The New Employment Insurance System: An Example of Discrimination by Omission Towards First Nations
Brief Submitted by The Assembly of First Nations of Quebec and Labrador to The Commission nationale d’examen sur l’assurance‐emploi
July 12, 2013
Table of Contents Foreword ................................................................................................................................................ 3 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 4 Summary ................................................................................................................................................. 5 Correspondence ...................................................................................................................................... 6 Statistics .................................................................................................................................................. 8 Discrimination by omission ...................................................................................................................... 9 Impacts ................................................................................................................................................. 11 Recommendations ................................................................................................................................ 13 Appendix ............................................................................................................................................... 14
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Foreword To help the reader place this brief in its proper context, we are providing a few considerations, some relating to the terms used, others to help the reader learn more about the authors:
The Assembly of First Nations of Quebec and Labrador (AFNQL) is the occasional meeting point for the Chiefs of 43 communities of the First Nations of Quebec and Labrador. The AFNQL holds Chiefs’ Assemblies four times a year, at which time it is empowered with different political mandates.
The First Nations Human Resources Development Commission of Quebec (FNHRDCQ) is the organization mandated by the AFNQL to ensure workforce and labour market development for 29 First Nations communities in Quebec and all Aboriginal people living in urban areas.
Like the AFNQL, the FNHRDCQ takes position on third-party decisions, governmental or other, that have an impact on its ability to carry out its mission. And like the AFNQL, its positions are non-partisan, reflecting only the desire to see First Nations people improve their quality of life through employment.
The position set out in this brief is that of the First Nations as a whole, though each First Nation or community is free to take position as it sees fit.
The documents provided by the federal government to explain the changes to employment insurance describe the gaps that were identified in the previous system, the implemented measures and the intended benefits. As the role of the AFNQL is not to act in the place of those who have the democratically acquired responsibility of defining the government’s directions and implementing the corresponding policies, it however maintains the right to underline and seek recognition of errors committed, and even more so when it deems that the directions and policies are discriminatory and detrimental to the First Nations.
Though the FNHRDCQ is not an advocacy organization for the rights of workers and the unemployed, the fact that it is responsible for the development of the workforce and labour market of the First Nations, that a significant portion of its clientele is affected by the EI changes, and that the impact of these changes are as daunting as the precarious socio-economic conditions of the communities, inevitably makes the organization want to take part in this reflection.
In this brief, we use the generic term “changes to employment insurance” to describe all the changes announced and defined by the 2012 Budget and Bill C-38, whether they consist of amendments to the Employment Insurance Act or to the EI Regulations.
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Introduction With this brief, the AFNQL intends to pursue its efforts to raise awareness among non-Aboriginal people about the perverse effects of the decisions that non-Aboriginal governments continue to make without the active participation of First Nations representatives – policies that fail to take our unique realities into account which, consequently, are subjected to effects that were not considered, provided for or prevented. With the brief, the AFNQL intends to demonstrate that the changes made to employment insurance by the federal government – first with the 2012 Budget then with the adoption of Bill C-38 – are particularly harmful to First Nations people, and that by implementing policies that affect a particular segment of the Canadian population, without mitigation measures set in place, the federal government perpetuates the discrimination by omission to which First Peoples are too often subjected. With this brief, the AFNQL intends to inform the Commission nationale d’examen sur l’assurance-emploi (CNEAE, i.e. the National Employment Insurance Review Commission) of the reasons why it is opposed to the new employment insurance system, while denouncing its clearly discriminatory nature. With this brief, the AFNQL expects to empower the Commission with arguments that will help it defend the interests and rights of workers and unemployed persons of the First Nations in Quebec. Thus, the following sections should enable the Commission to: be aware of the position of the AFNQL on the changes made to employment insurance; understand how the new employment insurance system is particularly harmful to First Nations; understand how the manner in which the federal government went about amending employment insurance without the slightest regard for the particular challenges of the First Nations violates the provisions of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; and to examine the recommendations put forth by the AFNQL on the manner in which the employment insurance system would best meet the specific needs of the First Nations in Quebec.
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Summary When the changes to employment insurance were first announced, the organization launched a monitoring and analysis process in order to determine the impacts the changes would have on First Nations, especially since the mitigation measures that were previously implemented – particularly with the revised economic regions – were crucial to maintaining the already precarious socio-economic conditions of First Nations. On the political front, the Chief of the AFNQL, Ghislain Picard, wrote to Minister Finley to make her aware of the potential impacts of the changes, but as we will see in the next section, none of the concerns or grievances of Chief Picard received a favourable response. From the very outset of the analysis and awareness efforts, it became obvious that the particular socioeconomic conditions of First Nations would not be taken into account and that the EI changes would be one more example of discrimination by omission towards First Nations. The section relating to the impacts will help the reader understand how the changes to employment insurance are particularly discriminatory and detrimental to First Nations. The section is followed by the AFNQL recommendations relating to the employment insurance system, economic regions and the relationship between First Nations and the State. As supplementary information we have included in the appendix a more in-depth analysis of the new Working While on Claim pilot project, as well as an analysis of the combined and cumulative effects of inflation and population growth on the employment and training funds of the First Nations in Quebec, in addition to the two letters to which we will refer in the next section.
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Correspondence On July 24, 2012, the Chief of the AFNQL, Ghislain Picard, wrote to the Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development, Diane Finley, to: seek an “equitable and enlightened application of the Employment Insurance Act” through “flexibility measures […] put in place for First Nations communities”; remind the Minister that the “socio-economic conditions of First Nations communities are particularly appalling compared to the general population of Quebec and Canada, and therefore deserve special attention and solutions tailored to their situation that will measure up to the challenges met”; underline the risk “that the application of such measures [i.e. EI changes] may cause a rapid, even exponential, decline of the disposable income of individuals and families already living precariously”, and even more so in the “communities dependent on seasonal industries”; describe the potential impacts regarding the amendment or abolition of “certain transitional measures which are presently easing the impacts of the Employment Insurance Act in some [regions] more vulnerable”; underline the risk that “without flexibility measures, the new provisions may confine our people in unemployment and income security, rather than encouraging them to want to improve their lives through work”; and express the wish “that the AFNQL take part in the exercise of revision for economic regions, in order to ensure that our specific reality be considered at its true value”. In her response of January 2013, Minister Finley remained very general, almost elusive, in providing no more than an outline of her reform: about the number of weeks used to calculate the amount of benefits, the Minister says that the new approach will be fairer by taking regional realities into account, but she omits taking into consideration the unique reality of First Nations communities, where the unemployment rate may be up to four times higher than that of the economic regions where they are located, which is anything but fair; about the new Working While on Claim pilot project, when the Minister states that by allowing claimants to keep half of every dollar earned, it will make any job opportunity beneficial, she is obviously referring to the elimination of the “plateau without earnings” of the old system, but she omits mentioning that the old system allowed those who work for low wages to keep a larger portion of their benefits, as is often the case with First Nations; o
regarding the option of reverting to the former provisions, it is important to emphasize 1) that the common practice in the Service Canada Centres is to invite applicants to reach the Regional Calling Centre (RCC) in order for their situation to be evaluated, which may challenging for applicants whose primary language is their Aboriginal mother tongue for example, and 2) if approved, the claimants will not be able to use the new technologies to declare their earnings, being forced to use the old report cards, which can be a further obstacle for those who want to improve their situation by using the former provisions;
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about the definition of suitable employment (by the addition of sections 9.001-9.004 to the Employment Insurance Regulations replacing sections 27.2.b, 27.2.c and 27.3 of the Employment Insurance Act), the Minister assures us that the personal circumstances of claimants will be taken into account, but omits taking into account the general lack of awareness of the unique First Nations realities (not to mention the reported cases of discrimination and racism) that would inevitably harm the case-by-case evaluation of the First Nations claimant files; about the particular needs of citizens living in areas with high unemployment rates and weak employment prospects, the Minister assures us that “the Employment Insurance program will be there for them as it always was”, but she omits mentioning that the old system, with its mitigation measures and pilot projects, was clearly better adapted to the critical and unique needs of First Nations; about the existing measures and federal funding for Aboriginal employment and training, the Minister reminds us that HRSDC is investing an amount of 1.6 billion dollars over five years through the Aboriginal Skills and Employment Training Strategy (ASETS), but she omits taking into account the combined and cumulative effects of inflation and population growth on the intervention capacity of Aboriginal service delivery organizations, such as the FNHRDCQ: o
Decrease in the budgets of the FNHRDCQ between 1999 and 2014: $16.8M. In constant 1999 dollars, this is equivalent to a decrease of $51.4M in purchasing power.
o
Even including the additional funds received from HRSDC between 1999 and 2012, the losses in purchasing power had already reached $21.6M at March 31, 2012.
o
Given the rapid population growth of First Nations and Indigenous peoples in general between 1999 and 2012, the FNHRDCQ’s intervention capacity, per individual, now only represents 50% (or half) of its intervention capacity of 1999.
We invite the reader to find, in the appendix, the two letters presented above as well as the mathematical demonstration of the effects of inflation and population growth on the funding of the FNHRDCQ.
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Statistics Here, we will only present the statistics that best demonstrate the magnitude of the challenge facing our people in terms of employment and training, illustrating in turn the unique reality to which government policies and approaches should specifically respond. Almost half of all Aboriginals in Quebec are under 25 years of age (45%) *1 not employed (49%) *1 without a certificate or diploma (48%) *1 and we have two (2) times more workers in seasonal jobs, in comparison to the Non-Aboriginal population *3 Language 44.8 % of Aboriginals speak mainly an Aboriginal language *1 39.4 % of Aboriginals speak mainly French *1 13.5 % of Aboriginals speak mainly English *1 Poverty and low income 20.7% of the Aboriginal population is considered to be living in poverty compared to 12.5% for Quebec’s general population *1 53.3% of Aboriginals earn less than 20,000$ a year in employment revenue *1 Racism 26.2% of Aboriginals migrating to urban settings have stated being confronted to racism compared to 10.8% for those that have never left their community *2
Sources *1 Portrait des Premières Nations et des Inuits sur le marché du travail au Québec, First Nations and Inuit Labour Market Advisory Committee, 2012 *2 First Nations Regional Health Survey, First Nations of Quebec and Labrador Health and Social Services Commission, 2008 *3 Census 2006
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Discrimination by omission Unlike other portions of the population who will also suffer the effects of the changes to employment insurance, First Nations have a special relationship with the State – explicitly defined in the Constitution – which should be fully considered in the development of any policy that may affect them. This special relationship between First Nations and the State is also the subject of an international declaration, namely the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which sets out parameters for a healthy, respectful and constructive relationship between a State and its First Peoples. Under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP): “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.” (Article 19) “1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security. 2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities.” (Article 21) If it is to be hoped, and even demanded, that the government will ensure that policy development will be carried out without any form of discrimination, this does not only encompass the cases of overt discrimination where an individual or group of individuals is clearly – and unduly – favoured over another, but also includes the cases where the needs and interests of an individual or group of individuals are infringed upon because they were not given any particular consideration. This discrimination by omission is precisely the one that concerns us here. A more in-depth analysis of the EI changes shows that no impact assessment was conducted with regard to First Nations populations. In fact, the detrimental effects of these changes should have, at least, forced the government to introduce mitigation measures specifically for First Nations, which by no means is the case. This goes against not only the moral and fiduciary responsibility of the State towards First Nations, but also the provisions of the UNDRIP, which Canada officially endorsed in November 2010 while emphasizing the limited scope and non-binding nature of the Declaration.
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Supplementary information about the UNDRIP In May 2011, the North American Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus (NAIPC), which includes the AFN, made important recommendations to the Tenth Session of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII)1, some of which correspond to our present concerns:
that the United Nations – through its various bodies, including the UNPFII – remind Canada that it does not have the right to unilaterally define, rewrite or interpret the UNDRIP, and that they encourage Canada to express its full, unqualified support for the UNDRIP;
that a mechanism be established to conduct an annual review on the manner in which the UNDRIP is being interpreted, represented and implemented by the member States;
that the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples on the “minimum steps that he considers to be required to move forward with implementation of the Declaration beyond its formal endorsement by States”2 be implemented – in particular that States, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, review their existing laws and policies to ensure compliance with the standards set forth by the UNDRIP.
To this end, in July 2013, the AFNQL submitted a resolution to the Assembly of First Nations (organization made up of all the First Nations governments in Canada) under which the Chiefs-inAssembly want to ensure that any Statements3 presented by the Observer Delegation of Canada to the regular sessions of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) are consistent – without errors or omissions – with what is actually experienced by the First Nations, otherwise the Chiefs-in-Assembly will undertake to expose, denounce and rectify the way Canada represents its relations with First Nations before the UNPFII and the international community.
1
Cf. http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/session_10_crp_5.pdf, paragraphs 46-48 Cf. http://www.un.org/en/ga/third/65/documentslist.shtml, Item 65a (A/65/264), paragraphs 64-69 3 Cf. http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/prmny-mponu/canada_un-canada_onu/statements-declarations/ecosoc/ECOSOC2012.aspx?lang=eng 2
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Impacts The changes to employment insurance that will have the greatest impact on First Nations involve the definition of suitable employment, the number of best weeks used to calculate the amount of benefits, and the amount that may be earned during a benefit period. Contrary to the provisions of articles 19 and 21 of the UNDRIP, the changes to the Employment Insurance program announced by the federal government during the adoption of Budget 2012, which were defined and progressively implemented with the adoption of Bill C-38, will hinder the improvement of the economic and social situation of many First Nations citizens and communities whose particular socio-economic conditions were not given adequate consideration in the development and application of the changes – thus perpetuating discrimination by omission on the part of the federal government towards First Nations: a. Seasonal workers (fishing, forestry, construction, tourism, etc.) will be categorized as frequent claimants and, consequently, they will be forced to accept lower-paying jobs farther away from home and outside their usual occupation which will have a greater effect on First Nations since employment opportunities and the economy of many communities are heavily dependent on seasonal work; i. According to the 2006 Census, the portion of First Nations community members working in agriculture, forestry, fishing or hunting was more than two times greater than that of the non-Aboriginal population of Canada; ii. Also according to the Census, 58% of First Nations community members work part of the year or on a part-time basis, compared to 45% of the non-Aboriginal population of Canada; b. The new way of calculating the amount of benefits based on the highest weeks of earnings will disadvantage a large number of First Nations communities whose number of best weeks of earnings will increase from 14 to 18, 19 or even 20 weeks, thus reducing the amount of benefits – a situation that will affect the claimants as much as their communities, where the unemployment rate largely exceeds that of their respective regions and where the median salary is well below the national median salary; i. According to the 2006 Census, the unemployment rate of First Nations communities (24.9%) was four times higher than that of the non-Aboriginal population of Canada (6.3%); ii. Also according to the Census, the median employment income of First Nations community members ($13,705) was half the median employment income of the non-Aboriginal population of Canada ($27,097); c. In addition, the new way of calculating the amount that can be earned while on claim will also significantly disadvantage claimants who live in First Nations communities, the median employment income in First Nations communities being – as mentioned above – well below the median employment income of the non-Aboriginal population of Canada; i. The attached chart shows that for insurable earnings of $340 or less, the new “Working While on Claim” pilot project will only be advantageous for a claimant who works for a salary of more than $150.
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ii. For insurable earnings of $341 or more, a claimant will have to work for a salary that is more than 80% of the amount of his/her benefits in order for the new formula to be advantageous. iii. For insurable earnings of less than $167, the new formula is never more advantageous than the old formula. iv. This incentive to accept work therefore is only intended for the portion of the Canadian population with higher insurable earnings and higher-paying employment opportunities than those that usually exist in First Nations communities. As a more comprehensive example of the impacts, but also more disturbing, we wish to underline that due to the socio-economic conditions of First Nations communities that are already more precarious than in other types of Canadian communities, the changes to employment insurance will: d. gradually force claimants to turn to income security; e. cause impoverishment in First Nations communities; and f.
widen the financial security gap between First Nations citizens and the non-Aboriginal population of Canada.
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Recommendations In view of rectifying the situation outlined in this brief, the AFNQL: 1. Urge the Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) to cancel all changes brought to the employment insurance program as defined in the 2012 Budget and Bill C-38, which are particularly detrimental to First Nations people, and therefore clearly discriminatory – in particular the amendments related to: a. the definition of suitable employment; b. the number of best weeks used to calculate the amount of benefits; c. the amount that may be earned during a benefit period. 2. Urge the Minister of HRSDC to extend or reinstate the transitional measures and pilot projects that were in effect prior to these changes in order to foster the financial security of First Nations people, for these measures and pilot projects took better account of the particular socio-economic conditions of First Nations. 3. Request that in the next exercise related to the revision of economic regions, an economic region be established separately for the First Nations communities, in such a manner as to take into account the distinct socio-economic conditions of the communities, which bear no comparison with the economic regions in which they are currently located. Such a measure would not only be fairer, but it would repair some of the wrongs – social, economic, and others – caused by a system of governance imposed by the federal government, which continues to restrict the opportunities for the economic growth of First Nations communities. 4. Request that in accordance with the particular constitutional relationship between the State and First Nations and the principles set out in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the First Nations be informed, consulted and fully considered in the development of any policies which may affect them.
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Appendix Working While on Claim under the old and the new system: a graphically illustrated comparative analysis, accompanied by a reading guide Reduction in the FNHRDCQ's response capacity as a result of reduced budgets, inflation and population growth Letter from the Chief of the AFNQL, Ghislain Picard, to the Minister of HRSDC, Diane Finley, and response from Minister Finley to Chief Picard
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Working While on Claim Comparison of the two formulas for insurable earnings of 280$ 340 $
320 $
300 $
This shows that the new formula clearly disadvantages claimants with low insurable earnings who will only be able to work for modest salaries, as is often the case in First Nations communities. For insurable earnings of $340 or less (as it is the case here, where insurable earnings are $280), the new “Working While on Claim” pilot project will only be advantageous if a claimant works for a salary of more than $150.
280 $
For insurable earnings of $341 or more, a claimant will have to work for a salary that is more than 80% of the amount of his/her benefits in order for the new formula to be advantageous.
260 $
For insurable earnings of less than $167, the new formula is never more advantageous than the old formula.
Combination of employment insurance benefits 240 $ and salary earned while on claim
Old formula more advantageous
New formula more advantageous Old formula (according to salary earned while on claim)
220 $
200 $
New formula (according to salary earned while on claim)
180 $
160 $
140 $
Salary earned while on claim
Produced for the AFNQL by the First Nations Human Resources Development Commission of Quebec (FNHRDCQ)
v.130528a
Working While on Claim Comparison of the two formulas for insurable earnings of $280
Reading Guide To facilitate the reading of the attached chart and resulting conclusions, we included the following observations: •► Where the two curves coincide, at the bottom left-hand side – Under both the old and the new EI systems, a claimant with insurable earnings of $280* collects an amount of $154 in benefits (i.e. 55% of $280). * The insurable earnings used for the present exercise represent an amount slightly higher than the median employment income of First Nations citizens living in a community (Census 2006).
•► Blue curve – Under the old system, the total amount in benefits and salary earned while on claim first follows an upward curve (each dollar in salary being added to the benefits), reaches a plateau once the eligible earnings amount is reached (in this case, $75), then continues upwards once the earnings reach $229 ($154 + $75), after which the claimant keeps the salary earned but no longer receives benefits. •► Red curve – Under the new system, the total amount in benefits and salary increases less rapidly than under the old system (the claimant being allowed to keep half the salary earned), but continuously until the earnings threshold is attained, where it reaches a short plateau before continuing to increase once the earnings reach $280, after which the claimant keeps the salary earned, but no longer receives benefits. •► Blue surface – Between $1 and $149 in earnings, the old system allowed the claimant to draw a higher income, once benefits and earned salary are combined, than under the new system. •► Red surface – Between $151 and $279 in earnings, the new system allows a claimant to draw a higher income, once benefits and earned salary are combined, than under the old system. •► Where the two curves coincide, in the middle – At $150 in earnings, the two curves meet since the 50% kept by the claimant under the new system corresponds to the amount of $75 that was eligible under the old system. •► Where the two curves coincide, at the upper right-hand side – As mentioned above, under the new system, starting from $280 the claimant no longer receives benefits, his income being entirely made of earned salary, while under the old system, it was $229. Therefore, at $280, the two curves meet and increase according to the salary earned.
Analysis produced by the FNHRDCQ for the AFNQL
(v.130527a)
1
For insurable earnings of $341 and higher, the situation is similar, though calculations are slightly different. •► Eligible amount – As previously seen, under the old system, for insurable earnings of $340 or less, the maximum salary that could be earned while on claim was $75, but at $341 or more in insurable earnings, the maximum amount that could be earned while on claim represents 40% of the amount of the benefits. •► Consequently – Since under the new system, the claimant can keep half his employment earnings, he must therefore earn the equivalent of 80% of the amount of his benefits to keep as much as under the old system. The only situation that presents particular results is related to insurable earnings of less than $167. •► Earnings threshold – Under the new system, the earnings threshold corresponds to 90% of the insurable earnings. If the salary earned during a benefit period exceeds the earnings threshold, each dollar earned is deducted at 100% from the benefits. •► Consequently – If the insurable earnings are less than $167, the earnings threshold will be lower than $150, and (according to calculations too complex to discuss here) the old system will always be preferable to the new system – unless, of course, the salary earned exceeds the insurable earnings, in which case the two systems will be equivalent, the claimant’s income being entirely made of earned salary.
Conclusions
This shows that the new formula clearly disadvantages claimants with low insurable earnings who will only be able to work for modest salaries, as is often the case in First Nations communities. For insurable earnings of $340 or less (as it is the case here, where insurable earnings are $280), the new “Working While on Claim” pilot project will only be advantageous if a claimant works for a salary of more than $150. For insurable earnings of $341 or more, a claimant will have to work for a salary that is more than 80% of the amount of his/her benefits in order for the new formula to be advantageous. For insurable earnings of less than $167, the new formula is never more advantageous than the old formula.
Analysis produced by the FNHRDCQ for the AFNQL
(v.130527a)
2
RESTRICTED
Reduction in the FNHRDCQ's response capacity as a result of reduced budgets, inflation and population growth First Nations Human Resources Development Commission of Quebec (FNHRDCQ) A body of 29 First Nations communities and four Urban Service Centres in Quebec 1999-2011 inflation rate 2002=100 1999=100 0,019798638 0,019798638 1,9799% 1,9799%
EXCLUDING additional funds (reallocation exercises and non-recurring targeted contributions)
Fiscal year
CPI [2002 reference year]
CPI [1999 reference year]
Annual budget in current dollars
Annual budget in 1999 constant dollars
A
B
C
D
E = D / C x 100
1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014
93,5 95,8 98,0 100,0 102,5 104,5 106,9 108,7 110,4 112,7 113,4 114,8 118,3 120,6 123,0
100,0 102,5 104,8 107,0 109,6 111,8 114,3 116,3 118,1 120,5 121,3 122,8 126,5 129,0 131,6 Total: Cumulative (losses) :
$19 025 198 $18 655 199 $18 398 277 $17 853 698 $17 756 480 $17 762 292 $17 777 292 $17 672 295 $17 672 291 $17 642 366 $17 672 921 $17 672 291 $17 672 291 $17 672 291 $17 672 291 $268 577 473 ($16 800 497) [reduced budgets]
Annual (losses) in Additional funds in Cumulative (losses) purchasing power current dollars
Additional funds in 1999 constant dollars
G=∑F
I = H / C x 100
F = En - E 0
$19 025 198 $18 207 318 $17 553 458 $16 693 208 $16 197 374 $15 892 577 $15 548 894 $15 201 100 $14 967 022 $14 636 746 $14 571 588 $14 393 373 $13 967 533 $13 696 364 $13 430 459
$0 ($817 880) ($1 471 740) ($2 331 990) ($2 827 824) ($3 132 621) ($3 476 304) ($3 824 098) ($4 058 176) ($4 388 452) ($4 453 610) ($4 631 825) ($5 057 665) ($5 328 834) ($5 594 739)
$233 982 214 ($51 395 756) [inflation]
($51 395 756)
2001-2011 pop. growth rate 0,019898567 1,9899%
INCLUDING additional funds (reallocation exercises and non-recurring targeted contributions)
H
$0 ($817 880) ($2 289 619) ($4 621 610) ($7 449 433) ($10 582 054) ($14 058 358) ($17 882 456) ($21 940 632) ($26 329 085) ($30 782 694) ($35 414 519) ($40 472 184) ($45 801 018) ($51 395 756)
Annual (losses) in Cumulative (losses) purchasing power
J=F+I
$3 503 257 $2 415 929 $2 673 712 $935 634 $2 389 395 $3 823 505 $1 810 923 $670 000 $475 001 $599 860 $425 000 $425 000 $254 999 $254 999 $254 999
$3 503 257 $2 357 927 $2 550 940 $874 818 $2 179 594 $3 421 031 $1 583 922 $576 311 $402 288 $497 666 $350 419 $346 145 $201 542 $197 629 $193 792
$3 503 257 $1 540 047 $1 079 200 ($1 457 173) ($648 229) $288 410 ($1 892 381) ($3 247 787) ($3 655 888) ($3 890 787) ($4 103 191) ($4 285 680) ($4 856 123) ($5 131 205) ($5 400 946)
$20 912 213
$19 237 281
($32 158 476)
Interpretation of columns D-G This means that, once the annual budgets are converted to 1999 constant dollars (to be able to evaluate FNHRDCQ budgets in terms of real purchasing power), cumulative losses of $16.8M [column D] between 1999 and 2014 (as a result of reduced annual core budgets) actually represent a cumulative loss of $51.4M in purchasing power [columns E, F and G]. (Column G only serves to demonstrate the cumulative effect of successive losses in purchasing power, annual budgets being fully spent by March 31st of each year as they cannot be deferred.) Interpretation of columns H-K Taking into account additional funds received during this period (reallocation exercises and non-recurring targeted contributions) amounting to $19.2M (i.e. $20.9M converted into 1999 constant dollars) [columns H and I], cumulative losses for the period of 1999 to 2014 drop from $51.4M to $32.2M [columns J and K], of which $21.6M in purchasing power had already been lost at March 31, 2012 [column K, fiscal year 2011-2012]. (Column K only serves to demonstrate the cumulative effect of successive losses in purchasing power, annual budgets being fully spent by March 31st of each year as they cannot be deferred.) Interpretation of columns L-N Although FNHRDCQ annual budgets in 1999 constant dollars decreased significantly between 1999 and 2012, they were used to fund employment and training measures and services for a growing number of individuals [column L], thus reducing the FNHRDCQ's per capita purchasing power even further. A comparison of the FNHRDCQ's per capita purchasing power in 2012 to 1999 figures (when the first generation of the AHRDS was implemented) [column M] reveals that the organization's response capacity had already decreased by 50% at March 31, 2012 and will, by 2014, amount to only 46% of its 1999 response capacity (i.e. less than half) [column N].
K= ∑J $3 503 257 $5 043 304 $6 122 504 $4 665 331 $4 017 102 $4 305 512 $2 413 130 ($834 656) ($4 490 545) ($8 381 332) ($12 484 522) ($16 770 202) ($21 626 325) ($26 757 529) ($32 158 476)
Population 15-64 years FNHRDCQ L 30 966 31 583 32 211 32 766 33 407 34 080 34 752 35 480 36 123 36 678 37 265 37 781 39 226 40 007 40 803
Per capita Percentage of 1999purchasing power 2000 response in 1999 constant capacity dollars M=(E+I)/L $728 $651 $624 $536 $550 $567 $493 $445 $425 $413 $400 $390 $361 $347 $334
N = M n / M0 100% 90% 86% 74% 76% 78% 68% 61% 58% 57% 55% 54% 50% 48% 46%
FINDINGS Between 1999 and 2014, the FNHRDCQ's budget shrank by $16.8M. In 1999 constant dollars, this amounts to a $51.4M loss in purchasing power. Even with the inclusion of additional funding received from HRSDC between 1999 and 2012, losses in purchasing power already totalled $21.6M at March 31, 2012. Given the high population growth of First Nations and Aboriginals in general between 1999 and 2012, the FNHRDCQ's per capita response capacity has fallen to only 50% (or half) of its 1999 response capacity.
Sources Consumer Price Index (CPI): Statistics Canada, Table 326-0021 (http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?id=3260021&retrLang=eng&lang=eng) Using the CPI to Compare Dollar Values: Statistics Canada, Your Guide to the CPI (http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/bsolc/olc-cel/olc-cel?catno=62-557-X&lang=eng) 2001-2011 population data: annual data from the AANDC Register FNHRDCQ (AFNQL regional and urban ASETS agreements)
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