Introduction
Hezbollah is a Lebanese-based Islamic political organization that is primarily rooted in the Shiʿa-populated regions of the country. The group has established itself as a resistance force against the state of Israel, gaining recognition for its organized military structure and disciplined fighters during multiple conflicts between Israel and Lebanon. In addition to its military presence, Hezbollah has actively participated in the Lebanese political system, gaining representation in parliament since 1992 and participating in the government as a major actor since 2005. Its influence extends further to include charitable and financial institutions.
Hezbollah adheres to an Islamic political ideology, drawing on the Shiite interpretation of such movements. The group, along with other similar movements categorized as “fundamentalist”, is inspired by the idea of a global Islamic State, with Islam serving as the common denominator among them.
I- Sectarianism and the Lebanese Political Economy: Hezbollah’s Origins
Greater Lebanon was established as a country under the French Mandate in 1920. The country was composed of many religious groupings, with Christians mainly residing in Mount Lebanon and while Muslims were a
majority in regions like Bekaa Valley, Jabal-Amil, Akkar, Beirut, Saida, and Tripoli.
The Lebanese independence in 1943 established the National Pact that confirmed political representation along sectarian lines. The Shiʿ a population was marginalized, with the lowest socio-economic and political representation compared to other communities. The majority of the Shiʿa were rural, concentrated in South Lebanon and North-Eastern Lebanon, and had low levels of literacy. The Shiʿ a were also located in the periphery of Lebanon, characterized by large private properties owned by wealthy landowners who exploited private sharecroppers. The Shiʿ a population was governed bynotable families whoacted as intermediaries and maintained a patronage-based socio-political structure through control over landed properties, capital of merchant families, allocation of resources and mediation with the authorities.
Lebanon’s independence in 1943 led to a concentration of control and power in the hands of a small group of elites, who dominated the country’s economy and politics. The service sector, dominated by finance and banking, was the largest sector in the Lebanese economy, while industrial production was limited. The interests of the commercial and financial bourgeoisie were also imposed on the agricultural sector, leading to the displacement of traditional sharecroppers and small farmers, who then had to move to cities or migrate abroad. This led to a large-scale rural to urban migration, with most migrants coming from Shiʿa rural areas and finding jobs in the service sector. As a result,
urbanization increased, with 65% of the population living in cities by 1975. These trends led to growing disparities between the center and the periphery, with high levels of poverty and unemployment, especially in South Lebanon and the suburbs of Beirut.
By the 1970s, Lebanese society was marked by significant social, regional and sectarian inequalities. However, the gap between Christians and Muslims had narrowed and class position was not solely based on sect affiliation. International migration has had a significant impact on the development of the Shiʿa population. The growth of a Shiʿa diaspora began during the French Mandate, but by the 1950s and 1960s, the flows were redirected towards the Arab oil countries. By 1975, a large percentage of Shiʿa in the Bekaa and South Lebanon had abandoned their villages and settled in Lebanese cities or abroad, particularly in Africa and the Gulf. This has led to the transformation of power relations in the community as older leaders were marginalized by migrants who used their remittances to purchase land, establish channels of commerce and socio-political influence.
The growth of the Shiʿa diaspora and the rise of an educated, younger, middle class had begun to shape the community. This new layer of the Shiʿa population initially directed its economic activities towards minor sectors such as small-scale real estate and trade with Africa. This new elite, formed through migration, had a significant impact on the political and financial spheres. In this context, the Shiʿa-based party known as Amal emerged in 1974 around the leadership of cleric Moussa al-Sadr.
Sadr mobilized the majority of the Shiʿa population, drawing strength from peasants, workers, and the urban middle classes who experienced under-representation in a political system. Although Sadr did not challenge the sectarian basis of Lebanon’s political arrangement, he was critical of Maronite domination and accused the government of neglecting the Shiʿa population.
The Lebanese Civil War, which began in 1975, had a major impact on the sectarian system in the country and the formation of Hezbollah. One of the key factors contributing to the conflict was the growing presence of the Palestinian resistance in Beirut and southern Lebanon, which was home to 260,000 Palestinians, more than half of whom lived in refugee camps. The political debate surrounding the Palestinian resistance and the large Palestinian population in the country intersected with the future of the sectarian system in Lebanon. The Christian-led Lebanese Front criticized the Palestinian resistance and sought to maintain the political system,whilethe LebaneseNational Movement (LNM), led bythe Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, supported the Palestinian resistance and called for an end to the sectarian system.
Lebanon’s Shiʿa population was divided between the poorer populations in Beirut and southern Lebanon and the community’s leadership represented by Moussa Sadr's “al-Mahrumīn”. Al-Mahrumīn initially participated in the LNM and had strong ties with Palestinian
organizations, but distanced itself from the Palestinian resistance and the LNM after the Syrian military entry into Lebanon. Hezbollah was officially established in 1985, but had been active militarily and politically since 1982, operating under the banner of “Islamic Resistance”. Key figures in the origins of Hezbollah include Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, Muhammad Mahdi Chamsedine, and Moussa al-Sadr, with the latter being the most influential. Fadlallah was never a member of Hezbollah but was its leading ideologue throughout the 1980s. Fadlallah was initially supportive of Iran and the concept of Wilāyat al-Faqīh, but later became more critical and distant from Iran and Hezbollah in the early 1990s. Hezbollah has been politically, socially, and financially supported by Iran since its official establishment, as Iran’s foreign policy of “exporting the revolution” was promoted by conservative factions of the state. In 1982, Iran sent 1,500 soldiers from the Revolutionary Guard Corps to Lebanon to participate in the Lebanese civil war.
The formation of Hezbollah was mostly driven by members of Amal who were dissatisfied with the leadership of Nabih Berri. These members joined forces with other Shiʿa groups organized by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to form Hezbollah.
In the early days of Hezbollah, the party’s legitimacy was largely based on its military struggle against the Israeli occupation. It was was involved in attacks against both the Israeli and Western presence in Lebanon,
which led to the withdrawal of American marines from the country. The party also launched an active recruitment campaign in Beirut’s southern suburbs and established its political bureau and weekly newspaper, al‘Ahed.
Hezbollah's 1985 political manifesto, “Hezbollah’s Open Letter to the Downtrodden of Lebanon and the World”, formally declared the existence of the movement. The manifesto drew inspiration from the 1978-1979 IranianRevolutionandheldupAyatollahKhomeinias the“single wise and just leader”. Most of Hezbollah’s members at that time were young clerics who were dissatisfied with Amal's non-clerical leadership and accommodation with Lebanese clientelism and the political system. The party’s opposition to both the Israeli invasion and the Lebanese political system drew supporters away from Amal and into its own sphere of influence. Financial support from Iran also allowed Hezbollah to grow at the expense of Amal, as it could offer its fighters not only ideological simplicity and authenticity, but also financial rewards.
II- Hezbollah and the Political Economy of Lebanese Neoliberalism
The end of the Civil War in Lebanon marked a new beginning for the country’s political and economic systems. The Ta'if Agreement was put in place as a new political consensus between the religious communities, which codified sectarianism, strengthened the positions of Sunnis and Shiites, and granted Syria a de-facto control over the country. The
agreement also led to economic liberalization measures that were focused on integrating the country into the global economy and promoting private sector growth.
Rafiq Hariri became Prime Minister of Lebanon in 1992 and played a significant role in the country’s reconstruction efforts. As a wealthy businessman, he had deep connections with Saudi Arabia and had established a network of services and charitable activities in Lebanon, which gave him a social base in the country's clientelist system. Hariri's vision for the country's political economy was centered on liberalizing capital flows and deregulating the tax system to attract foreign investment.
The first decade of the 2000s marked a highly polarized outcome of neoliberal reform in Lebanon’s political economy. Poverty and inequality levels were extremely high, with 28% of the population living on $4/day or less and 8% living on $2.4/day or less. Unemployment levels were also significant, with only an estimated one-third of the working-age population actually in employment. Between 1993 and 2008, Lebanon paid $38 billion on debt, or an average of $9,500 per person over this period.
Hezbollah was initially critical of the existing political system in Lebanon and the sectarian privileges enjoyed by other religious communities. It advocated for an Islamic form of government based on Ayatollah Khomeini’s vision of Wilayat al-Faqih. However, following the acceptance
of the 1989 Ta'if Agreement, Hezbollah's attitude towards sectarianism changed and it began to integrate into the structures of the state. This change was partly due to Hezbollah’s greater weight in the political process and its recognition as a resistance movement, as well as changes in its main ally, the Islamic Republic of Iran. The end of the Iran-Iraq War and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini led to a more pragmatic foreign policy in the IRI, which was preoccupied with socio-economic problems and improving diplomatic relations with other countries. This was accompanied by a policy of socio-economic liberalization in Iran, which pushed Hezbollah to seek increasing integration into the Lebanese political system.
The election of Abbas al-Mussawi in 1991 as Secretary General of Hezbollah, followed by the election of Hassan Nasrallah, represented this evolution towards “infitah” or opening. Both leaders were considered to be ideologically closer to the pragmatic orientation of the new Iranian leadership, led by President Rafsandjani and Supreme Leader Khamenei, than their predecessor Tufayli, who was considered to be too close to the “Export of the Revolution” camp.
Over time, Hezbollah has grown to become an important player in the Lebanese political landscape and has been involved in various economic activities in the country. While it has maintained its stance as a resistance movement against Israel, it has also played a role in Lebanon’s government, participating in cabinet positions and providing various
social services to its constituents. Hezbollah's participation in the 1992 legislative elections sparked debates within the organization. A small minority, led by ex-Secretary General Sheikh Tufayli, opposed any integration into the political system, while the majority of the leadership argued for a more pragmatic approach. The matter was eventually submitted to Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Hosseini Khamenei who issued a fatwa supporting the decision of the majority. Disagreements between Hezbollah and Tufayli grew and eventually Tufayli was expelled from the movement after he organized a separate demonstration from Hezbollah’s official march on Jerusalem Day in 1998. Tufayli later became one of the most outspoken critics of Hezbollah and the leadership of the IRI, accusing both of corruption and selling out the ideals of Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution. Since then, Hezbollah has participated in all parliamentary and municipal elections, controlling the largest legislative blocs in the National Assembly from 1992 to 2009.
In 2009, Hezbollah’s new manifesto reflected their gradual acceptance of the sectarian political system. The manifesto confirmed that political sectarianism was a major problem but postponed any change to the system until a future date. The manifesto described the sectarian system as the basis of co-existence and that suppressing political sectarianism was the best way to alleviate the burden of the confessional system, but an objective and calm debate was needed to elaborate an adapted project and its mechanism. However, Hezbollah has not given up its ideal of an Islamic state in Lebanon. The party's leadership has repeatedly stated
that an Islamic State is their preferred option, but that it is not a practical option in the near future given the country’s confessional and sectarian make-up. It is important to note that Hezbollah has not given up its goal of an Islamic state and continues to view it as the preferred option.
In the last three decades, Hezbollah has positioned itself as a party that advocates for the rights of the oppressed and opposes deprivation, even as it supports neoliberal measures such as liberalization and privatization in Lebanon. This contradiction is rooted in the political thought of prominent figures in Shiʿa Islamic fundamentalism like Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Ayatollah Khomeini. Al-Sadr advocated for an Islamic state that would implement an Islamic economic system that balances private and public property, while Khomeini’s views on economics changed according to the political climate.
Hezbollah had to make a balance between mitigating the impact of neoliberal reforms and promoting growth and private sector development in Hezbollah and Lebanese neoliberalism. This balance is reflected in the works of two prominent Hezbollah thinkers, Ali Fayyad and Abd al-Halim Fadlallah, who led the Collective for Research and Training on Development-Action (CCSD). Both authors are critical of some aspects of globalization and the implementation of various economic agreements, including those with the IMF and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, but they continue to prioritize support for the private sector. They argue that economic and social decisions should not be made at the expense of the
private sector and budget rationalization is necessary in areas such as health and basic education.
Lebanon’s agricultural sector has been one of the most neglected economic sectors since the country’s independence, and Hezbollah's governance of the Ministry of Agriculture has not brought any significant changes. Instead, Hezbollah has continued to advance the interests of large landowners from which it draws political and clientelist support.
The Bekaa Valley, which is located in eastern Lebanon, has a significant agricultural sector, with cannabis being the primary crop. Farmers in the region have criticized Hezbollah for supporting the interests of large landowners and failing to support low-cost irrigation or the building of dams.
Despite an agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture and private banks to facilitate loans to small and middle farmers, this has not translated into reality because high risks and low benefits do not encourage banks to lend. Furthermore, no consistent or sustainable projects to improve the irrigation of lands, especially in the Bekaa and the South, have been undertaken. Lebanon still relies upon foreign agricultural imports while national products are not protected. At the same time, no measures limiting the influence of cartels and monopolies in the sector have been implemented, and large landowners and retailers still dominate the market.
The budget of the Ministry of Agriculture has been slightly increased under Hezbollah's administration, but most of this has been used for the recruitment of new employees and not to promote development projects. According to Youssef Mohieddine, President of the Federation of Agriculture, the new development projects are mostly linked to international financial assistance and projects and not from the government. Funding is distributed to further reinforce clientelist and sectarian interests of Hezbollah.
The Bekaa Valley farmers have accused Hezbollah of conspiring to keep people dependent on them by refusing to support low-cost irrigation or the building of dams and supporting the interests of large landowners. This has led to the inequalities among farmers being very large, with 5 percent of farmers controlling 47 percent of total cultivated lands, while half of the farmers own only 8 percent of the total cultivated lands. Hezbollah’s reliance on large landowners and powerful clans has also come under attack from farmers in the Bekaa region.
III- Lebanese Class Structure Under Neoliberalism: Poverty and Lebanon’s Sectarian Mix
As a result of neoliberal reforms and capital inflows, Shi’a took a fraction of the bourgeoisie in Lebanon, particularly in Shi’a-majority areas in Greater Beirut and the South of Lebanon controlled by Hezbollah. The liberalization of capital flows has enabled the Shi’a to deepen their
accumulation opportunities and converge around these capital flows. This is evidenced by their increased representation in major business associations such as the Beirut Traders Association and the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture of Beirut and Mount Lebanon. They have also reached parity on the boards of the Association of Lebanese Industrialists, but they are still underrepresented in the Association of Lebanese Banks, where they control only four banks. A micro-level analysis of key Shi’a-owned companies and individuals highlights the significance of this emerging class within the Lebanese economy.
In Lebanon, there are companies that are under the direct influence of the Hezbollah political party. These companies tend to focus on construction and real estate, as well as tourism and recreational activities aimed at the growing Shi’a middle class. There exist many companies that provide an illustration of these trends. One is Tajco, a real estate development company owned by Shiʿa businessman Ali Tajjedine, who is a former Hezbollah military commander. Tajco acts as an intermediary for Hezbollah to purchase lands and is involved in construction and civil engineering works. The second company is the Al-Inmaa group, which is involved in the construction of numerous Hezbollah projects. The company has more than 1,200 employees and operates mainly in Shiʿ apopulated regions, especially in the Dahyeh neighborhood and South Lebanon. The close linkages between Al-Inmaa and Hezbollah’s political structures is confirmed by its CEO, Adham Tababja, who is also the Mayor of the Kafr Tabnit municipality and is affiliated with Hezbollah. Other
Hezbollah-linked companies are Jihad al-Bina, Waad and Meamar Engineering and Development, privately owned and operated, but are closely linked to the party and headed by Hezbollah members and supporters, including electoral candidates for the party.
These companies enrich a narrow layer of the Shiʿa community who control them, and are largely based in Hezbollah-controlled areas, with clients drawn mostly from Hezbollah’s educational, media, and schooling institutions. Hezbollah officials frequently praise these institutions in publicly organized celebrations, and concerns have been expressed around clientelism and patronage stemming from the party’s position in the state apparatus. The close links between Hezbollah and these companies point to the emergence of a bourgeoisie linked to the party, and reflects the nature of an adventurous, speculative, and commercial capitalism that dominates the region, characterized by short-term profit seeking.
Hezbollah has undergone a significant transformation in its social base over the years. Initially, Hezbollah emerged from the poor Shiʿ a populations of Lebanon and its membership and cadres reflected the lower socio-economic classes of the Shiʿa community. However, over time, the party has evolved and its social base has expanded, encompassing the growing Shiʿa fraction of the middle class and bourgeoisie in Beirut.
One of the primary indicators of this transformation is the profile of party cadres. Hezbollah cadres are no longer made up of clerics from lower middle-class backgrounds like they were when the party was founded in 1985. Instead, the party’s cadres are now largely drawn from the professional class, who hold secular higher education degrees.
Today, supporters of Hezbollah can be found throughout all social classes and are no longer restricted to the poorer, pious layers of the Shiʿ a population. A large number of youths from the middle and higher classes of the Shiʿa population now support or have joined the party, including tribal elites in the Bekaa Valley who were traditionally opposed to Hezbollah.
Hezbollah's changing social base is also reflected in its educational network. The very high tuition fees required to attend the al-Mustapha schools, which are under the control of Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem, is one indicator of this change. These schools are aimed at the children of the party's leadership, as well as the upper and middle-class fraction of the Shiʿa population. Other Hezbollah institutions such as its tourism and leisure activities are also oriented towards the wealthier classes. The party's focus on the middle and upper classes is reflected in the luxurious facilities and services it provides. It is important to note that the party’s social welfare activities, including its provision of health and education services, have helped to broaden its support base.
IV- Hezbollah and Shi’a Civil Society
Hezbollah has established its dominance among the Shiʿa population in Lebanon through a combination of both consent and coercion. The party provides essential services to the Shiʿa community while simultaneously employing repressive measures against those who deviate from its established norms. This is facilitated through Hezbollah's network of organizations that serve as part of civil society, including associations, religious institutions, the media, and others.
Hezbollah’s institutional network operates as a unified and coherent intervention into Lebanese civil society, with significant rotation of leadership and reinforcement of activities among institutions. The ideological framework promoted by the network is centered on the Islamization of the Shiʿa population, which has been crucial to strengthening Hezbollah’s hegemony. This process of Islamization has been both promoted and employed as a means of disciplining elements of the community that have resisted it. In this manner, Hezbollah has developed its dominant position among Lebanese Shiʿa through the interplay of consent and coercion, as mediated through Islamization.
Hezbollah has a highly centralized internal structure. Its highest decisionmaking body is the Decision-Making Consultative Council, also known as the Shura, which is made up of seven members including the Secretary General and the Vice-Secretary. The Shura is elected every three years
by the General Convention, a gathering of 200-250 high-level party members.
The Shura forms the core of the party’s strategic intervention in civil society and political orientation, and carries out its role through five councils: The Executive Council, Political Council, Jihad Council, Judicial Council, and Parliamentary Work Council. These councils oversee committees that implement selected policies, and the nationwide structures are complemented by Regional Shura Councils at the district level.
Hezbollah has gained support among the Shia population through its efforts to support the civilian population following conflict and war. The direct beneficiaries of Hezbollah's resources and services are estimated to be between 40,000 and 80,000 people in Beirut alone, including employees and members. In addition, the party offers a range of social support to a wider layer of non-members and supporters in the Shia population through organizations such as the Imdad organization, which provides health care, education, emergency relief, and other services.
The political elites of the Shiʿa population in Lebanon were weakened during the Civil War. In response, new religious institutions, such as Hezbollah-affiliated mosques and hawzāt (religious seminaries), emerged as a challenge to existing elites who had typically monopolized religious learning. These new institutions provided space for previously
marginalized youth to enter religious vocations and disseminated Hezbollah’s worldview and ideology. The seminary students who identify with Hezbollah are largely drawn from lower social classes and families that lack the traditions of Shiʿ a scholasticism. The rise of these new institutions was due to socioeconomic changes in the Shiʿa regions, including rural deterioration and marginalization by the Lebanese state.
Hezbollah has placed a strong emphasis on developing its media network since its establishment in 1985. The group’s media network consists of three main components: Al-Manar, a television channel established in the 1990s and now under total control of the party; websites, magazines, and newspapers such as al-Intiqad, a weekly publication that serves as the party’s main mouthpiece; and radio station al-Nour. Each of these institutions plays a key role in promoting Hezbollah’s worldview through programs, documentaries, and games on themes such as resistance, Islam, Palestine, and Zionism. Hezbollah also has other resources, such as musical groups, publishing houses, and film and production houses, to spread its messages.
The party has placed a strong emphasis on religious education and has infused religious symbolism and ideology into all of its activities, from media to social services. This religious ideology is centered on two key concepts: the hāla islāmiyya, or the Islamic milieu, and iltizām, or commitment.
The hāla islāmiyya is a collective identity that embodies a vision of Islam as an ideology and a system. It is a product of solidarity and voluntarism, with individuals responsible for making informed choices based on religious knowledge. In this identity, iltizām refers to individual norms and practices, ranging from contractual obligations to a personal sense of duty. Hezbollah authority figures play a crucial role in circumscribing the norms of social behavior and promoting conformity within the Shiʿ a populations.
Women are seen by Hezbollah as the main transmitters of religious norms, and are held responsible for the upbringing of their children.
According to Hezbollah’s interpretation of Islam, women have the right to work and be educated but their primary role is in “female work” such as teaching, nursing, and sewing, and their work should not interfere with their family responsibilities.
Women are a strategic interface between the party and its social environment, organized in women’s councils through mosques and neighborhoods. They help mobilize for social and cultural events called for by the party and play a central role in transmitting party values to its wider social milieu. Despite women being a significant part of the party, its institutions are led by a small number of male cadres, with women serving as volunteers.
V- Hezbollah and the Lebanese Labor Movement
During the Lebanese Civil War, trade unions played an important role in organizing demonstrations and resistance against the conflict, the power of militias and Israeli occupation. The trade unions attempted to organize across sectarian lines and organized demonstrations for the unity of the country. Between 1985 and 1989, there were over 114 collective protests against the Civil War, and the CGTL (Confederation Generale des Travailleurs au Liban) was the only significant, cross-sectarian force that emphasized the unity of the country and opposition to the Civil War.
In the 1990s, a strategy was developed by the main political elites in Lebanon to undercut the power of the CGTL and its associated federations and unions. The Hariri government, Hezbollah, Amal, the Baʿth party, and the Syrian Social National Party were among the key players in this effort. The strategy was designed to weaken the CGTL’s ability to mobilize across sectarian lines and to subordinate the labor movement to the priorities of the government’s economic reform measures. The objective was to eliminate the main obstacle in the implementation of neoliberal policies and a possible political rival to the sectarian and bourgeois political elite. The Syrian regime was also involved in the process, providingsupport for the Lebanese government’s efforts to repress and weaken the CGTL until its military withdrawal in 2005.
Hezbollah has established numerous federations and trade unions in the country as a means of expanding its base in CGTL. The party has created rival and sectarian unions and federations, with leadership made up of solely Shiʿa members, who are politically dominated by Hezbollah. The most prominent example is the al-Wafa federation, which was first established in the Bekaa region as a federation of trade unions, but has since expanded to Beirut and South Lebanon, representing around 2,500 workers across various economic sectors. Hezbollah has also established rival federations in the agricultural, health, and transport sectors. The party organizes its work in these affiliated federations and unions through its Trade Union and Workers’ Unit (TUWU), which prioritizes the defense of workers but also calls for harmonious economic development and dialogue between business owners and employees. The TUWU displays no opposition to neoliberal measures such as privatization but calls for a case-by-case basis approach and emphasizes Shiʿa religious reference points.
The early 2000s marked a crucial moment in the consolidation of Lebanese neoliberalism after the IMF-led negotiations of the Paris I and II Agreements from 2001 to 2003. However, there was little opposition to these economic reforms from the CGTL. A new wave of labor mobilization emerged, but it was largely outside the structures and initiative of the CGTL. The weakening of the CGTL and its subordination to the Lebanese Ministry of Labor and political forces close to the Syrian regime would be demonstrated throughout the renewal of the country’s
labor struggles. Hezbollah’s attitude towards these new movements has been characterized by hesitation and an unwillingness to encourage independent mass struggles, frequently prioritizing its own sectarian interests over a cross-denominational labor movement.
VI- Hezbollah’s Military Apparatus
Hezbollah’s military operations are controlled by the Jihad Council (JC), which is headed by Hassan Nasrallah, according to various sources. The council is overseen by the Majlis Shura al-Qarār, which holds all decisionmaking power and oversees various functional councils. The Majlis Shura al-Qarār considers all aspects of the group’s activities, including political and military wings, as a unified entity. Hezbollah’s leaders stress the importance of unity among its diverse activities, with the Secretary General serving as the head of both the Shura Council and the Jihad Council. However, researcher Matthew Levitt argues that the majority of Hezbollah officials and parliamentarians are unaware of the details of the party’s covert military activities, which are decided by the highest party and council leadership. The Jihad Council manages three units: The Islamic Resistance, the Security Organ, and the External Security Apparatus (ESA).
The exact number of Hezbollah soldiers is difficult to estimate, but is believed to range from 5,000 to 7,500 full-time soldiers, with some 20,000 reservists. Recruits usually follow a specific course of military
training, which takes place in Iran in the various training camps run by the Qods Force of the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) and sometimes in Syria. The most elite element in Hezbollah’s military organization, the Special Forces unit, undergoes an intensive threemonth course.
The military apparatus of the Islamic movement is very autonomous in the implementation of their orders, which come from the leadership. Hezbollah has purposely reduced intermediaries between the top military leadership and local commanders on the ground, making their command structure less pyramid-like and more horizontal. Timur Goksel, the former spokesman of the United Nations monitoring force in South Lebanon, confirmed this and noted that Hezbollah fighters work independently and know what they are doing. Naim Qassem stated that once the green light for a military operation is given, the small command involved in its planning, execution, and tactics handles all decision-making.
The Security Organ Unit is a critical component of Hezbollah’s security apparatus, responsible for protecting the members of the organization, its arms, and its military apparatus. The unit oversees four territorial commands covering South Lebanon, Dahyeh, the Bekaa Valley, and the Mediterranean coastline. It is tasked with monitoring the entry and activities of visitors, including journalists and photographers, in these regions.
The Security Organ Unit has been highly effective in ensuring the security of Hezbollah members. This was particularly evident during the 2006 Lebanon War, where not a single high-ranking member was killed despite numerous attempts by the Israeli army. In 2014, the unit was responsible for uncovering a major security breach, where a Mossad agent was discovered to have infiltrated the Hezbollah Unit 910. The double agent, Muhammed Shawraba, was placed under surveillance for several months before being detained, interrogated, and tried for treason.
However, despite the unit's effectiveness, it has not prevented the assassination of seven Hezbollah commanders by Israeli armed forces. These assassinations have taken place since the murder of one of the organization's founding fathers, Sheikh Ragheb Harb. In addition to its functions aimed at external threats, the Security Organ Unit also plays an important role in the repression of dissent within Lebanon itself. The unit has been compared to a “quasi-state apparatus” in regions under Hezbollah's control, and has frequently overruled the authority of Lebanese government institutions.
The External Security Apparatus (ESA) is the unit in charge of operations conducted by Hezbollah outside of Lebanon. Imad Mughniyah was reportedly the head of the ESA until his assassination in 2008 in Damascus. His successor, Mustapha Badr al-Din, took over the leadership and was responsible for filling a range of military and security positions in the organization. However, he was killed in 2016 in a large explosion
near Damascus airport in Syria while fighting alongside the forces of the Assad regime.
Unit 1800 is the most well-known part of the ESA, and it is responsible for conducting operations in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Unit 1800 coordinates with Palestinian groups like the Islamic Jihad and Hamas to carry out military operations against Israeli targets. The unit provides military training, funding, and expertise to Palestinian groups and also has the ability to recruit Palestinians to conduct operations under its direct control. Additionally, the unit trains Palestinians at camps in the Bekaa Valley or sends them to Iran for advanced training.
The formation and development of Hezbollah’s armed apparatus is closely tied to its resistance activities, particularly against Israel. The 1989 Ta'if Agreement legitimized Hezbollah’s military wing as a resistance actor and the organization was not required to disarm. Hezbollah's attacks against Israel steadily increased following the agreement, reaching 908 operations in 1995. In 1997, following the death of the leader’s son, Hezbollah announced the formation of the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, an open volunteer unit trained and guided by Hezbollah cadres.
The South of Lebanon was finally freed from Israeli occupation in May 2000 and Hezbollah took on a mostly defensive role. This changed in 2006 with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which resulted in the loss of
hundreds of Hezbollah fighters and further reinforced its popularity as a resistance actor. One month after the end of the war, Hezbollah celebrated “The Divine Victory” in front of hundreds of thousands of people, solidifying its position as a powerful political and military force in Lebanon.
Following the 2006 Lebanon War, the Israel-Lebanon border was largely quiet until a few security incidents occurred between 2013 and 2014. Hezbollah responded to these incursions with military retaliation, conveying a message to Israel that it was ready to defend itself. In 2014, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declared that Israel should fear Hezbollah, underlining the group's continued commitment to its resistance activities. Hezbollah’s military and political power remains an important factor in Lebanese and regional politics.
Hezbollah is often portrayed as a resistance movement against the Israeli occupation. However, the historical record indicates that Hezbollah has used its weapons against its political opponents, including secular and leftist forces, as well. In 1982, the Lebanese National Resistance Front was targeted by a wave of assassinations, primarily of its communist leaders inWest Beirut. This was due to Hezbollah’s criticism of the Front’s secularism and the fact that it did not call for an Islamic alternative to gain independence.
In 1983, with the assistance of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah attacked the remaining presence of the Lebanese state
in the Bekaa Valley and took control of the Sheikh Abdallah barracks, which became the headquarters of the Pasdaran. Hezbollah also had numerous violent military conflicts with Amal throughout the 1980s, including a serious battle in 1988 when both groups sought to establish dominance in the suburbs of Beirut and South Lebanon. The struggle resulted in 3,000 deaths and ended with two negotiated settlements under the auspices of Iran and Syria in 1989. The reconciliation in 1990 allowed for a refocus on Hezbollah’s military resistance in the South, which was undermined by the military confrontation with Amal.
In May 2008, Hezbollah used its weaponry against Lebanese national actors for the first time since the end of the Lebanese Civil War. Hezbollah’s action came after threats by the March 14 alliance to politically attack key Hezbollah military interests. The Lebanese government, led by Siniora, passed two decrees aimed at weakening Hezbollah’s military apparatus. The first decree was the reassignment of the head of security at Beirut’s airport, Wafiq Shuqayr, a general officer who was accused of being too close to Hezbollah. The second decree challenged the legality and constitutionality of Hezbollah’s independent telephone system.
Hezbollah responded to these decrees with a military offensive. On May 7, Hezbollah and its allies took over West Beirut in a well-planned operation. Hezbollah overwhelmed its rivals, the militias from the Future Movement, and took control of West Beirut in less than twelve hours. The conflict spread to other areas, including the Druze areas of Mount
Lebanon, leading to intense fighting. The violence ended a week later with over eighty deaths and 250 wounded. Hezbollah justified its military action in Beirut as a defense against the government’s decision, which it claimed was an American plan to disarm the resistance and submit it to Israel’s will. However, these events were criticized by many as being a violation of Lebanese sovereignty.
Despite the criticism, Hezbollah continued to maintain a strong military presence in Lebanon and has since been involved in various conflicts, including the 2006 Lebanon War with Israel and the Syrian Civil War. Hezbollah’s actions in May 2008 demonstrated its willingness to use military force to achieve its political objectives and solidified its position as a major political and military actor in Lebanon.
VII- Hezbollah and Revolutionary Processes in the Middle East and North Africa
Hezbollah has a distinctive understanding of world politics that is based on a rejection of Western values and religion. In its discourse, the United States is viewed as the “Big Satan”, Israel as the “Small Satan”, and Britain and France are considered “evils”. This hostility towards the West is rooted in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s opposition to “Westoxication” and “Eastoxication”, where the former refers to a fascination with everything Western and the latter to an obsession with Marxist and communist ideologies.
However, Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran is characterized by pragmatism and flexibility. The group views its conflict with Israel partly in religious terms, with leaders often employing anti-Semitic tropes that present Jews as evil. Hezbollah also supports the works of French intellectual Roger Garaudy, who denies the Jewish Holocaust.
The relationship between Hezbollah and the Syrian regime has been long-standing and has only become stronger over time. Under Hafez alAssad, Hezbollah was seen as a useful tool for strengthening Syria’s relations with Iran and for pressuring Israel during peace negotiations. However, under Bashar al-Assad, the relationship evolved into a strong and strategic alliance, with deep political and military collaboration.
Hezbollah became an important proxy for the Syrian regime in Lebanon and was described in its 2009 manifesto as having a distinctive attitude and having supported the resistance movements in the region.
The relationship between the two actors was further solidified when Hezbollah came to the aid of the Assad regime during the Syrian uprising in March 2011. In several speeches, Nasrallah accused the West, Israel, moderate Arab regimes, and even al-Qaeda of collaborating to overthrow the Assad regime. He stated that these parties sought the downfall of the Assad regime because itsupportedthe resistance,andthat they were seeking to realize the project of the New Middle East of George W. Bush.
Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict began to escalate in the middle of 2012. The group was reported to be providing technical and
logistical support to Damascus and helping some of Syria’s Shi’a population to form self-defense militias. The Hezbollah also established training camps in the Bekaa Valley, near the Syrian border, to train youth from various religious sects in self-defense. As reports of Hezbollah casualties increased, it became more difficult to hide the group’s involvement in Syria.
In December 2012, videos emerged that allegedly showed Hezbollah fighters in southern Damascus, home to a Shi’a shrine. The group’s fighters were increasingly participating in the fighting alongside the Syrian army, and in spring 2013, Hezbollah played a key role in a military offensive launched by the Syrian regime on the city of Qusayr. Hezbollah sent a large number of its troops to the town of Yabroud in February 2014 and established the Syrian Shi'a militia Quwat al-Ridha in 2014 and 2015.
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria was framed as an “existential battle” against Sunni extremists, and the perception among the Shi’a population was reinforced following multiple attacks by jihadist groups targeting Lebanese Shi’a-populated areas. Hezbollah’s deputy, Hussein Mussawi, declared that the group’s presence in Syria and Iraq was a duty recommended by God. This discourse was echoed by Hezbollah soldiers in Syria, with some fighters saying that they joined the group to wage war against injustice.
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria has had significant consequences in terms of rising insecurity, sectarianism and regional political tensions. The involvement of the Islamic movement in Syria has increased the level of sectarianism and tensions between the Sunni and Shiʿa communities in Lebanon. This has been exacerbated by a number of events in recent years that have radicalized the Sunni Lebanese population, strengthening the Salafist and Sunni jihadist groups. Frustration among Sunnis has arisen from a number of factors, including the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in 2005, which the Assad regime and Hezbollah were accused of being involved in. The involvement of foreign Shiʿa fighters from Hezbollah, Iraq, and Iran has added to Sunni grievances.
Hezbollah uses a religious and sectarian discourse among its members to justify its military interventioninSyria.Thegroup’s leadershiphas argued that they needed to intervene in Syria to protect the resistance and defend Shiʿa villages and religious symbols, such as the Shrine of alSayyida Zaynab in Damascus. The display of banners, photos, and songs glorifying Shiʿa religious symbols in Shiʿa neighborhoods has increased, particularly during Ashura celebrations.
The growing insecurity in Shi‘a populated areas and the worsening of sectarianism in Lebanon and the MENA region, along with the increasing number of Hezbollah deaths onthe Syrian battlefield, have led to growing dissatisfaction among sections of the Lebanese Shiʿa and Hezbollah’s popular base. Although criticisms have been limited, there are indications of growing discontent.
Joseph Daher, Hezbollah: The Political Economy of Lebanon’s ‘Party of God, Pluto Press, 2016.
The views and opinions expressed in this summary are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Lebanese Forces Party.