TheSpectrum Issue 8 • June 2018
The King’s Think Tank’s annual policy journal
Letter from the Editor I am excited to announce that we have relaunched our blog, completely redesigned our journal, and tripled the number of submissions to The Spectrum. In this issue, readers will find student-written policy proposals and commentaries on an wide array of topics, ranging from cyber vulnerability to education inequality to non-communicable diseases. None of our contributors claim to have conceived the ultimate solution to processing asylum seekers, achieving the sustainable development goals, or preventing violent extremism. But their contributions are a testament to their will to appreciate, engage, and grapple with some of the biggest challenges faced by policymakers in the world today. And, whatever the scope of their policy brief, all students certainly benefited from the exercise of producing structured, rigorous, and innovative arguments in a distinctively non-academic format. Some proposals are bold; others modest. Some emphasise new opportunities for states and organisations to share best practices; others provide stringent evaluations of past policies which, despite the best intentions, have failed to achieve their goals. Some policies are legislative; others focus on resource allocation, regulation, and broader strategy. All of them propose well-informed and timely solutions to problems which will require us to work collaboratively and think creatively. Indeed, recent reports from the World Economic Forum and the Overseas Development Institute lament the scarcity of thoroughly ‘evidence-based’ policy-making. Students are particularly well placed to produce academically substantiated proposals, and The Spectrum is yet another platform which connects researchers to decision-makers. The King’s Think Tank is proud to empower students and showcase their insights into how we can champion development and progress. I hope you thoroughly enjoy the 8th edition of our policy recommendation journal, The Spectrum. Elina Solomon Head Editor King’s Think Tank Founded in the wake of 2010’s student protests, The Spectrum is the UK’S oldest student-run policy journal. It offers students the opportunity to devise original solutions to today’s political, military, economic, and social issues. This initiative constitutes but one of the unique ways in which the King’s Think Tank helps students develop the skills necessary to develop policy in both business and government. The Spectrum is published both on paper and online, at: www.kingsthinktank.com/the-spectrum/archive/.
Contents european affairs
7 An EU humanitarian emergency visa scheme by sara noske and stephanie gast zepeda 10
Macron and Brexit negotiations
A comprehensive European approach towards de-radicalisation
Make the Sustainable Development Goals the EU’s new business language!
by charles halb
by anton muratov
by onna malou van den broek
defence and diplomacy
The TAPI pipeline: Herald of peace? by caroline burleigh, daniel page, and
US policy in Afghanistan: Time for a new approach?
Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure
by alex strelet
by salome gongadze and mirko giordani
Student mobility in Central Asia’s higher education institutions
Sex and relationship guidance in British faith schools
How can the UK help reduce educational inequalities in East Africa? by bertram o’brien, rachel wibberly, and
by marina zabelina
by thomas materman and alex ostick
The Societas Europaea regulation: European company law after Brexit
Tax avoidance within the CCCTB: Trouble in paradise?
by joseph lai
by pierre nicolas and joseph lai
energy and environment
45 Reducing noise pollution in urban ecosystems by ayo meshe and phia joli 48
Restructing the UK’s agricultural policy
Should the UK introduce a plastic bottle deposit scheme?
by rafael holder
by george warren and anya herne
Lessons from the Philippines: Countering non-communicable diseases
EU self-defence training: the key to preventing violence against women? by diana m. suciu
by jonathan higgs
religion and society
Countering radicalisation in prison and probation schemes by issy royce, edited by emma shleifer
The economics of faith: the Church of England’s financial survival by carly mckenna, edited by emma shleifer
The media’s impact on policy decisions: the case for accountability by bertram o’brien, hussain dawani, and
letter from the president
lucia saborio perez
The views expressed in The Spectrum are uniquely their authors’ and do not represent the King’s Think Tank or King’s College London. The King’s Think Tank is a neutral organisation that enables and encourages students to explore and discuss policy. All images featured in The Spectrum are royalty-free, unless otherwise stated.
Write for us! The King’s Think Tank hosts a student-run blog as well as an annual journal. Students from all disciplines and backgrounds are highly encouraged to contribute their ideas to our growing community of writers. Find out how to submit a paper at: www.kingsthinktank.org/the-spectrum/
A new EU humanitarian emergency visa scheme by sara noske and stephanie gast zepeda
Almost three years after the peak of what is comonly referred to as the ‘Syrian refugee crisis’, the European Union (EU) member states are still dealing with its consequences on national and supranational levels. The immigration of non-EU nationals and its regulation have since become heatedly discussed topics, causing friction and political divide both within and between member states. Not only have the shortcomings of the current framework become apparent, but also how difficult it is to adopt a EU-wide approach to such a contested issue. As one possible way of addressing those shortcomings without increasing political friction, we propose the creation of a humanitarian emergency visa scheme which would allow legal entry with limited territorial validity to refugees seeking humanitarian protection in the EU more efficiently than current legislation on humanitarian visas does. Background
Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, many Syrians have fled their country and made their way to the EU. Frontex reports that, in 2011, only 1,616 out of 141,051 (1.15%) illegal border crossings (IBCs) into the EU were by Syrian nationals; this figure constantly increased and peaked in 2015, when Syrians attempted 594,059 IBCs, constituting 32.6% of total IBCs into the EU (1,822,177). The high number of IBCs was also reflected in first time asylum applications across the EU, which amounted to almost 1.26 million in 2015 and roughly 1.20 million in 2016. According to the 2016 joint Europol-INTERPOL report on
migrant smuggling networks, more than 90% of migrants entering the EU illegally rely on smugglers. As a result, migrant smuggling has become a profitable business, with an estimated revenue of 5-6 billion USD in 2015 alone. Assuming that 90% of IBCs generate 5 billion USD of illegal revenue, a single IBC would account for roughly 3,000 USD – which is far more expensive than a legally bought one-way flight from Syria to Europe would cost. Additional to the economic costs of illegal migration, the human costs are not to be underestimated. The IOM’s Missing Migrants Project estimates that in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East alone, 3,920 international migrants died or went missing in 2015 and 5,319 in 2016, of which by far the biggest share died in the Mediterranean. These developments suggest that the high demand for smuggling services by Syrian refugees fleeing from war and heading to Europe for international protection has also facilitated irregular migration for non-Syrians as well. Current policies
Under the 1951 Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, commonly known as the Geneva Convention, EU member states only have a legal obligation towards people seeking international protection once they are on EU territory. Article 31 of the Convention stipulates that refugees cannot be penalised for entering an EU country illegally, recognising the fact that refugees regularly have to enter EU territory illegally to apply for humanitarian protection. The 2015 Handbook on European Law relating to Asylum, Borders and Immigration also points out the paradox of Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guaranteeing the right to asylum, while EU law does not provide sufficient legal entry options for asylum seekers, who would usually require a visa to enter the EU but often do not qualify for an ordinary visa – hence opting for irregular entry. Researchers at the Centre for EuropeA closer look at Frontex data (2018) reveals that after a first peak of Syrian IBCs (7,038) as a share of total IBCs (40.49% of 17,380) in March 2015, the share of Syrian IBCs (115,505) peaked again in August 2015 at an astonishing 61.03% of 189,266 total IBCs into the EU.
THE SPECTRUM an Policy Studies also identify “refugees’ dangerous journeys to the EU [as] a result of EU visa policies and carrier sanctions” and therefore call for rethinking visa requirements for the EU. Accepting the need for illegal entry allows for a migrant smuggling market to persist. The 2015 EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling aims to reduce incentives to irregular migration by transforming “migrant smuggling networks from ‘low risk, high return’ operations into ‘high risk, low return’ ones”. However, reducing the smuggling market cannot be achieved by solely targeting the supply side; demand needs to be decreased as well, in order to avoid a ‘high risk, high return’ business situation. An existing market and easy access to migrant smuggling services could potentially encourage migra- Over 900,000 Syrian were displaced in 2017, according to World Vision. tion also by those who without such services would not head to Europe, and who do not qualify for pro2015, aiming to ease the pressure on the main countries of tection under the Geneva Convention. entry by relocating 160,000 refugees across the EU according to a quota system (including 106,000 refugees from Italy According to Article 25 of the Visa Code, it is possible for and Greece) officially ended on September 26, 2017, and as member states to issue visas with limited territorial validity of March 12, 2018, accounts for only 33,844 refugees relocat(LTVs) on humanitarian grounds or international obligaed from Italy and Greece. Considering the lack of political tions, which is usually valid only in the member state that willingness by some member states to reduce stress from the issued the visa. Jensen identifies 16 EU member states that external border countries through a quota system, a reform have or have had some sort of uniform, LTV and/or national of the Dublin regulation might, when eventually agreed humanitarian visa schemes. But, as the Court of Justice of upon and implemented, offer a feasible long-term solution the EU ruled in 2017, “member states are not required, unto the issue of asylum applications. der EU law, to grant humanitarian visa to persons who wish to enter their territory with a view to applying for asylum, Policy proposals but they remain free to do so on the basis of their nationTo address the issues occurring under the current policies, al law”. Each member state therefore has to decide for itself we propose a ‘Humanitarian Emergency Visa Scheme’ simiwhether – and under which conditions – it is willing to issue lar to the Normative Resolution No. 17 introduced in Brazil humanitarian visas to seekers of international protection, in 2013 stipulating that “[for] humanitarian purposes (…), and in the past they have been issued rather sparingly. the appropriate visa can be granted to individuals affected by the armed conflict in the Arab Republic of Syria that exThe Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliapress willingness to seek asylum in Brazil” (Article 1). More ment and of the Council (2013) commonly known as Dubspecifically, the ‘Humanitarian Emergency Visa Scheme’ we lin III, determines which member state is responsible for propose would apply to those eligible for subsidiary protecprocessing an asylum application, which usually is the one tion under Article 15c of the Directive 2011/95/EU (2011), through which the asylum applicant first entered the EU. according to which individuals qualify for subsidiary proAccordingly, high numbers of irregular entries put a lot of tection due to serious harm, commonly defined as “serious pressure on those member states in the EU’s external border and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason region, such as Italy and Greece. The Proposal for a Regulaof indiscriminate violence in situations of international or tion of the European Parliament and of the Council (2016), internal armed conflict.” Such a definition allows for a very commonly known as the Dublin IV proposal, introduced a quick processing and issuance of visa applications, possibly corrective allocation scheme as an addition to the current within hours, requiring applicants to merely submit (i) proof system in order to address this problem. of identity, (ii) recent proof of residence and (iii) proof of nationality. For effective implementation, the EU would need However, the temporary relocation scheme introduced in to regularly, or at least in the event of armed conflict, spec-
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS ify to which countries or regions the proposed visa scheme would apply. In line with Article 6 of the Visa Code (2009), in the scheme proposed here, protection seekers would need to apply for an emergency visa at an embassy or consulate of the member state through which they plan to enter and in which they plan to apply for international protection. The embassy or consulate would register the applicants in the Visa Information System (VIS), which pursuant to Article 13 of the Visa Code (2009) includes their biometric identifiers. Dublin III Chapter 3, Article 12 (2013) determines that, â&#x20AC;&#x153;[where] the applicant is in possession of a valid visa, the member state which issued the visa shall be responsible for examining the application for international protectionâ&#x20AC;?. Once visa holders arrive in the member state that issued the Humanitarian Emergency Visa, they would be able to apply for international protection under the Geneva Convention. The Syrian conflict that started in 2011 led to a considerable rise of IBCs which abruptly peaked in 2015, especially in Germany, where the government was not prepared to register all individuals and to process their applications for protection. The proposed Humanitarian Emergency Visa Scheme could help process similar migrant flows more efficiently in the future, since the visa would be issued very quickly and the personal information of all those entering the EU on this scheme would already be stored in the VIS. The shift from illegal to legal routes would decrease IBCs and consequently ease the pressure on external border control. Legal routes are also safer and often cheaper for migrants to undertake. Furthermore, creating such a legal entry option for those eligible for subsidiary protection under Article 15c of the Directive 2011/95/EU would help reduce the smuggling market, since demand for smuggling services would decrease. Finally, the responsibility to process asylum applications would be spread more evenly throughout the EU; admittedly not across all member states, but there would still be somewhat less pressure on those at the external EU border than under the current framework, i.e. the Dublin III Regulation.
a very limited and clearly defined group, abuse is relatively difficult, and each member state can stop issuing these visas once it has reached its capacity. A question that would need to be addressed in more depth if the scheme were to be implemented, is how exactly it should be determined which conflicts the scheme would apply to. Given the voluntary nature of the scheme, this could even be decided on national level. Conclusion
Considering the high numbers and developments of IBCs into the EU in 2015, the shortcomings of the current framework for seekers of international protection became evident â&#x20AC;&#x201C; in particular the paradox of a guaranteed right to asylum and the lack of legal entry options for those seeking asylum. The proposed Humanitarian Emergency Visa Scheme would create a safe and quick legal entry option for those in need of international protection due to armed conflict, while being limited enough to not be easily abused. The scheme would not only help to prevent unnecessary economic and human costs, but it could also help relieve pressure from border controls and from those member states through which irregular migrants currently first enter the EU, while still preserving national autonomy regarding immigration.
The biggest challenge this proposal would probably face is reluctance from member states to implement the scheme, since the proposal for a quota system has shown that not all member states are willing to take in refugees. While the voluntary nature of the proposed scheme does not promise broad implementation, we believe it would give less reason for friction among member states than the quota system. Secondly, even member states that support the quota scheme might be reluctant to issue Humanitarian Emergency Visas, if they fear it would lead to an increase in migration in general. However, since the scheme would only apply to
Europe and Macron’s strategy for Brexit by charles halb
Last May, against all odds, French voters granted Emmanuel Macron the French presidency and a five-year tenancy of the Elysée Palace. This arrival to power came in a tumultuous context. The international community – and more specifically Europe – seemed on the edge of collapse due to the resurgence of nationalism all around the globe. European politics is now roughly divided between ‘globalists’ who are aiming for more European Union involvement into domestic politics and ‘nationalists’ who want to gain back some parts of their country’s sovereignty. This tension has been going on for a long time and recently culminated in the Brexit referendum of June 2016, where British voters elected to leave the EU, followed by Donald Trump’s election to America’s Presidential office in November of the same year. Therefore, the arrival to power of pro-Europe figure such as Macron came as a huge surprise. With a weakened Angela Merkel, he has now become the key advocate of pro-European ideas. One of the best illustrations of his agenda is his behaviour toward Brexit negotiations, which France has undoubtedly taken the lead of. This paper will aim to provide an analysis of Macron’s policy and argue that his administration should pursue a harsh policy towards Britain, in order to deter other countries from leaving the EU. However, it would be mistaken to completely antagonize the UK, as it has been a long-time European ally. Macron must be ready to make some concessions. France has adopted a very strong stance with regards to Brexit. There are many reasons for Macron to take that course of action. Understanding Macron’s personality is of primary importance to fully analyse this policy. He is a former Rothschild banker and a globalist who believes in the virtues of free trade and EU integration. He has recently announced a plan to strengthen the Eurozone including an increase of joint financial resources and the creation of the Eurozone budget. With such a policy agenda, it would be a huge incoherence if Macron was not tough on Brexit negotiations. In Paris’ financial centre, La Défense, there many who sees Brexit as an opportunity. Some journalists suggest that ‘it raised the possibility that, with the UK gone, France could shape the EU more to its own liking.’ Following Chancellor Angela Merkel’s ‘grand coalition’ with conservatives in February 2018, this has created a power vacuum in the EU. France has a card to play in order to become the leading
member of the European Union. This has been president Macron’s unofficial policy since he took power. In the short-term, plenty of firms will need to reallocate their European headquarters, according to Macron, and this is expected to create 4000 French jobs, in addition to the taxes the firms will pay to the French state. Prestigious firms like Goldman Sachs or HSBC have claimed they were ready to take Paris as their new European headquarters. In short order Macron has managed to make France Brexit’s main benefiter. France’s youngest president is also committed to deterring other states from leaving the Union, notably by giving no concessions to the UK. According to a senior French official, ‘there would be a risk of contagion, there would be a risk of unravelling for the EU.’ Very early onto the negotiations, Macron has made it very clear that he stands by zero-tolerance policy. In a joint press conference with UK Prime Minister Theresa May, he states that ‘if you [the UK] want access to the single market-including the financial services – be my guest. But it means that you need to contribute to the budget and acknowledge European jurisdiction.’ This declaration shows Macron’s willingness to give no concessions to the UK. He has already started to put pressure on Theresa May, notably on the matter of Calais. Multiple reports indicate that Macron ‘now expected to cut the delay in processing the cases of children hoping to be united with family members from six months to 25 days.’ The EU commission has seemed to support Macron’s initiatives: EU French Brexit commissioner Michel Barnier declared that a country cannot have the status of a third country and at the same time want the advantages of the Union.’ Barnier is himself a deep ‘Europeist’, who is competing for the EU commission presidency in 2019. His sentiment is echoed by other EU members: The Economist indicates that ‘[European leaders] will continue to insist that full participation in the single market must include both free movement of people in the ECJ jurisdiction. They will firmly oppose cherry-picking by the British. And they will want to ensure that a post-Brexit Britain is in a worse situation than full membership.’ It is clear that the European Union want to show a united front on the Brexit issue. Macron as a fervent pro-Europe leader is at the epicentre of the Brexit negotiations, championed a Brexit deal advantageous to the European Union.
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS However, the UK and the EU have a long-standing relationship, and it would most certainly be a mistake on the part of Macron to completely antagonize the British. Both countries have historically been close allies since WWI and have remained so since then. Theresa May has always assured that she wanted to pursue a very close relationship with the EU during her speech at Florence: ‘We may be leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe.’ May is not a partisan of a ‘hard’ Brexit herself and it is very likely she will concede to European leaders’ demands regarding Brexit. Furthermore, May has some assets to use in the negotiations, like the enormous number European citizens living in the UK and whose life could Macron is keen on dissuading other member states from leaving the EU. be profoundly affected by Brexit. In addition, French academic Christian Lequesnes remarks that as declared to the BBC: ‘Life will go on after Brexit,’ prov‘the UK remains France’s fifth most important customer of ing that French government does not intend to totally cut France and its eight most important supplier.’ Despite BrexBritain from the EU. During the Franco-British summit in it. Great Britain remains a huge market for Europeans. It is January 2018, Macron explained that he was open ‘to a deal certain that London will always remain a city of tremendous falling between a Norway-style single market agreement and importance as a financial and cultural hub. a free-trade agreement. ’. This is another sign of conciliation between the two states. They also found middle ground reMay’s main challenge will be to reach an agreement that segarding the status of UK citizens living in Europe. cures as much access as possible to the single market, but she is too lucid to think this will not come without barriers: ‘We Both Brexit and Macron’s presidential ascension have shaped all need to face up to some hard facts. We’re leaving the sinthe current Franco-British relationship, but neither should gle market; life is going to be different. Access to each other’s stop the two countries from continuing their long-lasting almarkets is going to be less than it is now.’ There is no doubt liance. Although Macron and Europe must be tough on the that Brexit will mark a new dawn and leave a strong impact conditions for British withdrawal from the EU, they must in Franco-British relations. frame their terms carefully. France and the EU both have a lot more to gain by keeping the UK close. The negotiations Furthermore, if the Brexit deal conditions are too high, the may take time, but if Macron and his EU colleagues frame British might start to look like martyrs instead of people their approach smartly, they will emerge stronger for it. who made the wrong decision. In doing so, the EU will run the risk of exciting even more nationalism within European countries. Macron and the EU must therefore proceed carefully with Brexit negotiations, because the Union cannot pass for a tyranny. They must appear comprehensive but at the same time not comply with May’s demands to keep the UK in the single market: they must be an iron hand inside a silk glove. Right now, it seems that the difficulties encountered by May has for now deterred the thought of leaving the EU among nationalists. In France, the idea of an exit from the euro is not very popular among the French Eurosceptic electorate.’ Macron and Barnier must preserve this trend by making Brexit a soft but a clear departure. So far, Macron and the EU seems to have adopted the right policy. For instance, French finance minister Mr Lemaire
A comprehensive approach towards de-radicalisation and counter-terrorism in Europe by anton muratov
Since 2014, Jihadist or religiously-inspired terrorist attacks have taken the lives of hundreds of Europeans. Although 580 of the 718 individuals arrested on suspicion of terrorist activity have been tried in court proceedings in 2016, an increase from previous years, more remains to be done on the part of the European Union (EU) to quell extremist terrorism. It currently enforces laws on security and law enforcement cooperation such as the Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA and the ‘PPPR’ strategy. However, the EU has not updated its counter-terrorism strategy since 2005, which represents a major security risk for the entire union, where the responsibility of national security is left almost entirely to each individual country. It is therefore in the EU’s interest to consider the following holistic strategy towards countering both radicalisation of its own citizens and potential terrorist threats within its territory. The objectives and two main components of the aforementioned policy recommendation are: • The creation of a universal de-radicalisation programme to be implemented in each EU member state (MS). • The centralisation of counter-terrorism efforts, with expanded powers granted for the execution of duties. Policy proposals This policy proposal aims to alleviate the issue of extremist terrorism through a comprehensive strategy that targets the threat of terrorist attacks and their instigators, as well as potential radicalisation, thereby addressing both the issue and its root causes. 1. De-radicalisation programme on the basis of the aarhus model. The majority of Islamist terrorism in EU states is perpetrated by local citizens or permanent legal residents. Therefore, the EU’s greatest terrorist threat is the radicalisation of Muslim individuals within their territory, particularly youth who feel alienated from society and often experience economic marginalisation. In order to tackle this problem, the EU should implement a general programme on the basis of the Aarhus Model. The Aarhus Model is a Danish government initiative that aims to counter the threat of potential radicalisation as well as dealing with individuals who are already radicalised.
Such a programme would take the form of a ‘directive’, as defined in Article 288 of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, whereby member states may adapt the form in which they implement the programme in order to suit the specific needs of each country, while still having to meet particular results. The model is composed of three main elements: • Prevention of early-stage radicalisation and exit strategies for radicalised persons. • The prosecution of criminally violent radicalised individuals. • Foiling of potential threats to national security. The first element is achieved by connecting a strong network of support services, such as schools, families, friends, and community centres, to young people who are reported to authorities as having violent or extremist leanings. The causes of these tendencies are often feelings of resentment or isolation, characteristics which are best dealt with through workshops, mentoring, and education with community and group support. The exit strategy relies on inclusion and integration into society, with the individual being taught about the fundamental qualities of a successful society, and their role within it. The second element of the model pushes for the prosecution of radicalised people who have carried out violent crimes, whether that be in other MS countries or outside the EU, thereby addressing the issue of returning Islamic State (IS) fighters. The model’s third element is cooperation within states between intelligence and law enforcement agencies in order to track and prevent potential terrorist attacks. The Aarhus model relies on the close cooperation and trust of Muslim schools, mosques, and families, therefore making it crucial that they are treated as equals, responsible for the wellbeing of their communities, rather than accomplices or suspects. With two-thirds of terrorist attacks influenced by personal connections and contacts as opposed to online exposure, it is vital that the EU’s approach towards de-radicalisation be a community-based one. A potential concern for members states is that, although the Aarhus Model was successful in a municipality within
People mourn in rememberance of the 2015 November attacks in Paris.
a relatively small country, Denmark, it would be difficult to scale the initiative and implement it on a federal level for a larger country, such as Germany or France. Additionally, it would require current social service workers to extend their responsibilities to identifying and approaching potentially violent individuals, as well as teaching about de-radicalisation, which would require training, further staff hiring, and an overall increase in funding from the state. Nevertheless, many of these issues can be solved by existing institutions such as schools, where issues of extremism can be tackled at a young age, simply by including it within curricula. In addition, member states would be eligible for assistance from the EU Radicalization Awareness Network, which has working groups dedicated to de-radicalisation, education, youth, families and communities, health and social care and various other applicable issues. Given that it would be an EU directive, member states would have complete discretion as to the methods and ways in which they implement such a programme. 2. Centralisation of counter-terrorism efforts with expanded executive powers. Radicalised individuals and terrorists are citizens from across the EU. An issue of this scope must also be dealt with on the regional level, in addition to the aforementioned national level. This policy proposes to centralise the EU’s concentration of efforts to a single agency, so as to deal with the terrorist threat more effectively. This initiative would take the form of a ‘decision’ from the European Commission, which would allow for specific EU agencies, non-govern-
mental organisations and member states to comply. In order to reduce redundancy and increase efficiency, counter-terrorist operations should be centralised within the newly created European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC), a segment of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). This would require for ECTC to subsume counter-terrorism related duties from the European Judicial Network and EUROJUST. In terms of financing, its €123 million budget can sustain this shift of responsibilities, however if funding is rearranged from other EU agencies dealing with terrorism whose effort in that area becomes obsolete, ECTC would be well within its means to operate as a pan-European agency. Additionally, funding would be available from the €3.8 billion Internal Security Fund. In addition, this paper recommends the expansion of executive powers that are available for the ECTC. Currently, Europol is unable to make arrests or carry out investigations without the consent of each relevant MS, a significant obstacle when dealing with a time-sensitive issue such as terrorist activity. It is therefore suggested that several tools be made available for Europol in terrorist-related matters such as an expedited process to obtain a ‘European Arrest Warrant’ the simplification of requesting a ‘European Investigation Order’, and the power to freeze funding and apply punitive measures against those funnelling the money through the ‘Anti-Money Laundering Directive’ . In order to achieve this, closer cooperation should be promoted between relevant agencies such as the European Bor-
THE SPECTRUM der and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL). This would also require the establishment of a central database for individuals within the EU suspected or convicted of terrorist activity, using the framework of current databases such as the Schengen Information System, European Criminal Records Information System, and the 2005 Prüm Convention. Previous efforts by the EU to centralise intelligence sharing and cooperation related to terrorism suggest that this effort is attainable and would be most effective if it were incorporated into The EU must update its overall counter-terrorism strategy. the existing Europol Information System. or religiously motivated. The policy proposed in this paper allows for an encompassing strategy that targets both the One challenge for this policy is that it requires national source and threat of terrorist attacks, both of which must be agencies to liquidate entire department sections tasked with considered when dealing with the unique problem of ideocounter-terrorism, and would necessitate the drafting of leglogically-driven violence. islation which imposes the sharing of counter-terrorist intelligence and expands Europol’s executive powers. Yet many This policy paper recommends that the European Union organisations which would have to relinquish their work are strengthen its approach to terrorism and violent extremism already EU agencies, so the transfer of duties would be facilby adopting a holistic view and solution to the causes and itated by Europol’s own 2009 reformation into an EU agency. circumstances surrounding terrorist activity. This includes legislation that results in: Another concern is that the policy overlooks the impact of online radicalisation and the role of the internet in promot• The creation of a universal de-radicalisation proing terrorism. But this issue would be directly addressed by gramme based on the Aarhus Model developed in the European Union Internet Referral Unit, a recently esDenmark, the methodology and implementation of tablished department within the ECTC dedicated to trackwhich is subject to the specific needs and conditions ing and analysing jihadist and extremist networks on social of each member state. media and the internet. Although it may expand its power, it could only do so after several separate decisions which take • The centralisation of the EU’s major counter-terrorinto account issues of privacy, freedom, and human rights ism operations, along with expanded executive powconcerns. This would prevent the EU from granting an exers for the European Counter Terrorism Centre to cessive amount of power to a single law enforcement agenconduct investigations, arrests, and share intelligence cy. Overall, incremental changes to current laws, sweeping with other EU agencies. directives, and a sustained commitment to fundamental human rights would allow this policy to effectively combat With the multiple recent attacks on EU soil and the calls terrorist threats in the EU. for more from the territory-losing and desperate IS, the EU should implement a decisive approach towards eliminating Conclusion terrorism and extremist violence and overhauling its nationThe national security of the EU and its constituent counal security architecture. tries is threatened by terrorism from various external and internal forces. With increasing casualties and an out-dated defence strategy, the EU is vulnerable and unable to fully defend against attacks on civilians and the values on which it is based. European leadership must be resolute in countering terrorism in all of its forms, whether politically, single-issue,
Help us so we can be responsible! Make the SDGs the EU’s new business language by onna malou van den broek
“We believe business has an essential part to play in meeting these goals – indeed without it the ambition is unlikely to be fully realised.” Jon Pender, Vice President, IP & Access & Global Health, GSK
This policy commentary addresses the gap between the necessity of business in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the lack of clear targets and measurement tools necessary to mobilize the business community. Currently, businesses tend to reshuffle their sustainable reporting into the SDG framework, resulting in a continuation of the status quo rather than transforming business activities. The European Union (EU) needs to take leadership and publish a Green Paper on business contribution to the SDGs, in line with their 2001 Green Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility.
practical transferability of the SDGs to the private sector. To avoid accusations that the SDGs are merely a propagandist exercise and more decorative than operational, there is a need for greater cooperation between the private sector and the SDG indicators to truly accomplish the transformative potential of the SDGs. Hence, as PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) mentioned: “companies are still struggling to translate the SDGs into appropriate metrics”. Redman shows that unfortunately the SDGs mostly perpetuate the status quo; companies tend to reshuffle their existing sustainability reporting to fit the SDGs framework instead of implementing actual changes. This argument is supported by a research on SDG reporting in France and reflected in the existing measuring tools available. Currently the UN Global Compact and the SDG Compass, the two main bodies for private sector involvement to the SDGs, have reframed existing tools within the SDG framework but failed to offer new tools.
After the expiration of the famous Millennium Goals in 2015, there was an international call to develop a new set of comprehensive and mutually reinforcing targets. Consequently, the UN formulated the SDGs, which set out 17 different targets as a guideline for development until 2030. During the creation of the SDGs, various stakeholders were consulted in picking and articulating the goals, targets and measurements. One of the most crucial stakeholders involved was the business sector. Indeed, the goals clearly urge businesses to take part in Business is ready accomplishing the SDGs and the private but unprepared. sector is expected to be one of the key drivThe EU must ing force to deliver the them.
However, times are changing: a multi-stakeholder dialogue is taking place to agree upon quantified measurement methods, led by the Global Compact and the SDG Compass. Such international initiatives on sustainabilstandardize SDG ity within private companies have a crucial However, it is not clearly delineated how role to play in elaborating metrics that can be reporting. companies can contribute to the SDGs. used to measure companies’ direct contribuEven though the business sector was intion to the SDGs. Recognizing that the SDGs volved in the consultation process, the SDGs were designed are characterised by their non-binding, hence voluntary, for nation-states, not for the private sector. The targets and character, we need quantifiable tools to stimulate and evalmeasurements of the SDGs are primarily designed to shape uate new business practices on the SDGs, and ultimately to national legislation and government priorities, leaving little keep companies accountable for their actions. Therefore, we room and no measurement tools for business involvement. should strive to standardise private sector reporting on the Hence, the reality does not reflect the high expectations for SDGs or tracking progress will be extremely difficult. business involvement in achieving the SDGs. It is time for the European Union to take-up leadership. The In an open-letter to the UK government published in The EU should be concerned with guiding business to contribTimes, a group of business urges states to: “work with busiute to the SDGs because it can showcase their strategic goal nesses to deliver the SDGs, creating a transparent reporting of becoming a stronger global actor and norm-setter, and framework and clear benchmarks”. Although there is a high develop a deeper and fairer internal market and monetary SDG awareness amongst the business community, it is ununion. The contribution of business to the society and enclear to companies how they can contribute, due to guidevironment is a strategical target for the European Commislines’ complexity. The focus on states has undermined the sion. Furthermore, by signing and making the SDGs one
THE SPECTRUM Some organisations actively encourage the private sector to achieve the SDGs. For instance, intergovernmental organisations such as the Community of Democracies (left) promote multi-stakeholder and cross-sectoral engagement to secure strong democratic institutions (Goal 16). CoD photo
current practices. As has been the case in the UK, the government has proven unable, and perhaps unwilling, to clearly demonstrate business guidance vis-à-vis the SDGs. The of their core priorities, they need to step up and make SDG language the norm. Guiding business practice around the SDGs will, amongst other things, help to reduce poverty in the world, to ensure sustainable economic, social and environmental development. In 2001 the European Commission published their Green Paper titled “Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)”. The aim of the Green Paper was to foster discussion on how the EU could promote CSR to support existing good practices, stimulate innovation, bring transparency and increase reliability on evaluation tools. A lot has changed since the publication of this paper, given the 2008 global financial crisis, after which business practices became more scrutinized. Therefore, it is time to generate a new Green Paper for sustainable business around the contribution of business to the SDGs. It is important to make sure everybody talks the same language when talking about sustainable development: the language of the SDGs. The time is now to generate this new paper: business is asking for it, creating a window of opportunity for policy entrepreneurship. The new Green Paper needs to build upon the previous one and further encourage companies to “endeavour to raise the standards of social development, environmental protection and respect of fundamental rights and embrace an open governance, reconciling interests of various stakeholders in an overall approach of quality and sustainability”. Commencing from a holistic approach, the new Green Paper should follow the structure and outline of the SDGs: how can business contribute to the targets of the SDGs? By providing clear guidance, the EU stimulates national governance to take up the quest as well. Coordination between the EU and its member states in this issue is necessary to change
Netherlands, on the other hand, has developed the SDG Charter, which convenes business and other actors, catalyses their joint actions and creates synergy in their work. Bundling good-practices on government involvement in business contributions to the SDGs in the new Green Paper will illustrate, inspire and ultimately generate new practices. Business are muddling through; without a clear voice from our governments, momentum will be lost. It is up to the EU to fill this current gap and take regional leadership. The SDG framework is the new language for sustainable development. Business are the key actors to achieve the SDGs by 2030. However, with the goals targeting nation-states, business is muddling through without a clear sense on how they can contribute to the SDGs. It is, therefore, time for the EU to take action and leadership in translating the SDGs in common business language. With the UN Global Compact taking the lead in translating targets, it is up to the EU to guide their member states and activate business to contribute to the SDGs. Grasp the momentum by drafting a follow-up Green Paper on business contributions to the SDGs, which should provide guidance and showcase best-practices examples of both business and nation-states. The EU will underlie its role as regional and international norm-setter by guiding both States and business into a new era in which SDGs will be the common language in CSR. Only together can we achieve the SDGs and strive to create a better world!
Defence and Diplomacy
The TAPI pipeline: herald of peace? by caroline burleigh, daniel page, and paul ng
The north-west of South Asia continues to suffer from instability and economic insecurity, compounded by the geography and ill-defined borders of the region. This policy recommendation promotes energy exports which would create greater impetus for good governance and inter-state cooperation by building upon the concord achieved in the signing off of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India(TAPI) gas pipeline. Upon its projected completion in 2019, this 1,814-kilometre pipeline is to run from the Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India. This policy paper proposes the creation of a multinational battalion composed of Afghan, Indian, and Pakistani (AIP) forces, organised and commanded within the Afghan military hierarchy. This force must be buttressed by a development project, equally funded by the three countries, tasked with building heavy rail connections from Herat to Kandahar and from there into Pakistan, with a view to improving geographic mobility, moving infrastructure toward the Sino-Afghan border. In addition, both sides should undertake initiatives to ensure that the construction of the Kishenganga and Ratle dams, on the Indus river, will no longer be disputed. This is conditional on a renegotiation of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), with concessions granted to India in return for support for dam construction. Background Afghanistan has continued to suffer from severe problems relating to security and prosperity since the late 1970s. Furthermore, trade between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan is currently at 5% of overall total commerce within South Asia. Potential cooperation remains minimal and will continue to be until leaders of each country see that there is more to gain through collaboration than through conflict. Tensions between India and Pakistan are omnipresent, and it is possible that a historic flashpoint (the dispute over Kashmir being just one example) may flare up and derail efforts at cooperation. For example, when Modi made a surprise visit to Pakistan in 2015, it was followed not by diplomatic improvements, but by a terrorist attack. The response by both countries caused relations to deteriorate. Hence, many nonstate actors strive to maintain a deep divide between India and Pakistan. Policy proposals The aim of this policy paper is to address concerns associat-
ed with the decade-long Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan, which should be regarded as a regional and potentially global geopolitical threat. This paper recommends that both nations work towards a ‘cooperative equilibrium’ which encourages regional economic and political stability by incorporating ‘non-securitised’ issues. The focus of this paper will be on energy security as a vital interest for both nations: 1. Increase lobbying for the full completion of the TAPI gas pipeline, designed to export Turkmen gas to ‘energy-starved’ Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. 2. Create a joint multinational Afghan (50%)/Indian (25%)/Pakistani (25%) (AIP) force to protect this costly infrastructure. Embedding Indian and Pakistani forces into Afghan army units will ensure that they do not directly aggress each other and focus their attention on the protection of the valuable pipeline assets from hostile non-state actors. 3. Complement the pipeline with a joint venture (50% Afghan-, 25% Indian-, 25% Pakistani- controlled) to develop railway infrastructure in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which would foster currently low trade levels along the route and facilitate the movement of AIP troops along the pipeline area. The funding of said venture would be divided equally between the three parties. 4. India must demand that the construction of the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric dams currently under construction (330 megawatts and 850 megawatts respectively) in Jammu and Kashmir be made conditional on the renegotiation of the 1960s Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). The current Treaty allocates a mere 20% of the entire Indus River Basin’s water flows to India. The IWT’s ¬current provisions also inhibit India’s ability to pursue its own hydroelectric projects in the disputed Kashmir region. Concurrent bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan over the status of the Indus river shall proceed, however these talks are to be handled as a separate issue from that of the TAPI pipeline. An independent observer from the World Bank – the facilitator of the IWT in 1960 – is to oversee the progress of negotiations amidst Pakistani opposition to the current construction of the Kishenganga and Ratle dams.
DEFENCE AND DIPLOMACY Although these proposals are ambitious and involve active cooperation between two historically hostile nations, build upon existing joint ventures between the concerned parties. The fact that they merely seek to ensure that the construction of the TAPI gas pipeline and the renegotiation of the Indus Waters Treaty are successful in their conclusion, indicates a potential for receptive audiences in decision-making spheres of the four countries involved. Turkmenistan will see as confirmation that its southern trade routes for its abundant gas resources will be preserved, along with the establishment of a new, populous export market. India and Pakistan will gain access to direly needed energy resources, alongside the creation of physical levers US Admiral Mullen greets Pakistani troops upon arriving in Islamabad. (the gas pipeline and hydroelectric dams feed into both territories) to deter future fallouts. Challenges Pakistan has always feared a ‘pincer movement’ or strategic encirclement if India and Afghanistan became allies. Therefore, Pakistan has traditionally worked towards supporting a pro-Pakistan regime in Afghanistan and tried to drive a wedge between Afghanistan and India. Historical animosity notwithstanding, this proposed policy attempts to initiate a remolding of the traditional antagonistic stance the countries have towards one another. Thered is potential for success because this is a pragmatic change in perspective. Instead of seeing one another as enemies, the proposed joint force and funding puts them on the same side. It is no longer a zero-sum game whereby Pakistan ‘loses’ if India ‘wins.’: each country’s success will be contingent on the other’s.
Each nation’s leadership must be bold enough to overcome domestic forces which oppose cooperation. Implementation of these proposals would involve high-level official dialogue between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan to discuss the status and continuation of the TAPI pipeline. Holding the negotiations in Kabul would emphasize the mediatory purpose of the meeting, with the relevant departmental heads present: Ministers of Energy and of Transport, along with relevant decision-makers from the armed forces. Additionally, an observer from Turkmenistan must be present, both to ensure that their economic priorities are kept in mind and to maintain the focus of discussions on the pipeline and its protection. Large-scale investors may also attend, as the financing of such a costly project is impossible if restricted to state coffer funds alone. In fact, the Saudi Development Bank has committed to considerable investment in the project, based on agreements reached between Turkmenistan and Saudi Arabia in May 2016. Likewise, private Turkish companies have expressed an interest in getting involved.
The consequences of open conflict would involve the jeopardization of vast amounts of energy, water and goodwill, which should keep both capitals secure in the knowledge that this can succeed. Afghanistan meanwhile would act as an infrastructural and military intermediate between the former nations, all the while gaining a more hands-on approach to counter insecurity and underdevelopment. Conclusion Since a peace process seems overly ambitious between India and its western neighbour, this paper focuses on pragmatic, cooperative initiatives which could result in a long-term economic equilibrium. Energy, whether conventional or alternative, is a vital source of survival for any given nation. Creating a joint energy grid partially passing through Afghanistan (TAPI pipeline) and the disputed Kashmir (hydroelectric plants in the Indus Basin) would create a certain degree of co-dependence, as well as deterrents for open conflict, with each party controlling energy supplies to the other side. Considering Pakistan’s population is expected to nearly double by 2050, and that India is home to roughly 20% of the world’s population, neither nation can afford to imperil their energy and water security over open conflict with one another.
American policy in Afghanistan: time for a new approach? by alex strelet
After 16 years of involvement in Afghanistan, the United States of America has largely failed to achieve its goals of defeating terrorist groups and bringing peace and stability to the country. In August 2017, the Trump Administration took the decision to increase the number of US troops stationed in Afghanistan, bringing their total number to approximately 13000. At the time, it was announced that the US will not be ‘nation-building again’ - it will be ‘killing terrorists’. Contrary to expectations, the situation on the ground has not seen any significant improvement in the following months. In fact, the Taliban have increased their influence, controlling ‘more than 13 percent of Afghanistan’s 407 districts and contesting another 30 percent,’ and the prospects for peace have not improved. At the same time, the American public continues to grow increasingly frustrated over a war that has claimed thousands of American lives and that seems to have no end in sight. In this context, calls for a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan have been abundant. In light of the above, it becomes clear that the current state of affairs calls for a rethinking of the US policy in Afghanistan. Policy aims America’s main goal in Afghanistan must remain to bring an end to the conflict and ensure peace and stability in the country. An unstable Afghanistan would heavily undermine the security interests of the US and its allies. However, the US should reconsider whether its current aim of defeating the Taliban militarily is the right approach towards achieving this goal. Throughout its 16-year-long presence in the country, this approach has not worked. Now, it is widely agreed that a primarily military approach is not appropriate for attaining an end to the conflict. It is time for the US to redefine what it sees as ‘winning the war’. Rather than militarily defeating the Taliban, winning the war should mean achieving a negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government. This must be attained by enabling internationally supported peace negotiations as well as by setting conditions for reconciling and reintegrating the Taliban into the Afghan society. In order to facilitate a peace process, the US must ensure the credibility and legitimacy of the Afghan government. This does not imply that the military aspect should be ignored. America needs to prevent the consolidation of the Taliban and provide incentives for them to engage in peace talks by preserv-
ing a residual force in Afghanistan – but not escalating the situation. A more detailed account of the aims and strategy that the US should pursue is provided in the following sections. Policy proposals 1. Achieve a negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government. In order to do this, the US must first set the conditions for internationally supported peace negotiations with the Taliban. This means that it should rebuild a consensus position among regional powers to support the peace process in Afghanistan. America should take steps to revive regional platforms such as the Quadrilateral Coordination Group, consisting of the United States, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Other, broader groups of Afghanistan’s neighbors and related regional actors, such as the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) and the Kabul process should also be engaged. The US also needs to address the problem of Russia and Iran supporting the Taliban. These countries’ motivations for supporting the Taliban and other terrorist groups include the need to fight ISIS as well as ensuring stability in Afghanistan after the large scale withdrawal of US troops from 2011-2014. The US needs to offer them an alternative. This alternative must take the form of a firmly declared American commitment to peace in Afghanistan, which would send a message to Russia and Iran that continued support for the Taliban is not a viable and realistic approach to achieving stability. Alongside this, America must assure the two countries that both the US and NATO remain committed to fighting ISIS, in order to encourage Russia and Iran to decrease their reliance on the Taliban. Special attention must also be given to Pakistan. Reductions in military and economic aid have so far proven ineffective in getting Pakistan to limit its support for the Taliban. Instead, the US should focus on Pakistan’s strategic concerns. This means that the US should directly assist Pakistan in strengthening its capacity to address terrorist threats on its own territory. One of the reasons for which Pakistan is continuing to support the Taliban is its fear of a retaliation
DEFENCE AND DIPLOMACY other Afghan factions’. The US must also take steps to convince the Taliban that it will not be aggressive after a reconciliation. For instance, removing certain groups from the U.S. list of terror suspects will add further incentives for these groups to engage in peace talks and reconciliation. More incentives for reintegration of the Taliban will be provided by legitimizing the Afghan government – in this context, ensuring the fairness of the 2018 parliamentary elections is essential. This, and other aspects related to the legitimization of the Afghan government will be elaborated upon in the next section. 2. Ensure the credibility and legitimacy of the Afghan government. Memorial day at the US embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.
of Taliban-related groups within its borders in case the Pakistani government cuts support. In other words, Pakistan lacks control over the very groups it is supporting – although it has been reluctant to admit it. Strengthening Pakistan’s ability to pursue these groups can give it more confidence to limit support for them and overcome the fear that they will retaliate. At the same time, the US should seek for an improvement in relations between Pakistan and India. This stems from the assumption that another key reason for Pakistani support for the Taliban is the fear of increased Indian influence in Afghanistan. To address this concern, the US should actively make use of every occasion to encourage dialogue between the two countries as well as to promote economic integration within a regional framework. The US should also take steps towards assuming a mediator role between the two states, particularly in the Kashmir conflict. Pakistan has already expressed its willingness to welcome the US in such a role , therefore the US needs to actively engage in dialogue and cooperation with India, in the hopes of convincing them that the US could be a reliable and effective mediator. Furthermore, the United States should prepare for reconciliation with the Taliban and their reintegration in the Afghan society. This implies that American officials must work with the Afghan authorities to devise an arrangement which would secure a voice for the Taliban in the Afghan government, on the condition that the latter renounce engaging in violent and extremist activities. This approach is in line with the Taliban’s expectations. Its officials recently claimed that ‘the Taliban leadership does not seek a political monopoly, and… it recognizes the importance of sharing power with
The Taliban currently do not view the current Afghan government as legitimate. Yet ensuring its legitimacy is crucial for getting the Taliban to engage in peace negotiations. Government legitimacy must also be ensured in the eyes of the Afghan population, who currently perceive it as ‘inept, corrupt, brutal, or all three’. Such a perception encourages citizens to turn to alternative, non-state forms of authority, including the Taliban, thereby consolidating these terrorist groups’ power and undermining prospects for peace. The US must address this issue by bolstering efforts to assist the Afghan government in fighting corruption. Despite some progress having been made in this regard , the US needs to posit anti- corruption initiatives as a precondition of sending financial aid to Afghanistan. It must also take steps to consolidate Afghanistan’s newly created National Procurement Authority (whose aim is to improve transparency of the government procurement system) and the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC), ‘which has prosecuted several government officials, including a two-star general from the Ministry of Interior and a Provincial Council Chairman from Herat, for corruption’. The US must also commit to strengthening the rule of law by increasing funding for the State-Department sponsored Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program (AJSSP), which is a ‘multi-pronged effort to develop and strengthen the capacity of the Afghan criminal justice sector institutions and justice professionals’. These efforts to reduce corruption will facilitate the fight against illegal drug trade, particularly opium poppy production and distribution, which has reached ‘unprecedented highs’ in the past year, reaching a record of 9000 metric tons. This activity is an essential source of income for the
THE SPECTRUM A soldier of the Afghan National Army displays his right index finger as a symbol his participation in the 2014 Afghan national elections.
Taliban and other terrorist groups, but was largely neglected by American officials in past years. Reducing corruption and increasing transparency in the government law enforcement bodies is vital. This would reduce the Taliban’s income, thereby hindering their war efforts and creating yet another incentive to enter peace talks with the government. Finally, together with NATO and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the US must assist the Afghan government in ensuring democratic fairness and timeliness during the 2018 parliamentary elections as well as the 2019 presidential elections. This must be done by directly assisting Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission, which has so far not shown significant progress in preparations for the upcoming elections. Conducting these elections in transparent manner is crucial to ensure government credibility. Despite the Trump Administration’s reluctance to engage in nation-building, this element remains vital for achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan. 3. Prevent the consolidation of the Taliban and other terrorist groups by making it costly for them to continue fighting. As mentioned previously, this would also incentivise Taliban leaders to enter peace negotiations with the Afghan government. The United States should do this by preserving a small local force but not escalating the situation. For instance, President Trump can opt to maintain the current number of troops on the ground, which stands at around 13,000. The focus of this force should be counterterrorism as well as training the Afghan military, and would prevent the Taliban from consolidating power, thereby placing them in a situation in which they would ‘pay a heavy price for continuing to fight’ . It will encourage Afghanistan’s neighbours, notably
Pakistan, to stop supporting terrorist groups while hoping that the US is getting ready to leave Afghanistan. This military force should remain on the ground until a settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban is reached. Conclusion It is time for a new approach for American policy in Afghanistan. The US must redefine its political objectives: instead of seeking to eliminate the Taliban entirely, America should seek a victory whereby the Taliban and current Afghan government negotiate a settlement. This must be done by enabling internationally supported peace negotiations as well as by setting conditions for reconciling and reintegrating the Taliban into the Afghan society. The US must also ensure the credibility and legitimacy of the Afghan government by preserving its current forces in Afghanistan, which would prevent the Taliban’s consolidation while providing incentives for them to enter peace negotiations. America now has a unique opportunity to bring an end to its longest war – it must not be squandered.
DEFENCE AND DIPLOMACY
Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure by salome gongadze and mirko giordani
An evening in December 2015 marked the first well-publicized incident of a type of attack that experts have anticipated for some time: a cyberattack on a power grid that led to large-scale blackouts. A sophisticated, multi-stage attack was staged on a power control center in the Ivano-Frankivsk region of Ukraine, leading to the loss of power for 230,000 people. Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure - assets that are vital for societal needs - are, as the incident in Ukraine demonstrates, especially alarming due to their capabilities to completely destabilize civilian life. The first section of this policy paper will discuss known incidents of cyberattacks on critical civilian infrastructure and assess the threat they pose in the future. Known incidents The sophisticated and destructive manner in which the Ukrainian power grid was attacked in 2015 merits an exploration to understand how similar infrastructure may be at risk. A 2016 US-based report lays out the timeline and technologies used in the attack. Phishing technologies, which mimic the look of legitimate communications delivered through email, were used by the attackers to gain an entry into the IT networks of the power companies. Login credentials and other data were stolen to remotely login to the power companies’ ‘supervisory control and data acquisition’ (SCADA) networks, which controlled the power distribution itself. Alarmingly, once the initial takedown of power distribution occurred, the hackers launched an ancillary attack: in order to prevent customers from calling in to report power outages, a telephone denial of service (TDOS) attack was used to flood the phone systems with fake calls to prevent a speedy reporting of the power outage. The disruption was resolved in a matter of hours, but demonstrated how a well-planned attack can spread quickly and disable efforts to report it. Another notable 2017 attack demonstrates the effects that ransomware, a form of malicious software that threatens to erase data unless a ransom is paid, can have on critical medical infrastructure. Although the ‘WannaCry’ ransomware hit Microsoft computers globally, a major victim was the United Kingdom’s National Health Service. WannaCry was allegedly developed from a Microsoft security vulnerability identified by the U.S. National Security Agency, and takes advantage of this vulnerability to spread automatically from one infected computer to another, demanding a bitcoin ransom for the return of data. The resulting disruption led to the cancellation to thousands of NHS appointments, but was prevented from spreading further when a researcher studied
the code and registered a domain name written in it, which functioned as a ‘kill switch’ that stopped the ransomware. Given the reliance of many medical services on computer software for the planning of appointments and the storage of medical data, cyberattacks on medical infrastructure are a clear cause for concern. Who attacks critical infrastructure? The secretive nature of cyberattacks makes it difficult to determine their sources, but Russia and North Korea were alleged to be the places of origin for the Ukrainian power attack and WannaCry attack on the NHS, respectively. This does not necessarily imply that the governments of these states ordered critical infrastructure attacks - there is no consensus to the degree of affiliation between the hacking teams developing such attacks and the governments in question. Cyberattacks on critical civilian infrastructure can therefore theoretically be generated from a number of sources, from national governments to various non-state actors to criminal gangs. Furthermore, some forms of malware are reportedly sale on the secretive deep web, allowing even those without the resources to develop their own hacking technologies to deploy them. Assessing the threat There is widespread agreement that critical infrastructure is broadly not prepared to deal with a large scale attacks. There are several factors that enhance vulnerability and make defense difficult. Firstly, cyberattacks are difficult to predict and there may be an aversion to spending resources to prevent an attack of an unknown nature and source. Secondly, many critical infrastructure facilities run outdated software and cyber defenses. For example, reports produced after the attack on the NHS indicated that NHS trusts were not implementing various cyber security training measures or widely disseminating information about pre-prepared defense plans. Risk management experts suggest that it is doubtful any nation presently has a comprehensive plan to defend infrastructure from cyberattack. Finally, the protection against cyberattacks involves the identification of weaknesses that, if exposed, can be used to generate attacks. The ‘Eternalblue’ security vulnerability that was exploited by the globally destructive WannaCry ransomware was, as mentioned earlier, a product of American NSA security research supposedly conducted for espionage purposes. This research was leaked and then utilized in the ransomware, leaving big questions about the role of government in stock-
THE SPECTRUM piling such vulnerabilities and highlighting how vulnerability research can backfire. Clearly, the threat of possibly catastrophic damage to civilian life through cyberattack on critical infrastructure is a serious one that demands an active response strategy. The following section outlines some policy recommendations for the defence against infrastructure attacks. Policy proposals 1. Develop state-level cyber-vigilance strategies. The Wannacry virus targeted the UK’s NHS in particular, causing certain It is important for states to take the threat hospitals to cancel appointments and operations. of cyberattacks on infrastructure seriously and produce written, resource-backed commitments and such cooperation would succeed in preventing attacks from plans for protecting against them. Some have been more acnon-state actors or ‘rogue’ states like North Korea, which tive than others. The UK, for instance, published a National are not engaged in traditional multinational networks. Still, Cyber Security Strategy, which includes a £1.9 billion investthe sharing of best practices and cooperation with security ment for financing joint projects between UK government groupings like the OSCE can form a component of a sucand private entities. cessful cyber-vigilance strategy.
2. Develop preventative technical measures. The scope of recommended technical preventative measures is wide and will vary depending on the infrastructure and state in question. Possible options can include the encryption of sensitive data, which converts information into a format in which it can only be converted into readable form by appropriate personnel. Network monitoring can be used to study suspicious behaviour in order to design rapid counter-measures. Penetration testing involves staging controlled cyber-attacks in order to assess defence capabilities; research must be tightly controlled in order to prevent vulnerability information from leaking. The implementation of such measures can go hand in hand with a state cyber-vigilance plan, which can design and provide recommendations or requirements for how the public and private sector might implement such measures. 3. Increase international cooperation. Experts are divided about the role that international cooperation can play in the shadowy world of cyberattacks and prevention. An optimistic report by the U.S.-based think tank Council on Foreign Relations recommends vigorous institutional cooperation, such as the establishment ‘cyber norms’ through United Nations mechanisms and the establishment of an international arbitration body to settle cyberattack accusations and disputes. It is questionable how much
Conclusion Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure present an evolving threat to civilian safety in the 21st century, and can only be expected to increase as the world grows more and more digitally connected. We have shown that, despite confirmed occurances of such technology being used, most states are not prepared to respond. Though it is impossible to be fully protected due to the diversity of cyber-tools and infastructure targets, we have made several recommendations for ways in which governments can step up their response strategies.
Student mobility in Central Asia’s higher education institutions by marina zabelina
Higher education student mobility schemes in the European Union have demonstrated positive impacts on the standards of higher education institutions across the region, by increasing the sharing of best practices. With the further aim of improving tolerance, this paper recommends the creation of a similar mobility scheme in Central Asia that is aligned with the EU model and supported by ERASMUS+. Background In 2014 the World Bank published a report on Uzbekistan’s tertiary education system and its urgent need for improvement. It pointed out that the country had failed to reform its education system in response to the nation’s shift from a largely agricultural to a service sector economy. Indeed, little change has been made since 1991, and the Soviet-era style of education remain largely the same. Although other former Soviet countries have kept high tertiary education attainment a norm, with 54% of 25-64-year-olds in the Russian Federation attaining tertiary education, Uzbekistan has the lowest rate of tertiary education in Central Asia: only 15% of the population attends university. This is in stark contrast to Tajikistan (26.4%) and Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, whose figures are similar to the Russian Federation’s.
Policy proposals 1. Create a ‘Central Asian Higher Education Area’ aligned with the ‘European Higher Education Area’ Countries with similar Soviet-style education systems to Uzbekistan’s have successfully reformed by becoming members of the Bologna Process, a collective effort of education stakeholders across 48 countries, including the European Commission, which harmonizes higher education systems. Started in 1999, its main aim is to standardize the three-cycle system of bachelor/master/doctorate degrees to simplify the recognition process of qualifications, thereby allowing for easier movement between countries for study and work. In the past 15 years, former Soviet countries such as Russia, Georgia, and Belarus have gained membership to the Bologna Process and the European Higher Education Area (EHEA). Yet in Central Asia, Kazakhstan is the only states to have becomes a member. Whilst the hydrocarbon-rich and economically developed countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have adapted their tertiary education systems in line with European standards, Uzbekistan and most of Central Asia lag behind.
But the obvious solution for Uzbekistan is not to join the EHEA. As a macro-region, Central Asia has a specific eduUzbekistan, therefore, faces a crisis: it does not have the cation climate distinct from other regions. The similarities qualified workforce necessary to support its growing econinclude a shared Soviet history, a common origin for their omy. A key way in which countries such as Uzbekistan have present higher education systems, and “expansive” popubattled with the brain drain phenomena and the skills gap in lation pyramids, with a large proportion of young people. the workforce is by opening up These differences make it borders. This has entailed the challenging for Uzbekistan Promoting mobility empowers creation of less restrictive visa to adapt its current system to students to share ideas and take regimes for highly skilled projoin the EHEA (Uzbekistan the initiative, acting as an fessionals as well as involvedoes not currently use a “credeffective peacebuilding tool. ment in education projects like it system” to measure student Erasmus in Europe. Increasing workload). Uzbekistan is also the number of foreign students entering a country for eduinhibited by its geographical position: Kyrgyzstan, the pication allows for a larger pool of potential skilled labor that oneer of the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation may join the local workforce. System (ECTS) in the region, was rejected membership on Standardizing higher education qualifications and rethe basis that it was not a signatory to the European Cultural forming curriculum will equip students with the skills needConvention, “which it could not do so insofar as it was not ed for the transitioning economy. Increasing the mobility of (and could not be for geographical reasons) considered Euboth students and the workforce has been shown to decrease ropean”. the skills gap in the labor market in Europe and is a model which can be followed in Central Asia. Even if it were possible to overcome the challenges and geo-
Erasmus students celebrate. The ERASMUS+ can act as a guide for a Central Asian student mobility programmes.
graphical requirements, joining the EHEA would not be beneficial for Uzbekistan and the region as a whole. Firstly, the existing variety of investment into higher education among the Central Asian countries means that education, and more precisely higher education, is not always the political or budgetary priority. Looking at the development of the EHEA, political decision-making had to take place at the highest levels of government in order to make the changes necessary to create uniformity in the European higher education market. Taking into consideration the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, an education agreement from the EU would face significant implementation hurdles without the direct buy-in of regional governments. Instead, Uzbekistan must work collaboratively with the Central Asian countries towards creating a Central Asian ‘Higher Education Area’ (CAHEA), whereby regional states standardize education qualifications in order to encourage and facilitate student mobility across borders. The CAHEA was first proposed by a Tempus Project in 2011 under the title ‘Towards a Central Asian Higher Education Area: Tuning Structures and Building Quality Culture’ (TuCAHEA). Education harmonization in the region demands that each country’s respective Education Ministry and stakeholders have real ownership in the CAHEA project. To ensure successful implementation and longevity of the project, governments must be able to have input rather than a top-down approach from the EU. The 2011-2015 TuCAHEA project has set the foundations for creating a successful regional higher education area. With the support of the 5 countries ministries (who all met during the project’s progression) and both EU Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and Central Asian HEIs participating, the project published descriptors for first, second and third levels of higher education. Although the project also made headway in developing descriptors for eight Sub-
ject Areas which included Engineering, Humanities and Social Sciences, a comprehensive framework for qualification standardization has yet to be reached. However, it is a positive step that these countries, some of which have historical conflict and ethnic tensions between them, have realized the potential a collective Central Asian qualifications framework can have. 2. Develop a student mobility scheme within Central Asia with the support of ERASMIS+. The primary purpose of the aforementioned ‘Higher Education Area’ is to increase the mobility of students and the workforce between the participating countries. Current education mobility trends in Central Asia point to an outward movement of students leaving to study abroad with little balance of external students coming into the Central Asian region to study. Instead, mobility between university students and teachers could be encouraged in the region if the education systems were first harmonized within Central Asia through CAHEA. CAHEA also kick-started student mobility in the area by facilitating a formal pilot program in 2014. The program allowed students from participating universities in the region to go to another institution in Central Asia for several months to study. The initial response from students was positive but the program met with some challenges, including visa permissions being denied by host countries and money transfer difficulties from Europe as a result of financial compliance. The issue of visa permissions from authorities demands the involvement of high ranking officials in the countries’ Education Ministries, with help from the EU. Since the pilot, this to some extent has already taken place through the establishment and signing of the Astana Declaration. Encour-
THE SPECTRUM Central Asian universities which could participate in a regional student exchange scheme include the Nazarbayev University in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan.
moting mobility between HEIs creates a platform that can empower students and academics to share their ideas about HEI management rather than keep a top-down approach. Students and academics will also be exposed to new cultural settings and create a regional forum of mutual understanding. Student mobility has the power to be an effective peacebuilding tool as well as helping countries like Uzbekistan encourage foreign students to gain and share their skills in the labor market.
aged by the EU, 5 Ministers for Education agreed to work cooperatively towards academic mobility in Central Asian countries. The EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s commitment to the region included establishing an ERASMUS+ office in Uzbekistan as well as awarding over 2000 scholarships to students in Central Asia to study in Europe. This demonstrates their willingness to assist educational programs in the region. The EU has the financial means to invest in projects that may strengthen the HEIs in the area, including student mobility schemes. The support of the EU is not only pertinent to help with the funding and administration of a mobility scheme but also to provide a framework for which the Central Asian countries can emulate, like the EHEA or ERASMUS. The mobility scheme combats the one-way direction of movement to Europe and is a way for both students and HEIs to diversify their experiences and skill-set. Students will share their culture with other students from the region which will promote mutual understanding between neighboring countries that have had poor diplomatic relations in the past. A mobility scheme can be a first step in bolstering diplomatic ties between the Central Asian countries. It can also allow Education Ministries to learn from other HEIs in the region, collectively raising the quality of higher education in Central Asia. Conclusion An education agreement that allows for the standardization of qualifications across Central Asia in conjunction with an ERASMUS-style student mobility project will allow for greater student and academic exchange in the region. Pro-
Sex and relationship education in British faith schools by thomas materman and alex ostick
This report offers recommendations to monitor and remedy unequal educational outcomes that will be caused by two clauses of Section 34 of the Children and Social Work Act 2017: the parental right to withdraw their secondary school children from RSE and the right of faith schools to teach relationship and sex education (RSE) within the tenets of their faith. Non-objective teaching of RSE in faith schools is likely to create an environment in which issues of sexual health, abuse and sexuality cannot be openly discussed. This, combined with some students missing out on RSE, will compromise the physical and mental well-being of students, especially abused and LGBT+ students at faith schools. In order to monitor potential inequality of RSE provision this report recommends a bi-annual evaluation of RSE on a national scale. Furthermore, we propose an alteration in the law that removes the above clauses and replaces them with compulsory objective and LGBT+ inclusive RSE. Background Section 34 of the Children and Social Work Act 2017 introduces compulsory ‘relationships education’ in all primary schools, and compulsory ‘relationships and sex education’ in all secondary schools. Subsequent to government consultations and the publication of a compulsory guidance document, English schools will be expected to implement RSE from September 2019. Prior legislation made sex and relationships education compulsory in state-maintained schools, meaning that academies, free schools and independent schools, although advised to cover RSE, were not obliged to teach RSE - whereas faith schools were given the freedom to ‘teach within the tenets of their faith’. The quality of RSE under past legislation has been variable and generally poor: OFSTED (2012) found that ‘sex and relationships education required improvement in over a third of schools’. Changes in legislation have responded to mounting social pressure to make RSE compulsory in all schools; a number of campaigns have been led by organisations and charities such as the PSHE Association and Terrence Higgins Trust. Common reasons stated in favour of compulsory RSE include: ensuring consistency and quality of RSE; encouraging an environment in which students feel able to disclose abuse and exploitation; and learning about diversity, tolerance and British values. Whilst changes to the status of ‘relationships education’ and RSE as a subject in prima-
ry and secondary schools is positive, there are a number of aspects of the bill that threaten the principle of equality in education. Firstly, parents retain the right to withdraw their child from RSE in secondary schools (other than aspects of RSE which are taught as part of the National Curriculum in maintained schools); parents cannot, however, remove their children from ‘relationships education’ in primary schools. Secondly, faith schools have retained the right to teach RSE ‘according to the tenets of their faith’. Methods This paper has undertaken a comprehensive literature review of existing academic research surrounding SRE dissemination in schools. Papers have focused on which RSE methods and resources achieve best practise. In addition to this the paper has examined and analysed a range of grey literature such as current government legislation. This has included the 2000 Sex and Relationships Guidance published by the Department for Education (DoE) as well as the Children and Social Work Act 2017. Furthermore, non-statutory guidance has also been examined such as the SRE for the 21st century which was supported by the DoE and issued by organisations such as the PSHE Association, Sex Education Forum and Brook. Policy proposals 1. Initiate a bi-annual review into RSE in schools. A bi-annual review should accompany the publication of the new RSE curriculum, ensuring that statutory teaching requirements for all English schools are clearly defined. This would allow OFSTED to assess and evaluate schools against a clear criteria. Furthermore a bi-annual review would allow the curriculum to be regularly updated and increase opportunities to share the best teaching methods and resources. Currently the lack of statutory guidance has caused aspects of RSE to not be fully implemented or ignored altogether and has also made inspection more difficult. We recommend a review of the RSE curriculum every two years. The last government publication on RSE in English schools, published in 2000, is 18 years out of date and lacks guidance on a wide range of contemporary issues. For example, how to stay safe online, revenge porn, and other impacts
THE SPECTRUM of widespread access to smartphones and cameras. Insufficient guidance does not provide teachers with advice on how to tackle current RSE issues, and fails to hold schools to account on the need for focused and relevant RSE. This contrasts with the devolved governments in Scotland and Wales. Scotland has invested considerable time consulting and updating its approach to RSE introducing comprehensive curriculum reviews in the 2008 Curriculum for Excellence programme and in its updated guidance following the 2014 Marriage and Civil Partnership Bill (Scotland). A bill stating teachers cannot affirm or condemn one form of relationship or marriage over another. This contrasts with the government guidance published in 2000 which repeatedly refers to the ‘importance of marriage for family life signifying a non-objective method of teaching RSE. Furthermore, it is unclear whether this can include LGBT+ couples and demonstrates the importance of providing clear and precise guidance. As such it is time for a clearly defined curriculum taking inspiration from Scotland’s example when reviewing its own RSE policies. 2. LGBT+ inclusive RSE should be taught objectively in all schools in order to ensure that RSE is delivered equally, at a consistent standard and, therefore, attains the same social outcomes. As it stands, faith schools have an ability to teach within the tenets of their faith, a policy that is likely to cause faith school students physical and emotional harm, especially if they are LGBT+. Evidence collected by the Terrence Higgins Trust shows that faith schools have been more likely to not teach RSE than other types of schools and are more likely to teach a narrower range of sex-ed topics. Among the frequently omitted topics, were LGBT+ and healthy relationships. Furthermore, faith schools were more likely to omit teaching about contraception in relation to same-sex relationships: just 10 percent of faith school pupils reported this was covered. This compares to, a similarly meagre, 20 percent of non-faith school pupils who covered this topic. Although a change to the law and new compulsory guidance is likely to address these poor RSE outcomes, the discrepancies between faith school and non-faith school taught RSE is a cause for concern. In non-faith schools reasons for not addressing LGBT+ in RSE can differ from the reasons that faith schools omit LGBT+ from the curriculum. In non-faith schools, poor RSE provision has been caused by various factors: it’s omission from the compulsory curriculum, insufficient 2000 government guidance, time constraints and heteronormativity. In non-faith schools with a significant religious community, there may also be a fear of offending pupils. The recent RSE bill addresses these factors.
Conversely, in some faith schools, adherence to conservative religious teachings that condemn LGBT+ people and sexuality more generally are contributing factors to poor RSE provision. Conservative religious teachings (Christianity, Judaism and Islam) state that homosexuality is a sin. Whether this is stated explicitly or omitted, it produces harmful effects. The School Report shows that just 57% of LGBT+ students at faith schools reported that their school condemned homophobic and biphobic bullying as wrong. In comparison to other types of schools, this was the lowest percentage obtained in the research. Many faith schools have good RSE provision and will continue to, however allowing faith schools to teach within the tenets of their faith could be used as an excuse, in those faith schools with poor RSE provision, to not improve teaching. If an anti-LGBT+ stance is taught in the context of RSE or RE, it is likely to cause or to compound a sense of shame within LGBT+ individuals as well as legitimise the bullying of LGBT+ students. Government advice on tackling bullying in schools states that ‘every school must have measures in place to prevent all forms of bullying’. This is informed by the 2010 Equality Act which came into force on 5 April 2011, seeking to prevent discrimination on the grounds of ‘age, disability, gender reassignment, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation’. In order to prevent discrimination against and bullying of LGBT+ students in schools, objective and LGBT+ inclusive RSE should be a minimal policy. Teaching all students LGBT+ RSE that is objective in its viewpoint would help to normalise the concept, therefore, sending a clear message about the willingness of the school to address issues of sexuality and lessening the chance of bullying. The Terrence Higgins trust states ‘it is vital that young people are reassured that the feelings they have, if not hetero-normative or cisgendered, are valid’. This is vital considering the increased suicidality of LGBT+ young people: Stonewall statistics state that ‘nine in ten trans young people (92 per cent) have considered taking their own life. For lesbian, gay and bi pupils who are not trans this stands at seven in ten (70 per cent). Furthermore, ‘LGBT pupils of faith are somewhat more likely to have tried to take their own life than those who aren’t (30 per cent compared to 25 per cent)’, highlighting the importance of objective and LGBT+ inclusive RSE in faith schools. 3. Revoke the parental right to withdraw their children from RSE in order to strengthen the status of RSE as statutory. A recent Barnardo’s poll showed that 74% of 11-15 year olds
believed children would be safer if they had age appropriate classes on RSE. Given increasing concerns around child sexual abuse and exploitation and the risks associated with growing up in a digital world, there is a particularly compelling case to act in relation to pupil safety. To further pupil safety we feel it is necessary to eliminate, or reduce the precedent for, withdrawing pupils from RSE, given that three quarters of secondary school-aged pupils support this and some argue certain pupils may not learn sufficiently through family or parental guidance alone. Furthermore, research suggests that RSE outcomes have been better when RSE ‘homework’ has been given, one impact of which is higher reported use of contraception. When a pupil discloses information and questions about RSE issues there tends to be a positive outcome, however when the parent is controlling or ‘overly inquisitive’ about RSE issues it can have a negative impact and the pupil may feel they cannot disclose information. Issuing RSE homework can prompt discussion at home making a pupil more likely to disclose information facilitating parental/child teaching. We argue that a combination of both RSE and parental involvement is key to opening a point of contact for both parents and children however withdrawing pupils from RSE makes it harder to facilitate joint involvement. The Cochrane Report found that RE at primary school increased the likelihood that pupils disclosed sexual abuse. Positively, RE in primary schools is now statutory under 2017 Children and Social Care Act and parents cannot withdraw their primary school children. Given the importance of RE for safeguarding in primary school, RSE in secondary schools can play a similar role. Many students become sexually active during secondary school and continue to be vulnerable to grooming, particularly online. The Lucy Faithfull Foundation indicates failure to provide high quality, age appropriate, sex and relationships education may leave young people vulnerable to inappropriate sexual behaviours and exploitation (OFSTED). Under 19-year olds have been found to be the victims of up to 30% of reported revenge porn incidents and it is widely acknowledged that ‘sexting’ is an issue in most schools.
Withdrawing a student can be detrimental to their personal understanding and identifying of abuse, this becomes particularly salient if the abuse they face comes from home. Withdrawing the pupil may hamper efforts from the school to identify and act upon suspected abuse, an increasingly visible issue in the public conscious. Furthermore, secondary school students are increasingly autonomous and, therefore, should be provided with the necessary information to make informed choices about their sexual, emotional and physical health. Conclusion Our recommendations seek to achieve equality of provision in RSE across all schools and for all pupils regardless of faith or sexuality. The first recommendation, a bi-annual review of RSE in schools, provides a method of measuring RSE outcomes accounting for various factors including measuring discrepancies in provision in faith and non-faith schools. The evaluation of RSE could measure potential inequality of provision, enable quick responses to remedy problems and establish if the curriculum is lacking. Considering the rate of technological and social change, the curriculum is likely to require regular updates. This recommendation is proposed as a minimum course of action. Whilst the second and third recommendations are more ambitious than the first: they propose statutory changes to a recently passed bill in order to remedy the inequalities in the RSE bill. Namely, the parental right to withdraw their chil- dren and the right of faith schools to teach within the tenets of their faith, by proposing legal changes. The change in statutory status of RSE is a positive step towards providing comprehensive RSE of a good standard in all English schools. This report aims to positively influence ongoing government consultations that are producing RSE compulsory guidance. Our recommendations are designed to, firstly, ensure that the quality of RSE is evaluated by regular national reviews and, secondly, to recommend legal changes to ensure educational equality.
How can the UK help reduce inequalities in East Africa? by bertie o’brien, hana soma, and rachel wibberly
We at the King’s Think Tank’s Education Policy Centre have been investigating the work of the Department for International Development (DfID), focusing on the efficacy of its investment in education in developing countries. Focusing on Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania, we aim to propose a way for DfID to work towards its goal of ensuring all children receive a quality education. We believe that this entails a policy commitment to reducing education inequalities, not only between the developed and developing worlds, but in the developing world itself.
been shown that the mere attendance of a student does not guarantee actual learning.
Reducing education inequality is clearly a huge challenge: one policy paper could not hope to offer a global solution. Rather, a wide range of strategies will need to be developed and executed to make real progress on this issue, of which our policy will be just one instance. We credit DfID (and the UK government) for being one of major investors in international education, championing projects such as the Girls Education Challenge and the Global Partnership for Education.
To address these issues, DfID should ensure investment is tailored to the countries and regions it assists and avoid an inefficient ‘one size fits all’ approach. We recommend that DfID invest in charities and NGOs that not only operate in the East Africa region, but that are local to the region. These charities must focus on working with the poorest, most marginalised, or worst performing schools in the region.
I. Learning in East Africa
There are discouraging regional, gender, and class disparities in the levels of learning outcomes for children in East Africa. One organization that has been monitoring learning outcomes in the region is Uwezo. In 2012, an Uwezo study found that Kenya had overall test pass rates of 63%, whereas Uganda had overall pass rates of just 38%. There are similar Our policy is timely because East Africa currently faces very disparities when comparing districts within the same country. For example, Kenya’s Westlands region had pass rates substantial disparities - particularly regional disparities - in learning outcomes. Further, it focuses on the quality of edof 87.7%, whereas its Wajir South region averaged at 30.8%. These inequalities are exacerbated by wealth and gender ucation provided to students, rather than the access to education available to students. This is in response to rafts of gaps, with girls and children from poorer households often underperforming in literacy and numeracy tests. For inrecent research into the global ‘learning crisis’, where it has stance, the report revealed a 28% gap Uwezo reported improved enrollement rates between 2000 and 2011. between the literacy and numeracy rates of children from “non-poor” and “ultra-poor” households. In Uganda, the gap is 21 percentage points. Tanzania’s analysis of national examination results corroborates these statistics. In 2009, there was a 79% failure rate in English and a 65% failure rate in Mathematics for the country’s Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE). The same report shows that boys systematically outperform girls in all subjects, and that certain regions fare far better than others. For example, the Dar es Salaam region secured an average pass rate of 70%, whereas the central Shinyanga region
EDUCATION only achieved an average pass rate of 32%. The assessments mirror those of Uwezo’s: poor outcomes overall, exacerbated by local inequalities. II. Assessing the learning crisis 20 or so years ago, the focus of Governments and NGOs was on time children spent in schools; success was measured according to enrolment and attendance numbers. But getting children to attend schools is only effective in improving learning outcomes if the schools themselves can teach their students adequately, and there is a large body of research suggesting that this is not always the case. Recent research into education in developing countries has found that rising enrolment and attendance has not been matched with greater levels of learning. For example, Uwezo reports that over 90% of children in East Africa between 9-11 are enrolled in school. But as we have seen, many are not learning basic skills. RISE, a research organisation focusing on improving global outcomes, reports that ‘[i]n today’s world if one wants to find children who lack an education, the place to find them is in school’. Attendance alone is not enough. There is a need to provide schools with better and more resources: such as better teachers, more classrooms, and more textbooks. III. DfID’s international education aims DfID can expect to spend anywhere between £700-£800m on international education annually. Like any sensible investment-centric organisation, DfID seeks value for money and to maximise the impact of its investment. It makes sense, then, that DfID attend to the worst performing schools, regions, or groups in pursuit of this goal, since these have the most margin for improvement. The issue is not merely mathematical, however. We agree with the International Development Committee (IDC) when they say that DfID’s focus should certainly be on the most marginalised and poorest children. It follows from the commitment of the UK Government to Sustainable Development Goal 4 (SDG 4), which is to ‘ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all’. To make significant progress on reducing inequalities, massive quantities of investment are required; current estimates predict the need for an additional $1.8 trillion of international funding (on top of what is already invested). Education investment competes with other vital sectors such as humanitarian aid and global health for a slice of the UK’s Official Development Aid budget (0.7% GNI), and as such resources are limited. Obtaining the maximum impact of
the resources available to DfID is, therefore, of paramount importance. Current policy
We are focused on improving education quality in East Africa, via investment aimed at the most marginalised and worst-performing regions and groups. For example, DfID has instigated the ‘Education Quality Improvement Programme – Tanzania (EQUIP-T)’. This project clearly targets the worst performing regions (see maps 1.1 and 1.2). However, other investments are more controversial. DfID recently provided funding to non-state education providers, such as DEEPEN, Bridge International Academies, PEAS, and Omega. These organisations establish and run low-fee private schools across developing nations. DfID’s aim in supporting these providers is admirable, in that they view low-cost private education as (sometimes) necessary to provide children with access to education. The idea is that private schools sometimes fill a gap in education provision left by governments that do not have the political will or ability to provide it themselves. As the IDC states, ‘where governments have proven unable or unwilling to provide education sometimes support for low fee private schools is the only option available to parents.’ But however admirable the aim, private schools often cause an increase in learning outcome disparities, because the most marginalised families cannot access them. A recent study conducted at the UCL Institute of Education found that private school pupils in the developing world achieving greater learning outcomes than their state school counterparts. It also revealed that girls are less likely to have access to private schools than boys, and no decisive evidence that poorer students are more likely to have access than better off students. Having already seen that girls and poor students tend to perform worse than their counterparts, it seems that private schools can contribute to education inequality, rather than relieve it. Policy proposals
We appreciate that the governments of East Africa sometimes lack the political will, means, or expertise to provide a decent education to their entire student-age population. Therefore, some engagement with non-state entities is necessary. But we believe DfID could better achieve its aims, specifically that of reducing inequalities in outcomes, by investing in charitable or non-governmental organisations that work with government run schools. 1. Charities in East Africa Examples of charities and NGOs with which DfID can work
THE SPECTRUM include the Campaign for Female Education (Camfed), African Initiatives, the Henry van Straubenzee Memorial Fund (HvSMF), Soft Power Education, and Africa Educational Trust. Camfed and African Initiatives focus on providing marginalised girls quality education. For Camfed, part of this involves enabling access to education by paying school fees for some girls. But another important part of their work involves improving the quality of education for girls once they get into school, through providing equipment (books, uniforms, sanitary protection), training teachers in mentoring, and investing in other aspects of the girl’s life to ensure she is able to get the most out of her education. In Ghana and Tanzania, African Initiatives invests in school infrastructure, such as Uwezo’s East Africa study emphasizes the need for more quality teachers. dormitories, and teacher training, and run health clubs within schools for girls. These projects imoutcomes. We suggest that by investing in these charities, prove the quality of education and grant girls greater access which work with government run schools, DfID can mobilto education. We believe that by investing in charities such ise non-state organisations whilst at the same time reducing as these, DfID can help resolve disparities between girls’ and inequality. boy’s learning outcomes, thereby mitigating education inequality in East Africa. Finally, DfID can contribute to improved social mobility in East Africa by aiding organisations that aim at success in life Equally viable options are Soft Power and HvSMF, education beyond school. One such NGO operating in the region is charities that work in Uganda. HvSMF assists government Africa Educational Trust. One of their programmes, BRITE run schools, largely through improving infrastructure. With Futures, prepares students through training and experience the money that they raise, HvSMF builds classrooms, dorin high-demand subject areas so that they can successfully mitories, latrines, and bore holes for water. It also purchases transition to higher education, begin their careers, or betextbooks, sports packages, chairs, and tables on behalf of come entrepreneurs. These initiatives focus on how an edschools. HvSMF works in the poorest, rural areas of Uganda, ucational institution can significantly improve a student’s and was established precisely because these were the schools long-term prospects; a goal that DfID shares. that needed the most assistance. They operate in the gap left by a government that is unable to educate all its children ad2. Policy equately Soft Power works on similar projects to HvSMF. Its mandate is to help the Ugandan government in carrying out DfID should set aside a pot of money that can be awarded its policy of Universal Primary Education UPE). UPE was to charities working in East Africa, based on whether the introduced in 1997, but current school infrastructure was charities: incapable of dealing with the large influx of new primary school pupils that it caused. Soft Power therefore assists the • Offer value for money and return on investment government by refurbishing classrooms, demolishing and • Work to reduce inequalities in education, and end georeplacing buildings that are no longer safe, and building new graphical, financial, or gender disparities. classrooms from scratch. • Work to raise quality of education, improve learning outcomes, and enhance life prospects for students. These two charities are doing exceptional work to improve the quality of education for the poorest Ugandan children, The money should be awarded based on merit. Charities or which is helping to balance regional disparities in learning non-governmental organisations will apply for the funding
EDUCATION and the DfID should carry out thorough checks to ensure that the organisations meet the three criteria detailed above. DfID should see the award as a 5-year investment in the charity. Working with the charity, it should set yearly performance targets (such as building n number of classrooms, or training n number of teachers). The amount awarded should then be given in two tranches; the first tranche is awarded based on the organisation’s application, and the second is awarded based on the organisation meeting the performance targets agreed by all parties. This matches DfID’s contract with the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), where ⅓ of funding is provided only if GPE meets the agreed performance targets.
in a cost-effective manner. We feel that it could be an excellent method for tackling the huge disparities in learning outcomes that currently exist within East Africa.
During the 5-year contract, DfID should provide a supporting role to the charities it invests in: whether that be in offering expertise, advice, or human resources. It should aim to monitor the performance of the organisations on a regular basis and have strategies to assist those which fall below expected performance levels. These measures are to ensure that DfID does not compromise on its aim to ‘make sure every penny of UK taxpayers’ money is having maximum impact’. 3. Advantages Our policy has two advantages when compared with DfID’s current projects. First, it targets education inequality directly by mobilising non-state actors that work to support the most marginalised and poorest groups. In most cases, this is preferable to investing in private schools. Second, even when DfID executes initiatives designed to tackle inequality, much of the funding may go to governments, or to outsourced private consultancy firms. For example, on the aforementioned EQUIP-T programme, around one third of funding was received by the Tanzanian government. Another third was received by technical and advisory services. We believe that charities are more cost-effective operators, since many already contain technical and geographical expertise. Conclusion In sum, we have noted that the UK’s Department for International Development is committed to reducing disparities in education quality across the globe. We have concentrated on how DfID might better achieve this in East Africa. Our policy suggestion is for DfID to invest in charities that work in the region, especially those who possess relevant expertise and who focus on the lowest-performing pupils. The rationale behind the policy is that it presents a way for DfID to target the most marginalised groups directly, and
The Societas Europaea regulation: European company law after Brexit by joseph lai
Of course, not even the negotiators know the exact outcome of the Brexit negotiations. Thus, it is still important for us to ask how the European Union must react to the potential loss of one of the EU’s favourite locations for incorporation by member state companies, and the LSE, a capital market more than double that of Euronext. This concern is especially relevant in light of the Commission’s recent efforts to prepare European company law for technological and digital developments. After decades of development of the internal market and this recent pressure to further integrate company law into the single market objectives, the effects of Brexit are typically analysed as a serious complication in the Treaty’s vision to build an European economic union. Indeed, companies may choose to stay in Britain post-Brexit, as Peter Rees QC points out the UK’s strategic position outside of the European Union and the return of many English legal procedures that were previously prohibited under single-market rules such as anti-suit injunctions. Nonetheless, Europe must find an institution to accommodate all the European-owned companies incorporated in the UK that might be displaced by a hard Brexit who wish to remain incorporated within the Union. This paper proposes that the European Union should revisit the Societas Europaea (European Company) concept introduced by Council Regulation in 2004. Currently, the SE regulation model serves as a form of reflexive harmonization, making numerous references to member state legislation as opposed to creating a separate body of European company law. This is understandable, as the SE was originally introduced as a Directive aimed at public companies that already had an interest in having cross-border activity. At the time, an attempt to create a new supra-national body of company law would have had to compete in a market where, as a 2017 presentation by Dr Katelouzou from King’s College London and Dr Siems from Durham University explains, after decades of competitive federalism, a majority of companies choosing to incorporate in another member state would simply choose either the United Kingdom and, surprisingly, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. However, an overwhelming majority of these foreign companies in Slovakia and the Czech Republic are SEs. The United Kingdom leaving the Internal Market would be the loss of an attractive product in the EU’s company law market, leaving many European companies that are incorporated in the UK with a hard decision if the Brexit negotia-
tions go poorly: Either move to Ireland, where the UK Governance Code is incorporated by the Irish Annex (Code), or propose changes to the current SE Regulation that would make it a viable alternative. This policy paper proposes some changes. Resolving the shareholder vs stakeholder issue The shareholder vs stakeholder; issue has long been a point of disagreement between British and German corporate governance policy makers. Although the SE Regulation has long been lauded as a mix of various company law traditions, it has always taken a “choose-your-own” approach to employee participation in corporate governance. However, this “choose-your-own” approach is complicated by the fact that it cannot circumvent national law, and thus represents an obstacle to the Regulation’s core objective as an instrument of harmonization. However, if the SE were to become a supra-national body of company law, it could set forth a finite number of governance structure with varying levels of shareholder input in management. Company directors can evaluate the pros and cons of each management structure and find the structure that most fits their needs. This multi-option form of regulation also appeals to directors from various corporate governance traditions. Finally, creating a finite number of options under one company law regulation would allow more shareholder-oriented companies to compete against more stakeholder-oriented companies, which would answer many questions about the optimal level of stakeholder participation. Foreign institutional investors Currently, shareholder activism is governed under the Stewardship Code in the UK, and the proposed Shareholder Rights Directive in the EU. However, one of the primary concerns regarding codes of conduct for institutional investors is their lack of ‘bite.’ For example, the Stewardship Codes only applies to domestic investors established in the UK. This is a serious issue as more than half of UK public equity is foreign owned, and thus would not fall under the scope of the Stewardship Code. This issue is especially troubling once policy makers consider the symbiotic relationship between Stewardship and Governance codes. Brexit represents an opportunity for the EU to create a comprehensive and coherent system of company law, gov-
Companies registered in the SE include the aeronautical European multinational corporation Airbus.
ernance, and capital markets regulation. The SE regulation proposal should be amended to complement recent proposals to prepare EU companies for digital innovations and the proposed Shareholder Rights Directive. Finally, this is also an opportunity for the EU to clarify the status of European corporate governance, particularly on whether it is intended to be a hard-law or a soft-law instrument. European companies register The European Union should create a register of SE companies. Currently, the SEs are only obliged to register in their nation of incorporation, but this registration requirement should be implemented on the EU level. A consolidated companies register of all SEâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s would contribute to law enforcement efforts in fighting cyber and financial crime, improve creditor and investor protection by increasing market transparency, and contribute to the growing notion of a Eu-
ropean internal market. Conclusion The SE regulation could be a viable alternative to English company law in the unfortunate event that the Brexit negotiations end up poorly for everybody. The SE regime already has a track record of success, providing a platform both for many modern e-companies in the Eastern European member states, to the continentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s biggest financial actors, such as Airbus and Porsche. However, the SE incorporation form is still seen as a special-purpose case, intended for the smallest and largest companies with specific flexibility requirements. Proposing to amend the SE regulation has the object of expanding this form to small and medium enterprises. The SE regulation has potential to become a strong and flexible system of company law, and could benefit by implementing more robust measures as a supra-national institution.
Tax avoidance within the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: Trouble in Paradise? by pierre nicolas and joseph lai
The lack of tax loyalty and harmful tax competition between States, as a way to attract foreign investments, has recently been revealed to the general public through a series of tax scandals. In addition to this, the last financial crisis emphasised the need for governments to gather up financial resources, and in doing so, put an end to aggressive tax planning. The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) Directive has been proposed by the European Commission as a possible solution to this problem. This Directive provides a common set of rules within the EU in calculating the tax base of companies, and for an allocation of profits depending on a formula made of three factors (asset, labour and sales) between members of a group. In October 2016, the European Commission proposed a revision of the CCCTB Directive. This project split the former proposal into a two-step process: the implementation of the common base rules, and the consolidation of profits to be allocated to countries on the basis of the above-mentioned formula. The new Directives also answer some ambiguities that had been identified by business actors, particularly in administrative procedures and offer some very strong incentives. A super-deduction for companies that invest in Research and Development (R&D) is now provided, and the Directive also encourages companies to finance their activity through equity instead of debts, by enabling them to acquire a tax deduction each year in case of equity issuance, which will create more stable resources and resistance to market shocks. Finally, the Directive provides new measures in accordance with the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive of 2016 and work with OECD on BEPS issues related to hybrid mismatches. In March 2018 the European Parliament amended the Proposal in several aspects (including the addition of a data factor, the limitation of carrying forward losses, a digital permanent establishment, a tax credit instead of the super-deduction for R&D, and the deletion of the safeguard clause). Policy analysis I. The general anti-abuse rule Similarly to most of the EU Directives, the CCCTB Proposal
contains a General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) (Article 58) : “A member state shall disregard an arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put in place for the essential purpose of obtaining tax advantage (...)”. In comparison, the 2011 Proposal used the terms “sole purpose”; the Merger Directive, the “principal objective or one of the principal objectives”; and the Anti Tax Avoidance Directive, the “main purpose or one of the main purposes”. What is the meaning of essential purpose? Will it be interpreted in the same way as in the Halifax Case (CJEU 2006 C-255/02 Halifax), where the CJEU held that essential aim should be read as sole purpose? Advocate General Maduro stated that “the prohibition of abuse is not relevant where the economic activity carried out may have some explanation other than the mere attainment of tax advantages”. Or will it be interpreted as what the word commonly refers to: what is necessary, very important, at the heart of a particular transaction and therefore would require scrutinising the intentions of the taxpayer. The use of the word “essential” is contrary to legal certainty and to the principle stating that criminal law should be strictly defined. It allows a very wide test and discretionary power to tax administrations. We propose that the Directive should go back to the 2011 Proposal and use sole purpose for legal certainty. Indeed, the CCCTB working group was referring to “wholly artificial transactions”, and the words “sole purpose” set an objective criteria contrary to essential, main or principal. However, they make it easier for taxpayers not to fall within the GAAR: any commercial justification will be enough, independently of its importance. The only sustainable way to use the terms “main purpose” for legal coherence with the ATAD is to have precise commentaries by the European Commission on the meaning of the terms. In any case, no subsidiarity provision is desirable as was the case in the former Parent-Subsidiary Directive because it leads to forum shopping where General Anti-Abuse Rules have been implemented. It would be contrary to the goal of obtaining a total tax harmonisation, unless the ATAD, by introducing a minimum standard against tax evasion, is applicable. Here the use of the verb “shall” is welcome as no discretion is left to the State, which would lead to a case-by-case approach that is contrary to legal certainty for a provision of that importance. But it is worth mentioning
THE SPECTRUM that any general presumption applying predetermined general criteria is not possible without a thorough examination of each case individually (CJEU 1997 C-28/95 Leur-Bloem and CJEU 2011 C-126/10 Foggia). However it is necessary that the rule requiring ministerial approval in order to get the benefit of the Merger Directive, be sufficiently clear, precise and foreseeable, regarding the principle of effectiveness (CJEU 2017 C-14/16 Euro Park Service). This case might not be contrary with Leur-Bloem as it concerns rulings to get the benefit of the Directive while Leur-Bloem deals with tax avoidance objectives.
result but which produce different taxable amounts”. Such a provision is in line with Opinion AG Kokoot in the Zwijnenburg Case (CJEU 2010 C-352/08) and with the 2011 Proposal. Such a provision should be added, as a choice of a specific transaction can include different factors and notably tax consideration. There is no duty to pay the highest amount of tax possible and the taxpayer may choose to structure its business so as to limit its tax liability (CJEU 2006 C-255/02 Halifax).
If the taxpayer falls within the scope of the GAAR then the arrangement shall be disregarded. This should lead to a re-characterisation of the transaction to establish the situation that would have prevailed in the absence of the abuse practice, and therefore a taxation in a different way. Such a provision is a classic one and gives more power to the tax administration than in the cases where the wording states that the taxpayer will only not benefit from the provision of the Directive.
There should be no obstacles to reorganisations within the EU as tax neutrality for a business-friendly tax environment is required by the Lisbon Treaty, and because no commercial profits arise from this reorganisation. But at the same time it is necessary to be careful not to create opportunities for tax avoidance.
It also seems necessary to underline the fact that there is no general anti-abuse rule in the Proposal regarding the consolidated step. As articles of this proposal repeat CFC rules and Hybrid mismatches rules (Article 73 and 74) it was intentional: the GAAR should not apply to the consolidation step. It would also be wise to add a GAAR provision for the consolidated step as business reorganisation and intragroup transactions might be undertaken only in order to modify the factors (mostly asset and employees) and therefore allocate profits in low-tax jurisdictions.
II. Business reorganisations
a. transfer of assets 1. The transfer of substantially not all the assets.
Article 22 of the Directive provides tax neutrality for business reorganisation within a group; but in the case where “substantially all the assets” are transferred, the transferred assets are still attributed to the transferring State for the 5 years that follow the transfer, and by a fictional permanent establishment if necessary. Indeed, if the assets are moved to another State, then the share of the transferring member state will decrease as the formula includes assets as a factor. Therefore, such a requirement is necessary to protect the allocation of profits of the member state. But what is the But if the factors chosen are legitimate, where is the manipmeaning of “substantially all the assets”? Paul Simonis conulation? Moving assets or employees in a non-artificial way, siders that it represents more than 90% of the assets of the resulting in a change of the allocation of profits, is simply taxpayer. Consequently, there is a high risk of tax avoidance an application of both the literal and the by only transferring a branch not repreThe SE already has a teleological meaning of the law: taxation senting all the assets of the taxpayer. It in function of where the production factrack record of success might therefore be better to change “all” tors are located. Does this really consti- providing regulation for the assets transferred to “principal astute abuse as the law itself provides for sets value” (meaning more than 50% of the continent’s biggest taxation in function of defined factors? the value of the assets of the transferring financial actors. There is a difference between a loss of taxpayer). But again, this rule is written revenue of one country against another, as an anti-abuse rule in order to avoid and tax avoidance, especially when a genuine activity is carthe manipulation of the formula. Moreover, if the factors are ried out (notably CJEU 1998 C-264/96 Imperial Chemical legitimate and the business is really transferred, one might Industries). ask again, where is the manipulation? Finally, it is also worth mentioning that there is no escape clause in the 2016 Proposal, one which might provide that there is no abuse when there are “genuine commercial activities where the taxpayer is able to choose between two or more possible transactions which have the same commercial
2. Leaving the group followed by a disposal of the assets. Article 19 of the Directive requires the following: if the disposal occurs within 3 years of the taxpayer’s departure from the group holding the economic ownership over these as-
LAW sets, the proceeds shall be added to the consolidated tax base of the group in the year of disposal (and not at the year of the departure). Therefore, the member state of the Company that left the group will not be able to tax the unrealised gains. Indeed, the asset factor of that member state will have been reduced by the amount of the asset previously attributed to it before the Company left the group, whereas it actually had a right to tax the asset because the Company was also part of this member state while it was still in the group. This situation seems slightly unfair for that State. Therefore, an exit tax might be justified in order to safeguard the balanced allocation of taxing powers between member states and be subsequently applied only if the State loses its capacity to tax the unrealised gain. Here it can be the case because the profits are added to the consolidated tax base of the group at the time of the disposal. Therefore it might be possible that the member state, in which the Company that left the group is located, does not receive any profit at the time of disposal (if it has no other Company in the group, or other factor, and it does not get the proceeds at the time of the actual disposal as they go to the group consolidation). It has been held that immediate taxation of a transfer is disproportionate, and a deferral granted until actual realisation was suggested as an alternative (CJEU 2011 C-371/10 National Grid Indus, and CJEU 2012 C-38/10 Commission v Portugal). It would then be required that this deferral option was automatically available to the taxpayer, and was not subject to any application or administrative discretion (CJEU 2011 C-269/09 Commission v Spain). But if the realisation never takes place, then the member state should not be penalized. As it is hard to agree on a criterion to replace the date of
actual disposal, so a staggered payment might be more relevant (CJEU 2013 C-261/11 Commission v Denmark). This will allow the State to collect tax and eliminate the administrative burden of notably annual and disposal declarations required in the case of a deferral (CJEU 2006 C-470/04 N v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost). Such a mechanism was considered in compliance with EU law, notably in the cases of a 5 year or 10 year deferral (CJEU 2014 C-164/12 DMC and CJEU 2015 C-657/13 Verder LabTec). Interest might be chargeable on the total amount of the staggered payment in order to offset the deprivation of the use of resources for the State, and the cash flow advantage received by the Co in comparison to other taxpayers. The rate includes a premium to cover the risk of non-recovery. A provision of guarantee might be required in order to deal with the risk of non-recovery of the tax that will increase with the passage of time. But here the assets are easy to trace as they stay in the same country, and the other member states part of the consolidated base which are entitled to the staggered payments all apply the directive on Mutual Assistance in the Recovery of tax Claims. Thus it might be disproportionate as there might be no “genuinely and serious risk of non-recovery” (Advocate General Mengozzi in CJEU 2012 C-38/10 Commission v Portugal). Such a provision on exit tax would follow article 5 of the ATAD that makes mandatory exit tax in certain cross-border relocation events. We might surmise that, in the case of a staggered payment, it will be necessary to take into account the losses created after the departure of the group where the assets are sold at a price lower than the market value at the time the Company left the group. Finally, it is necessary that the member state of the Company allows a step-up based on the assets of that Company to avoid any double-taxation.
b. market of losses 1. Losses on entering the group
Losses on entering the group can’t be offset against the consolidated tax base: they are carried forward and offset against the ap-
The European Comission’s 2016 revision of the CCCTB Directive was recently refined by members of the European Parliament.
The European Comission organises a meeting with German business leaders.
portioned share of that taxpayer (Article 15), which seems to be an equitable manner to prevent the losses of one Company in one country being used in another country. But they might be lost if, despite the concept of fictional PE, there are no profits for them to be offset with. As suggested by Paul Simonis, such a situation could be handled by allowing the taxpayer a step up based on an amount equal to the lowest sum between the pre-consolidation group losses and the hidden reserves at the time of the transfer. 2. Losses incurred at group level Initially there was no limit to carrying forward losses, but in March 2018 the European Parliament voted in favour of a limitation of five years. Finding justification to such a limitation seems difficult. Would a State stop taxing profits after 5 years in the absence of losses compensating the profits? This provision is not related to business activity: losses should be available during the life of a business, and State cash-flow considerations shouldn’t intervene in such a process. As a result, we might expect an increase of acquisition activities: the whole assets of loss-making companies will be sold at market value to another structure at the end of the carrying forward limit of the losses, and because of goodwill there will be a step-up in basis allowing a higher depreciation for the acquirer, and the state will be able to tax capital gains on this sale. In this way, losses will indirectly stay in the new acquiring company and avoid the carrying forward limit. This is the reason why such an amendment should be deleted. 3. Losses on leaving the group Article 21 provides that “No losses shall be attributed to a group member leaving a group”. There is risk of market of
losses; for instance, in the case of an acquisition at a low price of a Company which is going to have losses for the next years and needs a refund (losses occurred in the CCCTB group and not before entering otherwise there would be no consolidation of losses). The Company provides losses for a certain amount of years and then is refunded and sold to a third party, therefore leaves the group while its losses stay in the group. This is the reason why the proposal should add that no losses shall be attributed to a group member leaving a group except for the losses directly related to this group member. Notwithstanding this, it is necessary to assure that those losses will stick with this entity to avoid any market losses, and therefore the step-up proposal when entering a group is a good solution. Therefore, the CCCTB should be mandatory to all businesses in order to be sure that those rules on losses are followed by all companies in all countries (in March 2018 The European Parliament proposed reducing the EUR 750 000 000 threshold to zero after 7 years). It would also be possible to require (as is the case in some national legislation with group relief) that the acquiring company continues, for a certain period of time, the acquired loss-profit making business (even if from a business point of view such a decision might be questionable). 4. Losses in the case of a reorganisation between two or more CCCTB groups
Whether it is an acquisition or a merger by absorption, the losses of the former group are allocated between each member of the absorbed group in application of the formula, or between the members of the two groups if a new Company is created by the merger. The losses of the entire group are split between members at the day of the reorganization, and might therefore be lost if one member is not able to offset
LAW them. This allocation of losses, as if the group had terminated, might be an obstacle to reorganisation as without this the losses would have been used. This is the reason why a cluster approach should be added to the provision: the losses should be able to be consolidated between the members of the former group until they are offset or as Paul Simonis suggests, the Directive should allow for a step-up of the value of the business transferred of the lowest amount between the group losses and the hidden reserves at the time of the reorganisation. Additionally, in the case of the termination of a group, when the group is dissolved, the tax year of a group ends. Therefore the losses are allocated to each group member in accordance with the formulary apportionment in the year of the termination. By the application of the formula, some member states will have to suffer losses of the group although the Company in this member state did not contribute to those losses. In the case of a new group formed instantly after the termination of the former, with almost the same taxpayers, then as suggested by Paul Simonis, the Directive should include a cluster approach stating that the unrelieved losses would not be attributed to separate taxpayers but to clusters of taxpayers forming the new group. This will enhance synergy by favouring group structures, and would not deter taxpayers from restructuring their business operations. But this would not permit the avoidance of tax planning (market of losses) because the losses will still be allocated in function of the formula, and in the case of one Company suffering losses not being part of the cluster, there might be an allocation of losses to other countries â&#x20AC;&#x201C; especially in the case of countries with high corporate rate where no Company directly suffered losses. III. Relation between tax authorities In the case of a disagreement between member states, the group can challenge a decision before the courts of the member state of the principal tax authority (PTA) (Article 65). There is also the possibility for the taxpayer to request an opinion on a tax issue of the tax authority of its residence with regard to the implementation of the Directive to a specific transaction or series of transactions planned to be carried out (Article 61). The opinion will be binding unless the courts of the member state of the PTA subsequently decide otherwise. Concerning the ability to challenge a tax administration decision before the courts of the Principal Tax Authority one might raise concerns about the neutrality of the Court of the PTA. Wouldnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t it be better to ask for an independent court such as the CJEU?
provision regarding the opinion raise potential conflicts between tax authorities. Indeed, taxation is part of sovereignty and each country has for goal to attract profits. Tax authorities of State in which subsidiaries are implanted might ask for a tax audit of the group. Therefore there is risk of lack of cooperation between tax inspectors of different States and of disharmonised practices. On top of that, the opinion can be overridden leading to a lack of legal certainty, which is counter to the whole purpose of advance rulings. It might also occur that the member state collecting the tax will not be the one allocated of it. Therefore member states with an efficient collecting process will be at disadvantage. One might suggest that the taxpayer should ask the opinion for a transaction to the principal tax authority (PTA) and not to its own tax authority (TA). But by doing that there will be a risk of forum shopping: if the PTA is the TA of the parent Company then groups will be structured in a way that the parent company will be in a country where tax administration will be incline to give favourable opinion. Another way might be to state that the taxpayer would ask an opinion to its TA (because he knows the procedural rules to do so) which is in charge to settle it within a specific timeframe with the PTA. Conclusion The tax harmonisation subject, at least at a European level, is paramount today, as it potentially represents a way to avoid some of the negative aspects of globalisation such as the use of tax disparities between countries, leading to the current trend of retreating into protectionism. The OECD with BEPS Actions has already done a lot in tackling tax avoidance. Nevertheless, it is not enough; observing economically-leading third countries lowering their tax rate, European ones might follow another ingenious way and seize the opportunity to gather their workforce by adopting this Directive, but in way that does not open the door to too many new tax avoidance schemes.
But would it have enough time to decide on each cases? The
Energy and Environment
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
Reducing noise pollution in urban ecosystems by ayokunle meshe and phia joli
Noise affects us all, knowingly or unknowingly. In a purely physical sense, sound is a vibration that travels through matter as a longitudinal wave. However, more tangibly, it is a phenomenon that we experience every day, from the moment that we wake up until the moment that we fall sleep. Not only does it govern human-functioning and societal living, but also the lives of many animal species. This can have unexpected repercussions on both human and ecosystemic health. Yet policy research concerning the effects of noise pollution has largely been conducted in marine habitats on ocean-dwelling species like whales, dolphins and porpoises. The ways in which ocean vehicles’ sonar impedes sea animals’ cognitive abilities to forage and communicate. Although this area is well-documented, more investigation is needed on land-based, urban species. The issue of noise pollution in urban ecosystems lacks both the urgency of marine ecosystems and the kind of broad-scale campaigns which are used in addressing other sources of environmental pollution such as artificial light. Initiatives such as ‘Light Out DC/NY’ exemplify what is possible with good media coverage and organisation. Within urban ecosystems specifically, questions remain regarding the long-term impact of loud, sudden noise, as well as the overexposure to chronic noise experienced by many animal species inhabiting these urban ecosystems. Greater attention should be afforded to
the soundscape that we all share as its integrity is directly linked to the well-being of humans and animals alike. This paper seeks to examine the impact of excessive noise on urban wildlife, and recommends policies that address this issue in the context of London. We propose two recommendations in maintaining the integrity of London´s wildlife and reflect on how they can appropriately be integrated into pre-existing development plans of the city. Our central objective is to encourage greater acknowledgment of, and action to reduce, noise as an environmental pollutant. Background A city’s ‘soundscape’ is referred to as a ‘common pool resource’ (CPR). As with air and water, it can be contaminated and subject to destruction if managed improperly. When the soundscape is ‘contaminated’ it means that noise has become an unwarranted source of pollution within the community. Excessive noise characterises many urban areas and cities, derived from sources like construction works or road, air and rail traffic. Little data is readily available to showcase the precise and impeding effects of noise pollution on the biology and behaviour of London’s urban wildlife. While the extent of London’s sound pollution’s on ecosystems and health may remain unclear for the moment, evidence points towards some degree of damage. If biodiversity is at all reduced, ecosystem resilience decreases, and a cycle of reduction occurs. Birds and insects, for example, rely heavily on acoustic communication, but are subject to similar
London’s Picadilly Circus is a particularly loud public space, in which an average of half a million people circulate every day.
THE SPECTRUM types of health degradation as humans, which can result in death or forced habitat relocation. In addition to having serious implications for wildlife integrity and conservation efforts, undermining bird health also harms human societies, which rely on these species for maintaining local ecosystem services.
2. Large-scale and long-term intervention: encourage municipal planning authorities to develop and enforce relevant noise-reducing measures.
1. Small-scale and short-term intervention: create and promote urban green space.
Because this is a relatively new area of environmental governance, novel and location-specific interventions will have the most impact. Practical steps that cities can take include the installation of road or rail noise barriers, managing flight movements around airports and encouraging private sector actors like car manufacturers to build noise-friendly vehicles, possibly by introducing more electric vehicles.
This paper recommends that the London municipality actively promote and protect green spaces, which research shows can reduce sound pollution by up to 6dB. Take the example of Russell Square in Central London, a green area containing trees where traffic is significantly quieter than on streets. Such urban green spaces can be integrated with commercial spaces. Indeed, Transport for London (TfL) is currently working towards a transformation of Oxford Street West, an initiative which perfectly exemplifies our policy recommendation. The service has already reduced the number of bus services to the area and is working on reducing buses’ emissions, resulting in quieter technology. By the end of 2018, Tfl plans to divert traffic away from Oxford Street West entirely. This kind of initiative helps preserve soundscape integrity as well as preserve air quality, both of which will benefit the city’s citizens and larger ecosystem.
New York University (NYU) is undertaking a multimillion-dollar project called Sounds of New York City (SONYC) that will use cutting edge technology, city personnel and agencies, citizen science and sensor networks to identify and map noise. The goal is to gather data that enable governing bodies to act to reduce soundscape disruption in the city. The city of Cuenca in Spain is also developing an action plan to mitigate excessive urban noise, aligned with recommendations from the EU’s Environmental Noise Directive (2002/49/EC). Cities are powerful laboratories of change and experimentation in tackling issues like noise pollution. London’s municipality can collaborate with artists and the broader public through initiatives such as Soundcities, an open database that maps urban soundscapes, in order to gather information and empower all factions of society to tackle the issue of noise.
Mobilising the necessary financial and human resources to bring this recommendation to fruition would need to be thought of as a medium-term, upstream commitment by governing bodies. The initiative would need to involve communication with the communities in which the target spaces for ‘greening’ are located to ensure that these spaces have the desired result. It may be viewed as a drawback, as it is energy intensive and it would be difficult to measure significant shortterm results, but building infrastructure of this kind is bound to have long-term pay-off.
Additionally, the EU has been active in promoting projects that push for more action from member states in the area of soundscape management. These include the Holistic and Sustainable Abatement of Noise by Optimised Combinations of Natural and Artificial Means (HOSANA) and a col-
Approximately 330,000 urban foxes live in Britain, according to the University of Bristol’s Mammal Research Unit. It remains difficult to estimate how many of these live in London.
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT laboration of more than 30 countries called the Soundscape of European Cities and Landscapes. Considering Brexit, the UK will have to renegotiate its relationship with soundscape governance projects, and London is well placed to set positive examples for the rest of the country and beyond. However, some argue that electric vehicles may be dangerous to pedestrians because of their near-silent movement at slow speeds. Suggestions proposed by vehicle manufacturers include everything from fitting hubcaps with rocks to speakers that emit custom sounds to alert pedestrians of their approach. The cost of these new technologies may initially be high, but private sector actors will ultimately be responsible for paying for their product development. British officials can also communicate with companies to inform them as to what would best suit the needs of their constituency to build effective green infrastructure. In addition, pedestrians can accommodate the situation by staying alert and avoiding distracting devices when crossing roads.
Nothing’ would be counter-intuitive and detrimental to the global push for a greener, healthier and smarter urban environment within cities across the globe. The soundscape is a valuable common pool resource and we must protect it. We do not advocate that governing bodies put aside all other issues to focus on noise pollution reduction, but rather that the issue be incorporated into discussions about how to create spaces that promote human and ecosystem health to greater extent. Doing nothing would be detrimental to the world-wide push towards a greener, healthier, smarter living environment in cities across the globe.
Conclusion We have outlined two policy recommendations based on examples from London and elsewhere that can be extrapolated and expanded to other areas of the city. Meanwhile, we acknowledge that solutions for noise pollution are still being developed, a complex and potentially expensive process given the behavioural and technological factors that need to be considered. There are other kinds of environmental pollution that threaten environmental health more immediately than noise, whose effects are generally gradual and insidious. For this reason, measurements of intervention success are ambiguous because of the wide range of indicators linked to noise pollution and the length of time over which they need to be measured. It may well be easier and cheaper for governing bodies to adopt a third strategy of ‘Do Nothing’. A phenomenon coined as the Lombard Effect shows that animals that rely on acoustic communication can raise their signal volume to offset noise pollution. They have also been shown to shift their sound patterns, frequencies and durations. Natural systems are dynamic and resilient and ecosystem services may not be as negatively impacted as we imagine. Additionally, one could argue following Boserup’s theory, that if urban wildlife was to disappear and ecosystem services affected, society would be able to find a way to counter this with human ingenuity. For example, in the case of China, there is already growing preponderance towards employing ‘human pollinators’ so as to offset the decline of local honey-bee populaces. Although in all retrospect, ‘Doing
Restructuring the UK’s agricultural policy by rafael holder
The European Union’s (EU) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will soon be undergoing changes due to Britain’s decision to leave the EU in June 2016. This policy has faced various criticisms over the years, particularly regarding its negative impact on the environment and health. In May 2007, condemnations had become so stark that Sweden decided to remove all farm subsidies provided by the CAP. Brexit has provided the UK with the opportunity to improve its agricultural policy. The EU must take time to reassess agricultural policies in light of increased global concerns regarding climate change. Its new policies, published on 27th February, will hopefully lessen the negative impact agriculture has had on climate and the environment.
countries that export agricultural produce to the European Union. Often, tariffs target developing countries whose economies rely predominantly on agriculture, resulting in devastating economic effects. Given the CAP support is based on acreage rather than yield, more funding goes to larger farms than smaller ones. In 2005, an investigation found that of £3 billion spent on UK farming, most went to large businesses, such as Nestlé or Cadbury.
This paper makes the following recommendations: first, that British taxpayers should pay the subsidies which the EU currently pays for. The EU must also limit the number of subsidies that larger farms receive at the expense of smaller farms. European leadership can then award subsidies to promote the protection of biodiversity and the environment.
The current system, whereby farmers obtain approximately £3 billion worth of subsidies, should continue after Brexit. However, the distribution of these subsidies should be changed. Some may argue that re-directing taxpayer funds into agricultural subsidies would decrease capital being delivered to other public services, such as the NHS, which are already financially struggling. Nevertheless, providing adequate funds for farming is absolutely necessary as it is an essential component of the economy, and provides most of our domestic food consumption needs. In 2015, agriculture created approximately £24 billion in revenues and contributed £8.5 billion of Gross Added Value (GAV) to Great Britain’s economy. In the UK, agriculture provides employment to 475,000 people directly, with another 30,000 supported through procurement activities.
Background The CAP has experienced many reforms since it was first introduced in 1962, most of them in response to changes in European agricultural activity. Currently, the CAP provides financial aid for 12 million farmers in Europe; in 2015, Great British farmers received £2.4 billion of the CAP, contributing to 55% of their total income. Yet the CAP has allowed the expansion of agriculture at the expense of the environment. For instance, the removal of hedgerows and woodland, in favour of agricultural development, has also caused a marked decline in some bird species due to a loss of habitat. Only in recent years has the CAP started to suggest more environmentally-friendly practises. In the first instance, it began placing tariffs on non-EU
Policy proposals 1. Subsidies that the eu currently pays for should be financed by british taxpayers.
2. Limit the amount of subsidies that larger farms receive at the expense of smaller farms. Henceforth, farms should be awarded subsidies based on efficiency rather than on size. Although larger farms usually have higher agricultural production rates than smaller
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT ones, this is not always the case. Competition with larger, more commercial farms has resulted in smaller farms going out of business: between 2013 and 2016, 1,000 farms failed. Yet these smaller farms play an important role in local communities, by providing food and employment opportunities. Whereas larger farms are more likely to export food and contribute to local communities experiencing traffic and pollution (Steedan, 2017). Subsidies based on efficiency will prevent small farms from disappearing.
niques and requires more farm space that corporations need to produce the same amount of food. In England, organic farming yields are 55% less than yields from traditional farming methods. Increased acreage requires the destruction of more habitats, such as woodland and hedgerows. Therefore, it may be necessary to provide more funding to increase agricultural production using more sustainable methods. Recently, there have been some breakthroughs to improve the situation for grassland birds, at no cost to farmers.
Britain must place a cap on subsidies awarded to larger but less productive farms. In the EU and elsewhere, attempting to calculate farm size is done by focusing on economies of scale, rather than the actual size of farmland, which makes it difficult to ascertain at what size a cap should be placed.
One such method includes the use of rotational grazing. Rotational grazing involves pastures being subdivided into small paddocks. Livestock are put into groups and placed in certain paddocks, where they are allowed to graze for a maximum of two days so that the livestock does not graze over the entire pasture throughout the grazing season. In resting periods, the paddocks are able to regrow. The rest period will also increase ground cover which is beneficial to bird species.
As of 2010, most farms in the UK are 100 hectares or larger, so it would be necessary to consider more of each farm’s characteristics before allocating subsidies. For instance, the state must take into account each farm’s geographical and climatic circumstances. Some places in the UK are considered Less Favoured Areas (LFA), because agricultural production is inhibited by factors like poor soil content. In these areas, it may be necessary to give certain dispensations to the farmers, regardless of the farm’s size or initial production rate. If more subsidies are given to smaller farms to the detriment of larger ones, major corporations could end up leaving the UK to establish agricultural activities in countries where laws and policies are more favourable to them. Therefore, the British government must provide incentives to guarantee that they do not leave. This could involve lowering tax rates. 3. Award subsidies to promote the protection of biodiversity and the environment. This paper also recommends that farmers be given greater funding if they adopt environmentally friendly practises which preserve biodiversity. Such practises should include organic farming which excludes the use of fertilisers and pesticides and . The use of natural resources would increase substantially and damages to the environment associated with the synthetic compounds found in fertilisers and pesticides would decline. This is a viable option for some farmers, given the increasing demand for organic food worldwide. Other measures to improve the protection of biodiversity and environment include the planting of woodland wildflower meadows, as well as the improvement of water quality.
To ascertain if farmers are abiding by green practises and therefore be awarded more funding, it would be important to carry out Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) on farms. These EIAs would be able to determine the positive and negative impacts farmers are having on the environment and should be taken every few months. To determine improvements in water quality and woodland planting, it would be necessary to compare previous EIAs with newer ones. Conclusion In July 2017, British Secretary of State for Envirnmoent, Food, and Rural Affairs, Michael Gove stated that Brexit has given the UK ‘a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to reform how we care for our land, our rivers and our seas, how we recast our ambition for our country’s environment and the planet. These policy recommendations represent a crucial step towards achieving this ambition. As concerns about climate change rise, protecting the environment and biodiversity has become paramount. The planting of woodland and hedgerows could encourage greater tourism in rural parts of the UK. Although adopting environmentally-friend agricultural policies may hinder agricultural productivity in the short-term, they have clear economic value for the future.
However, organic farming is often considered controversial: it requires far more acreage than traditional farming tech-
Should a plastic bottle deposit scheme be introduced in the UK? by george warren and anya herne
Plastic waste is a major environmental issue that can be mitigated by new recycling schemes which would reduce and eventually close the plastic waste stream altogether. The average family in the UK uses 480 plastic bottles annually, yet only 56% of these are ultimately recycled. Instead, 2.5 billion bottles accumulate in landfills and oceans or are incinerated, threatening terrestrial and marine ecosystems. In comparison, plastic recycling rates are substantially higher (above 90%) in many other European countries, such as Germany, Norway, and Sweden. Such comparatively high plastic recycling rates in these countries can be explained by the implementation of bottle deposit schemes (also known as reward-and-return schemes), which aim at reducing the accumulation of plastic bottles in the environment. The UK does not presently have this kind of scheme, and chiefly relies on single- use bottles. Changes in consumer behaviour, the growth of supermarkets, and better quality of plastic bottles have shifted demand from glass to plastic. The current economic, political, and environmental climate has pushed the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) to consider implementing a bottle deposit scheme to scale back plastic waste, publishing a call for evidence in October 2017.
land have advocated for a UK bottle deposit scheme, indicating that both manufacturers and the public are amenable to a government-mandated plastic bottle deposit scheme. In January 2018, China banned imports of plastic waste for recycling, adding urgency to resolving the plastic problem. The UK must now consider the viability of continuing its current waste system. In recent months, plastic waste has received increased media attention, particularly through popular television shows such as Blue Planet II and Planet Earth II. In conjunction with this rise in public concern for environmental issues, the Conservative government has announced a 25-year Environment Plan, which primarily focuses on plastic waste issues. With the government therefore currently receptive to introducing environmental initiatives, the UK is clearly at an optimal point to begin implementing new systems to counter the accumulation of plastic waste. Policy recommendations 1. Implement a bottle deposit scheme based on the German model.
We recommend the adoption of a UK bottle deposit scheme Outline of a national bottle deposit scheme based on the German model. The main strength of a bottle Bottle deposit schemes involve an initial deposit paid by the deposit scheme is its prior implementation in nations such consumer for each individual plastic as Germany, Canada, and ten states bottle they purchase. For example, in the United States. From these, patA UK bottle deposit scheme terns of clear benefits have emerged in Germany, consumers pay 15 euro cents per plastic multi-use bottle and especially from political, environcan form the beginning of 25 euro cents per single-use bottle. mental, and economic perspectives. green policy, but is not the This is added to the initial beverage price and repaid when the bottles are ‘silver bullet’ solution to the The diversity of schemes previousplastic problem. returned to official recycling points, ly administered in these countries usually at the supermarket. Research would enable the British governshows that this initial deposit serves to either disincentivment to cherry-pick from successful examples to create an ise purchase of the beverage, or incentivise consumers to effective UK version with little concerted government effort. return the bottle. Once returned, the bottle is washed and 89% of UK citizens supported the introduction of containrefilled, or ‘downcycled’ (broken down into smaller plastic er deposit legislation in 2010. The scheme has net political parts to be reassembled into a lower-value plastic good). As and environmental benefits, and is worth the shared mona result of this scheme, Germany’s plastic recovery rate has etary cost. Liberal conservative think tank Bright Blue has increased from 51.8% in 2001 to 99.6% since the implemenreported that this policy proposal could form part of a wider tation of the bottle deposit scheme in 2003 (see Figure 1). ‘green strategy’ employed by the Conservative government to engage younger voters. A pro-environment bottle deposRecently, major retailers such as Coca-Cola, Tesco, and Iceit scheme aligned with other nations such as Germany and
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
Figure 1. A graph comparing plastic recycling rates with overall recycling rates in Germany in 2001. The red line marks the introduction of a deposit scheme in 2003.
Canada could also be seen favourably abroad, especially with the risk of an environmental policy ‘race to the bottom’ looming post-Brexit. Environmentally, bottle deposit schemes have increased recycling levels and reduced litter in all participating nations. For example, Zero Waste Europe found German bottle return rates were at 98.5% in 2010, compared to the UK’s meagre 56%. IFEU Institute also calculated that refillable bottles had a reduced climate change potential of 50 to 60% compared to single-use containers. Predicted net greenhouse gas emissions savings are 607 thousand tonnes per year, equating to emissions of 100,000 UK residents. In contrast, UK waste management emissions increased by 5% between 2015 and 2016. If the UK can match Germany’s recycling rate, 6.2 million extra bottles could be recycled every day, greatly reducing landfill and ecosystem pressures. Research has also shown that a bottle deposit scheme could reduce the risk of chemicals leaking into the environment. The projected environmental benefits to the UK of this scheme were estimated at around £1.3 billion per year, including the costs of littering. A UK bottle deposit scheme can also result in high-level savings. According to Eunomia in 2010, local authorities and commercial enterprises involved in waste collection could save £206 million from a simplified system. The Environmental Audit Committee last year advocated for a bottle deposit scheme that would introduce the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ concept to plastic bottles: that those who cause the issue should pay personally. The scheme’s burden would, therefore, fall on beverage suppliers and consumers, rather than the current system where cost is spread throughout society and largely falls on the taxpayer. However, the financial burden is dependent on consumer recycling rates: under a bottle deposit scheme, higher recycling rates lead to lower
overall consumer costs. Added education and awareness initiatives could bolster this. However, any bottle deposit scheme is an important first step, but not the final goal. It must be accompanied by further policies to cement plastic reduction in the UK. 2. Implement auxiliary policies to further reduceplastic consumption. Despite bottle deposit schemes being an important positive first step towards plastic reduction, various drawbacks have been observed during their implementation in other countries. Therefore, alongside the introduction of a bottle deposit scheme in the UK, we recommend a series of added policies to promote effective plastic reduction. Overall, bottle deposit schemes do not solve the wider problem of reducing plastic consumption alone. A standalone scheme does not ‘close the loop’ on plastic, a scenario where 100% of plastic from bottles would be reused. Each PET bottle has a refill limit and is often downcycled due to degradation or contamination, further hindering reduction in plastic consumption. Following DEFRA’s own 2011 waste hierarchy guidance, further schemes to reduce the effects of plastic on environmental systems should focus on the reduction of plastic consumption, as opposed to solely on reuse or recycling. Low uptake of PET bottles by German producers has challenged the bottle deposit scheme’s effectiveness in realistically reusing plastic bottles. This has been caused by the unwillingness of some corporations to participate due to potential increased costs. In recent years, the UK has relied on exporting the majority of its plastic waste, including to China. Because the scheme would increase overall recycling rates, China’s refusal in January 2018 to import UK plastic waste could cause more plastic to be landfilled or incinerated. This
In 2016, 71.4% of UK packaging waste was recycled, but most of these materials were metal, not plastic.
issue necessitates a new holistic approach to recycling, complementing any implemented bottle deposit scheme. At £703 million per year, the overall cost of this scheme is considerable. In any bottle deposit scheme, costs will most likely fall on beverage consumers (estimated £491 million) and on producers and importers (estimated £212 million). The true distribution of this cost, however, depends on recycling rates; because beverage suppliers will theoretically pay for every public bottle returned, a lower recycling rate will increase consumer cost. Based on these drawbacks, we therefore recommend the following auxiliary policies: I. Greater recycling education, similar to that undertaken in Germany. It should be targeted at both children and adults. Since the introduction of the bottle deposit scheme in 2003, bottle depositing has become normalised in Germany and a part of their culture – with the same approach, this could also happen in the UK. This will be effective in the long term but will not produce immediate improvements. II. A consistent national recycling policy. This would help reduce current confusion in public recycling initiatives. An integrated recycling scheme would bring collection and distribution of plastic waste back to the UK, rather than exporting it, avoiding associated political and environmental risks. This may have a higher short term cost than current practices, but would be more effective in reducing plastic waste and consumption in the long term, as well as providing political stability and consistency.
III. Standardisation of plastic bottles to PET or another plastic substance. This would simplify recycling, avoiding the confusion experienced in Germany due to multiple types and qualities of plastic packaging. This would increase actual recycling rates, and reduce risk of plastic downcycling, landfilling, and ever-increasing bottle production. Corporations may resist this suggestion; however, the German experience highlights the necessity for its implementation. Conclusion The aim of any bottle deposit scheme should be to close the loop in plastic production and consumption, and promote reuse. Alongside the implementation of a UK bottle deposit scheme, we believe that a set of auxiliary policies are necessary to better close the loop on plastic consumption and avoid catastrophic environmental damage. A UK bottle deposit scheme should form the beginning of green policy, but is not the ‘silver bullet’ solution to the plastic problem. Efforts to properly close the loop on plastic consumption are vital to protect the environment. Indeed, major retailers such as Iceland and airline Ryanair aim to go plastic-free by 2023. This is one positive step towards a plastic-free environment. A move away from plastics altogether to more sustainable alternatives should be the UK’s primary goal.
Lessons from the Philippines: countering non-communicable diseases by jonathan higgs
Before 2012, the Filipino government estimated annual losses due to tobacco-related diseases at $4 billion, against tobacco excise revenues of only $US 747.3 million. Within the first year, they raised more than $1.2 billion and allowed the Philippines to provide health care to an additional 14 million families, or roughly 45 million Filipinos. Four years ago, roughly 74% of the population was enrolled in PhilHealth, the national health insurance programme. Today, 82% of the 100 million people living in the Philippines are covered. Such a policy should be adopted by other developing countries. Background According to the World Health Organisation, a disease is non-communicable (NCD) when has a long duration and worsens over time. The four main types of NCDs are cardiovascular disease, cancer, chronic respiratory disease, and diabetes. NCDs have increasingly become a problem due to economic development and rapid urbanisation, leading to more people adopting a modern lifestyle which usually includes at least one of the four main behavioural risk factors which can cause NCDs: tobacco use, unhealthy diet, insufficient physical exercise, and the harmful use of alcohol. Tobacco is currently the leading preventable risk factor for NCDs, with over a billion people smoking across the globe. Smoking is estimated to cause about 71% of all lung cancer deaths, 42% of chronic respiratory disease and nearly 10% of cardiovascular disease. Moreover, tobacco usage overall leads to 7.2 million deaths every year, including those affected by second hand smoke. Alarmingly, tobacco use is on the rise. It has doubled in the last four decades and it is more prevalent among young people and the poor. If low- to middle-income countries continue with their current policy prescriptions, it will have negative consequences on their future. Due to population growth and the tobacco industryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s strategy of targeting young people, the use of cigarettes and subsequent NCDs have profound consequences on development, with 80% of tobacco-caused-NCDs being in low and middle-income countries. The World Health Organisation expects deaths from NCDs to rise by 15%. In Sub-Saharan Africa, chronic illnesses are likely to surpass infectious diseases as the biggest killer by 2030.
One prominent consequence of NCDs is reduction of national productivity: chronic conditions can kill or disable up to half of life time users in their middle age, when their productivity is at its highest, resulting in negative economic impact on local communities. Indeed, researchers estimate that a total annual economic loss of about 1.3% of GDP worldwide could be attributed to tobacco. Moreover, tobacco usage costs billions of dollars each year with tobacco-related diseases costing individuals, families and the government huge amounts in health care. This has negative consequences for sustainable economic development and puts increasing strain on the already struggling healthcare systems of third world countries. Socially disadvantaged groups are at risk of developing NCDs due to exposure to harmful products, such as tobacco, unhealthy dietary practices, and limited access to health services. In low-resource settings, health-care costs for NCDs quickly drain household resources. The exorbitant costs of NCDs, including often lengthy and expensive treatment and loss of breadwinners, force millions of people into poverty annually and stifle development. Policy proposals Policy makers in developing countries can choose a faster road to a healthy and prosperous society by implementing excise taxes on cigarettes, earmarked to healthcare. An earmarked tax is defined as a certain amount of revenue that is raised from a tax to be dedicated towards a special purpose, in this case the public health system. The use of excise taxes can both raise government revenues and reduce the consumption of harmful taxes such as tobacco. A recent study investigating the potential of tobacco tax to contribute to achieving sustainable development modelled what would happen if every country in the world adopted a tax excise of one US dollar for a 20-cigarette pack. It found that prevalence of smoking would fall by 9% globally and represent an additional $190 billion dollars in government revenue across the globe. If allocated to health budgets this would see public expenditure on health increase by 4% globally and In Africa around a 10% increase in public healthcare expenditure. Despite the proven benefits of earmarked taxes on tobacco products, only around 30 countries from across the world have chosen
GLOBAL HEALTH to adopt such a policy. Indeed, in many developing countries, excise taxes on tobacco are usually lower, accounting for less than half the retail price. This paper argues that if such measures were implemented globally, low- to middle-income countries could more easily achieve sustainable development. Tobacco taxes are the most cost effective way to reduce tobacco use. Estimates indicates that the cost of implementing and administering tobacco tax increases at US$ 0.05 per person per year in low and middle-income countries, making it the least costly of all tobacco control policy. There is also strong evidence that higher tobacco taxes effectively de-incentivise consumption, especially in low- to middle-income countries. A tax that increases tobacco prices by 10% decreases tobacco consumption by about 4% in high-income countries and by about 5% in low- and middle-income countries. A prime example of this is in South Africa’s excise taxes on cigarettes, rose from 32% to 52% of retail price between 1993 and 2009. Tobacco consumption in the period was halved.
that excise policies would probably have to be paired with financial aid from abroad. If taxes are only imposed in some countries, then tobacco companies may engage in tax avoidance and evasion. This may include legal actions, such as purchasing products from countries with lower tax jurisdiction, to illegal actions, including illicitly producing cigarettes to sell on the back market and smuggling. It could be argued that earmarking taxes can constrain the choice of allocation and spending by the government. This may prevent such funds being used for more deserving programmes, promoting a fixed and unwieldy fiscal policy, or may result in overfunding inefficient programmes with substantial opportunity costs. Yet another argument against raising cigarette taxes is that such a policy would have an inflationary impact on the economy. This is especially problematic in countries where wages are indexed to inflation or where government policy prioritises keeping inflation low. Nevertheless, the inflationary effect of tobacco product tax increases depends on the degree of taxation, so some compromises can be made.
Furthermore, these tax revenues have the potential to create the fiscal space needed for governments in low and middle-income countries to finance development, including an important source of funding for healthcare. Thailand, for instance, has used revenues generated from a 2% surtax on tobacco and alcohol to fund the ThaiHealth Foundation, which supports a variety of health promotion activities including tobacco control. Finally, reduced cigarette consumption developing countries would reduce the economic toll of tobacco usage. Any universal healthcare system would benefit from reduced expenditure and increased efficiency as the productivity of workers who formerly smoked are able to work for longer. In the long run the rate of tobacco induced NCDS and degenerative diseases would begin to decline.
Conclusion Despite the concerns mentioned above, policymakers should commit to setting worldwide earmarked tax on cigarettes towards public healthcare. As stated by Dr Margaret Chan, “tobacco taxation offers a ‘win-win’ policy option for governments, where raising tobacco taxes will both generate extra revenue and reduce consumption”. Though concerns of tax avoidance and evasion are valid, such practices occur in areas of low taxes just as much as those with high taxes and no direct correlation has been found between illegal activities between tax rates and smuggling. Nevertheless, it should be noted that taxes without other campaign strategies such as information regulation and supply side measures will not be as effective.
Challenges One potential weakness of such a tax is that the tobacco industry would certainly interfere in many ways to weaken or undermine such taxes, including bringing extensive and expensive legal challenges into retracting their tobacco control policies. For example, in response to the imposition of excise taxes by the Keyan government British American Tobbacco legally challenged this in July 2017. Though it can be hard to establish a universal tax, as tobacco excise taxes are either specific (typically levied per stick or pack, or by weight), or a percentage of the overall price a combination of these.
But such taxes represent a crucial first step. As public health improves over time, the overall economic toll of tobacco will also decline. National health systems will also benefit from no longer having to devote huge sums of money and clinical health capacity to treat avoidable tobacco-related diseases. Economic productivity will rise when former tobacco users live longer and lead more productive lives. Overall, gains to productivity from reduced tobacco use underscore how raising tobacco taxes is consistent with fiscal policies that enhance economic development.
There are some countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, that are heavily dependent on tobacco farming for these countries’ economy. A decline in global demand caused by higher excise taxes could result in unemployment, meaning
An EU policy mandating self-defence training: The key to preventing violence against women? by diana suciu
It is almost incredible that in the year 2018, as much as a third of women across the EU experience some form of physical or sexual abuse . Despite constant efforts to tackle violence against women , the persistence of the age-old problem is forcing us to reevaluate whether our current ways of dealing with this issue are truly the most appropriate. A potential innovation is to focus on equipping women with the means to prevent violence themselves, rather than making them dependent on external actors. The most concrete example of such a policy can be found in a study requested by the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM), which proposes the introduction of an EU policy mandating self-defence training to be made available in every EU member state. Yet, however noble the intention, the current FEMM study lacks clarity as to what exactly is expected of member states. This paper seeks to propose concrete modifications that will increase the effectiveness of an EU policy mandating self-defence training. It starts by examining the merits of the FEMM study, followed by an analysis of the gaps left unaddressed. Then, the effectiveness of a similar policy in Canada is considered. Lastly, recommendations are made as to what should be included in an EU-wide policy on women’s self-defence training. Evaluating the FEMM proposal In 2016, the FEMM requested a study examining the viability of women’s self-defence training as a method of preventing violence . The study concluded that “more space should be made for women’s self-defence in policy” and proposed the introduction of such training at the EU level. The appeal of such a policy is easy to spot. In what is arguably its biggest advantage, self-defence focuses on preventing violence rather than responding to it after the fact. In the long run, this preventive quality has the potential to drastically lower the number of affected women. Furthermore, self-defence does not require monetary contributions for gear of any kind, as women can learn weaponless techniques. This ensures that the most vulnerable class of women, those from less economically developed backgrounds , can benefit from the policy to its full extent. Perhaps secondary to the social considerations above, such
a policy will also contribute to the EU’s compliance with the goals set forth by Article 12 of the Istanbul Convention 2012. The authors of the FEMM study propose that self-defence allows women to break stereotypes portraying them as the weaker sex, pursuant to section 1 of Article 12. But the FEMM study leaves several questions which may hinder the efficiency of such a policy. The underlying problem is the sheer number of cultural and political differences between member states. Whereas in the UK only 10% of the population believes any extent of physical violence against women (say, a slap on the wrist) is permissible , in Romania the percentage is a staggering 60% . This results in Romanian law enforcement sometimes refusing to take action against abusers, despite women’s attempts to report them . This is also apparent from the fact that only one EU member state, the Czech Republic, considers that self-defence is important enough to be legislated, and even then only in the case of child victims. Overall, such a wide discrepancy between member states’ attitudes towards domestic violence suggests that self-defence training may fail to be properly offered in some places, despite being mandated by law. Even if cultural and political discrepancies are addressed, there remains the question of how to persuade women to attend the training. It is reported that around 90% of violent physical abuse is committed by perpetrators known to the female victim . If the abuser is a close relation, they can more easily influence the female victim to skip attending self-defence training. Even if self-defence techniques are known, there is a concern that when faced with a loved one (especially a spouse or significant other) the victims will refrain from doing anything that will hurt their abuser. Particularly for women who are financially dependent on their abusers , the fear of losing their financial stability or custody of children can be sufficient to deter them from using what they learned in training. Case study: Canada In 2017, Canadian town Rothesay organized women’s self-defence training at a local martial arts center . The first workshop was so successful that a subsequent one was organized due to popular demand. After the workshop, the instructors reported some of the women came forward to share personal stories and confessions about violence they had experienced.
The implications of this example are twofold. Firstly, it serves to show that self-defence training encourages women to realize that violence is not acceptable. This is equally valuable for women with the highest and the lowest risk of experiencing such violence. Secondly, it exemplifies a type of training that can be implemented in the EU. By teaching martial arts during a weekend workshop, the Canadian course managed to be both cost and time effective. Policy proposals In order to bring clarity to the admirable aim of the FEMM proposal, an EU policy regarding self-defence training must settle on the type of policy it should be (regulation, directive, or something completely A self-defence instructor at Gracie Academy Women Empowered. different) and its exact components. This paper suggests three clarifications: curriculum, both short- and long-term goals of preventing 1. The policy should be in the form of a regulation. violence against women are achieved. Given the cultural and political differences between member states, allowing them a wide margin of appreciation regarding how they will implement self-defence training risks some countries failing to organize serious training. Regulations are binding legislative acts which must be applied in their entirety across the EU . By putting the policy in the form of a regulation, the standard of self-defence training will be uniform, thus surpassing the issue of cultural discrepancies.
Firstly, these training sessions would be held in schools but would be open to women of any age. As education is mandatory in all member states, school buildings are easily identifiable, have sports facilities readily available and are at the center of many communities. This means that women can access local training facilities without having to make efforts to commute far from their home, or in unfamiliar places. In the short term, this will likely increase convenience and thus participation from women.
One potential hurdle is that some less economically developed member states may argue that they do not have the same resources as more economically developed ones. For them, this means a greater financial effort to fulfill their obligations. However, the EU has made it clear that one of its objectives is to tackle domestic violence. Self-defence training, because it does not require equipment, is a cost-effective solution. The only real cost is training staff to deliver the courses, for which funding from the EU may be possible to secure.
On a deeper level, linking womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s self-defence to educational institutions ensures that women learn more than just self-defence techniques. They are also taught that standing up for themselves is socially acceptable and encouraged, leading to long-term social sustainability. Because most schools are coeducational, men can also benefit from the social education aspect of womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s self-defence.
2. Womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s self-defence training shold be implemented in the national school curriculum. Once the issue of cultural differences is surpassed, attention must be devoted to where self-defence training should take place in order to achieve maximum impact. By introducing training as an integral component of the national school
Member states may object to modifying their school curriculum because of cost constraints, arguing that implementing such training is beyond their educational budget. However, if an EU regulation in this respect exists, member states will have to implement self-defence training regardless. This means that there will be no extra costs if the policy is implemented in schools, rather than private training facilities. If anything, costs will be reduced as renting a training space will not be necessary and physical education teachers can be trained to teach the course as opposed to hiring specialized
THE SPECTRUM trainers. It follows that implementing self-defence training in the school curriculum is not just socially beneficial but also cost effective. 3. A national hotline should be established where women can report violence if local authorities fail to take action. Even if a clear legal mechanism exists to mandate women’s self-defence, the issue of law enforcement authorities refusing to comply persists. However ideal it would be to live in a world where law enforcement always fulfilled its purpose, the focus of EU policy must remain realistic. In order to identify and address the instances where women’s self-defence is not being properly administered, or even where authorities refuse to act when they are informed of specific instances of violence against women, each member state should have to enact and advertise a national hotline. By calling this hotline, women will be able to report specific instances where their self-defence training was insufficient or unsuccessful or the authorities refused to comply with their obligations. This recommendation remains slightly problematic. It is first limited by the costs required to set up such a hotline, which may put a strain on the budget of some member states. This could be alleviated by securing total or partial EU funding, but specific costs would have to be identified. Moreover, having a hotline does not equal women actually making use of it. For various reasons, from fear to lack of awareness, the hotline may not be able to catch all instances of legal abuse. However, this limitation is not as grave as it seems. Even if all misuses of law aren’t successfully addressed, it is nevertheless important to make available the means by which abuses can be reported in the hopes that the number of women using it will grow as they encourage each other to use the hotline in the long-term. Although it is not as clear cut a policy provision as the previous ones are, the benefits of such a hotline are likely to increase over time as women participate in self-defence training. Conclusion There is no doubt that women’s self-defence training would play a key role in preventing violence against women. By participating in EU-wide training, women would gain not just self-defence techniques but also an awareness of their worth and capabilities. As it presently stands, the FEMM study proposes an admirable but unclear EU policy. In order to increase the effectiveness of such a policy there must be guidelines as to the type, content and methods of checking the level of implementation. The proposals listed above address these three outstanding issue, to show that an EU women’s self-defence training policy is a realistic and noteworthy endeavour.
Religion and Society
Countering radicalisation in UK prisons by issy royce, edited by emma shleifer
In this policy proposal, we suggest several key policy improvements which will tackle the issue of radicalisation in prisons. These we suggest whilst keeping in mind the importance of integrating, rather than isolating prisoners and whilst maintaining our primary focus of rehabilitation rather than punishment. Firstly, we will look at what the UK government has done so far to tackle this issue, assessing the strengths and weaknesses. Following this assessment, we suggest our own amendments to current policy and discuss the best methods of achieving our overall goal. Prisons, according to the Telegraph, have become fertile ground for a ‘poisonous’ and ‘repugnant radicalisation’ that has only worsened in recent years. The responsibility lies largely on the growing number of foreign terrorist fighters, who now account for the highest proportion of arrests and convictions in Europe. Although unevenly distributed across EU member states, terrorist offences have clearly increased: 417 terrorists were convicted in 2015, compared to the 258 in 2013. It has now become common protocol, and in some cases, a legal requirement, for member states to prevent terrorist acts within public institutions such as prisons. Individuals at risk of radicalisation fall within this remit, especially considering that recent terrorist attacks across Europe were committed by individuals with a criminal past. For instance, Adrian Ajao, the perpetrator of the Westminster attack in March 2017, had previously served several stints in prison for knife crimes, during which time he was reportedly radicalised. With terror offences broadening from direct acts of violence to any form of purposeful radicalisation or hate speech, many nonviolent offences now result in prison time. This means a much higher percentage of radical influencers are present in public prisons. It is precisely for this reason that the government needs to implement further policy to prevent radicalisation in prison. Background The new UK ‘Prevent’ policy introduced in 2016 outlined a new directorate for Security, Order and Counter-Terrorism, and delivered a plan for countering extremism in prison and probation services. This came in the context of widening concern across Europe of rogue terrorist attacks and an increase in Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs) within the UK, and focused
on both task force structure and prison procedure. It proposed: • • • •
Setting up a new task force and counter-extremism unit, jointly formed between HM prison and probation services, and the home office. Boosting intervention teams’ rapid responses to terrorist-related incidents. Separating and holding extremists in ‘specialist units’. Crackdown on extremist literature and its narrative, including removing anyone from Friday prayers who is promoting anti-British beliefs or other dangerous views. A tighter vetting of prison chaplains to ensure the right people are in place in prisons to counter extremist beliefs. Further extremist prevention training of governors and prison officers, with experts to advise on the management of dangerous and high-profile extremist prisoners.
The 2016 policy focused on security rather than rehabilitation. For this reason, Britain’s current prevention methods may undermine the integration of Muslims in prisons, alienating them and provoking their radicalisation upon release. Instead of simply isolating prisoners who are deemed potential influencers or vulnerable to radicalisation, prisons should eschew this ‘us against them’ narrative and its isolationist consequences. Muslim chaplains could greatly help in this but are currently being subjected to tighter vetting, being held in suspicion themselves and being forced to over-emphasise British values. A study conducted at Cardiff University evidences how Muslim chaplains suffer in British prisons, as 65 chaplains found real issues with regards to the integration of Muslim offenders back into society. This could lead to Muslim prison chaplains being silenced for fear of being unfairly targeted as violent extremists. Instead of hosting suspicions, we should instead utilise Muslim chaplains as a tool to encourage Muslim integration, their mediatory role allowing for free-flowing religious debates that can positively influence the narrative. Perhaps the greatest challenge for UK prisons is the incredible speed of the radicalisation process, which
RELIGION AND SOCIETY can be as short as just two weeks. Prisoners who have shorter sentences for minor crimes can be radicalised before being integrated back into society, and constitute a greater threat than they were previously. Moreover, some VEOs receive very short sentences, giving the criminal justice system a limited window in which to effect a process of change. This short time-frame makes further support and supervision during probation even more crucial as prisoners’ re-affiliate with their family and community. The number of arrests in the UK has tripled over the last three years, placing increased strain on both probation and prison officers as offenders move through the criminal justice system. Overcrowding, a lack of staff or poor relationships between staff and prisoners, and poor facilities – including limited access to meaningful activities such as education and work – can have a negative impact on prisoners. Overall, although these new policies may be appeasing short-term public unrest and working temporarily as a preventative measure, it is not fixing the overall strategic issue which begins and ends with vulnerability to radicalisation being fuelled by resentment towards Britain and other political grievances about a ‘perceived Western hegemony’. To improve these policies, we must aim to focus on promoting and supporting integration within prisons during both sentencing and release, helping prisoners adjust to their new communities. We must also focus on building up prisoner-officer relationships and directly address prisoners’ general wellbeing and personal growth through vocational or educational programs, as well as meeting all their basic needs. The following proposal tackles this challenge from both within and outside prison walls.
Mehdi Nemmouche, the gunman who opened fire on the Jewish Museum of Belgium in 2014 (above), was allegedly radicalised in prison whilst serving a 5 year sentence.
a. inside prison walls
1. Provide ‘extra support’ to vulnerable inmates convicted of extremist offences or considered at risk of radicalisation. Extra support would involve increased supervision through regular but informal check-ups by psychiatric professionals, and the introduction of a specific rehabilitation programme to reverse the radicalisation process for those vulnerable to radicalisation or serving time for extremist offences.
However, there is no guarantee a specific rehabilitation programme would be effective, and more research needs to be done on this. The cost of hiring psychiatric experts specifically for this role may also be at the detriment of other areas of the prison service, impacting prisoners’ equally crucial wellbeing. Nevertheless, this could be extremely effective both as a deterrent and reversal method. 2. Ensure adequate funds for basic needs and wellbeing. A higher quality of life for prisoners through suitable
THE SPECTRUM catering and self-development opportunities reduces resentment, making them less likely to succumb to radical ideas. Finding the extra funding is a key issue here, as well as determining exactly how much is ‘adequate’. Ways in which funding could be sourced is by applying for further government grants, perhaps under a new budget relating directly to the defence and terror threat rather than prison welfare. 3. Improve staff-prisoner relations by building mutual respect, and by providing access to vocational work, education and religious spaces. It is vital that prison staff be properly trained in how to approach VEOs, and able to build mutual respect and trust. This should be done via a level of staff assessment based on background and experience, with a requirement to have sound knowledge and appreciation of the nuances of Islam. Although the UK government can instate training and guidelines for staff, it is difficult to anticipate how prisoners would react to these initiatives. Nevertheless, innovative ways of overcoming the pre-existing stigma of staff-prisoner relationships will be a step forward in the right direction.
b. outside prison walls
1. Sentences should be proportionate to the crime. Offences committed by VEOs are growing in range, from aggressive language to bomb detonation, and sentences should be given accordingly. Over-reacting to more minor offences is likely to fuel the radicalisation process because of the disproportionate measures used. Individuals committing relatively minor but terror-related offences should instead be put through the rehabilitation programme. 2. Provide family support mechanisms and partner with third sector NGO’s to prevent radicalisation as individuals transition from prison to the community. Family and NGO support after release helps ensure prisoners’ integration back into their community, and track their progress in a way that is neither accusatory nor threatening. However, this requires families to be present and willing in the release process, and some prisoners may not have access to any outside support. If this is the case, probation officers will have to extend their roles to suit this measure, with supported from a suitable NGO. Conclusion Overall, these policy modifications will help promore the rehabilitation of inmates prone to radicalisation, rather than their segregation. This will provide a longer-term solution to the issue of prison radicalisation because it aims to understand how and why prisoners are so vulnerable to radicalisation during their sentences, to better understand how to combat it. It starts at the root of the problem rather than using force and isolation methods to contain prisoners, which will ultimately lead to resentment and fuel the anti-Western narratives which encourage terrorist ideology. Ultimately, the argument here is that prisons matter – they have played an enormous role in the narratives of every radical and militant movement in the modern period. Despite their history as places of vulnerability, we must understand how prisons can also serve as incubators for peaceful change and transformation. Anjem Choundry was convicted and imprisoned for inciting terrorist activity in 2016, prompting debate about whether he should be kept in a separate prison sector to prevent him from radicalising other inmates.
The economics of faith: the Church of England’s financial survival by carly mckenna, edited by emma shleifer
15% of the Church of England’s (CofE) finances are from ethical investments but parishioners’ donations are its main source of funds. Although the CofE has so far been doing well, with a 17.5% return on funds in 2016 , parishioner attendance has steadily dwindled to 50% of what it was 40 years ago. If the CofE continues to survive it is mostly thanks to the generous donations of older parishioners, who have increased their contributions on average from 1% of their income to 3.2% over the last 25 years. However, the steadfast decline in parishioners makes this an unsustainable way to maintain the CofE’s finances, especially with the added burdens it now faces. As a state religion, the CofE wants to maintain its ability to serve throughout the country, which includes maintaining old churches. Although it owns 112,000 acres of land and receives some financial help, the preservation costs are huge for example in 2004 it spent £125 million on church and cathedral repairs. The CofE’s aim for countrywide availability has prevented it from selling some of the parishes with very small attendance. Consequently, staff has been reduced by 7% but the pension scheme of an ageing clergy is also a growing expenditure, especially as many clergy are now living longer. The Church will soon become in debt if it continues in its current form. Its financial survival depends on increasing attendance to grow donations, whilst any other income that
is needed should be supplemented by the ethical investment fund. The Church of England’s current policy The Church currently has a two-prong policy approach targeting investments and attendance. The investment policy was established to provide greater income from the CofE’s savings through investing in a variety of assets including the stock market. Like any other investor, the CofE still wants to make money off their investments but will only invest in areas that align with their beliefs. For instance, it has a ban on investing in weapons, gambling and human embryonic cloning. Thus, the CofE refers to its investment portfolio as its ethical investment fund. The ethical investment fund is currently heading in the correct direction with long-term, low-risk investments. The CofE has placed greater emphasis on climate change and are part of the Transition Pathway Initiative that assess how companies are transitioning to a low carbon economy. The mix portfolio has created good returns that fit in with their beliefs. The fund is managed by the Church Commission with an in-house team that reports annually, which keeps accountability for the investments. The CofE also has ethical analysts who research investments by: environmental performance, employment policies and practices, human rights,
The Guardian reports that 70% of young people in the UK do not identify as religious.
community work and corporate governance. By investing ethically, the CofE is putting into practice what it preaches whilst creating the greater profits needed for its increasing expenditure. As it stands, there are ultimately no strong incentives to alter the CofE’s investment policy. Meanwhile, the CofE’s has acknowledged that it needs to do more than traditional Sunday services to increase attendance. Currently, the CofE allows dioceses (areas looked after by a Bishop) to apply for funding for projects that may grow their audience. These include setting up more weekday services and training for laypeople in leadership and mentoring. This scheme gives greater flexibility to each parish, enabling case-by-case solutions more targeted to the local population. Yearly reports on projects’ progress are also submitted for evaluation to the Church Commissioner to ensure parishes remain on track. Overall, the CofE has shown its willingness to invest and experiment with new ways of worship such as the weekday services to grow attendance. While these initiatives are commendable, they can be improved. The Church should specifically target different age groups if it wishes to remain universally accessibly, as attendance varies depending on age group. Special attention should be given to the 16-25 category, whose low attendance is particularly problematic and does not bode well for future years. The Church should also give care to communications with potential parishioners, including how it keeps in contact with potential new members and persuades them to try different church activities. Furthermore, formal evaluation processes may leave clergymen reluctant to discuss problems if they believe their funding will be in jeopardy. There are also few opportunities for peer-to-peer learning whilst they are in the process of setting up these new schemes.
Policy proposals 1. Ring fence funds for projects dedicated to attracting more young people to the CofE. This would both ensure enough money is being invested towards this crucial age group, and signal to Dioceses that this is an area to improve and focus on, although it may divert attention from traditional Sunday services to activities that will appeal to this age group. Prioritising young people may not result in an immediate increase in donations, as this is not an age group likely to donate. However, this group will eventually become regular parishioners, and it is likely they will ultimately contribute when they are older and / or in a position to donate. It is worth investing in this demographic because of their potential for future innovation, attendance, and perhaps leadership of the CofE, which will help it surmount new challenges as it continues to adapt to the twenty-first century, and provide it with a healthy base of parishioners. 2. Use techniques from behavioural economics to help in messaging. Behavioural economics has studied how to persuade people to act in their best interest. One way this could be applied is by showing volunteering as a social norm, even including simple facts as ‘in the UK 16-25-year olds are most likely to volunteer’ when sending out invitations to participate in Church activities. Studies have shown that targeting specific demographics will render messages more salient, and therefore more persuasive. This targeted yet low-cost technique would be more effective than a general invitation to join CofE activities.
RELIGION AND SOCIETY The drawback is finding relevant contact information. This will work better when targeting individuals who have already shown interest in the Church but have only attended occasionally. The clergy can expand this base by collecting contact details during larger services, such as Easter and Christmas, or through visits to universities, and follow up with emails or letters personalised by demographic. Age groups’ preferences should be taken into account when personalising these letters; for instance, young people should be appealed to with volunteering opportunities rather than a Sunday mass, as they are statistically likelier to volunteer than attend church. This could also be helped by working with experts of behavioural policy; some local councils have been doing this by working with the behavioural insights team which was originally set up by David Cameron and is now expanded to be its own company applying behavioural economics. 3. The formal evaluation process already in place should also be supplemented by an online forum.
However, the three additional measures outlined above would help refine this policy. Firstly, there needs to be more focus on connecting with young people, which requires some of the funds to be ring fenced for youth-targeted projects. Secondly, incorporating behavioural economics into the policy would help make the Church’s messages more persuasive to each key demographic. Thirdly, an online platform would enable the clergy to discuss their successes and difficulties confidentially, and engage in peer-to-peer learning. Whilst there may still be issues preventing particularly young people from joining the church, these should be used and presented as on-going internal debates for what the Church should stand, as a healthy debate is more likely to attract new members who wish to express their views. Finally, although less people are attending church, there remains a significant number who believe in God and consider themselves Christians but are not currently attending church. It is for them particularly that the Church of England could provide a community for.
This will enable those who have successfully applied for funding to share what has and has not worked for them with other clergy-members looking to start the funding process. Not only an opportunity for peer-to-peer learning, a forum will also be more frequent than the annual evaluations. Clergymen may also benefit from an online forum’s anonymity, which would provide greater freedom to discuss problems without the fear of losing funding. This would help resolve the clergy’s issues about the Church Commissioners’ possible monitoring of the site. The freedom to discuss problems will hopefully enable best practice to spread, and encourage other parishes to experiment with new methods. Even with more targeted messaging to local communities, the CofE may continue struggling to attract more parishioners, especially the youth. A key reason is the difference in views on issues such as gay marriage between the CofE and most young people. However, the CofE has proven its willingness to be more inclusive, and there are LGBT groups with CofE background, such as ‘inclusive church’ advocating for the CofE to conduct gay marriages. As a wide-ranging church composed of members holding a variety of views, the CofE must be able to demonstrate that it is inclusive. Conclusion The Church of England’s economic survival depends on the donations of its dwindling parishioners, who contribute to most of the CofE’s income despite its lands and investments. The CofE’s growth strategy to allow Dioceses to apply for funding for audience-expansion schemes is a positive step forward and shows a willingness to innovate.
The media’s impact on policy decisions: the case for accountability
by bertie o’brien, hussain dawani and lucia saborio perez
The quality of public discourse in the UK and USA has come under scrutiny in recent times, as has the quality of democratic decision-making. “Brexit” and Donald Trump’s election to the office of President of the United States are just two examples of these phenomena. It was said of these events that, on the one hand, the public made decisions against their own interests, and that, on the other hand, public discourse reached rock-bottom in terms of integrity, honesty, and intellectual rigour. We naturally expect the two to go hand-in-hand. Why? Because public discourse, broadly construed, is just the process of information- and opinion-sharing through the media, whether it be online, in print, or on television. The quality of public discourse not only manifests the beliefs of citizens, it informs those beliefs. Naturally, the beliefs of citizens result in the decisions that they make during general elections, referendums, protests, and strikes. Better public discourse results in more informed opinions, which thus results in more informed decisions. In a democracy, the decisions of the public translate into policy decisions, either directly (Brexit), or indirectly (electing Trump). Therefore, the quality of decision-making depends to a large extent on the quality of public discourse. An informed polis will result in informed decision-making, thereby promoting the ideal of a democratic society. An uninformed polis will result in the opposite, validating Plato’s pessimistic view of democracy. Who is responsible for creating a well-informed polis and ensuring well-informed decisions? “The government” is an answer that might tempt one at first pass, given its role as the main provider of formal education. But in fact, usually state governments only provide an educational framework until citizens leave school or university; citizens then spend the remainder of their lives, and the vast majority of their politically active lives, outside of state education. From graduation onwards, most citizens obtain most of their information from the media (be it TV, Newsprint, Online, or Social). This is not surprising: those who think seriously about the topic all agree that the function of the media is to inform the public. In their book The Elements of Journalism, Bill Ko-
vach and Tom Rosenstiel affirm that ‘the primary purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with the information they need to be free and self-governing’ . We can think of “the media” as an all-encompassing term for any platform from which information (news) and opinion (comment) is disseminated. Because media organisations are in control of the content that is published on their platform, they are ultimately responsible for the content of public discourse, and for the impact that this content has on decision-making processes. If what we have said so far is correct, we should expect to find a correlation between the media and policy-making in developed democracies. Indeed we do. As Katrin Voltmer and Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten point out, “For most observers the significance of the mass media for public policymaking arises from the fact that the media shape public opinion, thereby forcing political actors to respond to popular preferences” . Examples of such observers are Robert Page and Benjamin Shapiro (1992), who conducted a detailed study of American policy preferences. They show that the media shape public opinion, which in turn has a significant impact on policy-making . Furthermore, some commentators argue that the media impacts on policy by having broader effects on the political in a given state. For example, Thomas Meyer, in his work Media Democracy: How the Media Colonize Politics, contends that “Not only the communicative behavior of high-profile, “media star” politicians has been affected. In addition, there have been shifts in the whole nature of politics in media societies: the role and relative weight of the major acts such as parliaments and parties; the quality of the political process; and the selection of problem-solving strategies (policies) as well as the latter’s prospects for success” . In sum, we find that there is a strong theoretical and empirical connection between the media, public discourse, and policy decision-making. This suggests a possible policy response to recent criticism of the democratic process in the
RELIGION AND SOCIETY UK and USA. We believe that policy-making can positively influence the quality of public discourse by placing regulations on the media, which will be an investment in the quality of future public policy. Current and past policy failures Concerns about our democratic process have been raised despite multiple attempts to develop frameworks and mechanisms of media accountability. Two of the main issues which are part of this wider stagnation in quality of public discourse are improper press intrusion and false reporting. There have been multiple attempts to address these issues, but the press has historically responded by setting up self-regulatory systems which have proved inadequate. Britain’s current media regulation system was instated by the 2013 Royal Charter 2013, (which was ratified as a result of the Leveson Inquiry in press culture, ethics, and practice) put the current media regulation system in place. The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), a self-regulatory body established in 2014, indicates that the Charter has been successful at processing many complaints for arbitration (40,000 in its first 3 years) and enforced (non-binding) retractions where misconduct has been identified. Though a step in the right direction, the Charter does not adequately address the main issues with these systems, which involve the non-binding nature of the body’s actions aimed at rectifying issues of false reporting or unjust press intrusion in addition to them being disproportionate to the severity of the initial misdoing. For instance, a number of news agencies who were ‘asked’ to issue retractions did so in an unremarkable manner: small disclaimers on the latter pages of the papers are not enough to rectify miscommunications and poor reporting. We are not suggesting state imposed sanctions, but the current system certainly needs more decisive measures against disingenuous and inaccurate reporting. Here, the principle of proportionality at sanctioning misconduct is key. This ought to be done by requiring binding mandatory retractions that are proportionate to the initial problematic news publications. Improper press intrusion and false reporting are two of the main issues which we aim to address in this paper, and for which the media should be accountable. Although it could be argued that the non-binding aspect of the system is important to avoid imposing a structural limitation on the press, in these cases it would be a necessary requirement (i.e. improper press intrusion, defamation, false reporting). These are behaviours which are inconsistent with the moral values which underpin the press and the Royal Charter 2013 and would thus be conformant with the current approach. Furthermore, operating this through an extension of the Royal Charter to further the power of self-regulatory
body on a by-law basis which would require operating these measures on contractual grounds (just as nations do with treaties) maintains the independence of the press. Policy proposals Whether we achieve the democratic ideal of well-informed, public-lead decisions depends largely on the quality of our media. If the media fails to stimulate high-quality public discourse, the polis will be misinformed and decision-making will suffer as a result. For these reasons, we propose that greater media accountability is the right response to recent criticism of discourse in the UK and USA. Without accountability, we leave ourselves at the mercy of partisan editors and moguls with commercial agendas, and we provide big money with yet another avenue of control. With accountability, we (the people) facilitate our right to constructive discourse, and to decision-making that is both democratic and in our best interests.We put the forward the following three proposals to address the pressing issues laid out above, and ensure a healthy democratic discourse: 1. News organisations will be under the obligation to retract statements found to be false by independent fact-checking bodies. The retractions must be as prominent as the initial statements. This proposal follows a global trend towards more media accountability, including EU regulations. 2. Enquire on the best way to disincentive economic gain which drives fakes news or misleading stories.Outrageous stories lead to higher traffic and ratings. A widely discussed and potential solution to this issue could be to fine companies whose ads appear alongside verifiably fake news stories. 3. Reaffirm the standards of journalism and reporting that the best in the field hold themselves to. Not all information can be easily verified as true or false, and for those cases, neither one of the first two policies would be effective. However, by elevating the standards of journalism and giving public recognition to those who adhere to it, we can encourage the media to report with more integrity, and not give the same credibility or platform to information which is misleading or not provable. Policy evaluation Some may argue that media accountability could inadvertently weaken the current mechanisms which hold our politicians and policy-makers to account. If a policy does not have the desired effect or faces public backlash, those responsible for it could presumably shift the blame on the media outlets who reported on it, instead of conceding their mistakes.
THE SPECTRUM Yet this argument is mistaken, for two key reasons. Firstly, the frameworks for media and for politician accountability are and will remain separate, because the two entities have different responsibilities. The media has a responsibility to inform the public and ensure good public discourse, whilst politicians have a responsibility to create good laws and govern effectively. Indeed, the process of electoral cycles ensures the public’s will is respected (at least in the long-term). Secondly, effective accountability systems already exist for our politicians and policy-makers, and these will not be undermined by our proposed media accountability mechanism. Public officials are constantly subject to individual ministerial accountability under the form of parliamentary Select Committee accountability hearings enquiries. Both those systems are fundamental to the UK’s constitution, and media accountability would supplement rather than weaken them. Another major concern surrounding all discussion of media accountability is the supposed threat to freedom of speech. Yet it does the exact opposite: accountability protects free speech by providing a space where well-informed citizens can interact in meaningful discourse, with fruitful disagreement, unclouded by misinformation. If we agree with philosopher John Stuart Mill that speech should be protected because it leads to the truth, there seems to be no good reason to protect untruthful, entirely misinformed media publications. 20th century philosopher T. M. Scanlon also proposes that speech protected by this right is one which adds meaningful discourse in the pursuit of good. It focuses on the benefits of free speech not just to the speaker, but to the listener, and protects individuals’ autonomy through a right to information which allows them to be well-informed. Ultimately, media accountability elevates political discourse and ensure a healthy, sustainable democracy. If we consider the media to be self-described news outlets or organisations, and exclude personal blogs and other over expressions of opinion -as per the definition set out in the introduction of this paper- then we must focus on the role and responsibility of these different agents and how media accountability may impact their right to freedom of speech. Personal blogs do not have a news organisations’ essential role to inform - rather, readers refer to a blog to be exposed to a different opinion and perspective. A looser definition of freedom of speech than Mill’s or Scanlon’s would defend their right to share that speech even if it contains elements of misinformation. Therefore, depending one’s understanding of this right, one may have different views on how a personal blog and other similar speech should be regulated. . Finally, it might be argued that our policy constitutes government overreach. Our proposal, however, is based on the principles of self-regulation, as opposed to government reg-
ulation. For example, The International Federation of Journalists call for more accountability and higher standards in their assessment of this issue . Government-independent bodies would carry out the key decisions regarding when, where, and how media should be held accountable. The government would only act as an enforcement mechanism. Our proposal is for a collective effort – what the EU calls ‘co-regulation’ – which uses legal and non-legal instruments and combines binding legislative and regulatory action with actions taken by stakeholders. Conclusion This policy proposal must be considered in its current context: public discourse on political, social and economic issues has bear directly upon state policy, referring here primarily to the United Kingdom and United States. The spread of fake news and misinformation, 24 hour news cycle and sensationalised news stories have resulted in misleading media formatting which may prove detrimental to democratic society. We have considered the political and moral grounds of the argument for more accountability, and why it is important to maintain a high quality of public discourse, while evaluating issues of scope and how some potential flaws in our policy recommendations would best be remedied. Ultimately, we propose higher standards for journalists and media organisations, and accountability mechanisms which keep the spirit of current policies but redress transgressions more decisively. This is in response to journalists’ own calls for reform and more regulation, and should therefore be considered self-regulation rather than government overreach, as some critics could argue. The significance of retractions, of higher standards of reporting and of disincentivizing economic gain through the spread of misinformation are, we suggest, an appropriate response to the problem at hand. A free press and an informed public are the lifeblood of a healthy democracy. Considering that one of the major threats to our Western democracies today is a misinformed public and vicious circle of unpopular policies and distrust in our governing systems, we believe that higher accountability for the media is essential to promote thriving and sustainable democracies.
Letter from the President Dear all, “For students, by students” - these are the words that guide our work at the King’s Think Tank. Founded in the wake of the 2011 student protests, we empower students to find the solutions they see fit for today’s most pressing problems. This year has been no exception. We organized 10 expert panels, won the second annual KCL-UCL Policy Debate, lobbied 4 MEPs at the European Parliament, held a roundtable discussion with former US Senator Kyl, taught three policy writing workshops, organized our very first Policy Day Competition, published tens of blog articles, and two insightful Spectrum issues. We achieved a blend of quality and quantity unprecedented in our history, a testament to the growth of King’s Think Tank year after year. Nonetheless, the role of the King’s Think Tank within the KCL community extends far beyond events and policy papers. The King’s Think Tank is a society that understands the value of independence. “For students, by students” does not simply mean that the committee is elected from the student body; it highlights the fact that all decisions are controlled by people like us, and it forces us to come forward for our successes and mistakes alike. Independence is a wonderful gift. Too often we see examples of life constraining us to reflect the opinions of others, as opposed to our own. It is only when we don’t have it that we realize its importance. Equally, it is a great responsibility that we must take seriously, constantly reflecting upon the ways in which our decisions affect others. Whether we speak of writing policy proposals or life more generally, I encourage you all to cherish and protect your ability to think for yourself. If I could only leave you with one thought from my experiences leading the King’s Think Tank, it would be this. In this issue of the Spectrum, we demonstrate exactly the kind of courage necessary to stand up for your beliefs. We hope to inspire you to start believing that there is no problem that cannot be tackled through extensive research and brainstorming. As another academic year draws to an end, we will let our work speak on our behalf. I can only hope you will choose to do the same, in your everyday lives and by joining the King’s Think Tank. Diana Suciu President King’s Think Tank
write For us!
The King’s Think Tank hosts a student-run blog as well as a biannual policy-recommendation journal entitled The Spectrum. Though these differ in style and purpose, both are designed to bridge the gap between students and policymakers by communicating clear, incisive analyses of current social, economic, and political developments. Students from all disciplines and backgrounds are highly encouraged to contribute their ideas and arguments to our growing community of writers. Find out how to submit a paper at: www.kingsthinktank.org/the-spectrum/.
Editorial team Executive team
- Elina Solomon - Daphne Friedrich head of communications - Meg Wamithi designer - Elina Solomon head editor treasurer
Policy centre editors Charles Halb Ellen Newell Francesco Merola Issy Royce Elina Solomon
Special thanks Thank you to our patron, Mr. Alderman Tim Hailes. Mr. Hailes graduated from Kings College London with a BA (Hons) degree in History in 1990. Whilst at university he served in a political capacity two members of Margaret Thatcher’s Cabinet. Mr. Hailes is a Jelf medalist (1990) and served as a member of College Council and a sabbatical officer in KCLSU from 1988-89. He is now a Managing Director & Associate General Counsel in the Legal Department of J.P. Morgan Chase & Company, based in London. Prior to joining J.P. Morgan in 1999, he was a solicitor in private practice for 7 years, specialising in derivatives, structured products, and financial markets law. Thank you to our academic sponsors, the KCL Department of Political Economy and the KCLSU Development Fund. Founded in 2010, King’s College London’s Department of Political Economy is the only one of its kind in the United Kingdom. Its teaching and research recognise that one cannot fully understand political processes without understanding the economic context in which they operate, just as sound economic analyses require some appreciation of how resource allocation is conditioned by political institutions, ethical values, and the way these have been understood by different traditions in social thought.
References All images featured in The Spectrum are royalty-free, unless otherwise stated. defence and diplomacy
America in Afghanistan: Time for a new approach? 1. Acheson, B., 2017. ‘No Military Solution And No Negotiations In Afghanistan - So What Next?’, Huffington Post, August 14, 2017. https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/benacheson/afghanistan_b_17745140.html 2. AJSSP (The Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program), 2017. ‘Overview: What we do’ http://jsspafghanistan. com/index.php/what-we-do/overview.html 3. Byman, D., 2017. ‘Order From Chaos: The case for continued U.S. involvement in Afghanistan’, Brookings Institution, September 5, 2017https:// www.brookings.edu/ blog/order-from-chaos/2017/09/05/the-case-for-continued-u-s-involvement-in-afghanistan/ 4. Byman, D. and Simon S., 2017. ‘Trump’s Surge in Afghanistan: Why We Can’t Seem to End the War’, Foreign Affairs, September 18, 2017 https://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/afghanistan/2017-09-18/trumps-surge-afghanistan 5. Cooper, C., 2017. ‘Why the Time Is Right to Talk to the Taliban’, Council on Foreign Relations, November 9, 2017 https://www.cfr.org/article/why-time-right-talk-taliban 6. Felbab-Brown, V., 2018. ‘Why Pakistan supports terrorist groups, and why the US finds it so hard to induce change’ Brookings Institution, January 5, 2018. https://www. brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/05/ why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-usfinds-it-so-hard-to-induce-change/ 7. Hadley, S., 2017. ‘A new, winning strategy for Trump in Afghanistan’, Washington Post: Opinions, August 16, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-new-winning-strategy-for-trump-in-afghanistan/2017/08/16/7d38c898-8296-11e7-ab27-1a21a8e006ab_story.html?utm_term=.b1ba459374a5 8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, 2017. ‘The Kabul Process for Peace & Security Cooperation’, June 6, 2017. http://mfa.gov.af/en/page/the-kabul-process. 9. ‘No military solution in Afghanistan, U.N. chief says on Kabul visit’, Reuters, June 14, 2017. https://www. reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-refugees/no-militarysolution-in-afghanistan-u-n-chief-says-on-kabul-visitidUSKBN195164. 10. ‘Pakistan welcomes US offer for mediation on Kashmir’, The Nation, November 3, 2017. https://nation.com. pk/03-Nov-2017/pakistan-welcomes-us-offer-for-mediation-on-kashmir. 11. RECCA: Regional Economic Cooperation on Afghanistan. http://recca.af/. 12. Stenersen, A., 2017. ‘Three Myths Holding Back Afghan Peace Talks’, IPI Global Observatory, March 10, 2017. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/03/afghanistan-taliban-isis-kabul-peace-talks/. 13. ‘Tuesday briefing: ‘Not nation building – killing terrorists’’, The Guardian, August 22, 2017. https://www. theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/22/tuesday-brief-
ing-not-nation-building-killing-terrorists. 14. ‘Trump announces new strategy for Afghanistan that calls for a troop increase’, The Washington Post, August 21, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ trump-expected-to-announce-small-troop-increase-in-afghanistan-in-prime-time-address/2017/08/21/eb3a513e868a-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.html?utm_term=.9c2467fd59a8. 15. UN (United Nations) News, 2017. ‘Afghanistan makes progress in fighting corruption, yet enormous challenges remain – new UN report’, April 25, 2017. https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/04/555982-afghanistan-makes-progress-fighting-corruption-yet-enormous-challenges-remain. 16. UN (United Nations), 2017. ‘After 40 Years of Conflict in Afghanistan, Peace Process Still Not Assured, Special Representative Tells Security Council, Urging Timely Elections’ SECURITY COUNCIL 8147TH MEETING (AM), 21 December, 2017. https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/ sc13137.doc.htm. 17. US Embassy in Afghanistan, 2017. ‘Statement by Ambassador Hugo Llorens on Corruption’, April 13, 2017. https://af.usembassy.gov/statement-ambassador-hugo-llorens-corruption/. 18. ‘US will have role in Afghan reconciliation with Taliban’, Stars and Stripes, March 22, 2018. https://www.stripes. com/news/middle-east/us-will-have-role-in-afghan-reconciliation-with-taliban-1.518273. 19. ‘Viewpoint: Why the US should withdraw from Afghanistan’, BBC, August 22, 2017. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-us-canada-41016347. Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure 1. BBC, ‘Hackers behind Ukraine power cuts, says US report’, 26 February 2016, available at: http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/technology-35667989 2. Zetter, Kim. ‘Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid’, Wired, 3 March 2016, available at:https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/ 3. CTED, ‘Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure Against Terrorist Attacks’, 8 March 2017, avaliable at: https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CTED-Trends-Report-8-March-2017-Final.pdf 4. E-ISAC, ‘Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid: Defense Use Case’, 8 March 2017, avaliable at: http://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Documents/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_18Mar2016.pdf 5. Ramzan, Zulfikar. ‘Phishing Attacks and Countermeasures’ In: Starvroulakis, Peter and Stamp, Mark, eds. Handbook of Information and Communication Security. London: Springer, p. 433. 6. Zetter, Kim. ‘Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid’, Wired, 3 March 2016, available at:https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/ 7. Rouse, Margaret. ‘Definition: Ransomware”, TechTarget, September 2017, avaliable at: http://searchsecurity.
THE SPECTRUM techtarget.com/definition/ransomware 8. Woolaston, Victoria. ‘WannaCry ransomware: what is it and how to protect yourself: the latest on the MS17-010 flaw and the WannaCry patch linked to the NHS cyber attack’, Wired, 22 May 2017, available at: http://www. wired.co.uk/article/wannacry-ransomware-virus-patch 9. National Audit Office, ‘Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS’ 27 October 2017, avalable at: https:// www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Investigation-WannaCry-cyber-attack-and-the-NHS.pdf 10. BBC, ‘Hackers behind Ukraine power cuts, says US report’, 26 February 2016, available at: http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/technology-35667989 11. Alleem, Zeeshan, ‘The WannaCry hack shows North Korea’s emergence as a cyber powerhouse’, Vox, 19 December 2017, avaliable at: https://www.vox.com/ world/2017/12/19/16794970/wannacry-north-korea-bossert-cyberattacks 12. Greenberg, Andy,’New Dark Web Market Is Selling Zero-Day Exploits to Hackers’,Wired, 17 April 2017, available at: https://www.wired.com/2015/04/therealdeal-zero-day-exploits/ 13. Wager, Daniel. ‘The Growing Threat of Cyber-Attacks on Critical Infrastructure’, IRMI, June 2017, avaliable at: https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/cyber-attack-critical-infrastructure 14. Neray, Phil. ‘Threat of cyber attack on critical infrastructure is real, present danger’, Third Certainty, 28 February 2017, available at: http://thirdcertainty.com/ guest-essays/threat-of-cyber-attack-on-critical-infrastructure-is-real-present-danger/ 15. National Audit Office, op. cit. 16. Wagner, Daniel, op. cit. 17. Auchard, Erik, and Volz, Dustin. ‘More disruptions feared from cyber attack; Microsoft slams government secrecy’, Reuters, 12 May 2017, avaliable at: https://www.reuters. com/article/us-britain-security-hospitals/more-disruptions-feared-from-cyber-attack-microsoft-slams-government-secrecy-idUSKBN18820S 18. Zegart, Amy. ‘The NSA Confronts a Problem of Its Own Making’,The Atlantic, 29 June 2017, available at:https:// www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/ nsa-wannacry-eternal-blue/532146/ 19. Defence Contracts Online, “Exposing cyber threats to critical national infrastructure”, available at: https://www. contracts.mod.uk/do-features-and-articles/exposing-cyber-threats-to-critical-national-infrastructure/ 20. Houses of Parliament, “Data Encryption”, Post Brief, no. 19, March 15, 2016, available at: http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/POSTPB-0019 21. GCHQ, “10 Steps: Summary”, January 16, 2015, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ cyber-risk-management-a-board-level-responsibility/10-steps-summary#home-and-mobile-working 22. Sans Institute, “Penetration Testing: Assessing Your Overall Security Before Attackers Do”, June 2006, available at: https://uk.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/ penetration-testing-assessing-security-attackers-3463 23. Chernenko, Elena et. al. ‘Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms’, Council on Foreign Relations, 23 February 2017, avaliable
at: https://www.cfr.org/report/increasing-international-cooperation-cybersecurity-and-adapting-cyber-norms 24. OSCE, ‘Protecting critical infrastructure from cyber attacks is crucial for international peace and security, say participants of OSCE conference in Vienna’, 16 February 2017, available at: https://www.osce.org/cio/300271. european affairs
An EU humanitarian emergency visa scheme 1. Court of Justice of the European Union (2017): Press Release No. 24 /17. Luxembourg, 7 March 2017. Judgment in Case C-638 /16 PPU, X and X v État belge. Available online at https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-03/cp170024en.pdf 2. European Commission (2016): Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. EU Action Plan against migration smuggling (2015-2020). Available online at https:// ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/ eu_action_plan_against_migrant_smuggling_en.pdf 3. European Commission (2016): Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the member states by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast). Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-270-EN-F1-1.PDF 4. European Commission (2018): Member states’ Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism (As of 12 March 2018). Available online at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_ play_-_relocation_en.pdf 5. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights; Council of Europe (2015): Handbook on European Law relating to asylum, borders and immigration. Edition 2014. Available online at http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2013/handbook-european-law-relating-asylum-borders-and-immigration 6. Europol; INTERPOL (2016): Migrant Smuggling Networks. Joint Europol-INTERPOL Report. Executive Summary. Available online at https://www.europol.europa. eu/sites/default/files/documents/ep-ip_report_executive_summary.pdf 7. Eurostat (2018): Asylum and first time asylum applicants - annual aggregated data (rounded). Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction. do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tps00191&language=en 8. Frontex data as of 02 February 2018: Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics download (updated monthly). Available online at http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Detections_of_IBC_2018_02_02.xlsx 9. Guild, Elspeth; Costello, Cathryn; Garlick, Madeline; Moreno-Lax, Violeta (2015): The 2015 Refugee Crisis in the European Union. CEPS Policy Brief No. 332. Available online at https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/CEPS%20 PB332%20Refugee%20Crisis%20in%20EU_0.pdf 10. IOM’s Missing Migrants Project (2018): Recorded mi-
grant deaths by region. Available online at https://missingmigrants.iom.int/downloads Jensen, Ulla Iben (2014): Humanitarian Visas: option or obligation? Study for the LIBE Committee. Available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ STUD/2014/509986/IPOL_STU(2014)509986_EN.pdf Official Journal of the European Union (2009): Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code). Available online at http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32009R0810 Official Journal of the European Union (2011): Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted. Available online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32011L0095 Official Journal of the European Union (2013): Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the member states by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast). Available online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:EN:PDF Rankin, J. (2017): EU could ‘scrap refugee quota scheme’. The Guardian. Available online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/11/eu-may-scrap-refugee-quota-scheme-donald-tusk The National Committee for Refugees (2013): Normative Resolution No. 17 of 20 September 2013. Available online at http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/ opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=54e72bb94 UNHCR (2010): Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Available online at http://www.unhcr. org/3b66c2aa10 UNHCR (2018): UNHCR calls for the EU relocation scheme to continue. Press Release 26 September 2017. Available online at http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/ press/2017/9/59ca64354/unhcr-calls-eu-relocation-scheme-continue.html
Macron’s strategy for Brexit negotiations 1. Barber, T. (2018, February 20). France’s hardening views on Brexit. Https://www.ft.com/. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://www.ft.com/content/366db7e0-161e11e8-9376-4a6390addb44 2. Parker, G., & Chassany, A. (2018, January 18). Entente kept cordiale as May and Macron test relationship. Https://www.ft.com/. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://www.ft.com/content/26bb023c-fc72-11e7-9b32d7d59aace167 3. Piper, E. (2018, January 17). ‘Be my guest’ - France’s Macron spells out reasons for Britain to stay in EU. Https:// www.reuters.com/. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-france/ be-my-guest-frances-macron-spells-out-reasons-for-brit-
ain-to-stay-in-eu-idUSKBN1F632D 4. Parker, G. (2018, January 18). Emmanuel Macron rejects special access for City after Brexit. Https://www.ft.com/. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://www.ft.com/content/e9a04db8-fc84-11e7-9b32-d7d59aace167 5. Brunsden, J. (2018, March 13). Barnier: UK yet to face up to ‘hard facts’ of Brexit. Https://www.ft.com/. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://www.ft.com/content/4988943a-26a9-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0 6. EU leaders take a tough line in the first week of Brexit talks. (2017, June 29). Https://www.economist. com/. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://www. economist.com/news/britain/21724420-european-governments-are-not-inclined-be-generous-theresa-mays-weak-and-unstable 7. May, T. (2018, September 22). PM’s Florence speech: A new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU. Speech, Florence. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pmsflorence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu 8. Lequesnes, C. (2017, November 10). Brexit – a French perspective. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from http://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-a-french-perspective/ 9. Parker, G., Pickard, J., & Mance, H. (2018, March 2). May sets out proposals for future British trading relationship with EU. Https://www.ft.com/. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://www.ft.com/content/fb682204-1e2211e8-956a-43db76e69936 10. Lequesnes, C. (2017, November 10). Brexit – a French perspective. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from http://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-a-french-perspective/ 11. Parker, G. (2018, January 20). Macron boosts May’s hopes of bespoke EU trade deal. Https://www.ft.com/. Retrieved March 20, 2018, from https://www.ft.com/content/78564d98-fdbe-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5 A comprehensive approach towards de-radicalisation and counter-terrorism in Europe 1. The Netherlands. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. Europol. Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. By Europol. 2017 ed. The Hague: European Union, 2017. 2. The Netherlands. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. Europol. Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. By Europol. 2017 ed. The Hague: European Union, 2017. 3. EU. “On Simplifying the Exchange of Information and Intelligence between Law Enforcement Authorities of the member states of the European Union.” Official Journal of the European Union386 (December 18, 2006): 89100. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=OJ:L:2006:386:0089:0100:EN:PDF. 4. European Council. “The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy.” November 20, 2005. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST 14469 2005 REV 4. 5. Bureš, Oldřich. “Intelligence Sharing and the Fight against Terrorism in the Eu: Lessons Learned from Europol.” European View15, no. 1 (May 03, 2016): 57-66. doi:10.1007/ s12290-016-0393-7. 6. Bertelsen, Preben. “Danish Preventive Measures and De-radicalization Strategies: The Aarhus Model.” PAN-
13. 14. 15.
ORAMA: Insights into Asian and European Affairs, July 14, 2015, 241-52. http://www.kas.de/politikdialog-asien/ en/publications/42032/. Bertelsen, Preben. “Danish Preventive Measures and De-radicalization Strategies: The Aarhus Model.” PANORAMA: Insights into Asian and European Affairs, July 14, 2015, 241-52. http://www.kas.de/politikdialog-asien/ en/publications/42032/. EU. “CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION.” Access to European Union Law. October 26, 2012. https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012E288. Bertelsen, Preben. “Danish Preventive Measures and De-radicalization Strategies: The Aarhus Model.” PANORAMA: Insights into Asian and European Affairs, July 14, 2015, 241-52. http://www.kas.de/politikdialog-asien/ en/publications/42032/. Johansson, Roland. “Religiösa Hatpredikanter Styr Islamistisk Terror I Europa.” GP. September 14, 2017. http:// www.gp.se/nyheter/världen/religiösa-hatpredikanter-styr-islamistisk-terror-i-europa-1.4632813. European Commission. “RAN Working Groups.” Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission. December 06, 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/whatwe-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ about-ran_en. EU. “Consolidated version of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union.” Access to European Union Law. October 26, 2012. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012E288. Europol. “European Counter Terrorism Centre - ECTC.” Europol. January 2018. https://www.europol.europa.eu/ about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc. Europol. Europol 2018 Amended Budget PDF. January 2018. Raw data. Eisenhowerlaan 73, The Hague. European Commission. “Internal Security Fund - Police.” Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission. March 25, 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/ internal-security-fund-police_en. Bureš, Oldřich. “Intelligence Sharing and the Fight against Terrorism in the Eu: Lessons Learned from Europol.” European View15, no. 1 (May 03, 2016): 57-66. doi:10.1007/ s12290-016-0393-7. European Justice. “European Arrest Warrant.” European E-Justice Portal. February 12, 2018. https://e-justice. europa.eu/content_european_arrest_warrant-90-en.do. College of Policing. “European Investigation Order.” Investigation. July 18, 2017. https://www.app.college.police. uk/app-content/investigations/european-investigations/ european-investigation-order/. EU. “On the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing, Amending Regulation.” Official Journal of the European Union141 (May 20, 2015): 73-117. June 05, 2015. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ PDF/?uri=OJ:JOL_2015_141_R_0003&from=ES. Wolff, Sarah. “From The Hague to Stockholm: The Future of EU’s Internal Security Architecture and Police Cooperation.” Overview Paper. 2010. 11. https://www.clingendael. org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20090930_cesp_paper_ swolff_police_cooperation.pdf. [Accessed 19 Mar. 2018].
21. EU. Twelfth Progress Report towards an Effective and Genuine Security Union. By European Commission. December 12, 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20171212_communication_on_ twelfth_progress_report_towards_effective_and_genuine_security_union_en.pdf. 22. EU. Twelfth Progress Report towards an Effective and Genuine Security Union. By European Commission. December 12, 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20171212_communication_on_ twelfth_progress_report_towards_effective_and_genuine_security_union_en.pdf. 23. EU. Twelfth Progress Report towards an Effective and Genuine Security Union. By European Commission. December 12, 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20171212_communication_on_ twelfth_progress_report_towards_effective_and_genuine_security_union_en.pdf. 24. European Commission. Joint decision of the European Commission and the high representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy on the Participation of the European Union in Various Organisations for Cooperation to Prevent and Counter Terrorism. PDF. Brussels: EU, August 27, 2015. 25. The Netherlands. European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. Europol. Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. By Europol. 2017 ed. The Hague: European Union, 2017. 26. EU. Council Decision 2009/371/JHA Establishing the European Police Office (Europol). By EU. April 06, 2009. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:jl0025. 27. Europol. “Europol’s Internet Referral Unit to Combat Terrorist and Violent Extremist Propaganda.” Press Release. July 01, 2015. https://www.europol.europa.eu/ newsroom/news/europol’s-internet-referral-unit-to-combat-terrorist-and-violent-extremist-propaganda. 28. Bureš, Oldřich. “Intelligence Sharing and the Fight against Terrorism in the Eu: Lessons Learned from Europol.” European View15, no. 1 (May 03, 2016): 57-66. doi:10.1007/ s12290-016-0393-7. Make the SDGs the EU’s new business lanugage? 1. The title is inspired by the article: Kinderman, D. (2011). ‘Free us up so we can be responsible!’The co-evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility and neo-liberalism in the UK, 1977–2010. Socio-Economic Review, 10(1), 29-57. 2. Hayakawa, Y. (2017). Business Sector Efforts and Challenges to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Journal of Environmental Information Science, 45, 31-36. And: Hopkins, J. D. (2016). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG): The role of the private sector. And: Scheyvens, R., Banks, G., & Hughes, E. (2016). The private sector and the SDGs: The need to move beyond ‘business as usual’. Sustainable Development, 24(6), 371-382. 3. Redman, A. (2017). Opportunities and Challenges of Applying the SDGs to Business 4. Open Letter to the UK government. Available at: http://blogs.wwf.org.uk/blog/business-government/ sustainable-development-good-uk-business-open-let-
REFERENCES ter-prime-minister/ 5. PwC. (2015). Make it your business: Engaging with the Sustainable Development Goals. And: Corporate Citizenship. (2015). From my world to our world: What the Sustainable Development Goals Mean for Business. 6. Pogge, T., & Sengupta, M. (2015). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGS) as drafted: Nice idea, poor execution. Wash. Int’l LJ, 24, 571. And: Langford, M. (2016). Lost in transformation? The politics of the sustainable development goals. Ethics & International Affairs, 30(02), 167-176. 7. PwC. (2016). A business guide to engaging with the UN Global Goals. And PwC. (2016). The Sustainable Development Goals: a common language for corporate reporting on societal issues. 8. Robin, M. O. (2017). A paradigm shift? The Sustainable Development Goals in corporate sustainability reporting from an organisational legitimacy perspective: The case of France’s 50 largest companies. Dissertation Msc Sustainability, University of Nottingham. 9. http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/corporate-social-responsibility_en 10. sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld and ec.europa.eu/environment/sustainable-development/SDGs/implementation/index_en.htm 11. Green Paper: Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility. file:///C:/Users/k1755473/ Downloads/DOC-01-9_EN.pdf 12. https://www.sdgcharter.nl/ 13. See my forthcoming article titled: Good Banks, Bad Banks, and Public Scrutiny: The Determinants of Corporate Social Responsibility in times of Financial Volatility law
Tax avoidance within the CCCTB: Trouble in paradise? 1. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base, European Commission, 25 October 2016 2. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, European Commission, 25 October 2016 3. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, European Commission, 16 March 2011. 4. European Parliament P8_TA-PROV (2018)0087. Legislative resolution of 15 March 2018 on the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)/ 5. Estafanía López Llopis - Formulary Apportionment in the European Union - Kluwer Law International - 2017 6. Silvia Velarde Aramayo - A Common GAAR to Protect the Harmonized Corporate Tax Base : More Chaos in the Labyrinth - Kluwer Law International - 2016 7. Giammarco Cottani - Formulary apportionment : a Revamp in the Post-Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Era ? - Kluwer Law International - 2016 8. Silvia Velarde Aramayo - A Common GAAR to Protect the Harmonized Corporate Tax Base : More Chaos in the Labyrinth - Kluwer Law International - 2016 9. Cerioni Luca : The Commission’s Proposal for a CCCTB Directive : Analysis and Comment - Bulletin for interna-
tional taxation September 2011 10. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) Proposal for a Council Directive and initial comments. Loyens and Loeff CCCTB Team 2011 11. Eduardo Baistrocchi - The transfer pricing problem : a global proposal for simplification - 2006 12. Jinyan Li - Global Profit Split : An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation - 2002 13. Avi-Jonah - Between formulary apportionment and the OECD Guidelines : A proposal for reconciliation - 2009 14. Robert Robillard -BEPS : Is the OECD Now at the Gates of Global Formulary Apportionment ? - 2015 15. McLure, Charles - Replacing Separate Entity Accounting and the Arm’s Length Principle with Formulary Apportionment- 2002 16. Introduction to European Tax Law : Direct Taxation. Spiramus, Fourth Edition. Michael Lang. Pasquale Pistone. Josef Schuch and Clause Staringer 17. European Economic and Social Committee - Common (Consolidated) Corporate Tax Base - Opinion ECO/419 20th September 2017 18. Sendetska, Olga - ECJ Case Law on Corporate Exit Taxation: From National Grid Indus to DMC: What Is the Current State of Law? - EC Tax Review 2014 19. Peeters, Steven - Exit Taxation: From an Internal Market Barrier to a Tax Avoidance Prevention Tool, EC Tax Review 2017 Authorities 1. CJEU Case C-371/10 National Grid Indus 2. CJEU Case C-38/10 Commission v Portugal 3. CJEU Case C-269/09 Commission v Spain 4. CJEU C-261/11 Commission v Denmark 5. CJEU Case 470/04 N v Inspecteur van de Belastingsdienst Oost 6. CJEU Case C-164/12 DMC 7. CJEU Case C-657/13 Verder LabTec 8. CJEU Case C-255/02 Halifax 9. CJEU Case C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke 10. EU impact assessment of the CCCTB, 25 October 2016 11. European Commission - Impact assessment - SWD(2016) 341 final - 25 October 2016 12. European Commission CCCTB Working Group, Taxud E1, 28 July 2006 13. European Commission CCCTB Working Group, Taxud D1, 20 October 2010 14. European Commission CCCTB Working Group, Taxud TF1, 13 November 2007 15. The great EU corporate tax lie - Esther de Lange, Brian Hayes and Gunnar Hoekmark - euobserver.com 16. https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/ files/ctr_factsheet2016.pdf 17. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3471_en.htm 18. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmeuleg/71-xxi/7103.htm 19. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council : Time to establish a modern, fair and efficient taxation standard for the digital economy - European Commission - 21 March 2018 20. Les impôts dans les affaires internationales 11ème édition - Bruno Gouthière - Francis Lefebvre 21. L’ACCIS à l’aune de la compétitivité des entreprises en
THE SPECTRUM Europe Delphine Siquier-Delot Octobre 2017 Institut Friedland 22. La relance de l’Accis : une révolution en perspective pour les groupes français - Daniel Gutmann - Feuillet Rapide Francis Lefebvre - 17 November 2016 The Societas Europaea regulation: European company law after Brexit 1. COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2157/2001 2. ETUI (2014), European Company (SE) Database, http:// ecdb.worker-participation.eu/ 3. P. Hall and D. Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Advantage of Comparative Advantage 4. Employee Involvement Directive 2001/86/EC education
How can the UK help reduce education inequalities in East Africa? 1. Uwezo 2013 East Africa Report. All results referenced here to be found p. 11-16. 2. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002152/215247e.pdf p. 166 3. Taylor and Spaull 2015, see the article for further references. Whelan 2014, Unesco 2014. Also see https://theconversation.com/many-east-african-kids-attend-schoolbut-not-enough-are-actually-learning-48529. 4. See https://www.riseprogramme.org/sites/www.riseprogramme.org/files/2017-11/RISE_Vision_document-1.pdf p. 3 5. IDC Chair to DfID Secretary of State p. 10 6. Implementing the Sustainable Development Goals 6. The Learning Generation report p21. 7. Tanzania Education Sector Analysis p169 8. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203363. 9. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmintdev/367/36706.html 10. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmintdev/367/36706.htm §92. 11. Monazza Aslam, ‘Non-state education provision; access and quality for the marginalised’, 2017. 12. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmintdev/367/36705.htm#_idTextAnchor008. 13. DfID Blog. 14. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203363/ transactions. 15. https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203363/ transactions. Student mobility in Central Asia’s higher education institutions 1. Country Note: Education at a Glance. (2016). OECD. Available at: http://gpseducation.oecd.org/Content/EAGCountryNotes/EAG2016_CN_RUS.pdf [Accessed 19 Mar. 2018]. 2. Leahy, M. (2017). A Need for Better Tertiary Education in Uzbekistan. [online] The Borgen Project. Available at: https://borgenproject.org/education-in-uzbekistan/ [Accessed 19 Mar. 2018]. 3. Knoema. (2015). Tajikistan Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education, 1970-2017.[online] Available at: https:// knoema.com/atlas/Tajikistan/topics/Education/Tertia-
ry-Education/Gross-enrolment-ratio-in-tertiary-education Ehea.info. (2018). Members - European Higher Education Area and Bologna Process. [online] Available at: http:// www.ehea.info/pid34250/members.html [Accessed 19 Mar. 2018]. Education and training. (2018). The Bologna Process and the European Higher Education Area. [online] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/higher-education/bologna-process_en [Accessed 19 Mar. 2018]. Isaacs, A. (2014). Building a Higher Education Area in Central Asia: challenges and prospects. Tuning Journal for Higher Education, [online] 2(1), p.53. Available at: http://www.tuningjournal.org/article/download/69/64 [Accessed 19 Mar. 2018]. Isaacs, A. (2014). Building a Higher Education Area in Central Asia: challenges and prospects. Tuning Journal for Higher Education, [online] 2(1), p.44. Available at: http://www.tuningjournal.org/article/download/69/64 [Accessed 19 Mar. 2018]. Central Asia Education Platform (CAEP). (2012). TUCAHEA: Towards a Central Asian Higher Education Area: Tuning Structures and Building Quality Culture. [online] Available at: http://dbase.caep-project.org/project/tucahea-towards-a-central-asian-higher-education-area-tuning-structures-and-building-quality-culture/ [Accessed 19 Mar. 2018]. http://www.tucahea.org/ Isaacs, A. (2014). Building a Higher Education Area in Central Asia: challenges and prospects. Tuning Journal for Higher Education, [online] 2(1), p.48. Available at: http://www.tuningjournal.org/article/download/69/64 [Accessed 19 Mar. 2018]. Astana Declaration. (2017). Astana. Available at: https:// eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/01_astana_declaration_170623_final_en.pdf [Accessed 19 Mar. 2018]. Point 24.
Sex and relationship education in British faith schools 1. OFSTED (2012). Not yet good enough: personal, social, health and economic education in schools. OFSTED. 2. Wight, Daniel, Lisa Williamson, and Marion Henderson. “Parental influences on young people’s sexual behaviour: A longitudinal analysis.” Journal of adolescence 29, no. 4 (2006): 473-494. 3. Measor*, Lynda. “Young people’s views of sex education: Gender, information and knowledge.” Sex education 4, no. 2 (2004): 153-166. 4. Terrence Higgins Trust. 2016. “LGBT-Inclusive Sex And Relationships Education In The UK”. Terrance Higgins Trust. https://www.tht.org.uk/~/media/Files/Campaign/ SRE%20Report%202016%20final.pdf. 5. Department for Education. 2017. “Preventing And Tackling Bullying”. London: Department for Education. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/623895/Preventing_and_ tackling_bullying_advice.pdf 6. Stonewall. 2017. “The Experiences Of Lesbian, Gay, Bi And Trans Young People In Britain’s Schools In 2017”. School Report. Stonewall; University of Cambridge. http://www.stonewall.org.uk/sites/default/files/the_
REFERENCES school_report_2017.pdf. 7. https://www.tht.org.uk/~/media/Files/Campaign/ SRE%20Report%202016%20final.pdf. 8. http://www.stonewall.org.uk/sites/default/files/the_ school_report_2017.pdf. 9. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/623895/Preventing_and_ tackling_bullying_advice.pdf. global health
Lessons from the Philippines: Countering non-communicable diseases in developing states 1. Boseley, S. (2017). Threats, bullying, lawsuits: tobacco industry’s dirty war for the African market. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2017/jul/12/big-tobacco-dirty-war-africa-market [Accessed 16 Mar. 2018]. 2. Goodchild, M., Perucic, A. and Nargis, N. (2016). Modelling the impact of raising tobacco taxes on public health and finance. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, [online] 94(4), pp.250-257. Available at: http://www.who. int/bulletin/volumes/94/4/15-164707.pdf?ua=1. 3. Tobacco free kids (2013). Tobacco and non-communicable disease.[ebook] Available at: https://www.global.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/global/pdfs/en/Tobacco_and_ NCD_en.pdf [Accessed 16 Mar. 2018]. 4. The World Bank (1999). Curbing the epidemic: governments and the economics of tobacco control. Tobacco Control, 8(2), pp.196-201. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ pmc/articles/PMC1759728/pdf/v008p00196.pdf 5. The World Health Organisation (2016). Earmarked tobacco taxes lessons learnt from nine countries. [ebook] Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstre am/10665/206007/1/9789241510424_eng.pdf?ua=1 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2018]. 6. World Health Organisation (2015). WHO | “Sin Tax” expands health coverage in the Philippines. [online] Available at: http://www.who.int/features/2015/ncd-philippines/en/ [Accessed 16 Mar. 2018]. 7. World Health Organisation (2015) The economic and health benefits of tobacco taxation [ebook] pp.1-6. Available at: http://www.who.int/tobacco/publications/economics/post2015tobacco/en/ [Accessed 16 Mar. 2018]. 8. World Health Organisation (2017). WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC, 2017 Monitoring tobacco use and prevention policies. [ebook] Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/255874/1 /9789241512824-eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1 [Accessed 16 Mar. 2018]. 9. World Health Organization. (2017). Non- communicable diseases. [online] Available at: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs355/en/. An EU policy mandating self-defence training: The key to preventing violence against women? 1. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. “Violence against Women: an EU Wide Survey.” Directorate General for Internal Policies, 2015. 2. The European Parliament convened a session in direct response to the #metoo campaign, on 25 Oct. 2017 3. European Parliament Policy Department for Citizens’
4. 5. 6. 7.
8. 9. 10.
Rights and Constitutional Affairs. “Knowledge and KnowHow: the Role of Self-Defence in the Prevention of Violence against Women.” Directorate General for Internal Policies, Nov. 2016. Study conducted by the European Parliament Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs “Domestic Violence and Poverty.” GetDomesticViolenceHelp.com. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 June 2017. The EU joined the Convention in 2017 Travis, Alan. “Domestic Violence Experienced by 30% of Female Population, Survey Shows.”The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 13 Feb. 2014, www.theguardian. com/society/2014/feb/13/domestic-abuse-violence-victims-crime-survey-figures. “Romania Criticised over Domestic Violence ‘Failures’.” BBC News, BBC, 23 May 2017, www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-europe-40010890. “Violence Against Women and Girls - Challenging the Myths.” Womens Aid. N.p., 12 Dec. 2016. Web. 23 June 2017. Bingley, Matthew. “How a Self-Defence Workshop Is Trying to Stop Domestic Violence.”CBCnews, CBC/Radio Canada, 25 Nov. 2017, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/jiujitsu-domestic-violence-prevention-1.4419848. “Regulations, Directives and Other Acts - European Union - European Commission.”European Union, 24 Oct. 2017, europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en.
energy and environment
Noise pollution in urban ecosystems 1. Barber, J., et al. (2009) The Costs of Chronic Noise Exposure for Terrestrial Organisms. Trends in Ecology and Evolution. 25(3): 180-189 2. Bernard van Leer Foundation. ‘Tackling noise pollution in Dhaka’. Accessed on February 14 2018 from https://bernardvanleer.org/urban95-challenge/tackling-noise-pollution-in-dhaka/ Soundcities. ‘About Soundcities’. Accessed on 14 February from http://www.soundcities.com/info. php. 3. Bolund, P., & Hunhammar, S., (1999) Ecosystem services in urban areas. Ecological Economics 29: 293-301 4. Cameron, P., Robertson, D., & Zaks, J. (1972). Sound pollution, noise pollution, and health: Community parameters. Journal of Applied Psychology, 56(1), 67-74. 5. Cerwén, G., (2017) Sound in Landscape Architecture: A Soundscape Approach to Noise. Doctoral Thesis from the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. 6. Dearborn, D. C., and Kark, S., (2009) Motivations for Conserving Urban Biodiversity Conservation Biology 24(2): 432-440 7. Decision No 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’. Available from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013D1386 8. Directive 2002/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2002 relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise - Declaration by the Commission in the Conciliation Committee on the Directive relating to the assessment
9. 10. 11.
16. 17. 18.
23. 24. 25.
and management of environmental noise. Available from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1516202452071&uri=CELEX:32002L0049 Dumyahn, S. L., & Pijanowski, B. C., (2011) Beyond noise mitigation: managing soundscapes as common-pool resources. Landscape Ecology 26: 1311-26 European Commission. ‘Environment: LIFE Programme’. Accessed on February 14 2018 from http://ec.europa.eu/ environment/life/project/Projects/ Francis, C. D., N. J. Kleist, C. P. Ortega, and A. Cruz. 2012. “Noise Pollution Alters Ecological Services: Enhanced Pollination And Disrupted Seed Dispersal”. Proceedings Of The Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 279 (1739): 2727-2735. doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.0230. Goines, Lisa, and Louis Hagler. 2007. “Noise Pollution: A Modern Plague”. Southern Medical Journal100 (3): 287294. doi:10.1097/smj.0b013e3180318be5. Gordon, Shira D., and George W. Uetz. 2012. “Environmental Interference: Impact Of Acoustic Noise On Seismic Communication And Mating Success”. Behavioral Ecology 23 (4): 707-714. doi:10.1093/beheco/ars016. Katti, Madhusudan, and Paige S Warren. 2004. “Tits, Noise And Urban Bioacoustics”. Trends In Ecology & Evolution 19 (3): 109-110. doi:10.1016/j.tree.2003.12.006. Kight, Caitlin R., and John P. Swaddle. 2011. “How And Why Environmental Noise Impacts Animals: An Integrative, Mechanistic Review”. Ecology Letters 14 (10): 10521061. doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01664.x. New York University. ‘Sounds of New York City: About’. NHTSA (2013) Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid and Electric Vehicles: Draft Environmental Assessment Norman, D., (2014) ‘What Noise does the Electric Car Make?’ MIT Technology Review. Available from https:// www.technologyreview.com/s/524241/what-noise-doesthe-electric-car-make/ Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (2009) Environmental Noise: Postnote. Available from http:// www.parliament.uk/documents/post/postpn338.pdf Potts, S. G., et al. (2016) The Assessment Report on Pollinators, Pollination and Food Production: Summary for Policymakers. Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) Rodríguez, R. L., (2005) The Behavioral Ecology of Insect Vibratinal Communication. BioScience 55(4): 323-334 Shannon, Graeme, Megan F. McKenna, Lisa M. Angeloni, Kevin R. Crooks, Kurt M. Fristrup, Emma Brown, and Katy A. Warner et al. 2015. “A Synthesis Of Two Decades Of Research Documenting The Effects Of Noise On Wildlife”. Biological Reviews 91 (4): 982-1005. doi:10.1111/ brv.12207. Slabbekoorn, Hans, and Margriet Peet. 2003. “Birds Sing At A Higher Pitch In Urban Noise”. Nature424 (6946): 267-267. doi:10.1038/424267a. Soundcities. ‘About Soundcities’. Accessed on 14 February from http://www.soundcities.com/info.php. Transport for London. ‘Have your say on the transformation of Oxford Street: Overview’. Accessed on 14 February 2018 from https://consultations.tfl.gov.uk/roads/oxford-street/ Warren, Paige S., Madhusudan Katti, Michael Ermann, and Anthony Brazel. 2006. “Urban Bioacoustics: It’s Not Just Noise”. Animal Behaviour 71 (3): 491-502.
doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.07.014. 27. Wenny, D., (2011) The Need to Quantify Ecosystem Services Provided by Birds. The Auk. 128(1): 1-14 Restructuring the UK’s agricultural policy 1. Ackrill, R. (2000) The Common Agricultural Policy. UK: Sheffield Academic Press Ltd. 2. BBC News (2018) Post-Brexit farming funding set out by Michael Gove. BBC News [Online] Available from: http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-42559845 [Accessed 31 January 2018]. 3. Birt, C. and Robertson, A. (2016) A CAP for healthy living: Mainstreaming health into the EU Common Agricultural Policy. European Public Health Alliance. [Online] Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/future-of-cap/foc-fb-ha_en.pdf [Accessed 31 January 2018]. 4. Development Economics (2017) Contributions of UK agriculture. NFU. [Online] Available from: https://www. nfuonline.com/assets/93419 [Accessed 18 April 2018]. 5. European Parliament (2010) Summary of the hearing of Dacian Ciolos - agriculture and rural development. European Parliament. [Online] Available from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=IM-PRESS&reference=20100113IPR67224&language=EN [Accessed 31 January 2018]. 6. Eurostat (2017) Agricultural census in the United Kingdom. Eurostat. [Online] Available from: http://ec.europa. eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Agricultural_ census_in_the_United_Kingdom [Accessed 31 January 2018]. 7. Gosden, E. and Dakers, M. (2016) What would Brexit mean for farmers and the Common Agricultural Policy? The Telegraph. [Online] Available from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/13/what-would-brexit-meanfor-farmers-and-the-common-agricultural-p/ [Accessed 31 January 2018]. 8. Matthews, A. (2011) Post-2013 EU Common Agricultural Policy, trade and development: A review of legislative proposals. ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development. [Online] Available from: https:// www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/2011/12/ post-2013-eu-common-agricultural-policy-trade-and-development.pdf [Accessed 31 January 2018]. 9. Paull, J. (2011) The uptake of organic agriculture: A decade of worldwide development. Journal of Social and Development Sciences, 2(3), 111-120. 10. Ribeiro, M. and Marques, C. (2002) Rural tourism and the development of less favoured areas – between rhetoric and practise. Internatioanl Journal of Tourism Research, 4(3), 211.220. 11. Steedan, K. (2017) Why are Small Farms Important to Britain? Resilience. [Online] Available from: http://www. resilience.org/stories/2017-04-17/why-are-small-farmsimportant-to-britain/ [Accessed 31 January 2018]. 12. The Local (2007) Sweden ‘abolish EU farm subsidies’. The Local. [Online] Available from: https://www.thelocal. se/20070529/7443 [Accessed 31 January 2018]. 13. Tuomisto, H. L., Hodge, I. D., Riordan, P. and Macdonald, D. W. (2012) Does organic farming reduce environmental impacts? - A meta-analysis of European research. Journal of Environmental Management, 112, 309-320.
REFERENCES 14. Undersander, D., Temple, S., Bartlet, J., Sample, D. and Paine, L. (2014) Grassland birds: Fostering habitats using rotational grazing. University of Wisconsin-Extension. [Online] Available from: http://learningstore.uwex.edu/ assets/pdfs/a3715.pdf [Accessed 31 January 2018]. 15. University of Leeds (2010) Research bulletin. University of Leeds. [Online] Available from: http://www.fbs.leeds. ac.uk/research/bulletin/index.php?id=1094 [Accessed 31 January 2018]. 16. Woods, N. (2017) Brexit is a chance for farming reform – but we must get the policy right. The Guardian. [Online] Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/ business/2017/aug/17/brexit-farming-reform-uk-agriculture-cap [Accessed 31 January 2018]. Should a plastic bottle deposit scheme be introduced in the UK? 1. BBC. “Michael Gove Suggests Plastic Bottle Deposit Scheme.” October 2, 2017. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ uk-politics-41474334. 2. Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit (BMUB). Abfallwirtschaft in Deutschland 2016: Fakten, Daten, Grafiken. March 2016. https:// www.bmub.bund.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Pools/Broschueren/ abfallwirtschaft_2016.pdf. 3. Department for Business, Energy, & Industrial Strategy, 2016 UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions, H.R. Doc. (2016). 4. Engel, Annegret, and Ludivine Petetin. “Environmental Protection after Brexit: A Race to the Bottom.” Cardiff University Blogs. Entry posted December 7, 2017. https:// blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/brexit/2017/12/07/environmental-protection-after- brexit-a-race-to-the-bottom/. Environmental Audit Committee. “Plastic Bottles: Turning Back the Plastic Tide.” 5. House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, First Report of Session 2017-19, December 22, 2017. 6. “Guidance on Applying the Waste Hierarchy.” DEFRA, 2011. 7. Hall, Sam. “Conservatives Need New Climate Policies to Attract Young Voters.” Green Alliance Blog. Entry posted November 10, 2017. https:// greenallianceblog. org.uk/2017/11/10/conservatives-need-new-climate-policies-to- attract-young-voters/. 8. Hogg, Dominic, Debbie Fletcher, Tim Elliott, and Maxine von Eye. Have We Got the Bottle? Implementing a Deposit Refund Scheme in the UK. N.p., 2010. 9. James. “How Does the German Pfand System Work, and Is It Effective?” Live Work Germany. Last modified May 21, 2017. https://liveworkgermany.com/2017/05/ howdoes-the-german-pfand-system-work-and-is-it-effective/. 10. Lee, Peter, Paul Vaughan, Caroline Bartlett, Tracy Bhamra, Vicky Lofthouse, and Rhoda Trimingham. Refillable Glass Beverage Container Systems in the UK. N.p., 2008. 11. Maltby, Kate. “The Tories Need to Find Ways to Engage Younger Voters, or Risk Extinction.” The Guardian, October 1, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2017/oct/01/tory-engaging-younger-voters-extinction. 12. Patrick, Katie. “21 Reasons Why Plastic Bottles Ruin Everything: Recycling Won’t Fix It, Zero Waste Will.” HuffPost. Last modified December 6, 2017. https:// www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/21-reasons-why-plastic-
bo_b_12848918.html. 13. “Recycling Rate of Municipal Waste.” Eurostat. http:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ tgm/refreshTableAction. do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=t2020_rt120&language=en. 14. Siewert, Lillian. “Which Beverage Packaging is the Best.” Spiegel, May 24, 2015. http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/ service/mehrwegflaschen-einwegflaschen-im- pfandflaschen-wirrwarr-a-1031491.html. 15. Simon, Joan Marc. “Beverage Packaging and Zero Waste.” Zero Waste Europe. Last modified September 7, 2010. https://zerowasteeurope.eu/2010/09/beverage- packaging-and-zero-waste/. 16. Smithers, Rebecca. “British Households Fail to Recycle a ‘Staggering’ 16m Plastic Bottles a Day.” The Guardian, October 15, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/ environment/2016/oct/15/british-households-fail-to-recyclea-staggering-16m- plastic-bottles-a-day. 17. Stefanini, Sara, and Charlie Cooper. “The Greenwashing of Theresa May.” Politico, January 10, 2018. https://www. politico.eu/article/the-greenwashing-of-theresa- may/. 18. Taylor, Matthew. “Rubbish Already Building up at UK Recycling Plants Due to China Import Ban.” The Guardian, January 2, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/ environment/2018/jan/02/rubbish-already-building-up-at-ukrecycling-plants-due- to-china-import-ban. 19. TOMRA. Response to Zero Waste Scotland- Deposit Return System- Call for Evidence. N.p., 2015. religion, culture, and society
The media’s impact on policy decisions: The case for accountability 1. Rosenstiel and Kovach 2000, p. 12 2. On Liberty (1859) 3. A Theory of Freedom of Expression, Thomas Scanlon, http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/ Courses/SCANLONfreeexpression.pdf 4. Media Accountability: Setting standards for Journalism and Democracy, Aidan White, http://ethicaljournalisminitiative.org/assets/docs/009/135/b548609-5902487. pdf Tackling radicalisation in British prisons 1. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-setsout-new-measures-to-tackle-extremism-in-prisons 2. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/01/ new-counter-extremism-taskforce-tackle-poisonous-repugnant-radicalisation/ 3. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/religionpublicsphere/2016/08/ prison-radicalisation-the-focus-should-be-on-rehabilitation-and-integration-not-segregation-muslim-chaplains-can-help-with-this/ 4. https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/apr/02/ counter-terrorism-unit-to-tackle-extremism-in-jails-inengland-and-wales 5. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/prison-extremism-task-force-tackle-islamism-radicalisation-a7661886.html 6. ‘Approaches to violent extremist offenders and countering radicalisation in prisons and probation’ RAN P&P Prac-
THE SPECTRUM titioners’ working paper, Second Edition, 2016. https:// ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/whatwe-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ about-ran/ran-p-and-p/docs/ran_pp_approaches_to_violent_extremist_en.pdf 7. House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, Number 07487, 14th April 2016, Radicalisation in prisons in England and Wales. The economics of faith: the Church of England’s financial survival 1. Addley, Esther (2016) Church of England decline heralds calls for innovative use of church buildings. The Guardian, 7 June [online]. Available at: https://www.theguardian. com/world/2015/jun/07/church-of-england-declineheralds-calls-for-innovative-use-of-church-buildings (accessed 07 March 2018). 2. Behavioural Insights Team (2018) Who We Work For Available at: http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/whowe-work-with/ (accessed 19 March 2018) 3. Bell, J., Hopkinson, J., and Archbishops’ Council (2017) Shaping Strategies for Mission and Growth in Rural Multi-church groups Available at: https://www.churchofengland.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/Shaping%20 strategies%20for%20mission%20and%20growth%20 in%20rural%20multi-church%20groups.pdf (accessed 22 February 2018). 4. Church Commissioners (2016) The Church Commissioners Annual Report 2016 Investing in the Church’s growth Available at: https://cms.churchofengland.org/sites/ default/files/2017-10/church_commissioners_annual_report_2016_0.pdf (Accessed 25 February 2018). 5. Church of England A (2018)Ethical Investment Advisory Group Policies and Reviews Available at: https://www. churchofengland.org/about/leadership-and-governance/ ethical-investment-advisory-group/policies-and-reviews 6. Church Of England B(2018) Strategic Development Funding Available at: https://www.churchofengland.org/ more/diocesan-resources/funding-mission-and-growth/ strategic-development-funding (accessed 20 February 2018). 7. Church of England (2017) Strategic Development Funding Summary of Projects Funded. Available at: https://www. churchofengland.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/Stra-
tegic%20Development%20Funding%20-%20consolidated%20list%20of%20projects%20%28master%20li.._.pdf (Accessed 20 February 2018) Hallsworth, M., List, J., Metcalfe, R., and Vlaev, I. (2017), ‘The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance’, Journal of Public Economics, 148, 14–31. Inclusive Church. (2018), About Inclusive Church Available at: https://www.inclusive-church.org/about-us (Accessed 19 March 2018). Kreander, N., Mcphail, K., and Molyneaux, D. (2004) God’s fund managers: A critical study of stock market investment practices of the Church of England and UK Methodists, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 17, Issue 3, pp.408-441 Available from: https:// doi.org/10.1108/09513570410545803 (Accessed 12 February 2018). Matthews, A. & Barrie S. (2017) Ethical Investment Advisory Group Annual Review 2016/17 and Report of the National Investing Bodies’ Engagement. The Church of England. Available at: https://www.churchofengland. org/sites/default/files/2017-11/EIAG%20Annual%20Review%202016%3A17.pdf National Council for Volunteer Organisations (2018) UK Civil Society Almana 2017/ Volunteer Profiles Available at: https://data.ncvo.org.uk/a/almanac17/volunteer-profiles-4/ (Accessed 19 March 2018). Paxman, J. (2017) Jeremy Paxman on the Church of England’s fight to survive. The Financial Times. September 06. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/fced3f209294-11e7-a9e6-11d2f0ebb7f0 (Accessed 01 March 2018). Tomkins, Richard (2008) A religion in Recession - Part 1 in Financial Times, July 11, Available at: https://www. ft.com/content/51e5c142-4d57-11dd-8143-000077b07658 (Accessed: 01 February 2018). Smith, P. (2018) Church of England fund becomes top world performer. The Financial Times. May 21. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/d87f60ec-3cbc-11e7821a-6027b8a20f23 (Accessed 01 March 2018). Statista. (2014) Attitude towards gay marriage in Great Britain 2014, by age. Available at: https://www.statista. com/statistics/298875/age-attitudes-towards-homosexual-marriage-in-great-britain/ (Accessed: 07 March 2018).
The views expressed in The Spectrum are uniquely their authors’ and do not represent the King’s Think Tank or King’s College London. The King’s Think Tank is a neutral organisation that enables and encourages students to explore and discuss policy.