Theoretical Perspectives: A Lens Through Which to View the World
1.1 ZONE OF COLLABORATION? SOUTHEAST ASIAN AREA STUDIES AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
The case of Southeast Asia is a curious one. While the various social science disciplines have produced many studies about other regions in the last two decades, Southeast Asia has interestingly not been studied as extensively. Although, since the start of the twenty-first century, the region has politically and economically all in all developed in a stable way, Southeast Asia still appears to be far away from the centers where global images are primarily shaped (Europe/North America). It is an essential task for scholars of Southeast Asia to bring the region a little bit closer to the Western political consciousness (Kuhonta et al. 2008: 2, 5, 24). Southeast Asia only emerged as a political region of its own after the Cold War, in the two decades since the end of the 1990s, due to its growing economic potential. Before, even during the Vietnam War, the region was never a primary focus of the global major powers or of major global research (Kang 2003: 58). It is thus true that political science is a much more established and older branch that features a standard toolkit and is more firmly rooted in merited theory, while Southeast Asian area studies are not. As a result, on the one hand, the latter are more open to neighboring disciplines such as the humanities, providing more opportunities for innovative cooperation, while, on the other, they may lack the rigor and precision of long-established approaches (Emmerson 2008: 309). Ideally,
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 J.S. Lang, Foreign Policy and the Media, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-59494-5_1
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the dialectic conversation between the overlapping bodies of theory and region should be the foundation of good Southeast Asian political studies that are “guided by theory yet grounded in empirics” (Kuhonta et al. 2008: 331). A “vigorous dialogue between theory and evidence” can both enrich all major international relations (IR) paradigms and contribute to a deeper scholarly understanding of Southeast Asia (Kang 2003: 85). For area studies, a deeper engagement with theory is thus advisable, while for political science, reorientation toward contextual knowledge is called for (Fukuyama 2004; Diamond 2002; Kuhonta et al. 2008: 238). Proponents of both camps have been at odds for a long time. The former criticized the latter for not having enough deep knowledge about an area, while the latter criticized the former for not adhering to standard methodology and not addressing wider theoretical debates. Between Southeast Asian area studies and political science, there has thus developed a “polemicized divide” (Emmerson 2008) that leads most discussions into an unproductive direction, neglecting the fact that both spheres actually overlap. This overlap should be a “zone of healthy and productive collaboration” in which both the respective shortcomings as well as the positive elements of the other are respected. This debate between area studies specialists and political science proponents is closely connected to the problems accompanying the exclusivity of Western international relations theories (IRTs). The dominance of Western worldviews in IR, in particular realism, is widely acknowledged, but the simple call to incorporate non-Western IRTs into the Western academic discourse will not help to make the discipline more democratic because it only reproduces “the very hegemonic logic of dominance” (Chen 2011: 4). As of yet, IR scholarship outside the West has turned into a source of information of the Western center only. Thus, in order to avoid ever reinforcing the rules of center vs. periphery, Southeast Asia scholars need to raise awareness at the center about nonWestern ways of thinking and perceptions, by creating non-hegemonic spaces that allow different ideas and interpretations to co-exist and benefit from each other (Chen 2011: 3), an approach that this study follows.
1.2
INTERPRETIVIST SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AS A RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE
Mainstream IR theories such as realism that dominated the discipline until the 1990s treat world politics as an integrated whole that is undifferentiated by either time or territory (Hopf 1998: 199). True to its core
argument, the emergence of constructivism needs to be seen with the sociohistorical background in mind. In the aftermath of the Cold War, there was a need for alternative explanations because the existing IR theories had been unable to foresee or explain the developments that followed, as some issues in the empirical world had simply been neglected. It was in this context that constructivism drew attention to ideas, norms and identities (Barnett 2005: 258). In arguing that the world is socially constructed, social constructivism gives the social more weight than the material in world politics. Material factors are ascribed meaning “through a process of interaction between agents (individuals, states, non-state actors) and the structures of their broader environment”. This “idea that states and the international environment are mutually constituted is inherent in the constructivist approach” (Hurd 2006: 305). In the case of Southeast Asia, constructivism allows the researcher to focus on the historical production of identities in the various colonial and post-colonial contexts (Davidson 2008). It is with this background in mind that constructivists criticized realism for its Eurocentric approach that is undeniable largely based on European historical experiences (Acharya and Stubbs 2006). In looking at other non-European regions mainly through the lens of realism, in the past, Western scholars tended to disregard many of the respective area’s specific characteristics, a phenomenon that Edward Said called “Orientalism” (2003).
Social constructivism in IR can be separated into various strands. Two of these emerged as the dominant ones, usually referred to as conventional or positivist and interpretative or post-positivist. They agree that the world is made and remade through human action, for which ideas are central. These ideas “define and transform the organization of world politics, shape the identity and interests of states, and determine what counts as legitimate action” (Barnett 2005: 252). The conventional strand, however, concerns itself with constructivism as a philosophical, metatheoretical enterprise and is more “interested in uncovering top-down/deductive mechanisms and causal relationships” (Checkel 2008: 72; Hurd 2006: 299), while the interpretivist strand “moved away from abstract philosophical argument toward the study of human discourse and practice beyond the narrow confines of IRT” (Reus-Smit 2006: 215). The interpretative strand assumes that causal relationships do not matter that much in the mediation and construction of social reality, but rather that language plays a central role and thus a respective situation’s background and linguistic constructions (social discourses). This strand asks “how” questions and is not so much
interested in generalizing but in the respective content. In contrast to the conventional strand, the methods with which interpretivists proceed can be deeply inductive (bottom-up), and textual and narrative (Checkel 2008: 73). It is hence that the epistemological divide between positivists and post-positivists runs deep (Hurd 2006: 307). There are in fact many divisive points among constructivists. A central one is the notion of state centrism or, rather, the unit of analysis (Hurd 2006: 306). Traditionally there are three levels of analysis in IR, as Kenneth Waltz famously outlined in 1959, referring to them as the “three images”, by which phenomena of international politics could be explained. These are the individual, the group and the intergroup levels. Most constructivist scholars favor the view that the arena of politics equals the interplay of actors at various levels (Checkel 2008: 78). Alexander Wendt is the most notable exception because he focuses solely on the systemic level and hence treats states as unitary actors, while methodologically proclaiming a “scientific realism” (Reus-Smit 2006: 222). The interpretivist strand of constructivism sees “no impetus for a zero-sum debate over which level provides the most leverage over puzzles”. In other words, as constructivism acknowledges that states as well as actors below state level can have an impact on politics, it makes no sense to argue whether the domestic level is important to IR or not (Hurd 2006: 306). That is why a study of media perception is of interest for the IR scholar.
For proponents of area studies, the interpretative approach has clear advantages because it allows for a heightened cultural sensitivity that matters more than formal replicability. Here hypothesis-testing is but one step in a long process of research that encompasses several levels. Causality still matters but not as a means by itself; rather as an inseparable part of social phenomena in general. Interpretivist work is thus a highly descriptive task, but the work can nonetheless be analytically ambitious (Kuhonta et al. 2008: 8–9). Cliffort Geertz called this attempt to develop an approach that describes the social phenomenon in a theoretically grounded way “thick description”. In his opinion, researchers should know a lot about a smaller number of cases and generalize within them, instead of attempting to vainly extrapolate to other cases (1973). Thus the interpretivist method accumulates knowledge not primarily through hypothesis-testing but rather by accumulating general insights into patterns of individual behavior in similar but not identical social settings. These insights then lead to a more precise and better understanding of the behavior under study and of the variations of the behavior across different contexts (Geertz 1973).
Thus, when understanding qualitative social inquiry as a means by itself, which allows the researcher to analyze a selected few cases in greater depth rather than to generalize about a broader population, interpretivist social constructivism offers an appropriate lens through which empirical settings can be observed, while bearing in mind the respective sociohistorical background.
1.3
POWER AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM
In constructivism, power incorporates both material and non-material factors (Hurd 2006: 299). It is a concept that is constructed out of both material power and ideological structures (Checkel 2008). “Power can be understood not only as the ability of one actor to get another actor to do what they would not do otherwise but also as the production of identities and interests that limit the ability to control their fate” (Barnett 2005: 264). It can be “anything that institutes or sustains control” (Novotny 2010) and hence comprises the following components: economy, military and prestige. Following this logic, power is not only an entity’s aggregated material might; it is also about how it is perceived.1 Power can thus be a very subjective entity. As with other social concepts, constructivists see power as contextually constructed, getting its relevance from how it is perceived – its interpretation depending on the contextual conditions. Hence the understanding of power is different from case to case. Perceptions in turn derive from the way in which a group or an individual understand and respond to a set of intersubjective ideas, identities and norms (Novotny 2010: 31).2 Accordingly, this study acknowledges the power that derives from material might, but also stresses the acute relevance of social context for the understanding of power relations. Similar to the concept of power is the social construction of threats. A threat is never a primordial constant because it is always dependent on the social construction of an “Other” and not just there already (Hopf 1998: 199). This means that how states perceive each other has an influence on their interests and thus on their behavior (Hopf 1998: 199). Constructivism is therefore interested in change, since it assumes that relationships and perceptions are not stable because they develop over time depending on the ongoing interaction between the parties and their social context (Hurd 2006: 303). The process of identity and interest formation is then closely interconnected. As identities are fundamentally social and always shaped in relationship to others, they are not fixed but changeable, and again they shape interests: “Knowledge shapes
how actors interpret and construct social reality” (Barnett 2005: 263, 267). This means that ideas in international politics are intersubjective and institutionalized. They are shared among people and expressed in practices and identities (Hurd 2006: 301). “New foreign policy ideas are shaped by preexisting dominant ideas and their relationship to experienced events” (Legro 2005: 4). Threat then, for instance, is not self-evident. The one who perceives some material factor has to understand it in a specific way. For this, their social background is important. Thus beliefs and interpretations are inescapably part of international politics (Hurd 2006: 301–302). As social constructivism focuses on the constructedness of objects, it is well suited to asking how actors in IR come to see others as friends or as enemies (Hurd 2006: 299). This study looks at how the Indonesian press perceived US foreign policy with the aim of denaturalizing the image of the USA as a political actor in a part of Indonesian society.
1.4
IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Since this study asks how the perception of US foreign policy developed in the Indonesian press, it is an analysis of a part of the US foreign image. The concept of image is closely related to the notions of identity and identification (Herrmann 2003). Images are an integral part of an actor’s worldview and their identity formation that derives from social interaction. Social interaction is a reciprocal process, in which identities are perceived by others and thereby their own identities are defined. This process ultimately leads to a state’s “public image” (Jenkins 2008: 93). Although the dynamics are different, a state’s image—in other words, a collective “public image”—is similar to that of an individual. Both images are formed through “intra- and inter-group processes”. Collective national self-identification through government-sponsored nation-building is an example of an intragroup process (Nguitragool 2013). Such identification normally involves a construction of identities, and the processes of defining national goals and national role conceptions (Holsti 1970). The humanities in particular have developed a substantial body of literature about images and perceptions, but this topic is of relevance to the social sciences and IR as well (Nguitragool 2013: 1). “Within the context of globalization, national image has become unprecedentedly crucial for governments of countries” because in IR, states behave toward other states depending on whether they are allies or enemies, friends or foes (Herrman et al. 1997: 423; Zhang and Meadows 2012: 77). This referential categorization depends
on a perceived position, or quality, of an actor in a particular social relation (Nguitragool 2013). How a nation is perceived by others is then an important referential category because decisions of international dimensions can depend on the question of whether a state is perceived as friendly or not by others (Li and Chitty 2009). A nation’s image can thus be an asset or a liability, determining the strength of the nation’s soft power (Li and Chitty 2009: 4). Since nations more and more acknowledge the relevance of soft power in IR, governments have been increasing their efforts to influence their nation’s images via cultural diplomacy, a form of soft power that has been termed “nation branding” (Zhang and Meadows III 2012: 77–78; Li and Chitty 2009: 5). Nonetheless, not all efforts in this direction are successful because a nation’s image is not only dependent on stately propaganda. National images usually have various sources that are not always easy to track down (Herrman et al. 1997: 422–423). According to theories of strategic decision-making, foreign policy choices are made on the basis of another nation’s image. This image is again formed on the basis of three judgments an actor makes: first, on the perceived relative power of another actor; second, on the perceived threat and or opportunity another actor represents; and, third, on the perceived culture of the other actor (Herrman et al. 1997: 407–408). In other words, a nation’s reputation consists of the “collective judgments of a country’s foreign image and character” (Wang 2003: 91).
A nation’s image therefore has various components. One of these is stereotypes that often function as frames, to which individuals and groups refer when receiving information about an Other. Edward Said’s term Orientalism (2003) has been used in various cases to describe different circumstances. In its basic form, however, it gives a name to the phenomenon that—based on a centuries-long history of perception through representation in literature and other media—the West has constructed a picture of the East as a cultural counterpart. The former views the latter through the lens of timeless clichés. This phenomenon also exists vice versa (Buruma and Margalit 2004; Mahbubani 2008; Carrier 1992: 195). From a theoretical perspective, Occidentalism should be understood as a “normal” phenomenon, very similar to its counterpart. Both generate distinct and essentialist images of the respective Other. James Carrier calls this “definition by opposition”, a way of developing an identity by contrasting oneself dialectically against an Other (Carrier 1992: 195–197). Owing to the imbalanced geopolitical situation, there are asymmetric possibilities of constructing the Other, which means that as the West is,
and has been, the political and cultural hegemonic power for centuries, the East is less likely to produce its own images of the West without being influenced by it (Carrier 1992: 198). It can be assumed that this is the case in Southeast Asia because the experiences of colonialism influenced the region’s political appearance dramatically. During the centuries-long colonial rule, new geographical borders, hierarchies and kinships were established according to the colonial power’s interests (Steedly 1999: 433–436). These historically grown conditions can be reinforced by contemporary events and actions. In the case of the image of the USA in Southeast Asia that often figures as an epitaph for the West, the “American manhood” identity that is embodied in US foreign policy, at first worked as a means to distinguish the American from the European colonizers (Doty 1996: 30). An example is the current perception of the US by some countries, including those in Southeast Asia. Here, Indonesia can serve as case in point. While at the beginning, twentieth-century US democracy was something worth aspiring to, at the turn of the millennium, the “American manhood” foreign policy was no longer perceived positively. The new image of the USA now resembled “rampaging armed forces” disseminating their “platitudes of democracy” (Bond and Simons 2009: 90). Since independence, Indonesian leaders have used the West as the Other to construct the Indonesian identity. In recent times there have been signs that the West has once again “become a central element in an effort to reinvent Indonesia’s roles, positions and more importantly its Islamic and democratic identities in international politics” (Nguitragool 2013: 2). The way in which the USA and its foreign policy are perceived through the Indonesian media is hence of relevance to bilateral relations, and, considering Indonesia’s self-image as a builder of bridges between the West and the East, it might have an impact on geopolitical issues. It is against this background that the current study attempts to ask how the Indonesian press perceived US foreign policy in the time from 9/11 until President Obama’s re-election in November 2012.
How then can the concept of image be defined? For this study, images consist of “privately held frames in the minds of individuals and public frames as discernible in media” (Li and Chitty 2009: 6). Apart from the three components that they are made of that were mentioned above, national images thus obviously address two dimensions because they are both projected and perceived. These perceived images can be defined as “pictures of other nations in the minds of people”, while the projected images are created through public communication (Li and Chitty 2009: 1, 3).
Basically, these images are hence embedded in the minds of individuals. The perceived images only come to light if they are communicated publicly. Here, the mass media acts as a key player in reproducing these images (Kunczik 1997). Particularly where international issues are concerned, the media is the essential channel through which to obtain information (Zhang and Meadows III 2012: 76) because it “occup[ies] the most significant place for most people when they access the world beyond their immediate environment” (Taylor 1997: 3). The news media “exert[s] significant influence on our perceptions of […] the most salient issues of the day” (McCombs and Reynolds 2009: 1), setting the agenda of public opinion with regard to international affairs (Zhang and Meadows III 2012: 80). Although there is still a wide knowledge gap concerning the exact machinations of the complex relationship between the media, public opinion and policy agendas, scholars agree that the news media exerts great power because information and misinformation can transform the world (Zhang and Meadows III 2012: 81). Owing to their own interests and their potential great power, the media can become subjective participants rather than objective observers (Li and Chitty 2009: 3). Hence whether intentionally or not, the media is the dominant shaper of national images (Li and Chitty 2009: 6).
1.5
MEDIA POWER IN SOCIETIES
To ask what power the media has in societies means questioning how influential it is in politics. There are five basic principles regarding the interplay between politics and the media as proposed by Gadi Wolfsfeld (2011). First, political power usually translates into power over the media, and to a certain degree also over public opinion. Second, in times of political crisis, the authorities usually lose control over the media. Third, no journalism can be truly objective. Fourth, the media gain more revenue if it tells a good story, leading to a tendency toward conflict reporting and dramatic descriptions. Fifth, the media affects the public intentionally, but most effects occur unintentionally.
1.5.1 The Media in Political Process
There are therefore three areas of interest in the study of political communication. These are media work, viewers’ work and media effects (Gamson et al. 1992). To date, most of the literature in media studies has focused
on neither media work nor viewers’ work, but on media effects. There is thus substantive literature on the nature of the impact of public opinion on foreign affairs, but how public attitudes change over time has mostly been neglected (Soroka 2003: 27). The impact of public opinion on the political process has long been debated. There are those agreeing with the Almond–Lippmann consensus that public opinion is irrational and thus of little influence on politics (Lippmann 1955), while others disagree and are convinced that the media at least has the power to set the agenda (Cohen 1963).3 There are, however, some basic assumptions where there is agreement. First, media and politics are two sides of the same coin, as the media is the public’s primary source of information about what is happening in politics, and policy-makers themselves turn to the media to obtain an understanding of public opinion and the important issues on the public agenda. In other words, “foreign policymakers respond to the public and the public responds to the media” (Soroka 2003: 28). The media then constantly have an effect on politics. Most of the time this influence is invisible, which is why in the literature the media has so far played a relatively small role in considerations of how foreign policy is formulated (Hindell 1995: 78). Nonetheless, research suggests a remarkably powerful effect of media content on the salience of foreign policy for the public. If an issue becomes salient, the public’s interest is aroused and politicians have to take into account the mood and react to it. Thus the media exerts power in setting the agenda and in changing the salience of issues (Soroka 2003). The press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen 1963: 13). This leads to a situation in which, at times, events occur that are of such significance that the media is able to “exert a much more profound influence than normal” (Hindell 1995: 78). This is especially true for issue areas such as foreign policy, because this is almost always outside the public’s personal sphere of experience, so that most information about foreign policy is most certainly “the product of media coverage” (Soroka 2003: 43). Thus the media affects public opinion, which again can have direct and indirect consequences for foreign policy-making, depending on the particular situation (Soroka 2003: 43–44).
In IR there are several traditional ways of capturing the role of different decision-makers in the process of the formulation of foreign policy that can be categorized into two camps: the pluralist and the elitist model of political process. David Novotny, in his 2010 study, opted for the pluralist
model but argued that for his aim (an analysis of the process of Indonesian foreign policy formation), an incorporation of the public’s opinion was not useful because the public tend not to be as well informed about foreign policy actions and events as about domestic issues. Although he is partially right, it is necessary to recognize that in situations when there are few sources of information, the public needs to rely particularly on the information they obtain from the media, which again grants the media power over information. In the end, when determining which model to follow, the researcher has to decide whether to adhere to the pluralist or the elitist model of political process. While the former assumes that every meaningful social actor has its media outlet, and thus citizens have many sources of information from which to form an opinion and ultimately influence a state’s foreign policy, the latter predicts that only a state’s elites have sufficient information as a result of their media access and partisanship, leaving the bulk of citizens with too little knowledge about foreign policy issues to be able to influence the process (Robinson 2012). This is connected to the notion of discourses functioning as sites of social power that define and constitute the world. Traditionally, elite discourses are more powerful than others since they imply institutional power. They therefore play privileged roles in the production and reproduction of discursive constructions and can even become hegemonic. However, the recent developments in the global information environment have caused a shift in societies’ balance of soft power away from the traditionally strong states and their institutions toward non-elite actors on both the international and the national stage (Rowley and Weldes 2012: 183; Robinson 2012: 176). Thus the relationship between the mass media, public opinion and foreign policy is changing. However, most knowledge that has been gathered about the relationship between the mass media, public opinion and foreign policy in modern times still stems from the Cold War decades. Since then, a country’s foreign policy focus has necessarily had to become much broader and the accompanying problems have diversified. Domestic agreement on foreign policy issues has become increasingly difficult, and broad political consensus is harder to achieve. Although today information is much more easily, the political decision-making process has not become more transparent. Instead, more interest groups are now a part of it (Nacos and Shapiro 2000: 1–6). For scholars, it has become harder to determine the relationship between society and the political process, and to track down who influences whom (Nacos and Shapiro 2000: 3). Much of the literature argues about why the media is or isn’t an actor in
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“That is the first riddle. The answer is house, reserving an opening for the doorway.
The men that stand, The men that lie down, The men that are folded.
“That is the second riddle. The answer is, house, again. The timbers that stand, the battens that are laid down and the grass that is folded. I must go home now. When the day arrives, you must come up. I will prepare the oven and when it is heated you answer the first riddle; and when you see the stones thrown out onto the sides, answer the second riddle; after that I will take ahold of the king and throw him in the oven.”
On the day appointed, Kepakailiula and his friend went to the king’s house. As they came in the king saw them and called out: “Let the stranger be seated here.” As soon as he sat down, the king said: “Will the stranger join in the fun?”
Kepakailiula replied: “Yes.” “I have two riddles,” said the king.
“Oia ka nane mua. Eia ka haina, he hale a koe ka puka komo.
O kanaka i ku, O kanaka i moe, O kanaka i pelupelu ia.
“Oia ka lua o ka nane, eia kona haina, he hale no, o ka laau e ku ana, o ka aho e moe ana, o ka mauu i pelupelu ia. E hoi au, a hiki ia la, pii ae oe, a na’u no auanei e hoa ka umu, a enaena, hai oe i ka nane mua; a ulu, a lele ke a ma kapa, hai oe i ka lua o ka nane; a pau ia na’u e lalau mai i ke ’lii a hoolei i ka umu.”
A hiki ia la, hele aku la laua nei me ke aikane a hiki, ike mai la ke ’lii, kahea mai la: “Maanei ka malihini.” A hiki keia olelo mai la kela: “E papa wahi lealea me ka malihini?” Ae aku keia. “Ae.” “He nane, ina e loaa a’u nane elua, kalua ia au i ka umu, ina loaa ole, kalua ia oe i ka umu, oia la.”
“If the right answers are given to them, I will be baked in the oven. If they are not answered correctly, you will be baked in the oven. These are the conditions.” The king then gave the first riddle.
Step all around, step to the bottom, Leaving, reserving a certain place.
Hai mai la ua ’lii nei i ka nane ia ia nei:
Kai a puni, kai a lalo, Koe, koe, koena.
“The second one is this: “Eia ka lua o kuu nane:
The men that stand, The men that lie down, The men that are folded.
“These are my riddles, I want the stranger to understand. If you give the right answers you will indeed live, but if you fail, I shall kill you. I will bake you in the oven.” When Kepakailiula saw that the oven was heated, he gave the answer to the first riddle:
“It is a house. It is thatched all around, reserving the door way.”
“Yes, you have given the right answer to my riddle; my second one is yet to be answered. If you
O kanaka i ku, O kanaka i moe, O kanaka i pelupelu ia.
“Oia a’u nane la, i lohe oe e ka malihini; a loaa ia oe pakele oe i na la, loaa ole ia oe make oe ia’u, kalua ia oe i ka umu.” A ike keia ua enaena ka umu, hai aku la i ka nane mua: “He hale, ako ia a puni, koe ka puka komo.”
“Ae, loaa ae la kuu nane mua ia oe, o kuu nane alua koe, ina aole e loaa, make oe ia’u.” Nana aku la keia a ulu ka umu, a hiolo ke a i lalo, hai aku la:
fail, I shall kill you.” Kepakailiula looked at the oven and when he saw the stones being thrown to the side he answered the second riddle:
It is also a house.
The timbers that stand,
The battens that are laid down, The grass that is folded.
“What! Who has told you?” While he was expressing his wonder he was thrown in the oven by Kukaea. At this time, the chiefs and men of Kauai jumped in to help their king, but Kepakailiula, his friend and Kukaea fought so well and bravely [516]that great numbers were slain, forcing the Kauai people to flee to the mountains. Makolea the wife of Kepakailiula was soon after found and they returned to the home of his friend. Upon arriving at the house, Kepakailiula gave Kauai over in charge of his friend with Kukaea under him. They then remained on Kauai for many days. Thus ends this legend. [499]
He hale no; He laau ke ku ana, He aho ke moe ana, He mauu ke pelu ana.
“Kahaha! I loaa la ia oe, ia wai?” Ia ia e olelo ana, o ka manawa ia noho ana i loko o ka umu ia
Kukaea. Iho iho ana na ’lii o Kauai e alu, a me na kanaka, e noke aku ana o Kepakailiula i ka
haihai, oia o ke aikane, o Kukaea, holo na kanaka i ke [517]kuahiwi. Loaa aku la o Makolea ka wahine, hoi aku la me ke aikane. A hiki i ka hale, haawi aku o Kepakailiula ia
Kauai a puni no ke aikane, o Kukaea ke ’lii malalo, noho lakou ia Kauai, o ka pau ana ia o keia kaao. [516]
Ke-paka-ili-ula, the red-skinned paka ↑
Hina, the favorite feminine character of Hawaiian story. ↑
Not shown whether brother or sister. ↑
Names indicating a stay-at-home, Kiinoho, and a traveler, Kiihele ↑
Paliuli, the Hawaiian Paradise, located in certain legends as in Puna, Hawaii, as it does here ↑
Cane of luxuriant growth that has bent over and curved upward. ↑
Bananas fell, or dropped, scattering from the bunch through ripeness. ↑
An anahulu is a ten day period This term is never applied to any other counting. ↑
This phrase indicates the Hawaiian ideal of physical perfection, and is frequently met with ↑
Hiwahiwa, beloved one, here refers to Hina ↑
Keiki a kaua, our son, from adoption, or rearing as foster parents, though nephews in fact ↑
As note 2. ↑
A deprecating comparison surely ↑
A better rendering would be “a wife for you.” ↑
Poohiwi, literally “shoulder to rest on.” ↑
A customary form in a contest; courtesy giving the stranger the
choice first. ↑
Lauawa, a Maui wind. ↑
Taking his name for adoption from fear In many of the South Sea Islands an exchange of names was a bond of friendship. ↑
Halau, a long, open, flat-top structure of temporary character, of coconut leaves usually, for sheltering canoes, and a kind erected for semioutdoor entertainments. ↑
Moa, a recognition of supreme sovereignty. ↑
Keaumiki and Keauka are sometimes referred to as gods of the tides ↑
Virtually burning his bridges behind him ↑
Perhaps figurative for the remains of the king’s food: the crumbs from the table. ↑
[Contents]
L W . K W .
Wahanui was the king, Kilohi was the prophet and Hawaii the land they lived in. Boarding his double canoe, he left Hawaii and set sail for Kaunolu, Lanai. The reason of this journey made by Wahanui was on account of an oath made by him, “When I step on the breasts of Kane and Kanaloa, then will I return to Hawaii.” Before Wahanui sailed from Hawaii, Kane and Kanaloa, together with their younger brother Kaneapua, were living at Kaunolu, Lanai. They were three gods who sometimes changed into other forms. Kane and Kanaloa taking the form of birds, while Kaneapua very often had a human form.
Once upon a time they became very thirsty, so Kane and
O Wahanui ke ’lii, o Kilohi ke kaula, o Hawaii ka aina, holo mai la kona mau kaulua mai Hawaii mai, a Kaunolu i Lanai. O ke kumu o keia holo ana o Wahanui, he olelo nana i hoohiki, penei: “Aia a hehi i ka houpo o Kane laua o Kanaloa, alaila, hoi i Hawaii.” Mamua ae o ka holo ana mai o Wahanui mai Hawaii mai, e noho ana o Kane, Kanaloa a me ko laua pokii o Kaneapua, i Kaunolu, ma Lanai; he mau akua lakou ekolu, o Kane a me Kanaloa, he mau kino manu ko laua, o Kaneapua he kino kanaka kona.
Noho iho la lakou a make i ka wai, olelo aku o Kane a me
Kanaloa requested their youngest brother to go to the uplands of Lanai for water, at a spring called Nanaihale. Upon the arrival of Kaneapua at the spring with his water jug, he urinated by the edge of the spring before he stooped down to fill his jug; he did not know that his urine had run into the spring. When he arrived home and met Kane and Kanaloa, they reached out for the water jug and each took a drink. When they had satisfied their thirst they discovered that it was urine instead of water, so they flew off and left Kaneapua on Lanai.
While Kaneapua was one day seated by the seashore on the Kaunolu point, he saw the double canoe of Wahanui passing by, so he called out from the shore: “Whose canoe is that?” “It is Wahanui’s,” replied the prophet Kilohi. “Wahanui is the chief, who is the prophet?” “Kilohi.” Kaneapua again asked: “A canoe, sailing where to?” “It is a canoe sailing to Tahiti to step on the breasts of Kane and Kanaloa.” Kaneapua called out:
Kanaloa ia Kaneapua, ko laua pokii: “E pii oe i wai no kakou, i uka o Lanai,” o Nanaihale ka inoa o ka wai. A hiki o Kaneapua me ka huewai ilaila, mimi iho la ia ma kapa nahelehele o ka wai, a pau ia, hoi iho la ia a ka punawai, ukuhi i ka huewai. Aole ia i ike, ua kahe ka mimi ona a loko o ka wai, hoi aku la ia a hiki i o Kane a me Kanaloa, lalau mai la laua i ka huewai a inu iho la, he mimi wale no ka wai, ia wa, lele laua a haalele ia Kaneapua i Lanai.
Ia Kaneapua e noho ana ma ka lae o Kaunolu, holo mai ana ka waa o Wahanui, kahea aku o Kaneapua mauka: “Nowai he waa?” “No Wahanui,” pela ’ku ke kaula o Kilohi. “O Wahanui ke ’lii, owai ke kaula?” “O Kilohi.” Ninau hou o Kaneapua: “He waa e holo ana i hea?” “He waa e holo ana i Kahiki, hehihehi i ka houpo o Kane a me Kanaloa.” I aku o Kaneapua: “Pehea la hoi owau kekahi?” Olelo mai o Kilohi: “He komokomo ka waa.” “I ka iako
“Why not let me come too?”
Kilohi answered: “The canoe is already loaded down.” “If the canoe is loaded down, let me ride on the sticks connecting the canoe to the outrigger.” “They are also overcrowded.” “Let me ride on the outrigger then.” “That too is overcrowded.” This conversation was carried on until every part of the canoe was requested for. Kaneapua then called after he had been denied a seat on any part of the canoe: “Return, it is going to be stormy.”
Kilohi replied: “Who are you that shall cause my lord’s canoe to return?”
After leaving the Kaunolu point, they continued on their way until they were off the Kaena point, where they encountered a heavy wind; soon after this a storm arose and the canoe was overturned. Wahanui the chief got a severe cold and the things in the canoe were wet: so they returned and landed at Lele, in Lahaina. After spending the night at this place they again set out the next day. Upon passing by Kaunolu, Kaneapua again called
au.” “He komo no.” “I ke ama au.” “He komo.” Pela no ka ia nei olelo a pau luna o ka waa. I aku o Kaneapua: “E hoi he ino.” I mai o Kilohi: “O oe no ka mea e hoi ai ka waa o ko’u haku?”
Holo mai la lakou mai Kaunolu a ka lae o Kaena, loaa i ka makani, ka ino, kahuli na waa, opili ke ’lii o Wahanui, pulu na ukana, hoi aku la a pae ma Lele, i Lahaina. Moe a ao ae, holo hou lakou a Kaunolu, hana aku no o Kaneapua e like me na olelo mua, aohe ae o Kilohi, ke kaula. Holo no a make hou, hoi hou, o ka lua ia. [519]Hooiaio iho o Wahanui i ka olelo a Kaneapua ke keiki, me kona manao ua oi kona ike i ko Kilohi, kana kaula.
out as before, and again the prophet, Kilohi, refused to allow him to come aboard. Not very far from this place they again were caught in another [518]storm and were forced to return a second time. On this return Wahanui began to realize how true the boy Kaneapua predicted and that he was much smarter than his prophet, Kilohi. On the next trip Kaneapua was given passage and the journey was then resumed. There were two sailing masters aboard, Hookele i Hilo and Hookele i Kau.1 Kaneapua sat behind the sailing masters. As soon as Kaneapua took his seat a thick fog was seen to approach them and before very long a thick darkness enveloped them; so thick indeed that those in the aft part of the canoe could not see those in the fore part. This darkness prevailed until they arrived at the land of Kanehunamoku, a land which appeared to them in the form of a dog. Kilohi said to Wahanui that it was a dog and begged him that they return to Hawaii and kiss the children and wives ere they be eaten up by
Ia holo ana, kau o Kaneapua i luna o na waa a holo aku la. Elua hookele o luna, o Hookele i Hilo, o Hookele i Kau; mahope o na hookele o Kaneapua. O ka manawa ia, paa o luna i ka ohu me ka pohina, aohe ike o mua ia hope o na waa; pela ko lakou holo ana a hiki i ka aina o Kanehunamoku, he kino ilio ke ano o ka aina ma ka lakou ike aku. Olelo aku o Kilohi ia Wahanui: “He ilio. E hoi kaua i Hawaii, i honi aku i ka ihu o ke keiki me ka wahine, a papau kaua i ka ilio ai kanaka a Hina.”
the man-eating dog of Hina. At this it was made evident to Wahanui, that Kilohi was not the great priest that he had all along thought him to be, and that they would all have been killed if Kaneapua had not been allowed to join them.
At this fear expressed by Kilohi, Kaneapua said reassuringly: “You are entirely mistaken, Kilohi, that is the land of Kanehunamoku. Upon seeing you to be a stranger the land is hidden from view, when it becomes clear [it will be seen]. There are people on the land as you can hear their voices.” When they drew nearer to the place they saw2 that it was land, they also saw a man who was gathering coral for food, a deathdealing food. Soon after this they left the land of Kanehunamoku and continued on their way. After they had sailed for some time they looked up and saw two hills, Paliuli and Palikea which appeared to be moving and towering above and ahead of them. These two hills were two demi-gods sent by Kane and
Olelo Hoakaka. Ua maopopo, aohe ike o Kilohi ma keia olelo ana; mai make lakou, ina aole o Kaneapua e kau pu me lakou. I aku o Kaneapua: “Lalau oe e Kilohi, he aina ia, o Kanehunamoku, ike mai la ia oe i ka malihini, lele ae la ka hauli o ka moku iluna, hoaiai mai la; he kanaka ko uka ke uwalo mai la.”
A kokoke lakou, i nana aku ka hana he aina, he kanaka, he puna ka ai, he ai make. Haalele lakou ia Kanehunamoku, holo hou lakou. I nana aku ka hana, he mau puu elua, o Paliuli, o Palikea, e oni ana iluna, a kiekie mamua o lakou nei, he mau kupua keia na Kane a me
Kanaloa, e ake ana e make lakou nei. I aku o Kaneapua ia Wahanui a me Kilohi: “He make keia, ina e hiolo iho, pau kakou i
Kanaloa who desired their destruction. Kaneapua said to Wahanui and Kilohi: “That is death, if those hills should crumble and fall on us we shall all be killed. They have been sent by Kane and Kanaloa.”
Kaneapua then called out to Paliuli and Palikea: “Return down below else I shall be killed and you two will be ashamed.” At this call the two hills were shamed and the travelers were saved. Kaneapua then said to Wahanui: “You float here while I dive down below. Honunuikuaeaea my grandmother is down there; if her back is turned up it will mean our death, but if it is turned down, we will be saved.” He then dove down and called out: “Honunuikuaeaea, turn your face upward.” She then turned her face upward and called out: “Whose offspring art thou?” “Yours.” “What is your name?” “Kaneapua.” The grandmother then fell on him and wept, and then asked him: “What is the object of this journey that brings my lord here?” “I want a rope to moor the canoe with.” She then
ka make; na Kane laua o Kanaloa keia make.”
Olelo aku la o Kaneapua ia
Paliuli a me Palikea: “E hoi i lalo, o make auanei au hilahila olua.”
Ma keia olelo, hilahila na puu, hala keia make. I aku keia ia
Wahanui: “E lana oukou maanei, e luu au ilalo, no ka mea, aia ilalo o ka Honunuikuaeaea, ke kupunawahine, o ke kua he make, o ke alo ke ola.” Luu keia a kahea iho: “E ka Honunuikuaeaea, huli ae ko alo iluna.” Huli ae ana kela iluna ke alo. “Nawai ke kupu o oe?” “Nau no.” “Owai kou inoa?” “O
Kaneapua.” Lele mai la ke kupunawahine uwe, a ninau mai la: “Heaha ka huakai a kuu haku i hiki mai nei?” “I kaula hekau no ka waa e paa ai.” Haawi mai la ka honu i ka naau ona ia
Kaneapua. Ea ae la o Kaneapua a ka waa, hikii iho la a paa.
gave Kaneapua her intestines and Kaneapua rose to the surface and tied the rope to the canoe.
Kane and Kanaloa soon after opened the calabash in which was kept the wind of Laamaomao. The wind came up, a storm arose, the sea became rough, the waves beat down and broke over them causing the coral to be thrown up on the shore. This storm lasted ten days. When the storm abated the travelers once more thought of safety and that all their troubles were about over; but there yet remained one more object to be encountered, a dog that belonged to Kaneapua. They then landed and [520]moored their canoe.
Kaneapua then said to Wahanui: “Go until you find three men who are lying down face up; they are Kane and Kanaloa, and the third one is Mauli. Step on the breasts of all three of them and return, but don’t look backward.”
Wahanui then went on his way and after carrying out the instructions he returned.
Kuu mai ana o Kane laua o Kanaloa i ka ipu makani a Laamaomao, pa ka makani, ka ino, ke kai, popoi, haki ka nalu, lele puna i uka me ke akoakoa, hookahi anahulu o ka pa ana. A pau ka pa ana, pau ae la ka make, aohe kupu e koe, he ilio nae koe, na Kaneapua no. Pae aku la lakou a uka i ke one, olelo aku la o Kaneapua [521]i ke ’lii ia
Wahanui: “E hele oe a na kanaka ekolu e moe ana iluna ke alo, o Kane a me Kanaloa, o Mauli ke kolu, hehi iho oe i na umauma o lakou a hoi mai; mai nana aku oe i hope, hele aku la o Wahanui a hoi mai la. Olelo aku o Kaneapua: “Ea! E wahi oukou ia’u a onionio, a e olelo oukou owau ko oukou akua, o Kaneapua.” Lohe o Wahanui i nei olelo a Kaneapua, kukuli iho la ia a mohai aku la i kana waiwai i lawe mai ai na Kaneapua. Akahi a maopopo ia lakou o Kaneapua keia me lakou. Akoakoa mai la ke namu,
Kaneapua then instructed his companions, saying: “You must now wrap me up and make me appear to be striped and say that I am your god, Kaneapua.”
When Wahanui heard this he went down on his knees before Kaneapua and offered him all the things of value brought by him; this being the first time that he was made aware that this person who had been with them all this time was Kaneapua. Shortly after this all manner of spirits3 gathered and asked:
“Where is your god?” “Here it is standing.” “Yes, you have a large god indeed.” “Yes, you could all be devoured [by him] without satisfying his hunger.”
After this Kaneapua instructed his companions as follows:
“When you get to the house don’t sit in the best places as that will mean your death, but sit in the bad places and you will be saved.” When they arrived at the house they followed out the instructions given them.
They lived here until after the expiration of some months when
ke nawa, ka huhu, ninau mai la: “Auhea ko oukou akua?” “Eia ke ku nei.” “U! He ’kua nui no ka ko oukou.” “Ae, he pau ko oukou i ka ai ia me kona maona ole.”
Olelo aku la o Kaneapua: “Ea, i komo oukou i ka hale, mai noho oukou ma kahi maikai, he make ia, ma kahi inoino he ola ia.” Hiki aku la lakou i ka hale. Pela ko lakou noho ana a hala he mau mahina, makaukau lakou e hoi, haawi mai o Kaneapua ia Wahanui, he mau pilikua elua. Eia ke ano o ka pilikua, o ke kua o kekahi me ke kua o kekahi hui, komo na iwi aoao a paa loa, elua
they made their preparation to return home. On leaving, Kaneapua gave Wahanui an image of a double-bodied giant,4 the bodies being joined together by means of the ribs growing into one another. It had two heads, four hands and feet and four eyes. If one was called to obey the laws of nature, the other accompanied without such desire, and so in all their movements. Upon accepting this present Kaneapua said to him: “Don’t show this image until you reach Hawaii for otherwise you will get killed.”
On the return voyage Wahanui first landed at Kauai, where they met a great crowd of people together with the king Kupakoili and his prophet Luluupali. Because of the shouts made by the people ashore Wahanui went ashore with his present.5 When the people saw this strange object they gave a mighty shout. When Kupakoili heard the shout, he inquired of his prophet, Luluupali: “How can I get possession of that image?” Luluupali answered: “Kill the king
poo, eha lima, me na wawae, eha no hoi maka, ina e hele kekahi e mimi, e hana lepo paha, alaila, hele kekahi me kona mimi ole, pela ma na hele ana a pau loa. No kekahi ka hele, hele aku kekahi. Lawe mai la o Wahanui i mau milimili nana. I mai o Kaneapua: “Mai hoike oe i kou wa e hoi ai, a hiki i Hawaii, o make oe.”
Hoi mai la o Wahanui ma a pae i Kauai, e paa pu ana na kanaka me ko laila alii o Kupakoili, me kana kilokilo o Luluupali. No ka uwa o uka, lele aku la lakou e nana, o Wahanui kahi i lele me ka pilikua ana; ike mai la na kanaka, uwa, lohe o Kupakoili, ninau aku i ke kilokilo ia
Luluupali: “Pehea la e loaa ai ia’u ka pilikua?” I mai o
Luluupali: “E pepehi i na kanaka me ke ’lii, a e puhi i na waa i ke ahi.” Ia wa ua hooko ia ko Kupakoili makemake. Ua make o
and his people and burn up the canoes.” This advice was carried out by Kupakoili, and Wahanui was killed and his image taken away. One man, however, escaped; he was one of the bailers; he dove into the sea and escaped. After a time he took unto himself a wife, a Kauai woman and settled there, taking up fishing as his occupation. It was this man’s usual custom while on his fishing trips to carry a large quantity of food along with him. After he had done this for some time his wife began to be inquisitive and at last asked him why he took so much food; he answered: “What fault is there in taking this food? Food is easily brought back again.”
Shortly after this while out fishing, a storm came up and he was blown out to sea, and after a number of days he managed to land on Hawaii. When he met the people he told them that Wahanui and his followers had all been killed in Kauai, and that he was the only one who escaped. A proclamation was then issued calling the people of Hawaii to come together and to
Wahanui ma, a lawe ia ae la na pilikua. Hookahi kanaka i pakele, o ke kanaka ka liu; luu no ia a nalowale, a mahope moe i ka wahine o Kauai, noho iho la lawaia.
He mea mau i keia kanaka ke holo i ka lawaia, he kumaupoi kona o e holo ai, pela i na holo ana a pau loa, haohao ka wahine a ninau aku, i mai kela: “Heaha auanei ka hewa, o keia lawe ana, he mea hoihoi ka ai.”
Holo hou keia i ka lawaia, e puhi iho ana ka makani lilo keia i ka moana a pae i Hawaii. Olelo aku la keia: “Ua make o [523]Wahanui a me na kanaka i Kauai, a owau ka i pakele.” Kuuhaua o Hawaii e hoakoakoa, a e hoomakaukau, hoouna mai la i na waa e kii ia
Kupakoili a me Kauai a puni, e holo i Hawaii e kii i ka waa i ka waiwai; aohe kane noho, aohe wahine, aohe keiki e holo a pau loa i Hawaii. O keia hana ana, he wea, i make a hiki lakou i Hawaii, pau i ka luku ia aohe mea koe. [522]
make preparations for avenging the death of [522]their king. A double canoe was then sent to Kauai to invite Kupakoili and his people to come to Hawaii and get all the canoes and all the property on that island. The invitation was as follows: “Let no man, woman, or child remain, all must sail for Hawaii.” This invitation was accepted and all the people sailed for Hawaii where they were all killed; no one escaped. [517]
These are the two sailing masters of the Pakaa story who displaced him ↑
Nana aku ka hana, an expression of wonderment or surprise, as we would say: Lo and behold! ↑
Namu, nawa, huhu; anger, and strange and confused speech. ↑
Pilikua, twin-bodied ↑
His twin-bodied gift from Kaneapua ↑
[Contents]
L K . K K .
Kukaohialaka was the father and Hinauluohia was the mother of three children, all boys. Kaeha was the first-born, Kamano was the second, and Kaulu was the youngest of the three. Kailua in Koolau [was] their birthplace. Kaeha the oldest brother loved and esteemed Kaulu; while Kamano hated and ill-treated Kaulu the youngest of their family. Kaulu was in his mother’s womb five years before he was born; at birth he already had a full set of teeth; his hair was long, and his buttocks covered with hair.
O Kukaohialaka ka makuakane, o Hinauluohia ka makuahine, o Kaeha, ka mua, o Kamano ka muli iho, o Kaulu ka pokii loa o lakou; ekolu lakou. O Kailua i Koolau ka aina hanau; o Kaeha ke kaikuaana aloha ia Kaulu; o Kamano ka hana ino ia Kaulu, oia ke kaikuaana hana aloha ole. Elima makahiki o Kaulu i loko o ka opu, ulu ka niho, loloa ka lauoho, huluhulu ka puukole. O ke kumu o keia noho ana o Kaulu i loko o ka opu, o ka ohumu o Kamano, e pepehi ke hanau ae o Kaulu; no keia hana a Kamano pela, noho no o Kaulu i loko o ka opu.
The reason why Kaulu stayed in his mother’s womb so long was because Kamano had said that he would kill the next child. On O ko laua kaikuaana o Kaeha, ia ia i lohe ai i ka make o Kaulu ke hanau ae, olelo aku ia ia Kamano: “Heaha ka mea e
hearing this Kaulu stayed in the womb. When Kaeha the oldest brother heard that the next child was to be killed, he asked Kamano: “Why should you kill the next child?” When Kaulu heard Kaeha say this he said to himself while still in the womb: “There, I see I will live. You will save me. Well and good, if you save me then I will take care of you.”
When Kaulu was born he was in the form of a piece of rope, having no human form. When Kamano, the angry brother saw that it had no human form, he said: “If you had a human body I would kill you.” Kaeha on the other hand took up the piece of rope, Kaulu, and put him up on a shelf, where he remained until all of thirty days had gone by without being once looked at. Kaeha in the meantime had been carried off by the spirits and was left in a certain place in the sky, or heaven, called Lewanuu and Lewalani1 where Kane and Kanaloa had their home.
make ai ko kaua pokii?” A lohe o Kaulu i keia olelo a Kaeha, olelo iho ia i loko o ka opu: “Aia ua ola, o oe ka ko’u mea e ola ai; heaha la hoi, i ola au ia oe, alaila, malama aku au ia oe.”
Hanau o Kaulu, he pauku kaula aohe kino maoli; nana ke kaikuaana huhu o Kamano, aohe kino, olelo iho ia, ina he kino kou make oe ia’u. O Kaeha hoi ko laua kaikuaana, lalau aku la ia i ke kino kaula o Kaulu, a lawe aku la a kau i luna o ka holopapa. Malaila o Kaulu i waiho ai a hala ekolu anahulu, me ka ike ole ia aku.
O Kaeha hoi, ko laua kaikuaana, ua lilo i ke akua, i kini akua i ka lehu o ke akua, i ka pukui akua, i ke kaikuaana o ke akua. Lawe ia aku la o Kaeha a ka Lewanuu a me ka Lewalani ka aina o Kane ame Kanaloa e noho ana.
Kaulu remained on the shelf until he turned or received a human body. This shelf was used for the purpose of stowing away kapas. When he awoke he looked around the inside of the house and saw that his oldest brother Kaeha was missing. He then proceeded out of the house and looking up he saw that his brother had been carried up by the spirits to the Lewanuu and Lewalani. At this he started off in search of his brother Kaeha. Upon coming to where the heavy surf was beating he inquired of the surf: “I say, this high surf are you strong?” The surf replied: “Yes.” Kaulu asked: “What is your strength?” “I strike from above and when I catch them I give them a good soaking,” said the surf. Eight surfs then struck Kaulu, but he was not injured. Kaulu then asked of his hands: “Say, Hakaukahi my right hand and Limapaihala my left hand.” “What is it?” asked the two hands. “Flamed is the upper jaw, flamed is the lower jaw.”2 Kaulu then reached for the surf and broke it into small pieces, thus making the surf small unto this
Maluna o ka holopapa o Kaulu, a lilo i kino kanaka (ke ana o ka holopapa he wahi kau kapa); ala ae la o Kaulu a nana ia loko o ka hale, aole kona kaikuaana o Kaeha; oili ae la ia a ma waho o ka hale, nana ae la a ike, ua lilo i ke akua i luna o ka Lewanuu a me ka Lewalani. Ia manawa hele o Kaulu e imi i kona kaikuaana ia Kaeha, a hiki ia i kahi a ka nalu e poi ana, olelo aku la ia i ka nalu: “E keia nalu nui e ku nei a kiekie, he ikaika no?” Ae mai ka nalu: “Ae.” Ninau aku o Kaulu: “Heaha kou ikaika?” “He poi iho maluna, loaa iho, eloelo,” pela mai ka nalu. Popoi ka nalu, ewalu nalu i luna o Kaulu, aohe nae o Kaulu make. Ninau iho o Kaulu i na lima ona, o Hakaukahi ka lima akau, o Limapaihala ka lima hema; olelo ae na lima: “A ke aha a ke aha?” “A ke a luna, a ke a lalo.” E uhae aku ana o Kaulu i ka nalu liilii a hiki i keia la. [525]
Hele hou o Kaulu a halawai me ia kupu, o ka ale iki, o ka ale nui. I aku o Kaulu: “O ka hookuakea moana wale no ka olua, aohe ikaika?” Olelo mai lauala: “Ha
day. He then continued on his way until he met other [524]demigods, the small and large waves to whom he said: “You are only making the ocean look white, you have no strength.” The waves replied: “We are strong and also brave.” A fight was then had in which he killed both of his opponents; therefore the waves are small to this day. After this he continued on his way until he met Kuililoloa, a dog that was guarding the land and the sea. Another battle was fought in which Kuililoloa was torn to pieces, therefore the dogs are small to this day.
When Kaulu arrived in the land where his brother was living, he approached the house and hid himself within the leaf of a palm tree. At dusk that evening the spirits asked Kaeha: “Let us prepare some awa.” They then all got some awa and prepared the awa to be pounded. After pounding a sufficient quantity, Kaeha went out to cool himself. Upon seeing Kaeha Kaulu came out of his hiding place and met
ikaika no, a he koa no.” Hakaka lakou a make ia Kaulu, nolaila, liilii ka ale o ka moana. Hele hou o Kaulu a loaa o Kuililoloa, he ilio ia e kiai ana i ka aina a me ke kai, hakaka laua a make o Kuililoloa, haehae ia e Kaulu, nolaila, liilii na ilio e noho nei i keia wa.
Hiki o Kaulu i ka aina a kona kaikuaana e noho nei; hele aku la keia a kokoke i ka hale, pee iho la keia i loko o ka ao loulu. A ahiahi molehulehu, olelo aku la na akua a pau ia Kaeha: “E mama awa kakou.” Mama iho la lakou, a pau ka mama ana, hele aku la o Kaeha iwaho o ka hale e hooluolu iaia iho. Hele mai la o Kaulu e ike; ninau aku la o Kaeha: “Owai neia wahi keiki?”
“O Kaulu, o kou pokii e kau ana i
