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시: 2014년 3월 26일 (수) 오후 2시-4시 30분

소: 사회복지공동모금회 대강당

최:

원:


Contents Ǫ. ଋԸ̍ԏ

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ǫ. ؅ࢼ‫ה‬

؅ࢼ 1 ࢄ‫ۺ‬୮ (ଛ˯ࢆ˽࢟Ь‫ۉࢄࢋە‬/ KCOCࢺॷ‫۾‬ਜ਼࢝(KoFIDࡈࠏ࡟ࡒ))  ٕ‫̔ۏ‬Ի‫أ‬ળઝο‫˕ݫ‬ଞ˲‫ی׷ݤ‬ୣࢂࠇଟ-ٕ‫ۏ‬ળઝο‫ࢇݫ‬ଭୃଢ଼߾оଞओ ࢂձࣸ‫ࡳݪ‬Ի

؅ࢼ 2 ϝࡒࢇ (˯‫ב‬ণն‫ ݥ‬ʋ؅ୃԬࢺॷ˔‫ ݥ‬л࠶ୃԬ˒࢝)  ٕ‫̔ ۏ‬Ի‫ أ‬ળઝο‫ࢇ ݫ‬ଭୃଢ଼˕ ଯ୯˃୤

 Ǭ. ؅ࢼ ˔ԭ ࢒Ջ

1. KoFIDٕ‫̔ ۏ‬Ի‫ أ‬ળઝο‫ࢇ ݫ‬ଭۘଢ଼˕ ଯ୯ ˃୤߾ оଞ ओࢂ۰(2014.2)  2. ˲‫̔ ۏٕ ݨࢽ࣏ה‬Ի‫ أ‬ળઝο‫ ݫ‬ए૲ ࢇଭୃଢ଼ ‫ ؀‬ଯ୯ оࡻ؏ଯ(ࢽٕٕঈ ଢѰ, 2014.1) 

 ǭ. ॰˅࢒Ջ

ْ‫ۼ ی‬ˀʋ؅ࡒ࣌ণୠ ‫ ۭה‬ 1. Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation(BPED) (2011.12) (ࠒ/ଞ) 2. Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness‫ی׷ݤ‬ୣ ʎ؈୪˕‫ࡶ۽‬ ࡢଞ ࢇ‫ੋݛ‬ٙ ࡕ৕(2010.9) (ࠒ/ଞ)

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ْ‍ ŰŒâ€ŹŕŞ°ŕŞšÎźâ€ŤÖ¸ ݨ‏Đ&#x;ŕŠ›Ő˝ ‍ ۭה‏ 1. Factsheet on 10 Indicators (2012.6) 2. Guide to the Monitoring Framework of the Global Partnership (2013.7)  ˯࢟‍ۉ״ݥ‏ୠ ‍ۭה‏Ěْ‍ ŰŒâ€ŹŕŞ°ŕŞšÎźâ€Ťŕ˘„ Ý¨â€ŹŕŹŞË’ ֧‍ݥ‏ਊ Ë…ŕĄ&#x;Ě” ୠॿ ˔ԭ 

1. [CPDE] Key Asks for Mexico HLM (2014.3) 2. [CPDE] Recommendations on HRBA (2014.1) 3. [CPDE] Background Paper on Private Sector Engagement in Development (2013.9) 4. [CPDE] An Enabling Environment for Civil Society Organizations: A Synthesis of evidence of progress since Busan (2013.10) 5. [CIVICUS] EEI Report 2013 (2013.10)  GPEDCË…ŕĄ&#x;Ě” ୠॿ Ë?‍(Ű­×” ݢ‏2014 Ď”4 ॓ 15-16 ࢇ, ֧‍ݥ‏ਊ) 

1. [GPEDC] First High-Level Meeting Draft Agenda (2014.3) 2. [GPEDC] Second Draft of the Mexico HLM CommuniquĂŠ (2014.3)



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  ╚╗сРКт▒К  

сХосвЮтАл╫отАмсБКсС║тл║ткжрг╢слЫ╙кт╡К╒ЫслКсПксвЪт╣║с╜Жс╖Ыт╡О сХосвЮтл║ткжрг╢слЫс╜вт╡╖т╖▓т╣Чс╢╛рлот╡КтЖ╢с╜ЖсЕктГ┐слЪс╝ксБК рвДтАл█║тАмрно (рмЫ╦првЖ╦╜рвЯ╨мтАл█ЙрвДрвЛ█ХтАм/ KCOCрв║ре╖тАл█╛тАмрйЫрвЭ(KoFIDрбИраПрбЯрбТ))

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부산 글로벌 파트너십과 한국 시민사회의 역할 -부산

파트너십 이행 현황에 대한 질의를 중심으로-

이성훈 한국인권재단 상임이사 / KCOC 정책센터장

들어가면서 •

2014 년은 MDGs 종료를 2 년 앞둔 해로서 국제사회 특히 유엔은 Post-2015 또는 Post-MDGs 개발목표를 새롭게 설정하기 위해 노력 중.

국내적으로 2014 년은 2015 년 종료되는 제 1 차 <ODA 선진화 방안> 종료를 2 년 앞둔 해로서 기존 정책에 대한 평가와 제 2 차 방안 준비를 시작해야 하는 시점.

한편 2012 년 시행된 OECD DAC 동료평가 결과 이행에 대한 중간평가가 이루어질 예정.

이런 국내외적 변화 가운데 멕시코에서 4 월 15-16 일 열리는 GPEDC 고위급 회의는 원조와 개발효과성의 관점에서 국내 정책과 실행 현황을 점검해보고 국제사회의 흐름을 조망해보는 유용한 계기가 될 것임.

특히 부산 총회의 주최국이자 OECD DAC 국가를 대표하여 집행위원회에 참여하고 있는 한국은 특별한 책무성을 지니고 있고 모범적인 리더십 역할을 수행해야 하는 위치에 있음.

부산 세계개발원조총회와 한국 •

2011 년 부산 세계개발원조 총회는 한국 국제개발협력 제도와 정책이 선진적으로 진화할 수 있는 역사적 계기였고 시민사회 또한 부산을 계기로 질적, 양적으로 큰 도약의 계기를 맞이했음. (부산총회를 계기로 2010 년 9 월 KoFID 출범)

부산총회는 단순한 정부간 국제회의가 아니라 시민사회가 옵저버가 아닌 동등한 권리와 책무성을 지닌 정식 참가자로 참석한 다자간 협상 회의.

부산 파트너십은 이러한 협상의 결과로서 정부뿐만 아니라 시민사회도 이행의 책무성을 지닌 공동의 합의문.

따라서 시민사회는 정부 정책 감시와 견인 등 애드보커시 활동뿐만 아니라 스스로의 책무성과 사업 효과성을 제고하려는 노력을 동시에 수행해야 함.

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부산총회와 시민사회의 역할 •

시민사회의 역할을 명시한 제 22 항은 현재 국제개발협력 분야 시민사회단체의 역할에 등대와 나침반을 제공

부산 글로벌 파트너십 제 22 항에 따르면 시민사회의 역할은 현장에서의 서비스 제공과 애드보커시 활동을 인권에 기반을 둔 접근 (HRBA)에 따라 하는 것으로 정식화.

시민사회 자체의 개발효과성 제고를 위해 시민사회 스스로 만든 이스탄불 원칙의 성실한 이행과 Enabling Environment 를 조성하기 위한 정부의 역할이 중요.

KoFID 는 2013 년 젠더, Enabling Environment, 환경, 원조투명성, HRBA, 아동과 개발 분과를 구성하여 각 분야에서 부산 파트너십 이행에 관한 모니터와 자체 조사 연구활동을 수행하였음.

특히 Enabling Environment 분과는 관련 정책과 국내 실현 방안에 대한 학습과 연구 사업 진행하였고 HRBA 분과는 HRBA 의 적용에 대한 논의를 지속적으로 수행 중.

2013 년 10 월 제 4 차 서울시민사회포럼에 CIVICUS 와 CPDE 대표를 초청하여 부산 파트너십과 Post-2015 개발의제의 연결에 대한 논의를 진행하였음.

KoFID 의 회원단체이기도 한 KCOC 는 부산 총회 직후 이스탄불 원칙 관련한 자료를 번역하여 배포하였고 2013 년 현장사업 단체 실무간사를 대상으로 이스탄불 원칙과 시엠립 프레임워크에 대한 교육 워크샵을 4 차례 실시하였음.

2014 년에는 코이카와 협력하여 단체 CEO 의 부산 파트너십과 이스탄불원칙에 대한 인지제고를 위해 노력할 계획.

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부산 글로벌 파트너십 제 22 항

22. Civil society organisations (CSOs) play a vital role in enabling people to claim their rights, in promoting rights-based approaches, in shaping development policies

and

partnerships,

and

in

overseeing their implementation. They also provide services in areas that are complementary to those provided by states. Recognising this, we will:

22-a)

Implement

fully

our

22.

시민사회단체들은

주민들이

권리를

주장할 수 있도록 하고, 인권 중심의 접근을 활성화하며, 개발 정책 및 새로운 파트너십을 형성하고, 그 이행과정을 감독하는 중요한 역할을 한다. 시민사회단체들은 또한 국가가 제공하는

서비스에

보완되는

서비스를

제공한다.

이에

영역에서

대한

인식을

바탕으로 우리는 다음 사항을 이행할 것이다.

respective

commitments to enable CSOs to exercise 22-a) 우리들 기존 각자의 약속을 충실히 their roles as independent development 이행함으로써, actors,

with

a

particular

focus

특히

우리의

합의된

국제

on 권리에 부합하는 개발에 대한 시민사회단체의

an enabling environment, consistent with 기여를 최대화할 수 있는 환경을 구축하는데 our

agreed

international

rights,

that 초점을 맞추어, 시민사회단체들이 독립적인

maximises the contributions of CSOs to 개발 주체로서 역할을 다 할 수 있도록 한다. development.

22-b)

Encourage

practices

that

CSOs

to

implement

strengthen

their 22-b)

시민사회단체들이,

accountability and their contribution to 시민사회단체 development the

Istanbul

International

effectiveness, Principles Framework

guided and for

이스탄불

개발효과성에

원칙과

대한

국제

by 프레임워크를 바탕으로, 개발효과성에 대한 the 시민사회단체의

기여와

책무성을

CSO 관행을 실천하도록 독려한다.

Development Effectiveness.

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강화하는


국제시민사회의 입장과 요구 부산에서 시민사회는 아래 네 가지를 핵심 과제로 제시하였음

파리와 아크라 약속을 평가하고 심화 Fully evaluating and deepening the Paris and Accra commitments;

인권 규범에 기반한 실천을 통해 개발효과성을 강화 Strengthening development effectiveness through practices based on human rights standards;

시민사회단체를 스스로의 권리를 지닌 독립적인 행위자로 인정하고 시민사회단체가 모든 나라에서 효과적으로 활동할 수 있도록 우호적인 환경을 조성 Supporting CSOs as independent development actors in their own right, and committing to an enabling environment for their work in all countries; and

공평하고 정의로운 개발협력제도 구축 Promoting an equitable and just development cooperation architecture.

부산 총회를 계기로 출범한 국제 시민사회 네트워크인 시민사회단체 개발효과성 파트너십 CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) 1는 멕시코 고위급 회의를 앞두고 부산 총회 때 요구했던 네 가지 과제를 중심으로 아래의 과제를 제시함

1) 부산 파트너십 이행을 가속화하고 심화 Accelerate & deepening Busan commitments 2) 파리선언과 아크라행동의제(AAA) 이행 심화 Deeper implementation of Paris and Accra Principles 3) 시민사회단체가 독립적인 개발행위자로 활동할 수 있도록 우호적인 환경을 강화 Strengthen enabling environment for CSOS as independent development actors 4) 공평하고 정의로운 개발협력 제도 구축 Promote equitable and just development cooperation architecture 1

www.csopartnership.org

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이 네가지 영역에 세부적인 요구사항을 제시하였음. 1) 부산 파트너십 이행을 가속화하고 심화 •

End policy conditionality.

Fully untie all forms of aid and implement demand-driven technical assistance.

Use country systems as the first option.

Address the unpredictability of aid flows.

Orient private sector development for sustainable livelihoods.

Operationalize inclusive accountability frameworks at country and global levels.

Adhere to the highest standards of transparency by all aid actors.

2) 파리선언과 아크라행동의제(AAA) 이행 심화 •

Ensure the realization of democratic ownership as the core aid and development effectiveness principle.

Practice inclusive multi-stakeholder policy dialogue.

Promote and implement gender equality and women’s rights.

Entrench human rights, decent work, and sustainability in development policies, programmes and outcomes.

Commit to and implement rights-based approaches to development.

3) 시민사회단체가 독립적인 개발행위자로 활동할 수 있도록 우호적인 환경을 강화 •

Focus support on strengthening sustainability of a diversity of CSOs as development actors in their own right.

Monitor existing commitments to minimum standards for enabling conditions for CSOs.

Support efforts in CSO accountability as guided by the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness.

4) 공평하고 정의로운 개발협력 제도 구축 •

Fast-track fundamental reforms in the global governance of development cooperation.

Agree on a comprehensive vision and policy framework to hold all actors including the private sector to account.

Ensure the functioning of an equitable and inclusive multilateral forum for policy dialogue and standard setting.

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국제시민사회, 특히 CPDE와 CIVICUS는 멕시코 회의를 앞두고 몇 가지 중점 영역에 대한 입장 문서를 준비

CPDE 부산총회 이후 Enabling Environment 관련 이행에 대한 실증적 평가 종합

An Enabling Environment for CSOs: A Synthesis of Evidence of Progress

Since Busan •

CPDE 인권에 기반을 둔 접근 Recommendations on HRBA

CPDE 민간기업의 참여 Background Paper on Private Sector Engagement in Development

CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index 2013년 보고서

부산 파트너십 이행에 관한 한국 시민사회의 질의 •

오늘

정책포럼은

KoFID가

정부에

보낸

28개

항목의

부산

글로벌

파트너십

이행상황과 향후 계획에 대한 질의서를 중심으로 논의 예정. •

질의서는 정부부처 합동으로 작성한 부산 글로벌 파트너십 지표 이행현황 및 향후 대응방향(1.13)을 검토 분석 한 후 준비한 것임.

질의서는 크게 절차와 계획에 대한 총론적 질문 3 개 (1-3 번), 우선 선정된 5 개의 지표 (1,4,5,9,10 지표)에 대한 질문 18 개 (4-21 번) 그리고 누락된 5 개 지표에 대한 질문 8 개 (22-28 번), 모두 28 개로 구성.

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질의서 목차

I. 총론 질의 – 절차 및 계획 (질의 1-3번)

II. 지표별 질의 1. (지표1) 협력국 우선 순위 반영 (질의 4-9번) 2. (지표4) 개발협력 정보 공개 (질의 10) 3. (지표5) 원조의 단∙중기 예측가능성 향상 (질의 11 – 16번) 4. (지표9) 협력국 공공재정관리 및 조달 시스템 활용 (질의 17-18번) 5. (지표10) 원조의 비구속화 (질의 19-21번)

III. 누락된 지표에 대한 질의 1. (지표 2) 시민사회의 참여와 기여 확대 (질의 22-23번) 2. (지표 3) 민간기업부문의 참여와 기여 확대 (질의 24번) 3. (지표 6) 원조 예산의 의회 승인 (질의 25-26번) 4. (지표 7) 포괄적 검토에 의한 개발협력 주체간 상호책무성 강화 (질의 27번) 5. 성평등과 여성 역량강화(지표 8) (질의 28번)

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  Ȼ ؅૯  

ᕮᢞ‫׮‬၊ᑺ⫺⪦ࣶ᫛ὢ⵷ⷲ⹗Ӫⶓ⺲Ҳ⹻ ϝࡒࢇ (˯‫ב‬ণն‫ ݥ‬ʋ؅ୃԬࢺॷ˔‫ ݥ‬л࠶ୃԬ˒࢝)



- 17 -




┘ХтАл █ПтАмGlobal Partnership рвЗрмнрв║╩жрб╢ рбврмЮ тАл█М╫╖▌дтАмрнг рв╜ре║рлж╘а тАЩ ▄╣ тАл█МтАмрнгтАл┘АтАмрдП╓╗╠Ц╦У╤░рнг ╨╛╩И╨║

тЙктЦЪ Joredo#Sduwqhuvkls т▒Юуй│ улоунУсЗж укПуоо сЖоун╖ сЙЧтАЮт╡Ът│┐тЯО сДЖтДЖул╗с┤Пт│┐уДпсЗктЯО

тЗосЙ╗ упВу░з тЗН унгу▓В сКВу▒Л сПоуЩ╛ т╜╛уиЪ сК╛с╖ж



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41#⇮ቻ



-#8ᄆ ☢♂ =#≪▚ ⱞ㮮ⱂ ⺮ⳮ▖㩗 ⳺ᅪ/#቗ᖞⲖ⮺ ᣃ⮺/#ᖒᖒ㫻ᴏ ⃹ ▦ძ㫻ᴏᇦ ⺪⟇ᇟⰊ/#ⷻ ⺮቗ᇦⱂ ᄆ℆㫻ᴏ/#ᄆ℆ⱂ 㟶㞢ᗲᵆ☆ⱂ ጚ⪯ ᧛



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≪▚ ᇟ⩧ ⱞ㩳Ⱞ ⯮㩞 ᇟ⫖቗ ⱞ㩳⺪㥆 ⷻ⟖Ⱖᵆ ⷻ⳺ ㉾⺮ᇦⴆṦ ☊⳿㩂⫖ ⱞ㩳ᆮ㭷Ⱞ ✂ầ -#☊⺮���ⵚጚᇪⱂ ᆧ⮚/#↮᢮ EJS ⱞ㩳ᆮ㭷Ⱞ ✂ầ㩂⺪ ⨴Ⱖ὚ ძ ቗ც2ጚᇪ↮ ⮚☊ ᇦⴆṦ ☊⳿㩂⫖ ㉾⺮ 㩂ᖂ/#ⱞ ᆧ⮚⪺᢮ ⺪㥆↮ ቖ㆞៖☛ ᾓ㥆 ᧛Ⱞ ℂᧆ⟆ ✂ầ㩂᝾

ᅭⰪ ⨮ែ

0 ✂⮺቗ ⱞ㩳⺪㥆⪺ ៪㩞☊ ⱞ㩳ᆮ㭷Ⱞ ✂ầ㩂᝾ ᅭ⇞៎ 㫻ᴏⰮ 㚟㩞 ᙦⱂ 㩂᝾ ᅭⱞ 㨮⭾㩂὚/#✂⮺቗ ⱞ㩳⺪㥆+㈇ 8ᄆ,#ⷻ ⱦ≪ ⺪㥆-᝾ ⺪㥆 ⳿ⱂ ⃹ ㌋⳿ℓⅿⱞ 㫮Ⲗጶ⺪ ⃢ 㬿⳿ ▫㗆 -#⟆⃦▖㭶 #⟆⃦ ⟆⃦▖㭶 ▖㭶 ㄢ⫖ ㄢ ㄢ⫖⬪ ⫖⬪ ጚ⫖ ⫖⬪ ጚ ጚ⫖㬿៪/#⃦ხ≮⩦ ⫖㬿៪ 㬿៪/#⃦ ⃦ხ≮⩦ ㄢ⫖ ⃦ხ≮⩦ ⃦ხ ㄢ⫖⬪ ጚ⫖ ㄢ⫖⬪ ጚ⫖ 㬿៪/#⩻☛㢳᧛ᇦ 㬿៪/ 㬿៪ ៪/#⩻☛ ⩻☛㢳᧛ ⩻☛ ᧛ᇦ ⫖☛ ⫖☛ ⫗Ჳჿ㬾 ⫗Ჳ ⫗ Ჳჿ ჿ㬾 㬾

≪▚ ᇟ⩧ ⱞ㩳Ⱚ ្ጚⳫⰦᵆ 㩞ᆚᤂ⺪ ᾥ㩂᝾ ⴆ᢮Ⳬ ≪≮ⱞ ⱲⰦ₪ᵆ/#

ⲏጚⳫ ᇪ⳺⪺☆ ⳻ዦ



51#㯂㰧 ⇍ 㭣㲂 ኂ㱋 ⽾㨚4#⟖Ⲏጫ Ɱ⛞ ⟚Ⳃ ⇖⮿ ⺪㥆ᖞ⮓ ⃹ ᾓ㥆㍂ +ᖞ⮓, ✂⮺቗ⱂ ⮚☊✆⯮+቗ცᄆ℆ⳮᲟ ᧛,Ṧ ℂ⫫㩆 ✂⮺቗ ᆚᇦ㞪 㭆⮓ ⳿᢮ +ᾓ㥆㍂, ᾒ᧊ ᇟ⫖ⷦ㆞ც ✂⮺቗ ᆚᇦ㞪 㭆⮓ - ᆚᇦ㞪+Uhvxow Iudphzrun, = ቗ცᄆ℆ⳮᲟ ᧛ⱂ ⳮᲟᾓ㥆+jrdo,/ ≮⩦̗ⱞ❲↮ ⷻხᾓ㥆+remhfwlyh,/ 㩂⯮ ☢≪ 㧮

ᵆዢᲒⱂ ᆚᇦ+rxwfrph, ᾓ㥆 ᧛Ⱞ ⴆ⟆㩆 ዢẦ ᫺᝾ 㥆ᵆ☆ ძ ᾓ㥆ⱂ ៖☛᢮Ṧ ㌋⳿㩂ጚ ⯮㩆 ⺪✂+lqglfdwru,⬪ 㩒Ꮒ ⺪ ✂ⱂ ጚⷪ㍂㨯ⷻხ㍂㨯ᾓ㥆㍂Ṧⴆ⟆

ˍ +ⷻ⳺㫻ᴏ቗,#቗ც㫻ᴏⳮᲟ+FSV,⪺ ✂⮺቗ ቗ცᄆ℆ⳮᲟ ℂ⫫/#✂⮺቗ ☛ᇦ㢳ც 㞪+Uhvxow#Iudphzrun,Ⱞ ⳺⺮Ⳬ 㭆⮓ ˍ +⌮ⷻ⳺㫻ᴏ቗,#⳿ㄯ㫻ⱂṦ 㚟㩞 ✂⮺቗ ⮚☊ ✆⯮ ℂ⫫

ˍ FSV#⃹ ▫⟆Ⳬ ⳿ㄯ㫻ⱂṦ 㚟㩞 ✂⮺቗ ⮚☊ ✆⯮ ℂ⫫ ⫲⳿ -#㧮ᵆዢᲒጚℂ⳻ዦⅿ+SED,#⟆ⅾ▖⪯Ⱞ 㚟㩞 ᆧ㫂 ㉿Ⳬ 㮮/ ☛ᇦ㢳ც㞪 Ⳬ⮓ ្ᆮⳫ 㬿៪ ᅪ㚊

ˍ ᆚᇦ㞪ⱂ ✂ầⰮ ⯮㩆 ㏒☎㟯/#ㇲ㆗⫚✂/#ⳮ•ც 㟶ᆖ ▖⪯ 㬿៪ 

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⽾㨚 7#㟪⁃⛯ =#ᇚ⇚㯏ᷣ⮎ ኾ㬚 ⷓ⊲ ኳᇚ ⺪㥆ᖞ⮓ ⃹ ᾓ㥆㍂ +ᖞ⮓, ᄆ℆㫻ᴏ ⳿⇞ᇟᄆṦ ⯮㩆 ᇟ㚟ⱂ ⳿⇞ᇟᄆ ጚⷪ+frpprq vwdqgdug,- 㭆⮓ ⳿᢮ - RHFG2GDFⱂ 㚟ᆮ⇞ᇊ⟆➎㙆+FUV/ Fuhglwru Uhsruwlqj V|vwhp, ⃹ 㪏㮮⺪⮺ᆮ㭷+IVV/ Iruzdug Vshqglqj

Vxuyh|,/ ቗ⴆ⮺ⵚ㜖Ὧ☛ጚቖ+LDWL/ Lqwhuqdwlrqdo Dlg Wudqvsduhqf| Lqlwldwlyh, ᡚⱞ㘚 ⇞ᇊጚⷪⰦᵆ ቖ☛

+ᾓ㥆㍂, ᾒ᧊ ᇟ⫖ⷦ㆞ც ᇟ㚟ጚⷪ ⱞ㩳

ˍ FUV/#IVV/#LDWLṦ ៪▫Ⱖᵆ ቖ㆞Ⳬ ᇟᄆ ጚⷪ ⃹ ⅾ⯮Ṧ ᇊᴎ/# 㫮 ⟆⳺⪺☆ ⴆᇟცត㩆 ⳿⇞Ṧ FUV#⃹ IVV⪺ ⇞ᇊ ⷻ

ˍ 侳47ᘮ ⷻ NRLFD⬪ HGFIⱂ LDWL#⬟⳪Ⅾ 㭆ᣃ 㮮/ 侳48ᘮ 㩂ℂጚ ⮚ẖ ⳿≪ⱂ LDWL#⳿⟇ ცⱯⰮ ᾓ㥆ᵆ ⷪ⌮ ⱻ⪯ ⺮㩳



⽾㨚8#Ⲏ⸮ⴖ ᢦ2⻏Ꮾ ⯆㏟ᆾᡣ⛯ 㭣♿ ⺪㥆ᖞ⮓ ⃹ ᾓ㥆㍂ +ᖞ⮓, 剾+្ጚ, 㩞៣ ᘮ᢮⪺ ᆮ㭷ᤆ ⮺ⵚც ⟎ⴆ ⺻㩳ᤆ ⌮Ⱂ/ 剿+ⲏጚ, ᇟ⫖቗ⱂ 㪏㮮 6ᘮხ ⺪㊆ᆮ㭷 Ⰺ„ +ᾓ㥆㍂, 剾+្ጚ, ᇟ⫖቗ ⺻㩳⫲⳿⩋ ⷻ ⃢⺻㩳ᤆ ⮺ⵚ⩋ⱂ ⌮ⰒⰮ 侳48ᘮጶ⺪ 425ᵆ ჺ㉿/ 剿+ⲏጚ, 㪏㮮 ⺪㊆ᆮ㭷⪺ 㣖㩒ᤂ⺪ ⨴Ⱚ ⮺ⵚ⩋ⱂ ⌮ⰒⰮ 侳48ᘮጶ⺪ 425ᵆ ჺ㉿

ˍ +Ⰺ▫⮺ⵚ,#45ᄆ ቗ც⬪ ጚ⇢㫻⳿+ID, ㆞ᆚ㩂⫖ ⫲㌋ცត☛ ⴆᇟ ្ᘮ᢮ ⫲▚ ㆞ⴆⱂ 㩆ᆮ♷⪺☆ ⲏጚ⫲㌋Ⱞ ⯮㩆 ID㆞ᆚ/# Ɫ㧮ᱦ ▖⪯ⱂ ☛ᆓ▫ Ⳳㄒ ⃹ ጚხⱞ ጢ⪞☆ ᆮ㭷⺻㩳ⱂ ⪞ᴎ⮪ ℆◇

ˍ +„▫⮺ⵚ,#៣㩞 ⫚᢮ ▖⪯⟆㩳ᆮ㭷Ⱞ ✂⮺቗ᇦ ᇟⰊ+⫫⪞ᵆ ᇟⰊ, -#➎⯒ᡞ ᄃⰪ ☊⺮ᇟ⫖቗᢮ 㫮⺪⪞ᵆ ᇟⰊ㩂᝾ ᆧ⮚᝾ ᅚⱂ ⪰ⰶ

ˍ +Ⰺ▫⮺ⵚ,##ጚ⇢ 㫻⳿ ㆞ᆚ 㬿៪ ⫲⳿/#㫮ⲏ ⷻ⟖ⱂ ⺻㩳ᇪẖ ㉾⺮ ˍ +„▫⮺ⵚ,#▖⪯⟆㩳ᆮ㭷 ᇟⰊ⪺ ៪㩆 ⺪㍒ ቖ㆞㬾 

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⽾㨚 <#⟖Ⲏጫ ኳኳ⵪ⷓ ኾὪ ⇍ ⸮ᢪ ⢚⡢㜚 㰚Ⱨ ⺪㥆ᖞ⮓ ⃹ ᾓ㥆㍂ +ᖞ⮓, ✂⮺቗ ⳿≪ ≪•⪺ ⺻㩳ᤆ ㈇ ⮺ⵚዲ⩋ ⷻ ✂⮺቗ ᇟᇟⲖ⳿ᇪẖ ⃹ ⵚ៖ ⟆➎㙆Ⱞ 㭆⮓㩆 ⌮Ⱂ +ᾓ㥆㍂, ᇟᇟⲖ⳿ᇪẖ ⃹ ⵚ៖ ⟆➎㙆Ⱞ 㭆⮓㩂⺪ ⨴᝾ ⮺ⵚዲ⩋ ⌮Ⱂ ჺ㉿

- ჺ㉿⌮ⰒⰪ ✂⮺቗ ᇟᇟⲖ⳿ᇪẖ ⟆➎㙆ⱂ ✂ⷪ⪺ ᨚᱦ ㄒ᧛ Ⳬ⮓

ˍ +Ⰺ▫⮺ⵚ,#ㄒᇪᆮ⩧⪺ ⱂᅚ/#✂⮺቗ ⟆➎㙆 㭆⮓ 㞣㱲 ⵚ៖Ⱚ ✂⮺቗ ⳿≪ც ⺮㩳㩂₪ᵆ 433(ᵆ ✂⮺቗ ⵚ៖⟆➎㙆 㭆⮓

ˍ +„▫⮺ⵚ,#✂⮺቗ Ⲗ⳿ᇪẖⱂ 㩆ᆮᵆ Ɫ㩞 ⟆➎㙆ⱂ 㭆⮓᢮ ⳪㩂 ✂⮺቗ ⟆➎㙆 㭆⮓Ⱞ ⯮㩞 㧮ᵆዢᲒጚℂ⳻ዦⅿ+SED,#⟆ⅾ▖⪯Ⱞ 5347ᘮ≪㘚 ㉾⺮ ⫲⳿

ˍ +Ⰺ▫⮺ⵚ,##⩻ⱺ ㄒᇪ ᆮ⩧⪺ ⱂᅚ㩂⫖ ⺪♷ ㉾⺮ ˍ +„▫⮺ⵚ,#⟆➎㙆 㭆⮓ⱞ ცត㩆 ቗ც⬪ ⪞ᴎ⮞ ቗ცᵆ ≮Ṃ㩂⫖ ㉾⺮ 

⽾㨚 43#␂ጪ❋㰒 ⺪㥆ᖞ⮓ ⃹ ᾓ㥆㍂ +ᖞ⮓, ⳮ㆞ ⮺ⵚ ⷻ ⌮ቖ♷ ⮺ⵚ- ⌮Ⱂ - ᾒ᧊ ⷦ㆞ც ቗Ⳬ⪺ ᇪᆮ⪰ⱞ Ɐㄚ⪺ ㄢ⫖ ცត㩆 ⮺ⵚ 㫿㗆

+ᾓ㥆㍂, ⺪♷Ⳬ 㪏▫

ˍ ቗ⴆᄆ℆㫻ᴏ ☊⺮㬾 ℓ⨲⪺ ⱂᅚ㩂⫖ ⺪♷ⳫⰦᵆ ⮺ⵚⱂ ⌮ቖ♷㬾 ㉾⺮ 0 5348ᘮ „▫ 433(/ Ⰺ▫ 83(ᵆ ᾓ㥆 ☎⳿

ˍ 倈45ᘮ ጚⷪ ⌮ቖ♷㬾 ⌮ⰒⰪ „▫⮺ⵚ ;7(/#Ⰺ▫⮺ⵚ 7;(ᵆ ᾓ㥆㍂ ▫㭶

• +倈46ᘮጶ⺪,#ᾓ㥆⌮Ⱂ ៖☛Ⱞ ⯮㩆 ⫚᢮↮ ⌮ቖ♷㬾 ៖☛⳿᢮Ṧ ⳺ᅪ㩂ᇊ/###

⺪♷ ㉾⺮ • +倈49ᘮⱞ㮮,#ⴆ5ㄒ ጚ⇢ᅶ㭷 ✂ầ ⟆ 倈49ᘮ ⱞ㮮 ⮺ⵚⱂ ⌮ቖ♷㬾 ⱞ㩳 ℓ⨲ 㣖㩒 

- 23 -


61#Ꮾ㙾 ⽾㨚 㯂㰧

0ጚ⪯ⱂ ᄆ℆▖⪯⟆ Ɫቶ/#ᙢᣃ/#㭂ᆧ/#ℂ≪㠒 ᧛ ᇪᴒ ዆ⅾ ⷪ✂Ṧ ቶᇊ㩂᝾ GDN#ცⱞᧆᱦⱢ Ẳᴒ+„▫, 0 Ⰺ▫ Ɫ㧮ᱦ ▖⪯⟆ 㭂ᆧ/#▖㭶⫫㪏⟖▖Ṧ ⯮㩆 HGFI#☢ⱞ㧮 ცᧆ Ẳᴒ





- 24 -


  Ȼ␦ӎ὾Ⴚ  

ᐊⱊӮဖ὾Ⴚ

- 25 -




        ! #"$)*'(&% +.,-/0.1./+$1%

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- 27 -


Î3]^_cb`a7Dª«¢»92Â;<ÏlºУ

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ÜueÛÝ ÒĀÓè éª!–ā á+F#CĂy#ă¢ å$#È%>w¥„a!kj ÒĄÓ ă¢ą@ã2Âv ÜueÛÝ    Ò -,Ó )‚(\Ć  ¶uvD> "ä< fć 5 !D Ĉ º  (Ćĉ(ou2Â7žgeÛÝ  !

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Ò--Ó Úª5  Ċ  ċDµ Čč7 ïĎ ď  ăÚ § ¾^5 ¤|tĐoÇÉ»ª¹«>cÅ8:ù™: ÜueÛÝ Ò -.Ó Úª5  ď  -. o đ¤¢ ď  âã> w¥ „a!kj

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)  ,*+-.0/132 Ò-±Ó <  Ú ª 5 7   ww ğ º Þ !†Ġ @ã8:Čč7ĢġˆµfBòoĘcÅ8BžgeÛÝ.,-Õ0ÛFČč ęĚϸė:ĢġueÛÝ Ò -ĀÓ ĒC ×  ;  Ē7D; ģÐ< C Ă ŠĤ;   Þ!†Ġv~ĥ ƒ@ã8BžgeÛÝ 4 6578 Ò-ĄÓ Ħ;=8ƒÈÚª5 ȊŸĞϸ§-,,ħÛFÄ 2Â7ž:Fßà„a!kj Ò .,Ó Úª5  Ėv ȊŸĞ Čč> ~ ¹ Úª5    Þ!†Ġ@ã ƒoõ—ėĨf:! #Čø;¥~ĩÃĪ è8aeÛÝ Ò.-Ó<  5 Ē|sī„<Ē7C  ĒCā Ččƒª  ĒCāČč7ĢġˆĬeÛÝ.,,Ā079ěƒéÿ4 §"ä¥ßà„a!kj (((jëĭµF¸;<  09:;><=

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- 70 -


-@G4  )o ă+ ‚'GW,  B2/h qƇKµ įLW Dă źƜ) É Ɲ jiL b1 A@? qƇKµ įL4  zPN ¸ Ĕ+ *"

 

>D ÈDL Ī¿G> ¯'ĵ { sL1 m F0µ ¸v A@? 1a ;Ƃ LM{ sL1  

      A@? cʆ–ċ> qƕ, ōNRƅ ‹’) ĚĊ, m ōNRƅ & iҙ›™ŧ ¤™Ň ¡¢¢Ƅ™£ ¤š¢  Ž ÅD ‚') ă+ B'µ V1 žPN ĴĒ{ sL1

   ŀ  A@? 1245, ĕNĖ ƞÝ & ōNRƅ"

 +j ¶-f BW{ sL1 A@?

f * ũh 4Į) 12 źƜ  PN ĴĒ{ sL1 A@? cÊc– īċ>  m) z  DE  *LÝy " _)²PNIJ L6 12 źƜ) É įL 4 ¸ z{ sL1 A@? 4Į) Dă f"

 ð2) € >€PN LM

GÇv, 1245, ĕNĖ ƞÝ & ōNRƅh ÅD  >  & B JD"v ă+  (ı jĶf ƒB"

 r7µ °K¸ ÔŴ sL1 

   ¡  A@? åq >D Ɵ? */) Bµ ¸~G4  z *€K{ sL1 L µ ¸ cÊc– īċ> m B) ¸~  A@) Mm gÚ §+{ Å b? DE/ " _){ sL1 74"? #ý ÈD [²Ĺ sL1    Ň   B2/h Ŀ. ŤD/"Î åq »L i„? Bµ ¸~G4  z  ’K & *€K{ sL1  B2/h  ōNRƅ) 4Ó  LM"v È + », ŤD źĒ, { & ji) i [² ]Ù) #ý ąÇ ŮļGW, d” b ? .Ļµ ¸~G4  ăĵ LM{ sL1

qÁ & À (w"v >€*³ ) ü% cË À/h

ƒN \•–F0) «f"v ƠTÔ b1 \•–F0) «fh À

/L ŤÇGW b? W8 B/ L¸GW, R6 B/ ž×GW >€    4Þ 1>? A@ m) â" «} b1 A@? À  qÁ*N 5fH ©Ĉơ ** r7 K5Ø & *Èż" - B)ƌ¤™£ ¤š¢ › Ÿš ›¢ŧž™ ¢ ť™ ¡™ŀžš›Ňšŧ  Ň ƒ¤ ¤™ŀžš›Ňšŧ "v 5ØH ƢƣƤ™Ə Ÿ™ ›  ĝÙ1 Ƣƣ ƥ  ‚ƒ/h Lµ LMG4 z{ sL¦, L +"v A@? 1a ;Ƃ LM{ sL1 

      K5Ø & *Èż F0ť™ ¡™ŀžš›šŇŧ  Ň ƒ¤ ¤™ŀžš›Ňšŧ ©¢ ›ª Řę +Ä, Ä÷, +), ÑB 4Þ, ‰ā  + vŌ" A$İص À* & qÁ*"v ˜Ÿ©ª «f *³GÎ G? ‹¾ ĊŰN ĴĒ1

   ŀ  À*"v ÅDL ‚ ) ïW ‚'G? \N] g" ‹¬ ś1     ¡  V1 Ôh f µ ¸ çþf $, ÅD <ŌƁ ĴĒ" xó š-@, * âġ3, Dă) <) Ƈf  Ɩąf BW €"

 ğńµ 5Ø1

Ñ" ¹ (w"v Àf įLW =× °KG4  

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cĈ A@? Ĕ‘ ¿ő#) Ʀ 'v  æh ž'N À (w"v,  ‡Ż  ōNRƅ L åePN ¸ 4" ¹ ;Ƨ/  ;=) =× 5ØG? ¶ A$ BN ñ'ĵ ¸… 1 =×  4 Ī¿"

 ç2?  z) *Äo >€*³f ũ 1 L

µ ¸v A@? 1a ;Ƃ LM{ sL1

      '(/h åe"

 =×  ÈĂ-@ ăĵ ÅD) +j  ‡Ż" ‚'P

N C_{ sL1

   ŀ  '(/L þ< ƾ" xy A@? åeg> ōyo š" zĜH mƒµ   ;=Vı<ŌƁ" ç2G4 ¸ { sL1 º, A@? ÅD Ŀ> & >  J D"v ÈĂ-@µ  2D, ˆÓ, 4Ò ü*<ƀ sL1

   Dă"v      PN cė Dă? "

 ¸~j)  q¶ ŐL1 >Šh A@) p¬  -’ Dă f"

v    ) BN É

{ UL1 74"?   ōúiŵÏ* ¾5H1 m

ōúiŵÏ ÷"v 1a ;Ƃ [²1

      °GW >€*³G¦ [Ē  f.L  Õ 1    ŀ  2) " ƾ ÈD mDG?ē bTv +) 2ƒ ÈDL V1 íh { ƨ Ŭ1, LNIJ +* «f  f "

¸ !/"Î ji ´ Å bÎ H1 

    ¡     * & * 4-/h 2ƒ  Ġ §ˆ & ÖMGW (ı jĶf ï?1    Ň  '(/h >  & >5PN ¬J C_„Çv ‰ˆÑB"v V1 Ôh ÑÁAµ ÉV{ Å b? ő#) ÑBµ ěĜ1 Lµ ¸, A@? _)H B Ʃ@o őY" xy Dă* ;Ē„? gę 

( ÈW²PNIJ

Dă* ) ĩĨ { G'ĵ { sL1 cĢ    B' & +jh >€*³ ‡ ¸ ‹¾G1 ƾ{ ÑA “’  * 4³ LMG? B'? °KG7… G¦, Lo ²±  B2/) +j  -ML '( " )¸ ÈD ĴĒ{ Å b'ĵ ¸… 1 '(h L6 B'µ Ŀ> ut  vN 1 ó ‡ ^ˆ" ĽÎ °K{ sL1 Lµ ¸, A@? 1a ;Ƃ LM{ sL1

      '( ‚'N B' & +j ÐK* LôT>'ĵ >DGW, Lµ C¸ +, >g B', > 45, )=, <=µ [²    ÈD mGGW vŌµ BG'ĵ 1

   ŀ  '( ‚'N I B', <ŌƁ, â  *1    ¡  '( ‚'N B' f "

 $H ĊŰ  >DG7 +j LÞ, LM &

- 72 -


ji ïÎ 1    Ň  >  & ĕNĖ JD"v (ı >  Ñš 8G7 B'Ġ) f¾ ) Ņſ ’ K1 

>€*³   dd & ñð †Ê >€*³ "

 Ā)? È+  ƫƪ ƊTvv #ý ‚ƒ & *) >

  ÑšPNċ> É.H1 Ĕ‘ dd & ñðh ð) (w" _GW  L ¦ >   ‚ ) ï? ¸~j ÖĿ²PNIJ '(/) vŌ ‡« +j  Ě Ċę OƬ Å b? ƭÈL b1   † A@? dd" r7G? íh */L 13 ÈD  ‡f m<" ‚W Ɵ? ¬ G¦, LsL  ü%G„ ¸ŬL 1ó ÈD >DƟ *³f Ʀ¸G> ¯”… 1W Ʈ?1 A@? 1a ;Ƃ C¸ >  (ı ņŅ °K{ sL1

      Ƈ ÑA, "

 ñðĚĊ) ;Ē ü%1

   ŀ  dd & ñð ĚĊęL >Šċ> Űś f +GW Lµ V1 ž ĴĒ1     ¡  '(/L Ø ‹¾ >) VWƎ¢Ə›™Ňŧ™ Ƅ¢¢›ª "

 ĚĊf ü%G?

Å^PNIJ dd ‚ƒ/ :) > čĝ, (ı ņŅ &  ƯŵÏ)  |}1      Ň  ddŭñð"  PN r7G4  >g, * â°Kµ >D1

!:   †c A@? Ġğ, , ¿ſ, ¶2@ ěĜ, ij 2D) ĴĒ" bT !:L “’  { 1? ;Ö +1 m F0µ ¸v A@? 1a ;Ƃ LM{ sL1

      Ȉ)

0  ăŤ/, ză & 7Ü -ĺ ‚ƒo G7 !:ç2   ę,

őB, M+ ĝÑ $GW, ư ŤĚç2 & !- ) ü

, Ž g, Ĕ‘,

* & >  JD W} *Ä ;ƱƓ ›ž™ ¡ƃ š  °K,  F0 >D z) °K µ  ż‡ +j  őB ĝÑ 5Ø1

   ŀ  >€*³ f. ĩ%G?  +j & ‡Ż 4ÓGW 5ĿG? +" !:) r7µ *³GÎ 1    ¡  m)  F0µ «fG?ē !: ÈD mD{ Å b? Ġğ  Šĸƒˆµ Âà  ‡<ƈ1

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   Ň  f o ÙÚ" ‹¬ ś >€*³ ) mPNIJ ƲĶ   DăƲµ ü%G7, <.) ÖŞ"

¹GW, 2 <."

 ĚĊf °KG¦, !: ‚ƒ/L ŤÇ

4µ öK<ƀ Å b? ĚĊę ü%1    ™  !- & -ĺ ^ƒ)

0/L   ;ƕ f µ m<" ü%G? gę žP

N #Ƴ²PNIJ vN"Î 'ƴL „'ĵ 1

Şo ę ƶƵ) Ʒ~     †† Ş? ĕNĖ  ’ðGÎ Ʀ¸GW,  ÈDPN LĒĹ Å b? 2D q<Ų ¦, ŰƹƸŌ 4-) ´ Ʀ¸GW, : ÷Vµ G? ßƺL1 Ş? Yƻµ 3G ¦ qÁ  ÀfPN LT>? ÑA* í1 A@? 8Ƽ ÞŞƽƤ Ɛ¢Ɠ™¤š¢ Ŧŧ šª¤ Ɛ¢££žƄ¤š¢  & ƑƔƐŸ ƾĥg>Ŧ¤šŘƿ£šŀ™£ƙ Ɛ¢Ɠ™¤š¢  æh / OQ PN Şo ę ƶƵ Ʒ~G4  m) z °K{ sL1 m F0µ «fG4 ¸ A@? 1a ;Ƃ LM{ sL1

      Ş Ʒ~"

 ð2) € å֑ LMGW, #ý Ş -M"

¸ Ķ-Ē Ko

ęǀ °K1 74"? È+ çþf °K, |ů  Ī|45) °K, ij W2"  Vı É

 Ž) zL [²H1

   ŀ  ǁ‰ǂ g> ăĵ °KGW, ǃ‰ -M"

¹GW, ę 2) ŕ, m~ & =ŵ

 * & B +j, ꃈ & B' .ĵ °K²PNIJ ę 2Š) ƶƵ Ʒ~ G4  I z *€K1 74"?    B ĩ%G? ę B+  M LM [²H1

4àÐK ÈD †­ ‹4  ąÇ"v DŽ U 4àÐK ÈDL ÏÎ ü*{ sPN Ɩ(H1 A@? m ÈDL \N] 4=o '‡ *ʼnDž si >GW, 4àÐK ÈD  V1 [Z    A@) ĚĊę ‡Þ"v ¶-f  çþf, Ɩą*³f ü%G4 ¸ z{ sL1 74"? 1a ;Ƃ [²1  

      '(/) ‡Þ  * ˆÓ) ÆÅ  qPNIJ *) 4àÐK +j  ˆÓ >€PN >DGW, Ƈ ÑA, '() <ŌƁ C¸ L6 ăÄ/L çþ gPN ÈD ÉVGW, ‡«„W, ¬Ů„'ĵ 1

   ŀ  4àÐK Ĵm" r7G? ‚ƒ/  ²±  f"v èh čĘ >€PN 8GW, 4àÐK ÈD) ‡« +"v èh ĠğL V1 [Z  " 47G'ĵ 1    ĬPN ԔŴ džŚ \•–F0µ Ú R@W Lµ ƊT$ %Vµ   †ì A@? Dă f"

 @$— & ”Ïy MmˆÓ" þ<H €" ÂG7, ÿ="

- 74 -


v _)H €  MmˆÓL f µ ŰLJ Å b'ĵ (ı ji *´ sL1 m F0µ « fG4 ¸v A@? 1a ;Ƃ LM{ sL1

      I '("v, )  f   ōN‰Ōµ $G4  A@ z) %‡( w ¬ŮGW (ı jĶf ü%G? I  žo A$ B" 4Þ ś ōúiŵ Ï" _)1 A@* _) L6 ōúiŵÏo >0 & F0/h I *) 5ƒ  (w  ž" ĽĜ sL¦, ð) Dă &  +j OQPN { sL1 º L 6 Ĵm ~ µ { sL1 

   ŀ  cÊc– Ëƛċ> € LM"

 %‡ (w ämPN ¬ŮGW, L"

 B, >

 LM jĶf BW{ Å b? $I„W, _ >0o F0" _){ sL1  '( ‚') LĦœŔŒ" 4Þ nW, 4Į Dă f DE ¬Ů Ñš 4ÞPN 1 A@? ť¢ª¤Ř˜Ÿ© ōúiŵÏ) ut"v L6 ăĵ Ůļ{ sL1 A@? + 4PN L6 Ĵm ~ µ 0{ sL1    ¡   f $ z) %‡ (w ¬ŮGW R ÙÚ *G? â °KG?  '( ‚') LĦœŔŒµ >D1 †Ë A@?  °KGW m) F0o JIKH Mm 8>G4 ¸v? ĕNĖ JD) [Z 

K z, (ıņŅ & jĶf  ²± >€  W· +Ä >DL ƾG1?

;Ö >1 > 45/h Ŀ."v) LM >DGW >5 z  ÅD) A$ B µ äˆG?ē bTv ‹¾ { { Å bW, R6 { ¸… 1 ƽƤ [ LjŸ™Ɠ™›¢Ƅœ™¤ Ɛ¢¢Ƅ™£ ¤š¢ ƍ¢£žœ ' ÿ=) _);Ƃ LMG?ē { { Å b 'ĵ 1 L6 F0µ ¸v 1a ;Ƃ LM{ sL1

      \řW [Z  lj     ĕNĖ NJ©›¢ŀ › ť £¤™£ªƃšƄ Ũ¢£ ƔŨŨ™¡¤šƓ™ Ÿ™Ɠ™›¢Ƅœ™¤ Ɛ¢Ř¢Ƅ™£ ¤š¢  5ØG7, +Ä ÅŪ"v € LM >DG W jĶf ï'ĵ 1 m h 13f [ĒG? Ńł ŹŷŸ C¸ >) čĝ  ‚4PN %‡;Ƃ ŮļG? [Lj 5Ø1     ŀ  cÊc– Ëƛċ> \N] ) *Nj]›šŧƃ¤  9ò) ]Ùg÷"

¸ _)1 m g

÷"? \N] ) 5fD, ðã· ;) +4 r7g÷, 1ó  [Lj V öGW, äˆG? g÷ [²1    ¡  Dă ÌƕÞ"Î m ~ vµ ƥ G? *o ‚ƒ* r7G? =)µ ČG7 \N] ĕNĖ  ]Ùg÷ & ĕNĖ #ĦŏŎ  ji >D{ >0o źƜ 5 ØG?ē _)ļĵ GW, cÊc– Ëƛċ> Dă ÌƕÞ  -ĺ ㍠Ĵm) ¬% ģãµ ŪG'ĵ ¾51    Ň  ƑƔƐŸo 8ƼōNRƅƽš¤™Ň Ƥ ¤š¢ª Ÿ™Ɠ™›¢Ƅœ™¤ ť£¢ŧ£ œœ™ "Î >Šċ>) ( ı  ð2) { & čA Ù  OQPN ĕNĖ L  PN 4³G'ĵ >D{ s ¾nj1   ŭǍŭ

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теер▒йспесмнтУН

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такреТтж╜тЭнтЬЩ╒йсЭОсБ░сйСтАлтЗ╡▌бтАм╟Н $40реЕсоб}сБ╜тзкснесп▒р▓╜сХ╜ сп▒соБр│О├н╔Щр╕Н┼БтАлтж╣реТ▌бтАм├н ┼ЦсоБрб╜}сБ╜со╣р╝Ктв╜скбaтК╣реЕ сФвткЩс│Хс╡▓ сЭБр┤С с│С с╕всо╣сп▒соЙсЦТ с░Ж╩Сс▒вспЩра║сБ╣┼б─е сйСтАл ▌бтАм╔Щр╕Н┼Б╔бр▓╜сГнсЬ╜сБЭсо╣сЬ╛си▒╩СсБ╣тж╣сйН$40реЕсБ░▌Ер╖Щ}сБ╜тзкснесп▒реЕ ┼Эсо╣тЪНр╗жтж╜┼б─еси▒тк╢┼БтзЙсоесЕХспЭржнси▒тмЙ┼Эс▒вспХрб╜▌Е с╕бсЬ╛тВЮтЗ╜сБ░┼ЦсоБскбсФвткЩсВСсмбтЗ╡╟Н $40реЕсоб}сБ╜тзкснесп▒р▓╜сХ╜}сБ╜┼бтзк┼Э─С┼ЭреЕси▒сХ╜╙╣скЙс╖╛├Ср╖Эс▒▓р╝КсЬ╜тФЕ┼Бтйес╕бсБ░тШБтВКс╕бсйОсФНтлнреЕсо╣ с╕бсЬ╛┼Эс╕бтй╜р╖ЭтбНтзЙсЬ╜тФЕр╗С тйвсЭБ╔Щр╕Н┼Бсп▒сЭБреЕспХтпНр╕╛тж╣█╡сБЩрп╣р╖Эснетж╜сКес▒есоеvтк╡тзХ╙╣aр╗ХсХ╜ сп▒сЭБреЕсо╣ ─Юти╣┼Э▌Ер╖Щ$40реЕсБ░}сБ╜тзкснесп▒реЕр▓╜сЗбтЦСсВСсмн╙╣a█╡сВКсГ╢соетиЖсФвсЬ╜тФНржнтмЙ┼Эс▒вспХрб╜▌Е ╔ос▒╢с▒вспХ┼Бс╕бсЧоaтАлтж╜▄ЖтАмсДбтк╡сЭЕтйесоеснетж╜тАл╫ЩтАмр▓Ж $40реЕсоб}сБ╜тзкснесп▒р▓╜сХ╜ a╙╜тж╣┼БсЧнслЩрб╜сФНрпнреЕси▒тАлтЬЪтзХ▌бтАмсДетпйсйОс▒▒соерв▒┼Б сФНрпнреЕсоеснетж╜сДбтк╡a с╕бсЧорвБсЩ╣спй█╡─С┼Эскбс│С├ХреЕси▒тЕйс▒▒соер╕┐тЗ╡р╗ХсХ╜ сп▒сЭБреЕсо╣}сБ╜тк╜ра║со╣с╕бсЧоaтАлтж╜▄ЖтАм─С┼ЭскбсйвтиЖр▓ЖсоесЭЕтйе тж╣╩СснетзХтй▓р▓ЖтзЙсоЭр▓╜сЯЙ тйес░НскбсБЩрп╣сЦЩтАл▌бтАмси▒├н╩нс╕бс╕бсЧорб╣█╡соБсФС MFHBDZ соесЕХс│ХтзБржнтмЙ┼Эс▒вспХрб╜▌Е спХсЬЕтФесЗйсм▒тК║си▒ржСрпЭ$40█╡}сБ╜┼бтзксое}сЦБтж╣┼Бсп▒сЭБреЕсо╣тВжр╛Хр╖Э▌Етж╣╩СснетзХс▒в╔Ъс▒вспЩс│СтК╣р╖ЭтЙЙтж╣ р▓Е┼БтАл╫ЩтАмр▓Жтж╣┼Бспй▌ЕспХр▒Нтж╜$40со╣тАл╫ЩтАмр▓Жр╝Ьс╕бсжл├нс╡▓сл╡тж╜с▒▒собспХр╖ЭaтАлтж╣▄ЖтАм├нтж╣█╡▌Ер╖Щ}сБ╜тзкснесп▒реЕсо╣ с▒╢тВжспХ╙╣┼бтзкспХспйсиХсзЭтж╜▌Е█╡с▒▒спХ▌ЕспХсЬЕтФесЗйсм▒тК║┼ЭсКесЬШтж╜тЙЙс╕бси▒сХ╜┼ЦсйН╟О┼ЭсЩ╣см▒╟Ос▒╢сЗб█╡сжетУНрпЭ тзкра║vр▓Ъсое╘ХтАлсже▌Есж╣╫┤тАмтУНрпЭтзкра║vр▓Ъси▒сХ╜b╟Оaскбс▒╢сЗб█╡$40a}сБ╜сйвсйОси▒сХ╜тИКсЗетпйр╝ЙреБс░Бс░Нр▓Жсое сп╣сБ╜тн╣тзБсЩ╣спйраер▓╛сЕХс░ЖтзХс╡Э█╡▀Ссо╣─Нсоер╝Йсж╣▌Ер╝ЙреБс▒╢сЗб█╡╩СсЕЩс▒вспЩспЩ╟нсоес╕бсм▒тзБсо╣р╛Хaспй┼Б╔Щс╡▓ си▒сХ╜раетЬЪтпй─СсФНскбс╕▓тлнсо╣сп▒соБ╔Щр╕Н┼Бтв╜тйесо╣сп▒соБр╖ЭсЕХс░ЖтзХсзЭтж╜▌ЕспХр╝ЙреБ├дспХр╝ЙсйНтмЙ┼Эс▒вспЩ}сБ╜со╣ с▒ес▒╜с│С├ХспХрб╜▌Е

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теер▒йспесмнтУН

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Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles1 Civil society organizations are a vibrant and essential feature in the democratic life of countries across the globe. CSOs collaborate with the full diversity of people and promote their rights. The essential characteristics of CSOs as distinct development actors – that they are voluntary, diverse, non-partisan, autonomous, non-violent, working and collaborating for change – are the foundation for the Istanbul principles for CSO development effectiveness. These principles guide the work and practices of civil society organizations in both peaceful and conflict situations, in different areas of work from grassroots to policy advocacy, and in a continuum from humanitarian emergencies to long-term development. 1.

Respect and promote human rights and social justice CSOs are effective as development actors when they … develop and implement strategies, activities and practices that promote individual and collective human rights, including the right to development, with dignity, decent work, social justice and equity for all people.

2.

Embody gender equality and equity while promoting women and girl’s rights CSOs are effective as development actors when they … promote and practice development cooperation embodying gender equity, reflecting women’s concerns and experience, while supporting women’s efforts to realize their individual and collective rights, participating as fully empowered actors in the development process.

3.

Focus on people’s empowerment, democratic ownership and participation CSOs are effective as development actors when they … support the empowerment and inclusive participation of people to expand their democratic ownership over policies and development initiatives that affect their lives, with an emphasis on the poor and marginalized.

4.

Promote Environmental Sustainability CSOs are effective as development actors when they … develop and implement priorities and approaches that promote environmental sustainability for present and future generations, including urgent responses to climate crises, with specific attention to the socio-economic, cultural and indigenous conditions for ecological integrity and justice.

5.

Practice transparency and accountability CSOs are effective as development actors when they … demonstrate a sustained organizational commitment to transparency, multiple accountability, and integrity in their internal operations.

6.

Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity CSOs are effective as development actors when they … commit to transparent relationships with CSOs and other development actors, freely and as equals, based on shared development goals and values, mutual respect, trust, organizational autonomy, long-term accompaniment, solidarity and global citizenship.

7.

Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning CSOs are effective as development actors when they … enhance the ways they learn from their experience, from other CSOs and development actors, integrating evidence from development practice and results, including the knowledge and wisdom of local and indigenous communities, strengthening innovation and their vision for the future they would like to see.

8.

Commit to realizing positive sustainable change CSOs are effective as development actors when they … collaborate to realize sustainable outcomes and impacts of their development actions, focusing on results and conditions for lasting change for people, with special emphasis on poor and marginalized populations, ensuring an enduring legacy for present and future generations.

Guided by these Istanbul principles, CSOs are committed to take pro-active actions to improve and be fully accountable for their development practices. Equally important will be enabling policies and practices by all actors. Through actions consistent with these principles, donor and partner country governments demonstrate their Accra Agenda for Action pledge that they “share an interest in ensuring that CSO contributions to development reach their full potential”. All governments have an obligation to uphold basic human rights – among others, the right to association, the right to assembly, and the freedom of expression. Together these are pre-conditions for effective development. Istanbul, Turkey September 29, 2010

Please note, the Istanbul Principles, as agreed at the Open Forum’s Global Assembly in Istanbul, September 28 -30, 2010, are the foundation of the Open Forum’s Draft International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness. These principles are further elaborated in Version 2 of this Framework, which is being updated and will be found on the Open Forum’s web site, www.csoeffectiveness.org. 1

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  Ȼ␦ӎ὾Ⴚ  



ᕮᢞ⫺⪦ࣶ᫛ኖશ⤞ᆯӮဖጦᤊ 

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INDICATORS

TARGETS FOR 2015

1. Development co-operation is focused on results that meet developing countries’ priorities Extent of use of country results frameworks All providers of development co-operation use country results frameworks by co-operation providers 2. Civil society operates within an environment which maximises its engagement in and contribution to development A subset of measures from the Enabling Environment Index

Continued progress over time

3. Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development Measure of the quality of public-private dialogue

Continued progress over time

4. Transparency: information on development co-operation is publicly available Measure of state of implementation of the common standard by co-operation providers

Implement the common standard – All development co-operation providers are on track to implement a common, open standard for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on development cooperation

5. Development co-operation is more predictable (a) annual: proportion of development cooperation funding disbursed within the fiscal year within which it was scheduled by co-operation providers; and (b) medium-term: proportion of development cooperation funding covered by indicative forward spending plans provided at country level

Halve the gap – halve the proportion of aid not disbursed within the fiscal year for which it was scheduled (Baseline year 2010) Halve the gap – halve the proportion of development cooperation funding not covered by indicative forward spending plans provided at country level

6. Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny % of development cooperation funding scheduled for disbursement that is recorded in the annual budgets approved by the legislatures of developing countries

Halve the gap – halve the proportion of development cooperation flows to the government sector not reported on government’s budget(s) (with at least 85% reported on budget) (Baseline year 2010)

7. Mutual accountability among development co-operation actors is strengthened through inclusive reviews % of countries that undertake inclusive mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments

All developing countries have inclusive mutual assessment reviews in place (Baseline year 2010)

8. Gender equality and women’s empowerment % of countries with systems that track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment

All developing countries have systems that track and make public resource allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment

9. Effective institutions: developing countries’ systems are strengthened and used (a) Quality of developing country PFM systems; and

Half of developing countries move up at least one measure (i.e. 0.5 points) on the PFM/CPIA scale of performance (Baseline year 2010)

(b) Use of country PFM and procurement systems

Reduce the gap. [use the same logic as in Paris – close the gap by two-thirds where CPIA score is >=5; or by one-third where between 3.5 and 4.5] (Baseline year 2010)

10. Aid is untied % of aid that is fully untied

Continued progress over time (Baseline year 2010)

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Guide to the Monitoring Framework of the Global Partnership Final version

Contacts: Ms. Marjolaine Nicod, tel. +33 1 45 24 87 67, email: marjolaine.nicod@oecd.org Ms. Hanna-Mari Kilpelainen, tel. +33 1 45 24 98 32, email: hanna-mari.kilpelainen@oecd.org Ms. Yuko Suzuki, tel. +1.212.906.6509, email: yuko.suzuki@undp.org Mr. Derek Kilner, tel. +1 212 906 5742, derek.kilner@undp.org

1 July 2013

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ABOUT THIS DOCUMENT

This document explains the objectives, process and methodology for monitoring the implementation of the selected commitments made in the Busan Partnership agreement through the set of global indicators and targets agreed in June 2012. It is designed to guide countries and organisations that wish to participate in monitoring efforts at the international level within the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (hereafter â&#x20AC;&#x153;the Global Partnershipâ&#x20AC;?). The first part of the document provides an overview of the ten indicators of progress and associated targets that are designed to support global accountability. It presents the purpose of the global monitoring framework and a description of the indicators and targets, as well as the process through which data will be collected, analysed and reported by the UNDP-OECD joint team supporting the Global Partnership. The second part of the document provides operational guidance for the collection and reporting of data on those global indicators that will draw on country-level sources of information. It includes guidance on how the process could be managed at country level and a set of questions and detailed definitions designed to assist relevant country stakeholders in collecting the necessary data. This guide is intended to primarily provide country stakeholders with an understanding of what participation in the monitoring framework of the Global Partnership entails and how countries can collect and submit their data in practice, working closely with providers of development co-operation and other stakeholders. This document was initially issued in a draft form for consultation on 5 March 2013. This final version incorporates feedback received from developing countries and other stakeholders.

To feed into preparations for the first Global Partnership ministerial level meeting scheduled for early 2014, the deadline for submitting country-level data to the UNDP-OECD joint support team will be 13 September 2013. All countries benefitting from development co-operation are welcome to participate in global monitoring efforts. There is no formal process to register in this process. All countries submitting data within the deadline of 13 September 2013 will be included in this yearâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s assessment of progress. A list of participating countries is available on the community site of the Global Partnership (see link below). Countries interested to participate in the 2013 monitoring process and not yet included in the country list, are invited to notify their intentions the joint support team at: monitoring@effectivecooperation.org. This Guide is available online on the Global Partnership website. For stakeholders leading or actively contributing to the Global Partnership monitoring effort, more practical information and updates can be found on the Global Partnership community space which contains relevant documents and responses to frequently asked questions (to register, please email: community@effectivecooperation.org).

2 Guide to the Monitoring Framework of the Global Partnership

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CONTENTS

PART I – OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR MONITORING PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING BUSAN COMMITMENTS .................................................................................................................................. 4 Purpose of global monitoring ............................................................................................................................. 4 How will global monitoring inform dialogue within the Global Partnership? ............................................................. 4 Indicators and targets ....................................................................................................................................... 5 Data sources .................................................................................................................................................... 6 What has changed with the global monitoring framework? ................................................................................... 6 Indicative timeline for 2013................................................................................................................................ 7 PART II – GUIDANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL MONITORING EFFORTS ................. 9 Scope of monitoring efforts at country level......................................................................................................... 9 Approach to collecting and validating data ......................................................................................................... 10 Help Desk ...................................................................................................................................................... 11 Submission of data .......................................................................................................................................... 12 ANNEX I- INDICATOR FACTSHEETS.................................................................................................................. 14 ANNEX II – QUESTIONS AND DEFINITIONS TO GUIDE DATA COLLECTION AT COUNTRY LEVEL ........................... 27

About the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation The Global Partnership is an inclusive political forum bringing together a wide range of countries and organisations from around the world that are committed to strengthen the effectiveness of development co-operation. The Global Partnership emerged from an agreement reached among the 160 countries, territories and organisations at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Republic of Korea, in 2011. It fosters engagement and knowledge exchange among the many, varied actors in the implementation of the agreements reached in Busan. It also supports regular monitoring of progress in implementation of the commitments made in Busan. The Busan Partnership agreement invited the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to work together to provide support for the effective functioning of the Global Partnership. The UNDP-OECD joint support team includes dedicated staff across the two organisations to provide day to day support to the Global Partnership. This joint support team has been tasked to develop, refine and implement the global methodology for monitoring the implementation of Busan commitments. More information at: www.effectivecooperation.org

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PART I – OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBAL FRAMEWORK FOR MONITORING PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING BUSAN COMMITMENTS This section presents the monitoring framework of the Global Partnership. It includes:

x

Key features of the global monitoring framework;

x

An overview of the set of indicators and associated targets which act as a basis for supporting international accountability for implementing the Busan Partnership agreement (each indicator is described in more detail, including means of measurement, method of calculation and data sources in Annex I); and

x

A description of the process and timeline through which data will be collected, analysed and reported at the international level.

PURPOSE OF GLOBAL MONITORING The purpose of the global monitoring framework is to support international accountability for “making progress in the implementation of commitments and actions agreed in Busan” (Busan Partnership agreement §35). It places particular emphasis on behaviour change in development co-operation efforts, which is in turn expected to contribute to the achievement of results as defined in the developing countries’ development strategies. Its aim is not to monitor development outcomes themselves, which are addressed through other international frameworks (e.g. the Millennium Development Goals). While entirely voluntary, participation in global monitoring efforts is important to provide evidence of progress and signal opportunities as well as obstacles for further progress. In this process, global monitoring efforts contribute to: x

Support accountability for the implementation of the Busan commitments and actions by providing a snapshot of progress at the international level;

x

Stimulate multi-stakeholder dialogue at both country and international levels on how to improve the effectiveness of development co-operation; and

x

Promote agreements on specific actions that are needed to enhance successful implementation of the Busan Partnership agreement and support accountability at country level.

The focus on accountability, which remains a central feature of the Busan Partnership agreement, needs to be balanced against the broader scope of the Global Partnership as a space for learning and knowledge-sharing. The nature of the agreement reached in Busan recognizes that different stakeholders may approach a common agenda for development in different ways. As such, partners engaged in South-South co-operation are not expected to participate in the monitoring framework of the Global Partnership but they are invited to share their experience and achievements in implementing agreed principles of effective development co-operation on a voluntary basis.

HOW DOES GLOBAL MONITORING INFORM DIALOGUE WITHIN THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP? Global reports of progress in implementing Busan commitments will be produced to inform high-level political dialogue within the Global Partnership during ministerial-level meetings, which are expected to take place every 1824 months. A first stock-take of progress will be undertaken in mid-2013 to inform the preparation of the first ministerial-level meeting of the Global Partnership scheduled for the first quarter of 2014 (date and venue to be confirmed). While the indicators offer a degree of insight into the efforts of individual countries and organisations as they implement their commitments, they are intended to act as an input to a broader political dialogue on development

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co-operation and its effectiveness, rather than to act as a narrow score card for the ranking of individual countries and organisations. Evidence generated by the indicators will be complemented, where available, by additional relevant evidence of a more qualitative nature to enrich the analysis. OE

INDICATORS AND TARGETS The set of global indicators (see table below) includes some indicators which are based on the previous indicators from the Paris Declaration that developing countries have identified as particularly important. Other indicators capture some of the broader dimensions of the Busan Partnership agreement. INDICATORS TARGETS FOR 2015 1. Development co-operation is focused on results that meet developing countries’ priorities Extent of use of country results frameworks All providers of development co-operation use country results frameworks by co-operation providers 2. Civil society operates within an environment which maximises its engagement in and contribution to development A subset of measures from the Enabling Continued progress over time Environment Index 3. Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development Measure of the quality of public-private Continued progress over time dialogue 4. Transparency: information on development co-operation is publicly available Measure of state of implementation of the common standard by co-operation providers

Implement the common standard – All development co-operation providers are on track to implement a common, open standard for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on development cooperation 5. Development co-operation is more predictable (a) annual: proportion of development Halve the gap – halve the proportion of aid not disbursed within the fiscal year cooperation funding disbursed within the for which it was scheduled fiscal year within which it was scheduled by (Baseline year 2010) co-operation providers; and (b) medium-term: proportion of development Halve the gap – halve the proportion of development cooperation funding not cooperation funding covered by indicative covered by indicative forward spending plans provided at country level forward spending plans provided at country level 6. Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny % of development cooperation funding Halve the gap – halve the proportion of development cooperation flows to the scheduled for disbursement that is recorded government sector not reported on government’s budget(s) (with at least 85% in the annual budgets approved by the reported on budget) legislatures of developing countries (Baseline year 2010) 7. Mutual accountability among development co-operation actors is strengthened through inclusive reviews % of countries that undertake inclusive All developing countries have inclusive mutual assessment reviews in place mutual assessments of progress in (Baseline year 2010) implementing agreed commitments 8. Gender equality and women’s empowerment % of countries with systems that track and All developing countries have systems that track and make public resource make public allocations for gender equality allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment and women’s empowerment 9. Effective institutions: developing countries’ systems are strengthened and used (a) Quality of developing country PFM systems; and

Half of developing countries move up at least one measure (i.e. 0.5 points) on the PFM/CPIA scale of performance (Baseline year 2010)

(b) Use of country PFM and procurement systems

Reduce the gap. [use the same logic as in Paris – close the gap by two-thirds where CPIA score is >=5; or by one-third where between 3.5 and 4.5] (Baseline year 2010)

10. Aid is untied % of aid that is fully untied

Continued progress over time (Baseline year 2010)

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A global target is available for each global indicator. This does not prevent stakeholders from agreeing different targets at the country level. For indicators where data is available, 2010 will be used as the baseline year. For others, a baseline will be determined depending on data availability. A detailed description of each indicator is provided in Annex I, which includes factsheets setting out the means of measurement, method of calculation and data source for each indicator.

DATA SOURCES The global monitoring framework consists of: i) indicators measured using data collected at the level of individual developing countries and aggregated to offer an overview of global progress; ii) and indicators drawing on other sources of information and established through desk reviews and other mechanisms. The table below establishes the distinction between those two categories of indicators. COUNTRY LEVEL (1)

INDICATORS 1 2

Development co-operation is focused on results that meet developing countries’ priorities Civil society operates within an environment that maximises its engagement in and contribution to development

OTHER PROCESSES (2)

„ CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index Desk review in collaboration with the World Bank Institute Desk review building on data sources of the common, open standard and conducted in collaboration with the IATI and OECDDAC- Secretariats

3

Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development

4

Transparency: information on development co-operation is publicly available

5a+b

Development co-operation is more predictable (annual and medium-term)

„

6

Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny

„

7

Mutual accountability strengthened through inclusive reviews

„

UNDESA work on mutual accountability

8

Gender equality and women’s empowerment

„ (Optional country level reporting)

Collected by UN Women

9a

Quality of developing country PFM systems

9b

Use of developing country PFM and procurement systems

10

Aid is untied

CPIA Desk review „ Collected by OECD-DAC

(1) See details provided in Part II of this document for guidance on data collection at country level. (2) See Part II of this document for opportunities to feed findings into country-level dialogue.

WHAT HAS CHANGED WITH THE GLOBAL MONITORING FRAMEWORK? „ Indicators In line with the Busan Partnership agreement, which calls for a selective and relevant set of indicators and targets, the number of indicators relying on data collection at country level has been reduced in comparison with the Paris Declaration monitoring framework. The reporting burden on developing countries is further alleviated as countries are not expected to submit additional qualitative information (previously in the form of the “country report”). Part II of this document focuses on guidance and definitions for data collection for the indicators relying on country level sources of information. For indicators drawing from the Paris Declaration monitoring framework, it also highlights changes from previous practice for ease of reference for country stakeholders.

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Â&#x201E; Scope of reporting For the purpose of monitoring the Busan Partnership agreement, indicators relying on country-level sources of data will continue to assess the effectiveness of development co-operation, looking at transactions qualifying as Official Development Assistance (ODA), which include grants or loans of a concessional nature and whose main objective is the promotion of economic development and welfare. In addition, developing countries interested to monitor the effectiveness of a broader range of official development co-operation funds (e.g. non concessional lending) are encouraged to do so. Â&#x201E; Data collection grounded in existing processes To produce periodic global progress reports, the UNDP-OECD joint support team will draw to the extent possible on existing sources of data where available. At present, an increasing number of countries have their own frameworks and tools in place to monitor the effectiveness of development co-operation. These build on country priorities and may encompass a much wider set of issues and commitments beyond the Busan global indicators. The incorporation of the standard indicators and definitions set out in this guide in such monitoring tools/frameworks will enable these countries to collect data and feed these to inform global monitoring efforts without the need to administer standalone questionnaires as was previously the case with the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration. The idea behind the Global Partnership monitoring approach is to ensure a degree of aggregation and comparability in the evidence generated through national frameworks, while avoiding the creation of parallel monitoring tools and cycles that primarily serve international reporting needs. Ad hoc arrangements may need to be established for countries which are interested to participate in global monitoring efforts but do not have in place processes or tools for periodic collection of country-level data required for global indicators. Developing countries interested in participating in global monitoring efforts are encouraged to ground data collection in existing national monitoring processes, using their own tools when they exist, according to their own calendar agreed in-country. However, to ensure a maximum degree of consistency and comparability in the data, it will be important that the standard methodology and definitions agreed at the international level be used for global reporting on those indicators which rely on country-level sources of information (see Annex II of this document). Â&#x201E; Dissemination of findings The UNDP-OECD joint support team will produce global reports of progress in implementing Busan commitments to inform the preparation of ministerial-level meetings of the Global Partnership every 18-24 months. It will draw on evidence of progress and challenges gathered through the set of global indicators and relevant qualitative evidence to generate richer analysis. The scope of global progress reports will be guided by the work of the Steering Committee to ensure that the analysis is focused on areas of relevant interest to the Global Partnership. Global progress reports will not include standard country chapters (as was the case with the Paris Declaration monitoring surveys). As such, countries will need to consider how best to consolidate evidence of both quantitative and qualitative nature to produce country-specific assessments of progress in implementing Busan commitments which meet their own development co-operation priorities and monitoring needs. The UNDP-OECD joint support team will draw on existing country-level analyses, where relevant and available, to complement the evidence generated through the global indicators and will invite countries to point the team in the direction of any such products.

INDICATIVE TIMELINE The main steps and milestones described below are presented to guide countries and organisations interested to participate in global monitoring efforts so that they can plan and organise their efforts. Country-level specific milestones should be adapted to country contexts.

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June 2013

Support to roll-out country-level data collection and validation Workshop organised for developing country governments to support the rolling out of the monitoring framework of the Global Partnership. Based on feedback received from countries, Monitoring Guidance and country spread sheet finalised and circulated to the national co-ordinators in participating countries as well as other stakeholders. On-going support to national co-ordinators for data gathering, validation and submission.

July - August

Data collection and validation

â&#x20AC;Śuntil

The national co-ordinators facilitate country level data collection in collaboration with development partners, including convening consultations and dialogue for data validation.

13 Sept 2013

Subsequently, country co-ordinators submit to the UNDP-OECD support team by 13 September 2013 the completed country spread sheet based on data available at the country level. Information on indicators drawing on global processes is gathered under the co-ordination of the support team. AugustSeptember 2013

Data processing and review Consolidation and aggregation of country-level data and desk reviews for indicators drawing on global-level data sources. Full country data tables are sent to national co-ordinators for final review in consultation with relevant stakeholders. In the case of any errors in the data, national co-ordinators notify the joint UNDP-OECD team. To the extent possible, data arising from the globally sourced indicators will be shared, as available and relevant, with country level stakeholders. Providers of co-operation also receive for information their full set of data pertaining to each country in which they have reported data to the government.

OctoberReport production December 2013 Data is analysed by the UNDP-OECD support team and used as a basis for the progress report to inform political dialogue at the first Ministerial Meeting of the Global Partnership. Exact timeline for publication and dissemination of findings to be confirmed. This will include on-line access to the full set of data.

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PART II – GUIDANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL MONITORING EFFORTS This section describes the scope of country level efforts to feed into the global monitoring framework and includes a description of the process at country level (detailed definitions and advice to assist in the data collection for indicators based on country level information are available in Annex II).

SCOPE OF MONITORING EFFORTS AT COUNTRY LEVEL „ Which global indicators are measured using country-level sources of information? The global indicators listed below will be measured at the level of individual developing countries and aggregated to offer an overview of global progress: Indicators 1

Development co-operation is focused on results that meet developing countries’ priorities

5a

Development co-operation is more predictable (annual)

5b

Development co-operation is more predictable (medium-term)

6

Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny

7

Mutual accountability strengthened through inclusive reviews

9b

Use of developing country PFM and procurement systems

[8]

Optional: Gender equality and women’s empowerment

The Global Partnership monitoring framework complements and builds on country-level efforts to monitor progress and strengthen mutual accountability. Countries may include additional indicators and targets relevant for their specific context and priorities when developing their own frameworks to monitor the effectiveness of development co-operation. Those indicators of the global monitoring framework which are assessed through desk reviews and other mechanisms are not described here (See Annex I for detailed factsheets on each indicator). However, opportunities for country stakeholders to contribute to the assessment of progress for these indicators and integrate their findings in country-level dialogue will be explored on a case by case basis. „ What kind of development co-operation is included? For the purpose of monitoring the Busan Partnership agreement at the international level, development co-operation funding primarily refers to Official Development Assistance (ODA). This includes all transactions undertaken: i) with the promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; and ii) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25%). 1 In addition, developing countries interested to monitor the effectiveness of a broader range of development cooperation funds (e.g. non concessional lending) are encouraged to do so, provided that the following criteria are met: official source (bilateral or multilateral); and promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective. Where development co-operation funding is provided to a developing country as part of a regional (multi-country) programme and it is possible to identify those activities and disbursements that are specific to that developing country, these disbursements should also be recorded. 1

Detailed definitions available in OECD-DAC Statistical Directives (OECD, 2007).

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The following official transactions are excluded from the scope of the Global Partnership monitoring efforts and should not be recorded: x

Transactions made to beneficiaries that are not based in the developing country or to regional organisations that cannot be identified at country level.

x

Debt reorganisation/restructuring.

x

Emergency and relief assistance.

APPROACH TO COLLECTING AND VALIDATING DATA „ Grounding data collection in country processes Consistent with the focus of the Busan Partnership agreement on implementation at country level, developing countries are encouraged to agree on their own country-specific frameworks for monitoring progress and promoting mutual accountability (Busan §35a). Such frameworks could provide the basis for the collection of data necessary for global indicators. Embedding such data collection within countries’ existing processes, using their own tools and agreed in-country calendars, will help to avoid the creation of parallel monitoring tools and cycles that primarily serve international reporting needs. Ways of grounding data collection in country processes – Illustrative examples A growing number of countries have embedded monitoring of development co-operation effectiveness or partnership commitments in their own systems and processes. Ways of achieving this include the following approaches: -

-

-

Incorporation of selected Paris Declaration and now Busan global indicators in data collection through country-level aid management systems (e.g. Burundi Aid Management Platform, Cambodia ODA database, Rwanda Development Assistance Database). Use of some or all Paris Declaration and now Busan global indicators in country-level mutual accountability frameworks (e.g. Mozambique Performance Assessment Framework of the Programme Aid Partnership, Rwanda Donor Performance Assessment Framework, the Pacific Islands Forum Compact) Collection and analysis of data from providers of development co-operation in advance of annual partnership talks.

Ad hoc arrangements may need to be established for countries, which are interested to participate in global monitoring efforts but do not have in place processes or tools for periodic collection of country-level data required for some or all of the indicators drawing on country-level sources of data. These could include arrangements similar to those used for the Paris Declaration surveys (e.g. using stand-alone questionnaires). However, such arrangements should, whenever possible, be designed in a way that supports broader country-level monitoring and reporting efforts beyond those of the Global Partnership. „ Roles of various stakeholders Developing country governments play a central role in leading monitoring efforts at country level. This involves the following aspects: x

ensuring that country stakeholders are fully informed about Busan global monitoring efforts and facilitating their contribution to the process;

x

overseeing the collection of data on Busan global indicators either through existing mechanisms and tools or ad hoc processes;

x

organising multi-stakeholder dialogue in support of data consolidation, validation and final review as well as ensuring the overall quality of data; and

x

submitting data to the UNDP-OECD joint support team.

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In previous global efforts to monitor aid effectiveness, governments found it useful to nominate national coordinators who were typically senior officials in ministries of finance, planning or foreign affairs responsible for aid management and coordination. Some countries also found it useful to appoint a ‘donor’ focal point to assist and support them in this process and to co-ordinate data collection from providers of development co-operation. Whether a government wants to nominate such a provider focal point for the Global Partnership monitoring efforts, and which partner may best fit this role, is left to each government to decide. UNDP has previously played such a role in some countries, and stands ready – on demand – to assume a similar role in this monitoring effort as well. Providers of development co-operation are called upon to actively support the process at country level by providing the necessary data to the government, in their co-operation countries. Three indicators require inputs from providers: annual predictability, aid on budget and use of PFM and procurement systems (see table below in the section on submission of data). Global programmes (for example, The Global Fund, GAVI…) are also invited to participate. For all providers, the in-country head of the organisation is responsible for ensuring the quality and accuracy of reporting. At the same time, previous experience has demonstrated that the provision of guidance and incentives from these organisations’ headquarters to their respective country offices is essential. Parliamentarians, civil society organisations, the private sector and other stakeholders play an important role in monitoring progress in implementing Busan commitments. Non-state stakeholders are, however, not expected to report to developing country authorities in this context (even when they implement projects and programmes funded by official development assistance). While country-level data for the purpose of the Global Partnership monitoring framework is provided by governments and providers of development co-operation, these stakeholders are encouraged to actively take part in the dialogue described below. „ Validation of data through inclusive country level dialogue Close communication among a wide range of stakeholders is important in ensuring the quality of the reporting on indicators as a monitoring tool and in strengthening mutual understanding of progress and challenges in make cooperation more effective. Local authorities, parliamentarians, CSOs and representatives of the private sector are encouraged to participate in country dialogue around monitoring Busan commitments. Undertaken in the context of countries’ own monitoring frameworks and coordination processes, such dialogue should wherever possible be used as an opportunity to review key data that will be shared with the UNDP-OECD joint support team. Multi-stakeholder dialogue and validation is an important contribution to ensure the accuracy of data used to monitor progress at the global level. In order to document good practice in multi-stakeholder country-level engagement in global monitoring efforts, countries will be invited to provide feedback on the consultation process as part of their submission of data to the UNDP-OECD joint support team. The UNDP/OECD joint support team will also in due course facilitate country-level access to information on the indicators measured through global processes so that findings can also feed into country-level dialogue.

HELP DESK A web-based “help desk” has been established within the community space for the Global Partnership, which is intended to provide a peer exchange space to share access to expertise, technical information and good practices.2 The community space features a separate section dedicated to monitoring, which provides a space for exchange of experience among country stakeholders and access to technical advice about the implementation of the agreed methodologies and processes for monitoring. The section also includes key reference materials and is regularly 2

This web solution builds on the UNDP Teamworks web platform and offers a password-protected ‘intranet’ for Global Partnership stakeholders.

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updated with frequently asked questions and answers. In offering a “one stop shop” for all ad hoc questions on indicators and the supporting methodology, this centralised support helps to ensure that arrangements for global monitoring, while relying on existing sources of data, provide reliable and comparable data across participating countries and organisations. The help desk function is co-ordinated by the UNDP-OECD joint support team and brings together specialists from the two organisations, including from the UNDP regional centres and country offices, which play a key role in supporting overall country-level implementation of Busan commitments and monitoring of progress.

How do I contact the help desk? Stakeholders leading and contributing to the monitoring process are encouraged to visit the monitoring section of the Global Partnership community space which contains relevant documents and responses to frequently asked questions. To register, please email: community@effectivecooperation.org For any queries, please contact: monitoring@effectivecooperation.org

SUBMISSION OF DATA „ Completing the country spread sheet Developing countries will be expected to submit data to the UNDP-OECD joint support team by means of a country spread sheet specially designed for the purpose of participating in global monitoring efforts. This spread sheet is an Excel document that records the data for the indicators measured through country-level information sources. The Country Spread sheet can be downloaded from the Global Partnership community space. It combines data provided by both developing country governments and providers of development co-operation, as summarised in the table below:

INDICATORS

Providers of development cooperation

Governments

Note that this indicator will be piloted in a limited number of countries in 2013. Reporting to take place separately

1

Development co-operation is focused on results that meet developing countries’ priorities

5a

Development co-operation is more predictable (annual)

5b

Development co-operation is more predictable (medium-term)

„

6

Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny

„

7

Mutual accountability strengthened through inclusive reviews

„

9b

Use of developing country PFM and procurement systems

8

Optional: Gender equality and women’s empowerment

„

„

„ „

Notes: Definitions of key terms, specific questions and additional guidance for all of the indicators listed in the above table are provided in Annex II.

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Â&#x201E; Submission of the country spread sheet Once the Country spread sheet has, under the leadership of the government, been completed and validated at country level, it should be submitted to the UNDP-OECD joint support team by email (monitoring@effectivecooperation.org) by 13 September 2013 at the latest. Upon receipt of the spread sheet, the joint support team will follow up with the designated developing country authorities for any necessary clarification. Â&#x201E; Complementary evidence Countries are also encouraged to share any additional information that the UNDP-OECD joint support team could use as a basis to enrich the global analysis of progress and challenges in implementing Busan commitments. This can be done through the country spread sheet, which includes a dedicated section for such information.

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ANNEX I â&#x20AC;&#x201C; INDICATOR FACTSHEETS

Detailed information on each indicator of the monitoring framework of the Global Partnership (see Table in Part I of the document) is provided in the factsheets presented in this Annex. These provide details on the methodology underpinning each indicator, including means of measurement, method of calculation and data source.

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Indicator 1. Development co-operation is focused on results that meet developing countries’ priorities Note: This is an area where no measurement has been undertaken so far. As such, the detailed definitions and means of measurement for this indicator remain subject to further work of a technical nature. Final work in this area will be undertaken as part of the rolling out of the Global Partnership Monitoring Framework at country level in 2013 and will involve piloting in a limited number of countries (see Annex II for the proposed approach). The purpose of this indicator is not to serve a narrow scorecard but to provide a basis to better understand the reasons for progress and remaining challenges in strengthening country-led results frameworks and their associated monitoring and evaluation systems by using them and to raise political attention on issues such as continued additional or parallel reporting requirements by providers of development co-operation. Ways of establishing a link with the quality of results frameworks, and in particular the inclusive process through which they have been developed, has been factored in the proposed dimensions for assessing progress in this area which are currently being reviewed. Relevant Busan commitment Paris Declaration (§45) and Accra (§23) commitments, as reaffirmed in Busan, to rely on partner country results frameworks and monitoring and evaluation systems. Busan commitment to adopt transparent, country-led and country-level results frameworks and platforms as a common tool among all concerned actors to assess performance based on indicators drawn from country development priorities and goals and with providers of development co-operation minimising their use of additional frameworks. (§18a) Indicator construction Numerator:

Denominator:

Measure

Number of development co-operation providers that are using country results frameworks Total number of development cooperation providers

% of providers of development co-operation using country results frameworks.

The extent to which providers of development cooperation use country results frameworks will be assessed on the basis of: use of objectives and targets from national development strategy as a reference for delivery and performance assessment; and use of the country’s own indicators, national statistics and monitoring and evaluation systems to monitor progress.

A score will be assigned using a graduated scale to assess the extent to which providers of development cooperation use country results frameworks, ranging from non-use, through partial use to full use, on the basis of the proposed dimensions.

Data source

Aggregation

Country level data – partner country government assessment against three dimensions.

Global, developing country, and provider of development co-operation.

Periodicity to be determined at country level depending on needs and priorities and existing mutual accountability review processes.

Developing country and provider aggregation: % of providers and % of developing countries respectively. The unit of observation is the provider of development cooperation in a given developing country. Proposed target All providers of development co-operation use country results frameworks.

Baseline To be determined

Rationale: based on the Busan commitment which calls on all actors to change behaviour in this area.

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Indicator 2. Civil society operates within an environment that maximises its engagement in and contribution to development Consensus was reached in 2012 to draw on a new Enabling Environment Index (EEI) under development by CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation. CIVICUS has developed an EEI under the guidance of a multi-stakeholder Advisory Group, with technical support from academia as well as by working in collaboration with the CSO Platform for Development Effectiveness. CIVICUS launched the pilot index for consultation in April and is currently finalizing the Index on the basis of stakeholder feedback. It had been initially envisaged that the Global Partnership indicator on the enabling environment for CSOs would focus on sub-dimensions of the CIVICUS-EEI relating to the Busan commitment, which is to enable CSOs to exercise their role as independent development actors and to maximise their contribution to development. Due to limited data availability for the selected sub-dimensions of the EEI that have direct bearing on CSO activity, it is challenging at this stage to use the EEI to construct an indicator that would alone provide a robust basis for meaningful dialogue on the state of enabling environment for CSOs within the Global Partnership. In light of these challenges, it is proposed to build on the work of CIVICUS-EEI and complement it with additional qualitative evidence to provide a preliminary narrative on the state of enabling environment for civil society. Particular emphasis will be placed on presenting where challenges and information gaps persist and on drawing political attention to areas where concerted international efforts would be needed to generate more comprehensive primary data and to enable more robust assessments of the enabling environment for CSOs in the future. Relevant Busan commitment [we will] â&#x20AC;&#x153;implement fully our respective commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as independent development actors, with a particular focus on an enabling environment, consistent with agreed international rights, that maximises the contributions of CSOs to development.â&#x20AC;? (Busan §22a). Indicator construction The assessment will draw on the CIVICUS-EEI, where data is relevant and available, and on other complementary evidence to provide a first, qualitative narrative on the state of enabling environment for CSOs. Complementary evidence may be generated by the CSO Platform for Development Effectiveness and/or by other stakeholders. In examining sub-dimensions of the CIVICUS-EEI, particular consideration will be given to those components that relate most directly to the Busan commitments and are largely within the control of stakeholders adhering to the Busan Partnership, i.e: selected elements of the governance / political environment that have a direct bearing on CSO activity, including the legal and regulatory framework for civil society operations.

Measure Selected components of the CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index. This first assessment will not deliver a single quantitative measure. It will rather provide a preliminary narrative building on both quantitative and qualitative information. .

Data source

Aggregation

CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index as well as relevant complementary evidence.

The unit of observation will be the individual country. Quantitative aggregation may not be feasible at this stage due to limitations in data availability. Proposed target

. Baseline To be determined based on the preliminary assessment of the state of enabling environment for CSOs.

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Continued progress over time. Rationale: there is no basis in the Busan Partnership agreement for a more specific target and the purpose of the indicator is to provide an entry point for a political discussion based on broad trends observed.


Indicator 3. Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development Note: Dialogue among interested stakeholders, including discussions within the Building Block on Public-Private Cooperation have confirmed that the monitoring and evaluation framework provided in the Public-Private Dialogue Handbook (B. Herzberg and Wright A., 2006, available online at: www.publicprivatedialogue.org) provides a useful basis for further work on the indicator. The Public-Private dialogue is an initiative aimed at building knowledge and capacity for public-private dialogue. It is hosted in the World Bank Institute and has been sponsored by DFID, the World Bank, IFC, and the OECD Development Centre. The preliminary tool to assess the quality of public-private sector dialogue is available for consultation with key stakeholders. Developing countries interested to take part in final discussions on the indicator construction and to be part of the piloting process are invited to confirm their interest. Work will involve primarily desk review of existing materials and targeted interviews to be undertaken under the responsibility of the UNDP-OECD joint support team in close collaboration with the World Bank Institute. It is envisaged to review the findings and validate the methodology through a range of relevant consultations in September-October. This approach will provide initial benchmarking on the quality of public-private dialogue in a selected number of countries, which will serve as a basis to inform the ministerial-level discussions within the Global Partnership scheduled in October 2013. Relevant Busan commitment Commitment to enable the participation of the private sector in the design and implementation of development policies and strategies to foster sustainable growth and poverty reduction (BPaยง32b) Indicator construction The indicator will assess the effectiveness of publicprivate dialogue as a proxy for private sector engagement (local and foreign, small, medium and large enterprises, business associations, chambers of commerce) and trade unions in country level dialogue around policy strategies and reforms of the enabling environment for private sector investment and development.

Measure A multi-dimensional index providing a graduated measure of the quality of public-private dialogue.

Dimensions to be assessed include: institutionalised mechanism or formalised x structures in place to facilitate the dialogue; x representativeness of private sector actors engaged in the dialogue; x some basic indication on the outcomes of the dialogue (e.g. number of reforms proposals and reforms enacted). Data source In the absence of existing data sources in this area, the UNDP/OECD joint support team is working closely with the WBI to review self-assessments by countries having a public private dialogue process in place to ensure a credible and comparable assessment. This process consists of a desk review complemented with targeted interviews with a selected range of stakeholders to complement the assessment with perspectives from a wider range of stakeholders.

Aggregation The unit of observation is the individual developing country. The method for global aggregation will depend in part on the final choice of the indicator (could look at % of countries scoring above a particular score; or average score across all countries).

Baseline

Proposed target

To be determined (depending on the final indicator and data availability).

Continued progress over time. Rationale: the purpose of the indicator is to provide means to support broader political discussion on enhanced public private cooperation and further mobilisation of the private sector within the Global Partnership.

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Indicator 4. Transparency: information on development co-operation is publicly available Note: The UNDP-OECD joint support team is working closely with the secretariats managing the two main systems of the common open standard, namely the IATI and OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System and the Forward Spending Survey, to resolve the pending technical issues related to the indicator construction and identify practical ways for continued collaboration in piloting the indicator in the coming months. Further refinement is needed on the approach to coverage of flows and actors as well as the definition of targets and ways of assessing progress in light of the implementation schedules that individual providers have adopted to implement the common, open standard. Stakeholder feedback on the indicator concept is being facilitated through the above mentioned secretariats and through the ad hoc group on the common standard. Relevant Busan commitment “Implement a common, open standard for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on resources provided through development co-operation... This standard must meet the information needs of developing countries and non-state actors... We will [aim to] implement it fully by December 2015. Busan (§23c). Indicator construction

Measure

The state of implementation of the common, open standard by 2015 by providers will be assessed against four elements which are derived directly from Busan Partnership commitments: i) timeliness; ii) level of detail; iii) forward looking nature; and iv) coverage of the information on development co-operation resources made available by providers. The indicator will assess provision of information on historical, current and future resource flows disaggregated to meet recipient countries’ information needs. Exact definitions and criteria will be determined drawing on the agreed main components of the indicator.

A composite indicator providing a graduated measure of the degree of implementation of the common standard by each provider of development co-operation (exact measure to be determined).

Data source

Aggregation

Desk review of data available through reporting on the components of the common, open standard (CRS/FSS and IATI). No collection of data at the country level is foreseen.

The proposed unit of observation is the individual country providing development co-operation (in the case of bilateral co-operation providers) or organisation (in the case of multilateral providers). In other words, the indicator looks at whether a given provider of development co-operation has implemented the common standard Ideally the indicator would be defined in a way that supports aggregation to the global level, offering a snapshot of progress.

Baseline To be determined on the basis of the final indicator construction (2011 would measure progress since Busan)

Proposed target for end 2015 Implement the common standard – All providers of development co-operation are on track to implement by 2015 a common, open standard for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on development co-operation Rationale: Busan commitment

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Indicator 5a. Development co-operation is more predictable (annual predictability) Paris Declaration commitment to “disburse aid in a timely and predictable fashion according to agreed schedules” (PD §26; reaffirmed in Busan) Indicator construction Numerator:

Denominator:

Measure

Development co-operation flows reported by provider as disbursed in year n Development co-operation flows scheduled for disbursement by provider in year n and communicated to developing country government

% of development cooperation funding for the government sector disbursed in the year for which it was scheduled by providers of development co-operation Note that this indicator builds on the broad approach used in Paris Declaration indicator 7

Data source Country-level data (self-reporting development co-operation)

Aggregation by

providers

of

In order to avoid the situation in which under- and overdisbursements cancel each other out, the ratio is inverted in cases where the numerator is greater than the denominator. This is consistent with the approach taken 3 in OECD (2011). Note however that when aggregating (globally, by country or by provider of development co-operation), a weighted average is now used. i.e. sum of all numerator values divided by the sum of all denominator values. This replaces the average country ratio used in OECD (2011) and previous work.

Baseline

Proposed target for 2015

2010 (estimate, 78 countries): 75%

Halve the gap – halve the proportion of development cooperation funding not disbursed within the fiscal year for which it was scheduled Rationale: based on Paris Declaration target

3

OECD (2011), Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, OECD, Paris, available online at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/aid-effectiveness-2011_9789264125780-en

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Indicator 5b. Development co-operation is more predictable (medium-term predictability) Relevant Busan commitment “By 2013... provide available, regular, timely rolling three- to five-year indicative forward expenditure and/or implementation plans as agreed in Accra...” (Busan §24a). Indicator construction

Measure

Developing country government determines whether, on the basis of its records, a forward expenditure plan is available for each co-operation provider covering the next one, two and three years. The forward spending plan must meet ALL THREE of the following criteria:

Estimated proportion of development co-operation covered by indicative forward expenditure and/or implementation plans for one, two and three years ahead.

x

Made available by the provider of development co-operation in written or electronic form;

x

Sets out clearly indicative information on future spending and/or implementation activities in the country;

x

Amounts are presented (at least) by year using the developing country’s fiscal year.

Additionally, for each year, to answer “YES” the information provided must meet BOTH of the following criteria: x

Comprehensive in its coverage of known sectors, types and modalities of support; and

x

Amount and currency of funding is clearly stated.

Data source

Aggregation

Data collected at country level (reporting by developing country governments on the availability of forward plans by each provider).

Indicator values for individual providers and for developing countries will serve as a basis for global aggregation.

Baseline

Proposed target

To be determined based on data collection in 2013.

Halve the gap – halve the proportion of development cooperation not covered by indicative forward spending plans provided at the country level. Rationale: following the same approach as for in-year predictability (see indicator 5a).

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Indicator 6. Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny Relevant Busan commitment Busan commitment to “...strengthen the role of parliaments in the oversight of development processes” (§21a); and also Accra commitment to “facilitate parliamentary oversight by implementing greater transparency in public financial management, including public disclosure of revenues, budgets, expenditures...” (AAA §24). Indicator construction

Measure

Numerator:

Development co-operation funding recorded in annual budget for year n.

Denominator:

Development co-operation funding scheduled for disbursement in year n by co-operation providers and communicated to developing country government at the outset of year n

% of development co-operation funding scheduled for disbursement that is recorded in the annual budgets approved by the legislatures of developing countries. Note that this indicator builds on the broad approach used in Paris Declaration indicator 3

Note that the denominator used in this indicator is the same as that used in the calculation of indicator 5a (annual predictability) Data source

Aggregation

Data collected at the country level (data taken from existing government budgets and self-reporting by providers of development co-operation)

In order to avoid the situation in which under- and overestimates cancel each other out, the ratio is inverted in cases where the numerator is greater than the denominator. This is consistent with the approach taken in OECD (2011). Note however that when aggregating (global, developing country or co-operation provider), a weighted average is now used. i.e. sum of all numerator values divided by the sum of all denominator values. This replaces the average country ratio used in OECD (2011) and previous work.

Baseline

Proposed target

To be determined and only available for countries having the calendar year as a fiscal year (data for the denominator are currently available only by calendar year)

Halve the gap – halve the proportion of development cooperation flows to the government sector not reported on government’s budget(s) (with at least 85% reported on budget)

For reference, aid captured in budgets in 2010 as a percentage of aid disbursements (PD indicator 3, 78 countries): 41%

Baseline year 2010 Rationale: Paris Declaration target

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Indicator 7. Mutual accountability among co-operation actors is strengthened through inclusive reviews Relevant Busan commitment Paris commitment to jointly assess mutual progress in implementing aid effectiveness commitments (PD §50). Accra commitment to ensure mutual assessment reviews in place in all countries, with stronger parliamentary scrutiny and citizen engagement (AAA §24b). Busan commitment to encourage participation of all development co-operation actors in these processes (§18d); agree country-led frameworks to monitor progress and promote mutual accountability (§35a). Indicator construction

Measure

Numerator:

Number of countries considered to have a mutual assessment

Denominator:

Total number of countries

% of countries that undertake inclusive mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments and meet at least four of the five proposed criteria

A country is considered to have a mutual assessment in place when at least four of the five criteria below are met: x Existence of an aid or partnership policy that defines a country’s development co-operation priorities x Existence of country-level targets for effective development co-operation for both developing country government and providers of development co-operation x Assessment against these targets undertaken jointly by government and providers at senior level in the past two years Active involvement of local governments and x non-executive stakeholders in such reviews. x Comprehensive results of such exercises are made public

Note that this indicator takes the form of an improved version of Paris Declaration indicator 12

Data source

Aggregation

Country-level data. Self-reporting against established criteria, using UNDESA work on mutual accountability

The unit of observation is the individual developing country (score across five dimensions). Global aggregation based on % of countries meeting at least four of the five criteria.

Baseline

Proposed target

2010 estimate * = 38% (of 78 countries)

All developing countries assessment reviews in place

* Note that the criteria proposed in the current methodology have evolved since those used to collect the 2010 baseline. As such this is an estimate only

Rationale: Paris target

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have

inclusive

mutual


Indicator 8. Gender equality and women’s empowerment In the spirit of the on-going discussions on the post-2015 development framework, countries at all stages of development are welcome to share evidence on their efforts in this area and performance against this indicator in view of the interest in advancing mutual learning and the exchange of experiences. Relevant Busan commitment “[We will] accelerate and deepen efforts to collect, disseminate, harmonise and make full use of data disaggregated by sex to inform policy decisions and guide investments, ensuring in turn that public expenditures are targeted appropriately to benefit both women and men.” (Busan §20a). Indicator construction

Measure

Numerator: Number of countries that have a system for tracking allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment

Proportion of developing countries with systems to track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment

Denominator: Total number of countries It is suggested that in order to be considered to “have a system in place”, countries would need to fulfill two of the following criteria, noting that criteria 4 is required: 1. There is an official government statement on a system for tracking allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment. This can for example be a framework or legislation on gender responsive budgeting. 2. Allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment are systematically tracked. 3. There is leadership and oversight of the tracking system by the central government unit in charge of public expenditures (for example the Finance Ministry or a sector ministry). 4. Gender equality focused budget information is publically available. This could be through parliamentary oversight, civil society scrutiny, publications, websites or other means. Countries may indicate if they a) use gender-specific indicators and data disaggregated by sex to inform budget allocation decisions at sectoral and/or local/district level; and b) if they conduct regular impact assessments of budgets which address how women and men benefit respectively from government expenditures. Data source

Aggregation

UN Women corporate reporting, based on data collected from ministries of finance at country level, drawing on existing data sources wherever possible

The unit of observation is the individual developing country.

Baseline

Proposed target

Not available. Data from UN Women annual reports for 2013 will provide the baseline.

All developing countries have systems that track and make public allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment by 2015.

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Global aggregation: percentage of developing countries.


Indicator 9a. Quality of developing country PFM systems Relevant Busan commitment Paris Declaration commitments to strengthen country systems at the same time as increasing their use (PD §17-30; reaffirmed in Busan §19) Indicator construction

Measure

This indicator takes the form of a score ranging from 1.0 (lowest) to 6.0 (highest), scored in half-point increments (0.5).

Same as Paris Declaration indicator 2a This indicator is based on the World Bank Country Policy 4 and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). It takes the value of one CPIA criterion – indicator 13 – which offers a measure of the quality of a developing country’s budget and financial management system

The following three dimensions are rated by the World Bank using established criteria: a. b.

c.

a comprehensive and credible budget, linked to policy priorities; effective financial management systems to ensure that the budget is implemented as intended in a controlled and predictable way; and timely and accurate accounting and fiscal reporting, including timely and audited public accounts and effective arrangements for follow up.

All three dimensions are given equal weighting. See World Bank (2010) for the detailed criteria underpinning each dimension. Data source

Aggregation

World Bank (existing international dataset, published on an annual basis and available for IDA countries).

The unit of observation is the individual developing country.

Baseline

When aggregating to the global level, the measure used is the percentage of developing countries moving up at least one measure (i.e. 0.5 points) since the baseline year. Proposed target for 2015

2010 (for countries participating in the 2011 PD Survey): CPIA PFM Score

>=5

4.5

4.0

3.5

3

<3.0

Half of developing countries move up at least one measure (i.e. 0.5 points) on the PFM/CPIA scale of performance

All

Rationale: Paris Declaration target Num. of countries %

0

2

8

25

12

0%

4%

14%

45%

21%

9

56

16% 100%

4 World Bank (2012), CPIA 2012, Operations http://www.worldbank.org/ida/IRAI-2012.html

Policy

and

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Country

Services,

World

Bank,

available

online

at:


Indicator 9b. Use of country PFM and procurement systems Relevant Busan commitment Paris Declaration (§21, 26) and Accra (§15) commitments, as reaffirmed in Busan. Busan commitment to “use country systems as the default approach for development co-operation in support of activities managed by the public sector” (§19a) Indicator construction Numerator:

Denominator:

Measure Note that this indicator combines Paris Declaration indicators 5a (use of country PFM systems) and 5b (use of country procurement systems) to offer a single composite indicator

Development co-operation flows using country systems (average of a, b ,c and d) Total development co-operation flows for the government sector

where: a = Development co-operation funding disbursed for the government sector using national budget execution procedures b = Development co-operation funding disbursed for the government sector using national financial reporting procedures c = Development co-operation funding disbursed for the government sector using national auditing procedures d = Development co-operation funding disbursed for the government sector using national procurement systems Data source Country-level data (self-reporting development co-operation)

% of development co-operation disbursements for the government sector using the developing country’s PFM and procurement systems (average across use of four components a-d below)

Aggregation by

providers

of

Developing country, co-operation provider, global: total of numerators divided by total of denominators

Baseline

Proposed target for 2015

2010 (78 countries): 49%

Country target depends on score for indicator 9a above (quality of PFM systems): x Reduce the gap by two thirds – a two-thirds reduction in % of development co-operation funding not using country PFM and procurement systems for countries with a score of >=5 on indicator 9a x Reduce the gap by one third – a one-third reduction in % of development co-operation not using country PFM and procurement systems for countries with a score between 3.5 and 4.5 on indicator 9a Rationale: based on the logic underpinning the Paris Declaration target (though procurement is now one of the four components of country systems now included in the indicator, rather than being subject to a separate target)

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Indicator 10. Aid is untied Relevant Busan commitment “Pursuant to the Accra Agenda for Action, we will accelerate our efforts to untie aid.” (§18e) Indicator construction

Measure

Numerator:

Amount of untied ODA

Same as Paris Declaration indicator 8

Denominator:

Total ODA

% of ODA that is fully untied For detailed definitions, see OECD (2007)

5

Data source

Aggregation

Existing international data source: self-reporting on tying status by providers of development co-operation through the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System

Developing country, co-operation provider, global: total of numerators divided by total of denominators

Baseline

Proposed target

2009 (all bilateral ODA): 79%

Continued progress over time Rationale: Paris target

5

OECD (2007), Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System, 4 September, DCD/DAC(2007), Reporting directives for the Creditor Reporting System, available online at: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/crsdirectives

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ANNEX II – QUESTIONS AND COLLECTION AT COUNTRY LEVEL

DEFINITIONS

TO

GUIDE

DATA

This annex provides advice to assist developing country authorities in collecting the data and to enable providers of development co-operation and other stakeholders to engage in the process. It includes guiding questions to support data collection for each indicator using country-level sources of information as well as detailed definitions for key concepts to ensure accurate reporting. More specific and detailed questions and answers related to all aspects of implementing the Global Partnership monitoring framework can be found under the “Frequently Asked Questions” of the monitoring section the Global Partnership community space (see Helpdesk in Part II of this document).

GENERAL DEFINITIONS Development cooperation transactions to be recorded

For the purpose of the monitoring framework of the Global Partnership, development co-operation funding primarily refers to Official Development Assistance (ODA). This includes all the official transactions as defined in OECD-DAC Statistical Directives (OECD, 2007), including grants or loans to developing countries which are: x undertaken with the promotion of the economic development and welfare as the main objective; and x concessional in character (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25%). In addition, developing countries interested to monitor the effectiveness of a broader range of development co-operation funding (e.g. non concessional lending) are encouraged to do so, provided that the following criteria are met: x official source (bilateral of multilateral); x promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; x the grant element is too low to qualify as ODA.

Development cooperation transactions NOT to be recorded

Disbursements

The following official transactions are excluded from the scope of the Global Partnership monitoring framework and should not be recorded: x transactions made to beneficiaries that are not based in the country receiving development co-operation funding or to regional organisations which cannot be identified at country level; x debt reorganisation/restructuring; and x emergency and relief assistance. A disbursement is the placement of resources at the disposal of a developing country as defined above (see development co-operation transactions). Resources provided in-kind should only be included when the value of the resources have been monetised in an agreement or in a document communicated to government. Where development co-operation funding is provided to the developing country as part of a provider of development co-operation’s regional (multi-country) programme and it is possible to identify those activities and disbursements that are specific to that developing country, these disbursements should also be recorded. In order to avoid double counting in cases where one provider of development co-operation disburses funds on behalf of another, it is only the provider who makes the final disbursement to the government who should report on these funds. The only exception to this is Qp4, against which providers should record total development co-operation funds channelled through other providers (in the case of delegated co-operation, funds provided through multilateral organisations at the country level or multi-donor trust funds administered by another provider).

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Disbursements for government sector

the

Development co-operation funding disbursed in the context of an agreement with administrations (ministries, departments, agencies or municipalities) authorised to receive revenue or undertake expenditures on behalf of central government. This includes works, goods or services delegated or subcontracted by these administrations to other entities such as: x

non-governmental organisations (NGOs);

x

semi-autonomous government agencies (e.g. parastatals), or;

x

private companies.

For the purpose of reporting against indicators 5a (annual predictability), 6 (aid on budget) and 9b (use of country PFM and procurement systems), development co-operation funding focuses on disbursements for the government sector. Exchange rates

Reporting should be made in US Dollars. A table of exchange rates is provided in the monitoring section of the Global Partnership community site.

Provider of development co-operation

A provider of development co-operation is a country, organisation or official agency - including state and local governments and multilateral institutions – that provide development co-operation funding. Under this definition, non-governmental organisations (NGO) and private companies are not considered providers of development co-operation, even when they implement programmes funded by providers of development co-operation. Notes: i. Data concerning providers of development co-operation that have different entities (agencies of distinct programmes) should be combined6. ii. In order to avoid double counting in cases where one provider of development co-operation disburses funds on behalf of another provider – bilateral or multilateral, it is only the provider of development co-operation who makes the final disbursement to the government that should report on these funds.

Reporting year of reference

The reporting year of reference is the latest fiscal year of the developing country for which there is information available on relevant aspects of development co-operation.

This also means that all data from providers of development co-operation is expected to be provided according to the developing country government’s fiscal year. In developing countries where the fiscal year differs from the calendar year, and where monitoring data is easily available through existing systems, governments may wish to complement fiscal year data with calendar year data. While this would remain optional, it would contribute to facilitate aggregation and comparability of data. Note that for most indicators, the reporting year of reference is likely to be 2012 (or the fiscal year ending in 2012 or 2013).

6

UN agencies are encouraged to report individually at country level. However, for the purpose of Busan global monitoring efforts, only combined reporting from ALL UN agencies should be included in the Country spread sheet. Results at the global level will be presented under a single heading: “United Nations”, with the exception of IFAD.

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INDICATOR 1: DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION IS FOCUSED ON RESULTS THAT MEET DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ PRIORITIES Note: Given the complex nature of this indicator as well as various approaches to country results frameworks, a more detailed and targeted consultation is required at country level in a selected number of countries interested to pilot the indicator. This will be done from July-September under the guidance of the UNDP-OECD joint support team and in consultation with the full range of interested stakeholders. This indicator seeks to measure the extent to which transparent, country-led and country-level results frameworks and platforms are adopted as a common tool among all concerned actors to assess performance based on indicators drawn from country development priorities and goals while providers of development co-operation minimise their use of additional and parallel frameworks. The preliminary methodology to assess the extent to which providers of development cooperation use country results frameworks identifies several dimensions which could be used for constructing various scenarios for each dimensions against a high, medium and low scale of use. This approach attempts to capture the complex nature of this indicator. However, this raises challenges in conducting the necessary assessments to inform this indicator and to ensure consistency across countries and in each country, across providers of development co-operation. Given that there has been no previous measurement undertaken to assess progress in this area, it is proposed to further refine and test this methodology through a piloting process in a limited number of countries interested and having the capacity to engage in this area in the coming months. The Joint Support Team will provide further guidance and advisory support to the national focal points as the countries undertake the pilot assessment using the following methodology and set of criteria/questions.

Countries interested to test this methodology and pilot the indicator are invited to contact the joint support team by 15 July.

QUESTIONS TO BE INTEGRATED IN COUNTRY-LEVEL DATA COLLECTION PROCESS Questions will be developed to assess the use of country results frameworks against the following dimensions: 1.

The extent to which a provider of development co-operation uses the objectives and targets from the National Development Strategy as a reference to deliver and assess the performance of its own country programme.

(Could be measured through examination of the provider’s Country Assistance Strategy, sector agreements with government or project documents) 2.

The extent to which a provider of development co-operation uses the partner country’s Results Framework and its associated M&E systems, including national statistical systems, to monitor the progress of its programme and projects.

(Could be measured through the use of the country’s indicators, national statistics and M&E systems as reflected in actual reporting processes associated with Country Assistance Strategies, sector agreements, loan and grant agreements, project documents) 3.

The extent to which a provider of development co-operation’s country programme is aligned with the developing country’s own programmes.

(Could be measured through the importance of development co-operation funding delivered through programme-based approaches such as projects delivered in support to SWAps, basket/pooled funds or budget support) During the pilot stage, it is proposed to collect qualitative feedback using a more detailed set of questions covering the proposed dimensions. This pilot phase will aim to come up with concrete examples for each of the scenarios in

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order to develop the methodology and scoring criteria to help countries to make assessment and provide further guidance in identifying behavior matching various levels of performance. Initial feedback provided from different stakeholders confirmed the clarity and relevance of the proposed definitions for country results frameworks. This suggests that the proposed dimensions capture the key element of what constitutes country results frameworks. At the same time, feedback also suggested that further work in this area would need to consider an approach involving a much simpler assessment, focusing on actual practice. As different countries are at varying stages of developing their national development strategies and country results frameworks, appropriate ways to assess performance under this indicator may need to be identified to generate meaningful dialogue on this important agenda at country level.

DEFINITIONS Country results frameworks

Country results frameworks define a countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s approach to results and its associated monitoring and evaluation systems focusing on performance and achievement of development results. They include agreed objectives and output / outcome / impact indicators with baselines and targets to measure progress in implementing them, as stated in national development strategies, sector plans and other frameworks (e.g. budget support performance matrices). Such frameworks should have been developed through participatory processes, involving inclusive dialogue with relevant stakeholders at country level.

National development strategies

National development strategies include Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and/or similar overarching strategies. These are typically prepared to cover a clearly identified period of time covering several years. The quality of these national development strategies in operational terms depends on the extent to which they constitute a unified strategic framework to guide the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s development policy and include strategic priorities linked to a medium-term expenditure framework and reflected in annual budgets. They are expected to have been developed through an inclusive consultative process involving the full range of relevant development stakeholders at country level.

National statistical systems

The national statistical system includes all the statistical organisations and units within a country that jointly collect, process and disseminate official statistics on behalf of the national government.

Programme-based approaches

Programme-based approaches are a way of engaging in development co-operation based on the principles of co-ordinated support for a locally owned programme of development, such as a national development strategy, a sector programme, a thematic programme or a programme of a specific organisation. Programme-based approaches share the following features: i) leadership by the host country or organisation; ii) a single comprehensive programme and budget framework; iii) a formalised process for donor-coordination and harmonisation of procedures for reporting, budgeting, financial management and procurement; iv) efforts to increase the use of local systems for programme design and implementation, financial management, monitoring and evaluation. Providers of development co-operation can support and implement programme-based approaches in different ways and across a range of modalities, including budget support, sector budget support, project support, pooled arrangements and trust funds.

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INDICATOR 5A: DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION IS MORE PREDICTABLE (ANNUAL PREDICTABILITY) This indicator focuses on in-year predictability of development co-operation. In doing so, it recognises that shortfalls in the total amount of funding for the government sector and delays in the in-year disbursements of scheduled funds can have serious implications for a government’s ability to implement development policies and strategies as planned. This indicator measures the gap between development co-operation funding scheduled by providers of development co-operation and development co-operation funding effectively disbursed as reported by the provider. This indicator is not identical to indicator 7 of the former Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, though it is similar in many ways. It aims to provide a better proxy for predictability of disbursements than the indicator used in the Paris Declaration monitoring framework. In contrast with past measurement, data for both the numerator and denominator of the indicator are now sourced from providers of development co-operation. The inclusion of disbursements in the measurement of this indicator no longer depends on the recording of these disbursements by the developing country government in its accounts. Further changes include the reference period, which can now be the developing country’s fiscal year.

QUESTIONS TO BE INTEGRATED IN COUNTRY-LEVEL DATA COLLECTION PROCESS „ PROVIDER OF DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION „ How much development cooperation funding did you disburse at country-level in… Qp1. …the reporting year of reference ? USD ________ „ How much of this was for the government sector in… Qp2. … the reporting year of reference? USD ________ „ How much development co-operation funding for the government sector did you schedule for disbursement at country-level in … Qp3. … the reporting year of reference? USD ________ „ For reference purposes only, how much development co-operation funding for the government sector did you disburse through other providers (funds which are not captured in your responses to Qd1 – Qd3 above) at the country level in… Qp4. ... the reporting year of reference? USD ________

MEASUREMENT OF INDICATOR At the global level, this indicator is calculated as follows:  5 (%) = 100 ×

2 3

DEFINITIONS Development cooperation funding for the government sector scheduled for disbursement

Development co-operation funding scheduled for the reporting year of reference n are considered to have been “scheduled for disbursement” when notified to government within the reporting year of reference n-1; it includes development co-operation funding scheduled for disbursement in agreements entered during year n.

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INDICATOR 5B: DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION IS MORE PREDICTABLE (MEDIUM-TERM PREDICTABILITY This indicator focuses on medium-term predictability of development co-operation. In doing so, it recognises that lack of comprehensive and credible forward information on development co-operation funding can have serious implications for a governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to plan and implement policies and strategies, deliver public services and design and conduct sound macro-economic policy. This indicator measures whether developing country governments have at their disposal a forward expenditure and/or implementation plan for each provider of development co-operation over the period of the next three years. Such plans must cover all known components of the co-operation providerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s country programme. For example, they cover all development co-operation modalities used by that provider ( e.g. budget support, projects, technical cooperation, in-kind aid) and include estimates of future flows that have yet to be allocated to specific activities or signed in co-operation agreements (i.e. â&#x20AC;&#x153;unallocatedâ&#x20AC;? resource envelopes, which will be provided to the developing country, but where the modality/sector/activity of spending has yet to be decided).

QUESTIONS TO BE INTEGRATED IN COUNTRY-LEVEL DATA COLLECTION PROCESS Â&#x201E; GOVERNMENT â&#x20AC;&#x201C; For each provider of development co-operation: Has the provider of development co-operation made available a comprehensive forward expenditure and/or implementation plan setting out expected development co-operation flows in... Qg1. Fiscal year ending 2014? (Yes/No) _____ Qg2. Fiscal year ending 2015? (Yes/No) _____ Qg3. Fiscal year ending 2016? (Yes/No) _____ [For all questions if â&#x20AC;&#x153;Yesâ&#x20AC;?, report 1; if â&#x20AC;&#x153;Noâ&#x20AC;? report 0]

MEASUREMENT OF INDICATOR Indicator value for provider P in country C  = ( 1 + 2 + 3) 3 For country C for 1, 2 and 3 years ahead (y=1, 2, 3) Cy = average of Qg1, Qg2 and Qg3 respectively across all providers, weighted by the volume of the providerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s development co-operation disbursed in the reference year used for question Qp1. 1 =

â&#x2C6;&#x2018; ( â&#x2C6;&#x2014; 1) 

2 =

â&#x2C6;&#x2018; ( â&#x2C6;&#x2014; 2) 

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3 =

â&#x2C6;&#x2018; ( â&#x2C6;&#x2014; 3) 

Where Wp = weight assigned to each provider P based on disbursements reported for question Qp1  =

1 â&#x2C6;&#x2018; ( 1)

Note that using weighted averages is intended to provide an estimate of the scale of resources covered by indicative forward expenditure and/or implementation plans. This reflects the relative importance that a developing country attaches to obtaining forward spending information from a large co-operation provider vis-Ă -vis a small provider. The above indicator values for individual providers and for developing countries will serve as a basis for global aggregation.

DEFINITIONS Forward spending and/or implementation plan

The developing country government should, for every provider of development co-operation participating in the global monitoring process, establish whether or not it holds information on that cooperation providerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s forward spending and/or implementation plans in the country. The national co-ordinator /reporting entity should consult with ministries or departments responsible for managing development co-operation (typically finance, planning, foreign affairs...) to ascertain whether adequate information has been received from each co-operation provider. A forward spending and/or implementation plan meets ALL THREE of the following criteria: x

Made available by the provider of development co-operation in written or electronic form (e.g. a single document or â&#x20AC;&#x201C; where appropriate systems are made available in country â&#x20AC;&#x201C; entered appropriately in an aid information management system).

x

Sets out clearly indicative information on future spending and/or implementation activities in the country, including:

x

o

programmed or committed resources, where the activity and modality is known; and

o

other resources that have yet to be allocated to specific activities in the country.

Amounts are presented by year (or in greater detail â&#x20AC;&#x201C; e.g. by quarter or month) using the

developing countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s fiscal year. Expected development co-operation flows in fiscal year ending in year 2014, 2015, 2016

A plan may be available which meets all of the criteria above, but the information provided may vary for different years. In responding to questions Qg1, Qg2 and Qg3, national coordinators should examine the data for each year. (The reason for this is that a forward spending/implementation plan may provide comprehensive information for next year, but not the following year). For each year, answer 1 (â&#x20AC;&#x153;Yesâ&#x20AC;?) if the information provided meets BOTH of the following additional criteria: x

Comprehensive in its coverage of known sectors, types and modalities of support (for example, a provider using both project and budget support modalities should include the amounts foreseen under both modalities); and

x

The amount and currency of development co-operation funding is clearly stated (where support takes the form of technical co-operation and the provision of goods and services in kind, the cost of these planned activities is provided).

Where these above additional criteria are NOT met for a given year, or where the three criteria defining a forward spending / implementation plan (definition above) are NOT met, answer 0 (â&#x20AC;&#x153;Noâ&#x20AC;?).

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INDICATOR 6: AID IS ON BUDGETS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY

The formulation of the budget is a central feature of the policy process in all countries. So the degree to which financial contributions from providers of development co-operation to the government sector are fully and accurately reflected in the budget provides a significant indication of the degree to which there is a serious effort to connect development co-operation programmes with country policies and process and to support domestic oversight and accountability for the use of development co-operation funding and results. Budget support is always on budget, but other modalities including project support can and should also be recorded on budget, even if funds do not pass through the country’s treasury. This indicator builds on the broad approach used in indicator 3 of the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, while introducing modifications that are intended to make it a better proxy for budget comprehensiveness. In other words, the indicator tries to capture the extent to which budgets cover resources expected at the time of their formulation. The denominator is now the amount of development co-operation funding scheduled for disbursement at the outset of year n, rather than ex-post disbursements. This separates the measurement of the extent to which government budgets reflect ex-ante aid estimates (indicator 6) from the measurement of predictability, that is the extent to which scheduled funds are actually disbursed or the realism of estimates (captured by indicator 5a).

QUESTIONS TO BE INTEGRATED IN COUNTRY-LEVEL DATA COLLECTION PROCESS „ GOVERNMENT „ How much estimated development co-operation funding was recorded in the annual budget as grants, revenue or loans (concessional and non-concessional)? Qg4. In the annual budget of the reporting year of reference: USD ________ Note that the denominator for this indicator is the same as that used in the calculation of indicator 5a (annual predictability).

MEASUREMENT OF INDICATOR At the global level, this indicator is calculated as follows:  6 (%) = 100 ×

4 3

DEFINITIONS Annual budget

It is the annual budget as it was originally approved by the legislature. In order to support discipline and credibility of the budget preparation process, subsequent revisions to the original annual budget — even when approved by the legislature — should NOT be recorded under question Qg4. This is because it is the credibility of the original, approved budget that is important to measure and because revisions to the annual budget in many cases are retroactive.

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INDICATOR 7: MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY AMONG DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION ACTORS IS STRENGTHENED THROUGH INCLUSIVE REVIEWS

This indicator seeks to measure progress made by developing countries in undertaking mutual assessment reviews. This indicator takes the form of a modified version of indicator 12 of the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2011) to build on the lessons learned and evidence on national-level mutual accountability (including evidence generated by UNDESA for the United Nations Development Co-operation Forum). Further refinements to the criteria and methodology underpinning this indicator have been introduced to better capture the extent of involvement of stakeholders going beyond governments to include civil society stakeholders and parliamentarians, for example. A country is considered to have a mutual assessment of progress in place for the purpose of measuring this indicator when at least four of the five proposed criteria are met, providing a graduated assessment of progress. The set of questions to inform the assessment of this indicator will further benefit from a more in-depth assessment of the situation, progress, and challenges of establishing and strengthening national mutual accountability frameworks through the national Mutual Accountability survey, administered and rolled out by UN DESA in close collaboration with UNDP. At country level, national coordinators are encouraged to liaise closely with the UN Country Team/UNDP to explore opportunities to synchronize and harmonize the assessment process by embedding the dialogue on national mutual accountability survey at a validation meeting/consultation for the global monitoring process and vice versa.

QUESTIONS TO BE INTEGRATED IN COUNTRY-LEVEL DATA COLLECTION PROCESS Questions Qg5, Qg6, Qg7, Qg8 and Qg9 below are drawn from the survey on mutual accountability conducted by UNDESA for the United Nations Development Co-operation Forum (DCF). UNDESA will coordinate a more in-depth survey on mutual accountability in the fourth quarter of 2013 in preparation for the 2014 DCF. Â&#x201E; GOVERNMENT Qg5. Is there an aid policy or partnership policy in place defining a countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s development co-operation priorities (or elements of such a policy agreed through other instruments)? (Yes/No) Qg6. Are there specific country-level targets for effective development co-operation for both the developing country government and providers of development co-operation? (Yes/No) Qg7. Has an assessment towards these targets been undertaken jointly by the developing country government and providers of development co-operation at senior level in the past two years? (Yes/No) Qg8. Have non-executive stakeholders (i.e. civil society organisations, private sector and parliamentarians) and local governments been actively involved in such reviews? (Yes/No) Qg9. Have comprehensive results of such exercises been made public in a timely manner? (Yes/No)

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MEASUREMENT OF INDICATOR At the global level, this indicator is calculated as follows: .       !       â&#x201E;&#x17D;     # ( 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)  7 (%      ) = 100 Ă&#x2014;   .       $ &    â&#x201E;&#x17D;   !     

DEFINITIONS Aid or partnership policy

A document which sets out agreed approaches to the delivery of development co-operation in the developing country, containing agreed principles, processes and/or targets designed to improve its effectiveness. This may take the form of a stand-alone policy or strategy document, or may be addressed within another document (for example, as part of a national development strategy or similar). The document has been the subject of an inclusive consultation between the developing country government, providers of development co-operation and other interested development stakeholders.

Country-level targets for effective development cooperation

Country-level targets for effective development co-operation have been established in line with Paris, Accra and Busan commitments. They may, however, go beyond the Busan Partnership agreement wherever the developing country government and providers of development co-operation agree to do so. Targets exist for both the developing country government and providers of development cooperation, providing the basis for assessing: the developing countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s performance in implementing its development strategy; and the performance of providers of development co-operation against agreed commitments to deliver on the quantity, quality and effectiveness of their support.

Mutual reviews

Mutual assessment reviews are exercises that engage at national level both developing country authorities and providers of development co-operation at senior level in a review of mutual performance. These reviews should be conducted through inclusive dialogue involving a broad range of government ministries (including line ministries and relevant departments, at central and local level), providers of development co-operation (bilateral, multilateral and global initiatives) as well as non-executive stakeholders, including parliamentarians, private sector and civil society organisations.

assessment

These assessments are undertaken on a regular basis (e.g. every one to two years) and might be supplemented through independent/impartial reviews. The comprehensive results of such assessments should be made publicly available in a timely manner through appropriate means to ensure transparency. For the purpose of assessing progress against indicator 7, a country is considered to have a mutual assessment review in place when the response to at least four of the five questions Qg5, Qg6, Qg7, Qg8 and Qg9 is â&#x20AC;&#x153;Yesâ&#x20AC;?.

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INDICATOR 9B: USE OF COUNTRY PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS

This indicator combines the Paris Declaration 5a (use of PFM systems) and 5b (use of procurement systems) to offer a single composite indicator. It focuses on the use of developing countries’ public financial management (PFM) and procurement systems when funding from providers of development co-operation is provided to the government sector, without applying safeguard measures. National systems for the management of funds are those established in the general legislation (and related regulations) of the country and implemented by the line management functions of the government. No particular development co-operation modalities automatically qualify as using country PFM and procurement systems. Most modalities including project support can be designed to use country PFM and procurement systems. A set of criteria are presented below to help providers of development co-operation determine when they are, and when they are not, using country PFM and procurement systems.

QUESTIONS TO BE INTEGRATED IN COUNTRY-LEVEL DATA COLLECTION PROCESS „ PROVIDER OF DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION „ In the reporting year of reference, how much development co-operation funding disbursed for the government sector used… Qp5.

…national budget execution procedures (USD)? ________

Qp6.

…national financial reporting procedures (USD)? ________

Qp7.

…national auditing procedures (USD)? ________

Qp8

… national procurement systems (USD)? ________

MEASUREMENT OF INDICATOR At the global level, this indicator is calculated as follows:  ( 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 )  9 (%) = 100 × ' 2

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DEFINITIONS Use of national budget execution procedures

Providers of development co-operation use national budget execution procedures when the funds they provide are managed according to the national budgeting procedures established in the general legislation and implemented by government. This means that programmes supported by providers of development co-operation are subject to normal country budgetary execution procedures, namely procedures for authorisation, approval and payment. Providers of development co-operation are invited to review all their development co-operation activities with a view to determining how funding for the government sector meet three out of the four criteria below (anything less does not qualify):

Use of national financial reporting procedures

1.

Are your funds included in the annual budget approved by country legislature? (Y/N)

2.

Are your funds subject to established country budget execution procedures? (Y/N)

3.

Are your funds processed (e.g. deposited & disbursed) through the established country treasury system? (Y/N)

4.

You do NOT require the opening of separate bank accounts for your funds? (Y/N).7

Legislative frameworks normally provide for specific types of financial reports to be produced as well as periodicity of such reporting. The use of national financial reporting means that providers of development co-operation do not impose additional requirements on governments for financial reporting. In particular providers of development co-operation do NOT require: i) maintenance of a separate accounting system to satisfy the provider of development co-operation’s reporting requirements, and ii) creation of a separate chart of accounts to record the use of funds from the provider of development co-operation. Providers of development co-operation are invited to review all their development activities with a view to determining how much funding for the government sector meet BOTH criteria below (anything less does not qualify):

1. You do NOT require maintenance of a separate accounting system to satisfy your own reporting requirements? (Y/N)8

2. You ONLY require financial reports prepared using country’s established financial reporting arrangements? (Y/N)

7 8

Budget execution — Yes: you do not require opening separate accounts. No: you do require opening separate accounts. Financial reporting — Yes: you do not require a separate accounting system. No: you do require a separate accounting system.

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Use of national auditing procedures

Providers of development co-operation rely on the audit opinions, issued by the country's supreme audit institution, on the government's normal financial reports/statements as defined above. The use of national auditing procedures means that providers of development co-operation do not make additional requirements on governments for auditing. Providers of development co-operation are invited to review all their development activities with a view to determining how much development co-operation funding for the government sector meet BOTH criteria below9 :

1.

Are your funds subject to audit carried out under the responsibility of the Supreme Audit Institution? (Y/N)

2.

You do NOT under normal circumstances request additional audit arrangements10? (Y/N)11

AND at least one of the two criteria below:

Use of national procurement systems

3.

You do NOT require audit standards different from those adopted by the Supreme Audit Institution? (Y/N)12

4.

You do NOT require the Supreme Audit Institution to change its audit cycle to audit your funds? (Y/N)13

Providers of development co-operation use national procurement systems when the funds they provide for the implementation of projects and programmes are managed according to the national procurement procedures as they were established in the general legislation and implemented by government. The use of national procurement procedures means that providers of development cooperation do not make additional, or special, requirements on governments for the procurement of works, goods and services. (Where weaknesses in national procurement systems have been identified, providers of development co-operation may work with developing countries in order to improve the efficiency, economy, and transparency of their implementation).

9

Note: where development co-operation funding is provided to parastatal entities (for example, public enterprises) and these entities are not subject to audit by the Supreme Audit Institution, the following criteria should be considered:

Providers of development co-operation are invited to review all their development activities with a view to determining how much development co-operation funding for the government sector meet BOTH criteria below: 1. Are your funds subject to audit carried out under the regular audit procedures established for the audit of parastatal entities? (Y/N) 2. You do NOT under normal circumstances request additional audit arrangements? (Y/N) AND at least one of the two criteria below: 3. You do NOT require audit standards different from those adopted by the partner country for the audit of parastatal entities? (Y/N) 4. You do NOT require a change in the audit cycle of the parastatal entity to audit your funds? (Y/N) 10

Reserving the right to make an exceptional audit (e.g. when fraud or corruption is discovered) does not count against this criteria.

11

Yes: providers do not require additional audits. No: providers do require additional audits.

12

Yes: providers do not require different audit standards. No: providers do require different audit standards.

13

Yes: providers do not require to change the audit cycle. No: providers do require change to the audit cycle.

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OPTIONAL â&#x20AC;&#x201C; INDICATOR 8 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMENâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;S EMPOWERMENT

This indicator seeks to measure government efforts to track and make public resource allocations for gender equality. It does so by encouraging national governments to develop appropriate budget tracking and monitoring systems and commit to making information about allocations for gender equality readily accessible to the public. A country is considered to have a system in place for the purpose of measuring this indicator when at least two of the four proposed criteria are met, noting that the forth criteria needs to be met (see question Qg13). UN Women in collaboration with the OECD-DAC Network on Gender Equality (GENDERNET) has developed a methodology and set of criteria to roll out this global indicator at country level and to monitor performance against this indicator over time. The UN Women is planning to support the roll out the indicator in 20 countries14 in 2013 and all its 65 UN-Women programme countries by 2017 as part of its annual organizational reporting process. The methodology was tested in March-April 2013 in 15 countries and is now available for all countries interested to use the indicator, beyond the 20 initial countries covered by UN-Women. Countries interested to use the indicator are invited to use the methodology and include data in their country spread sheet.

QUESTIONS TO BE INTEGRATED IN COUNTRY-LEVEL DATA COLLECTION PROCESS Â&#x201E; GOVERNMENT Qg10. Is there an official government statement on a system for tracking allocations for gender equality and womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s empowerment? (Yes/No) Qg11. Are allocations for gender equality and womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s empowerment systematically tracked? (Yes/No) Qg12. Is there leadership and oversight of the tracking system by the central government unit in charge of public expenditures? (Yes/No) Qg13. Is gender equality focussed budget information publically available (e.g. through Parliamentary oversight and civil society scrutiny, publications, websites or other means)? (Yes/No) Additionally, countries may indicate if they: x use gender-specific indicators and data disaggregated by sex to inform budget allocation decisions at sectoral and/or local/district level; x if they conduct regular impact assessments of budgets and expenditures which address how women and men benefit respectively from government expenditures.

MEASUREMENT OF INDICATOR At the global level, this indicator is calculated as follows: .       !   *   â&#x201E;&#x17D;      # ( 10, 11, 12, 13)  8 (%      ) = 100 Ă&#x2014;   .       $ &    â&#x201E;&#x17D;   !     

14

The 20 countries include: Bolivia, Cameroon, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Palestinian Authority, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Ukraine, Tanzania.

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DEFINITIONS Systems to track allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment

These are the processes and procedures in place to plan, approve, allocate and monitor public expenditures at the national and sectoral level in a way that ensures that expenditures are targeted appropriately to benefit both women and men. Such systems can include gender budget statements, classifiers, gender markers, and even preliminary guidelines as outlined in call circulars. The system in place is overseen by a governmental body, in most cases the Ministry of Finance that considers gender impact in budget decisions and incorporates measures to mitigate any adverse impact on gender equality and women’s empowerment.

Allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment

Allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment can be defined as: x Resources allocated at sector and local level for programmes that specifically target only women or girls (direct allocation). x Resources allocated at sector and local level to actions that target both women and men equally but gender equality is a specific objective. For example an action that promotes employment of women and men, equal representation within management posts, and equal pay (direct allocation). x Resources allocated at sector and local level to actions where gender is mainstreamed. For example, an infrastructure project that doesn’t include gender equality as an explicit objective but includes women as beneficiaries (indirect allocations).

Systematically tracked

“Systematically tracked” means that a tracking process is planned and regularly conducted. For instance, if the tracking of budgets allocations towards gender equality is officially planned and conducted annually by an identifiable or designated body it can be said that allocations for gender equality are systematically tracked.

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՛ ᫊Ꮺᢚ⹺ጦᤊ Ěᕮᢞ⫺⪦ࣶ᫛ὢ⵷Ӫቃ᫊❂ӎỲ‫⹺׷‬὆Ӯဖ 



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www.csopartnership.org

CSO KEY ASKS Key CSO Messages for the Mexico High Level Meeting

In 2011, civil society organizations (CSOs) called upon all development actors to achieve a bold outcome at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness by: โ€ข Fully evaluating and deepening the Paris and Accra commitments; โ€ข Strengthening development effectiveness through practices based on human rights standards; โ€ข Supporting CSOs as independent development actors in their own right, and committing to an enabling environment for their work in all countries; and โ€ข Promoting an equitable and just development cooperation architecture. The CSO Key Asks on the Road to Busan remained an important guide for CSO engagement with the process of reforming the aid system through development effectiveness advocacy, now pursued by the open platform called CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE). CPDE brings together CSOs from all over the world with the vision of realizing human rights, social justice, equality (including gender equality) and sustainability in development.            ments in areas crucial to civil society such as democratic ownership (ยง12a), gender equality (ยง20) and enabling environment for CSOs (ยง22), and bound all stakeholders to the shared principles of ownership, results, inclusive development partnerships, and transparency and accountability (ยง11). However, two years after these commitments were made, the lack of political will to implement the overall agenda and the consequent slow progress are undeniable. Thus, as the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) prepares to         !"#$ % $&' in April 2014, CSOs are calling on all development actors to ensure an urgent and meaningful    &   *     +

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A. DEEPER IMPLEMENTATION OF PARIS AND ACCRA PRINCIPLES

    /       7 ical space or infringing on basic rights and freedoms.

       /     business in implementing Paris and Accra principles and commitments and recommits all actors that signed on to them. CSOs reiterate the call on development actors to:

â&#x20AC;˘ Focus support on strengthening sustainability of a diversity of CSOs as development actors in their own right. 3 $  &           dards for enabling conditions for CSOs. â&#x20AC;˘ Support efforts in CSO accountability as guided by the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness.

â&#x20AC;˘ End policy conditionality. â&#x20AC;˘ Fully untie all forms of aid and implement demand-driven technical assistance. 35  ' '     + 36   %' 7* + â&#x20AC;˘ Orient private sector development for sustainable livelihoods. â&#x20AC;˘ Operationalize inclusive accountability frameworks at country and global levels. â&#x20AC;˘ Adhere to the highest standards of transparency by all aid actors.

B. ACCELERATE & DEPEEN BUSAN COMMITMENTS While the Busan Partnership has moved the agenda beyond aid effectiveness, there is a need to strengthen development effectiveness in practice and overall adherence to human rights standards. To this end, CSOs strongly ask development actors to: â&#x20AC;˘ Ensure the realization of democratic ownership as the core aid and development effectiveness principle. â&#x20AC;˘ Practice inclusive multi-stakeholder policy dialogue. â&#x20AC;˘ Promote and implement gender equality and * 8  + â&#x20AC;˘ Entrench human rights, decent work, and sustainability in development policies, programmes and outcomes. â&#x20AC;˘ Commit to and implement rights-based approaches to development.

C. STRENGTHEN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR CSOs AS INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT ACTORS

D. PROMOTE EQUITABLE AND JUST DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ARCHITECTURE Stakeholders in Busan agreed to a more inclusive development framework as the foundation for effective development cooperation. For inclusive development       9 %  with people â&#x20AC;&#x201C; especially the poor and marginalized â&#x20AC;&#x201C; at the heart of development and must ensure human rights, equity and accountability. CSOs urge all stakeholders to: â&#x20AC;˘ Fast-track fundamental reforms in the global governance of development cooperation. â&#x20AC;˘ Agree on a comprehensive vision and policy framework to hold all actors including the private sector to account. â&#x20AC;˘ Ensure the functioning of an equitable and inclusive multilateral forum for policy dialogue and standard setting.

6<$&!"#$ 9=>   for the formulation of an Action Plan on implementing the Busan commitments *  %    and timetable to gauge global and country-level progress in key areas of development effectiveness towards achieving an equitable and just development.

The CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) is an open platform that unites CSOs from around the world on the issue of development effectiveness.

The commitment to create an enabling environment for CSOs falls short on establishing an accountability framework that enables CSOs to resist

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THE GLOBAL SECRETARIAT 114 Timog Avenue Quezon City, Philippines 1103 Phone: +632 9277060 to 62, loc. 208 Email: secretariat@csopartnership.org


56789::7;<=>9;?9;,6 January 2014 Preamble The CPDE advocates for a human rights-based approach (HRBA) in development. The HRBA argues that human rights are at the very heart of the development agenda, and therefore aid and development must be consistent with human rights instruments and norms, bridg#$%#$&'*$+/0$+1234+$*#%2&55&+$6+*65+$66'7'1084'$&#$&'*7'$/0$59 :34+$ *#%2&5 #5 + ;*0+6 <+&'%0*=> #$<136#$% $0& 0$1= &2' *#%2&5 %3+*+$&''6 #$ $+/0$+1 1'%#51+/0$+$6<0$5/&3/0$5>;3&&2'?311+**+=0?*#%2&503&1#$'6#$#$&'*$+/0$+1234+$ *#%2&5<0$7'$/0$5@#$<136#$%?0*'F+481'>&2'0$7'$/0$0$&2'1#4#$+/0$0?11G0*45 0?#5<*#4#$+/0$%+#$5&I04'$JIK>&2'L$&'*$+/0$+107'$+$&0$#7#1+$6M01#&#<+1N#%2&5+$6&2'0$7'$/0$0$&2'1#4#$+/0$0?11G0*450?N+<#+1#5<*#4#$+/0$O> 6'<1+*+/0$5@53<2+5&2'QSUVW$#&'6X+/0$5'<1+*+/0$0$&2'N#%2&&0'7'1084'$&O> &2'LYZ0*'Y+;03*[&+$6+*65+$6&2'*#%2&5&2+&2+7';''$+*/<31+&'6;=W$#&'6X+/0$5 treaty monitoring bodies. An HRBA seeks to empower the rights-holders (people) to hold the duty-bearers account+;1'@6'7'1084'$&5&+\'2016'*5O9]2#5*'^3#*'55#%$#_<+$&+88*0+<252#`#$6'7'1084'$& <008'*+/0$8*0%*+45+$68*0j'<&5>+5q'11+5>#$6'7'1084'$&'x'</7'$'55801#<#'5+$6 #$&'*$+/0$+1%10;+1%07'*$+$<'5&*3<&3*'59]2'5'520316;';+5'60$+<<03$&+;#1#&=4'<2+$#545+$6431/z5&+\'2016'*58+*/<#8+&0*=8*0<'55'5>;0&2+&604'5/<+$6#$&'*$+/0$+1 levels.

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56789::7;<=>9;?9;,6 ,6@;<7A7B9C:7;D899C7E=>9;CE9FE=:? 1. The CPDE recognises the UN Common Understanding of a Human Rights-Based Approach to Devel_`{|}~__`|€_}‚ƒ„„†‡1ˆ€‰€Š}‹Œ|‰€€``_€‘’~_“|”__•|–“—€–|Œ|_`{|}~€‘~_‰‚{Š€~|€–_}_‰ˆ“‹€~|€–_}_‰€}–‘‹Œ‹‰_‘‹|~—_˜€}‹‰€_}‰™š›‰‡ˆ`_Œ‹–‹}˜–|œ}‹_}€}–‘_| ||{|}~‰~__`|€_}€‹|€,žŸ • €`_˜€{{|‰_”–|Œ|_`{|}~‘__`|€_}ˆ`_‹‘‹|‰€}–~|‘’}‹‘€€‰‰‹‰~€}‘|‰’_Š–”Š~’|~’| |€‹‰€_}_”’Š{€}‹˜’~‰€‰€‹––_•}‹}~’|¡}‹Œ|‰€|‘€€_}_”,Š{€}ž‹˜’~‰€}–_~’| ‹}~|}€_}€’Š{€}‹˜’~‰‹}‰~Š{|}~‰¢ • ’Š{€}‹˜’~‰‰~€}–€–‰‘_}~€‹}|–‹}ˆ€}–`‹}‘‹`|‰–|‹Œ|–”_{ˆ~’|¡}‹Œ|‰€|‘€€_}_”,Š{€}ž‹˜’~‰€}–_~’|‹}~|}€_}€’Š{€}‹˜’~‰‹}‰~Š{|}~‰˜Š‹–|€–|Œ|_`{|}~‘__`|€_} €}–`_˜€{{‹}˜‹}€‰|‘~_‰€}–‹}€`’€‰|‰_”~’|`_˜€{{‹}˜`_‘|‰‰¢ • –|Œ|_`{|}~‘__`|€_}‘_}~‹“Š~|‰~_~’|–|Œ|_`{|}~_”~’|‘€`€‘‹|‰_”£–Š~—™“|€|‰¤~_ {||~~’|‹_“‹˜€_}‰€}–¥__”£‹˜’~‰™’_–|‰¤~_‘€‹{~’|‹‹˜’~‰¦ ƒ¦  }Š{“| _” ‘_{{‹§|– –|Œ|_`{|}~ €‘~_‰ ‚{Š€~|€ ¨ “‹€~|€ –_}_‰‡ ’€Œ| €|€–— `_}_Š}‘|–~’|‹‰Š``_~”_€},žˆ€}–€|–|‰‹˜}‹}˜`_‹‘‹|‰€}–`€‘‘€‹}‰~Š{|}~‰•‹~’‹}~’| “_Š}–€‹|‰_”~’|‹{€}–€~|‰€}–‘€`€‘‹|‰¦,_•|Œ|ˆ~’‹‰{€—|‰Š~‹}€”€˜{|}~€_}‹}‘_}‘|`~Š€€``_€‘’|‰€}–_`|€_}€{|~’_–‰‘_}‘|}‹}˜,ž‹{`|{|}~€_}¢ †¦_}‰|©Š|}~—ˆ~’|ª‘€‰”_–|Œ|_`{|}~‰~€«|’_–|‰~_|}–_‰|~’|›™ª‹}‘‹`|‰ ‚ƒ„„¬‡2”_`_{_}˜€}–‹}~|˜€}˜’Š{€}‹˜’~‰‹}–|Œ|_`{|}~`€‘‘|‰¦­’|‰|`‹}‘‹`|‰ˆ“Š‹–‹}˜_}~’|¡E‘_{{_}Š}–|‰~€}–‹}˜ˆ‰’_Š–‰|Œ|€‰“€‰‹‘_‹|}~€_}‰~_‹}”_{`_‹‘—–|‰‹˜}€}– `_˜€{{‹}˜ˆ€}–‹–|}”—~’|«|—€|€‰€}–€‘Œ‹|‰”_’€{_}‹|–€‘_}Ÿ  Q93#16+52+*'63$6'*5&+$6#$%0?&2'1#$\5;'&q''$234+$*#%2&50;1#%+/0$5+$66'7'1084'$&8*#0*#/'5&2*03%26#+10%3'  ‚9L6'$/?=+*'+50?53880*&&08+*&$'*%07'*$4'$&50$234+$*#%2&5  ƒ9[+?'%3+*6234+$*#%2&5#$8*0<'55'50?5&+&'z;3#16#$%  „9[3880*&&2'6'4+$65#6'0?234+$*#%2&5  …9M*040&'$0$z6#5<*#4#$+/0$+5+;+5#5?0*40*'#$<135#7'+$65&+;1'50<#'/'5  V90$5#6'*234+$*#%2&5#$6'<#5#0$50$+1#%$4'$&+$6+#6#$5&*34'$&5  †90$5#6'*43&3+1*'#$?0*<'4'$&;'&q''$234+$*#%2&5+$6+#6'x'</7'$'558*#$<#81'5  U90$02+*4  S9]+\'+2+*40$#}'6+$6%*+63+&'6+88*0+<2&06'&'*#0*+/$%234+$*#%2&55#&3+/0$5  Q‡9$53*'&2+&&2'5<+1#$%z380?+#6#5<0$63<#7'&0234+$*#%2&5 ®¦›}~’|“€‰‹‰_”~’|›™`‹}‘‹`|‰ˆ~’|ª’‹˜’‹˜’~‰~’€~`€‘‹`€_}~’_Š˜’{Š™‰~€«|’_–|`_‹‘—–‹€_˜Š|ˆ|{`_•|{|}~ˆ€‘‘_Š}~€“‹‹~—ˆ€}–}_}™–‹‰‘‹{‹}€_}‰’_Š–“|~’|{€‹}`‹lars for development programs planning. ¯¦­’|‰|‰’_Š–“|€‰_~’|`€€{|~|‰”_©Š€‹~—{_}‹~_‹}˜€}–€‰‰|‰‰{|}~_”–|Œ|_`{|}~`_1

’§`Ÿ¥¥•••¦Š}–˜¦_˜¥€‘’‹Œ|°–_‘‰¥±²¯²™­’|°,Š{€}°ž‹˜’~‰°€‰|–°``_€‘’°~_°|Œ|_`{|}~°__`|€_}°­_•€–‰°€°_{{_}°¡}–|‰~€}–‹}˜°€{_}˜°¡E¦`–” 2 ’§`Ÿ¥¥•••¦_|‘–¦_˜¥–|Œ|_`{|}~¥˜_Œ|}€}‘|™–|Œ|_`{|}~¥†²†¯„¬¬®¦`–”

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˜€{‰ˆ~’_Š˜’~’|Š‰|`_‘|‰‰|€~|–‹}–‹‘€~_‰|³|‘}˜–|{_‘€‘`‹}‘‹`|‰€}–‹}‘Š‰‹Œ|}|‰‰ ~_€‰‰|‰‰€}—`Š“‹‘`_‹‘—‰~€~|˜—€‰•|€‰‘_}~|}~™|€~|–‹}–‹‘€~_‰€‰~_~’||´|‘Œ|}|‰‰‹}€––|‰‰‹}˜˜|}–|™‹}‘Š‰‹Œ|}|‰‰ˆ|}Œ‹_}{|}~€‰Š‰~€‹}€“‹‹~—€}–‹}|©Š€‹|‰¦ ±¦D_|_Œ|ˆ`|{€}|}~€}–‹}–|`|}–|}~{_}‹~_‹}˜€}–˜€~’|‹}˜|Œ‹–|}‘|`_‘|‰‰|‰‰’_Š–“| `Š~‹}`€‘|€}–‰Š``_~|–“—–|Œ|_`{|}~‰~€«|’_–|‰¦ ,6G9E<7A7B9C:7;D7H78>A7;7??C9B@8@7? ¬¦,Š{€}‹˜’~‰‘_}Œ|}_}‰ˆ‰~€}–€–‰ˆ}_{‰€}–‹}‰~Š{|}~‰‰’_Š–˜Š‹–|`_‹‘—‰|µ}˜‹}–|Œ|_`{|}~¦­’‹‰‹{`‹|‰~’€~`_‹‘—€|€‰‰Š‘’€‰~€–|ˆ€˜‹‘Š~Š|ˆ”_|‹˜}–‹|‘~‹}Œ|‰~{|}~ˆ–|“~‚|~‘¦‡ _”“‹€~|€€}–{Š€~|€€‘~_‰ˆ‰’_Š–“|‰‘||}|–~_|}‰Š|€–|˜||_”‘_’||}‘|‹}–|Œ|_`ment processes†¢ 8. In this context, the CPDE calls for mainstreaming a HRBA at all levels of development policy. It |}‘_Š€˜|‰~’|‹{`|{|}~€_}_”‹}–|`|}–|}~’Š{€}‹˜’~‰‘_{`€‹}~‰{|‘’€}‹‰{‰ˆ•’‹‘’•_Š– `_Œ‹–|‹}–‹Œ‹–Š€‰‚_˜_Š`‰‡€´|‘~|–“—“‹€~|€¥{Š€~|€–_}_™”Š}–|––|Œ|_`{|}~`_˜€{‰ {|€}‰_”|–|‰‰¢ ,6@;DI7GJDJE7C9?DKLMNGE=:7O9EQRD9O=E<?FB9S=B=889J;D=S@B@DT ²¦­’|ª€–Œ_‘€~|‰~’€~€˜_“€`€~}|‰’‹`‰{Š‰~“|‘_’||}~•‹~’‹}~|}€_}€’Š{€}‹˜’~‰ ‹}‰~Š{|}~‰ˆ‹}`€‘Š€~’||‘€€_}_}~’|ž‹˜’~~_|Œ|_`{|}~¦­’|‹˜’~~_–|Œ|_`{|}~`_Œ‹–|‰€}‹}~|˜€~|–ˆ’_‹‰‘€}–‘_’|‰‹Œ|”€{|•_«~_‹}”_{–|Œ|_`{|}~‘__`|€_}¦–’||}‘| ~_~’‹‰}_{•‹€––|‰‰__~‘€Š‰|‰_”`_Œ|~—ˆ‹}|©Š€‹~—€}–‹}·Š‰‘|ˆ€}–|‘__˜‹‘€–|˜€–€_}¢ ¸„¦‘‘_Š}~€“‹‹~—“€‰|–_}‹}~|}€_}€}_{‰‹‰~’|Œ|—{|€}‹}˜_”€},ž~_–|Œ|_`{|}~¦­’| ”Š~Š|`_‰~™ƒ„¸¯`_‘|‰‰‘_}‰~Š~|‰€}_``_~Š}‹~—~_|€—“__‰~`_‹‘—‘_’||}‘|“|~•||}–|Œ|_`{|}~`_{__}€}–’Š{€}‹˜’~‰‘_{{‹~{|}~‰¢ ¸¸¦­’|ª|‘_{{|}–‰“Š‹–‹}˜_}|¹‹‰}˜|`_}˜{|‘’€}‹‰{‰€~‹}~|}€_}€|Œ|ˆ‹}‘Š–‹}˜~’|‘_}_{‹‘€}–š_‘‹€_Š}‘‹¤‰€}}Š€Œ_Š}~€—{‹}‹‰~|‹€|Œ‹|•`_‘|‰‰ˆ€}–~’|¡}‹Œ|‰€ Periodic review of the Human Rights Council. The CPDE argues that states should streamline their `_‰~™ƒ„¸¯€}–‹}~|}€_}€’Š{€}‹˜’~‰|`_}˜_“‹˜€_}‰ˆ|}‰Š‹}˜~’€~~’|‹|‰`|‘Œ|}€_}€|`_}˜`_‘|‰‰|‰€}–€‘‘_Š}~€“‹‹~—{|‘’€}‹‰{‰|‹}”_‘|_}|_~’|¢ ¸ƒ¦D_|_Œ|ˆ~’|ª‘€‰”_}|•“‹}–‹}˜”€{|•_«ˆ|}€“‹}˜|´|‘Œ|{_}‹~_‹}˜ˆ€‘‘_Š}~€“‹‹~— €}–|}”_‘|{|}~{|‘’€}‹‰{‰ˆ~_“|€˜||–€~€˜_“€|Œ|¦­’‹‰”€{|•_«‰’_Š–|€º{~’|‰`‹‹~ _”~’|¸²»±|‘€€_}_}~’|ž‹˜’~~_|Œ|_`{|}~€}–‹~‰’_Š–“|“€‰|–_}~’||”Š}–€{|}~€ `‹}‘‹`|‰Ÿ ¸‡ {Š~Š€ €‘‘_Š}~€“‹‹~— ‚–_}_‰ €}– `€~}|‰ €| |©Š€— €‘‘_Š}~€“| ”_ –|Œ|_`{|}~ `_˜|‰‰‡¢ƒ‡–|{_‘€‘_•}|‰’‹`_”`€~}|‘_Š}~‹|‰‚€‹˜}{|}~_”–_}_‘_Š}~‹|‰~_`_‹‘—_“·|‘Œ|‰‰|~“—–|Œ|_`‹}˜‘_Š}~‹|‰ˆ~’_Š˜’‹}‘Š‰‹Œ|€}––|{_‘€‘`_‘|‰‰|‰‡¢€}–†‡‹}‘Š‰‹Œ|`€~}|‰’‹`‰‚`€‘‹`€_}_”–‹´||}~Œ€‹||‰_”–|Œ|_`{|}~‰~€«|’_–|‰ˆš~€~|€}–}_}™š~€~|€‘~_‰‡¦

3

D€€‰~‹‘’~ª‹}‘‹`|‰_}¹~€~|‹~_‹€›“‹˜€_}‰_”š~€~|‰‹}~’||€_”‘_}_{‹‘ˆš_‘‹€€}–Š~Š€ž‹˜’~‰ ’§`Ÿ¥¥•••¦˜_“€’|€~’‹˜’~‰¦_˜¥•`™‘_}~|}~¥Š`_€–‰¥ƒ„¸†¥¸„¥D€€‰~‹‘’~™ª‹}‘‹`|‰™_}™¹~€~|‹~_‹€™›“‹˜€_}‰™_”™š~€~|‰™‹}™~’|™€|€™_”™‘_}_{‹‘™š_‘‹€™€}–™Š~Š€™ž‹˜’~‰¦`–”

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0

- 153 -


An Enabling Environment for Civil Society Organizations: A Synthesis of evidence of progress since Busan

Civil Society Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE)

A CPDE Contribution to the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation Monitoring Framework: Indicator Two

Submitted by CPDE Working Group on CSO Enabling Environment October 2013

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Table of Contents A Synthesis of Evidence and CPDE Proposals 1. Monitoring the Busan Commitments to Civil Society

4

2. A Methodological Note

5

3. A CPDE Framework for Assessment Enabling Environment Progress

6

4. A Summary of Key Findings

7

Area One: Universally accepted human rights and freedoms affecting CSOs Recognition and implementation of rights and freedoms affecting CSOs Financing CSOs: Issues in foreign finance sources Ways forward in improving the legal and regulatory environment Rights of Specific Groups Ways forward in protection for specific groups

7 7 10 11 12 15

Area Two: Policy Influencing Spaces for inclusive dialogue and policy influencing Open budget and access to information Ways forward for more inclusive policy processes

15 15 19 20

Area Three: Donor â&#x20AC;&#x201C; CSO Relationships Donor polices and a CSO enabling environment Ways forwards for a donor CSO enabling policy framework

21 21 24

Appendix One: CPDE Framework for Assessing the Enabling Environment

27

Appendix Two: Documents Reviewed

32

Appendix Three: An Enabling Legal and Regulatory Environment for CSOs

37

Annex One: Summary Country Case Study Assessments 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Cameroon Kenya Malawi Rwanda Tanzania Zambia

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

3 7 13 18 21 26

Zimbabwe Indonesia Kyrgyzstan Nepal Bolivia Honduras

31 39 43 48 51 56

Annex Two: CPDE / Reality of Aid Africa Country Case Study Reports Zimbabwe Kyrgyzstan Bolivia Honduras (forthcoming)

Cameroon Malawi Tanzania Zambia

2

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Acknowledgements This Synthesis of Evidence builds upon the many contributions of CSO members of the Working Group on CSO Enabling Environment. We are particularly indebted to Brian Tomlinson of Aid Watch Canada for his tireless work in compiling and producing the final synthesis report. The work was produced in collaboration with the various CPDE members at the country level, who organized and contributed to CSO-led processes in the past several months, bringing together country assessments of current issues in enabling conditions for CSOs. These case studies are annexed to this report. CPDE country case studies have been complemented by additional country-level evidence collected through independent processes and case studies by several global CSO members of the Working Group (see the Sources section of this Synthesis for a list). As authors of the Synthesis, We are very grateful for their detailed and nuanced analysis. Members of the Working Group have improved the Synthesis as a result of their careful reading, reflecting their particular knowledge and expertise. The Synthesis is â&#x20AC;&#x153;work-in-progress,â&#x20AC;? reflecting evidence currently accessible to the Working Group and the author. In the coming months, the Working Group intends to enrich and broaden its country coverage. For CPDE, the Synthesis offers an essential evidence-based reference for multi-stakeholder dialogue within the Global Partnership to deepen its commitment to strengthen inclusive development. This dialogue will also continue to be facilitated by the Multi-Stakeholder Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment.

Vitalice Meja For Co-chairs CPDE Working Group on Enabling Environment

3

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An Enabling Environment for Civil Society Organizations: A synthesis of evidence of progress since Busan 1. Monitoring the Busan Commitments to Civil Society 1. The 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation made an important commitment to strengthen the enabling environment for civil society organizations (CSOs) as independent development actors: “Civil society organisations (CSOs) play a vital role in enabling people to claim their rights, in promoting rights-based approaches, in shaping development policies and partnerships, and in overseeing their implementation. They also provide services in areas that are complementary to those provided by states. Recognising this, we will: “a) Implement fully our respective commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as independent development actors, with a particular focus on an enabling environment, consistent with agreed international rights, that maximises the contributions of CSOs to development. “b) Encourage CSOs to implement practices that strengthen their accountability and their contribution to development effectiveness, guided by the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness.” [§22] 2. The Busan High Level Forum (HLF) on development effectiveness was unique as a multistakeholder process: CSOs were invited for the first time to participate in both the preparations and the HLF on the basis of an equal standing with governments and multilateral donors. All stakeholders in Busan – donors, partner developing country governments, CSOs, parliamentarians and the private sector – agreed to “Deepen, extend and operationalise the democratic ownership of development policies and processes.” [§12a] “[A]ccelerate our efforts to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of women through development programmes grounded in country priorities, recognising that gender equality and women’s empowerment are critical to achieving development results.” [§20] and “Focus, at the country level, on establishing transparent public financial management and aid information management systems, and strengthen the capacities of all relevant stakeholders to make better use of this information in decision-making and to promote accountability.” [§23b] 3. Implementing the Busan commitments to create conditions for inclusive development at the country level through implementation of democratic ownership, gender equality and women’s empowerment, and full transparency and accountability, on the part of all stakeholders. These were considered essential ingredients to enable CSOs to maximize their contributions to development.

4

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4. Paragraph 22 acknowledges CSOs’ commitments to their own development effectiveness as defined by the Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness. The International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness is recognized as the basis for holding CSOs accountable to their commitments to the Istanbul Principles, and thereby strengthening their effectiveness as development actors. Since Busan, the Civil Society Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) has been working with regional and country level platforms and CSOs, on awareness building, training initiatives, and improvements in CSO transparency and accountability related to the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness.1 5. Paragraph 22 of the Busan outcome document, alongside the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework, recognizes the diversity of roles that CSOs can play in development cooperation. A vibrant civil society is in itself an important development outcome. CSOs are “autonomous non-partisan political actors in the social realm” [International Framework: 7] that provide diverse development services, work with other stakeholders to shape development policies, enable citizens to mobilize to claim their rights, and strengthen citizens’ capacity to hold governments to account. 6. The Busan HLF agreed that CSOs are profoundly affected by the context in which they work. This context is shaped by many factors, including social attitudes, culture, ethnicity and religious beliefs. Consistent with the OECD Monitoring Framework for Busan commitments, this Synthesis of Evidence addresses “those components that relate most directly to the Busan commitments, and are largely within the control of stakeholders adhering to the Busan Partnership (i.e. legal and regulatory framework for civil society operations; and selected elements of the governance / political environment that have a direct bearing on CSO activity).” 2

2. A Methodological Note 7. This CPDE Synthesis of Evidence brings together accessible evidence on the current state of enabling conditions for CSOs. The evidence is derived from a number of sources (see appendix Two for a complete list): x Primary country-level research and CSO consultations undertaken by CPDE members;

1 CPDE has created a Working Group on CSO Development Effectiveness to promote and coordinate initiatives relating to CSO development effectiveness with regional and national CSOs, including the documentation of progress to date. This Synthesis of Evidence on Enabling Conditions for CSOs is a product of the CPDE’s Working Group on Enabling Environment. While acknowledging the importance of internal conditions for CSO effectiveness, the focus is on evidence relating to Indicator Two of the Busan Monitoring Framework and the implementation of the Busan commitment in paragraph 22 [a]. 2

OECD, “Guide to the Monitoring of the Busan Partnership,” April 2013, p. 17.

5

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x x

Recently published research reports, based on country analysis; and Assessments of conditions and indicators relating to the freedoms of association, assembly and expression. The CPDE Working Group on Enabling Environment, alongside the Reality of Aid Africa, enabled ten country level civil society consultations and case studies between June and October 2013. While the methodology varied in each country, they often involved questionnaires to a wide range of CSOs, focus group discussions, review of laws and current commentary on issues in the enabling environment. Time did not permit multi-stakeholder dialogue at the country level on the outcomes of these processes. The CPDE / Reality of Aid Case studies are provided in Annex Two. 8. Evidence provided by these CSO-led country processes has been complemented by recent global reports from the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, whose research and documentation database on legal and regulatory issues for CSOs covers 46 countries, and from CIVICUS, whose 2013 State of Civil Society Report provides 11 country case studies and 20 thematic chapters on the theme of enabling conditions for CSOs. Further documentation has been provided by 2013 reports from the Association of Womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Rights in Development (AWID), the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and a number of global reports from organizations such as Amnesty International, the Open Budget Partnership, European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes, and several donor-sponsored evaluations. A Summary of Country Level Evidence for 12 countries is provided in Annex One. 9. While recognizing significant gaps in information for a comprehensive assessment of progress since Busan, the evidence does allow for the identification of some key trends. It does so against a CPDE-agreed Framework for assessing progress in the enabling environment for civil society organizations (see Appendix One).

3. A CPDE Framework for Assessing Enabling Environment Progress 10. The CPDE Framework focuses on three core areas, and within each area addresses essential dimensions of the CSO enabling environment: Area One: Universally accepted human rights and freedoms affecting CSOs Dimension One: Recognition of rights and freedoms affecting CSOs. Dimension Two: The legal and regulatory environment, implementing rights and freedoms affecting CSOs. Dimension Three: Rights of specific groups Area Two: Policy Influencing Dimension One: Spaces for dialogue and policy influencing Dimension Two: Access to information Area Three: Donor â&#x20AC;&#x201C; CSO relationships 11. These CPDE areas affecting CSO enabling conditions are consistent with the areas

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identified and noted above for Indicator Two in the OECD’s Monitoring Framework. Over the past five years, CSOs, UN human rights bodies, and other stakeholders have pointed to notable shifts in the operating context for civil society at both the global and country level.3 12. The Global Partnership, in its Busan outcomes (§22) and its inclusive processes, strongly acknowledges civil society as essential development actors in their own right. Nevertheless, as can be concluded based on this Synthesis Report, this commitment continues to be in tension with the reality of significant and in dozens of cases growing restrictions on the rights and freedoms for civil society in a range of countries around the world.

3. A Summary of Key Findings Area One: Universally accepted human rights and freedoms affecting CSOs Recognition and implementation of rights and freedoms affecting CSOs 13. In October 2010 the United Nations Human Rights Council appointed Maina Kiai as a Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. His mandate has been to closely monitor national practices and experiences related to the promotion and protection of these rights, identify best practices, and to make recommendations on ways of ensuring protection and promotion of these rights.4 In May 2013, the Special Rapporteur reported to the UN Human Rights Council on appeals and allegations of violation of these rights from 71 countries, received by his office between March 2012 and February 2013.5 14. On September 23, 2013, the Special Rapporteur spoke at a High Level Event on Supporting Civil Society, convened by U.S. President Obama in New York, where he noted, “Civil society and those voicing dissent face some of the most significant challenges, unlike those who support official policies. … Repressive legislation, often shared between states, is becoming a threat to civil society as Member States make laws criminalizing or restricting this work. … Restrictions on funding have become a major existential threat to associations across the world.”6 3

See the documents cited for this Synthesis of Evidence Report in Appendix Two.

4

See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/AssemblyAssociation/Pages/SRFreedomAssemblyAssociationInd ex.aspx. 5

Maina Kiai, “Observations on communications transmitted to Governments and replies received (A/HRC/23/39/Add.2),” May 30, 2013, accessible at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/FAssociation/A-HR-23-39-Add2_EFS.pdf

6 Maina Kiai, “Sounding the Alarm: emerging threats to civil society and the need for a coordinated international response, ” The High Level Event on Supporting Civil Society, New York, 23 September 2013, accessible at

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15. In Busan, governments agreed “to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as independent development actors, with a particular focus on an enabling environment, consistent with agreed international rights [§22a, emphasis added].” Yet, country case studies and other documentation, from both CSOs and independent observers cited in the CPDE’s review of evidence, confirm the Special Rapporteur’s observation of a persistent and continuing narrowing of the legal and regulatory space for civil society.7 16. The rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, of association, and of expression are protected for the most part in the constitutions and basic laws of the countries examined. But despite these constitutional safeguards, a wide range of laws, implementing regulations, or government practices (whether formal, informal, or extra-legal) governing the registration, operations and permitted roles of CSOs have been identified as inconsistent with the full realization of these rights. A recent report by CIVICUS points to 413 threats to civil society in 87 countries between January 2012 and October 2013.8 17. Among these restrictive measures and practices highlighted in the various reports consulted are the following: a) Mandatory registration of organizations, rendering illegal any activities by unregistered CSOs, including smaller community-based organizations and informal associations [identified in 3 case studies (Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania) and 4 additional countries noted by ICNL in its online database (Kenya, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda)]; b) Unclear and/or multiple laws, and/or expensive and complex procedures for registering and governing CSOs. As a consequence, reports observe arbitrary and selective application of laws/regulations against certain organizations, significant barriers for smaller CSOs to register, and lengthy delays for successful registration and burdensome heavy reporting requirements. c) Vague grounds for refusal to register (or de-register) an organization as a not-for-profit or charity, with limited or no due process for appeal (Referenced in 7 of 12 countries

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/FAssociation/StatementCivilSocietyRoundtable2309201 3.pdf 7 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, at a press conference on October 18, 2012 made the following comment: “Human rights will not improve much without the direct participation of a robust, free and independent civil society - yet we are seeing increasing examples of State policies and actions that deliberate suppress, sideline or deter important civil society activities. In recent months, we have even seen public smear campaigns against members of civil society because of their attendance at human rights meetings at the UN here in Geneva, as well as direct threats against some of them and their family members. This is completely unacceptable behaviour anywhere, let alone in the halls of the UN.” See http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12675&LangID=E 8

CIVICUS 2013b: 2.

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reviewed for this Synthesis9). d) Onerous requirements for re-registration (sometimes annually), placing undue administrative burdens on CSOs and opportunities for selective denial of registration of targeted organizations (onerous procedures and/or undue discretion on the part of the government were referenced in 8 of the 12 countries under review). e) Unclear legal and regulatory restrictions for CSOs in aid-providing middle-income countries to collaborate and engage in South-South Cooperation.10 f) Measures banning public demonstrations, prohibiting non-citizens from participating in public protests, limiting numbers of participants in public picketing, and increasing penalties for violations of regulations regarding peaceful assembly.11 g) Institution of politically motivated legal proceedings against members of CSOs critical of official policies leading to arbitrary arrests and detention.12 h) Reprisals against members of CSOs for engaging with multilateral human rights institutions most notably, the UN Human Rights Council.13 Examples of disabling regulatory practices were observed in a wide range of countries under review. While violations are more persistent and far-reaching in highly polarized and authoritarian political environments, lesser legal and regulatory concerns were also recorded in more democratic country contexts such as Canada or Kenya.14 18. In an increasing number of countries, CSOs have drawn attention to state reviews and 9

Bolivia, Honduras, Nepal, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. See Brian Tomlinson, “Brazil Case Study: The role of CSOs in South-South Cooperation,” in UNDP China, Working with Civil Society in Foreign Aid: Possibilities for South-South Cooperation?, an e-book publication, September 2013, accessible at http://www.undp.org/content/china/en/home/library/south-south-cooperation/working-withcivil-society-in-foreign-aid/. 10

11 See David Moore and Jacob Zenn. “The Legal and Regulatory Framework for Civil Society: Global Trends in 2012, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, in CIVICUS, 2013 State of Civil Society Report, accessible at http://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289. The ICNL’s “NGO Law Monitor” (http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/) provides up to date information on approximately 50 countries on key issues relating to the freedom of association and the NGO legal framework. A recent review by ICNL of global trends in 2012-13 for freedom of peaceful assembly identified 11 country cases of restrictive measures on this freedom (Uganda, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Russia, Bahrain, Fiji, Canada, Malaysia, Egypt, and Iraq). See http://www.icnl.org/research/trends/trends42.html. 12

CIVICUS documents imprisonment of civil society members to suppress their work in eight countries (Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe) in CIVICUS 2013b: 13-14. 13

Ibid., 15-16.

14

In a survey of Canadian and US CSOs, “twenty-nine (29)% of respondents suggested that legal requirements were a significant barrier (including difficult application requirements and maintaining charitable status). Furthermore, several respondents felt that their ability to operate as legitimate development actors was either constrained or threatened.” (CCIC and Interaction, 2013: v)

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revisions of outdated legal and regulatory frameworks for CSOs, with mixed and often negative outcomes for the enabling environment for CSOs. Reports from CSOs in a range of countries, such as Cambodia, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Russia and Zambia, among others, have documented various regressive legal reforms affecting CSOs.15 19. On the positive side, some governments are making efforts to improve conditions for CSOs. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) reported that the NGO Coordination Board in Kenya met with the CSO Reference Group in late 2012 and “agreed to work together to establish a conducive legal environment for NGOs in Kenya.”16 The CPDE’s country case study for Kyrgyzstan (see the summary points in Annex Two) notes “in general a positive impact of the national legislation on the activities of CSOs and an ongoing process of making registration easier,” including improved legislation governing organizing meetings. CSOs in Malawi confirmed a rapid improvement in the political environment for CSOs following the April 2012 swearing in of a new President.17 At the global level, the Irish Government, with the support of Chile, Japan, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia among others, enabled the passing of a resolution urging a panel discussion on the creation of a safe and enabling environment for civil society in law and practice at the UN Human Rights Council’s 25th session in 2014. The Office of the High Commissioner was invited to liaise with States, relevant United Nations bodies and agencies, relevant special procedures, civil society and other stakeholders to ensure their participation in the panel.18 Financing CSOs: Issues in foreign finance sources 20. A number of CPDE/Reality of Aid Case Studies (Zimbabwe, Kyrgyzstan [draft law]) draw attention to the growing trend in legislative restrictions on access to foreign funding for legitimate CSO activities, providing government with political tools to arbitrarily restrict dissenting views and critics. In his April 2013 report to the Human Rights Council, Special Rapporteur, Maina Kiai, drew attention to “increased control and undue restrictions in relation to funding received [by CSOs].”19 15 See Borithy Lun, “Resistance and Solidarity: Cambodian CSOs confront a repressive draft law on associations and NGOs,” and Boris Pustyntsev, “The Russian Civil Society is Holding Out,” in CIVICUS, 2013 State of Civil Society Report, accessible at http://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289. See Chimpinde, K., 2013. “CSOs call for repeal of NGO Act,” Zambia Post, July 15, 2013, Accessed August 2013 at http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=35440 16 NGO Law Monitor – Kenya accessed September 2013 at http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/kenya.pdf. 17 See Reality of Aid Africa, “Malawi Country Case Study,” September 2013 in Annex Three (summary points in Annex Two). 18

See http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20UNIT/item_8_final.pdf and http://protectionline.org/files/2013/09/A_HRC_24_L24.pdf. 19 Maina Kiai, 2013: 5. Kiai’s report documents the types of regulatory restrictions on foreign funding and sets out arguments rooted in international human rights standards that protect the ability of CSOs to access funding and other resources from domestic, foreign and international sources. He also addresses the supposed linkages between counter-terrorism and restrictions on funding. His report notes “in order to meet the proportionality and necessity test [in international human rights

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21. CIVICUS’ 2013 State of Civil Society Report (citing ICNL) sets out a growing list of 23 countries with such restrictions and points to a “contagion effect” with laws introduced in one country drawing inspiration from laws in other jurisdictions.20 A recent report by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) has drawn attention 14 countries where government and/or parliaments were implementing or considering legal barriers to foreign funding in the period 2012-13.21 These restrictions often target foreign funding for CSOs engaged in policy processes, advocacy and the defense of human rights at the country level. CPDE/Reality of Aid country case studies (Cameroon, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Bolivia, Kyrgyzstan) draw attention to public demonization in some countries of particular CSOs as agents of foreign (Western) governments as a result of their receipt of foreign funding. In Russia, for example, all CSOs receiving foreign funding are now required by law to register as “foreign agents,” considered to be spies, which is being challenged by Russian CSOs in international courts. 22. The Special Rapporteur, in his May 2013 report, rightly rejects the justification of state sovereignty for government stigmatization of foreign funding that result in discriminatory treatment of CSOs. He calls upon States to “demonstrate a change in mentality by highlighting that funding associations contribute to the development of a flourishing, diversified and independent civil society, which is characteristic of a dynamic democracy.” States must “allow access by NGOs to foreign funding as a part of international cooperation to which civil society is entitled to the same extent as Governments.”22 According to the Special Rapporteur, it is reasonable to require CSOs to be accountable to their donors, and authorities may subject CSOs to a notification requirement of receipt of funds and to regulations that apply to all associations for the submission of periodic reports on their accounts and activities. Ways forward in improving the legal and regulatory environment 23. The CPDE country case study for Cameroon sets out some proposals for improving the legal and regulatory environment, which would resonate with CSOs in many countries around the world. These include 1) greater sensitivity in the law to various CSO roles and activities, consistent with the recognition of CSOs as development actors in their own right; 2) harmonization of a number of existing laws and scattered regulations to simplify accountability; 3) a more robust law tackling corruption; 4) the abolition of the power of standards], restrictive measures must be the least intrusive means to achieve the desired objective and be limited to the associations falling within the clearly identified aspects characterizing terrorism only. They must not target all civil society associations. … Laws drafted in general terms limiting, or even banning funding under the justification of counter-terrorism do not comply with the requisites of “proportionality” and “necessity”. (8) 20

CIVICUS, 2013a: 38.

21

ICNL 2013: 2-7.

22

Maina Kiai, op cit, 11.

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government alone to dissolve a CSO without judicial review; and 5) CSO funding laws that respect international solidarity. CSOs must be free to determine their own statutes, structures and activities and to make decisions consistent with their mandate, without state interference. Such proposals are consistent with widely acknowledged good-practice guidelines for laws and regulations affecting CSOs, which should be considered by all stakeholders for the revision or reform of the legal regime governing CSOs (see Appendix Three for a summary of some good-practice guidelines). Rights of specific groups 24. The true test of an enabling environment for CSOs, consistent with international rights, is one in which the rights of those CSOs working in more politically sensitive areas are fully respected and protected. 25. In most countries, the service provision and humanitarian assistance roles of CSOs are widely accepted and even promoted by other stakeholders. However, significant barriers often exist for particular groups with mandates that include the critique of and/or advocacy for policy change or for those that represent the views of marginalized and vulnerable populations. According to a recent survey of six countries (also confirmed by the CPDE/Reality of Aid Africa case studies), CSOs “working in human rights, community rights, land rights, natural resources, mineral and environmental issues are more likely to become stigmatized.”23 26. Many of the reports consulted as well as the CPDE country case studies highlight specific actions against organizations that challenge government and/or represent vulnerable populations: a) Human Rights Defenders Human rights defenders (HRDs) are particularly vulnerable and targeted in many countries. Women HRDs often face unique gender-based confrontations.24 According to the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders’ August 2013 report, “Both the Special Rapporteur and the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on Human Rights Defenders have repeatedly reported on the extraordinary risks faced by those defending the rights of local communities, including indigenous peoples, minorities and people living in poverty. These human rights defenders commonly face threats, harassment, intimidation, criminalization and physical attacks. The Special Rapporteur and the Special Representative have observed that human rights defenders are commonly branded as being against development if 23

Hayman et al., page 8.

24

See the work of the Women’s HRDs International Coalition at http://www.defendingwomendefendingrights.org/about.php and the 35 case studies in its 2012 Global Report on the Situation of Women’s Human Rights Defenders at http://www.defendingwomendefendingrights.org/pdf/WHRD_IC_Global%20Report_2012.pdf.

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their actions oppose the implementation of development projects that have a direct impact on natural resources, the land and the environment. … Human rights defenders also speak out against forced evictions that occur in connection to development programmes and projects.”25 The Special Rapporteur 2010 Report acknowledges the increased risks of women as HRDs, the need to make visible the seriousness of violations against women HRDs, and the need for a gender-specific approach to protection mechanisms.26 Attacks on HRDs in various forms were identified in five CPDE/Reality of Aid country reports (Cameroon, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Kyrgyzstan, and Honduras). According to Front Line Defenders, HRDs are essential agents of change. Through their work, “by documenting and denouncing abuses, exposing corruption, pushing for reforms, and ultimately by defending the rights of others, they contribute to building a society where all voices are heard.” 27 While documenting many cases of political and judicial harassment, physical attacks and assassination attempts, Front Line Defenders “reported 24 killings of HRDs in 2012 in a mix of countries including Brazil, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Mexico, the Philippines, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, and Ukraine.”28 b) Women’s Rights Organizations In the words of the CIVICUS 2013 State of Civil Society Report, “if a country cannot offer an enabling environment for women’s rights organizations, it should tell us that something is more broadly wrong.”29 While CPDE country case studies acknowledge some modest improvements in several countries (Zimbabwe, Kyrgyzstan), the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset assesses only eight out of eighty-five countries in which women’s rights are “guaranteed in law and practice.” 30 Women’s rights organizations play a catalytic role in strategizing and advancing work that challenges existing gender norms and power relations. The Association of Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) has documented increased violence against Women Human Rights Defenders (WHRDs), with 24 WHRDs murdered between 2010 and 2012 in a range of countries including Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. AWID has

25

See http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/418/11/PDF/N1341811.pdf?OpenElement 26

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya, UN HRC, 16th Sess., UN Doc. A/HRC/16/44 (2010) p. 6 para. 23

27

Andrea Rocca, “Enabling Human Rights Defenders”, in CIVICUS 2013a, 2013 State of Civil Society Report, accessible at http://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289. 28

Andrea Rocca, Ibid.

29

CIVICUS 2013a, “Where are we?”, 2013 State of Civil Society Report, page 32, accessible at http://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289. 30 See CIRI Human Rights Data Project. “Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset,” accessible at http://www.humanrightsdata.org/index.asp

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also pointed to the rise of religious fundamentalism across all regions, with 76% of 1600 women activists from 160 countries reporting in a survey that they have dealt with the consequences of religious fundamentalism in limiting their work over the past ten years. Finally AWID has been monitoring the financing of women’s organizations (see below) and notes shrinking funding from many of the traditional aid sources of finance.31 c) Trade Unions Trade unions are effective social organizations whose defense of workers’ rights contribute to reducing income inequality, strengthening social protection, and promoting gender equality in the workplace. These roles however are often highly contested. Several CPDE case studies (Cameroon, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Honduras) note specific attacks on the rights of trade unionists. In its 2013 Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, the ITUC draws attention to “severe attacks on trade unions in Burma/Myanmar, Fiji, Georgia, Guatemala, Bahrain, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, [which] have put the existence of trade unions and democratic institutions at extreme risk.” This 2013 report documents a range of disabling conditions facing trade unionists, including denial of civil rights, discrimination against trade unionists, and interference and denial of collective bargaining rights.32 27. Several reports have drawn attention to the impact of counter-terrorism legislation on the actions of CSOs, crucially highlighting the adverse effect of such legislations on the work of humanitarian NGOs on the ground. An independent report on the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action found “negative impacts on humanitarian activities, such as restriction of funding, blocking of project and self-censorship. … The research uncovered a high level of selflimitation and self-censorship. This was particularly acute in organizations, which perceived their reputation to be highly vulnerable, most notably faith-based Islamic NGOs. … Aid agencies also sought to ensure that counter-terrorism obligations are passed onto local implementing partners.”33 A review of measures for countering the financing of terrorism for the 2013 CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report concluded that such measures constrain CSO activities. They are the product of “a culture of suspicion in which the links between charities and terrorist 31 See Cindy Clark and Julia Miller, “Key Factors Shaping an Enabling Environment for Women’s Rights Organizations,” in CIVICUS 2013a, 2013 State of Civil Society Report, page 32, accessible at http://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289. 32 ITUC, “Countries at Risks: Violations of Trade Union Rights,” Geneva, 2013, accessible at http://ituc-csi.org/countries-at-risk-2013-report-on. 33 Kate Mackintosh and Patrick Duplat, “Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action,” Commissioned by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Norwegian Refugee Council, July 2013, accessible at https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/CT_Study_Full_Report.pdf. See also “CounterTerrorism laws can hurt humanitarian action,” IRIN News, July 22, 2013, accessible at http://www.irinnews.org/report/98454/counter-terrorism-laws-can-hurt-humanitarian-action.

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organisations have been exaggerated while measures to protect freedom of association and expression have been disregarded.” Furthermore, “the export of these [financial] regulations to countries where CSOs already operate in a restrictive political climate can provide repressive governments with new tools for surveillance and control and encourage people and money underground.”34 Ways forward in protection for specific groups 28. CSOs in several countries (Cameroon and Kenya for example) report that organizations targeted by government measures are made more vulnerable due to a lack of resources and capacities to defend their organization. Donors should consider flexible financing and other options to strengthen vulnerable organizations facing disabling conditions for their operations. States should also take special measures to ensure monitoring, follow-up and the application of the rule of law in relation to harassment and violence against human rights defenders, taking account of special circumstances for women human rights defenders. States should also put in place policies for the protection of members of CSOs that provide for independent investigations into criminal attacks on HRDs or other vulnerable populations and should provide national human rights institutions a mandate to support and work with CSOs. All states should issue open invitations to UN Special Rapporteurs and Special Procedures.

Area Two: Policy Influencing Spaces for inclusive dialogue and policy influencing 29. All stakeholders at the Busan HLF agreed that “inclusive development partnerships” are the foundation for cooperation for effective development. A more inclusive development process requires governments to “deepen, extend and operationalise the democratic ownership of development policies and processes.” [emphasis added, §12a] 30. Operationalizing inclusive development through democratic ownership involves empowering people as primary beneficiaries, but also as actors in their development. In this context, CSO policy influencing is not only about inclusive participation in consultations, which often remains episodic at the discretion of governments. It is also about creating structured and permanent forums for multi-stakeholder dialogue that include a diversity of civil society actors – particularly those involving marginalized populations –in advising and monitoring development policies, plans and strategies. The effectiveness and inclusivity of multi-stakeholder forums for dialogue are closely related to 34 Ben Hayes, “How international rules on countering the financing of terrorism impact civil society,” in CIVICUS 2013a, 2013 State of Civil Society Report, page 32, accessible at http://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289.

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an enabling environment for CSOs. Restrictions affecting CSOs, particularly in their capacities to express dissenting views and represent affected populations, pose serious challenges to the realization of democratic ownership, which aims to broaden and deepen the diversity of peoples’ participation in development. 31. The country case studies submitted as evidence for this Synthesis pointed to varying, but usually very limited, degrees to which national development strategies have been informed by inclusive consultations. In three country case surveys of CSOs by ACT/CIDSE, more than 50% of CSOs said that they never or only sometimes are invited to give feedback to or participate in government bodies or working groups on government policies (Malawi – 51%; Rwanda – 56%; Zimbabwe – 90%). Significant numbers of CSOs also said they would be concerned about making explicit criticism of government on development matters in public (Malawi – 43%; Rwanda – 48%; Zimbabwe – 75%). At the same time, at least in Malawi, CSO capacity to be openly critical of government policy and practice on development has improved compared to five years ago (Malawi – 62% say now is better than five years ago; Rwanda – 36%; Zimbabwe – 20%).35 32. These findings are also largely consistent with a 2011 review of 32 country experiences presented in a Global Report by CSOs working with the Reality of Aid Global Network. This report found at the time “a mixed experience with inclusive consultations and few fully inclusive multi-stakeholder bodies for development planning and monitoring.” 36 The Reality of Aid Report could point to only a few experiences among the 32 countries examined through case studies where there was sustained multi-stakeholder involvement in government national development planning directorates. 33. The evidence collected for this Synthesis, similar to the 2011 Reality of Aid Report, describe consultations that are mostly episodic, at the discretion of governments and often involved limited numbers of CSOs, selected for their broad support of government policy. Inclusion of CSOs and other stakeholders within government bodies mandated to coordinate and/or monitor country development strategies remains the exception rather than the rule. CSOs in country case studies and recent reports reviewed for the Synthesis point inter alia to a) Consultations with only a carefully government-selected set of CSOs, avoiding those that might put forward a critical perspective and/or alternatives to government policies (Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Bolivia, Honduras 2013 Country Case Studies) b) Consultations held to receive CSO views, but such views are based on limited or no access to documentation on relevant government draft policies or priorities (Tanzania 2013 Country Case Study; Peru 2011 Reality of Aid Report);

35

ACT/CIDSE 2013, forthcoming.

36

Reality of Aid, 2011. Pages 15 – 20.

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c) Superficial consultations in the final stages of policy development, designed for information sharing only, with limited opportunities to hear from stakeholders (Zambia 2011 Reality of Aid Report); d) A decline in previously-held inclusive consultations/dialogue based on a mutually agreed agenda, in favour of ones that target specific government determined priorities (2013 Canada/US Survey); e) Rhetorical commitments to create space for women’s participation in decision making and planning, but no structured mechanisms for realizing this commitment (Kenya 2011 Reality of Aid Report); f) Limited or non-existent opportunities for policy dialogue between governments involved in South-South Cooperation (SSC) assistance and CSOs in these countries seeking to make a contribution to SSC;37 and g) A general lack of accountability following consultations to determine if and how CSOs concerns were taken into account in the final policy decisions (Zambia 2013 Country Case Study). 34. Despite the Busan global commitments, country-evidence suggests that policy-making processes to determine development priorities and the allocation of resources for these priorities remain mainly an exclusive prerogative of government, with few opportunities for policy influence from affected populations. These latter opportunities, however, may be growing in a few countries. There are several recent examples of progress in formally established multi-stakeholder dialogue that deserve closer study from which stakeholders can draw lessons and elaborate approaches that might be applicable in other countries. a) In Kyrgyzstan, Public Watch Councils (PWCs) were created by Presidential Decree in late 2012. These Councils provide a permanent forum within selected ministries for CSO monitoring the implementation of government policies and the legislated use of public resources, holding state institutions more accountable. While clearly a positive innovation providing opportunity for non-state actors to engage with government at many levels, the early experience has raised questions among Kyrgyzstan CSOs about the current effectiveness of some Councils, the capacity for real impacts on ministerial policies and practices, and directions for deeper democratization of decision-making.38 b) The CPDE Cameroon case study – and other evidence for Kenya – point to some progress in more participatory forums for policy dialogue. A 2010 study by Aid Group Cameroon found 37 such forums in the country in areas such as public finance, agriculture, forests and environment, health and education. At the same time some

37

See UNDP China, op. cit.

38

See the CPDE Kyrgyzstan report for this Synthesis as well as Nurgul Dzhanaeva, Forum of Women’s NGOs of Kyrgyzstan, “Enabling environment for civil society in Kyrgyzstan: recent developments,” in CIVICUS 2013a, 2013 State of Civil Society Report, page 32, accessible at http://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289.

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Cameroonian CSOs, in another survey, raised concerns about the transparency of the selection process for civil society representatives. The USAID CSO Sustainability Report for Sub-Saharan Africa pointed to “numerous opportunities for CSOs to participate in the formulation of legislation aimed at advancing constitutional provisions and in reviewing existing laws …” (USAID 2012: 74). There were also reports of modest progress by CSOs in a few policy areas in Zambia, Honduras and Malawi through participatory forums (2013 CPDE/Realty of Aid Country Case Studies). The 2011 Reality of Aid Global Report described positive inclusive processes in ongoing policy planning bodies established by the Ghanaian government (Reality of Aid 2011:18 and 56). c) In 2012 the European Commission published an important statement on the value of CSOs in EU development cooperation. Among other areas, the Communication states, “the international community, the EU included, has a duty to advocate for a space to operate for both CSOs and individuals. The EU should lead by example, creating peer pressure through diplomacy and political dialogue with governments and by publicly raising human rights concerns.” The Communication explicitly defines and commits to regular engagement with CSOs and “sets standards that can be used to monitor whether improvements to conditions for civil society result from EU activities.”39 35. Several observers have noted greater space for civil society policy dialogue and engagement with local authorities around local policies and delivery of programs. A Honduran contribution to the 2011 Reality of Aid Report observed a continued productive engagement with local governments on development issues, despite a very restrictive environment for CSOs at the national level following the 2009 coup.40 While Nepalese CSOs have reported restrictive conditions imposed on CSOs by local authorities (Nepal Summary in Annex Two), the CPDE case study for Malawi reports that “many local CSOs participate in district-level decision-making processes and forums, including the District Executive Committees.” 36. Increasingly CSOs are seeking a place at the table in multilateral policy processes where important norms are established and commitments made for country-level reform. The Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment has drawn attention to the highly inclusive preparations and conduct of the multi-stakeholder 2011 Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. The Task Team has highlighted the Busan process as a practical example to inform other multilateral policy processes, such as the

39 See CIVICUS, “Where are we?,” page 17 in CIVICUS, 2013 State of Civil Society Report, page 32, accessible at http://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289. See also European Commission, 2012. For a commentary see Izabella Toth, Ester Asin Martinez, Olivier Consolo, and Daniel Nuijten, “Space for CSOs: a European perspective,” in CIVICUS 2013a, 2013 State of Civil Society Report, page 32, accessible at http://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289. 40

Reality of Aid 2011, op.cit., page 271.

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roadmap towards determining the post-2015 sustainable development goals.41 The May 2013 High Level Panel of Eminent Persons Report on Post-2015 Development Goals makes a notable call for an enabling environment and access to due process as a necessary condition for CSOs and other non-state actors to fulfill their varied roles in sustainable development.42 Despite these calls, and some recent positive developments within the UN Food Security Council, CSOs writing for CIVICUS 2013 Global State of Civil Society Report describe “missed opportunities at the multilateral level” in which there is “a strong civil society critique, particularly following Rio+20, of the ceremonial inclusion of civil society.”43 Open budget and access to information 37. For CSOs, there is a close relationship between transparency and democratic ownership. Transparency in information is essential to hold governments to account. Where governments tightly limit access to information, a culture of corruption is more likely to flourish. Among the 32 country cases, the 2011 Reality of Aid Report can only point to three cases that describe good practices with significant progress in transparency (Ecuador, Peru and Uganda). For the most part, access to information is either very partial or unavailable on a straightforward and timely basis. This assessment is confirmed by several of the CPDE/Reality of Aid case studies for this Synthesis (Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Bolivia Country Case Studies). The ACT/CIDSE survey of CSOs has similar findings, with 60% of Rwandan CSOs answering in the positive to a question about whether access to timely information about government policy and budget is better now than five years ago (compared to 32% in Malawi and 25% in Zimbabwe).44 38. An important indicator of access to public policy information and policy influence is the degree to which the budget process is transparent and open to public participation. The annual budget is a key public policy process, translating development policy priorities into on-the-ground programming. The International Budget Partnership (IBP) is an international coalition that monitors budget processes in approximately 100 countries with the aim “to ensure that government budgets are more responsive to the needs of poor and low-income people in society and, accordingly, to make budget systems more transparent and accountable to the public.”45 41

See Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment, “Enabling a Transformative Multi-stakeholder Post-2015 Development Agenda,” August 2013, accessible at http://csopartnership.org/task-team-on-cso-de-and-the-ee. 42

See the HLP’s 2013 report, A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development – The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post2015 Development Agenda, page 4, accessible at http://www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf. 43

CIVICUS, “Where are we?,” op cit., pages 11 and 19.

44

ACT/CIDSE 2013. Forthcoming.

45

See http://internationalbudget.org/who-we-are/ and the International Budget Partnership Annual Report at http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/IBP-Annual-Review-2012_finaledition_Digital-Edition-1.pdf

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39. The IBP’s Annual Survey for 2012 concludes that progress in accessible budgets has happened, but at a rate that is much too slow. The report highlights that average budget transparency scores have risen in nearly all parts of the world, with progress especially steady and significant among those countries with very low starting points, where the least budget information has been provided. However, there is great variation in how budget transparency has evolved over time in different countries. But while transparency has improved, public participation in the budgetary process has seen little progress: According to the Survey “opportunities for public participation in the budget process are either limited or completely absent in most countries. … [T]he idea that citizens have a right to participate in the budget process, and that it is desirable for them to do so, is still far from consensual.”46 Some CSOs’ involvement in their country’s budget monitoring - like ‘Dynamique Citoyenne’ in Cameroon47 – point to the difficulty in civil society inputs receiving due consideration in a key policy area. Ways forward for more inclusive policy processes 40. Governments and donors have a responsibility to facilitate democratic policy processes at the national level through creating structured and institutionalized roles for civil society and other non-state actors within governments’ and donors’ policy development, implementation and monitoring processes. A number of conditions are critical for realizing democratic ownership: a) Establish permanent institutionalized spaces for multi-stakeholder dialogue on development policy, based on principles of mutual trust, respect and shared responsibilities. Ongoing processes, not one-off events, are essential for sustained democratic ownership. It is also important to recognize the responsibilities and contributions of other actors, especially parliamentarians and local government. a) Facilitate inclusive engagement of a diversity of civil society actors on policy and its implementation at all levels through strengthening fully representative CSO platforms, particularly those representing grassroots-based social organizations, women’s and indigenous peoples’ organizations. Policy dialogue must be sufficiently resourced to enable full participation of stakeholders. b) Build open and timely access to information and transparent accountability mechanisms and processes, protected by legislation.48 There must be clarity of

46

International Budget Partnership, 2012: 34. The average score among countries for public participation is 19 out of 100. This compares with a score of 43 out of 100 for transparency and 52 out of 100 for legislative oversight. 47

http://www.africanmanager.com/site_eng/detail_article.php?art_id=19389

48

The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression points to international standards on these issues that governments should follow, endorsing a set of principles on freedom of information by the civil society organization, Article 19 –

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purpose and process, with accountability/feedback to those who have been consulted. Access to key documentation in the languages of those being consulted is also essential. c) Implement full transparency for budget documentation and deepen citizens’ direct engagement with the budgetary processes. d) Build inclusive fully participatory processes from the country level to the global level in order to establish a new global consensus on the post-2015 sustainable development goals and directions for achieving these goals at the country level. e) Support the capacities for a wide range of CSOs – including women’s rights organizations, rural, indigenous, people with disabilities, and urban community organizations – to participate effectively in multi-stakeholder policy processes.

Area Three: Donor – CSO relationships Donor polices and a CSO enabling environment 41. Most DAC donors (but not all) have written accessible policies that address their relationships with CSOs in the delivery of aid. A DAC review of good practice for donors suggests that these policies should inter alia, “[S]et out measurable objectives including for implementing the commitments made on civil society in the Busan 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (para 22). These are: recognising CSOs as development actors in their own right, promoting an enabling environment (including effective donor support), and encouraging CSOs to implement practices that strengthen their accountability and contribution to development effectiveness.”49 The DAC peer reviews have pointed to a number of good practice policies – Sweden, Denmark, Australia, Finland, among others – that address CSOs as development actors in their own right. 42. Translating civil society policies into donor decision-making processes and practices on the ground however remains an ongoing challenge. A recent independent assessment of Sweden’s civil society policy concluded that “the Busan commitments, the OECD lessons and the Sida CSO Policy, which all define good practices and guidelines for CSO support, have only to a limited extent influenced CSO funding practices at embassies and Sida HQ units.”50 While similar assessments by other donors would be useful, it is likely that other donors The Public’s Right to Know: Freedom on Information Legislation, which is based on international and regional law and standards on the issue. 49

OECD Development Assistance Committee, Partnering with Civil Society: 12 Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews, OECD 2012, page 11. Accessible at http://www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviews/partneringwithcivilsociety.htm / 50

Nilsson, et al, 2013: 88.

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face similar challenges, balancing good practice directions in CSO policy statements with broader political and programmatic demands on donor officials implementing a range of donor policies, particularly at the country level. 43. Several DAC donors have been identified in recent peer reviews urging further policy development in consultation with civil society. A 2013 DAC Peer Review of France for example observed (page 20), “France has not so far developed a strategic approach to civil society organisations, and devotes few resources to strengthening them.” The 2012 Peer Review of Canada (page 10) called on CIDA to “complete its civil society effectiveness strategy,” (page 20) through which it “should take a fresh look at how it can better achieve its development aims in relation to civil society.” (page 29) The latter “will need to strike a balance between respecting CSO autonomy as development actors in their own right, and steering CSOs to deliver Canada’s development co-operation objectives”(page 29).51 44. Over the past several years, CSOs based in both donor and partner countries have identified a number of issues in donor policies52 that affect and constrain their effectiveness as development actors: a) Non-responsive donor CSO policies Donor directive policies (narrow donordetermined results requirements) and modalities of support for CSOs (contracting for donor-determined programming) limit CSO capacities and space for pursuing partnerships based on the principles of ownership and alignment with the priorities of their partners and constituencies. DAC donor priorities (and also INGO priorities) are often developed with little engagement with developing country CSOs and sometimes with little knowledge of conditions facing local CSOs. (See the Kyrgyzstan and Tanzania case studies.) b) Funding modalities and conditions CSO effectiveness is weakened by an inappropriate mix and choice of funding modalities,53 unpredictable timing and long delays,54 shrinking opportunities for financing that is responsive to CSO priorities and 51

For all DAC donor peer review documents see http://www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviews/peerreviewsofdacmembers.htm. 52 These issues have been derived from a synthesis of the 2010 Open Forum consultations with CSOs (http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/what_we_do/Synthesis%20of%20Open%20Forum%20Consultations. pdf) in more than 70 countries; Wood, J., and Karin Fällman, “Official Donors’ Engagement with Civil Society: Key Issues in 2012,” in in CIVICUS, 2013 State of Civil Society Report, page 32, accessible at http://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289; UNDP China 2013, Chapter 6; OEDC DAC 2012, op. cit. and various CPDE/Reality of Aid Case Studies for this Synthesis. 53 See Nilsson, et al, 2013, pages 81-83 and UNDP China, 2013, pages 77 – 85 for a description of the advantages and disadvantages of different funding modalities for CSOs, based on the principles set out at the Busan HLF for CSO development effectiveness. 54 For example in Canada, there has been a two-year gap in a general call-for-proposal by the section of DFAITD (formerly CIDA) responsible for partnerships with Canadian CSOs. CIVICUS 2013a, State of Civil Society Report and the CCIC / Interaction CSO Survey notes that donors recently have withdrawn previous long-standing programmatic support for CSOs in Canada, New Zealand and the Netherlands. (CCIC & Interaction, 2013)

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programs, and high transaction costs due to a lack of harmonized requirements by donors.55 CSOs report that competitive funding modalities have resulted in more intensive competition among CSOs in both donor and developing countries, undermining interest in and space for constructive CSO collaboration and coordination. (See Cameroon Case Study)

c) Availability of institutional funding

While CSOs may be able to seek funding for projects related to their programmatic activities, the terms of donor finance often preclude (or seriously limit) support for core basic operational functions of the organization. This lack of support for these functions undermines the capacities and sustainability of CSOs, particularly those in developing countries, to sustain effective programming capacities to achieve impact over the medium and longer term.

d) Public awareness programming in donor countries Sustaining a public constituency for development cooperation is often undermined by limited resources in donor support for public awareness programming in donor countries. There is often a lack of donor clarity about the purposes of its public awareness programming – is it communications about donor/CSO programs or is it to build citizen engagement and critical awareness of the challenges facing people living in poverty? e) Pressures for uncritical CSO alignment with government policies CSOs in developing countries face increasing pressure to align with government development strategies for sector programming. The CPDE Bolivia Case Study (page 19), for example, notes that Bolivian CSOs must state in their statutes the scope of their social and economic activities, “taking into account the guidelines laid down in national plans, national policies and sectoral policies.” Where strategies have not been developed through inclusive multi-stakeholder processes with different country stakeholders, CSOs may legitimately argue that their programming fills gaps in these strategies or speaks to the interests of populations whose interests have been marginalized. Similarly, without sustained access and dialogue between CSOs and government, practical collaboration and alignment with government is difficult. f) Donor-dependency and direct funding to developing country CSOs CSOs in a number of the CPDE country studies (Cameroon, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Tanzania) raise the issue of high dependency on official donor finance (either indirectly through INGOs or directly). But at the same time, they also report few if any alternative financing through in-country philanthropy or government ministries. The few alternatives that do exist are based upon a contract-for-service agreement with local governments. There is also increased donor interest in balancing direct financing to local CSOs with support channeled through CSOs in donor countries. CSOs in developing countries 55

A ITUC review of donor support mechanisms concluded, in part, that “the consequences of the political nature of trade union development work and its implications for support mechanisms should not be underestimated. However, … the streamlined, one-size-fits-all nature of the funding procedures is a general trend where support mechanisms for CSOs are concerned. The specific features of TU development work are therefore not sufficiently recognised.” (ITUC 2012: 43)

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appreciate their relationships with CSOs based in DAC donor countries, which have resulted in solidarity; moral and political support; and access to information, networks and the international arena. At the same time, there is strong interest in several developing countries in local CSO/donor-managed pooled funds from several donors, which provide alternative direct support for strengthening domestic CSOs. Donors must try to determine an appropriate balance between these two channels. g) Opportunities and resources for developing country policy dialogue CSOs in developing countries are increasingly collaborating to influence their government’s development policies and hold governments to account at the national and local level. A major evaluation of donor support for developing country CSO policy initiatives in Uganda, Mozambique and Bangladesh revealed the need for better and more focused financial and evaluation instruments for donor support, including assessment of civil society engagement in government policy dialogue in complex developing country contexts..56 CSOs in several CPDE case study countries Cameroon, Kyrgyzstan, Canada also drew attention to the limited scope for regular CSO/donor dialogue, consistent with good practice consultation noted above (paragraph 37). CSOs in Bolivia, on the other hand, noted that the Bolivian Development Partners Group agreed in 2011 to create spaces for dialogue with CSOs, consistent with their commitments in Accra and Busan. A first dialogue was held in November 2012. (Bolivia Case Study, 54) Ways forwards for a donor policy framework for enabling CSOs 45. The Civil Society Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) is calling upon DAC donors and other aid providers to pay due attention to the local political, social and economic environment in which CSOs operate, and in the words of the UN Special Rapporteur, to pay particular attention to conditions for “associations working with grassroots communities, marginalized and vulnerable peoples, and on ‘unpopular’ or cutting edge issues.”57 46. Consistent with commitments at Busan, donor and other aid providers should assure financial and political support for all roles of CSOs, including their roles in monitoring policy implementation and dialogue, by a) Focusing support on strengthening the sustainability of a diversity of CSOs as

56

See the recommendations for development partners in ITAD/COWI. 2012: 71-78. These recommendations included 1) funds for policy processes and for initiatives determined by CSOs themselves (the right to initiate), 2) long term and targeted support that acknowledged the long timeframes for policy change processes, 3) a higher proportion of funding for capacity development and CSO administrative costs in CSO policy influencing processes, 4) pro-active engagement to protect and expand policy spaces for CSOs, and 5) expanding / demonstrating the practice of regular CSO/donor policy engagement. See also the UK’s Trade Union Congress’ critical assessment of DFID’s support for social dialogue involving the trade unions, government and employers. (TUC 2012: 21-23). 57

Maina Kiai, op cit, 5.

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development actors in their own right, and limiting the utilization of CSOs merely to implement donor policies and programs. Such targeted use of CSOs may promote an international CSO community characterized mainly by consultancy-oriented CSOs bidding for projects with agendas set by donors.58 b) Taking a “whole-of-government” approach that takes civil society into account across all government policies and programs in development cooperation and direct engagement with Southern CSOs as partners. c) Collaborating with governments, other stakeholders, and CSOs working domestically to improve enabling political and regulatory frameworks and their implementation. d) Creating systematic space for meaningful dialogue on relevant development policies with civil society in both donor and developing countries, including strategizing with CSOs for the inclusion of enabling environment issues in policy dialogue with developing country governments and other influential bodies. e) Providing funding to enable CSOs to pursue development objectives in a way that responds to and is driven by local demand, strengthening the role of CSOs as independent development actors. Such funding includes funding for core functions and for inclusive policy processes. The funding should be provided in a manner that harmonizes donors’ terms and conditions and reduces transaction costs for both donors and CSO partners. Sweden is leading an important initiative on harmonization of donor CSO requirements, with recent progress in developing key principles, operational guidelines for implementation in selected areas and an accountability framework, all of which is intended to initiate harmonized conditions for CSOs.59 f) Applying results and value assessments that embrace process and qualitative results over the medium to long term and consider value-added contributions. g) Building upon innovative mechanisms for sustainable financing for social movement organizations focusing on women’s rights, decent work, indigenous peoples and discriminated minorities. These mechanisms should ensure increased, responsive, substantial, flexible, predictable and multi-year core funding for these organizations. h) Engaging fully with the multi-stakeholder Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment to monitor existing commitments to minimum standards for enabling conditions for CSOs, document and promote good practice, and ensure issues of inclusive development are fully engaged in deliberations and outcomes of ministerial meetings of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. 58

Nilsson, et al, 2013: 90. This independent assessment noted the consequences for CSOs of donor instrumental approaches: “Using CSOs only as ‘implementing organisations’ … undermines the credibility of CSOs, weakens their accountability to their own stakeholders and shifts this towards the donors, makes it difficult for CSOs to engage in longer term planning such as for their own policy and capacity development, and makes the claims by adversaries that certain CSOs are donor agents more believable among the public.” (90)

59 See Sida 2013a, Sida 2013b, Sida 2013c and Sida 2013d. See also the 2010 donor mapping of donor conditions and requirements for CSO funding at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan041786.pdf.

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i) Minimizing the impact of the Northern financial and fiscal crisis on development cooperation and commitments, including the impact of government cuts on programs for financing vulnerable civil society organizations.

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APPENDIX ONE A CPDE Monitoring Framework for Assessing Progress for a CSO Enabling Environment The CPDE Framework focuses on three core areas, and within each area addresses essential dimensions of the CSO enabling environment: Area One: Universally accepted human rights and freedoms affecting CSOs Dimension One: Recognition of rights and freedoms affecting CSOs. Dimension Two: The legal and regulatory environment, implementing rights and freedoms affecting CSOs. Dimension Three: Rights of specific groups Area Two: Policy Influencing Dimension One: Spaces for dialogue and policy influencing Dimension Two: Access to information Area Three: Donor – CSO relationships Area One: Universally accepted human rights and freedoms affecting CSOs The Busan Partnership affirms CSOs as independent development actors in their own right. It substantially links an enabling environment for CSOs to governments fulfilling their obligations to international human rights. Dimension One: Recognition of rights and freedoms affecting CSOs Dimension One asks whether a state recognizes at the national level three universally recognized human rights and freedoms affecting CSOs. As a reflection of this recognition, the questions therefore examine whether a state recognizes these rights and freedoms in the constitution and in the basic laws, and whether there are significant violations of these rights. ¾ Is the right to freedom of association protected in the constitution and basic laws of your country? ¾ Is the right to freedom to peacefully assembly protected in the constitution and basic laws of your country? ¾ Is the right to freedom of expression protected in the constitution and basic laws of your country? ¾ Are there significant and/or severe restrictions on the exercise of one or more of these rights through government intimidation, intrusion, harassment or threats? (Please Note: Dimension Two below will address particular restrictions governing the exercise of these rights based on the implementation of CSO laws and regulations.)

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Dimension Two: The legal and regulatory environment, implementing rights and freedoms affecting CSOs Dimension Two explores the legal and regulatory environment governing CSOs’ exercise of the human rights and freedoms addressed in Dimension One. 1. Entry: CSO formation and registration ¾ Is there an enabling law on CSO registration, and in practice are CSOs able to easily register? Definition:

“Enabling law” includes voluntary registration allowed for any legal purpose; requiring a small number of founders and/or small amount of assets; based on reasonable, transparent, objective criteria; and providing avenues for appeal.

¾ Are the processes/regulations for formation and registration enabling for civil society organizations? Definition:

“Enabling processes/regulations” includes easy access for all irrespective of location, simple procedure without undue administrative burdens; nominal or affordable fees; timely decision; registration in perpetuity.

2. CSO Operations: Free from interference ¾ Can CSOs, at the time of and after registration, freely choose where, with whom and with what mandate to work? ¾ Are CSOs free to operate, in law and in practice, without excessive administrative burdens and/or government interference (harassment)? ¾ Is there interference in CSO operations on the part of the state and other actors for political or arbitrary reasons? Is there legal recourse against such harassment? Definitions:

“CSO Operations” – The capacities to govern, implement and assess activities on the part of the CSO, consistent with its mandate and the roles of CSOs as actors in support of public goods. “Excessive” – Interferes with CSO’s capacity to act independently in carrying out its mandate.

3. CSO expression of views and advocacy ¾ Are there legal or political barriers that hinder a CSO’s ability to openly express its opinions, particularly on matters critical of government policies? (Barriers may also include CSO self-censorship of views.)

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¾ Are there legal or political barriers that hinder a CSO’s ability to engage in public policy activity and/or advocacy? 4. Access to resources ¾ Are there legal, policy or political barriers to access – i.e. to seek, secure and use resources, including foreign resources, for CSOs? ¾ Are there legal or policy incentives to promote local resource mobilization and financial sustainability among CSOs? 5. Rights to assembly peacefully ¾ Are there legal or political barriers to the right to peaceful assembly? ¾ Can groups who gather openly criticize the government through peaceful protests or other forms of demonstrations? ¾ Are there restrictions to assemble and make claims on government, including government use of harassment, arbitrary arrest or use of excessive force? Dimension Three: Rights of specific groups This dimension focuses on evidence of discrimination in the application of laws, regulations and policies for particular groups that may advocate for policy change or represent marginalized and vulnerable populations. Important factors also include fair administration of the laws and regulations, equal access to due process and the ability to seek redress. ¾ Are there CSOs representing particular groups that receive less favorable treatment under the legal and regulatory environment (Dimension Two) due to their specific mandate or activities? (Examples of such groups might include trade unions, women’s rights organizations, human rights organizations, organizations of indigenous peoples, LGBT organizations etc.) ¾ Are there recent examples of leaders and/or members of vulnerable organizations facing discrimination, harassment, arbitrary arrest or extra-judicial killing? Area Two: Policy influencing The ability of CSOs to engage with governments on policy concerns through dialogue and advocacy is an essential area for consideration of CSO enabling conditions. The degree to which there are institutionalized spaces for policy dialogue and fair and inclusive processes for government/CSO consultations are critical ingredients of democratic ownership of public policy. Considerations of an enabling environment must not only take account of opportunities/processes for engagement, but also the resulting impacts on public policy.

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Dimension One: Spaces for dialogue and policy influencing ¾ Does government establish inclusive and accessible processes for policy engagement at all levels (local, regional, national)? Are marginalized groups included (e.g. women’s rights organizations, indigenous groups)? Are such processes available for all kinds of policies? ¾ Are there inclusive institutionalized opportunities for CSOs to participate in policyand decision-making processes? ¾ Are CSOs involved in design, implementation and monitoring of national development plans and policies? ¾ Is CSO input taken into account in the policy outcomes? Are there fully accessible accountability mechanisms for feedback and policy assessment, ensuring that governments consider CSO input? ¾ Are there initiatives to address capacity needs of all stakeholders to fully and effectively participate in policy dialogue? (In particular, governments and CSOs.) Definitions:

“Established processes” for policy engagement includes periodic consultation mechanisms, episodic government/civil society dialogue processes, and processes for government/community engagement. “Institutionalized opportunities” includes permanent structured mechanisms for policy dialogue, which meet regularly and have a defined mandate to inform the development, implementation and assessment of government policies.

Dimension Two: Access to information Governments must put into practice principles and laws governing the full transparency and accountability for government priorities, strategies, plans and actions. ¾ Do CSOs have a right to access to relevant government information, by law and in practice? ¾ Is the process of obtaining relevant government information simple, timely, transparent and based on established procedures? Area Three: Donor – CSO relationships In many countries, donor policies and financing requirements affect CSOs’ roles as effective, independent development actors. Donors should establish transparent and consistent policies that define the place and roles of CSOs in donor strategic frameworks and plans, including country-level program implementation plans. Financing modalities should enable

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CSOs to implement their own mandates and priorities and be relevant to a diversity of CSOs, respecting their different roles, capacities, constituencies and approaches. ¾ Are CSO funding mechanisms responsive to the programmatic priorities of CSOs? ¾ Are CSO funding mechanisms reliable, transparent, easy to understand, and disbursed impartially? ¾ Are there initiatives by donors for facilitating diversification of CSOs’ income sources? ¾ Are donors creating inclusive processes for CSO policy engagement on donor strategies at all levels (headquarters, within partner countries)?

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ANNEX TWO DOCUMENTS REVIEWED A. CSO Partnership for Effective Development (CPDE): Contributions of Evidence Case Studies 1. CPDE Cameroon (Elomo Tsanga, COSADER), “Cameroon Case Study,” September 2013. 2. Reality of Aid Africa, “Malawi Case Study,” September 2013. 3. Reality of Aid Africa, “Towards Enabling Environment for CSO Participation in Domestication of Busan Agreement – The Legal and Institutional Framework in Tanzania opportunities and Challenges,” Tanzania Case Study, October 2013. 4. Reality of Aid Africa, “Enabling Environment for CSOs,” Zambia Case Study, October 2013. 5. CPDE Zimbabwe, “Development Effectiveness, Aid Transparency and Accountability,” Zimbabwe Case Study, September 2013. 6. CPDE Indonesia, “Indonesia Case Study,” forthcoming. 7. CPDE Kyrgyzstan (Nurgul Dzhanaeva, Forum of women's NGOs of Kyrgyzstan), “Report on the monitoring of the indicator two on enabling environment in Kyrgyzstan: Assessing Progress for a CSO Enabling Environment,” Case Study, August 2013. 8. CPDE Bolivia (Susana Eróstegui, UNITAS), “Pilot Study on Enabling Environment Bolivia,” Case Study, October 2013. 9. CPDE Honduras, “Honduras Case Study (First Draft),” (original in Spanish, Google translation into English), September 2013. 10. Canadian Council for International Cooperation and Interaction, 2013. Two Years on from Busan: Looking back, looking forward. An analysis of a survey on the Istanbul Principles, Human Rights-Based Approaches to development and the Enabling Environment, A collaborative effort by Jared Klassen (CCIC), Suzanne Kindervatter (InterAction), Fraser Reilly-King (CCIC), and Brian Tomlinson (AidWatch Canada and the Working Group on the Enabling Environment of the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness)., October 2013, accessible at http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/what_we_do/2013_10_29_CPDE%20_Report_of_Findings.pdf. CPDE Member Reports/Documentation ACT Alliance/CIDSE, 2013. Case Studies and a Survey of CSOs in Colombia, Malawi, Rwanda and Zimbabwe [Title to be determined]. Forthcoming 2013. Arutyunova, A and Cindy Clark 2013. Watering the Leaves, Starving the Roots: The Status of Financing for Women’s Rights Organizing and Gender Equality. Association of Women’s

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Rights in Development (AWID), accessed at http://www.awid.org/Library/Watering-theLeaves-Starving-the-Roots CIVICUS 2013a. State of Civil Society 2013: Creating an enabling environment. Andrew Firmin, Ciana-Marie Pegus, Brian Tomlinson editors. Accessible online at http://socs.civicus.org/?page_id=4289. CIVICUS 2013b. “Global Trends on Civil Society Restrictions: Mounting restrictions on civil society – the gap between rhetoric and reality,” A report co-authored by Tor Hodenfield and Ciana-Marie Pegus. October 2013, accessible at https://civicus.org/images/GlobalTrendsonCivilSocietyRestrictons2013.pdf. International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL). “NGO Law Monitor,” accessible at http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/index.html International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) 2013. “The Legal and Regulatory Framework for Civil Society: Global Trends in 2012-13”. Global Trends in NGO Law, Volume 4, Issue 2. Accessible at http://www.icnl.org/research/trends/. ITUC 2013. Countries at Risk: Report on Violations of Trade Union Rights, 2013, Cameroon, International Trade Union Confederation, 2013. Accessed August 2013 http://www.ituccsi.org/countries-at-risk-2013-report-on ITUC Development Cooperation Network, 2012. Trade Unions’ Views on Working with Donor Governments in the Development Sector: A review of 18 donor governments’ support mechanisms. TUDCN Development Papers, 2012/4. Accessible at http://www.ituccsi.org/IMG/pdf/tus_working_with_donors_full_study_en-2.pdf. B. Other Reports and Documents Amnesty 2013. Amnesty International 2013 Report: The State of the World’s Human Rights, accessed August 2013 at http://files.amnesty.org/air13/AmnestyInternational_AnnualReport2013_complete_en.pdf Barago, E. and Olivia, Tchamba. “From defunding civil society to defending civil society,” CIVICUS Blog, June 7, 2013, accessible at http://blogs.civicus.org/civicus/2013/06/07/from-defunding-civil-society-to-defendingcivil-society/ Calingaert, D. “Resisting the Global Crackdown on Civil Society,” Freedom House, Policy Brief, July 11, 2013, accessible at http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/resisting-globalcrackdown-civil-society Churchill 2013. “Self-regulation key to success of new NGO law,” The Standard (Kenya), June 18, 2013. Accessed August 2013 at http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000086203&story_title=self-regulation-keyto-success-of-new-ngo-law European Commission, 2012. “The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations.” Communication from the

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Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, September 2012, accessible at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0492:FIN:EN:PDF. Hayman, R., Lawo,T., Crack, A., Kontinen, T., Okitoi, J., Pratt, Brian. “Legal Frameworks and Political Space for Non-Governmental Organisations: An Overview of Six Countries,” European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), Policy Paper Series, July 2013, accessible at http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/research_highlights/res/NGO-BMZ_Final_draft_11_July.pdf Human Rights Watch 2013. World Report 2013 (Events of 2012). Accessed August 2013 at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2013_web.pdf International Budget Partnership, 2012. Open Budget Survey 2012. Accessible at http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/. ITAD/COWI. 2012. Joint Evaluation of: Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue - Synthesis Report. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, November 2012. Accessed at http://um.dk/en/danidaen/results/eval/eval_reports/evaluations/publicationdisplaypage/?publicationID=E45733 92-00E9-4DE0-A56E-784EF229CE95 Irish, L., Kushen, R., and Simon, K., 2004. Guidelines for Laws Affecting Civil Society Organizations, Open Society Institute and ICNL, Second Edition, 2004, accessible at http://www.icnl.org/research/resources/assessment/guidelines_en.pdf. Jupp, D., Sultan, M., & Costa, T. 2013. Joint Evaluation of Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue: Bangladesh Case Study Report. ITAD & COWI, January 2013, accessible at http://www.sida.se/Publications/Import/pdf/sv/Support-to-Civil-Society-Engagement-inPolicy-Dialogue---Bangladesh-Country-Report_3447.pdf. Kabuchu, H., Abola, C., Felton, M., & Gariyo, Z., 2013. Joint Evaluation of Support to Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue: Uganda Case Study Report. ITAD & COWI, January 2013, accessible at http://www.sida.se/Publications/Import/pdf/sv/Support-to-CivilSociety-Engagement-in-Policy-Dialogue--Uganda-Country-Report_3444.pdf Kiai, M. “Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development,” Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Human Rights Council, April 24, 2013, accessible at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HR C.23.39_EN.pdf Lawrence, S., Dobson, Chisten. “Advancing Human Rights: The State of Global Foundation Grant Making,” The Foundation Center and the International Human Rights Funders Group, 2013, accessible at http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/humanrights2013.pdf Nilsson, A., Holmberg, A., Modéer, P., Brekke Mogen, M., Chritoplos, I., and Jessica Rothman, 2013. Review of Civil Society Support Modalities at Sida HQ and Swedish Embassies, Final

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Report, Sida Decentralized Evaluation #15, May 2013. Accessible at http://www.sida.se/Publications/Import/pdf/sv/Review-of-Civil-Society-SupportModalities-at-Sida-HQ-and-Swedish-Embassies---Final-report_3475.pdf. Ochido, H.O. 2013. “My Brother’s Keeper: Challenges in Gifting in the Kenya Context,” International Journal for Not For Profit Law, Volume 15, No. March 2013. Accessed August 2013 at http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol15iss1/art_2.htm PARTICIP, 2008. Evaluation of the EC aid channeled through civil society Organizations, Volume 3. Cideal, Channel, Research and South Research, with the collaboration of ECDPM, an evaluation commissioned by the European Commission, December 2008, accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2008/1259_docs_en.h tm Reality of Aid, 2011. Democratic Ownership and Development Effectiveness: Civil Society Perspectives on Progress since Paris. Reality of Aid 2011 Report, IBON Books, accessible at http://www.realityofaid.org/roa_report/democratic-ownership-and-developmenteffectiveness-civil-society-perspectives-on-progress-since-paris/. Sida, 2013a. “Code of Practice on Donor Harmonisation: Main Document,” Informal Donor Group, Harmonisation of donor support to civil society through donor country civil society organizations. Sida, 2013b. “Code of Practice on Donor Harmonisation: The key principles for harmonisation and alignment,” Informal Donor Group, Harmonisation of donor support to civil society through donor country civil society organizations. Sida, 2013c. “Code of Practice on Donor Harmonisation: Guidelines for Operationalisaton of the Key Principles,” Informal Donor Group, Harmonisation of donor support to civil society through donor country civil society organizations. Sida, 2013d. “Code of Practice on Donor Harmonisation: Code of Practice on Donor Harmonisation – Tool for commitment and accountability,” Informal Donor Group, Harmonisation of donor support to civil society through donor country civil society organizations. Trade Union Congress (UK) 2012. Assessing DFID’s Contribution to achieving Decent Work. Accessible at http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/difid_and_decent_job.pdf. UNDP China 2013. Working with Civil Society in Foreign Aid: Possibilities for South-South Cooperation?, an e-book publication, September 2013, accessible at http://www.undp.org/content/china/en/home/library/south-south-cooperation/workingwith-civil-society-in-foreign-aid/ USAID 2012. The 2011 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa. Bureau for Africa, Office of Sustainable Development. Accessed August 2013 at http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/technical_areas/civil_so ciety/angosi/reports/2011/subafrica/2011_Sub-Saharan%20Africa_CSOSI_9-20-2012.pdf Voluntary Action Network India (VANI). “Enabling Environment for Voluntary

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Organizations: A global campaign,” [review of six countries], 2013, accessible at http://www.ong-ngo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Vani_Enabling-Environmenteng.pdf Women’s Human Rights Defenders International Coalition. “Global Report on the Situation of Women Human Rights Defenders,” January 2012. Accessible at http://www.defendingwomendefendingrights.org/pdf/WHRD_IC_Global%20Report_2012.pdf World Democracy Movement & ICNL. “Defending Civil Society Report”, Second Edition, June 2012, accessible at http://www.icnl.org/research/resources/dcs/DCS_Report_Second_Edition_English.pdf World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). “Violations of the right of NGOs to funding: from harassment to criminalization,” The Obervatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, 2013 Annual Report, accessible at http://www.omct.org/files/2013/02/22162/obs_annual_report_2013_uk_web.pdf

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APPENDIX THREE An Enabling Legal and Regulatory Environment for CSOs Based on international experience of laws and regulations affecting CSOs, a number of norms and good practices have been identified that enable CSOs to be effective in fulfilling their roles as development actors. Those considering drafting new or revised laws and regulations for CSOs should consider the following international-recognized norms against which national legislation should be assessed. 60 These principles include: x The right of CSOs to entry (that is, the right of individuals to form and join CSOs); x The right of CSOs to operate to fulfill their legal purposes without state interference; x The right to free expression; x The right of CSOs to communication with domestic and international partners; x The right to freedom of peaceful assembly; x The right to seek and secure resources, including the cross-border transfer of funds; and x The state’s positive obligation to protect CSO rights. Based on these norms a number of good practices in national legislation can be identified. 61 1. Acquisition of legal status should be voluntary, based on objective criteria, and not a prerequisite for the exercise of rights to expression, peaceful assembly and association. 2. Civic organization laws should be written, clearly defined and administered so that it is quick, easy and inexpensive to establish and maintain a civil organization as a legal entity in perpetuity, with a defined and reasonable time limit for decisions and written justification for denial of status, subject to appeal. 3. All acts and decisions affecting formal civil organizations should be subject to appropriate and fair administrative and independent judicial review. 4. Laws and regulations should exclude or simplify reporting procedures for small, provincial, community-based organizations and alliances.

60 Quoted from World Movement for Democracy and International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, Defending Civil Society Report, Second Addition, June 2012, accessed October 2013 at http://www.icnl.org/research/resources/dcs/DCS_Report_Second_Edition_English.pdf. 61 These proposals for good practice in the legal and regulatory framework for CSOs are adapted from Open Society, ‘Guidelines for Laws Affecting Civic Organizations’, Open Society, New York, 2004, accessed July 2013 at http://www.icnl.org/research/resources/assessment/guidelines_en.pdf. They also take into account extensive research on the part of the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (www.icnl.org) and the World Movement for Democracy (www.wmd.org). See also the recommendations on the legal status of NGOs by the Council of Europe found at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1194609&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntr anet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75

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5. Laws and regulations should sustain effective processes and instruments that ensure social participation in public policy development, implementation and evaluation. 6. Laws and regulations should provide guarantees for civil organizations with the right to speak freely on all matters of public significance, including existing or proposed legislation, state actions and policies, and the right to non-partisan criticism of state officials and candidates for public office. 7. Civic organizations should be facilitated to carry out public policy activities such as education, research, advocacy and the publication of position papers. 8. Laws, regulations and policies should provide for mechanisms and processes that allow for less bureaucratized, consistent, transparent and more efficient access to public funds, with accountability on the part of both government and CSOs. 9. Laws, regulations and policies should facilitate civic organizations to engage in any legitimate fundraising activity, with voluntary self-regulatory mechanisms for accountability, but public disclosure of the ways in which fund are raised and used, including fundraising expenses. 10. Laws, regulations and policies should create an enabling tax regime that stimulates civic participation through tax incentives for donations from individuals and the private sector. 11. A formal civic organization that is properly established in one country generally should be allowed to receive cash or in-kind donations, transfers or loans from outside the country so long as all generally applicable foreign exchange and customs laws are satisfied. Such laws should not impose confiscatory taxes or unfair rates of exchange. 12. CSO laws and regulations should be administered by an independent multi-stakeholder body. A government agency mandated to determine whether an organization qualifies for ‘public benefit’ or ‘charitable’ status, and to administer laws and regulations governing CSOs, should function as an independent commission with mixed stakeholder governance. Regulatory burdens for civic organizations should be commensurate with the benefits they obtain from the State.

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THE CIVICUS 2013 ENABLING ENVIRONMENT INDEX

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About CIVICUS CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation is an international alliance of civil society organisations and activists working to strengthen citizen action and civil society throughout the world, especially in areas where participatory democracy and citizensâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; freedom of association are challenged. CIVICUS has a vision of a global community of active, engaged citizens committed to the creation of a more just and equitable world. This is based on the belief that the health of societies exists in direct proportion to the degree of balance between the state, the private sector and civil society, and that governance is improved when there are multiple means for people to have a say in decision-making. CIVICUS seeks to amplify the voices and opinions of people and their organisations, share knowledge about and promote the value and contribution of citizen participation and civil society, and help give expression to the enormous creative energy of a diverse civil society. CIVICUS, with its numerous partners, works by bringing together and connecting different civil society actors and other stakeholders in civil society; researching into and publishing on the health, state and challenges of civil society; and developing policy positions and advocating for the greater inclusion of and a more enabling environment for civil society. CIVICUS was founded in 1993 and is headquartered in Johannesburg, South Africa. We warmly welcome new members and partners. To join us or find out more please visit www.civicus.org

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CONTENTS Chapter 1: Introduction to the EEI

4

Chapter 2: The EEI unpacked

9

- Data sources - Coverage

11 11

Chapter 3: EEI results

13

Top 5 countries Worst 5 countries Socio-cultural dimension Socio-economic dimension Governance dimension Imbalanced scores EEI ranking Countries and territories not in the EEI

14 14 15 17 19 21 24 26

Chapter 4: Discussion

28

Contact CIVICUS

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Welcome to the 2013 Enabling Environment Index produced by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. The Enabling Environment Index (EEI) was built in partnership with the University of Pretoria, under the supervision and leadership of Professor Lorenzo Fioramonti. CIVICUS is especially grateful to him for his vision and his stewardship. The EEI has been developed through a consultative process and the feedback we have received from our members, friends, partners, supporters and others in the CIVICUS alliance helped shape the index and this report. In particular, we wish to thank the Enabling Environment Index Advisory Group for their efforts and continuing support. We would also like to thank the members of the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) and its Working Group on the Enabling Environment for Civil Society, as well as staff at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) working on the post-Busan monitoring framework.

CIVICUS wishes to express our gratitude to the following persons and institutions who contributed to the development of the index. Index Development Team Lorenzo Fioramonti, Olga Kononykhina

Index Advisory Group Chairperson - Netsanet Belay (Amnesty International); Members - Brian Tomlinson (AidWatch Canada); David Brown (Hauser Center, Harvard University); Deborah Hardoon (Transparency International); John Garrison (World Bank); Leonardo Arriola (University of California, Berkeley); Lester M. Salamon, Megan Haddock and Wojtek Sokolowski (Center for Civil Society Studies, John Hopkins University); Marion Derckx (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands); Nilda Bullain (International Center for Not for Profit Law); Robin Oglivy (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development); Vitalice Meja (Reality of Aid Africa)

Consultation Coordinators Africa CSO Platform for Principled Partnership (Kenya); Asia Society for Social Improvement and Sustainable Transformation (India); Centro Ecuatoriano de Derecho Ambiental (Ecuador); European Commission/Swedish International Development Agency (Belgium); Nigeria National Network of NGOs (Nigeria); Uganda National NGO Forum (Uganda); University of Pretoria (South Africa)

CIVICUS Donors Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid); Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida); Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD)

CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index Project Team Ciana-Marie Pegus, Katsuji Imata, Danny Sriskandarajah

CIVICUS Staff Amy Miller-Taylor, Clara Bosco, Dorothée Guénéheux, Enrica Barago, Ine Van Severen, Kiva La Touché, Mandeep Tiwana, Mark Nowottny, Zubair Sayed

Graphic Design and Website Design InJozi

ACRONYMS CIVICUS: CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation CPDE: CSO Platform for Development Effectiveness, the CSO coalition formed to follow up on the Busan Partnership for Development CSI: CIVICUS Civil Society Index, a civil society self-assessment project CSW: CIVICUS Civil Society Watch, a project to monitor the space for civil society CSO: Civil society organisation DAC: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, which brings together most government development donors EC: European Commission – the executive body of the European Union EEI: CIVICUS Civil Society Enabling Environment Index, a new tool to quantitatively measure conditions for civil society in different countries GPEDC: Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation ICNL: International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, an international civil society organisation NGO: Non-governmental organisation, a type of civil society organisation OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, an intergovernmental organisation of 34 countries, in which most development donor governments are represented UN: United Nations

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Introduction to the EEI For 20 years, CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation has been at the forefront of efforts to understand the state of civil society and draw attention to threats faced by civil society around the world. On the former, CIVICUS has built tools such as the Civil Society Index (CSI), a participatory research process conducted in over 70 countries. On the latter, CIVICUS has issued countless alerts about legal, regulatory and policy measures in many countries that restrict civil societyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to exist and operate freely and its ability to participate in governance processes.

and assassinations of civil society activists, as well as crackdowns on protests and demonstrations. In recent years, there has been a growing recognition of the importance of an â&#x20AC;&#x153;enabling environmentâ&#x20AC;? for civil society in order for any democracy to flourish. In general, the international development community considers an enabling environment for civil society to be the political and policy context within which civil society organisations (CSOs) operate, with particular interest paid to areas that can be controlled by the State and that relate to governance.

It has also highlighted other threats such as physical attacks, harassment, imprisonment 4 - 197 -


Introduction to the EEI

INTRODUCTION

THE CIVICUS DEFINITION OF “ENABLING ENVIRONMENT” In the State of Civil Society Report published in April 2013, the environment for civil society was broadly defined as “the conditions within which civil society works.”1 CIVICUS has long used a working definition of civil society as being “the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests.” It follows from this working definition of civil society that the environment for civil society is made up of the forces that shape and influence the size, extent and functioning of that arena.

The State of Civil Society report highlights that key aspects of the enabling environment should include the following2 A. CSOs’ legitimacy, transparency and accountability: Civil society groups should make efforts to be transparent and accountable to their stakeholders, to derive their legitimacy from endorsement by their stakeholders3; B. Building connections, coalitions and solidarity: There should be multiple connections and collaborations between different civil society groups and individuals, and collaborative platforms and coalitions at different levels; C. The legal and regulatory environment: CSO laws should be clear and well-defined. The registration process should be quick, easy and inexpensive. The state’s laws, regulations and policies on civil society should make it easy for civil society groups to form, operate free from interference, express their views, communicate, convene, cooperate and seek resources; D. Political environment: Governments and politicians should recognise civil society as a legitimate social and political actor and provide systematic opportunities for state and civil society institutions to work together; E. Public attitudes and perception: There should be tolerance of people and groups who have different viewpoints and identities; and it should be easy for all people to participate in civil society; F. Corruption: There should be no tolerance of corruption amongst state officials, political actors, people in business and civil society personnel; G. Communications and technology: There should be reliable, cheap and widespread access to communications platforms and technologies; H. Resources: Civil society groups should be able to access resources from a range of sustainable sources, including domestically, and to define their own activities, rather than have these defined by funding opportunities.

This list indicates that the enabling environment for civil society could be broader than what the current discourse suggests.

1

5

2013 State of Civil Society report: Creating an enabling environment for civil society, CIVICUS, 29 April 2013, pg 10. The full text is available at http://socs.civicus.org. Ibid, pg 19. 3 CIVICUS also acknowledges that while civil society organisations are primarily accountable to their stakeholders, they are also accountable to the government, other civil society groups and the public at large. 2

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How thinking about the enabling environment for civil society has evolved

Year

INTRODUCTION

Milestone

1980-90s

Aga Khan Foundation and others initiated discussions about the enabling environment for civil society.

February 2003 & March 2005

Key stakeholders agreed to encourage civil society participation in the coordination of aid strategies at the First High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and the Second High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Rome (2003) and Paris (2005) respectively.

June 2008

September 2008

October 2008

March 2011

June 2011

December 2011

June 2012

September 2012

December 2012

Formation of the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment, a global CSO platform to improve the impact of CSO development work and advocate for more favourable government policies and practices for CSOs. At the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, Ghana, CSOs for the first time were recognised as independent development actors in their own right. Countries, territories and international organisations agreed in the Accra Agenda for Action to work with CSOs to provide an enabling environment that maximises their contributions to development. BetterAid, a platform to improve the capacity of civil society to engage in aid effectiveness policy, and Open Forum started to act as the twin civil society fora to engage with the post-Accra international process on aid and development effectiveness. The Multi-stakeholder Task Team on Civil Society Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment published key messages for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and outlined the following fundamental rights guaranteed in regional and international instruments for protection: freedom of association, freedom of expression, the right to operate free from unwarranted State interference, the right to communicate and cooperate, the right to seek and secure funding, and the State’s duty to protect. Open Forum adopted the Siem Reap CSO Consensus on the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness. It defines an “enabling environment” as the political and policy context created by governments, official donors and other development actors that affect the ways CSOs may carry out their work. It defines “enabling standards” as a set of inter-related good practices by donors and governments – in the legal, regulatory, fiscal, informational, political and cultural areas – that support the capacity of CSO development actors to engage in development processes in a sustained and effective manner.

At the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, it was agreed in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation that countries, territories and international organisations would implement fully their respective commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as independent development actors, with a particular focus on an enabling environment, consistent with agreed international rights, that maximises the contributions of CSOs to development.

The Working Party on Aid Effectiveness agreed on a set of indicators, targets and processes for the monitoring of the Busan commitments. The enabling environment is one of 10 global indicators. This indicator will monitor whether civil society operates within an environment that maximises its engagement in and contribution to development.

The European Commission issued its communication on relations with CSOs in 2012, which affirmed the need to promote the CSO enabling environment. In the communication, the CSO enabling environment referred to a functioning democratic legal and judicial system, which gave CSOs the de jure and de facto right to associate and secure funding, coupled with freedom of expression, access to information and participation in public life.

CSOs launched the CSO Platform for Development Effectiveness (CPDE). The CPDE is the successor civil society platform to the Open Forum/Better Aid processes.

6 - 199 -


It is within this context that CIVICUS started to develop a new tool for assessing the enabling environment for civil society, called the Enabling Environment Index (EEI) in 2012. CIVICUS worked on building the EEI with the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria under the leadership and supervision of Professor Lorenzo Fioramonti. This research partnership was formed to ensure that the EEI passed the test of academic rigour and methodological legitimacy. The EEI defines the enabling environment as “a set of conditions that impact on the capacity of citizens (whether individually or in an organised fashion) to participate and engage in the civil society arena in a sustained and voluntary manner.”4 There are at least two notable features of this definition. One is the adoption of the capability approach, which “emphasises the underlying conditions that make individuals ‘capable’ of fulfilling their own goals.”5 This approach considers the quality of the “demand” side of the environment (i.e. the readiness of CSOs and citizens) to be as important as the “supply” side (i.e. governance and policy measures that directly affect civil society). As such, this approach recognises the role of socio-economic and socio-cultural factors as key components of the enabling environment for civil society. The choice of the capability approach to underpin the EEI has been consciously made. This approach points to the importance of “readiness” by CSOs and individual citizens. Recognising that this is formed by socioeconomic and socio-cultural factors, these issues need to be incorporated into the long-term policy debate. Strengthening the communications infrastructure and addressing economic and gender inequality are vital parts of building a healthy civil society. Tolerant, participative societies and cultures of volunteering and giving are key to a vibrant civil society. Without trust in CSOs, the legitimacy, impact and strength of civil society is severely undermined. We hope that future discussions on the enabling environment will embrace an expansive view of the issue and include socio-economic and socio-cultural factors as well. The other notable feature is the conscious inclusion of individual citizens, as well as CSOs (or organised forms of civil society), as the actors in the civil society arena. This is consistent with the general CIVICUS approach, which affirms that all actions from outside the government and business spheres that promote democracy, good governance, human rights, social justice, equality and sustainable development are part of civil society, whether they are generated by organisations, movements, ad-hoc groups or citizens. Many aspects of the EEI (notably its reliance on secondary statistical data) are departures from the CIVICUS tradition of participatory action-research that is generated and owned by civil society actors at the country level. However, we believe that it is nevertheless useful to look at what a tool like this can tell us about the environment in which civil society operates. We consider this a useful complement to the other tools we use to understand civil society, and not a substitute for them. We also wanted to build a tool that would generate debate and dialogue about the enabling environment for civil society. As part of this process, we assembled a multi-stakeholder Advisory Group, whose thoroughness and insight proved indispensable for the refinement of the product. We also published a draft version of the EEI in April 2013, alongside our State of Civil Society Report, and opened up a public consultation in the following months. During this period we coordinated several events that fed into the consultation process, during which we received invaluable feedback from our network of members, partners, friends and critics. The EEI described in this paper has been shaped by all of these exchanges.

7

4

Methodological note on the CIVICUS Civil Society Enabling Environment Index, CIVICUS, October 2013, pg 3. The full text is available at http://www.civicus.org/eei. Ibid, pg 4

5

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Feedback from consultations

INTRODUCTION

Date

Location

Organising Partner

Key Points

25 May

Bellagio, Italy

CIVICUS

Real-time, crowd-sourced information in future should accompany index; Development of index must be academic process

3 June

Lagos, Nigeria

Nigeria National Network of NGOs

Importance of gender rights, corruption and education to local context; Need for citizen-generated data, yet understanding of constraints relating to primary data gathering clear

6 June

Kampala, Uganda

Uganda National NGO Forum

Need for ranking; Explanation of index should be less academic; Vital role of national platforms in disseminating index

6 June

Johannesburg, South Africa

University of Pretoria

Need to measure capacity of people for struggle; Some of the data sources are not timely

20 June

Brussels, Belgium

European Commission and Swedish International Development Agency

Need for better measurement of civil society funding and infrastructure; Index not advocacy focused enough

20 June

Quito, Ecuador

Centro Ecuatoriano de Derecho Ambiental

Local concern about freedom of expression and division amongst civil society actors

26 June

Nairobi, Kenya

Africa CSO Platform for Principled Partnership

Objectives, purpose and rationale need to be explicit; Importance of socio-economic dimension and socio-cultural dimension cannot be underestimated; Index should measure broader trends not transient events

8 - 201 -


the eei unpacked The EEI is a global composite index developed using secondary data that seeks to understand the propensity of citizens to participate in civil society. Readers who are interested in the methodology can refer to the Methodological Note as well as the Dimensions and Sources Table, both of which can be found and downloaded from the CIVICUS website. The composite index is made up of 53 indicators. The indicators that are part of the EEI have different units and scales. In order to be incorporated into the EEI, they are re-weighted on a scale of 0-1. These 53 indicators are clustered into 17 sub-dimensions, which are then averaged and sorted into 3 dimensions.

9 - 202 -


THE EEI UNPACKED

Enabling Environment Index źƢĴƢŠ¤¶·Ì¤¼·Ì źƢIJĸƢÌ؄ƒŠ¤¶·Ì¤¼·Ì źƢĶĴƢ¤·Š¤…yÒ¼ÈÌ

ENABLING ENVIRONMENT INDEX

Socio-Economic Environment

Socio-Cultural Environment

Governance Environment

Education

Propensity to Participate

Civil Society Infrastructure

Communications

Tolerance

Policy Dialogue

Equality

Giving and Volunteering

Corruption

Gender Equality

Trust

Political Rights and Freedoms Associational Rights

Rule of law

Personal Rights

NGO Legal Context

Media Freedoms

10 - 203 -


Data Sources

THE EEI UNPACKED

The Enabling Environment Index is made up of 71 data sources, which cover the period 2005 to 2012. Over 70% of the sources are from the years 2010 and 2011. Data points from earlier years have been included where the dimensions tend to evolve slowly over time. All of the data points from the period 2005 to 2009 are used in the socio-cultural dimension. However, the socio-cultural dimension does include data sources from 2009, 2010 and 2011 also. All the data in the socio-economic and governance dimensions are from 2010 onwards.

Number of data points in the EE Index by year

40 30 20 10 0 2005

2005-7

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Coverage The EEI covers 109 countries. The number of countries included in the EEI is determined by data availability, and only countries that have scores in at least 14 out of 17 sub-dimensions have been included.

Table: Enabling Environment Index coverage6 Region

Number of UN member states in the EEI

Number of UN member states in the region

Percentage of UN member states in the region covered by the Enabling Environment Index

Africa

29

54

53.7

Asia-Pacific7

18

58

33.3

Europe

41

47

87.2

The Americas

20

35

57.1

6

Even though Kosovo is not a member state of the United Nations, it is included in the EEI. The limited country coverage inhibits more detailed regional comparison. The decision to compare countries in Asia and Oceania is due to the fact that only two countries in Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) had the requisite number of data sources to be included in the index. All the other countries in Oceania had data for 9 or less sub-dimensions. The two countries from Oceania both rank extremely highly on the Enabling Environment Index and are not representative of a general trend in Oceania or the Asia-Pacific region.

7

11

- 204 -


Coverage: continued

THE EEI UNPACKED

As a result of extensive existing research on various components of the enabling environment in the region, the EEI has the highest level of coverage of countries in Europe. A severe deficiency of the EEI is that it only measures 2 out of 38 Small-Island Developing States.8 This is particularly problematic with regard to countries in the Asia-Pacific region and the Americas, more specifically countries in the Pacific and the Caribbean. In the Pacific, there is hardly any information available on economic inequality, education and gender equality and there is absolutely no data available for all the components of the socio-cultural dimension. In both the Caribbean and the Pacific, there is little data on civil society infrastructure, policy dialogue and the NGO legal framework. In the case of the Caribbean, the only two Small-Island Developing States that are included in the index are the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago. If data were available for the other 14 Small-Island Developing States, then the EEI would cover 97.1% of the countries in the Americas. There is a huge discrepancy between the percentage of countries assessed in Europe and the percentage of countries in other regions that are in the EEI. This suggests that there is a need to focus further data gathering efforts on civic space in these regions. Small-island states not included in the Enabling Environment Index by region Africa - 5 The Americas - 14 Asia PaciďŹ c - 17

AVG. EEI 0.2558

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Figure: World map of the scores of Enabling Environment Index

8

The number of small-island developing states listed does not include small-island territories or dependencies

- 205 -

12


the eei RESULTS

13 - 206 -


Top five countries on the EEI

EEI RESULTS

Owing to its good implementation of human rights protections and low levels of inequality and corruption, New Zealand ranks highest on the EEI with a score of 0.87. New Zealand is the only country that is consistently in the top 5 countries in all three dimensions. It is closely followed by Canada (0.85) in second place. Canada, a country with a good education system, excellent communication infrastructure and robust human rights protections, is in the top 10 countries in the socio-economic, socio-cultural and governance dimensions. Australia (0.84) ranks third, followed by Denmark (0.81). Rounding out the top five is another Nordic country, Norway (0.80). Top 5 countries Ranking

Country

Score

1

New Zealand

0.87

2

Canada

0.85

3

Australia

0.84

4

Denmark

0.81

5

Norway

0.80

Worst five countries on the EEI Due its political instability and poor civil society infrastructure, the Democratic Republic of Congo (0.26) is the lowest ranked country on the EEI. Ruled by an authoritarian regime with a poor human rights record, Uzbekistan (0.29) is considered to have the second worst enabling environment for civil society of countries included in the index. Burundi, which is emerging from a protracted civil war, is still wrangling with establishing the rule of law. According to the index, Burundi (0.31) has the third worst enabling environment and is closely followed by Iran (0.31). A lack of gender equality and the repression of civil liberties are the primary factors which restrict the space for and the potential of Iranian civil society. Governed by a President that openly threatens civil society9, the Gambia (0.32) has the fifth worst enabling environment for civil society ranked on the index Top 5 countries Ranking

Country

Score

105

The Gambia

0.32

106

Burundi

0.31

107

Iran

0.31

108

Uzbekistan

0.29

109

Democratic Republic of Congo

0.26

9

The Gambiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s bloodcurdling threat, The Guardian, 1 October 2009 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/oct/01/gambia-jammeh-human-rights.

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14


Socio-cultural dimension

EEI RESULTS

The global average for the socio-cultural dimension is 0.52. The Americas ranks highest on the socio-cultural dimension with a regional average of 0.59. Five of the countries that are ranked in the top ten in the socio-cultural dimension are from the Americas (Canada, United States of America, Colombia, Guatemala and Trinidad and Tobago). A high propensity to participate, a high degree of tolerance of different ethnic and religious groups and high public trust in non-profit organisations are key attributes of these national contexts. Only 5 of the 20 countries covered by the EEI in the region were below the average. Due to limited trust in people and infrequent giving and volunteering, Ecuador (0.44) has the lowest socio-cultural score in the Americas.

Average socio-cultural score by region

Indicators of the socio-cultural dimension

Global

Propensity to Participate

Africa

Tolerance

Asia-PaciďŹ c

Trust (including trust and public image of NGOs)

Europe

Giving and Volunteering

The Americas 0.00

Top 10 countries in the socio-cultural dimension

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

Low score for socio-cultural dimension in Balkans and former Soviet-bloc

10 worst countries in the socio-cultural dimension

1 New Zealand

0.83

1 Jordan

0.40

85 Georgia

0.46

2 Australia

0.80

2 Guinea

0.40

87 Montenegro

0.45

3 Canada

0.78

3 Serbia

0.40

89 Albania

0.44

4 USA

0.78

4 Kazakhstan

0.37

91 Kosovo

0.43

5 Colombia

0.72

5 Gabon

0.33

94 Macedonia

0.41

6 China

0.71

6 Gambia

0.33

95 Tajikistan

0.40

7 Guatemala

0.67

7 Angola

0.33

96 Croatia

0.40

8 Trinidad and Tobago

0.66

8 Uzbekistan

0.30

97 Kyrgyzstan

0.40

9 Burkina Faso

0.64

9 Burundi

0.29

98 Bosnia & Herzegovina

0.40

10 South Korea

0.64

10 Democratic Republic of Congo

0.28

100 Serbia

0.40

103 Kazakhstan

0.37

107 Uzbekistan

0.30

The Asia-Pacific region has the widest range of scores. Four countries in the Asia-Pacific region were in the top 10 countries (New Zealand, Australia, China and South Korea). In fact, New Zealand and Australia are the two highest ranked countries with scores of 0.83 and 0.80 respectively. As is the case of highly ranked countries in the Americas, there are high levels of public participation and public trust in New Zealand and Australia.

15 - 208 -


Socio-cultural dimension: continued

EEI RESULTS

In the Asia-Pacific region, the post-Soviet States are amongst the worst performing countries in the region. This is not particularly surprising given the fact that the socio-cultural dimension measures social cohesion and trust (including trust in non-profits), which is low in post-communist countries and may not have been helped by the post-communist influx of non-indigenous forms of civil society.10 The European country with the highest score in this dimension is Denmark (0.56), which is ranked 27th out of 109 countries. Low levels of giving and volunteering as well as a lack of interest in public participation are the reasons why 63.4% of the countries in Europe are below the global average. In Europe, there is a narrow range of scores in the socio-cultural dimension, with the lowest score being that of Serbia (0.40). The countries in the Balkan Peninsula, which the EEI indicates is categorised by low levels of trust in people in general, do not score highly in the cultural dimension. Burkina Faso, ranked 9th out 109 countries globally, is the nation with the best socio-cultural environment for civil society on the African continent. This is linked to a high degree of tolerance of different ethnic and religious groups in the West African nation. Much like Europe, 63.3% of the countries in Africa ranked by the EEI are below the global average. However, 6 African countries are in the bottom 10 countries in this dimension (Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Gabon, Gambia, Angola and Guinea) due to a very poor public perception of civil society.

AVG. EEI 0.2558

0.8688

Figure: Map of the socio-cultural dimension

10 Bridging the gaps: Citizens, organisations and dissociation, Civil Society Index summary report: 2008-2011, CIVICUS, August 2011. The full text is available at http://civicus.org/downloads/CSIReportSummary.pdf

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16


The socio-economic dimension

EEI RESULTS

The global average for the socio-economic dimension is 0.54. It is clear that there is a strong correlation between socio-economic development and the enabling environment for civil society. However, CIVICUS does not believe that a countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s level of socio-economic development is the sole determinant of its enabling environment. With generally high education levels and good communications infrastructure, the continent that scores highest in the socio-economic dimension is Europe, with a regional average of 0.67. Norway (0.83) is the country that scores highest globally in the socio-economic dimension. Six other countries in Europe appear in the top 10 (Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, Iceland, Finland and Denmark). Over 90% of the European countries in the index have a higher score than the global average. The only sub-average countries in Europe are Macedonia, Montenegro, Georgia and Kosovo whose low results can be attributed to a failure to tackle gender inequality. The lowest ranking European country is Kosovo (0.51). However, in the global socio-economic ranking Kosovo is only sixty-fifth.

Average socio-economic score by region

Indicators of the socio-economic dimension

0.8

Education

0.6 Communications (with a focus on internet users and access)

0.4

Equality (with a focus on economic inequality)

0.2 0

Gender equality

The Americas

Top 10 countries in the socio-economic dimension

Europe

Asia-Pacific

Africa

Global

10 worst socio-economic environments for civil society

1

Norway

0.83

100

Tanzania

0.31

2

Sweden

0.82

101

Mozambique

0.31

3

Netherlands

0.82

102

Benin

0.31

4

Germany

0.79

103

Malawi

0.29

5

New Zealand

0.78

104

Burkina Faso

0.29

6

Iceland

0.78

105

Nigeria

0.29

7

Finland

0.78

106

Liberia

0.28

8

Australia

0.78

107

Mali

0.28

9

Canada

0.77

108

Democratic Republic of Congo

0.24

10

Denmark

0.77

109

Sierra Leone

0.23

The average for the Asia-Pacific region is 0.54. As is the case with the socio-cultural and governance subdimensions, New Zealand scores highest in the region. In Asia, the average is brought up by a few high scoring countries as only 39% of the countries scored higher than the global average. Interestingly, economic giant India (0.32) is the country which is considered to have the worst socio-economic conditions for civil society in the region. Particularly high rates of economic inequality and lack of access to communications infrastructure resulted in India ranking 99th out of 109 countries.

17 - 210 -


The socio-economic dimension: continued In the Americas, the highest ranked country is Canada (0.77). The regional average is 0.51, which is slightly below the global average. In stark contrast to the high scores in the socio-cultural dimension, only 6 of the 20 countries measured in the region are above the global average of 0.54 (Canada, United States of America, Trinidad and Tobago, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay). This is mainly due to the fact that residents of these countries can easily access basic services.The countrywith the lowest score in the region is Guatemala (0.43). Low rates of secondary school completion and internet access negatively impact the potential for vibrant civic action and well connected civil society organisations. Africa does not fare well in the socio-economic dimension of the enabling environment. The average for the region is 0.35, well below the global average of 0.54. The best country in the region is Botswana (0.53), which has a good education system and ranks 53rd out of 109 countries. All the countries in the bottom 10 are in Sub-Saharan Africa. As is the case of the Indian example cited above, it is clear that there needs to be investment in enhancing the communications infrastructure and addressing the pertinent issues of economic and gender inequality in the region.

AVG. EEI 0.2558

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Figure: Map of the socio-economic dimension

18 - 211 -


Governance Dimension

EEI RESULTS

It is very apparent that governance is the most important component of an enabling environment for civil society. Given its critical role in shaping the enabling environment for civil society, the governance dimension makes up half of the EEI score, while the socio-economic dimension and the socio-cultural dimension amount to one quarter of the score each.11 The global governance average is 0.58. Europe is the region that has the highest score on the governance dimension, with an average of 0.73. Denmark is considered to have the most conducive enabling environment for civil society, with a near perfect score of 0.96. All other Nordic countries score particularly high on the governance dimension with Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden all scoring above 0.91. Only 19% of countries in Europe were ranked below the global average of 0.58. All the European countries below the global average are post-communist States, in which old authoritarian structures and conservative political forces still wield significant influence. Belarus (0.23) and Russia (0.34) are the two worst governance contexts in Europe for civil society. Belarus ranks 106th out of 109 countries globally.

Indicators of the governance dimension

Top 10 governance environments for civil society

Civil society infrastructure • Organisational capacity • Civil society financial viability • Effectiveness of service provision organisations

Policy Dialogue • Civil society advocacy ability • Budget transparency • Networking • Civil society participation in policy

Corruption Political Rights and Freedoms • Political stability • Political participation • Political culture • Political rights • Human rights • Political terror

1

Denmark

0.96

2

Iceland

0.94

3

Switzerland

0.94

4

New Zealand

0.93

5

Canada

0.93

6

Sweden

0.92

7

Finland

0.92

8

Norway

0.91

9

Luxembourg

0.91

10

Austria

0.91

10 worst governance environments for civil society

Associational rights Rule of law • Legal Framework • Electoral pluralism • Confidence in honesty of electoral process • Independence of the judiciary

Personal rights • The rights not to be tortured, summarily executed, disappeared, or imprisoned for political beliefs • Trade union rights • Workers rights

NGO Legal Framework Media freedoms

100

Tajikistan

0.30

101

Gambia

0.30

102

Zimbabwe

0.26

103

Democratic Republic of Congo

0.25

104

Ethiopia

0.25

105

Vietnam

0.25

106

Belarus

0.23

107

China

0.20

108

Uzbekistan

0.19

109

Iran

0.17

• Free speech • Press freedom • Freedom on the Net

19

11 If the governance dimension, the socio-cultural dimension and the socio-economic dimension were simply averaged, the scores of 91 of the 109 countries in the index would only vary by +/-0.05 or less.

- 212 -


Governance Dimension: continued

EEI RESULTS

These four countries are in the bottom ten countries globally because of particularly poor legal frameworks for civil society and severely strained relationships between civil society and the State.

Average governance score by region Global

The Asia-Pacific region has the lowest regional average for governance, which at 0.43 is only slightly lower than the African average. As a result of minimal corruption and strong freedom of association, assembly and expression guarantees, New Zealand (0.93) and Australia (0.90) have the best governance environments. South Korea (0.72) and India (0.54) have the third and fourth best governance environments in the region.

Europe The Americas Asia-PaciďŹ c Africa 0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

The regional governance average for Africa is 0.44, which is well below the global average of 0.58. The three best governed countries on the continent are in the Southern Africa region. Botswana, South Africa and Namibia rank 39th, 40th and 41st out of 109 countries respectively. Botswana scores particularly high on guaranteeing freedom of association (0.94) and South Africa has the most conducive environment for policy dialogue between civil society and the State (0.80). It is hoped that these in-country best practices can be further studied and disseminated across the continent. The West African nations of Ghana and Benin round off the top five best governed countries in the region, both countries scoring higher than 0.60. Only 20% of countries in Africa surpass the global average of 0.58. Gambia (0.30), Zimbabwe (0.26), Democratic Republic of Congo (0.25) and Ethiopia (0.25) have the least favourable governance environments for civil society.

This sharp plummet in scores indicates that there is a huge disparity in governance environments in the region. If New Zealand and Australia were not included in the region, the average score for the Asia-Pacific region would be 0.38. Developing economy powerhouses India (0.54), Indonesia (0.52), Turkey (0.47) and Malaysia (0.44), are above the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s governance average, but they are well below the global average of 0.58. The Asia-Pacific region has the most countries in the bottom ten (Tajikistan, Vietnam, Iran, Uzbekistan and China). Poor civil society-State relations, inadequate legal protections of civil and political rights and frequent violations of the rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly are the principal reasons that these countries have very low scores in the governance dimension. It is apparent that human rights protections in the region need strengthening.

AVG. EEI 0.2558

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Figure: World map of the governance environment

20 - 213 -


Imbalanced Scores

EEI RESULTS

One interesting aspect of the EEI scores is the imbalances between different dimensions of the index. For example, the gap between the socio-economic and socio-cultural scores reveals two types of imbalances. On the one hand, some countries, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Guatemala and Tanzania have relatively high scores on the socio-cultural dimension but low socio-economic scores. This could suggest that, despite low socio-economic outcomes in these counties, the socio-cultural context for civil society is relatively strong. The reverse seems to be true in several European countries (Sweden, Norway, France and Germany) where, despite very good socio-economic conditions, more needs to be done to build trust in non-profits and a culture of giving and volunteering in order to strengthen civic engagement and CSO impact. Socio-economic score

Socio-cultural score

0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 Burkina Faso Mali

Guatemala Tanzania Sweden

Norway

France

Germany Finland

Countries

Gap between the economic score and the cultural score

Socio-economic score

Socio-cultural score

Burkina Faso

0.36

0.29

0.64

Mali

0.34

0.28

0.62

Guatemala

0.32

0.35

0.67

Sweden

0.31

0.82

0.51

Norway

0.30

0.83

0.53

France

0.30

0.76

0.47

Germany

0.29

0.79

0.49

Tanzania

0.28

0.31

0.59

Finland

0.28

0.78

0.50

Iceland

0.28

0.78

0.50

21 - 214 -

Iceland


Imbalanced Scores: continued

EEI RESULTS

If we look at the gaps between socio-cultural and governance scores, the biggest imbalances are generally seen in European countries which have extremely high governance scores coupled with comparatively low scores on the socio-cultural dimension. As indicated above, this suggests that this is an area which needs to be addressed in order to enhance the impact of European civil society organisations locally. However, the big outlier in this case is China, which has a very high score on the socio-cultural dimension and the third worst governance environment for civil society. Good governance conditions are critical to the health and state of the environment for civil society. Although China clearly has great potential for civic action and for organised civil society, political and legislative reforms are essential for civil society to flourish.

Socio-cultural score

Governance Environment

1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00 China

Iceland

Finland Luxembourg

Sweden

Austria Denmark Switzerland Belgium Norway

Countries

Gap between the economic score and the governance score

Socio-cultural score

Governance score

China

0.51

0.71

0.20

Iceland

0.44

0.50

0.94

Finland

0.42

0.50

0.92

Luxembourg

0.42

0.50

0.91

Sweden

0.41

0.51

0.92

Austria

0.41

0.50

0.91

Denmark

0.40

0.56

0.96

Switzerland

0.40

0.54

0.94

Belgium

0.39

0.49

0.88

Norway

0.38

0.53

0.91

22 - 215 -


Imbalanced Scores: continued

EEI RESULTS

Turning to the gap between socio-economic and governance scores, several Latin American countries have high governance scores, but low scores on the socio-economic dimension. Although Uruguay, Costa Rica and Chile do not have low scores on the socio-economic dimension per se, there is a clear discrepancy between their average socio-economic scores and their high governance scores. The EEI indicates that these countries, as well as Benin, Mali and Sierra Leone, should focus on closing the gender and economic gap in educational achievement and access to communications infrastructure in order to strengthen citizen participation as a whole. Although Belarus, China, Russia and to some extent Uzbekistan have fairly good socio-economic conditions for civil society, they have poor governance contexts, which are marked by acrimonious State-civil society relations. Local and international civil society must continue to pressure these governments to enact reforms to strengthen the governance environment and protect the space for civil society. Socio-economic

Governance Environment

0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 Belarus

China

Uzbekistan Russia

Uruguay

Mali

Benin

Costa Rica

Sierra Leone

Chile

Countries

Gap between the economic score and the governance score

Socio-economic score

Governance environment score

Belarus

0.37

0.60

0.23

Uruguay

0.33

0.55

0.88

China

0.32

0.52

0.20

Mali

0.31

0.28

0.58

Uzbekistan

0.31

0.49

0.19

Benin

0.29

0.31

0.60

Costa Rica

0.29

0.52

0.81

Sierra Leone

0.28

0.23

0.51

Russia

0.27

0.61

0.34

Chile

0.27

0.56

0.83

23 - 216 -


Enabling Environment Index ranking Ranking

Country

EEI RESULTS

Score

Ranking

Country

Score

1

New Zealand

0.87

31

Costa Rica

0.66

2

Canada

0.85

32

Latvia

0.65

3

Australia

0.84

33

Lithuania

0.65

4

Denmark

0.81

34

Slovakia

0.65

5

Norway

0.80

35

Trinidad and Tobago

0.64

6

Netherlands

0.79

36

Italy

0.63

7

Switzerland

0.79

37

Argentina

0.61

8

Iceland

0.79

38

Bulgaria

0.61

9

Sweden

0.79

39

Croatia

0.60

10

United States of America

0.79

40

South Africa

0.59

11

Finland

0.78

41

Romania

0.59

12

Ireland

0.76

42

Brazil

0.59

13

Luxembourg

0.76

43

Botswana

0.58

14

Austria

0.76

44

Panama

0.57

15

United Kingdom

0.75

45

Peru

0.57

16

Belgium

0.75

46

Ukraine

0.56

17

Estonia

0.73

47

El Salvador

0.56

18

Uruguay

0.73

48

Ghana

0.56

19

France

0.72

49

Montenegro

0.55

20

Cyprus

0.71

50

Macedonia

0.55

21

Chile

0.71

51

Mexico

0.55

22

Spain

0.70

52

Albania

0.55

23

South Korea

0.70

53

Guatemala

0.54

24

Malta

0.70

54

Serbia

0.54

25

Germany

0.70

55

Namibia

0.53

26

Slovenia

0.69

56

Colombia

0.52

27

Hungary

0.69

57

Bolivia

0.52

28

Czech Republic

0.69

58

Bosnia and Herzegovina

0.52

29

Poland

0.68

59

Indonesia

0.52

30

Portugal

0.68

60

Kosovo

0.52

* All scores have been rounded off.

24 - 217 -


Enabling Environment Index ranking: continued Ranking

ยง

Country

Score

Ranking

Country

EEI RESULTS Score

61

Moldova

0.52

92

Sierra Leone

0.41

62

Mali

0.51

93

Belarus

0.41

63

Dominican Republic

0.51

94

Egypt

0.40

64

Burkina Faso

0.50

95

Gabon

0.40

65

Thailand

0.50

96

Iraq

0.40

66

Georgia

0.50

97

Madagascar

0.39

67

India

0.50

98

Nigeria

0.38

68

Malaysia

0.50

99

Tajikistan

0.38

69

Benin

0.49

100

Vietnam

0.37

70

Ecuador

0.48

101

Angola

0.37

71

Tanzania

0.47

102

Ethiopia

0.36

72

Turkey

0.47

103

Zimbabwe

0.35

73

Armenia

0.47

104

Guinea

0.35

74

Malawi

0.46

105

The Gambia

0.32

75

Russia

0.45

106

Burundi

0.31

77

Honduras

0.45

107

Iran

0.31

78

Nicaragua

0.44

108

Uzbekistan

0.29

79

Kazakhstan

0.43

109

Democratic Republic of Congo

0.26

80

Kyrgyzstan

0.43

81

Venezuela

0.43

82

Senegal

0.43

83

Azerbaijan

0.43

84

Kenya

0.43

85

Mozambique

0.43

86

Rwanda

0.42

87

Uganda

0.42

88

Liberia

0.41

89

China

0.41

90

Morocco

0.41

91

Jordan

0.41 0.41

* All scores have been rounded off.

25 - 218 -


Countries and territories not in the EEI

ยง

EEI RESULTS

Afghanistan

Djibouti

Algeria

Dominica

American Samoa

Equatorial Guinea

Andorra

Eritrea

Anguilla

Faeroe Islands

Antigua and Barbuda

Fiji

Aruba

French Guiana

Bahamas

Greece

Bahrain

Greenland

Bangladesh

Grenada

Barbados

Guam

Belize

Guinea-Bissau

Bermuda

Guyana

Bhutan

Haiti

British Virgin Islands

Holy See

Brunei

Hong Kong

Burma

Isle of Man

Cambodia

Israel

Cameroon

Jamaica

Cape Verde

Japan

Cayman Islands

Kiribati

Central African Republic

Kuwait

Chad

Laos

Channel Islands

Lebanon

Comoros

Lesotho

Congo, Republic of the

Libya

Cook Islands

Liechtenstein

Cote d'Ivoire

Macau

Cuba

Maldives

Curacao

Marshall Islands

26 - 219 -


Countries and territories not in the EEI: continued

Martinique

Seychelles

Mauritania

Singapore

Mauritius

Sint Maarten

Micronesia

Solomon Islands

Monaco

Somalia

Mongolia

South Sudan

Nauru

Sri Lanka

Nepal

St. Martin

Netherland Antilles

Sudan

New Caledonia

Suriname

Niger

Swaziland

Niue

Syria

North Korea

Taiwan

Oman

Timor-Leste

Pakistan

Togo

Palau

Tonga

Palestinian Territories

Tunisia

Papua New Guinea

Turkmenistan

Paraguay

Turks and Caicos Islands

Philippines

Tuvalu

Puerto Rico

United States Virgin Islands

Qatar

United Arab Emirates

Reunion

Vanuatu

Saint Kitts and Nevis

West bank

Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia

27 - 220 -

EEI RESULTS


the DISCUSSION The creation of the EEI has been an important step in at least two longer journeys. For those interested in development effectiveness, it is an attempt to map some of the elements of an enabling environment for civil society; and for CIVICUS, it is a further contribution to understanding the state of civil society in countries around the world. We believe the EEI is an important contribution in itself, but it is also important to recognise its limitations and identify opportunities to make further progress. One of the most pertinent questions that emerged in the consultation process was that of the political utility of the EEI, with some of our constituents questioning whether the index would be useful to improve the conditions of the environment in which civil society operates. These days, there is a plethora of indices, which makes it necessary to consider how an index can be communicated widely and be visible in order to possess any political clout. From this point of view, credibility and relevance to policy-makers are among the key factors of success.12

12 Duncan Green, in his blog post, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Why do some (better) alternatives to GDP get picked up, while others sink without trace?â&#x20AC;? (http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=13574) mentions five key success factors of indices, which are 1) relevance to policymakers; 2) salience for a broad audience (simplicity, understandability, good communication); 3) credibility and legitimacy (where neutrality is a key); 4) stakeholder participation and 5) preference of single figure index over complex dashboards.

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28


The Discussion With regard to the question of credibility, an index needs to have a solid theoretical foundation in order to withstand the rigorous review of the research community. More than anything, it needs to be seen as a neutral tool (i.e., communicating facts rather than selective observation or mere opinions). CIVICUS has strived to achieve this with the EEI. The EEI comes at a time of heightened attention on the issue of the enabling environment in policy-making circles and its mention in the post-Busan global monitoring framework of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) in particular. We hope that policy-makers will find our contribution useful but we acknowledge that a tool like this will not answer all of the critical questions being asked about the enabling environment for civil society. One of the reasons for the limited utility of the current EEI is the lack of data, particularly regarding the legal environment for civil society. The absence of relevant indicators limits the explanatory power of the EEI. In the EEI, only two sub-dimensions directly measure the legal and regulatory framework for civil society, which are the “civil society infrastructure” sub-dimension and the “NGO legal context” subdimension, both of which have limited country coverage. For CIVICUS, this represents a serious shortcoming but it is at the same time a significant opportunity for the international community. One lesson we have learned in the course of developing the EEI is the need for gathering in-depth primary data at country level. There is a significant shortage of research and reporting on civil society and its environment that, on the one hand, is detailed enough to monitor country-specific events and changes in a systematic manner and that, on the other hand, is comprehensive enough to highlight emerging global trends. Initiatives such as the Civil Society Index13 have been very important in collating comparative information on the state of civil society. However, the data gathered is now out of date, does not have full coverage and is not always comparable across countries. More recently, CIVICUS has been in partnership with the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) to conduct country-level assessments of the enabling environment for civil society in close to 20 countries, and the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) civil society coalition has also been mapping various CSO efforts on data collection on the enabling environment for civil society. Yet, these efforts will also not in themselves deliver the sort of comparative evidence base that policy-makers and indeed civil society itself would like to see. Here, we believe that a concerted effort by CSOs, donors14, partner governments and others is needed to develop a common and comparable knowledge base on civil society. As discussed above, such a knowledge base should be as broad as the EEI in its coverage of factors but, importantly, it should involve the collection of fresh data. There are international political opportunities that can be used to generate such data. For example, within the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) process itself, each country government has been tasked with collecting country-specific data on certain indicators within the scope of the Busan commitments. Although the enabling environment for civil society has not been included for this country-level task, there is room to use this process to bring issues to the political level in order to mobilise necessary resources for further data collection. There is also a growing awareness and effort to build a knowledge base on democratic governance, in line with the motivation to develop new indicators in the post-MDG era. Accordingly, a careful decision must be made whether to single out the enabling environment for civil society as a unit of measurement on the one hand or to create a conscious alignment with other indices on democratic governance.

29

13 The Civil Society Index is a participatory needs assessment and action-planning tool for civil society that has been implemented by CIVICUS over the past ten years in more than 75 countries. Further information about CIVICUS’ Civil Society Index is available at http://civicus.org/what-we-do-126/csi. 14 At the time of writing the European Union and several of its donor governments are developing roadmaps for working with civil society. This represents a significant opportunity for further engagement on the issue of the enabling environment.

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The Discussion CIVICUS will be working with partners over the coming years to build such a comparative knowledge base, drawing on a variety of methods that have been used in this area. We would welcome ideas and suggestions on how we might go about assembling this more comprehensive database. Finally, our consultation process has also revealed that the discussion of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;enabling environment for civil societyâ&#x20AC;? is still largely occurring amongst a select few civil society organisations and donors. Hardly any of the civil society practitioners in our consultations in Johannesburg, Kampala, Lagos, Nairobi and Quito had previously heard of the concept of the enabling environment. This suggests a need to promote better connections between the immediate concerns of civil society about the operating conditions or civic space in their own countries, and the international policy discourse on the enabling environment. For CIVICUS, our over-arching aim is to ensure that the real challenges faced by our colleagues in civil society across the world are addressed. The recent interest in the enabling environment provides a useful opportunity to engage international policymakers in the concerns of civil society, and we hope the EEI goes some way in highlighting the countries and areas in which civic space is under threat.

END.

13.

14.

The Civil Society Index is a participatory needs assessment and action-planning tool for civil society that has been implemented by CIVICUS over the past ten years in more than 75 countries. Further information about CIVICUSâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Civil Society Index is available at http://civicus.org/what-we-do-126/csi. At the time of writing the European Union and several of its donor governments are developing roadmaps for working with civil society. This represents a significant opportunity for further engagement on the issue of the enabling environment.

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30


Contact CIVICUS CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation is an international network of civil society organisations and activists working to strengthen citizen action and civil society throughout the world. Email: info@civicus.org Facebook.com/CIVICUS Twitter.com/CIVICUSalliance YouTube.com/CIVICUSworldalliance Become a member: civicus.org/join Weekly newsletter: civicus.org/subscribe South Africa CIVICUS House 24 Gwigwi Mrwebi Street Newtown, Johannesburg, 2001 Tel: +27 (0)11 833 5959 Fax: +27 (0)11 833 7997 United Kingdom Unit 60, Eurolink Business Centre 49 Effra Road London SW2 1BZ Tel: +44 (0)20 7733 9696 United States 1425 K Street NW Suite 350 Washington DC 20005 Tel: +1 202 331 8518 Fax: +1 703 224 8801 Switzerland 11 Avenue de la Paix CH-1202 Geneva Tel: +41 (0)22 733 3435

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First High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: Building Towards an Inclusive Post-2015 Development Agenda (Second Draft of the Mexico HLM Communiqué, 17 March 2014) I.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and the implementation of the Post-2015 Development Agenda

1. We, Ministers and leading representatives of developing and developed countries, multilateral and bilateral development and financial institutions, parliaments, local governments, private sector, philanthropic foundations and civil society organizations, met in Mexico City on 15-16 April 2014, in a spirit of full inclusion and solidarity, for the First High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), to build upon our voluntary adherence to the shared principles, common goals, and differentiated commitments that unite us in our collective pursuit of inclusive and sustainable development worldwide. 2. Global development is at a critical juncture. Poverty and inequality, in their multiple dimensions and across all regions, remain central challenges. Health pandemics, slow global economic growth, insecurity in supplies of food, water and energy, lack of quality education and decent work for all, and instances of conflict, fragility and vulnerability to economic shocks and natural disasters are also pressing concerns in many areas of the world. Managing climate change and the global commons add further complexity to our global agenda. At the same time, humankind’s technological achievements and potential to act together have never been so inspiring and promising. The possibilities for human development are immense and we have at our disposal the means to end poverty at global scale in the course of one generation. But to achieve this, we must muster our political will for bold and sustained action for shared development and improved gender equality. We are determined that the GPEDC contribute to this effort. 3. As the global community strives to maximize progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and the United Nations works to design a new, universal agenda for inclusive and sustainable development post 2015, the GPEDC will continue advancing efforts to bring about more effective development cooperation, with poverty eradication, gender equality and the respect for human rights at its core, as an essential component of the enabling international economic environment required to support development. We pledge synergy and cooperation with other efforts having similar goals, such as is taking place in the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum. If the Post-2015 Development Agenda will define the “what”, the GPEDC will seek to play an important role as a contributor to the “how” as we all undertake to implement this new global agenda. 4. Critically, the GPEDC is committed to implementing a transformative paradigm shift from aid effectiveness to effective development cooperation, sustained by the reinforcement of aid and its systematic leveraging in order to better support the long-term and broad developmental impact of a strengthened mobilization of domestic resources and other resources of all stakeholders in the public and private domains, at all levels, for financing for development. The more effective our development cooperation is, the faster we can end poverty and secure a sustainable future that leaves no one behind. That is the fundamental aim of the GPEDC.

effectivecooperation.org

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5. With this conviction, we undertake to fulfill all our collective and individual commitments in support of financing for inclusive and sustainable development, particularly those agreed in the Monterrey Consensus and its follow up and at the United Nations Conferences on the Least Developed Countries, and upon this foundation, we reaffirm our determination, as articulated at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, to generate sustainable and tangible results and opportunities for the benefit of all people at global scale, through a human rights-based approach to development and with a special attention to poor and vulnerable communities. II.

Concrete actions towards socially inclusive and sustainable development results

II.A.

Progress since Busan and inclusive development

6. We welcome the valuable information provided by the global monitoring report on the implementation of the commitments undertaken at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, building upon the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and the 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonization, as well as the additional data provided by other relevant national reports on convergent efforts and by entities such as the postBusan Building Blocks. Based upon this evidence, we recognize the progress made in upholding the Busan principles of country ownership, focus on results, inclusiveness, and transparency and mutual accountability. However, we also recognize that many more efforts and behavioral changes are required to fully implement the commitments undertaken in Rome, Paris, Accra and Busan. The unfinished aid effectiveness agenda remains a critical concern. Thus, with renewed political will and sense of urgency, we commit ourselves to expeditiously address identified shortcomings and bottlenecks through sustained concrete actions. As we move forward, we underline the following: Ownership of development priorities by developing countries 7. We are encouraged by the actions undertaken in both developed and developing countries to ensure that cooperation actions are aligned to national priorities and strategies and tailored to countryspecific situations and needs. However, we recognize that the leading efforts of developing countries to promote ambitious and complex domestic reform and development agendas that contribute to the social and economic well-being of citizens need to be matched by the same level of engagement and commitment by providers of development cooperation. 8. In this context, we agree to broaden and strengthen our actions to continue enhancing country ownership and the corresponding alignment and tailoring of aid. In particular, we agree to invigorate efforts to reinforce and use country systems as the default option, strengthen budget support as a delivery instrument, continue untying aid, enhance the localization of development cooperation, including by promoting local procurement, and support countriesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; ambitions to better coordinate, assess and manage the plurality of aid. 9. Based on improved country systems, we will continue reducing aid fragmentation, strengthening joint programming, improving donor coordination to address the challenge of potentially under-aided countries, making better use of multilateral institutions, enhancing policy coherence for development and, on a priority basis, ensuring the predictability of cooperation flows in compliance with the commitments undertaken in Paris, Accra and Busan. In this context, we encourage all providers of development assistance to actively participate in country-led coordination mechanisms. Focus on results 10. We recognize and encourage the broadening and strengthening of the initiatives, operational policies and instruments undertaken for improving country results frameworks in order to better manage, monitor, evaluate and communicate progress, and thus to provide a solid platform to promote scaling up of support, strengthening national capacities and leveraging additional resources and initiatives in support of the maximization and sustainability of gender-sensitive, human rightsbased development results and impacts.

effectivecooperation.org

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Inclusive partnerships and development 11. We encourage continued progress in ensuring that all stakeholders and voices are duly acknowledged and the necessary space is given and expanded to enhance inclusive and democratic ownership of the development agenda, including through human rights-based approaches and womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s empowerment, in the spirit of openness, trust, and mutual respect and learning from the different and complementary roles of all development partners. 12. We encourage the strengthening of the critical role of parliaments in linking citizens with government, overseeing development cooperation processes and action plans, and laying down the legislative framework for effective development co-operation, including norms to channel private sector investments and revenue toward inclusive and sustainable development. 13. We also encourage providing further support to local governments to enable them to assume more fully their roles in service delivery and in enhancing participation, transparency and accountability at the subnational level, including through decentralization, capacity building, access to data, legal protection and international cooperation. 14. Civil society organizations (CSOs) play a vital role in enabling people to claim their rights, in shaping development policies and partnerships, and in overseeing their implementation. In this regard, we reaffirm our appreciation to the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness. Furthermore, we encourage the institutionalization of inclusive and democratic multi-stakeholder dialogue mechanisms at country level, as well as the establishment of enabling environment monitoring frameworks and the provision of related capacity building and supportive measures, consistent with international human rights agreements, that maximize the contributions of CSOs to effective development cooperation. 15. We recognize that the private sector is an important actor in effective development cooperation, in partnership with the public sector and other development stakeholders and through a variety of modalities. In this context, we acknowledge the role and value added that philanthropic foundations bring to the GPEDC efforts. In particular, we welcome the voluntary Guidelines for Effective Philanthropic Engagement developed in conjunction with the OECD network of Foundations Working for Development and encourage continuous multi-stakeholder dialogue and cooperation to foster their implementation and follow up. Transparency and accountability to each other 16. We emphasize the need for country level requirements to drive transparency and accountability efforts. We acknowledge global progress made for increased transparency, as more partners are improving the availability and quality of information on the scope and results and impacts of their cooperation actions and budgets, including through efforts to fully implement the common standard by 2015. But many more efforts are needed to fulfill the commitments made in Paris, Accra and Busan in terms of quality, timeliness, comprehensiveness, comparability, accessibility and forward-looking nature of the information and to ensure that overall progress in transparency meets the critical information needs of developing countries and all stakeholders at country level, including by tracking and making public resource allocations for gender equality and womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s empowerment. 17. We encourage providers of cooperation to make their funding information more transparent and usable by ensuring that the information provided is aligned to country systems and adheres to local formats as required by the recipient country, recognizing that this not only allows providers of development cooperation to be more accountable to local authorities, but also for the latter to be accountable to their citizens. We also reaffirm our commitment to inclusive mutual accountability and we encourage the participation of all stakeholders in country-led dialogue and frameworks for progress review and implementation monitoring.

effectivecooperation.org

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Supporting transition to resilience of fragile and conflict-affected states 18. We reaffirm the priority and urgency of supporting fragile and conflict-affected states in their transition out of fragility and towards resilience, including in the context of the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Those of us who have endorsed the New Deal developed by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, including the g7+ group, will continue to fully implement our agreed commitments. To this end, we will set clear benchmarks and make concrete plans for cooperation delivery, ensure the fulfillment of both the FOCUS and TRUST principles and commitments, and reverse the falling share of ODA going to the poorest fragile states. In addition, we will redouble our efforts to ensure that all development cooperation serve to reinforce stability and address the drivers of conflict, including through additional support to the areas prioritized by the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals. II.B.

Domestic resources mobilization

19. We recognize the critical challenge of ensuring the adequate mobilization of public and private domestic resources to support development. Adequate mobilization of Government revenues is required for direct financing and for leveraging private funds for investments in public services and social protection, institutional and human resources development, and basic infrastructure. In this regard, we reaffirm our commitment to support the strengthening of taxation systems that are sustained by a broader tax base and a progressive structure that is fair and just. We also reaffirm our commitment to combating corruption, tax havens, money laundering, and illicit flows, including by the return of stolen assets and the reinforcement of the implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption. We welcome the OECD/G20 collaborative work on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting to curb transfer mispricing by multinational companies and acknowledge and further encourage efforts by countries and multilateral and bilateral development and financial institutions to enhance international cooperation and information exchange on tax matters and to provide expertise, technical assistance and capacity-building on fiscal matters as requested by developing countries. We also encourage industrialized nations to ensure, in partnership with other countries and stakeholders, that their own tax systems and trade and economic policies do not have negative spillovers on the prospects for lower income countries to effectively mobilize domestic resources. 20. The strengthening and developing of an inclusive domestic financial sector, affordable access of small and medium-sized enterprises, individuals and households to the full range and means of financial services, the reduction of transfer costs of migrant workersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; remittances, the incorporation of the informal sector into the formal economy, as well as the sustainable, transparent, and accountable management of natural resources, are also key avenues to mobilize and channel domestic resources for development, which we undertake to actively support. II.C.

Middle Income Countries

21. Middle Income Countries (MICs) are categorized as such upon an indicator â&#x20AC;&#x201C;income per capitaâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;, which is limited in scope and does not capture the diversity and the complexity of the development challenges that these countries face, such as poverty, inequality, vulnerabilities to economic shocks, climate change and natural disasters, lack of innovation and competitiveness in dynamic economic sectors, and institutional weaknesses. MICs have the largest number of people in poverty in the world. Global development cooperation would not be effective if support to them is abruptly phased out. Therefore, we recognize that the current categorization criteria should be revised to account for these realities and to provide a sound basis for targeted and differentiated strategies for effective development cooperation with MICs, based on their specific country situations, including through innovative finance mechanisms and the provision of loans and technical cooperation as well as grants where necessary, and we encourage concrete proposals from all stakeholders to address this key concern. We stress that the support to MICs shall not be undertaken at the expense of the support provided to other categories of countries, such as Least Developed Countries, Small Island Developing States, and Africa. Moreover, we highlight the need to secure ways and means to support soft transitions of countries from a lower-income to a higher-income category in order to ensure that effectivecooperation.org

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eventual adjustments on concessional regimes and other development cooperation instruments do not hamper the development gains achieved by these countries. 22. As we recognize the increasing importance of MICs in the global economy, in the sustainable management of global public goods, and in addressing global, regional and cross-border challenges, we acknowledge the dual role that some MICs are playing as both providers and recipients of development cooperation and knowledge sharing and underline the importance of supporting their valuable role in South-South and triangular cooperation. II.D.

South-South, Triangular Cooperation, and Knowledge Sharing

23. Southern partners are increasingly active in exchanging developmental experiences and in cooperating in solidarity with other developing countries, especially through regional cooperation and integration initiatives, infrastructure and economic development, public services and social protection, resilience building, and knowledge sharing. We welcome the positive impact of these valuable cooperation efforts and encourage their broadening and strengthening in quantitative and qualitative terms, in partnership with all development stakeholders. Looking ahead, as the nature, modalities and responsibilities that apply to South-South cooperation differ from those that apply to North-South cooperation, we reaffirm that the principles, commitments and actions agreed in the outcome document of the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness shall be the reference for South-South partners on a voluntary basis. 24. Triangular Cooperation is an innovative way of inclusive partnering, which provide us with the opportunity to bring together the diversity and richness of the experiences, lessons learned and different assets of Northern and Southern partners, by maximizing, through well-supported cooperation schemes, the use of effective, locally owned solutions that are appropriate to specific country contexts. We encourage scaling up the deployment of triangular cooperation projects, drawing on the relative advantages of all development partners. 25. We recognize the importance of country-led knowledge sharing for development effectiveness, especially considering its valuable contribution to the enhancement of national and local capacities. Knowledge sharing can involve North-South, South-North, South-South and triangular and regional approaches including the engagement of public and private stakeholders. We encourage the development of networks for knowledge exchange, peer learning and coordination among all development partners. In this context, we encourage the active promotion of technology transfer and capacity building in support of developing country efforts to address inclusive and sustainable development challenges. 26. Critically, as agreed in the Bali High-Level Meeting on South-South Cooperation in July 2012, we will foster the sharing of knowledge and mutual learning through knowledge hubs by strengthening the capacity of country institutions to systematically engage in results-oriented knowledge sharing. II.E.

Business as a Partner in Development

27. We recognize the strong contribution of business to poverty eradication and sustainability through economic growth, wealth and decent jobs creation, productivity and innovation, knowledge sharing and technology transfer, and expanded access to goods and services for all. In this context, we emphasize the critical importance of promoting an enabling business environment conducive to inclusive and sustainable development, supported by appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks and with corporate social and environmental responsibility, transparency and accountability, and respect for human rights at its core. 28. We welcome the efforts made to strengthen and to put in place platforms and hubs for inclusive, democratic, and structured multi-stakeholder dialogue, exchange and monitoring on the broad range of public-private partnerships with the aim of improving the alignment of business and development core objectives and the enhancement of shared value delivery, public goods collaborative provision, and sustainable consumption and production patterns, and we look forward to effectivecooperation.org

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hearing about their results and development impact and to working together in the follow-up of these efforts. 29. We encourage the development of innovative public-private finance mechanisms that appropriately share investment risks, maximize economic, social and environmental development impact, and enhance financial inclusion. We also encourage further efforts to scale up private financing for development in partnership with all stakeholders in strategic sectors such as agriculture, health, education, water, sanitation and infrastructure. 30. Small and medium-size enterprises play a critical role in achieving inclusive and sustainable development, creating decent jobs, and expanding access of the poor to finance, goods and services, particularly in developing countries. We emphasize the need to fully support them and enhance their development impact, including through strengthened financial inclusion, technical cooperation and capacity building. III.

Working arrangements and evolving role of the GPEDC

31. We will convene every two years a High Level Meeting of the GPEDC to take stock on progress made and identify ways and means to further advance effective development cooperation. Our next High Level Meeting will take place in [...]. 32. We will continue advancing our process under the leadership of a Steering Committee that is accountable to and representative of the different constituencies and reflects the multi-stakeholder and action-oriented nature of the GPEDC. The Steering Committee will continue to meet regularly. We look forward to its first meeting after Mexico on the eve of the UN Development Cooperation Forum in July 2014 in New York. With gratitude to the Steering Committee members stepping down, we congratulate our newly elected Co-chairs, and extend our warm welcome to all new members. 33. We welcome with appreciation Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s initiative on hosting an annual workshop to take stock and bring together partners to review the implementation of the Busan commitments at country level, in order to support building up of evidence-based global high level political dialogue and commitment on effective development cooperation. We also agree on the need to build capacity for quality data collection and statistical analysis to monitor progress and evaluate impact. 34. We agree to undertake a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder review of the global arrangements for monitoring and reporting on the fulfillment of the Busan commitments towards the end of 2015 or early 2016 with a view to assessing ways and means for their continuous improvement and their relevance to, contribution and fit with the upcoming Post-2015 Development Agenda. 35. We thank the United Nations Development Program and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for their support to the GPEDC and invite them to continue supporting its effective functioning. We will also explore ways and means for increased cooperation with regional organizations and platforms. 36. Together, we undertake to make sure that the GPEDC continue to have a constructive and action-oriented role in international cooperation for development now and once a post-2015 framework is agreed. With this purpose, we entrust the Steering Committee with the responsibility of submitting the message and results of this First High-Level Meeting of the GPEDC to all convergent intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder processes, including the UN Development Cooperation Forum, the UN International Conference on Small Island Developing States, the International Conference on Financing for Development, and the UN deliberations to devise the Post 2015 Development Agenda. ANNEX: Voluntary Initiatives at the GPEDC. This section provides a platform to highlight important efforts led by members of the GPEDC. The guidelines for the presentation of such initiatives will be provided shortly. effectivecooperation.org

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