities of the federal government for providing particular and specific items to them, but say little to nothing about the expected form of internal governance and controls within the tribe. Conceptually, a robust version of tribal sovereignty following this line of thinking is merely adherence to the original agreements laid out between tribes and the federal government. Preservation of the treaty agreements would retain separate, autonomous spheres for tribes. This version of tribal sovereignty does not recognize as legitimate all of the subsequent Supreme Court decisions and Acts of Congress that have served to undermine tribal autonomy, and only recognizes as legitimate those Acts and decisions that conform to the dictates of treaties. The decisions and statutes that do conform collectively come to comprise the various facets of the federal trust doctrine.7 Tribal sovereignty is, therefore, considered the foundational and most essential principle in Indian affairs, and also the important line of defense in protecting tribal freedom as it is thought to enable self-governance and self-determination.
Following an argument posed by Jacob T. Levy, I adopt the reasoning that sovereignty is a problematic way “to conceive of indigenous rights today,” and follow him at least insofar as he claims that constitutionalism offers a “more promising” foundation, along with adherence to common law and principles of neo-republicanism to stem the tide of plenary power, all of which I will present later in the work.8 For Levy’s part, he rightly identifies the terms of sovereignty employed,9 as being born out of, and in relation to, the imperial projects of European nations that, in part, defined themselves against what they were encountering. By claiming that indigenous people existed in variously defined “states of nature,” without politics or polities, and, therefore, in an immoral condition without use of sufficient rational faculties to will themselves out of it, social contractarians usefully devised an understanding of indigenous people that they could juxtapose against themselves, and to their own great benefit. Such a rendering of indigenous peoples enabled the structuring of relations of domination that continue to exist today.
The concept of nationhood remains vibrant for many tribal peoples. As cultural and political communities, tribal peoples exhibit the primary defining
7 Stephen Pevar, “The Federal–Tribal Trust Relationship: Its Origin, Nature, and Scope,” CA Water Plan Update, Vol. 4, 2009.
8 Jacob T. Levy, n.d. “Indigenous Rights, Modern Political Concepts, and the State,” working paper, 2: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1904671 (last accessed April 2017).
9 This is the Weberian state with a territorially sharply bounded jurisdiction, a monopoly within those bounds on the legitimate use of force within them, and a professional bureaucratic class and army paid for out of an impersonal corporate public fisc; and it is the Westphalian state, partly constituted by mutual recognition as an independent equal in a system of states. Levy, n.d., 4
features of nations – namely that they act or seek to act with an “underlying unity of consciousness.” Additionally, nations (or nationhood) share the territorial features of states, thus behaving “as a political actor and agent that is at least the potential bearer of a state.”10 A final characteristic Levy attributes to nationhood is that it contains a logic of “unity and exclusivity,” though he rejects the application of the concept to indigenous people in part because he views that nationhood’s deep historical and conceptual entanglement with statehood as leading away from indigenous rights claims and not being reflective or sufficient to address them.11 Federalism has served as a tool, as I shall reference later in this work, to structure relationships between political entities that do not stand as equals (in that some may not hold the exclusive, unitary, and monopolistic characteristics of states), yet which might be considered separate nations, even or especially if they aspire to statehood.
Constitutionalism, on the other hand, serves as an entrance to discussions of federalism, as it is in the body of a constitution that federal relationships can take concrete form. Levy takes Montesquieu as the philosopher most relevant to building this theoretical framework and suggests, contrary to James Tully, that constitutionalism can be understood as a way of navigating pluralistic conditions.12 Of course, the constitutionalism that Levy is referencing is exactly that which took hold in the United States and which was initially employed to navigate the divisions between colonies and create a unified nation-state. The federation (and confederation before it) was premised on the recognition of the status of colonies as pre-existing political communities, and explicitly did not, say, include tribes. My point here is to indicate that federations are constituted by pre-existing sovereigns and not in the absence of them. This point will become more relevant as the constitutive theory unfolds.
The constitutive theory of tribal sovereignty, as will be articulated in this book, recognizes that tribes exist not as autonomous polities that retain powers as a function of their pre-colonial existence, but as interdependent, distinctive polities – nations – that ought to constitute their political existence strategically within the US federation as equals to state governments. The premise that tribal authority stems from pre-colonial existence is not rejected, but I do not take it as sufficient for defending tribal rights in the contemporary era. Tribal sovereignty is the structured form of self-determination and self-governance as it embodies both normative and pragmatic elements. Its normative purpose is
10 Levy, n.d., 15.
11 Ibid.: “[T]he concept of the nation developed as a concept for modern Europeans, emphatically not one for the differently-organized parts of the non-European world.”
12 Though for thinking about federalism, we likely need look no further than the Haudenosaunee confederation. Given that the point here has more to do with the conceptual inheritance that we find ourselves in today as nations within a nation-state, I follow Levy’s lead. In regard to Tully (1995), Levy diverges from him insofar as Tully reads constitutionalism as invested in the social contractarian tradition and, thus, hostile and incompatible with indigenous political communities.
the preservation and protection of tribal freedom and internal flourishing, and pragmatically it functions through institutionalized government relations. The constitutive theory relies on the distinctive features of self-determination and self-governance that I described above, as it is the unifying concept that brings them together. Significantly, the constitutive theory derives animating principles from theories of freedom within the republican tradition, as well as from theories of federalism that aim to structure relations between polities.
The future of tribal self-determination is being tested in the current era as a result of the political and legal contexts in which increased tribal administration and governance are occurring. Tribes need a new paradigm and conceptual framework to work from in order to better secure the right of self-government. Paradoxically, the greatest conceptual constraint on self-governance for tribes is, I argue, antiquated definitions of tribal sovereignty. By operating from the idea that tribes are extant sovereigns, the goal and outcome of tribal political and intergovernmental activities focus on recapturing as much of a nation-state form of sovereignty as possible, against the states and the federal government. But this form of sovereignty is not only impossible to attain, it is undesirable as well, and I will take up the limits and possibilities of this version of tribal sovereignty shortly. The constitutive theory shows us the way forward and gives tribes the best chance of attaining the protected space for tribal flourishing and freedom that Deloria referenced.
The Trouble with Sovereignty Outline
This first chapter aims to present some of the ways in which the current model of tribal sovereignty fails to support self-governance and self-determination as a matter of practice, the challenges facing tribes, and why a new model must be constructed to better secure the political position of tribes as governments for the future. Chapter 2 presents the constitutive theory of tribal sovereignty in greater depth and examines the problems and paradoxes inherent to traditional concepts of tribal sovereignty, with a focus on the limits placed on the concept in the context of federal Indian law. I argue against concepts of sovereignty currently in use, noting that they may harm the pursuit of tribal selfdetermination because they render tribes vulnerable, weak, and are founded on conceptually unstable ground. I also address recent concerns raised by scholars regarding the potential harm incorporation and federalism might do to tribal governments. An extensive discussion of these issues is warranted because I believe federalism should be taken seriously in theory and practice by tribal law and policy scholars and practitioners. It has, thus far, been rejected outright as it is assumed that a determining feature of tribal sovereignty is that it existed prior to the US federation and, therefore, cannot be incorporated into it. Recognizing the extant sovereignty of tribes, then, is the only way to secure tribal rights. It is my goal to demonstrate that we can appeal to new configurations and ideas without relying exclusively on treaties and that it is not a
luxury but a necessity that we do this, given the limits and constraints this reliance commits us to.
Chapter 2 assesses the potential of federalism, republicanism, and democratic theory to secure self-governance and self-determination for tribes. I evaluate the limits of democratic theory for this purpose, and argue that federalism offers up the ability to do what many democratic theorists are attempting to do (such as secure non-domination for tribal governments), as well as ensure a longer, more stable institutional position for tribes as governments than democratic theory alone can provide. To demonstrate some of the limits and possibilities of democratic theory and federalism, I examine how both theories are playing out in contemporary political contexts in Chapters 3 and 5.
Chapter 3 further considers the ability of the constitutive theory, and particularly agreement-making, to strengthen and secure tribal self-governance and self-determination. I examine the recent history of tribal–state relations and show how agreement-making has become the dominant form for formalizing intergovernmental interactions and setting up mutually agreed-upon expectations. Agreement-making is also the clearest example of the processes of federalization that are moving tribes from extra-constitutional political entities into subunits of the federal polity. Briefly, while two centuries of Indian law have attempted to create and maintain separation between tribes and non-federal entities, the past three decades of federal devolutionary policies for states and self-governance policies for tribes have created horizontal frameworks for engagement, a product of the day-to-day governance activities of both. These processes have taken, most predominately, the form of tribal–state memoranda of agreement, bind only one or a few tribes and a state, and are usually quite narrow in their scope (i.e. they address the distribution of a single natural resource, such as water). The proliferation of these agreements reflects the strength and possibility of tribal self-governance as tribes are exercising their self-governance prerogatives, though the relative position of tribes in the United States as a result of the complexities of federal Indian law makes the stability and foundation of agreements limited and questionable. These agreements are evidence of the process of federalization as well as the strength and potential of federalism for addressing tribal selfgovernance and self-determination.
Chapter 4 examines the implications of the constitutive theory for the relationship between tribes and the federal government. The constitutive theory opens the door for more expansive relations with states and it must also account for how the role of the federal government should change under these new conditions. Currently, the exclusive relationship between tribes and the federal government (in theory, though not in practice, as Chapter 3 demonstrates) must be revisited as the federal role as “guardian” and chief arbitrary interferer is diminished through the constitutive theory. Additionally, I address the role that treaties ought to play in thinking through rights and responsibilities for tribes and the federal government.
The constitutive theory also makes significant contributions to help explain how tribes as polities and Indians in their capacities as individuals have become increasingly entrenched in democratic and electoral politics in the United States. In Chapter 5 I examine the participation of individual Indians and tribes in state and federal electoral politics. Through participation, tribes and individual Indians are actively engaged in the shaping of domestic and intergovernmental policies that matter to self-governance. I present a typology of Indian participation that enables us to structure our discussion of how and with whom tribes are engaging politically. This participation is evidence of both democratic and federal incorporation, and I demonstrate that, while such participation is valuable, agreement-making processes are more valuable than participatory politics for tribal governments insofar as they ensure greater institutional security and protection from majority tyranny in non-Indian democratic politics.
To conclude, Chapter 6 presents some of the implications the constitutive theory holds for structuring tribal relations with other polities. Importantly, this chapter begins the process of articulating how the constitutive theory might inform the structuring of institutions, though in no way, shape, or form completes this process. While theorists of federalism have long held the United States as the model of a constitutionally symmetrical, stable democracy, the rise of new subunits in the federation challenges this perception. If federalism is the direction tribes elect to pursue, then the United States may, indeed, need to embrace asymmetrical federalism to accommodate meaningful self-determination and self-governance for tribes. Many of the issues raised herein are left largely unanswered and are the foundations for discussion as well as for my next work.
Challenges to Tribal Self-Governance and Self-Determination
To better understand the reasons why tribal sovereignty needs to be recast, I will briefly highlight two common areas of conflict between tribes and states that have come up in the past several decades, namely gaming and environmental issues. Conflict over these issues has developed in the context of the “era of self-determination” where tribes have been empowered and recognized by the federal government, but where the lack of clarity regarding the relation between tribal and state sovereignty has only been magnified.
Gaming: Tribal gaming is one issue area where tribes, federal, state, and local political actors are constantly engaging one another.13 Should a tribe pursue
13 The Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act (IGRA) of 1988, 25 USC 2701–2721 (2000), is the relevant governing law. Twenty-five years after passage, there are over 200 compacts between tribes and twenty-plus states. Thanks, in part, to the duration of compacting, scholars are just beginning to assess the overall impact of mandated agreement-making on states and tribes, and the role of the federal government in this process. There are many different factors that can be
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Title: Itinerarium curiosum (centuria II) or, an account of the antiquities, and remarkable curiosities in nature or art, observed in travels through Great Britain. To which is added, the Itinerary of Richard of Cirencester, monk of Westminster. With an account of that author and his work
Author: William Stukeley
Dubious author: of Cirencester Richard
Forger: Charles Bertram
Release date: January 29, 2024 [eBook #72806]
Language: English
Original publication: London: Baker and Leigh, 1776
Credits: Tim Lindell, Robert Tonsing, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
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MAPPA BRITTANIÆ FACIEI ROMANÆ
SECVNDVM FIDEM MONVMENTORVM
PERVETERVM DEPICTA
Tabulam hanc Geographicam Antiquitatis Patriæ Cimelium celeberrimo viro Gulielmo Stukeley M.D., C.L.M., F.R.S. cet observantiæ testandæ ergo D. D. Carolus Bertramus 1755.
C. Bertramus ipse delin: ab Orig: & sculpsit.
ITINERARIUM CURIOSUM: OR, AN ACCOUNT OF THE ANTIQUITIES, AND REMARKABLE
C U R I O S I T I E S IN
N A T U R E OR A R T,
OBSERVED IN TRAVELS THROUGH
G R E A T B R I T A I N. ILLUSTRATED WITH COPPER PLATES. C E N T U R I A II. TO WHICH IS ADDED, The I of R of C , M O N K W E S T M I N S T E R.
With an ACCOUNT of that AUTHOR and his WORK.
By WILLIAM STUKELEY, M.D. F.R. & A.S.
O quam te memorem, quantum juvat usque morari
Mirarique tuæ spectacula plurima terræ!
L O N D O N:
Printed for Messrs. B and L , in York-Street, Covent-Garden.
M.DCC.LXXVI.
Table of Contents.
ADVERTISEMENT
The BRILL, Cæsar’s Camp at Pancras. ITER BOREALE.
RICARDI MONACHI LIBER PRIMUS.
RICARDI MONACHI LIBER SECUNDUS.
RICHARD OF CIRENCESTER I.
RICHARD OF CIRENCESTER II.
RICHARD OF CIRENCESTER III.
NOTÆ in CAP. I. et II. LIBRI PRIMI.
THE WEDDINGS.
INDEX
INDEX COMMENTARIOLUM GEOGRAPHICUM THE PLATES
ADVERTISEMENT.
THAT Dr. Stukeley had altered the plan of his intended History of the antient Celts, &c. mentioned in the Preface of the former part of this work, plainly appears by his publishing Stonehenge and Abury separately: but, as many of the Plates he left unpublished were undoubtedly intended for that Work, and others for a Second Volume of the Itinerarium, neither of which were ever completed; the Editor hopes it will give pleasure to the Learned to see those Plates, together with such of his Tracts as relate to them, collected into one Volume, and that they will be found not altogether unworthy of their attention;—sensible however that the many defects which must unavoidably happen in publishing a Posthumous Collection from loose papers, and notes carelessly thrown together, will stand in need of their candid indulgence.
The Itinerary of Richard of Cirencester, together with Dr. Stukeley’s Account of, and Observations upon it, were thought by some Friends of the Doctor a very proper addition. It is a tract truly valuable for the new light it has thrown on the study of British Antiquities, and being out of print is now become very scarce.
It may be expected that some account should in this place be given of the Author, and his Works. A Catalogue of those which have appeared in print we subjoin; and for his Life we refer the reader to Mr. Masters’s History of Benet College, Cambridge, printed in quarto, 1753; adding only, that he died March 3d, 1765, in his 78th year, and was buried in the church-yard of East-Ham in Essex, having ordered by his will that no memorial of him should be erected there.
A CATALOGUE of Dr. STUKELEY’s Printed WORKS.
4to. An Account of Arthur’s Oon and the Roman Vallum in 1720
Scotland
Fol. Lecture on the Spleen 1722
Fol. Itinerarium Curiosum 1724
12mo. A Treatise on the Cause and Cure of the Gout 1734
4to. An Explanation of a Silver Plate found at Risley in Derbyshire 1736
4to. Palæographia Sacra, No. 1. or Discourses on the Monuments of Antiquity that relate to Sacred History 1736
Fol. Stonehenge, a Temple restored to the British Druids 1740
4to. A Sermon preached before the House of Commons, 30 Jan. 1741 1741
Fol. Abury, a Temple restored to the British Druids 1743
4to. Palæographia Britannica, No. 1. or Discourses on Monuments of Antiquity that relate to British History 1743
4to. Palæographia Britannica, No. 2. 1746
A Philosophic Hymn on Easter-Day 1748
Verses on the Death of the Duke of Montagu 1749
4to. A Sermon before the College of Physicians, 20 Sept. 1750
4to. Palæographia Britannica, No. 3. 1751
An Account of Lesnes Abbey, read before the Antiquarian Society, 12 April, 1753, and published in the Archæologia
An Account of the Eclipse predicted by Thales, published in Phil. Trans. Vol. 48
An Account of the Sanctuary at Westminster, published in the Archæologia 1755
12mo. The Philosophy of Earthquakes, 2 parts 1755
4to. Palæographia Britannica, No. 3.
4to. Medallic History of Carausius, Emperor in Britain, part 1. 1757
4to. Medallic History of Carausius, part 2. 1759
4to. Palæographia Sacra, No. 2. 1763
4to. A Letter from Dr. Stukeley to Mr. Macpherson on his 1763
publication of Fingal and Temora, with a Print of Cathmor’s Shield
Several Moral Papers in the Inspector.
He was also engaged, at the time of his death, in a work entitled the Medallic History of the antient Kings of Britain; and had engraved 23 Plates of their Coins, which were published by his Executor; but the Manuscript was too imperfect to be given to the Public.
61·2d . Stukely desig dec 1758
CAESAR’S Camp called the Brill at PANCRAS.
The BRILL, C ’ C at Pancras.
October 1758.
MANY and large volumes have been written on the celebrated city of London, which now, beyond doubt, for magnitude, splendor, riches, and traffic, exceeds every city upon the globe: the famous Pekin of China only boasts itself to be larger. London, then called Trinobantum, was a considerable trading emporium in British times, and before Cæsar’s arrival here. But the greatest curiosity of London, and what renders it highly illustrious, has never been observed by any writer: to give some account of it, is the purpose of this paper
When I resided in London in the former part of my life, I proposed to myself, as a subject of inquiry, for my excursions now and then on horseback round the circuit of the metropolis, to trace out the journeyings of Cæsar in his British expeditions. This I account the æra from whence we derive the certain intelligence of the state and affairs of our native country. I was pretty successful therein, and made many drawings of his camps, and mansions; several of which I then engraved with a design of printing the copious memoirs I had wrote concerning them.
No subject concerning our own country antiquities could be more noble. But what I mean to speak of at this time, is a camp of his, which I have long since observed no farther off than Pancras church.
In all my former travels, I ever proposed an entertainment of the mind, in inquiries into matters of antiquity, a former state of things in my own country: and now it is easy to imagine the pleasure to be found in an agreeable walk from my situation in Queen’s Square, through the fields that lead me to the footsteps of Cæsar, when, without going to foreign parts, I can tread the ground which he trod. By finding out several of his camps, I was enabled, off-hand, to
distinguish them; and they are very different from all others we meet withal.
It was the method of Roman discipline, to make a camp every night, though they marched the next morning; but in an expedition like Cæsar’s, in a new and unknown country, he was to trust to his own head, and the arms of his troops, more than to banks and ditches: yet, for the sake of discipline, a camp must be made every night; it was their mansion, and as an home; where was the prætorium, or general’s tent, and the Prætorian cohorts, as his guards; it was the residence of the majesty of the Roman genius, in the person of the commander; it was as a fixed point, subservient to order and regular discipline military; where and whence every portion and subdivision of an army knew their regular appointment and action.
This camp was very small; designed but for a night’s abode, unless the exigence of affairs required some stay: but the third part of the army lying under arms every night, prevented the danger of a surprise.
Cæsar, led on by divine Providence, entered our country in the year before the vulgar æra of Christ 54. the second time, about the middle of the month of July, as we now reckon, in his own Julian kalendar. I shall not recapitulate what I have observed of the footsteps of this great man in Kent; I hesitate not in believing that Carvilius, one of the four kings, as called, who attacked his camp while he was on this side the Thames, lived at Guildford; the name of the place shows it; the river was called Villy, or Willy, a common British name for rivers; so that Carvilius was a local title of honour, as was the British custom, like that of our present nobility: so Casvelhan, Cæsar’s opponent, was king of the Cassii, Cogidubnus of the Dobuni, Togodumnus of the Dumnonii, Taeog being Dux in British. It was the method of the British princes thus to take the names of towns, and of people, as it was the method of their ancestors the Midianites; of which we find an instance in Josephus, Antiq. . 7. Rekam, a king there, of the same name as his city, the capital of all Arabia; now Petra.
Cæsar passed the Thames at Coway stakes, notwithstanding the stakes: the town of Chertsey preserves a memorial of his name, as Cherburg in France: he pursued the Britons along the bank of the Thames as far as Sheperton, where the stakes were placed, and there pitched his camp with the back of it upon the Thames. At his camp on Greenfield common, near Staines, a splendid embassy came to him from the Londoners; desiring his alliance and protection, and that he would restore their prince Mandubrace, who was then in his retinue. To his little camp, or prætorium, on this account he orders another to be drawn round it, for reception of these ambassadors, and their prince, together with forty hostages which he demanded, and corn for his army.
Upon this, ambassadors came to him from the Cenimani, people of Cambridgeshire; the Segontiaci, Hampshire; Ancalites, Buckinghamshire; Bibroci, about Berkshire; and Cassii, of Hertfordshire; submitting themselves to him. For them he orders another appendix to his camp, to receive them.
When business was done with them, he moves forward to attack Casvelhan, who was retreated into his fortified town at Watford. One of his camps thitherward, is to be seen very fair on Hounslow heath, in the way to Longford; which I showed to lord Hertford then president, and to lord Winchelsea vice-president, of the Antiquarian Society, in April, 1723; who measured it, and expressed the greatest pleasure at the sight.
His next camp was at Kingsbury: it is now the church-yard, and still visible enough: its situation is high, and near the river Brent: the church stands in the middle of it.
From hence he went, and forced Casvelhan’s military oppidum at Watford, and Rickmansworth; a gravelly island of high ground, sylvis paludibusque munitum, as he expresses it; and by this he brought Casvelhan to submit. It is not my present purpose to speak largely on these particulars; but from hence he advanced towards London, effectually to settle his friend and ally Mandubrace, whose protection he had undertaken, in the kingdom of the Trinobantes; and reconcile him to his subjects, and to his uncle Casvelhan. Mandubrace was the son of Immanuence, commonly called Lud in the British story,
which signifies the brown; who was killed by his ambitious brother Casvelhan, too near a neighbour to London; his residence being at Harrow on the hill, and Edgeware called Suellaniacis from him: he likewise forced Mandubrace to fly to Cæsar in Gaul, to implore his aid: the great Roman was not averse to so favourable an opportunity of advancing his glory, by invading Britain, a new world.
delin.
Prospect of Cæsars Camp at Sheparton Oct: 28 1723
A. Way to Domsday bushes & Chertsey B. Way to Littleton & Greenfield Common C. Lords bridge DD. Plain Works of the Outer Ditch EE. of the Inner F. a Canal dug this year G. the Antient Course of Ashford Brook
Stukeley
Toms Sculp.
58·2d
60·2d .
CAESARS Camp on Hounslow heath. 18 Apr. 1723.
d .
W Stukeley delin 20 Sept 1767
62·2
CAESAR’S Camp at Kingsbury, the Church built of Roman Bricks from the City of V E R U L A M.
63·2d .
Ravensbury a Roman Camp near Hexton Bedfr . 10 Iuly 1724.
Stukeley delin. E. Kirkall Sculp.
Simoni Degg Ar. d.d. W. Stukeley
It was not suitable to his honour, or his security, to quarter in the city of London; but he pitched his camp, where now is Pancras church: his prætorium is still very plain, overagainst the church, in the foot-path, on the west side of the brook; the vallum and the ditch visible: its breadth from east to west forty paces; its length from north to south sixty paces.
This was his prætorium, where his own tent was pitched in the centre; the prætorian cohorts around it. There was no great magnificence in Cæsar’s tent, here placed; it was not his manner. L. Aurunculeius Cotta, who was here present, in his commentaries writes, when Cæsar was in Britain, although he had acquired the highest fame by his great actions, yet was he so temperate in his manner of life, such a stranger to pomp, that he had only three servants in his tent. Cotta was killed the next year in Gaul. When I came attentively to consider the situation of it, and the circumjacent ground, I easily discerned the traces of his whole camp: a great
many ditches, or divisions of the pastures, retain footsteps of the plan of the camp; agreeable to their usual form, as in the plate engraved: and whenever I take a walk thither, I enjoy a visionary scene of the whole camp of Cæsar, as described in the Plate before us; a scene as just as if beheld, and Cæsar present.
His army consisted of about 40,000 men, four legions with their horse. After long debate of authors concerning the quantity of a Roman legion, I infer, from Josephus so very often using the expression of ten thousand, many ten thousands, and the like, that the usual and general number of soldiers in a legion was ten thousand.
Authors generally state a legion at 6666 men; but they must mean strictly the soldiery, without officers or horse: so that I conclude a complete legion of foot and horse to be 10,000. Polibius, Vol. 2. book iii. writes, in the war of Hannibal, each legion consisted of 5000, besides the auxiliaries, together with 900 horse; and therefore we may well judge, a legion with its officers should be reckoned 10,000.
Romans
10,000
Strabo writes, the Romans generally had their horses from Gaul.
Cæsar had now no apparent enemy; he had leisure to repose his men, after their military toil. He was in the territory of a friend and ally of the Roman state, whom he had highly obliged in restoring him to his paternal kingdom: nor was it his purpose to abide here for any time: he therefore did not fortify his whole camp with a broad ditch and vallum for security; but the army was disposed in its ordinary form and manner: it might be bounded by a slight ditch and bank, as that of the whole length of the camp on the west side, (the foot-path from the bowling-green accompanying; or it might be staked out with pallisado’s called valli) which returns again on part of the north side, at the porta decumana, till it meets the ditch that passes on the west
