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Environmental Issues of Deep Sea Mining Impacts Consequences and Policy Perspectives Rahul Sharma
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Cover picture: Artist’s impression of deep-sea mining system
Images: Research vessel Sindhu Sadhana (National Institute of Oceanography, Goa, India), deep-sea miner (National Institute of Ocean Technology, Chennai, India)
Design: Ms. Sujal Bandodkar
Printed on acid-free paper
This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Foreword
It is a great pleasure to write this foreword for Dr. Rahul Sharma’s book on the resource potential and technical, environmental and management issues associated with deep-sea mining.
After many years ‘on hold’ the prospects for deep-sea mining have improved significantly in recent years. Better scientific understanding of deep-sea mineral resources as well as the development of new technologies for exploitation and processing of deep-sea minerals has led to renewed commercial interest, particularly in the ‘area’ beyond national jurisdiction. As a result, the International Seabed Authority has been tasked with the development of a comprehensive code for deepsea mineral exploitation, consistent with the norms established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, under which sustainable harvesting of seabed minerals may be conducted for the benefit of mankind as a whole.
It has taken many years to reach this point. Scientists and engineers from various organizations around the world have for decades been conducting research on developing techniques for mineral prospecting and resource estimation as well as designing efficient and cost-effective systems for mining of these resources. Many of these scientists and engineers are or will be reaching retirement age, and one of the principal aims of Dr. Sharma’s book is to bring together in one place the accumulated wisdom and knowledge of several of the world’s leading experts on deepsea mining. Rahul Sharma himself is one of those experts, having spent some 30 years teaching and working in the field conducting research on deep-sea minerals and the environmental issues associated with their exploitation. It has been my pleasure to have worked with him on a number of projects associated with the International Seabed Authority.
I congratulate him and the experts that have contributed to this important book. Whilst many challenges remain, not least the challenge of maintaining environmental balance whilst harvesting marine minerals, I am confident that these challenges can be overcome in order to provide the world with a safe, sustainable and secure supply of critical minerals well into the future. I am confident that this book will serve as an important source of reference for future generations on this topic. With best wishes.
International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica Michael Lodge
Preface
Mankind’s quest for exploration has led him to traverse from the vast expanse of outer space down to the deepest parts of the oceans. One such discovery in the later part of the nineteenth century was that of minerals on the seafloor, which are now being looked upon as the alternative source of some of the strategic metals that are feared to get exhausted on land in the coming decades.
In the present century, a sudden leap in the number of entities that have filed claims over seabed areas in international waters under the UN Law of the Sea, as well as the growing interest of state sponsored and private entrepreneurs in mining of the seafloor deposits leading to development of guidelines by regulating agencies such as the International Seabed Authority, has necessitated a synthesis of available information related to deep-sea mining.
In spite of several challenges associated with the exploitation of these deposits in terms of operating under extreme conditions in the open seas, the ingenuity of humankind has led not only to the development of technologies to gather information about the environs of where these minerals occur but also to the formulation of techniques to bring them up from the deep-sea floor and extract precious metals. However, the outcomes of research conducted around the world on different aspects of deep-sea mining are only available in scattered sources.
This book attempts to bring together diverse perspectives of authors from around the globe who have been working on various issues related to deep-sea mining for several decades. The first section of the book focuses on the distribution characteristics of deep-sea minerals, their resource potential, and techniques for mapping. The second section is devoted to concepts of deep-sea mining technologies and their utility for other industrial applications.
The book continues with authoritative overviews on metallurgical processing techniques for extraction of metals and sustainable use of mine tailings, as well as the associated environmental concerns for prediction and management of impacts related to deep-sea mining.
I would like to acknowledge the contributions from all authors to make this book a reality. Thanks also to various agencies in funding and supporting the research presented in this volume. My family also deserves a special mention for their love and support throughout my career as well as during the compilation of this work.
Goa, India Rahul Sharma
Part I Deep-Sea Minerals: Distribution Characteristics and Their Resource Potential
1 Deep-Sea Mining: Current Status and Future Considerations .......... 3 Rahul Sharma
2 Composition, Formation, and Occurrence of Polymetallic Nodules ..................................................................................................... 23
T. Kuhn, A. Wegorzewski, C. Rühlemann, and A. Vink
3 Marine Co-Rich Ferromanganese Crust Deposits: Description and Formation, Occurrences and Distribution, Estimated World-wide Resources .......................................................... 65
Peter E. Halbach, Andreas Jahn, and Georgy Cherkashov
4 Seafloor Massive Sulfide Deposits: Distribution and Prospecting...... 143 Georgy Cherkashov
5 Submarine Phosphorites: The Deposits of the Chatham Rise, New Zealand, off Namibia and Baja California, Mexico—Origin, Exploration, Mining, and Environmental Issues ................................. 165 Hermann Kudrass, Ray Wood, and Robin Falconer
6 Predictive Mapping of the Nodule Abundance and Mineral Resource Estimation in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone Using Artificial Neural Networks and Classical Geostatistical Methods............................................................................ 189
Andreas Knobloch, Thomas Kuhn, Carsten Rühlemann, Thomas Hertwig, Karl-Otto Zeissler, and Silke Noack
7 Statistical Properties of Distribution of Manganese Nodules in Indian and Pacific Oceans and Their Applications in Assessing Commonality Levels and in Exploration Planning .............................. 213
T.R.P. Singh and M. Sudhakar
Part I
Deep-Sea Minerals: Distribution Characteristics and Their Resource Potential
Chapter 1
Deep-Sea Mining: Current Status and Future Considerations
Rahul Sharma
Abstract Deep-sea minerals such as polymetallic nodule, hydrothermal sulphides, and ferro-manganese crusts have for long attracted attention as an alternative source of metals to terrestrial deposits. The occurrence of many of these deposits in the international waters has necessitated its regulation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea through the establishment of International Seabed Authority.
A sudden spurt in the number of ‘Contractors’ interested in claiming large tracts of seafloor with exclusive rights for exploration from just eight in the first four decades (1970–2010) to 25 in the next 4 years (2011–2015) as well as consistent research and development of technology for prospecting, mining, and processing of these resources, coupled with issuing of licences to private entrepreneurs for deposits within the EEZ of some countries, calls for a re-look at the current status and future prospects of deep-sea mining.
1.1 Historical Perspective
Although the first known discovery of deep-sea minerals (Fig. 1.1) was made during the expedition of H.M.S. Challenger (21 December 1872–24 May 1876) when the expedition leader C.W. Thomson described the dredge haul of polymetallic nodules on 7 March 1873 as ‘peculiar black oval bodies about 1 inch long’ and the chemist J.Y. Buchanan revealed that they were ‘almost pure manganese oxide’ (en.wikipedi. org/wiki/HMSChallenger), it was Mero (1965) who unravelled the economic potential of these deposits and predicted that deep-sea mining would commence in 20 years time that steered the world attention towards developing these resources as an alternative source of metals for the future.
A global effort during the conference on ‘Ferro-manganese deposits on the ocean floor’ at Lamont Doherty Geological Observatory in January 1972 to collate existing data on nodules was followed by studies dealing with distribution, geochemistry, and mineralogy of the deposits in different parts of the Pacific Ocean (Hein et al. 1979; Thijssen et al. 1981; Glasby 1982; Usui and Moritani 1992), as well as Indian
R. Sharma (*)
CSIR-National Institute of Oceanography, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Dona Paula, Goa 403004, India
R. Sharma (ed.), Deep-Sea Mining, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-52557-0_1
Ocean (Glasby 1972; Siddiquie et al. 1978; Frazer and Wilson 1980; Cronan and Moorby 1981). Many of the studies also deciphered the formation process, geological factors as well as their relationship with sedimentary environment (Cronan 1980; Frazer and Fisk 1981; Glasby et al. 1982; Rao and Nath 1988; Martin-Barajas et al. 1991). Simultaneously, hydrothermal sulphides (Rona 1988; Plueger et al. 1990) and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts (Halbach et al. 1989; Hein et al. 1997) were also identified as potential resources.
Following the initial studies, extensive exploration programs ensued leading to several entities laying claims over large tracts of seafloor with potential resources in the international waters for gaining exclusive rights under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, which led to the establishment of International Seabed Authority with its headquarters in Jamaica in 1994 for regulating the activities in the ‘Area’, i.e. in the international waters beyond the national jurisdiction of any country. Whereas until 2010, there were eight Registered Pioneer Investors subsequently called the ‘Contractors’ (France, Russia, Japan, China, Korea, Germany and InterOceanMetal Joint Orgnisation—a consortium of East European countries—in the Pacific Ocean and India in the Indian Ocean), all of them for polymetallic nodules only; a sudden spurt of applications was witnessed raising the number to 25 by 2015 for nodules, crusts, and sulfides (Table 1.1, Fig. 1.2a–d) (www.isa.org.jm (2016)).
Persistent interest in exploring these mineral resources, coupled with continued research and development for new technologies for prospecting as well as mining and extracting the metals from these ores, has led to numerous publications in several journals, symposia proceedings, and reports. The objective of this book is to synthesize all the information and make it available in a concise form so as to make it available for future generations. This chapter provides an overview of the
Fig. 1.1 Artist’s impression of association of deep-sea minerals with seafloor features
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Table 1.1 Contractors for exploration for (a) polymetallic nodules, (b) ferromanganese crusts, (c) hydrothermal sulphides
Contractor Sponsoring state
Contractors for exploration for polymetallic nodules
Marawa Research and Exploration Ltd. Kiribati CCFZ, Pacific Ocean
Ocean Mineral Singapore Pte Ltd Singapore
Cook Islands Investment Corporation Cook Islands
UK Seabed Resources Ltd.—II UK
CCFZ, Pacific Ocean
CCFZ, Pacific Ocean
CCFZ, Pacific Ocean
Government of India India Indian Ocean
Contractors for exploration for ferromanganese crusts
Government of the Russia Russia
China Ocean Mineral Resources
Research and Development Association
Pacific Ocean
China Pacific Ocean
Japan oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation Japan
Contractors for exploration for hydrothermal sulphides
Institut français de recherche pour l’exploitation de la mer
France
Government of the Russia Russia
Government of the Republic of Korea
China Ocean Mineral Resources
Research and Development Association
Govt of India
Bundesanstalt fur Geowissen Schaften und Rohstoffe
Korea
China
India
Germany
Pacific Ocean
Mid-Atlantic Ridge
Mid-Atlantic Ridge
Central Indian Ridge
Southwest Indian Ridge
Southwest Indian Ridge
Southeast and Central Indian Ridge
hypothetical estimation of potential of one of the mineral resources in a typical area and introduces economic, technical, environmental, and policy issues related to deep-sea mining. The subsequent chapters deal with each of these issues in detail on the basis of actual experimentation and analysis.
Fig. 1.2 (a) Map of exploration areas for polymetallic nodules in Pacific Ocean (www.isa.org.jm). (b) Map of exploration areas for ferromanganese crusts in Pacific Ocean (www.isa.org.jm). (c) Map of exploration areas for hydrothermal sulphides in Atlantic Ocean (www.isa.org.jm). (d) Map of exploration areas for polymetallic nodules and hydrothermal sulphides in Indian Ocean (www.isa.org.jm)
1.2 (continued)
Fig.
1.2 Economic Issues
Periodical evaluation of information on distribution and potential of deep-sea minerals as well as techniques for resource estimation and mining (Pearson 1975; Glasby 1977; Cronan 1980, 2000; UNOET 1982, 1987; Dick 1985; Kunzendorf 1986; Rona 2003) has kept the world’s interest in these deposits alive, even leading to the preparation of a geological model for polymetallic nodules in the ClarionClipperton Fracture Zone of the Pacific Ocean (ISA 2009). Reports of Fe-Mn deposits from the Christmas island region and Afanasiy-Nikitin seamounts of the Indian Ocean (Exon et al. 2002; Banakar et al. 2007) as well as the Marshall island area of the Pacific Ocean (Usui et al. 2003) and the granting of licences to private entrepreneurs for exploration of seafloor massive sulphides off Papua New Guinea and New Zealand (Gleason 2008) reaffirm the continuing interest of researchers and mining companies in exploring and exploiting the deep sea mineral deposits, indicating the possibility of gradually developing technologies for mining of marine minerals from relatively shallower deposits such as the crusts and sulphides (1000–2500 m) towards the deeper ferro-manganese nodules (4000–6000 m).
Fluctuating metal prices as well as factors such as recycling, new onshore deposits, and technological developments have stalled the commercial exploitation of these deposits, although these are considered important in the overall metal budget of the earth and constitute a substantial resource that would cover the twenty-first century demand for metals such as Mn, Fe, NI, Co, Cu, Mo, and many others including Rare Earth Elements (Kotlinski 2001). According to Lenoble (2000), the commercial viability of deep-sea deposits lies in their concentration compared to the currently mined deposits on land and also in their estimated magnitude. As per one estimate (Glumov et al. 2000), considering the present trends of mining ores with low metal grades, mean metal contents in deep-sea manganese oxide ores will be higher than those in the terrestrial deposits by factors between 1.1 for Ni and >5 for Co in about 2020.
The decision to commence mining of any deep-sea mineral will depend on the availability of metals from terrestrial sources and their price in the world market, as well as the techno-economic analysis based on capital and operating costs of the deep-sea mining system. With each of the Contractors being allotted areas averaging several thousand square kilometers in international waters (ISA 1998), considering the resource potential in a typical area of 75,000 km2. for polymetallic nodules and their cut off abundance (5 kg/m2) as specified by UNOET (1987), the total resource available in the area could be 375 Mt (wet) or 281.25 Mt (dry) with a total metal equal to 67.081 Mt (Table 1.2), at a conservative value of concentration of metals (Mn = 22%, Ni = 1.0%, Cu = 0.78%, Co = 0.1%). Out of the 281.25 Mt, only 10.6–21.2% (i.e. 30–60 million tonnes) of the resource will be used at the proposed mining rate of either 1.5 million tonnes/year (ISA 2008a) or 3 million tonnes/year (UNOET 1987) over duration of 20 years, with a large balance (78.8–89.4%) to be mined in future.
The total annual production of metals would range from 0.358 Mt/year (for 1.5 Mt/year) to 0.716 Mt/year (for 3 Mt/year). Considering average metal prices
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Table 1.2 Resource potential and metal production estimates—a hypothetical case study
Gross in-place value of metal $/20 years @ 1.5 Mt/year @ 3 Mt/year
Nodule/ metal Mean concentr-ation a Resource potential t (Mt) b Metal production per year t (Mt) @ 1.5 Mt/year @ 3 Mt/year Price of metal ($/Kg) c Gross in-place value of metal $/year @ 1.5 Mt/year @ 3 Mt/year
a Source: Morgan ( 2000 ) for Clarion-Clipperton Zone in Pacific Ocean/Jauhari and Pattan ( 2000 ) for Central Indian Ocean b @5 kg/m 2 for 75,000 km 2 (75 × 10 9 m 2 ) considering the lower value of concentration of metals between Pacific and Indian Ocean (in col. 2)
c Average metal prices for the period from July 2010 to January 2011 (source: www.metalprices.com )
d Mero ( 1977 )
for a given period (www.metalprices.com (2011)), the value of total metals produced annually will be $936.5 million, with a total yield of about $18.73 billion in 20 years from a single mine-site at 1.5 Mt/year mining rate. The same would be double (i.e. $1873 million/year, or ~$37.46 billion in 20 years) for a mining rate of 3 Mt/year (Table 1.2). Here it must be noted that these estimates are based on minimum value of metals and also lowest value of abundance and so the actual returns could be much higher as the in-situ average abundances are normally expected to be higher than the cut off (i.e. 5 kg/m2) and also the concentrations of metals could be higher in the potential mine-sites than that considered here as have been reported in the Pacific Ocean (Herrouin et al. 1991).
In spite of such a potential, most of the deep-sea mineral deposits can only be termed as ‘resources’ (and not ‘reserves’) as they cannot be economically recovered under prevailing economic conditions, but may be exploitable in the foreseeable future and such resources could become economic when price and market conditions or new technologies increase the profit margin to acceptable levels (UNOET 1987). According to estimates, the cost of different types of collectors, power generation, and risers, as proposed by different Contractors that are involved in developing technology for mining at 1.5 Mt of nodules annually, shows a capital expenditure of $372–562 million and an operating cost of $69–96 million/year. Added to this would be the capital expenditure for purchasing three vessels for ore transfer estimated at $495–600 million, with an annual operating cost of $93–132 million and a capital expenditure of $750 million for the processing plant with an annual operating cost of $250 million (ISA 2008a). Even if we consider the highest values (rounded to the nearest 50), the total estimated cost of a single deep-sea mining venture works out to $11.90 billion (Table 1.3), which when compared with the total yield of metals worth $18.73 billion (Table 1.2) may seem promising.
However, in order to ‘fix’ the timing for commencement of deep-sea mining, a detailed economic study looking at the CAPEX and OPEX with respect to production rates and metal values is required to arrive at an optimum mining rate. Most of the earlier studies conducted in 1970s and 1980s based on conditions existing at that time suggested that processing of 3 Mt/year could be less costly per tonne of nodules (UNOET 1987). Calculations had also shown that mining of 3 Mt/year using a single ship was not viable, except in case of higher nodule abundances, higher ship speed, or larger dredge head (Glasby 1983). Earlier estimates for a 2 Mt/year operation,
Table 1.3 Estimated capital and operating expenditures for polymetallic nodules mining [figures in brackets show the range for different systems as proposed by different Contractors (ISA 2008a)]
Item
Mining system $550 mia ($372–562 mi)
Ore transfer $600 mia ($495–600 mi)
$100 mi/yeara ($69–96 mi) × 20 years = $2.0 billion
$150 mi/yeara ($93–132 mi/year) × 20 years = $3.0 billion
when the capital investment was estimated at $250 m and metal prices were significantly lower than considered here, showed the expected rate of return at 13% per year (Mero 1977). Alternative scenarios of mining operations from 1.2 to 3 million tonnes per year for a 20 year mine-life produced internal rates of return ranging from 14.9 to 37.8% (ISA 2008a). This scenario could undergo a change taking into consideration the techno-economic feasibility as well as metal markets.
1.3 Technical Issues
1.3.1
Delineation of Mine-Site and Estimation of Area for Mining
A ‘mine site’ is defined as an ocean bottom area where, under specific geological, technical, and economic conditions, a single mining operation can be carried out for a period of time. For example, the following criteria have been suggested for polymetallic nodules (UNOET 1987):
• Cut off grade = 1.8% Cu + Ni
• Cut off abundance = 5 kg/m2
• Topography = acceptable
• Duration (D) = 20 years
• Annual recovery (Ar) = 3 million dry tonnes, which has been subsequently proposed as 1.5 million tonnes by ISA (2008a).
Using this information, the total mineable area (M) can be estimated as follows:
where, At = total area,
Au = area un-mineable due to the topography,
Ag = area below cut-off grade;
Aa = area below cut-off abundance.
Furthermore, the size of mine site (As) can be calculated as:
where,
As = size of mine-site (km2),
Ar = annual nodule recovery rate (dry tonnes/year),
D = duration of mining operation (years),
An = average nodule abundance in the mineable area,
E = overall efficiency of the mining device (%),
M = proportion of mineable area.
Higher the average abundance, smaller would be the size of the mine-site with respect to the allotted area that augers well with the concept of restricting the mining activities to a smaller area, especially from the point of environmental impacts.
1.3.2 Mining System Development
The overall efficiency (E) of a mining system would largely depend upon the collection efficiency of the dredge head that would sweep the seafloor to collect the minerals which is calculated as (UNOET 1987):
ed = dredge efficiency, which is the ratio of minerals effectively gathered by the dredge head, versus the minerals on the seabed before dredging, es = sweep efficiency, which is the percentage of the bottom actually swept by the area dredged.
The efficiency of deep-sea mining would also depend on the system for lifting the minerals to the surface, such as, the air-lift, which has 2–5 times higher energy consumption, but is easier to maintain as the compressors are above the water surface as compared to the hydraulic lift, which requires less power, allows higher transport densities, and hence needs smaller pipes for lifting the minerals, but is difficult to maintain due to under water pump system (Amann 1982). Given the high investment–high risk nature of the operations, future technology could consider deployment of a number of autonomous vehicles operating from the mining platform that would provide better operational and maintenance options, even from environmental point of view due to limited area of contact of these devices with the water column and the seafloor; and also in recovery or abandoning them in case of a mishap, as the mining platform and collection devices would be independent of one another (Sharma 2011).
Information available in public domain suggests that development of mining technology has been in different stages, including model studies and a few at-sea tests of crawlers and lifting mechanisms by the Contractors (Table 1.4). However, once these designs and prototypes are tested, the real challenge lies in up-scaling and integrating different subsystems and making them work on a sustained basis continuously for ~300 days/year under variable conditions, including extreme weather (rainfall, winds, and cyclones), hydrographical conditions (high pressure, low temperature, currents, and lack of natural light), and seafloor environment (undulating topography, sediment thickness, and heterogeneous distribution of deposits).
Application of new technology for exploration as well as mining, such as 3D sensing, autonomous navigation, robotic manipulators, and vehicles for the extreme environment adopted from space missions, could provide some of the solutions (Jasiobedzki et al. 2007). Similarly, advances in floating oil platforms, availability of riser hardware for deep-water and harsh environments, sub-sea power systems and pumps required for mining (Halkyard 2008), as well as the advantages of flexible
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1 Deep-Sea Mining: Current Status and Future Considerations
Table 1.4
Sr. no.
Status of mining and processing technologies for deep-sea polymetallic nodules
Contractor
Mining technology
1 Francea Model studies on self-propelled miner with hydraulic recovery system
2 Japanb Passive nodule collector tested At ~2200 m depth
Processing technology
Tested pyro and hydrometallurgical processes for Ni, Cu, Co
Developed a process to recover Cu, Ni, Co
3 Indiac (a) Design includes flexible riser and multiple crawlers (a) Tested 3 possible routes (b) Pilot plant set up for 500 kg/day for Cu, Ni, Co (b) Crawler tested at ~410 m depth in the sea
4 Chinac (a) Includes rigid riser with selfpropelled miner
Developed a process to recover Mn, Ni, Cu, Co, and Mo (b) Tried different concepts of collector and lifting mechanisms
5 Koreac (a) Design includes flexible riser system with self-propelled miner (Not known) (b) Developed 1/20 scale test miner
6 Russiac Collector and mining subsystems in conceptual stage Recovered Mn, Ni, Cu, Co from nodules
7 IOMc Conceptual design includes nodule collector, buffer, vertical lift system
Economic assessment of different schemes
8 Germanyc Considering innovative concepts for mining Considering different options for processing
Source: aHerrouin et al. (1991) bYamada and Yamazaki (1998) (for mining technology) cISA (2008b)
risers in connecting pumps and power cables, reduced top tension for surface vessel, ability to retrieve and reinstall, and easy handling in severe weather conditions could provide the much required technological support for development of sub-sea mining systems (Hill 2008).
Major research efforts have been concentrated on the development of collector and riser systems (Chung 2003), whereas very few studies have been conducted on the mining platform and ore handling or transfer at sea (Amann 1982; Ford et al. 1987; Herrouin et al. 1991) that have proposed possible designs, dimensions, and infrastructure required to support a deep-sea mining activity. This sector (mining platform and ore transfer) may have to depend on existing infrastructure available for offshore oil and gas production and bulk carriers to be modified into mining platforms and transport vessels.
1.3.3 Processing Technology and Waste Management
Different Contractors are pursuing different approaches or processing routes mainly depending on the number of metals to be extracted (Table 1.4). According to a study ‘the incremental capital requirement of manganese recovery (in addition to Cu, Ni, Co)
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in a four metal route over a three metal route was small enough to make a 1.5 Mt/year capacity plant economically viable’ (ISA 2008b). Further, it has also been suggested that ‘a three metal recovery system needed to operate at higher annual capacities, with 3 million dry tonnes per year; whereas, four metal systems with additional costs and revenues from manganese production can operate at half the capacity’. Finally, the decision of extracting three or four metals will depend on the metal prices, available technology, investment potential, and the returns expected from such investments. In terms of post-processing scenario, probably the least attention has been given to the disposal of material that will remain after extraction of metals. In case of polymetallic nodules, it amounts to large quantities of material (as high as 76% in case of four metals and 97.5% in case of three metals) for which due consideration is required for either disposing them or using them for any ‘constructive’ purpose (see Wiltshire 2000; Wiltshire, this issue).
1.4 Environmental Issues
1.4.1 Impact of Environment on Mining
Generally in case of any developmental activity, the issue of the impact of the activity on the environment occupies higher significance not realising that the component of ‘environment’ has a two-way implication. As in case of deep-sea mining, the activity in most likelihood would have an impact on the marine environment; the reverse, i.e. impact of environment on mining activity, is equally important because the prevailing conditions such as atmospheric, hydrographic, seafloor topography, mineral characteristics, and associated substrates at the mine-site would play a major role in the design and performance of different sub-systems of the mining system (Table 1.5). Hence, collection of environmental data would not only help in impact assessment after mining activity, but also play a key role in designing of the mining system as well as planning of the mining operation (Sharma 2011).
1.4.2 Impact of Mining on Environment
It is known that the areas likely to be affected by deep-sea mining would range from the surface and water column due to particles discharged (accidently or otherwise) during lifting, at-sea processing, and transportation (Pearson 1975; Amos et al. 1977) to the seafloor where the mineral will be separated from the associated substrate either due to scooping or drilling, leading to resuspension and redistribution of debris in the bottom water along the path of the collector device as well as in the vicinity of the mining tracks (Foell et al. 1990; Trueblood 1993; Fukushima 1995; Tkatchenko et al. 1996; Sharma and Nath 2000; Theil 2001; Sharma 2001, 2005) and the land due to metal extraction and tailing disposal (Fig. 1.3).
Table 1.5 Influence of environmental conditions on mining system design and operation
Sr. no. Conditions (key parameters) Influence on mining system
Fig. 1.3 Areas likely to be affected due to different activities of deep-sea mining 1 Deep-Sea Mining: Current Status and Future Considerations
Will determine actual fair weather conditions for operating the mining system during different seasons of the year
Will influence operations on the platform including ore-handling and mining system deployment at the surface; and stability of riser system in the water column
Will have a bearing on the manoeuvrability and stability of the mining device on the seafloor
Important for designing the mechanism for collection, crushing as well as screening of mineral at the seafloor from un-wanted material before pumping the nodules to the surface
Will affect the mobility and efficiency of the collector device to be able to operate without sinking (or getting stuck) in the sediment and be able to avoid the rock outcrops for its safety
The first impact assessment study for deep-sea mining was during two of the pilot mining tests under the Deep Ocean Mining Environment Study (DOMES, 1972–1981) conducted by Ocean mining Inc. (OMI) and Ocean mining Associates (OMA) in the Pacific Ocean (Ozturgut et al. 1980). Subsequently, several experiments have been conducted by Contractors for assessing the potential impacts using devices such as the plough-harrow as well as a hydraulic sediment re-suspension system in the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Table 1.6). Their results have shown that the scale of these experiments was significantly smaller than that expected during commercial mining (Yamazaki and Sharma 2001). Syntheses of the results of these experiments have revealed the need for several improvements for conducting similar experiments in future (Morgan et al. 1999). An engineering and environmental assessment of deep-sea mining has suggested to ‘test benthic disturbance in scale and system large enough to represent the commercial mining scale’ (Chung et al. 2001).
Table 1.6 Basic data of Benthic Impact Experiments (BIEs) for assessing potential environmental impact of nodule mining
Experiment Conducted by Area
Hamburg University, Germany
NOAABIEc National Oceanographic & Atmospheric Administration, USA
JETd Metal mining Agency of Japan
IOM-BIEe Inter Ocean Metal–consortium of East Europen Countries
INDEXf National Institute of Oceanography, Govt. Of India
Source:
aYamazaki and Sharma (2001)
bFoell et al. (1990)
cTrueblood (1993) dFukushima (1995)
eTkatchenko et al. (1996) fSharma and Nath (2000)
Clipperton Fracture Zone
Clarion Clipperton Fracture Zone
Clipperton Fracture Zone
Indian Ocean Basin
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1.5 Policy Issues
A deep-sea mining venture requires the implementation of several components starting with ‘Exploration and resource estimation’ followed by ‘Technology development’ for mining and metallurgical processing, and ‘Environmental’ component so as to establish baseline conditions, undertake impact assessment and monitoring, leading to development of environmental management plan. The final execution of the project would depend on a ‘Techno-economic assessment’ as well as ‘Legal’ framework in order to guide the decisions and actions for implementation on the basis of inputs received from other components. Activities under each of these components could initially be independent of each other, but a close networking among these is required to execute the project.
In view of many of the deep-sea mineral deposits occurring in the international waters, any commercial activity related to them could have global implications for which the Preparatory Commission for the International Seabed Authority (ISA) initiated the ‘Draft regulations on prospecting, exploration and exploitation of polymetallic nodules in the Area’ (UN 1990). With increasing awareness for the need to regulate such activities in the international waters, it was also suggested that the ‘UN and ISA should draw up a concrete plan for keeping abreast of scientific progress and at regular intervals assess the need for revising regulations’ (Markussen 1994).
Since the formation of the ISA in 1994 (by article 156 of 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea), it has served as the regulating agency for all activities related to the resources in the Area (i.e. defined as the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction); beginning with the notification of the plan of work for exploration of the Pioneer Investors and the area allotted to them (ISA 1998) to the establishment of a comprehensive set of rules, regulations, and procedures for prospecting and exploration for polymetallic nodules in the international seabed Area (ISA 2000). Through a series of international workshops, ISA has also issued the recommendations for assessment of possible environmental impacts from exploration of nodules (ISA 2001) and for establishment of environmental baselines and associated monitoring program for exploration of polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts (ISA 2005). The International Marine Minerals Society has also prepared a code for environmental management for marine mining, which provides a framework for development and implementation of an environmental program for a marine exploration and extraction site by marine mining companies and for other stakeholders in evaluating such programs (www.immsoc.org/IMMS_code.htm (2011)).
Deep-sea mining is in an advantageous position due to the substantial lead time available to the regulatory agencies to put in place the policies required for exploration and exploitation of the seabed resources as well as the Contractors to adopt such guidelines and gear themselves up for a sustained development of this common heritage of mankind.
Acknowledgments Author gratefully acknowledges the permission given by Secretary General, International Seabed Authority, Jamaica, for reproducing the maps from website.
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work together harmoniously and efficiently; to complement, not to antagonize each other; provided means are taken to ensure to each its due relative precedence and weight in the determination of practical questions.
Historically, the institution and development of naval administration has been essentially a civil process, the object of which has been to provide and keep in readiness a national weapon for war. The end is war—fighting; the instrument is the navy; the means are the various activities which we group under the head of administration. Of these three, the end necessarily conditions the others. The proverb is familiar, “He who wills the end wills the means.” Whatever is essential to the spirit and organization of the navy afloat, to its efficiency for war, must find itself adequately represented in the administration, in order that the exigencies of fighting may be kept well to the front in governmental and national consideration. Since armies and navies have existed as permanent national institutions, there has been a constant struggle on the part of the military element to keep the end—fighting, or readiness to fight—superior to mere administrative considerations. This is but natural, for all men tend to magnify their office. The military man having to do the fighting, considers that the chief necessity; the administrator equally naturally tends to think the smooth running of the machine the most admirable quality. Both are necessary; but the latter cannot obtain under the high pressure of war unless in peace the contingency of war has dictated its system. There is a quaint, well-worn story, which yet may be new to some readers, of an administrator who complained that his office was working admirably until war came and threw everything out of gear.
The opposition between civil and military, necessitating their due adjustment, may be said to be original, of the nature of things. It is born with naval administration. Corresponding roughly to these primary factors are the two principal activities in which administration is exerted—organization and execution. These also bear to each other the relation of means to end. Organization is not for itself, but is a means to an ultimate executive action; in the case of a navy, to war or to the prevention of war. It is, therefore, in its end—war—that organization must find the conditions dictating its character. Whatever the system adopted, it must aim above all at
perfect efficiency in military action; and the nearer it approaches to this ideal the better it is. It would seem that this is too obvious for mention. It may be for mention; but not for reiteration. The long record of naval history on the side of administration shows a constant predominance of other considerations, and the abiding necessity for insisting, in season and out of season, that the one test of naval administration is not the satisfactory or economical working of the office, as such, but the readiness of the navy in all points for war. The one does not exclude the other; but there is between them the relation of greater and less.
Both organization and execution are properties alike of the active navy, the instrument for war, and of the naval administration, the means which has been constituted to create and maintain the instrument; but from their respective spheres, and in proportion to their relative nearness to the great final end of war, the one or the other characteristic is found predominant. The naval officer on board his ship, face to face with the difficulties of the profession, and in daily contact with the grim implements which remind him of the eventualities of his calling, naturally sees in organization mainly a means to an end. Some indeed fall short. The martinet is a man to whom the organization is more than a means; but he is the exception. Naval administration, on the other hand, in the common acceptation of the term, is mostly office work. It comes into contact with the navy proper chiefly through official correspondence, less by personal intercourse with the officers concerned; still less by immediate contact with the daily life of the profession, which it learns at second hand. It consequently tends to overvalue the orderly routine and observance of the system by which it receives information, transmits orders, checks expenditure, files returns, and, in general, keeps with the service the touch of paper; in short, the organization which has been created for facilitating its own labors. In due measure these are imperatively necessary; but it is undeniable that the practical tendency is to exaggerate their importance relatively to the executive end proposed. The writer was once visiting a French captain, who in the course of the interview took up wearily a mass of papers from a desk beside him. “I wonder,” said he, “whether all this is as bad with you as with us. Look at our Navy Register;” and dividing the pages into two parts, severally about onesixth and five-sixths of the whole, he continued, “This, the smaller, is
the Navy; and that is the Administration.” No wonder he had papers galore; administration needs papers, as a mill needs grist.
Even in the case of naval officers entering administrative offices, the influence of prolonged tenure is in the same direction. The habits of a previous lifetime doubtless act as a check, in proportion to the strength they have acquired in the individual. They serve as an invaluable leaven, not only to his own thought but to that of his associates. Nevertheless, the experience is general that permanence in an office essentially civil tends to deaden the intimate appreciation of naval exigencies; yet upon this alone can thrive that sympathy between the administrative and executive functions of the navy which is requisite to efficiency. The habit of the arm-chair easily prevails over that of the quarterdeck; it is more comfortable. For this reason, in the best-considered systems, a frequent exchange between the civil and military parts of their profession, between the administrative offices and the army or fleet, is thought expedient for officers who show aptitude for the former. It is better for them personally, better for the administration, and consequently better for the service at large. It prevails extensively in the United States Navy, where it is frequently the subject of ill-instructed outside criticism on the score of sea-officers being on “shore duty.” Without asserting that the exact proportions of service are always accurately observed, it may be confidently affirmed that the interchange between the civil and military occupations tends to facilitate the smooth working of both, by promoting mutual understanding of conditions and difficulties.
The British System
[35]
[From 1660 to 1832, British naval administration was divided between a civilian “Navy Board” and a military “Board of Admiralty.”—E .]
Divided control means divided responsibility; and that in turn means no responsibility, or at least one very hard to fix. The abuses that grew up, especially in the dockyards, the effect of which of course was transmitted to the navy that depended upon them, led to a loud outcry throughout the service towards the end of the
eighteenth century; but horses are not swapped when crossing streams, and the exigencies of the great wars which ended in 1815 made it long impossible to attempt the revolutionary change needed. This was carried out in 1832 by the Government which came in with the Reform Bill of 1830. The spirit of the innovation was summarized in the expression, “Individual (undivided) Responsibility.” The Navy Board disappeared altogether. The civil functions which in the process of centuries had accumulated in its hands, and had culminated by successive additions into a very numerous and loose aggregation of officials, were concentrated into five heads, having separate and independent responsibilities; in this resembling the chiefs of bureau in the United States Naval Administration. Each of the five was specifically under one of the members of the Admiralty Board, who thus represented that particular interest of the Navy in the Board regarded as a consultative body. Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton writes: “This was a consolidation of functions and a subordination of the civil branches to the Admiralty as a whole ... under the Board of Admiralty collectively and under the Lords individually.” While the First Lord is a civilian, the majority of the other members of the Admiralty are naval officers. Authority, therefore, is in civil hands, while military influence enters strongly.
While I highly appreciate the value of this latter factor, particularly as the sea lords do not consequently give up their profession, but remain actively connected with it, it appears to my observation of human nature that the system has some of the disadvantages of a council of war, tending to make responsibility elusive. I question, in short, the entire soundness of a scheme which by its nature, if not by specific provision, inclines to place executive action in the hands of a consultative body. It seems to sap individual responsibility; not perhaps in subordinates, but, what is much worse, in the head, in the commander-in-chief of the administration, upon whom depend the great determinative lines of provision and of policy. In conception, the Admiralty is primarily a Board, secondarily individual members. For individual responsibility at the head, too much depends upon the personality of the First Lord, too little upon his position. Since these lines were first written, five years ago, it may fairly be inferred, from the language of the English Press, that very decisive changes of policy have been adopted which are attributed popularly, and even professionally, to the dominating influence of one of the “Sea” Lords.
During a brief period in 1827, as two centuries before, an arrangement more formally ideal obtained. The Duke of Clarence, afterwards William IV, being appointed Lord High Admiral, the Admiralty Board lapsed as a board and became his council. The modification here made in deference to royal blood might well serve as a model for naval administration; a head with advisers feels responsibility more than a head with associates. It should go without saying that in any case the head must be good.
In the United States Naval Administration the head is one man, with no division of responsibility. His own superior, the President, may control his action, as may Congress by law; but this, as far as it goes, is simply a transfer of responsibility in its entirety. It is not a division. The Secretary of the Navy has no associates, but he has subordinates. In them he has capable advisers, so far as he chooses to use them; but he can transfer to them no responsibility, except that of doing as he tells them. The responsibility of decision is his alone. The law constitutes them subordinate executive officers, just as it constitutes a lieutenant in the navy; but it does not constitute them advisers, and there is in their position nothing which compels the Secretary to hear their advice, still less to accept it. Each is independent of the others, and there is nothing in law to compel conference between them. The Secretary may assemble them, or any number of them, as a board for consultation, in his presence or otherwise; but there is nothing in the system which obliges him to do so. Unity of action between several naval technical experts, each of whom is represented in the planning and maintenance of every naval vessel, and some in every element of naval military efficiency, depends entirely upon the co-ordinating force of the Secretary, who is a civilian, possibly with only more or less outside knowledge of the subject. The system provides no strictly professional unifying force, such as the Board of Admiralty, which has a numerical preponderance of combatant sea-officers, each of whom has in individual control one or more of the technical administrative departments, and may be supposed therefore to be fully informed of its arguments in any technical matter under discussion. The constitution of the Admiralty Board also ensures that all technical details and their effect upon naval efficiency shall be scrutinized from the point of view of the men who shall do the work of war. The American plan fixes the very strictest individual responsibility in the
Secretary, and in his principal subordinates, the chiefs of bureau. His duties are universal and supreme, theirs sharply defined and mutually independent. This result appears to me superior to the British, but it has the defects of its qualities; not too much independence in responsibility, but, so far as the system goes, too little co-ordination. As I said of the responsibility of the First Lord, unity of action depends too much on the personality of the Secretary.
The United States System[36]
The United States system of naval administration has progressed successively, and without breach of legislative continuity, from the simple rudimentary organ, the one man, in whom all functions as well as all responsibility were centered, through the phase of a complex organ with aggregate functions and responsibilities, defined, but still undifferentiated, into an organization elaborate in form, if not final in development. The process has been from first to last consistent in principle. The sole control and single responsibility of the Secretary—the representative of the President—have been preserved throughout, and all other responsibility is, and has been, not only subordinate to him but derivative from him, as a branch derives its being from the root. Moreover, consistency has also been maintained in restricting the administration thus evolved to the civil function which it essentially is. From the first departure, in the institution of the Board of Commissioners, to the present time, it has not had military authority properly so-called. It has had necessary authority in matters pertaining to a military establishment, but it has had no direction of activities in themselves essentially military; that has remained with the Secretary, and is by him transferred only to officers properly military in function. Finally, the principle of particular responsibility has been strictly followed. Within the limits of the duty assigned, the corporate responsibility of the Board in its day was, and the individual responsibility of each bureau chief now is, as certain and defined as that of the Secretary.
The defect of the system is that no means is provided for coordinating the action of the bureaus,[37] except the single authority of the Secretary. This, in his beginning days of inexperience, together with his preoccupations with the numerous collateral engagements
attendant upon all positions of public responsibility, will most usually be inadequate to the task. To indicate a defect is not to prescribe a remedy; and the purpose of this article is to show things as they are, not to advocate particular changes. One of the ablest administrative sea-officers, both afloat and ashore, that I have known in my professional career, stated before a Congressional committee that he had “always believed it would be wise to have a board of five officers for the purpose of harmonizing difficulties between bureaus, settling upon a ship-building policy, and other matters that embarrass the head of the Department on account of a lack of professional knowledge.” I do not undertake to pass an opinion upon this particular suggestion, but confine myself to remarking that the fault in the system certainly exists, and that any remedy requires the careful observance of two points: 1, that the adviser, one or a board, be wholly clear of administrative activity; and, 2, that he or they be advisers only, pure and simple, with no power to affect the individual responsibility of decision. This must be preserved under whatever method, as the Secretary’s privilege as well as his obligation.
13. T M R
It may be asserted, as perhaps the most tenable general definition of the principle upon which the rule of obedience rests, that the spirit of obedience, as distinguished from its letter, consists in faithfully forwarding the general object to which the officer’s particular command is contributing. This finds expression in the well-known directive maxim, “March to the sound of the guns.” In doubtful cases, however,—and by doubtful I mean cases where action other than that prescribed in the orders seems expedient,—liberty of judgment is conditioned by the officer’s acquaintance with the plans of his superior. If his knowledge is imperfect, or altogether lacking, the doing that which at the moment seems wise to himself may be to defeat a much more important object, or to dissolve the bonds of a combined movement to which his co-operation is essential. If, under such circumstances of ignorance, resting only upon his own sagacity or surmises, he errs either in his reading of his commander’s general purpose, or in his decision as to his own action, and through such error disobeys, he cannot complain if he receive censure or punishment. He has violated a recognized rule without adequate reason. The rectitude of his intentions may clear him of moral blame, though not necessarily even so; for the duty of obedience is not merely military, but moral. It is not an arbitrary rule, but one essential and fundamental; the expression of a principle without which military organization would go to pieces, and military success be impossible. Consequently, even where the individual purpose may be demonstrably honest, not willful, blame adheres and punishment may follow, according to the measure of the delinquency, though that be due to nothing worse than personal incompetency....
No man wrestled with the question more vigorously than Nelson; none found greater exasperation than he did in the too often successful opposition of the letter to the demands of his impetuous spirit for co-operation, addressed to men over whom he had not immediate control; none was more generous in his attitude to subordinates who overrode or overpassed his own orders, provided he saw in their acts the intelligent and honest will to forward his purposes. Obedience he certainly required; but he recognized that,
given a capable and zealous man, better work would usually be had by permitting a certain elasticity of initiative, provided it was accompanied by accurate knowledge of his general wishes. These he was always most careful to impart; in nothing was he more precise or particular. If he allowed large liberty in the letter, he expected close observance of, nay, rather, participation in, the spirit of his ideas. He was not tolerant of incapacity, nor would he for a moment bear willful disregard of his plans. When considerations of high policy entertained by himself were crossed by Sidney Smith, his language became peremptory. “As this is in strict opposition to my opinion, which is never to suffer any one individual Frenchman to quit Egypt, I strictly charge and command you never to give any French ship or man leave to quit Egypt.” The italics are his own; and he adds again, as though distrustful still: “You are to put my orders in force, not on any pretense to permit a single Frenchman to leave Egypt.” The severity of the tone sufficiently proves his disposition to enforce the strictest rule, where necessary to control individuals; but a more liberal reliance upon principle, in preference to rule, was his habit. None, it may be added, illustrated more copiously than he, when a junior, the obedience of the spirit and the disobedience of the letter. His practice was in this consistent in all stages of his career. Unfortunately, the example may tempt smaller men to follow where their heads are not steady enough to keep their feet.
Of course, thinking and feeling thus, he gave frequent expression to his views, and these, coming from a man of his military genius, are often very illuminative. There is one such that is singularly applicable to our present purpose, of searching for the underlying principle which governs the duty and observance of obedience, and determines its absolute necessity to all military action. “I find few think as I do, but to obey orders is all perfection. What would my superiors direct, did they know what is passing under my nose? To serve my King and to destroy the French I consider as the great order of all, from which little ones spring, and if one of these little ones militate against it, I go back to obey the great order.”
14. P
N W [39]
Preparation for war, rightly understood, A falls under two heads,— preparation and preparedness. The one is a question mainly of material, and is constant in its action. The second involves an idea of completeness. When, at a particular moment, preparations are completed, one is prepared—not otherwise. There may have been made a great deal of very necessary preparation for war without being prepared. Every constituent of preparation may be behindhand, or some elements may be perfectly ready, while others are not. In neither case can a state be said to be prepared.
In the matter of preparation for war, one clear idea should be absorbed first by every one who, recognizing that war is still a possibility, desires to see his country ready. This idea is that, however defensive in origin or in political character a war may be, the assumption of a simple defensive in war is ruin. War, once declared, must be waged offensively, aggressively. The enemy must not be fended off, but smitten down. You may then spare him every exaction, relinquish every gain; but till down he must be struck incessantly and remorselessly.
Preparation, like most other things, is a question both of kind and of degree, of quality and of quantity. As regards degree, the general lines upon which it is determined have been indicated broadly in the preceding part of this article. The measure of degree is the estimated force which the strongest probable enemy can bring against you, allowance being made for clear drawbacks upon his total force, imposed by his own embarrassments and responsibilities in other parts of the world. The calculation is partly military, partly political, the latter, however, being the dominant factor in the premises.
In kind, preparation is twofold,—defensive and offensive. The former exists chiefly for the sake of the latter, in order that offense, the determining factor in war, may put forth its full power, unhampered by concern for the protection of the national interests or for its own resources. In naval war, coast defense is the defensive factor, the navy the offensive. Coast defense, when adequate, assures the naval commander-in-chief that his base of operations—the dockyards and coal depots—is secure. It also relieves him and his
government, by the protection afforded to the chief commercial centers, from the necessity of considering them, and so leaves the offensive arm perfectly free.
Coast defense implies coast attack. To what attacks are coast liable? Two, principally,—blockade and bombardment. The latter, being the more difficult, includes the former, as the greater does the lesser. A fleet that can bombard can still more easily blockade. Against bombardment the necessary precaution is gun-fire, of such power and range that a fleet cannot lie within bombarding distance. This condition is obtained, where surroundings permit, by advancing the line of guns so far from the city involved that bombarding distance can be reached only by coming under their fire. But it has been demonstrated, and is accepted, that, owing to their rapidity of movement,—like a flock of birds on the wing,—a fleet of ships can, without disabling loss, pass by guns before which they could not lie. Hence arises the necessity of arresting or delaying their progress by blocking channels, which in modern practice is done by lines of torpedoes. The mere moral effect of the latter is a deterrent to a dash past,—by which, if successful, a fleet reaches the rear of the defenses, and appears immediately before the city, which then lies at its mercy.
Coast defense, then, implies gun power and torpedo lines placed as described. Be it said in passing that only places of decisive importance, commercially or militarily, need such defenses. Modern fleets cannot afford to waste ammunition in bombarding unimportant towns,—at least when so far from their own base as they would be on our coast. It is not so much a question of money as of frittering their fighting strength. It would not pay.
Even coast defense, however, although essentially passive, should have an element of offensive force, local in character, distinct from the offensive navy, of which nevertheless it forms a part. To take the offensive against a floating force it must itself be afloat—naval. This offensive element of coast defense is to be found in the torpedo-boat, in its various developments. It must be kept distinct in idea from the sea-going fleet, although it is, of course, possible that the two may act in concert. The war very well may take such a turn that the sea-going navy will find, its best preparation for initiating an offensive movement to be by concentrating in a principal seaport. Failing such a contingency, however, and in and for coast defense in its narrower
sense, there should be a local flotilla of small torpedo-vessels, which by their activity should make life a burden to an outside enemy. A distinguished British admiral, now dead, has said that he believed half the captains of a blockading fleet would break down—“go crazy” were the words repeated to me—under the strain of modern conditions. The expression, of course, was intended simply to convey a sense of the immensity of suspense to be endured. In such a flotilla, owing to the smallness of its components, and to the simplicity of their organization and functions, is to be found the best sphere for naval volunteers; the duties could be learned with comparative ease, and the whole system is susceptible of rapid development. Be it remembered, however, that it is essentially defensive, only incidentally offensive, in character.
Such are the main elements of coast defense—guns, lines of torpedoes, torpedo-boats. Of these none can be extemporized, with the possible exception of the last, and that would be only a makeshift. To go into details would exceed the limits of an article,— require a brief treatise. Suffice it to say, without the first two, coast cities are open to bombardment; without the last, they can be blockaded freely, unless relieved by the sea-going navy. Bombardment and blockade are recognized modes of warfare, subject only to reasonable notification,—a concession rather to humanity and equity than to strict law.[40] Bombardment and blockade directed against great national centers, in the close and complicated network of national and commercial interests as they exist in modern times, strike not only the point affected, but every corner of the land.
The offensive in naval war, as has been said, is the function of the sea-going navy—of the battleships, and of the cruisers of various sizes and purposes, including sea-going torpedo-vessels capable of accompanying a fleet, without impeding its movements by their loss of speed or unseaworthiness. Seaworthiness, and reasonable speed under all weather conditions, are qualities necessary to every constituent of a fleet; but, over and above these, the backbone and real power of any navy are the vessels which, by due proportion of defensive and offensive powers, are capable of taking and giving hard knocks. All others are but subservient to these, and exist only for them.
What is that strength to be? Ships answering to this description are the kind which make naval strength; what is to be its degree? What their number? The answer—a broad formula—is that it must be great enough to take the sea, and to fight, with reasonable chances of success, the largest force likely to be brought against it, as shown by calculations which have been indicated previously. Being, as we claim, and as our past history justifies us in claiming, a nation indisposed to aggression, unwilling to extend our possessions or our interests by war, the measure of strength we set ourselves depends, necessarily, not upon our projects of aggrandizement, but upon the disposition of others to thwart what we consider our reasonable policy, which they may not so consider. When they resist, what force can they bring against us? That force must be naval; we have no exposed point upon which land operations, decisive in character, can be directed. This is the kind of the hostile force to be apprehended. What may its size be? There is the measure of our needed strength. The calculation may be intricate, the conclusion only approximate and probable, but it is the nearest reply we can reach. So many ships of such and such sizes, so many guns, so much ammunition—in short, so much naval material.
In the material provisions that have been summarized under the two chief heads of defense and offense—in coast defense under its three principal requirements, guns, lines of stationary torpedoes, and torpedo-boats, and in a navy able to keep the sea in the presence of a probable enemy—consist what may be called most accurately preparations for war. In so far as the United States is short in them, she is at the mercy of an enemy whose naval strength is greater than that of her own available navy. If her navy cannot keep the enemy off the coast, blockade at least is possible. If, in addition, there are no harbor torpedo-boats, blockade is easy. If, further, guns and torpedo lines are deficient, bombardment comes within the range of possibility, and may reach even the point of entire feasibility. There will be no time for preparation after war begins.
[The remainder of the essay considers the vital problem of supplying the navy with trained men, both in active service and in reserve. It is pointed out that, of the two systems, compulsory enlistments for short service and voluntary enlistments for long service, the second system, which is the one employed by the United
States, produces fewer though better trained reserves; and it therefore necessitates a larger standing force.—E .]
PART II
SEA POWER IN HISTORY
15. A N E
France under Louis XIV
The peace signed at Ryswick in 1697 was most disadvantageous to France; she lost all that had been gained since the Peace of Nimeguen, nineteen years before, with the single important exception of Strasburg. All that Louis XIV had gained by trick or force during the years of peace was given up. Immense restitutions were made to Germany and to Spain. In so far as the latter were made in the Netherlands, they were to the immediate advantage of the United Provinces, and indeed of all Europe as well as of Spain. To the two sea nations the terms of the treaty gave commercial benefits, which tended to the increase of their own sea power and to the consequent injury of that of France.
France had made a gigantic struggle; to stand alone as she did then, and as she has since done more than once, against all Europe is a great feat. Yet it may be said that as the United Provinces taught the lesson that a nation, however active and enterprising, cannot rest upon external resources alone, if intrinsically weak in numbers and territory, so France in its measure shows that a nation cannot subsist indefinitely off itself, however powerful in numbers and strong in internal resources.
It is said that a friend once found Colbert looking dreamily from his windows, and on questioning him as to the subject of his meditations, received this reply: “In contemplating the fertile fields before my eyes, I recall those which I have seen elsewhere; what a rich country is France!” This conviction supported him amid the many discouragements of his official life, when struggling to meet the financial difficulties arising from the extravagance and wars of the king; and it has been justified by the whole course of the nation’s history since his days. France is rich in natural resources as well as in the industry and thrift of her people. But neither individual nations nor men can thrive when severed from natural intercourse with their kind; whatever the native vigor of constitution, it requires healthful surroundings, and freedom to draw to itself from near and from far all that is conducive to its growth and strength and general welfare.
Not only must the internal organism work satisfactorily, the processes of decay and renewal, of movement and circulation, go on easily, but, from sources external to themselves, both mind and body must receive healthful and varied nourishment. With all her natural gifts France wasted away because of the want of that lively intercourse between the different parts of her own body and constant exchange with other people, which is known as commerce, internal or external. To say that war was the cause of these defects is to state at least a partial truth; but it does not exhaust the matter. War, with its many acknowledged sufferings, is above all harmful when it cuts a nation off from others and throws it back upon itself. There may indeed be periods when such rude shocks have a bracing effect, but they are exceptional, and of short duration, and they do not invalidate the general statement. Such isolation was the lot of France during the later wars of Louis XIV, and it well-nigh destroyed her; whereas to save her from the possibility of such stagnation was the great aim of Colbert’s life.
War alone could not entail it, if only war could be postponed until the processes of circulation within and without the kingdom were established and in vigorous operation. They did not exist when he took office; they had to be both created and firmly rooted in order to withstand the blast of war. Time was not given to accomplish this great work, nor did Louis XIV support the schemes of his minister by turning the budding energies of his docile and devoted subjects into paths favorable to it. So when the great strain came upon the powers of the nation, instead of drawing strength from every quarter and through many channels, and laying the whole outside world under contribution by the energy of its merchants and seamen, as England has done in like straits, it was thrown back upon itself, cut off from the world by the navies of England and Holland, and the girdle of enemies which surrounded it upon the continent. The only escape from this process of gradual starvation was by an effectual control of the sea; the creation of a strong sea power which should ensure free play for the wealth of the land and the industry of the people. For this, too, France had great natural advantages in her three seaboards, on the Channel, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean; and politically she had had the fair opportunity of joining to her own maritime power that of the Dutch in friendly alliance, hostile or at least wary toward England. In the pride of his strength, conscious of absolute
control in his kingdom, Louis cast away this strong reinforcement to his power, and proceeded to rouse Europe against him by repeated aggressions. In the period which we have just considered, France justified his confidence by a magnificent, and upon the whole successful, maintenance of his attitude against all Europe; she did not advance, but neither did she greatly recede. But this display of power was exhausting; it ate away the life of the nation, because it drew wholly upon itself and not upon the outside world, with which it could have been kept in contact by the sea. In the war that next followed, the same energy is seen, but not the same vitality; and France was everywhere beaten back and brought to the verge of ruin. The lesson of both is the same; nations, like men, however strong, decay when cut off from the external activities and resources which at once draw out and support their internal powers. A nation, as we have already shown, cannot live indefinitely off itself, and the easiest way by which it can communicate with other peoples and renew its own strength is the sea.
16. T G B
S P [42]
England after the Peace of Utrecht, 1715
While England’s policy thus steadily aimed at widening and strengthening the bases of her sway upon the ocean, the other governments of Europe seemed blind to the dangers to be feared from her sea growth. The miseries resulting from the overweening power of Spain in days long gone by seemed to be forgotten; forgotten also the more recent lesson of the bloody and costly wars provoked by the ambition and exaggerated power of Louis XIV. Under the eyes of the statesmen of Europe there was steadily and visibly being built up a third overwhelming power, destined to be used as selfishly, as aggressively, though not as cruelly, and much more successfully than any that had preceded it. This was the power of the sea, whose workings, because more silent than the clash of arms, are less often noted, though lying clearly enough on the surface. It can scarcely be denied that England’s uncontrolled dominion of the seas, during almost the whole period chosen for our subject, was by long odds the chief among the military factors that determined the final issue.[43] So far, however, was this influence from being foreseen after Utrecht, that France for twelve years, moved by personal exigencies of her rulers, sided with England against Spain; and when Fleuri came into power in 1726, though this policy was reversed, the navy of France received no attention, and the only blow at England was the establishment of a Bourbon prince, a natural enemy to her, upon the throne of the two Sicilies in 1736. When war broke out with Spain in 1739, the navy of England was in numbers more than equal to the combined navies of Spain and France; and during the quarter of a century of nearly uninterrupted war that followed, this numerical disproportion increased. In these wars England, at first instinctively, afterward with conscious purpose under a government that recognized her opportunity and the possibilities of her great sea power, rapidly built up that mighty colonial empire whose foundations were already securely laid in the characteristics of her colonists and the strength of her fleets. In strictly European affairs her wealth, the outcome of her sea power,
made her play a conspicuous part during the same period. The system of subsidies, which began half a century before in the wars of Marlborough and received its most extensive development half a century later in the Napoleonic wars, maintained the efforts of her allies, which would have been crippled, if not paralyzed, without them. Who can deny that the government which with one hand strengthened its fainting allies on the continent with the life-blood of money, and with the other drove its own enemies off the sea and out of their chief possessions, Canada, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Havana, Manila, gave to its country the foremost rôle in European politics; and who can fail to see that the power which dwelt in that government, with a land narrow in extent and poor in resources, sprang directly from the sea? The policy in which the English government carried on the war is shown by a speech of Pitt, the master-spirit during its course, though he lost office before bringing it to an end. Condemning the Peace of 1763, made by his political opponent, he said: “France is chiefly, if not exclusively, formidable to us as a maritime and commercial power. What we gain in this respect is valuable to us, above all, through the injury to her which results from it. You have left to France the possibility of reviving her navy.” Yet England’s gains were enormous; her rule in India was assured, and all North America east of the Mississippi in her hands. By this time the onward path of her government was clearly marked out, had assumed the force of a tradition, and was consistently followed. The war of the American Revolution was, it is true, a great mistake, looked at from the point of view of sea power; but the government was led into it insensibly by a series of natural blunders. Putting aside political and constitutional considerations, and looking at the question as purely military or naval, the case was this: The American colonies were large and growing communities at a great distance from England. So long as they remained attached to the mothercountry, as they then were enthusiastically, they formed a solid base for her sea power in that part of the world; but their extent and population were too great, when coupled with the distance from England, to afford any hope of holding them by force, if any powerful nations were willing to help them. This “if,” however, involved a notorious probability; the humiliation of France and Spain was so bitter and so recent that they were sure to seek revenge, and it was well known that France in particular had been carefully and rapidly
