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The Citizen in Teaching and Education: Student Identity and Citizenship Ralph Leighton
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Science Communication: Culture, Identity and Citizenship 1st Edition Sarah R. Davies
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For my mother, Kathy Smith, who taught me my own revolutionary values.
A CKNOWLEDGMENTS
My first thanks must go to Professor Antoni Kapcia. Not only have I relied, throughout the writing of this book and the thesis that preceded it, on his knowledge, thoroughness and wisdom, but I have also been continually touched by his unstinting kindness and patience.
While grateful to all my interviewees, special mention is necessary of Rita GonzĂĄlez, Enrique GĂłmez Cabezas, Wilfredo Mederos GarcĂa and Alexei Padilla Herrera, without whose help and advice this book would have been impossible. Finally, and most importantly, my thanks go to the young people of Cuba, who generously welcomed me into their homes, social circles, frustrations and dreams.
Table 3.2 Revolutionary heroesâ key characteristics (HC6 and HC 9)
Table 3.3 Characteristics of past and current generations of Cubans (interview data)
Table 5.1 Youth prioritiesâDomĂnguez GarcĂa, M. 2010:107
Table 5.2 Opportunities afforded by society
Table 5.3 Strengths and weaknesses of student organizations
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Learning Your Place
Asked what they learned at school today, most children would respond with subjects, facts or skills; few would say that they learned to take turns, follow orders, like the same television program as the coolest girl in the class or understand that only boys want to be engineers; still fewer would report having learned their place in society, their relationship with authority or a personality formed in relation to culturally contingent codes of behavior. This process of assimilation, of becoming, some would say of indoctrination, is, however, just as fundamental to their future lives as where the apostrophe goes or what makes volcanoes. The promotion of such social norms is now explicitly taught in most nations as civic or citizenship education, but their reproduction is effected through processes that extend well beyond the explicit delivery of such themes into every aspect of curriculum and the community of schools, with both conservatives and progressives having frequently posited the attainment of certain civic attitudes and behaviors as the purpose of education.
Educators, who continually bemoan the reduction of their role to the facilitation of exam success, the subjugation of professional practice to data on yet another spreadsheet, understand through experience that their work is the formation of people in societyâof citizens. The modes of citizenship they work to promote are, of course, socially and culturally contingent. The assimilating purpose of education has been explicit at least since the time of Aristotle, who laid out the specifics of an education necessary for the formation of a citizen of Athens but also stated that each society would have to formulate an education that was suited to the pri-
orities and nature of that society (Heater 2005:20 and 138). The case of Sparta, for example, was praised because its highly disciplined, punishing preparation resulted in young men able to excel in the brutal, martial, rigidly hierarchical society they were to enter (Heater 2005:8â9). Similarly, in the case of a neoliberal market democracy, an effective education system (from the perspective of secure social reproduction) would be one that encouraged trust in representatives and structures, built skills that were not tied to any specific industry and represented history as a tale of various individuals, rather than of groups contesting power relations. It is a recognizable scenario and one with which teachers of all political stamps tacitly cooperate in order to secure both their own employment and the societally specific success of their learners.
The perennial debate between progressive educators attempting to develop humans as subjects and conservative educators promoting the transfer of apolitical knowledge is a disingenuous distraction. As argued by Paulo Freire and others:
There is no such thing as a neutral educational process. Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity or it becomes the practice of freedom, the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world. (Shaull 2014:34)
The choices available are not whether or not ideology should be taught but which ideology and how that teaching should be effected. Where such choices are seen as belonging peculiarly to teachers, however, there is a glaring failure to problematize the state as an ideological actor, presenting it as a constant, neutral framework for political and social issues, rather than an interested agent in their genesis.
Different states take different approaches to this question: some ideologize directly, promoting a totalizing truth and prohibiting discussion of other perspectives; others, particularly neoliberal states, eschew the explicit promotion of an ideology but reinforce one through everyday practice, the omission of challenging perspectives and the naturalizing of extant social relations, until the possibility of alternatives is effectively obliterated. There is, of course, an alternative term for such stifling consensus, and that is hegemony: the mechanisms by which ideology is neutralized and assimilated to such an extent that it appears natural and seamless, characterized
in Antonio Gramsciâs works as âthe seemingly willing participation by subaltern groups in their own dominationâ (McLaren et al. 2002:156).
As has been described by Michael Apple (2006), the contemporary focus on tangible, auditable educational outcomes, while it may appear because of its âobjectivityâ to be a de-ideologizing move, in fact works to reinforce the inherently ideological perception of people as individual units of success and failure in perpetual competition. Making education about nothing that cannot be counted does not remove the ideological element; rather, it entrenches it, removing young peopleâs vision of themselves as anything more than that which can be counted.
In this context, we educators need to keep continually in view the tension between our role of enabling young people to succeed in society and our role in reproducing its limits and inequalities. We need to question what the ideology is that we are teaching and whether it is more or less harmful to do so implicitly or explicitly. And, by and large, we do question all of these things and seek to humanize education and ameliorate the deterministic roles set for our students where we can.
The less-asked question, however, is whether education can work not simply to reproduce society to a greater or lesser degree but rather to produce it; whether it can create citizens able to share a social purpose and reimagine reality. It is a question addressed in this book through the examination of education and citizen formation in a country that has spent the last 50 years trying to do just that.
Cuba is a fitting crucible for the examination of these issues for a variety of reasons. Firstly, its government has, since the Revolution of 1959, put the socializing and ideologizing function of education at the heart of all policy. In addition, it runs counter to global trends not only in the ideological model it seeks to promote through education, but also in its unapologetic decision to continue doing so directly and explicitly. The decision, moreover, to make education a resource priority means that its system yields tangible outcomes comparable with those of âdevelopedâ neoliberal economies.
This is not a comparative study. While it is my hope that the Cuban experience will shed light on the issues raised above for all of us, the story is definitively that of Cuban youth and Cuban education. It is a story that many of those who take an interest in Cuba think they know by heart. It is a story, however, that perhaps needs to be retold.
When enumerating the successes of the Cuban revolutionary project, the two elements that spring most predictably to mind are always health
and education. The governmentâs consistent focus on ensuring universal, high-quality, free education and healthcare has endured half a century of economic and policy reversals, and these âsocial gainsâ are widely regarded as the reason that the Revolution has maintained legitimacy within Cuba in spite of international isolation and internal controls. The concrete outcomes of the emphasis on education are easy to identify: full literacy; continent-leading school results; a meteoric rise in university matriculation, with numbers increasing â77-fold between 1958 and 1990â (Eckstein 1997:109); and a studentâteacher ratio of just 10:1 (Damon and Glewwe 2009).
It is notable, then, that the acknowledged importance of the education system to Cubaâs Revolution is not reflected internationally in a significant output of academic work examining that system. Since the initial interest of the 1960s gave rise to touchstone works, such as those of Richard Fagen (1969) and Arthur Gillette (1972), publications have been scant and, where they have existed, have tended either to offer uncritical paeans (Macdonald 2009; Wald 1978) or demonizations of state control and indoctrination (Cruz-Taura 2003; Bunck 1994). These polarized approaches inhibit either meaningful criticism of Cuban education or the possibility that international educators can learn from its successes. Recent years have seen the publication of at least two serious studies, with Martin Carnoyâs Cubaâs Academic Advantage: Why Students in Cuba Do Better in School (2007) attempting to dissect the causes of the countryâs notably high results, particularly in literacy and numeracy, while Denise Blumâs Cuban Youth and Revolutionary Values: Educating the New Socialist Citizen (2011) begins to assess the effectiveness of values education in schools. Blumâs anthropological study, based largely on observations undertaken within a secondary school in a marginalized barrio (neighborhood) of Havana, pays particular attention to the ethos and character of Cuban schooling. She emphasizes the affective relationships between students and teachers and highlights the importance of extracurricular activities, the Pioneers Mass Organization for school children and the continuing emphasis on labor education as methods of engendering and developing collective and solidary values.
This study seeks to build on Blumâs work by addressing areas relatively untouched by her study: the content and function of the curricula and texts designed to engender revolutionary values, and the effectiveness and relevance of this citizenship training in maintaining revolutionary values and behaviors as young Cubans leave schooling and begin to insert
themselves into adult societal roles. It does this by focusing on the developing experiences of a specific generation and tracing the relationship between their emergent personal, generational and social identities and taught ideological norms. By concentrating on this generation and taking a broadly chronological approachâdelineating their schooling, experiences of post-school educational and social projects, and then transition into work, political participation and parenthoodâI attempt to re-present the values promoted through education not as fetishized absolutes, but rather as basic and inherently valuable tools for negotiating and developing Cuban society, which are sustained, jettisoned and modified in relation to the countryâs changing reality. This work places the experiences and testimonies of young people center-stage, endeavoring thereby to shift discourse from its emphasis on abstract objects (values) to subjects (the people upon whom those values are inculcated).
The generation selected for this focus is uniquely fitted to the aims of a study seeking to identify the relationships between static value systems and shifting social and economic realities. Now (2014) aged between 21 and 34, all passed at least part of their compulsory education in the decade following the collapse of socialism in Europe, a period recognized as certainly the most economically challenging, and arguably also the most politically and socially challenging, experienced by Cubans since 1959. Equally significantly, they were all aged between 14 and 21 at some point between the years 2000 and 2008, years in which, under the Battle of Ideas, the values and engagement of youth were the explicit and targeted priorities of government policies and programs. Finally, as they move now into the full responsibilities of adulthood, it is inevitable that they will be the first generation of Cubans since the âTriumph of the Revolutionâ to experience and influence a government no longer directed (for reasons of age and mortality) by the heroes of the Sierra Maestra guerrilla struggle: the generaciĂłn del centenario superseded by the generaciĂłn del milenio. 1
The baton is passed, however, to a generation about which the hopes of Cubans are not always sanguine. There is widespread concern that the changes to education brought about by the crisis of the 1990s and the social programs of the 2000s have damaged Cubaâs still notable but previously unassailable record on educational attainment, leading to lower levels of academic and cultural capacities. The fears are, however, less practical than moral, reflecting a narrative of degenerating values and political commitment.
Gustavo Torroellaâs 1963 investigation of the values and priorities of young Cubans, conducted as part of a global study of youth by the United Nations, surveyed 581 young people between 16 and 23, and the results were, for the nascent Revolution, more than gratifying. Two years on from the 1961 âYear of Educationâ, Torroella found that the values espoused by young Cubans were, in great part, altruistic and based on a collectivist outlook; their hopes for the future prioritized social change and conceived that change as both communist and progressive; their professional ambitions were also geared toward public service, with teaching and medicine the most popular choices; there was, most importantly, a palpable sense of optimism and positivity, with 89% of 16- to 18-year-olds and 92% of 19to 23-year-olds saying they would rather live now than at any other point in history (Torroella 1963:81).
That blooming generation is now old and its infant Revolution is, perhaps, reaching middle age. In the intervening years, the Revolution formed by that generation has created and nurtured an education system designed to reproduce its values and, thereby, its social and political structures. In the context of the new challenges faced by Cuba and of the young generation causing their parents and grandparents such concern, this work offers an assessment of the extent to which Cuban education has been successful in its aims, firstly, of reproducing those values and, secondly, of creating a generation willing and able to use those values to continue making the Revolution in the new century. It does these using three key sets of resources:
EDUCATIONAL TEXTS
To analyze the effectiveness of ideological and citizenship education, it is first necessary to understand in detail the aims and content of that education. Contextualized against academic readings of Cuban ideology (drawing in particular on Antoni Kapciaâs conception of cubanĂa revolucionaria), Ministry of Education guidelines and the dissertations and theses of practicing teachers, I undertake a close textual analysis of the textbooks used for the teaching of civic education and Cuban history in use when the focus generation were at school. My interpretation highlights the selection of themes and rhetorical techniques and reads them in the light of the historical circumstances and reflective comments of young people.
ENDOGENOUS CUBAN SCHOLARSHIP
Given the paucity of available international materials and the serious and ongoing reflection on the themes of education and ideological training within Cuba, a critical foundation in the interpretations of values education and youth development expounded by Cuban experts is required. Material used for this book falls broadly into three areas: firstly, internal assessments of the successes, failures and trajectory of values education, sourced primarily through Ministry of Education documentation centers and the records of the biennial PedagogĂa education conference; secondly, social science studies on youth programs and identity, predominantly those produced by the Centre for Youth Studies (CESJ) and Centre for Psychological and Sociological Research (CIPS); and, finally, 32 interviews conducted for this study with a selection of Cuban experts, ranging from research center heads, leaders of social programs and high-ranking officials to practicing and former educators and writers for children and young people. Their insights are used to gain understanding of the functioning of youth projects about which little is written and to inform the bookâs analysis of youth and education in the context of wider societal change in Cuba. While it was not, unfortunately, possible to develop a relationship with the Ministry of Education or conduct interviews with its officials (Ministry of Education (MINED) is known for its cautious and, some might argue, bureaucratic, approach, developing perhaps from the increasingly controversial nature of education policy within Cuba), representatives from all other bodies approached, including the Ministry of Higher Education (MES), were happy to participate and were often gratified to have the chance to communicate the achievements, as well as discuss the shortcomings, of the projects with which they were involved.
YOUTH INTERVIEW DATA
The core of the research, this data is gathered from a series of 60 semistructured interviews conducted during three research visits to Cuba in 2012 and 2013. These three visits, comprising about six months in total, were spent largely in Havana. They were supported by the University of Nottingham and the Centre for Research on Cuba, which also facilitated the research through its links with the University of Havana. The interviews sought insights into young peopleâs educational experiences, values,
practices and characters from their own perspectives and in their own voices.
The selection of young people to participate in the study arose from a combination of an attempt to encounter a variety of experiences and social conditions, a wish to avoid a sample provided by âauthority figuresâ and, as is inevitably the case given the attendant challenges and idiosyncrasies of research in Cuba, not a small amount of serendipity. Using academic and social networks, as well as visits to cultural and educational events, it was possible to gather a cohort with a number of important strengths. The group has a relatively equal gender balance (28 female to 32 male) and a racial mix that appeared broadly to equate to that of Cuba, as identified by census data (roughly two-thirds white to one-third black and mixed heritage), although Morales DomĂnguez argues that the real percentage of Cubans of color may be much higher, noting that both the census data and the process of identifying race by the interviewerâs visual assessment lead to âdata biased by multiple subjectivities and underlying prejudicesâ (Morales DomĂnguez 2013:80). The interviewees were from a variety of areas across central and greater Havana, ranging from wealthy Vedado and Miramar to marginalized barrios, such as Diez de Octubre and San Miguel de PadrĂłn. Importantly for the purposes of this study, there was also a broad range of educational levels, with the sample including graduates of traditional universities, adult returners and those who had not attended university but left formal education after finishing (or dropping out of) pre-university or technical high schools. Just five interviewees were recommended by recognizable âauthoritiesâ (one interviewed at his post at the university and four others at their workplace in Bayamo, in the east of Cuba). Interviewees were not asked either to identify their sexuality or whether they considered themselves to have a disability; these may, therefore, be areas in which the study is not representative.
Perhaps the most significant potential omission is that only 4 of the 60 young people interviewed were living outside of the capital, with 2 others having moved to the city. This bias toward the capital is due largely to the limitations of networks and the need to use Havanaâs resources for other aspects of the study. It must be noted, however, that the experiences of young habaneros cannot be directly extrapolated to all young Cubans; the perception within Cuba is that problems caused by globalization, tourism and new economic inequalities are far more intense in the capital than elsewhere. It may also be due in part to the Havana-centric nature of the
research that few interviewees were involved in manual work and none in agriculture. Finally, there was an element of self-selection in that all interviewees took part voluntarily and without payment. It is worth stating, however, in a country often characterized as limiting free speech, that, of 62 young people asked to participate, only 2 declined. Appendices A and B list the interviews carried out; interviews are anonymous but basic biographical detail is given. They are referred to in the text by the number of the interview preceded by âYâ (for youth) or âEâ (for expert).
The data set that results from these interviews, comprising hundreds of hours of recorded conversation, is varied, extensive and illuminating. It is neither large enough nor sufficiently scientifically selected to provide quantitative data on either behavior or values, but that was never its aim. The purpose of using the testimony of young people and, especially, the flexible format of a semi-structured interview (which frequently led to conversations of several hours) was to enable young people to speak in their own voices and develop their own themes, and so to reach the qualitative, the subjective, the human realities upon which political, social and national commitments are contingent.
My analysis of the interviews treats them both as expert testimony and as primary texts, seeking to identify not merely common themes, but also repeated language and tropes, areas of hesitancy and styles of debate and discussion, trying to find the general in the personal and the personal in the general. Any work that aims to judge the success of education in forming the ideology and citizenship norms of a generation must look beyond the simple, though important, question of whether values can be reproduced or conformity imposed. It must ask the questions of who these people have become, how they became that way and to what extent they can or will take on the task of sustaining and reinvigorating Cubaâs Revolution.
The attempt to address these questions begins, for me, with the belief that the subjective voices of these young people are the most useful and authentic tools for assessing their reality; that we must move away from an obsession with analyzing the success of education through grades and data and instead analyze the extent to which it enables those educated to become fully developed people, able to inhabit and transform their societies; that the point of education is not to reproduce reality but to change it. For Cuba, it begins with a set of beliefs, an ideology rigidly taught but organically formed through 150 years of struggle.
NOTE
1. The centennial generation and the millennial generation.
REFERENCES
Apple, M.W. 2006. Educating the ârightâ way: Markets, standards, God and inequality. New York/Abingdon: Routledge.
Blum, Denise F. 2011. Cuban youth and revolutionary values: Educating the new socialist citizen. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Bunck, Julie. 1994. Fidel Castro and the quest for revolutionary culture in Cuba. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Carnoy, Martin, et al. 2007. Cubaâs academic advantage: Why students in Cuba do better in school. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Cruz-Taura, Graciella. 2003. Rehabilitating education in Cuba: Assessment of conditions and policy recommendations. Cuba Transition Project. http://datatopics.worldbank.org/hnp/files/edstats/CUBdprep03.pdf. Accessed 27 Sept 2014.
Damon, Amy, and Paul Glewwe. 2009. Three proposals to improve education in the LAC region: Estimates of the costs and benefits of each strategy. In Latin American development priorities: Costs and benefits, ed. Lomborg, 45â91. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eckstein, Susan. 1997. The coming crisis in Cuban education. Assessment in Education: Principles, Policy and Practice 4(1): 107â120.
Fagen, Richard. 1969. The transformation of political culture in Cuba. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Gillette, Arthur. 1972. Cubaâs educational revolution. London: Fabian Society. Heater, Derek. 2005. A brief history of citizenship. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
McLaren, Peter, et al. 2002. The specter of Gramsci: Revolutionary praxis and the committed intellectual. In Gramsci and education, ed. Borg et al., 147â178. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.
If the meaning and success of the Revolution was to be formed through the characters and participation of its New Men and Women, then it was necessary to put in place structures and experiences through which these citizens could develop motivation for and habits of participation. In his 2008 study in the USA, Russell J. Dalton found that the single most significant
factor in determining whether someone would display âengagedâ behaviors, such as campaigning, boycotting or making contact with political representatives, was their level of education. Unlike in the case of healthcare, most developed societies, of whatever political stamp, choose to provide a âfree at the point of deliveryâ universal school system. This is true across all political stances, so cannot simply be about respect for the social right of the individual to receive education. It is clearly recognized that the benefits of education extend to society at large, as well as to the individual. These wider benefits fall broadly into two categories: the creation of a workforce with the skills required to keep its economy going, and the creation of values and patterns of behavior that fit that particular society.
This process of assimilation is fundamental to education in all parts of the world. The presentation of civic or citizenship education as a discrete subject not only perpetuates the notion that the content and methodology of the other subjects are somehow culturally and ideologically neutral, but also tends to treat values education as an adjunct to the core business of education, rather than recognizing that every element of the skills, knowledge, attitudes and attributes developed by schooling works to facilitate the studentâs insertion into the specific social and ideological structures of that young personâs community or nation.
What is notable about the Cuban case is the way in which education has been framed simultaneously as a tool for disseminating revolutionary ideology, a central component of the content of that ideology and a significant arena of knowledge production for its formation. The importance of this process is particularly marked in the case of the Triumph of the Revolution in 1959. The events of that year can be understood not only as the birth of revolutionary Cuba but also, because of the limited sovereignty that resulted from US domination in the first half of the twentieth century, as the inception of independent Cuba per se, making its educational project one that goes beyond the production and propagation of an ideology to become one of nation-building. The ideological development of new nations is significant here because it highlights the importance of citizenship education not only as a means of disseminating pre-determined ideological tenets, but also as an element in the process of state formation. Commonly regarded as a top-down âhistorical process through which ruling elites struggle to build a local identity, amend or pre-empt social fragmentation and win support from the ruledâ (Wong and Apple 2003:81), citizen formation in these cases is more transparent and accelerated, and analyzing its dynamic can reveal the more opaque processes that continue in established states.
In Cuba, popular cubanĂa1 interacted with Marxism in the formation of an ideology at once radical and traditional, through which a counterhegemonic movement was assimilated into the state at the same time as that state was being created. The revolutionary direction was thereby domesticated and formalized by the state, and the state revolutionized by the movement. These dialogic processes can be said to have created the modern Cuban state. The dynamic of state formation is two way, with individuals and civil society institutions partaking in that formation even through their resistance. This is particularly significant in the case of schools, with their capacity for both the reproduction and the production of knowledge. As Wong and Apple describe:
Schools are usually depicted as being shapedâsometimes in an unmediated and mechanical mannerâby the emergence of the nation-state, new forms of citizenship, and the transformation of sovereignty⊠This formulation neglects the relative autonomy of the education system and overlooks the possibility that schools themselves might generate profound effects that may block or modify the course of state formation. (Wong and Apple 2003:81)
If this book is successfully to negotiate the development of the identities, beliefs and practices of contemporary Cuban youth in relation to the education they have received, it is essential first to set out and analyze the content and form both of the national ideology (if that entity can be argued to exist as a bounded and defined construct) and of the educational system through which it is disseminated and developed, recognizing the close symbiotic relationship through which each has informed the other.
A REVOLUTION WITHOUT ANÂ IDEOLOGY?
Visiting Cuba in the first months of the Revolution, Jean-Paul Sartre questioned the âapparent absence of ideologyâ (Hansen 1960:74) and received the answer that âthe Revolution is a praxis, which forms its ideas in actionâ (Hansen 1960:74), showing dedication to the improvement of the lives of its people without requiring recourse to a rigid, overarching structure of thought and belief. It is thought that this same perception of a lack of a concrete ideological thrust contributed to non-intervention of the USA after the seizing of power and during the first months of administration by the new regime (Draper 1965:117), which respite, while extremely shortlived, gave it the scope to become embedded in those vital first months.
After half a century in power, however, there is no doubt that the Revolution is ideological; it openly declares itself to be so in its constitution, rather than eschewing the term as is so frequently done in the West. That constitution requires that the state âconsolidates the ideology and the rules of living togetherâ (Constitution 1992: Preamble), assigns its single party the role of defining and enforcing ideology as the âhighest leading force of society and of the state, which organizes and guides the common effort toward the goals of the construction of socialismâ (Constitution 1992: Article 5), and openly advocates that âthe state promotes the patriotic and communist education of the new generations and the training of children, young people and adults for social lifeâ (Constitution 1992: Article 39c). The party, moreover, uses propaganda to disseminate government-supported views and even has a department of ideology that ensures the ideological compliance of the partyâs decision-making and has the power to censor cultural and news output (Chanan 2001:8). Exactly what the ideology is that the Revolution is unashamed to hold and how closely that resembles the ideological positions of the people of Cuba is a harder point to settle.
In the 50 years since it came to power, the revolutionary government has been seen as demonstrating, among others, a Soviet-style MarxistâLeninist ideology (Bunck 1994); an ideology developed from existing national(ist) codes (Kapcia 2000); a MartianoâBolivariano2 ideology of Latin Americanism; and a total ideological flux, whereby a directionless, floundering state is held together by the personal charisma of Fidel Castro (SuĂĄrez 1974).
One of the reasons that the ideology of Cuba over the last 50 years is so hard to pin down is that there have been marked fluctuations and indeed apparent reversals in substantive policy, both foreign and domestic. An early period of mass participation arising from grassroots nationalist commitment (Kapcia 2008:65), coupled with a Guevarian eschewal of market mechanisms and an iconoclastically independent international stance, and based on an original interpretation of MarxismâLeninism that stressed voluntarism and mobilization (Yaffe 2009:64; Kapcia 2008:35), was followed by a move in the 1970s toward an economic and practical reliance on the Soviet Union that entailed the top-down promulgation of an ideology conforming much more closely with that of communist countries in the Eastern Bloc (Mesa-Lago 1989:98; Kapcia 2008:106). The âRectificationâ (of past errors and negative tendencies) that was instigated in the mid-1980s attempted to reverse these trends toward what was often
viewed in Cuba as hierarchism, formalism and materialism and to reinvent an authentically Cuban socialism that would revitalize popular participation and commitment (Bunck 1994:19).
This discourse of Cuban exceptionalism differentiated it from its European counterparts and may have helped it avoid sharing in the collapse of the Soviet bloc, a fate that many had considered inevitable (Rabkin 1992:32; Carmona BĂĄez 2004:3). That very collapse, though, and the unprecedented economic crisis that followed for Cuba (once its preferential markets were withdrawn and it found itself increasingly unable to obtain necessities such as fuel and fertilizers (Cole 2002:50)), necessitated yet another policy reversal, permitting dollarization, limited private enterprise and an increased role for foreign (capitalist) investment, particularly in the newly significant tourist industry, in order to avoid total economic obliteration (Carmona BĂĄez 2004:37â38). Although framed as temporary emergency measures, through the designation âSpecial Period in Time of Peaceâ (effectively placing the nation on a war footing to deal with a peacetime crisis), the innovations of the early 1990s experience, like its economic and social scars, have proved stubbornly resistant to removal. The inequalities that arise from a dual currency, the financially lucrative but exclusionary tourist industry and the black market in desirable goods, all of which are so at odds with the stated aims of the Cuban revolutionary project, are clearly visible and manifestly resented in contemporary Cuban society (Kapcia 2008:160; Pastor Jr 2000:43).
The need to counteract these individualizing tendencies and rebuild collective participation led to the âBattle of Ideasâ, which, kick-started by the rallying case of EliĂĄn GonzĂĄlez,3 sought particularly to re-engage and re-emphasize the importance of youth (Kapcia 2008:175). It was against the backdrop of this, most recent, major ideological campaign that the transition into adulthood for the young people who are the focus for this research was set.
The picture of reversals, contradictions and even betrayals evoked by the abbreviated history above suggests two possible models: a continual tension between two or more opposing ideological threadsâfor example, a âpragmaticâ thread, sanguine about market mechanisms, and an âidealistâ strand, placing the negation of such mechanisms and the socialist conscientization of its citizens above economic realityâor, alternatively, a total lack of coherent ideology, leading to arbitrary policy reversals. Either of these models, if sufficiently dominant in popular consciousness, would be likely to lead to a weak and fragmented hegemony. How then, has such a
seemingly inchoate regime managed to maintain 50 years of functioning government with no major uprisings and so little recourse to wholesale military repression? How has it come about that such a large majority, estimated at a more or less consistent figure of four-fifths of the population, has continued to express basic, if critical, identification with the aims of the Revolution (Kapcia 2008:44)?
In looking, then, for âanâ ideology of the Revolution, one is presented with these two narrativesâof continual change, as various systematic approaches were trialed, or of coherent continuity, as a core of hegemonic values were expressedâand it is difficult to identify which of these seemingly opposed imaginings embodies the ideology. Oneâs interpretation of ideology, as expressive either of political theorizations or of the shared values of a people, may lead to a greater emphasis on one or the other, but essentially they cannot be seen in isolation, because of the way in which reality causes them to be in daily interaction, reminding us that âCuba is not the transfiguration of a doctrine, nor the reification of a totalitarian philosophy. It is a countryâ (HernĂĄndez 2003:15).
Cubanness (SuĂĄrez HernĂĄndez 1991:62). From the outset, therefore, the Revolutionâs proponents were intent on it being understood as a martiano4 project. From the 26th July Movementâs first manifesto, in which their plaints and objectives in each area are prefaced by a pertinent quote from MartĂ (Brenner et al. 1989a:35â41) to the revised constitution of 1992, there has been a concerted effort to represent the Revolution as an enterprise underpinned by, and faithful to, MartĂâs ideals.
Lest the revolutionary government be accused of pure opportunism in hijacking a popular figure for its own ends, it is important to be aware that not only were the members of the movement largely Cuban themselves, and therefore similarly steeped in the mythology of MartĂ, but also that the Cuban people had proved astute in their ability to recognize such tokenistic tactics. Much of the unpopularity of the Batista regime arose from the hypocrisy of its stated espousal of martiano virtue, set against its actual corruption and kowtowing to the USA. This maintenance of martiano discourse in the public sphere was doubly ineffective in that it produced dissatisfaction while keeping alive a spark of the utopian, which could be tapped by radical movements (Kapcia 1989:171). The fact that the Revolution, by contrast, can still be legitimized as at heart martiano is demonstrative of a popular perception of the goals and, more importantly, the practice, of the Revolution as authentically attuned to that heritage.
For most, however, the association is inherently convincing because the revolutionary movement displayed close actual correlation with his aims and attributes. His priorities, and those of the revolutionary government, are integrally related to the phenomenon that Kapcia identifies as the central ideological force within CubaâcubanĂa. This ideology, which Kapcia
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CHAPTER XVIII
PRINCESS VICTORIA EUGENIE OF BATTENBERG AS QUEEN OF SPAIN
Señora Flaquer says: âThe presence of the beautiful Princess at the royal palace is like a shining star on a dark night, a soft balmy breath of wind in a violent storm, a refreshing dew in hot weather, and a ray of hope in depression.â
This description is Spanish in its imagery, and it is interesting to note the more measured language in which Figuerola Ferretti expresses the joy of Spain at the news of the engagement:
âThe news is like a fresh spring of hope to us Spaniards, who regard any English girl as a symbol of sincerity and sweetness, and how much more so when that girl is grand-daughter of the great Queen Victoria, whose name is venerated throughout the Peninsula!
âWhilst regarding the entry of Princess Ena into Spanish spheres as the commencement of a new era for the education and progress of our women, who are only waiting for the opportunity to prove their intellectual worth, I must say I might have some fears lest the Princess should be chilled by the restrictions of Spanish Court etiquette, had not King Alfonso already shown himself capable of breaking down the unnecessary barriers which would prevent his future bride continuing the happy outdoor life and the social pleasures which brighten the existence of royal ladies in England.
ââManners maketh man,â it is said, but it is also true that âman maketh manners,â and when our monarch follows the natural and noble impulses of his heart, it is always to the making of a manner which expresses good feeling.
âTo judge from ancient records, the arrival of the young Princess Eleanor of England in 1170 as the bride of Alfonso VIII. of Spain led to a reaction against the strictures of etiquette introduced by the Moors to the extreme limitations of the liberty of our ladies; and it was by the natural assumption of a certain freedom of action that the
daughter of young Henry II. passed a happy life of nearly half a century as Queen-Consort in our country. And Princess Ena is not likely to fall short of her English predecessor in her natural love of liberty.
âReaders of Marianaâs âHistory of Spainâ may be struck with the resemblance of the meeting of the young royal lovers on the borders of Spain in 1170 and that of the illustrious couple at Biarritz. The ardent young Alfonso VIII. was charmed with his English Eleanor, even as our Alfonso XIII. admired the Ena of your land; and as Queen Eleanor associated herself with the promotion of learning and letters for men, and supported the foundation of the University of Palencia, our future Queen Ena will doubtless encourage the present movement for the education of girls, which has just culminated in the opening of the Middle-Class College under the committee of ladies of the Ibero-American Society, presided over by Queen Maria Cristina.â
The joy foretold by the Spanish courtier was more than realized at the arrival of the English bride. Her bright, sunny smile and ready acknowledgment of the peopleâs evident admiration of their future Queen delighted the people.
But the tragedy of the bomb cast in the bouquet, which caused so much disaster, came like a sudden frost, and nipped the spontaneous joy of the young Queen, and the drives and walks in the city of Madrid became a source of fear instead of joy. It is hard to us here in England to realize what the bomb outrage on her marriage-day was to Queen Victoria of Spain.
QUEEN VICTORIA OF SPAIN AND THE QUEEN-MOTHER AT A BULL-FIGHT
Wearers of the Victoria Cross and the D.S.O. have not often gone through such a terrible ordeal. For soldiers on active service are at least prepared for such tragedies, but in the glitter and gaiety of a marriage-day the blow was dealt in the dark.
An officer in the Wad Ras Regiment, who was close to the carriage, told me that he can hardly bear to speak of it even now. The gaily-decorated street was suddenly transformed into the fearful scene of a battle-field. The cries of the dying and the sight of the killed sent many people out of their minds. With the calm courage of a soldierâs daughter, Queen Victoria neither swooned nor went into
hysterics; but the shock went deep into her soul, and she naturally fears a repetition of the horror when she is in the city.
The people, therefore, are a little disappointed at their greetings not meeting with the quick response of the first days in her new land; and as Spaniards would do anything for a smile, and love to see happiness, this inborn terror, begotten of the tragedy of her weddingmorn, would form a barrier between the English Queen and her people, were they not reminded of the source of the set expression on her face.
In La Granja this is different. The freedom of the country life gives scope again for our Princessâs smiles, and the beautiful gardens and the charm of the palace seem far removed from the tragedy of the city.
âOh, how we adore her when she is like that!â said the simplehearted, sympathetic Spaniards, as they saw the eager, guileless way the Queen showed her young cousin, Princess Beatrice of Coburg, her lovely country residence; and after she had passed up the fine staircase of the palace, lined by the halberdiers sounding their drum tattoos of welcome, she appeared at one of the windows to smile on the soldiers as they saluted her in their parade past the palace.
PRINCE FERDINAND OF BAVARIA, BROTHER-IN-LAW OF ALFONSO XIII.
Bouquets are naturally, of course, still looked upon with suspicion at the Spanish Court. When Miss Janotha, the celebrated pianist, wished to leave a beautiful bouquet at the palace as an offering to Princess Henry of Battenberg, when she was in Madrid, the lackey looked at it askance, saying:
âWe are not to take bouquets.â
Miss Janotha looked regretful, and I was very glad when a superior official stepped forward and said:
âWe do not take bouquets, but as it comes with the English lady we know here, it is all right.â
This confidence I acknowledged gratefully; the Polish pianist was pleased, and the bouquet was taken.
âThe Queen is always her bright, merry self on the yacht,â said a distinguished naval officer, when speaking of the shock of the bomb to the young Queen. âShe sings, and is as happy as the day is long, for there is no fear of such tragedies on board ship.â
One always connects Spain with sunshine, and Queen Victoria was interested at seeing the after-effects of a snow-storm in Madrid. Their Majesties sallied forth in a motor-car to the park of the Retiro. The Queen expressed her admiration at the clever efforts in statuary made of the snow which had fallen in the morning. The newlyappointed Prime Minister, Maura, was easily distinguished as a snow-man, and many other celebrities were recognized in this exhibition of snow-figures made by the street gamins. Great lions in front of the War Office also showed the skill of the officials in turning the snow into form when clearing the pathways, and in the squares and streets there were many presentments, both male and female.
The Infanta Maria Teresa was driving across the Puerta del Sol with her young husband during the inclement weather, when a mule of her carriage slipped on one of the tram-lines, which form a perfect network at this busy centre, and the carriage came to a standstill. The Princess descended from the vehicle, and would have walked home had she not herself slipped on the treacherous footwalk. Fortunately, the etiquette which formerly forbade a commoner to touch royalty even in a time of danger does not now prevail, and a policeman raised the Infanta from the ground, and placed her in a tram, in which the rest of the journey to the palace was made.
THE INFANTA MARIA TERESA, AFTERWARDS WIFE OF PRINCE FERDINAND OF BAVARIA