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Combatants in African Conflicts
Professionals Praetorians Militias
Insurgents and Mercenaries 1st Edition
Simon
David Taylor
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“The book offers a thought-provoking contribution to the debate about who fights in war and how we can understand these actors and their agency. It provides an ideal type categorisation, which is illustrated by case material from African conflicts; recommended reading!”
Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Professor of International Studies and Global History, Leiden University, The Netherlands
“Combatants in African Conflicts demonstrates that Carl von Clausewitz’s trinitarian understanding of war is highly relevant to contemporary warfare in Africa. The book’s careful application of lessons from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European history and beyond to conflict parties in Africa’s post-colonial wars results in a wealth of thought-provoking insights”.
Henning Tamm, University of St Andrews, UK
“Simon Taylor’s book provides much-needed conceptual clarity over our contemporary understanding of combatants in Africa and beyond. It is not the least of its merits that it should do so strongly resting on African military history”.
Henri Michel Yéré, Centre for African Studies, University
of Basel, Switzerland
Combatants in African Conflicts
This book focuses on the different types of combatants in conflicts in Africa, exploring the fine lines between what might be classified as a militia in one conflict, a rebel in another, or a terrorist in a third.
Drawing on the work of Carl von Clausewitz, this book provides a conceptually stable and analytically sound new typology on combatants. Analysing the relationships between state and society, and drawing on Clausewitz’s Trinity of passion, chance, and reason, the book presents a set of five types of armed actors: Professionals, Praetorians, Militias, Insurgents, and Mercenaries. Each type is developed through a close reading of foundational theoretical texts, reviews of contemporary studies, and a historical analysis of their unique characteristics. Unlike a reductionist binary perspective, this typology accounts for the dynamic, complex, and evolving relationships of these actors with the state and society.
A typology of combatants in conflicts in Africa can provide avenues for more in-depth analysis of such conflicts and holds implications for Security Sector Reform projects and other peace-building programmes. As such, this book will be an essential reference for scholars and students of African Politics and Military and Security Studies.
Simon David Taylor is a former Senior Foreign Service officer at the South African Department of International Relations and Co-operation and holds a Master of Social Science from the University of Cape Town and a PhD in International Relations from the University of St Andrews, Scotland. He writes on African history, diplomacy, terrorism, and security issues.
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Combatants in African Conflicts
Professionals, Praetorians, Militias, Insurgents, and Mercenaries
Simon David Taylor
First published 2022 by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Taylor, Simon David, author.
Title: Combatants in African conflicts: professionals, praetorians, militias, insurgents, and mercenaries / Simon David Taylor.
Description: New York: Routledge, 2022. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021049721 (print) |
LCCN 2021049722 (ebook) | ISBN 9781138475984 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032219646 (paperback) | ISBN 9781351065467 (ebook)
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021049721
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021049722
ISBN: 978-1-138-47598-4 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-21964-6 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-351-06546-7 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781351065467
Typeset in Times New Roman by Newgen Publishing UK
Preface and Acknowledgements xi
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
Introduction 1
Introduction 1
Identifying the Problem 3
Limitations 5
Ideal Types 6
Chapter Breakdown 7
Concepts and Definitions 7
Power 8
Authority 8
Legitimacy 9
The State 9
Society 10
Soldiers 11
Chronocentrism and Anachronisms 11
Afropolitan Critique of Contemporary Approaches to African Conflicts 11
Existing Typologies and Frameworks for African Conflicts and Combatants 15
Binary Categorisations 16
A Historical Approach to African Armed Forces 24
Historiography Issues 25
African Militaries as Colonial Imports 26
1 Trinitarian Theory 47
Introduction 47
Clausewitz and The Trinity 50
Background 51
History of Trinity and Common Pitfalls 52
The Trinity and Politics 55
Interpreting the Trinity 55
Extension of Trinity Type Beyond the State 58
Ideal Types 60
Clausewitz and the Ideal Type 60
The Professional Soldier Ideal Type 61
The Praetorian Soldier Ideal Type 62
The Militia Soldier Ideal Type 62
The Insurgent Soldier Ideal Type 64
The Mercenary Soldier Ideal Type 65
Conclusion 67
2 The Professional Soldier Ideal Type 74
Introduction 74
History and Context 76
Pre-Napoleonic European Forces: Amateurs, Aristocrats, and Mercenaries 77
Revolutionary France and Napoleon: Levée en Masse and Nationalisation of the Military 79
Post-Napoleonic Europe and the Professionalisation Era 82
Conclusion 85
Theory Review 86
Professionalism 87
Corporateness 88
Expertise 89
Responsibility 89
Independent Africa and the Professional Soldier 89
Trinity Development 90
Conclusion 92
3 The Praetorian Soldier Ideal Type 100
Introduction 100
History and Context 101
Praetorian Soldiers in African History 103
Military Intervention and Levels of Analysis 104
Discernible Characteristics 107
Theory Review 108
Defining Terms 110
Types of Intervention 112
Types of Coups d’État 113
Reasons for Intervention 115
Trinity Development 120
Relationship with the State 120
Relationship with Society 123
Conclusion 124
4 The Militia Soldier Ideal Type
Introduction 134
History and Context 135
Historical Comparison 136
Conceptual Distinctions 137
Militias as a Response to Changes in the Security Environment 141
Theory Review 142
Militias and the American Experience 144
Clausewitz and On War 148
Conclusion 150
Trinity Development 150
Relationship with the State 152
Relationship with Society 152
Conclusion 153
5 The Insurgent Soldier Ideal Type
Introduction 158
History and Context 159
Ancient to Pre-Modern World 160
Slave Revolts in the New World and the Haitian Revolution 161
Anti-Colonial Resistance 163
Liberation and Revolution 164
Post-Cold War 166
Discernible Characteristics 168
Theory Review 168
Conceptual Definitions and Debates 169
Insurgent or Terrorist 170
Mao, Guevara, Fanon, and Cabral 171
Critiques and Criticism 175
Clausewitz on Small Wars 177
Conclusion 178
Trinity Development 179
Insurgent Ideal Type 181
Conclusion 183
6 The Mercenary Soldier Ideal Type
Introduction 191
History and Context 191
First Occurrences 192
Colonial and Neo-Colonial Mercenaries 193
Post-Cold War and Privatisation of Security 198
Conclusion 200
Theory Review 200
Attempts at Regulation and Oversight 203
Trinity Development 205
Relationship with the State 207
Relationship with Society 208
Conclusion 208
158
191
Preface and Acknowledgements
Making the decision to research political violence is never an easy one. It is not a topic filled with rainbows and unicorns; rather, it often involves some of the worst acts of cruelty and inhumanity imaginable (which is the point).
My primary research interest is in types of actors in conflicts, or the practitioners of political violence. The initial inspiration for my PhD thesis was to study how different types of combatants experience Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programmes in post-conflict settings in Africa. However, I soon encountered a significant problem with the conceptualisation of types; there seemed to be little agreement on what were the pertinent aspects of distinction between types. More to the point, none of the existing types included a social dimension, as in how the combatants relate to the civilian population. The end point of DDR is the reintegration of the combatants back into society, but without a deeper understanding of how the professional soldiers, militias, or insurgents interacted with the civilian population during the conflict, any reintegration project would be bound to fail. I decided my PhD project should aim to resolve this problem, and this book is my proffered answer to the problem.
I had intended to include a chapter in my PhD thesis on Insurgents as a unique type of actor, with a section on using terror as a method. Two months before I was due to submit my thesis, I decided to take a short holiday to visit my family and to clear my head after a stressful six months before devoting my remaining time to the last chapter on insurgents. The flights home involved changing planes in Istanbul. Unfortunately for me, my flight landed at the same moment that the airport was attacked by a group of terrorists. A series of explosions ripped through the airport, and indiscriminate shots were fired into crowds of passengers and well-wishers. None of this information was relayed to us passengers as we filtered into the departures hall. Thrice I was caught up in stampedes as passengers ran from one end of the hall to other any time there was a loud bang. The last time was when we heard gunfire just the other side of the exit we were being herded through. It was then that I experienced that emotion of a panic and dread: terror. For an instant it felt like there was someone who wanted me dead for no other reason than because I was not them.
Preface and Acknowledgements
When I eventually made it home, I became aware almost immediately that I was experiencing symptoms of post-traumatic stress: panic attacks, nightmares, heightened awareness of surroundings, amongst others. In discussions with my supervisors, I decided to change my thesis at the last minute and drop the chapter on Insurgents. I received some help from the University to overcome some of the effects of post-traumatic stress and tried to return to normal. As the months went on, I felt like I was doing better, with my research concerns replaced with thoughts of graduation and going on the job hunt.
Any time I tried to return to my research, I would start to feel a panic attack coming on, and sometimes a return of nightmares. I tried to not think about it and knuckle down, but that rush of adrenaline would surge through my nerves unabated. This is where things started to get complicated.
Three years before, when I was under extreme stress, I was struck with a nasty case of shingles. I did not have much time to recover, and the stress did not ease quickly, which contributed to the virus causing lasting damage to my nerves. The quest for an effective treatment and management of the pain continues to this day. Later, doctors noted that I was unconsciously hunching my shoulders in a futile attempt to cradle my head when I was in pain. This would create strain in my neck that would be released in the form of debilitating migraines. The nerve pain could be triggered by simple activities such as washing my hair, being outside in a strong wind or a dramatic temperature change. The primary treatment for this condition is medications that aim to, in rudimentary terms, slow down nerve signals. The unfortunate side effect is that they start to interfere with other aspects of the brain. Despite initial pain relief, I would soon experience a range of side effects such as confusion, loss of balance, drowsiness, muscle weakness, depression, and struggling to concentrate – hardly the ideal state in which to complete a PhD.
Worst of all though, the damaged nerve would not respond well to the panic attacks and resulting adrenaline and associated stress hormones. In effect then, whenever I tried to return to my research, I would soon experience a panic attack which would lead to nerve pain. If I tried to push through the pain, I would eventually experience a migraine. By early 2018, I felt I had lost emotional control, with the pain and migraines becoming unbearable. News of terrorist attack anywhere would be hard for me to handle. At this point, I decided it would be best to return home and try to get proper help.
I met with a psychiatrist soon thereafter, who diagnosed me with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and arranged for me to get psychological support as part of the treatment. I went to a psychologist a few times a week for about two months to facilitate in processing my memories and emotions about that night in Istanbul. The painful part of the therapy was to initially let my body experience the full weight of the panic and adrenaline. During this therapy, I had migraines every few days. By the end of the therapy, I started to regain control over my emotions. I might still feel a panic attack, but with a
Preface and Acknowledgements xiii
combination of the therapy and beta-blockers, I was able to mollify the worst of it. After six months, I felt strong enough to try to tackle my research again. However, the neuropathic pain was still present, making progress extremely slow. The thing about neuropathic pain medications is that they work by slowing down pain signals in the central nervous system, including the brain. These effects are not limited to pain signals only, meaning that a potent side effect is that thinking clearly becomes a problem. Finding a balance between the desirable effect of limiting pain and the negative effects of ‘brain fog’ is a difficult and continuous challenge.
After months of trying to find such a balance, I was able to get an appointment with an exceptional team of doctors at a Pain Management Unit. For the first time since my initial attack of shingles, I had a thorough examination, of nearly two hours, where the team checked and scanned my head and nerves. The team further included pain psychologists and physiotherapists who provided me with invaluable supporting in coming to terms with my condition and working with me to find a more manageable treatment regimen. After a few months of their diligent care, I felt strong enough to return to my research.
I suffered an initial setback when I developed an allergy to the prescribed beta-blocker. To compensate for the lack of a pharmaceutical means of avoiding panic attacks, I worked slowly and took frequent breaks. Covering the more harrowing aspects of political violence has been challenging, but with the help of the techniques that I learnt in my trauma therapy, I have been able to create enough mental and emotional distance to halt any pain-inducing panic attacks.
After many months of stop-start research and writing, I have completed the work I began several years ago. Pain and fear are powerful forces, and it has taken me some time to overcome my hesitancy. There is a gruelling aspect to the study of political violence. Reading through witness testimonies, survivors’ statements, and perpetrators’ confessions tear away at the soul. Trying to build a career on researching the worst of humanity does feel exploitative, more so when under the pressure to publish. But these stories need to be remembered and told. And told with the fine balance of compassion and objectivity.
I am indebted to many people and would not have been able to complete this manuscript without their assistance. Sadly, the first to thank would be my supervisor, Prof Ian Taylor, who passed away in February 2021. My unreserved and indebted thanks for his understanding, encouragement, good humour, and expert advice over the years. Without his support, this work may never have been completed. I would also like to extend my thanks to Prof Hew Strachan for his assistance with all things related to Clausewitzian. Prof Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Dr Henning Tamm provided much advice and refinement of the original text of my PhD thesis. Special thanks also goes to Dr Henri-Michel Yere who agreed to provide some last-minute check on some of the historical aspects. Much of my inspiration for this work is due to Prof
xiv Preface and Acknowledgements
Annette Seegers and her lessons in asking the right questions when it comes to the study of conflict.
My friends, colleagues, and teammates at the University of St Andrews and across the world are owed a debt of gratitude. I greatly appreciate the patience and understanding that afford me by the great team at Routledge. Lastly, I wish to say a heartfelt thank you to my family for their constant and unwavering support in all forms to help me through; for even in the coldest of dark Scottish winters, they never let me forget the warmth of South Africa.
Acronyms and Abbreviations
ANC African National Congress
AU African Union
BSAC British South African Company
CAR Central African Republic
CDF Civil Defence Force
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CMR Civil-Military Relations
CO Commissioned Officer
COIN Counter-Insurgency
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DOAG Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft (German East African Company)
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EO Executive Outcomes
FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)
ICoCA International Code of Conduct Association
MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer
NEPAD New Partnership for African Development
NPRC National Provisional Ruling Council
OAU Organisation of African Unity
PAC Pan African Congress
PMC Private Military Company
PSC Private Security Company
RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)
RSLMF Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force
RUF Revolutionary United Front
SACP South African Communist Party
xvi List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
SADF South African Defence Force
SALW Small And Light Weapons
SAP South African Police
SLA Sierra Leonean Army
SLPP Sierra Leonean People’s Party
SSR Security Sector Reform
SSR/G Security Sector Reform/Governance
UK United Kingdom
ULIMO United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
UN United Nations
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
USA United States of America+B15
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VOC Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Dutch East India Company)
Introduction
Introduction
Within the study of conflicts in Africa, there is a dearth of typological studies on combatants. As a result, the concepts used to describe combatants lack clarity and often rely on catch-all or residual terms such as ‘militias’ or ‘rebels’ that could apply to any number of actors regardless of shared characteristics or not. When categories have been developed, they have tended to focus either on the relationship with the state (e.g. ‘pro-government militias’ and ‘non-state armed groups’) or on the primary tactics used (e.g. ‘guerrillas’ and ‘irregular fighters’). However, both bases of categories are founded on static assumptions of combatants’ political orientation or strategic ingenuity.
Existing typologies of armed actors in conflicts almost exclusively define the actors in terms of their relationship with the state only. Such an approach leads to any number of conceptual problems, most especially when examining intra-state conflicts where the conflict is about who the state is or ought to be. A Trinitarian Theory of combatants offers a solution to this conceptual conundrum by offering a third axis for defining types: the actors’ relationship with society.
Comparative studies of typologies are rare. In practice, many types of combatants are defined in relation to an assumed professional soldier, often without a clear articulation as to the characteristics of the referent object. This book offers a typology that includes all the primary types of armed actors in contemporary conflicts in order to demonstrate the essential differences, and similarities, among armed actors in conflicts; and how the historical development of these types are interconnected (mercenaries to professionals, insurgents counter to professionals, militias counter to praetorians and insurgents).
A Trinitarian Theory of combatants develops a typology based on the relationships combatants have with both the state and society. Understanding the unique sets of relationships combatants can have with the state and society is the key to understanding the categorical differences between types of combatants. The basis of this approach to understanding combatants lies in the work of Carl von Clausewitz and his famous treatise On War, 1 wherein he
DOI: 10.4324/9781351065467-1
posits that all wars contain a dynamic relationship between passion, chance, and reason. These three elements are manifested in, and associated with, three principal actors: the people, the army, and the government. For Clausewitz, the nature of a war and its conduct is dependent on the dynamic interactions of these elements and actors. A Trinitarian Theory of combatants changes the perspective to see how different types of combatants, beyond only the army, have different relationships with the people and the government.
Using a theory developed by a nineteenth-century Prussian to address concerns in the twenty-first-century Africa does pose an initial challenge. In order to see this challenge, a unique theoretical critique is presented: an Afropolitan Critique. This form of critique is based on the works of several noted African political philosophers such as Franz Fanon and Achille Mbembe; it is based on the dual principle of Africa’s necessary presence in World History and forces of World History on Africa.
Each chapter explores the historical and theoretical development of each key type of combatant through a close reading of foundational theoretical texts, reviews of contemporary studies, and a historical analysis of the unique characteristics. In much of the contemporary literature, the dominant form of classification is along a strict binary of state versus non-state combatants. Such a view of conflicts arose during the Cold War with the growth of insurgent forces fighting against incumbent regimes, often fuelled by revolutionary ideology. The binary view persisted into the post-Cold War environment, although with a decreased emphasis on ideology as a prominent factor. This binary view is seldom accurate and often fails to account for the dynamics and evolution of combatant groups during the course of a conflict. A striking example of this disruption of the simple binary is the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991–2002) where the combatants shifted their orientation towards the state over the course of the conflict. Two of the belligerents on the supposed ‘state’ side of the binary, the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) and the Kamajors, shifted their orientation to the state, such that at different times they were state-aligned and at other stages they were seen as non-state belligerents. As a means to resolve this quandary, this book presents a new theory for distinguishing types of actors in contemporary conflicts.
A typology of combatants is developed from the work of Carl von Clausewitz’s On War and his theory of the Trinity of passion, chance, and reason. Passion, especially violent emotion and enmity, is said to be primarily the preserve of ‘the people’, or society. Chance and random probability in warfare allow for a degree of ‘creative spirit’ and are more of an aspect of the military. The aspect of politics and policy, of which warfare is an instrument, brings a quality of pure reason and rationality to the conduct of warfare. This final aspect is the preserve, mostly, of the state. The three elements form three points of attraction in an interactive relationship that forms the basis for understanding warfare. This Trinitarian dynamic analysis of conflict provides a foundation from which to understand how different types of combatants have distinct sets of relationships with the state and society. Five sets of
relationships are developed according to five distinct ideal types: Professional, Praetorian, Insurgent, Mercenary and Militia Soldiers.
Identifying the Problem
Much of the current literature which informs policy offers a series of Manichean binaries as the main typology of combatants, especially in Africa. These binaries view combatants as political or apolitical, regular or irregular, and coercively or voluntarily recruited. Often, these binaries rely on an implicit further binary which views the combatants as state or non-state actors. However, these binary interpretations are not stable and often lose conceptual clarity and analytical utility when examined more closely. These simple binaries often become insufficient in the face of complex cases. In the face of such complexity, particularly where conflicts in Africa are concerned, the complexity is dismissed in favour of reductionist explanations of irrationality or offering instead a pathologising discourse, which uses a narrative that focuses on the weird and bizarre. The essence or ontological basis of an armed group does not necessarily change, although its outward manifestation or epistemological perception might – how it is viewed, by whom, and when.
As diverse as the scholarship may be on African combatants, it is evident that there is a considerable gap in the literature pertaining to accounting for differences in types of combatants. The Manichean interpretation presents a framework for understanding combatants as either politically motivated, professional, mass-based movements or greed motivated, unprofessional barbaric bandits with forced recruitment. Whilst some offer categorisations for differences within types, these types are either non-transportable beyond the designated subsets or lacking in analytical rigour. Moreover, there has yet to be a study of any comparative value encompassing both statutory and nonstatutory, or regular and irregular forces.
Detailed research by anthropologists does provide valuable insights into some of the differences and similarities between regular and irregular armed forces. Most significantly is how the regular army learnt from the irregular rebels and changed much of their corporate, professional identity. This is then indicative of a much more complex dichotomy of actors than a simple binary of regular versus irregular. It is also indicative of a far more dynamic understanding of combatants than that offered by others.
The same can be said of other simple binary dichotomies. For instance, the distinction between child soldiers and adult soldiers is not as simple as contemporary views would suggest. Similarly, the perceived simplicity of apolitical combatants, the supposed ‘greed’ theory, has been shown by others to be an over-reduction of motivations that plainly ignores existing politics of exclusion and legitimate political motivations. All warring factions have tended to be treated the same; as the “indistinguishably violent factions in a civil war without logic or rules”.2 The framework is held in contra-distinction to politically motivated combatants who conduct their campaigns according
to an established military protocol and fight for clearly articulated political goals, most especially, self-determination. It is clear that such binary interpretations of combatant types are largely unstable as the distinctions become blurred upon closer examination. A more complex understanding of actors is thus evidently required, to which this book aims to contribute.
The primary contribution of this book is to overcome much of the limiting, pathologising, and reductionist analyses of conflicts in Africa. The principal means of doing so is through the development of Clausewitzian theory, specifically how it relates to a typology of combatants in conflicts in Africa. This theory helps to make sense of many of the issues that are raised by complications in the current literature, especially the notions of civil-military relations and legitimacy.
For different combatant types, the same Trinitarian relationship with the state and society can be applied to analyse distinct dynamics. In addition, the argument can also be advanced that most categorisations of combatant types rest on a binary interpretation of state/non-state, and have largely missed the interactive relationships with society, i.e. how the relationship between the state and society can change depending on the relationships with different armed forces.
The absolute, perfect, or ideal type of relationship contained within the theorising of On War demonstrates that the military acts under authority of the state, which gains its legitimacy from the people in exchange for delivering security through the military. This ideal type is termed the Professional Soldier. The historical processes leading to the development of this type, which also became the model that was applied to several African militaries during decolonisation, are explained and analysed. From the Professional Soldier type, the other four ideal types are developed: the Praetorian Soldier, the Insurgent Soldier, the Mercenary Soldier, and the Militia Soldier.
The Praetorian Soldier is one who uses power to influence, intervene in or assume government authority. This usurping of authority does not necessarily require any legitimising relationship with society, although there are instances where the military does seek to legitimise its actions through appeals to the people.
An Insurgent Soldier seeks to challenge the status quo, an armed politician in waiting. The primary aim of an insurgent is to usurp the legitimacy relationship a society has with the state.
Mercenary Soldiers, as form of private security, the relationship is solely with the state as their employers. There is a minimal to no relationship with society, although there are burgeoning attempts for both domestic and international civil society to develop methods of oversight, and thus legitimacy, for newer forms of private security actors.
A Militia Soldier’s primary relationship is with the society to which they belong. Militias are recruited and supported directly by their own communities, and this relationship mitigates the relationship with the state. The authority of the state is only obeyed as long as society views the state as
legitimate. If the security of the environment changes, such that the state turns against the people or fails to protect them, then the authority of the state is weakened for the Militia Soldier.
In pursuit of the primary objective, the development of a Clausewitzian interpretation of ideal types of combatant, a secondary objective is advanced: to demonstrate the relevance of an understanding of world and African history to the study of conflicts in Africa. History has tended to play a relatively minor role in the analysis of conflicts in Africa. This has been both in terms of an understanding of African military history as well as the role of world history in Africa. Each of the ideal types identified is the result of historical processes that contributed to the formation of the unique sets of relationships and core characteristics. Without an adequate understanding of these processes and how they manifested in Africa, any analysis of combatants in Africa would be incomplete.
Limitations
In a sense, all readings of Clausewitz are at the very least interpretative. Raymond Aron likens the reading of Clausewitz to a detective novel that is missing its final chapter, leaving each reader to solve the mystery on their own.3 The use of Clausewitz’s theories in this book is limited to how his works have been interpreted. Christopher Bassford notes four broad schools that most Clausewitzian scholarship tends to cover: original intent, receptionist, editorial, and inspirationist.4 Briefly, the original intent school focuses on Clausewitz’s influences, goals, and the limits of his theory to the specific context of the time. Inspirationists seek to freely adapt the theories to current issues. Receptionists examine how theories of the inspirationists have been received. Editorialists want to edit the rough drafts of Clausewitz’s work to faithfully convey what they believe he meant. It is the inspirationist school into which this book falls.
The level of analysis of this theory is on the corporate, sub-state level. While this level has several benefits in terms of subsuming individual or small group interests, motivations, and dynamics in the pursuit of conceptual clarity for an ideal type, this is not without its problems. These small group and individual dynamics are nonetheless of great importance in the field of conflict studies, especially in terms of the competing forces of agency and structure as they bear down on individuals in the throes of a violent conflict. This is to say that, at a lower level of analysis, different forms and processes may be more important in differentiating or even linking types of combatants; the ontological reality of a particular fighter may be more a consequence of happenstance than a conscious formation of a relationship with the state or society. This atomisation of the conflict would, however, reduce conceptual clarity and the general applicability that a theory of combatant types seeks to establish.
The broader field of African History is generally under-researched, which makes any attempt to properly situate and contextualise African conflicts
substantially more difficult than for a comparative study, perhaps, of European conflicts. This is a limitation that will continue to plague research in this field, but this does not mean that reliable information and theories cannot be developed at all – only that we as researchers should be mindful of the contingent history and assumptions on which new theories and research are based.
For some chapters, the Professional Soldier in particular, European states are chiefly discussed as they were, at the time, the preeminent military powers. In the Americas, wars of independence against the Spanish had not yet begun in earnest, and the United States was still deliberating on the structure of their military (which is discussed in more detail in the Militia chapter). Although East Asian states, such as Japan, had somewhat distinctive military system, it was on the European model that most African post-colonial militaries were based.
Ideal Types
The heuristic aid of Ideal Types was developed by Weber over the course of several writings as a method of aiding causal explanations of social phenomena.5 The basic method works by comparing a set of observations with a model constructed from idealised premises.
The justification for this method is the ability of ideal types to make explicit the significant aspects of a referent body in order to offer causal explanations for social science phenomena. This is due to its abstract nature through the limiting of empirical data by ideal cases. The types are ideal in the sense of the idealisation of empirical analysis, not as a normative ideal. As Weber states, the function of an ideal type is “the comparison with empirical reality in order to establish its divergences or similarities, to describe them with the most unambiguously intelligible concepts, and to understand and explain them causally”.6
Hans Henrik Bruun compares Weber’s Ideal Types method with more traditional categorisations as follows:
Instead of a number of concepts deriving their significance from a relation to one or more “values”, but nevertheless described and analysed as individual units, now we get a group of constructed ideal types, to which the rest of the concepts are compared and in relation to which they are classified.7
Ideal types are defined by traits or factors that are not possessed by all of the individual cases or groups, some cases may possess some of the key factors, but no case contains all factors. In this sense, a case may be compared to an ideal case, but no case can be an instance of an ideal type.8
Weber’s construction is principally used as a device for drawing out causal explanations for goals and norms. As such, this then is not a method of
categorisation in a strict sense; the focus is on causal explanations of behaviour not on accounting for differences across types. Weberian ideal types do not “exhaust all empirical reality. The definition is a mode of accentuating a type to make it objectively possible and subjectively meaningful. It is not categorial”.9 The utility of ideal types is determined by the ability to make explicit significant aspects of a referent body. This is due to its abstract nature through the limiting of empirical data by ideal cases. However, to use ideal types perhaps necessitates a greater theoretical knowledge of the concepts and phenomena. This can be a limiting factor in cases where theory is sparse. Such is the case with armed actors in conflicts in Africa. That being said, the aim of this theory is to propose a new theoretical understanding of combatant types, thus the formulation of ideal types as theoretical and abstract constructs are a necessary aspect of the methodology for theory development.
Chapter Breakdown
The core theory is developed in Chapter 1. Clausewitz’s writings on the Trinity and the background, history, and translation issues relating to the text are presented. Subsequently, the relationships outlined by Clausewitz are developed further and analysed according to political concepts. From this analysis, five sets of ideal types are generated: the Professional Soldier, the Praetorian Soldier, the Militia Soldier, Insurgent Soldier, and Mercenary Soldier.
Each ideal type is the subject of a chapter, where the history and theories on the type are reviewed and assessed. The key relationships between each type and the state and society are then elaborated with the core characteristics identified. Ideally, each of these chapters would follow a similar structure; however, the literature, history, and theory of each type vary dramatically. There is a great deal of theoretical and historical literature on the development of the Professional Soldier compared with the others. The Praetorian Soldier chapter examines some ancient history literature that pertains to the term ‘praetorian’ with more attention paid to the abundant contemporary theory and studies of military involvement in politics. Theoretical and historical literature on Militias is surprisingly sparse given their usage throughout history. Moreover, the conceptual clarity of the term ‘militia’ is substantially more lacking than the others. The unique structure of each chapter is explained in the introduction of each relevant chapter. Wherever possible, the key aspects of the relevant type are determined from a close reading of pertinent theoretical texts. In the final section of each chapter, the Clausewitzian Trinitarian aspects are developed to clearly demonstrate the unique relationships for each type.
Concepts and Definitions
For the purposes of this book, the following definitions are proposed for key political concepts used throughout the chapters. All of these concepts are
dynamic and continue to be debated, especially within the field of Political Philosophy and International Political Theory. Whilst these definitions can be refined and debated ad infinitum, the discussion here aims to provide a degree of conceptual clarity as three concepts – power, authority, and legitimacy – are similar and related and can create confusion if not adequately distinguished.
Power
Power has been defined by many different authors, including Max Weber, Samuel Huntington, Robert Dahl, amongst others. Dennis Wrong’s definition of power, as “the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others”,10 implies a capacity of an individual (or groups of individuals). This definition is similar to Huntington’s, which also implies a capacity “to control the behaviour of other people”.11 Weber’s definition is perhaps slightly more complex but amounts to a similar capacity to enforce will, or to affect the behaviour of others: “Power is the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests”.12
For the purposes of this book, the more frank and clear definition of Dahl is preferred: power is the ability of A to make B do what B would not otherwise do.13 Unlike the other definitions, it is not specific to individuals, or groups of people, but could also refer to institutions and is more wide ranging than the purely social relationships intimated in Weber’s definition. One aspect all the definitions have in common is that power is a relational concept, in that it defines a relationship between one group and another. One cannot speak of power as a characteristic of one actor, in any meaningful way, without including whom one has power over.
The study of power can be termed politics. 14 Politics in this sense is the academic conceptual usage. However, politics in a more formal and restricted sense can refer to party politics, the adversarial competition between various groups for control or administering of the state; different groups acting in different ways. A contrasting term is policy, which implies unity and co-operation between groups; all the elements of the state following one directive.15 These distinctions are crucial for understanding Clausewitz’s theories and interpretations below, as the term Politik can encapsulate all three, depending on the context. Indeed, as Bassford notes, these different translations are a source of considerable debate within the field of Clausewitzian scholars.16 For the purposes of clarity, political will be used to refer to both the adversarial and unitary aspects of politics, and where necessary, party politics and policy will be explicitly stated.
Authority
Not all exercises of power can, however, be justified. In general, it can be argued that authority is the right to exercise power, or in the instances of states, the right to rule.17 Because this is a right, the government can reasonably expect its
decisions to be obeyed. Every genuine form of authority requires, for Weber, some minimum degree of “voluntary compliance, that is, an interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience”.18 Authority is the capacity of a state to issue commands and binding decisions, and reliably expect them to be implemented. The very definition of a state, for some such as R. P. Wolff, relies on the concept of authority as the state is “a group of persons who have and exercise supreme authority within a given territory”.19
Similarly to power, authority is also a relational concept. This is especially so when defining authority as a right and an expectation of obedience. That is to say, that authority implies a sense of rights, duties and obligations. Such a notion is often encapsulated in the form of a social contract, as the citizenry –who are most of those who are expected to obey – obey because they have an expectation of duties and obligations on the part of the state.20
Legitimacy
Philosophical questions about legitimacy often concern “attempts to discover a way of justifying coercively imposed political and social institutions to the people who have to live under them, and at the same time to discover what those institutions must be like if such justification is to be possible”.21 For Weber, the answer as it pertains to states and governments lies in four forms: tradition, emotion or faith, value-rational, or legal.22 However, these notions exhibit, or even exude, an understanding of norms, which will differ from society to society and across time. Thus, while we may accept Perlmutter’s definition of legitimacy as “a condition of validity and acceptance enjoyed by systems of authority”,23 we should nonetheless be mindful that it rests on a relationship of norms. Actors may perceive an authority or an exercise of power if the relationship is viewed as “legally valid, justifiable according to shared norms and beliefs, [and/or] confirmed through actions expressing consent”.24
Thus, while legitimacy is a relational concept like power and authority, there is far more of a normative and subjective aspect to the relationship. As is demonstrated in the chapters on Praetorian and Militia Soldiers, legitimacy plays a crucial role in the acceptance or rejection of military intervention in politics and the orientation of militias towards or against the state. Legitimacy is difficult to measure or detect, although it may be possible to see its absence in either popular revolts by society, or the use of coercion by those in power to stay in power, or even the existence of coercive institutions, e.g. Secret police, banning of political parties, or limiting of free speech. In other words, the presence of legitimacy is assumed, and the absence of legitimacy may be detected by the presence of coercive forces.
The State
Africa’s particular colonial history and its largely under-researched pre-colonial history potentially present a problem for defining the state. Mainstream
International Relations preference for studying the nation-state as a Westphalian construct has a troubled application in Africa, broadly-speaking, as most African states inherited a fractured state system which resembled the colonial power in form but not necessarily in substance.25 It is to say that the state as the supreme political authority within a given territory (with a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence) did not emerge from a long historical process in the mode of Max Weber,26 Charles Tilly,27 or Michael Mann.28 Discussed below in more detail are some of the political systems that were present in pre-colonial African societies, who some argue were states in their own right,29 but there is also an argument to be made that the political and societal revolutions from feudal kingdoms and empires into nation-states was a process that was interrupted by colonialism.30 While it is evidently worthwhile to debate at length the meaning of the state in Africa across its long history and countless polities, to do so would be beyond the scope of this book. In operational terms, then, the state will be taken to mean the supreme political authority over legislative, executive and judicial power within a given internationally recognised territory. The terms state and government are used interchangeably throughout this book with variance dependent on context. As is evident in the chapter on Militia Soldiers, the characteristic of a monopoly of legitimate use of violence is not included, as the legitimacy of such violence is highly contested, and is most often an idealised characteristic of states rather than an accurate reflection of reality.31
Society
Much as the state in Africa was largely an inherited construct, rather than the development of long processes of development, contemporary societies in Africa could also be argued to be artificial, externally imposed constructs. The fractured nature of African societies is a constant refrain among analysts of African politics, owing largely to the colonial powers’ tactics of divide and rule,32 and the imposition of borders without cognisance of the particular societies contained within. However, the salience or not of ethnicity as a functional variable is not the subject of debate in this book.
Society, or in more political theory terms ‘civil society’, is comprised of many different people, individuals, social groups and all manner of professions and ages. Chabal sees civil society in relational terms as a counter-point to the state.33 However, in operational terms and for the purposes of this book, society is defined as comprising those civilians who are neither members of any of the belligerent parties nor the state (as defined above). As the primary level of analysis for this book is the corporate, sub-state level, the actions or experiences of individuals are considered only in terms of their reflection of the broader trend. The terms society and the people will be used interchangeably throughout his book with variance dependent on context.
Of course there also exist multiple societies, especially within almost every modern African state. The post-colonial African state by and large inherent
the previous colonial borders, resulting in multi-national and multi-ethnic societies. Furthermore, most of the conflicts examined herein are intra-state conflicts, where often the heart of the conflict lies in questions regarding who is or is not included in the society. Some societies formed their own groups of fighters around particular societal bonds, such as in Somalia and the forces based on clan-ties.34 Nonetheless, the relationships between the belligerents and the civilians can be discerned by the appeals they make to each other. In other words, does the combatant group form a legitimating relationship with a narrow community, or a broader ‘national’ view of the entire nation?
The term ‘nation-state’ is purposefully avoided. What is most often implied and rarely elucidated by the term is a society with some form of an established contract with the state. ‘Nation’ in this context cannot possibly refer to any sort of coherent and indivisible ethnicity as such societies do not exist in either the modern or pre-modern world. Rather, ‘nation-state’ often serves as a shorthand to avoid a serious analysis of a governed society. Albeit a part of the ‘state’, a ‘society’ is nonetheless a distinguishable element that ought to be a subject of analysis as much as the ‘state’ and the ‘armed forces’.
Soldiers
While the subsequent chapters refer to individual soldier-types, the focus throughout is on groups of soldiers with a level of analysis at the medium or corporate level. Atomising armed forces down to individuals and their motivations would run counter to the basic phenomenology of armed forces, that is, for individuals to act as a collective in pursuit of a collective end. One-man armies may win a skirmish, but rarely a battle, and never a war.
Chronocentrism and Anachronisms
The development of the typology draws on sources from over 2000 years of world history. Over such a long time period, the clarity of any concepts can righty be questioned. To focus purely on the contemporary, however, would mean devaluing the long historical processes at play and treat the present with an undue level of uniqueness. This latter aspect has been termed by others as ‘chronocentrism’35 or by this book as a Narcissism of the Present. The emphasis is on the construction of abstract ideal types as a means against which to compare reality. These ideal types further the analytical ability of terms across time especially in terms of how the actors’ relationships with the political and social may or may not vary in differing contexts.
Afropolitan Critique of Contemporary Approaches to African Conflicts
Africa has had a strange and strained relationship with History as an academic discipline, which has somewhat carried over into the sub-discipline
of International Relations. No small part of this inheritance is due to the lingering spirit of Hegelian philosophy and approach to History.
Hegel first admitted that he did not know much, or indeed anything, about African history, spirituality or intellectual traditions, but this did not prevent him declaring that “[f]or it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit”.36 For such an assertion to stand, even in Hegel’s time, a distinction is forcibly made among parts of Africa:
Africa must be divided into three parts: one is that which lies south of the desert of Sahara – Africa proper – the Upland almost entirely unknown to us, with narrow coast-tracts along the sea; the second is that to the north of the desert – European Africa (if we may so call it) – a coastland; the third is the river region of the Nile, the only valley-land of Africa, and which is in connection with Asia.37
This is a forced and artificial geographic division of Africa in order to substantiate a Eurocentric perception of Africa with no regard to actual history, lives, economics, trade, societies, and cultures that inhabit these zones. Such an artificial division for a metaphysical philosophical argument has persisted in current International Relations with the geopolitical construct of ‘subSaharan Africa’. This is a concept that excludes the dynamics of 5 countries, relegating the remaining 4838 to having similar dynamics, amounting to a disingenuous attempt to assert a degree of diversity to the study of Africa. Potential outliers, or cases which do not automatically fit the prevailing perceptions (for example, West Africa’s long and ancient history with North Africa, East Africa with its Islamic empires, the lack of coups d’état in Southern Africa, or the relatively marginal ethnic politics in South Africa and Sierra Leone), are then subsumed, ignored, or conceptually forced into the colonial perception. A narrative that may be alternative to the current framework, based on a wider inclusion of cases, would allow for political dynamics distinct from such reductionist views to come to the fore and more competently challenge the ethnic or solely neo-patrimonial colonial narratives.
For example, historically, the interaction between North Africa and those communities, states, kingdoms and empires that straddled the Sahara and beyond has shaped the political, economic, social, intellectual and religious dynamics over millennia.39 To view the Sahara as a barrier or a wall, separating groups of people ignores this vast history of complex relationships. These concerns are particularly felt in the field of studying conflicts in Africa. When an issue arises that does not automatically fit the dominant or conventional understanding of a concept or framework, that issue is discounted and treated as an entirely different concept or framework, rather than examining the concept further in order to analyse any challenges this issue may present. For example, during the era of colonial expansion, European observers of African conflicts, with their highly racialised view of civilisation, did not accredit:
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Title: Observations on the new constitution, and on the Federal and State conventions, by a Columbian patriot
Author: Mercy Otis Warren
Author of introduction, etc.: Lawrence W. Towner
Dubious author: Elbridge Gerry
Release date: January 5, 2024 [eBook #72627]
Language: English
Original publication: Boston: The Old South Association, 1955
Credits: Bob Taylor, Steve Mattern and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AND ON THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONVENTIONS, BY A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT ***
Old South Leaflets
No. 226
Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and State Conventions
By a Columbian Patriot
Sic transit Gloria Americana [Mercy Otis Warren, Boston, 1788] with a Prefatory Note by L W. T Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Published by THE OLD SOUTH ASSOCIATION
Old South Meeting-house, Boston, Massachusetts
Copyright 1955 by the Old South Association Reproduction permitted to all who give credit to the Association.
THIS pamphlet, first printed in Boston shortly after Massachusetts ratified the Federal Constitution on February 6, 1788, achieved its largest circulation in New York where it was issued both in pamphlet form and in a newspaper series during the spring of that year.[1] At the time of publication the Anti-Federalist cause still seemed hopeful, for despite the fact that Massachusetts was the sixth state to ratify (in the two previous months, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut had voted affirmatively), the approval of three more states was required before the Constitution would become operative. Even when Maryland, South Carolina, and New Hampshire would make the total nine (between April 26 and June 21), no continental government could be effective without Virginia and New York, where strong opposition existed (they ratified June 25th and July 26th, respectively).
The objections to the new Constitution expressed in the Observations are typical of Anti-Federalist thought from New England to Georgia.[2] Many of the details seem querulous today; many were met, as far as the author was concerned, by the Bill of Rights.[3] Still, the underlying questions asked are as vital now as they were then. Essentially, the problem facing that generation was how to organize political power so that it could be placed safely in the hands of men. Government had to be made strong enough to survive, yet it had to be kept properly tender about individual life, liberty, and property. As might be expected, the problem was seen in terms of rights against government rather than in terms of the citizen’s responsibility to government, but in the twentieth century’s era of absolutism it is useful to be reminded, in Mrs. Warren’s words, “that man is born free and possessed of certain unalienable rights....”
For many years this pamphlet was attributed to a leading AntiFederalist, Elbridge Gerry. However, the publication of Mercy Otis Warren’s statement of authorship in a letter of May, 1788, and evidence within the work that she was its author and Gerry was not, would seem to indicate that she should be given the honors.[4]
The reproduction of the Observations here made is from the original in the Massachusetts Historical Society with the kind
permission of Mr Stephen T Riley The first four and one-third pages have been omitted.
Observations on The New Constitution
ALL writers on government agree, and the feelings of the human mind witness the truth of these political axioms, that man is born free and possessed of certain unalienable rights—that government is instituted for the protection, safety and happiness of the people, and not for the profit, honour, or private interest of any man, family, or class of men—That the origin of all power is in the people, and that they have an incontestible right to check the creatures of their own creation, vested with certain powers to guard the life, liberty and property of the community: And if certain selected bodies of men, deputed on these principles, determine contrary to the wishes and expectations of their constituents, the people have an undoubted right to reject their decisions, to call for a revision of their conduct, to depute others in their room, or if they think proper, to demand further time for deliberation on matters of the greatest moment: it therefore is an unwarrantable stretch of authority or influence, if any methods are taken to preclude this reasonable and peaceful mode of enquiry and decision. And it is with inexpressible anxiety, that many of the best friends of the Union of the States—to the peaceable and equal participation of the rights of nature, and to the glory and dignity of this country, behold the insidious arts, and the strenuous efforts of the partisans of arbitrary power, by their vague definitions of the best established truths, endeavoring to envelope the mind in darkness the concomitant of slavery, and to lock the strong chains of domestic despotism on a country, which by the most glorious and successful struggles is but newly emancipated from the spectre of foreign dominion.—But there are certain seasons in the course of human affairs, when Genius, Virtue, and Patriotism, seems [sic] to nod over the vices of the times, and perhaps never more remarkably, than at the present period; or we should not see such a passive disposition prevail in some, who we must candidly suppose, have liberal and enlarged sentiments; while a supple multitude are paying a blind and idolatrous homage to the opinions of those who by the most
precipitate steps are treading down their dear bought privileges; and who are endeavouring by all the arts of insinuation, and influence, to betray the people of the United States, into an acceptance of a most complicated system of government; marked on the one side with the dark, secret and profound intrigues, of the statesman, long practised in the purlieus of despotism; and on the other, with the ideal projects of young ambition, with its wings just expanded to soar to a summit, which imagination has painted in such gawdy colours as to intoxicate the inexperienced votary, and to send him rambling from State to State, to collect materials to construct the ladder of preferment.
But as a variety of objections to the heterogeneous phantom, have been repeatedly laid before the public, by men of the best abilities and intentions; I will not expatiate long on a Republican form of government, founded on the principles of monarchy—a democratick branch with the features of aristocracy—and the extravagance of nobility pervading the minds of many of the candidates for office, with the poverty of peasantry hanging heavily on them, and insurmountable, from their taste for expence, unless a general provision should be made in the arrangement of the civil list, which may enable them with the champions of their cause to “sail down the new pactolean channel.” Some gentlemen, with laboured zeal, have spent much time in urging the necessity of government, from the embarrassments of trade—the want of respectability abroad and confidence of the public engagements at home:—These are obvious truths which no one denies; and there are few who do not unite in the general wish for the restoration of public faith, the revival of commerce, arts, agriculture, and industry, under a lenient, peaceable and energetick government: But the most sagacious advocates for the party have not by fair discussion, and rational argumentation, evinced the necessity of adopting this many headed monster; of such motley mixture, that its enemies cannot trace a feature of Democratick or Republican extract; nor have its friends the courage to denominate a Monarchy, an Aristocracy, or an Oligarchy, and the favoured bantling must have passed through the short period of its existence without a name, had not Mr Wilson, in the fertility of his genius, suggested the happy epithet of a Federal Republic.—But I leave the field of general censure on the secrecy of its birth, the
rapidity of its growth, and the fatal consequences of suffering it to live to the age of maturity, and will particularize some of the most weighty objections to its passing through this continent in a gigantic size.—It will be allowed by every one that the fundamental principle of a free government, is the equal representation of a free people.— And I will first observe with a justly celebrated writer, “That the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the absolute rights which were vested in them by the immediate laws of nature, but which could not be preserved in peace, without the mutual intercourse which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities.” And when society has thus deputed a certain number of their equals to take care of their personal rights, and the interest of the whole community, it must be considered that responsibility is the great security of integrity and honour; and that annual election is the basis of responsibility,—Man is not immediately corrupted, but power without limitation, or amenability, may endanger the brightest virtue —whereas a frequent return to the bar of their Constituents is the strongest check against the corruptions to which men are liable, either from the intrigues of others of more subtle genius, or the propensities of their own hearts,—and the gentlemen who have so warmly advocated in the late Convention of the Massachusetts, the change from annual to biennial elections; may have been in the same predicament, and perhaps with the same views that Mr. Hutchinson once acknowledged himself, when in a letter to Lord Hillsborough, he observed, “that the grand difficulty of making a change in government against the general bent of the people had caused him to turn his thoughts to a variety of plans, in order to find one that might be executed in spite of opposition,” and the first he proposed was that, “instead of annual, the elections should be only once in three years:” but the Minister had not the hardiness to attempt such an innovation, even in the revision of colonial charters: nor has any one ever defended Biennial, Triennial, or Septennial, Elections, either in the British House of Commons, or in the debates of Provincial assemblies, on general and free principles: but it is unnecessary to dwell long on this article, as the best political writers have supported the principles of annual elections with a precision, that cannot be confuted, though they may be darkened, by the
sophistical arguments that have been thrown out with design, to undermine all the barriers of freedom.
2. There is no security in the profered [sic] system, either for the rights of conscience or the liberty of the Press: Despotism usually while it is gaining ground, will suffer men to think, say, or write what they please; but when once established, if it is thought necessary to subserve the purposes, of arbitrary power, the most unjust restrictions may take place in the first instance, and an imprimatur on the Press in the next, may silence the complaints, and forbid the most decent remonstrances of an injured and oppressed people.
3. There are no well defined limits of the Judiciary Powers, they seem to be left as a boundless ocean, that has broken over the chart of the Supreme Lawgiver, “thus far shalt thou go and no further,” and as they cannot be comprehended by the clearest capacity, or the most sagacious mind, it would be an Herculean labour to attempt to describe the dangers with which they are replete.
4. The Executive and the Legislative are so dangerously blended as to give just cause of alarm, and every thing relative thereto, is couched in such ambiguous terms—in such vague and indefinite expression, as is a sufficient ground without any objection, for the reprobation of a system, that the authors dare not hazard to a clear investigation.
5. The abolition of trial by jury in civil causes.—This mode of trial the learned Judge Blackstone observes, “has been coeval with the first rudiments of civil government, that property, liberty and life, depend on maintaining in its legal force the constitutional trial by jury.” He bids his readers pause, and with Sir Matthew Hale observes, how admirably this mode is adapted to the investigation of truth beyond any other the world can produce. Even the party who have been disposed to swallow, without examination, the proposals of the secret conclave, have started on a discovery that this essential right was curtailed; and shall a privilege, the origin of which may be traced to our Saxon ancestors—that has been a part of the law of nations, even in the feudatory systems of France, Germany and Italy —and from the earliest records has been held so sacred, both in
ancient and modern Britain, that it could never be shaken by the introduction of Norman customs, or any other conquests or change of government—shall this inestimable privilege be relinquished in America—either thro’ the fear of inquisition for unaccounted thousands of public monies in the hands of some who have been officious in the fabrication of the consolidated system, or from the apprehension that some future delinquent possessed of more power than integrity, may be called to a trial by his peers in the hour of investigation.
6. Though it has been said by Mr. Wilson and many others, that a Standing-Army is necessary for the dignity and safety of America, yet freedom revolts at the idea, when the Divan, or the Despot, may draw out his dragoons to suppress the murmurs of a few, who may yet cherish those sublime principles which call forth the exertions, and lead to the best improvement of the human mind. It is hoped this country may yet be governed by milder methods than are usually displayed beneath the bannerets of military law.—Standing armies have been the nursery of vice and the bane of liberty from the Roman legions to the establishment of the artful Ximenes, and from the ruin of the Cortes of Spain, to the planting of the British cohorts in the capitals of America:—By the edicts of an authority vested in the sovereign power by the proposed constitution, the militia of the country, the bulwark of defence, and the security of national liberty is no longer under the controul of civil authority; but at the rescript of the Monarch, or the aristocracy, they may either be employed to extort the enormous sums that will be necessary to support the civil list—to maintain the regalia of power—and the splendour of the most useless part of the community, or they may be sent into foreign countries for the fulfilment of treaties, stipulated by the President and two thirds of the Senate.
7. Notwithstanding the delusory promise to guarantee a Republican form of government to every State in the Union—If the most discerning eye could discover any meaning at all in the engagement, there are no resources left for the support of internal government, or the liquidation of the debts of the State. Every source of revenue is in the monopoly of Congress, and if the several
legislatures in their enfeebled state, should against their own feelings be necessitated to attempt a dry tax for the payment of their debts, and the support of internal police, even this may be required for the purposes of the general government.
8. As the new Congress are empowered to determine their own salaries, the requisitions for this purpose may not be very moderate, and the drain for public moneys will probably rise past all calculation: and it is to be feared when America has consolidated its despotism, the world will witness the truth of the assertion—“that the pomp of an eastern monarch may impose on the vulgar who may estimate the force of a nation by the magnificence of its palaces; but the wise man judges differently, it is by that very magnificence he estimates its weakness. He sees nothing more in the midst of this imposing pomp, where the tyrant sets enthroned, than a sumptuous and mournful decoration of the dead; the apparatus of a fastuous funeral, in the centre of which is a cold and lifeless lump of unanimated earth, a phantom of power ready to disappear before the enemy, by whom it is despised!”
9. There is no provision for a rotation, nor anything to prevent the perpetuity of office in the same hands for life; which by a little well timed bribery, will probably be done, to the exclusion of men of the best abilities from their share in the offices of government.—By this neglect we lose the advantages of that check to the overbearing insolence of office, which by rendering him ineligible at certain periods, keeps the mind of man in equilibrio, and teaches him the feelings of the governed, and better qualifies him to govern in his turn.
10. The inhabitants of the United States, are liable to be draged [sic] from the vicinity of their own country, or state, to answer the litigious or unjust suit of an adversary, on the most distant borders of the Continent: in short the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Federal Court, includes an unwarrantable stretch of power over the liberty, life, and property of the subject, through the wide Continent of America.
11. One Representative to thirty thousand inhabitants is a very inadequate representation; and every man who is not lost to all sense of freedom to his country, must reprobate the idea of Congress altering by law, or on any pretence whatever, interfering with any regulations for time, places, and manner of choosing our own Representatives.
12. If the sovereignty of America is designed to be elective, the circumscribing the votes to only ten electors in this State, and the same proportion in all the others, is nearly tantamount to the exclusion of the voice of the people in the choice of their first magistrate. It is vesting the choice solely in an aristocratic junto, who may easily combine in each State to place at the head of the Union the most convenient instrument for despotic sway.
13. A Senate chosen for six years will, in most instances, be an appointment for life, as the influence of such a body over the minds of the people will be coequal to the extensive powers with which they are vested, and they will not only forget, but be forgotten by their constituents—a branch of the Supreme Legislature thus set beyond all responsibility is totally repugnant to every principle of a free government.
14. There is no provision by a bill of rights to guard against the dangerous encroachments of power in too many instances to be named: but I cannot pass over in silence the insecurity in which we are left with regard to warrants unsupported by evidence—the daring experiment of granting writs of assistance in a former arbitrary administration is not yet forgotten in the Massachusetts; nor can we be so ungrateful to the memory of the patriots who counteracted their operation, as so soon after their manly exertions to save us from such a detestable instrument of arbitrary power, to subject ourselves to the insolence of any petty revenue officer to enter our houses, search, insult, and seize at pleasure. We are told by a gentleman of too much virtue and real probity to suspect he has a design to deceive—“that the whole constitution is a declaration of rights,”—but mankind must think for themselves, and to many very judicious and discerning characters, the whole constitution with very few exceptions appears a perversion of the rights of particular states,
and of private citizens.—But the gentleman goes on to tell us, “that the primary object is the general government, and that the rights of individuals are only incidentally mentioned, and that there was a clear impropriety in being very particular about them.” But, asking pardon for dissenting from such respectable authority, who has been led into several mistakes, more from his predilection in favour of certain modes of government, than from a want of understanding or veracity. The rights of individuals ought to be the primary object of all government, and cannot be too securely guarded by the most explicit declarations in their favor This has been the opinion of the Hampdens, the Pyms, and many other illustrious names, that have stood forth in defence of English liberties; and even the Italian master in politics, the subtle and renowned Machiavelli acknowledges, that no republic ever yet stood on a stable foundation without satisfying the common people.
15. The difficulty, if not impracticability, of exercising the equal and equitable powers of government by a single legislature over an extent of territory that reaches from the Mississippi to the Western lakes, and from them to the Atlantic Ocean, is an insuperable objection to the adoption of the new system.—Mr. Hutchinson, the great champion for arbitrary power, in the multitude of his machinations to subvert the liberties of this country, was obliged to acknowledge in one of his letters, that, “from the extent of country from north to south, the scheme of one government was impracticable.” But if the authors of the present visionary project, can by the arts of deception, precipitation and address, obtain a majority of suffrages in the conventions of the states to try the hazardous experiment, they may then make the same inglorious boast with this insidious politician, who may perhaps be their model, that “the union of the colonies was pretty well broken, and that he hoped to never see it re[n]ewed.”
16. It is an undisputed fact that not one legislature in the United States had the most distant idea when they first appointed members for a convention, entirely commercial, or when they afterwards authorized them to consider on some amendments of the Federal union, that they would without any warrant from their constituents,
presume on so bold and daring a stride, as ultimately to destroy the state governments, and offer a consolidated system, irreversible but on conditions that the smallest degree of penetration must discover to be impracticable.
17. The first appearance of the article which declares the ratification of nine states sufficient for the establishment of the new system, wears the face of dissension, is a subversion of the union of Confederated States, and tends to the introduction of anarchy and civil convulsions, and may be a means of involving the whole country in blood.
18. The mode in which this constitution is recommended to the people to judge without either the advice of Congress, or the legislatures of the several states is very reprehensible—it is an attempt to force it upon them before it could be thoroughly understood, and may leave us in that situation, that in the first moments of slavery in the minds of the people agitated by the remembrance of their lost liberties, will be like the sea in a tempest, that sweeps down every mound of security.
But it is needless to enumerate other instances, in which the proposed constitution appears contradictory to the first principles which ought to govern mankind; and it is equally so to enquire into the motives that induced to so bold a step as the annihilation of the independence and sovereignty of the thirteen distinct states.—They are but too obvious through the whole progress of the business, from the first shutting up the doors of the federal convention and resolving that no member should correspond with gentlemen in the different states on the subject under discussion; till the trivial proposition of recommending a few amendments was artfully ushered into the convention of the Massachusetts. The questions that were then before that honorable assembly were profound and important, they were of such magnitude and extent, that the consequences may run parallel with the existence of the country; and to see them waved and hastily terminated by a measure too absurd to require a serious refutation, raises the honest indignation of every true lover of his country. Nor are they less grieved that the ill policy and arbitrary disposition of some of the sons of America has thus precipitated to
the contemplation and discussion of questions that no one could rationally suppose would have been agitated among us till time had blotted out the principles on which the late revolution was grounded; or till the last traits of the many political tracts, which defended the separation from Britain, and the rights of men were consigned to everlasting oblivion. After the severe conflicts this country has suffered, it is presumed that they are disposed to make every reasonable sacrifice before the altar of peace.—But when we contemplate the nature of men and consider them originally on an equal footing, subject to the same feelings, stimulated by the same passions, and recollecting the struggles they have recently made, for the security of their civil rights; it cannot be expected that the inhabitants of the Massachusetts, can be easily lulled into a fatal security, by the declamatory effusions of gentlemen, who, contrary to the experience of all ages would perswade them there is no danger to be apprehended, from vesting discretionary powers in the hands of man, which he may, or may not abuse. The very suggestion, that we ought to trust to the precarious hope of amendments and redress, after we have voluntarily fixed the shackles on our own necks should have awakened to a double degree of caution.—This people have not forgotten the artful insinuations of a former Governor, when pleading the unlimited authority of parliament before the legislature of the Massachusetts; nor that his arguments were very similar to some lately urged by gentlemen who boast of opposing his measures, “with halters about their necks.”
We were then told by him, in all the soft language of insinuation, that no form of government, of human construction can be perfect— that we had nothing to fear—that we had no reason to complain— that we had only to acquiesce in their illegal claims, and to submit to the requisition of parliament, and doubtless the lenient hand of government would redress all grievances, and remove the oppressions of the people:—Yet we soon saw armies of mercenaries encamped on our plains—our commerce ruined—our harbours blockaded—and our cities burnt. It may be replied that this was in consequence of an obstinate defence of our privileges; this may be true; and when the “ultima ratio” is called to aid, the weakest must fall. But let the best informed historian produce an instance when
bodies of men were entrusted with power, and the proper checks relinquished, if they were ever found destitute of ingenuity sufficient to furnish pretences to abuse it. And the people at large are already sensible, that the liberties which America has claimed, which reason has justified, and which have been so gloriously defended by the sword of the brave; are not about to fall before the tyranny of foreign conquest: it is native usurpation that is shaking the foundations of peace, and spreading the sable curtain of despotism over the United States. The banners of freedom were erected in the wilds of America by our ancestors, while the wolf prowled for his prey on the one hand, and more savage man on the other; they have been since rescued from the invading hand of foreign power, by the valor and blood of their posterity; and there was reason to hope they would continue for ages to illumine a quarter of the globe, by nature kindly separated from the proud monarchies of Europe, and the infernal darkness of Asiatic slavery.—And it is to be feared we shall soon see this country rushing into the extremes of confusion and violence, in consequence of the proceedings of a set of gentlemen, who disregarding the purposes of their appointment, have assumed powers unauthorized by any commission, have unnecessarily rejected the confederation of the United States, and annihilated the sovereignty and independence of the individual governments.—The causes which have inspired a few men to assemble for very different purposes with such a degree of temerity [a]s to break with a single stroke the union of America, and disseminate the seeds of discord through the land may be easily investigated, when we survey the partizans of monarchy in the state conventions, urging the adoption of a mode of government that militates with the former professions and exertions of this country, and with all ideas of republicanism, and the equal rights of men.
Passion, prejudice, and error, are characteristics of human nature; and as it cannot be accounted for on any principles of philosophy, religion, or good policy; to these shades in the human character must be attributed the mad zeal of some, to precipitate to a blind adoption of the measures of the late federal convention, without giving opportunity for better information to those who are misled by influence or ignorance into erroneous opinions.—Litterary talents
