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The Spectrum The Spectrum is the weekly blog and annual student-written policy recommendation journal published by King’s Think Tank. It is the essence of our organisation founded in the wake of the 2010 student protests. The Think Tank was designed to be the missing link between students, ever so politically active, and policy-makers. That is why The Spectrum is crucial: it is the platform and mechanism for great policy recommendations and research to reach MPs, select committees, Parliament and any and all interested parties. The King’s Think Tank invites students from all disciplines to contribute to problem-solving and engagement on a wide variety of issues, by attending panel discussions, roundtables and workshops throughout the academic year. The Spectrum provides an outlet for the thoughts and recommendations developed by students throughout the year. Based on how they perceive a problem and its solutions, students write policy recommendations, on their own or with the help of an academic mentor, which are then professionally edited by our editorial team. Mentors are paired with students on the basis of their field of expertise and interest in the subject matter.

The King’s Think Tank

Europe’s largest student-led policy institute King’s Think Tank exists to empower the student body with the tools necessary to become proactive in decision making, having a say before a policy is formulated. This is done through expert events, policy workshops, and training in how to write and advocate policies which communicate the student voice. We hope to build on the amazing work in 2016-17, and welcome you to our upcoming events and invites you to participate in our policy workshops. We strive to make sure student voices are heard before policy is formulated, giving students a platform and the training they need to be proactive in decision making. The opinions presented in these articles belong to the authors and do not represent the King’s Think Tank or King’s College London. The King’s Think Tank is a neutral organisation that facilitates and encourages students to discuss and explore policy. www.kingsthinktank.com

Editorial Team Editor-in-Chief Rocky Howe Sub-editor & design Ryan Lee Vincent


Contents Editorial Rocky Howe

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Policy in an age of crisis

Business & Economics Jason Myers

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Friendlier capitalism

A four stage approach to stimulating SMEs Charlotte Baker 11

The post-Brexit economy

Education Alizah Hameed, Anne Sie- 14 benaler & Marina Zabelina

The way forward for England

A comparative study of intercultural education at primary school level

European Affairs Allana Yurko 20

Transnational contention

A Comparative Analysis of the Environmental and Labour Movements in the European Union Valentina Arnez, Alexander 24 Botashev, ClĂŠmence Courteault & Aaron Mile

Migration allocation across Europe

Does the recast of the Dublin-Regulation provide proper solutions on how to allocate migrants in Europe?

Energy & the Environment Ryan Lee Vincent 31

Credibility & accountability

An interdisciplinary approach to consumer policy for the encouragement of sustainable behaviours Siddarth Narayan 35 Rob Terwel 37 Anne Siebienaler 38

The great divide Industrial strategy for a low-carbon economy Taking back control or continuing to obey

Britain’s difficult task of revisiting the benefits and costs of retaining current EU ecodesign requirements after Brexit

Defence & Diplomacy Irina Avdeeva 43

Transatlantic cooperation

An opportunity for more dialogue with Russia Alice Munnelly 45

Fostering peace and institutionalising democracy The Case for International Trusteeship of South Sudan

Mireia Raga 49

What do the previous Syrian ceasefires imply about the prospects of the current ceasefire?

Global Health Amally Ding 54 Grant Rosensteel 56

Treatment of opioid drug dependence in Russia and Australia Mapping the health of the nation

Modernising disease tracking and surveillance in the United States

Law Brad Albrow 59

Nicklinson vs Ministry of Justice, 2014

Diana Suciu 62

Facing juvenile capital punishment in Saudi Arabia

The constitutional complexity of assisted dying

All papers and articles are fully referenced in the appendix of this publication.


Policy in an age of crisis Rocky Howe We are told that we live in an era of crisis. The media bombards us regarding the significant political and economic challenges posed by Brexit, while we learn about the way in which the new American administration continues to wreak havoc on both its own domestic affairs and international relations through incoherent and mystifying actions. Beyond the global North, humanitarian crises seem abound in places such as South Sudan, Myanmar, and the Philippines. Some may further turn their thoughts to problems at the planetary scale – the absence of the direct and significant action necessary in the face of an urgent climate catastrophe worsened by the rollback of existing environmental protections.

and that of our past, however defined. There is a further assumption embedded into such a question – that while the world at large has changed, we ourselves continue to stay the same.

As such images of crisis at the local and global scale become increasingly normal, society is conditioned to contemplate its own existence as a succession of crises. One response we may have is to ask, “what happened to the good old days?” Such injunctions about the current state of the world certainly go further than mere nostalgic reference. Instead, we are asked to question if there are fundamental differences between the conditions of contemporary society

The price we pay in such a society is our trust and faith in the idea of governance. While some optimistically continue to advocate better governance, the more disillusioned seek extra-institutional solutions to our problems. Personal views on this ‘division of labour’ aside, practical worries about policy-making follow from such dialectics over the right kind of institutional arrangements, and by extension the role of and scope for governance in various domains of our lives.

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Such images of crisis, mediated through media and the computer screen, behave in a particular way. They act to attribute responsibility to the Other, which in today’s world, is the failure of governance in both producing and not addressing our crises. This may be a feature largely endogenous to the way we imagine the media’s role in society – as a check on government. More important is its capacity to, in turning our attention to governance’s failures and Kafkaesque absurdities, effectively distance ourselves from it.


One such worry is the normative question of Two brief proposals follow: what, in the first place, can be addressed through 1. Policy must demonstrate an empathetic policy. Should it promise to solve all our probunderstanding of who it impacts. Particularlems? What can policy actually do? By defining ly, the ways in which individuals and commusomething as a policy-problem to be solved or nities are affected by policy choices. Policy a problematic policy that should be fixed, notmust go beyond its spectacle to engage and ing that the two may be quite different, we widinvolve real people. Consequently, we should en the scope of governance itself. Similarly, we pay attention to who makes policy and what tend to ask question about the implications of kinds of practices and processes are involved particular trends, such as Artificial Intelligence or – has policy been sufficiently well-thought Automation, on policy. That acts to suggest that through and inclusive? there is a right way for policy to react, and especially ironically, to do so in the face of uncertain 2. Policy must straddle both the re-imaginand unpredictable future conditions. ing of the future and strategically address the pathways to get there. This means that Perhaps there really is a right way for policy to be policy must be visionary, paying attention to made, even if far beyond the reach of most huthe long-term objective it contributes to. In man beings, but the point here is one about payso doing, we may be led out of our crises, fuing attention to the way in which policy thinking/ ture and present. In practice, this requires the writing/advocating/making may imagine and right methods and tools to develop a deep produce itself as merely a response to crisis. As understanding of the complex environment both policy workers and concerned citizen-uswe make policy in, and a constant focus on ers of media images, we need to be careful that the bigger picture. our imagination of what policy can or should be does not fall into this parochial trap. The Spectrum as a project seeks to place policy-making in the hands of students. This ediIn today’s environment then, the task of poli- tion has gathered diverse views from students cy-making seems ever more difficult. In suggest- at King’s College London, each of whom invoke ing that policy work needs to carefully consider their imagination of the future whereby, we may its own underpinnings, it becomes important to begin to formulate policy that moves us beyond address how our policy thinking can stay true in our age of crisis. difficult times. 4


Friendlier capitalism A four stage approach to stimulating SMEs Jason Myers The King’s Think Tank, Business & Economics Policy Centre Many analysts have stated that Brexit was about the difficult economic realities faced by many citizens living outside of economic hubs such as London and Oxford. In particular, the advantages of globalisation have not spread in a uniformly distributed fashion (see section 1.1). With this as the background, this policy paper will try to animate two intentions of the current government. The first of these intentions refers to the vision of a friendlier capitalism mentioned by Prime Minister Theresa May. In order to meet this goal, this proposal will advocate the invigoration of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). This invigoration broadly splits into two parts, where the first is to help grow SMEs by encouraging greater partnerships between universities and business accelerators/incubators (section 2.1). In the second part, this idea of ‘friendlier’ capitalism is furthered via two policies to encourage increased partnerships between larger corporations and SMEs. The first policy proposal is based on the currently existing Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme except applied to corporations (section 2.2.1) whilst the second is the encouragement of R&D departments of larger corporations to work with SMEs in a mutually beneficial way (section 2.2.2). These proposals will help ensure that benefits accruing to larger corporations can be more easily spread throughout the economy helping to iron out inequality in a natural way. The second intention is related the government’s Northern Powerhouse policy where the idea is to help boost economies in the north “by investing in skills, innovation, transport and culture, as well as devolving significant powers and budgets [...]” [northernpowerhouse.gov.uk]. This principle is applied to the UK in general by expanding on government’s ”Economic Zones” (EZs) to include ideas of the previous section along with existing training schemes and other government policy. This will create an innovative solution to the problem of non-homogeneous geographic economic development in the UK. The core of the idea is to provide special incentives for new SME’s and branches of larger corporations to set up in geographically defined regions throughout the country (section 3). Before providing details of the proposal it should be noted that many of the following ideas build off of pre-existing policy largely within Scotland and Northern Ireland. These areas were precisely those that voted to remain within the EU outside of the highly industrialized English cities. The hope is this set of proposals will bring economic developments in a more uniform manner which may begin dealing with the displeasure shown by large portions of the population of the UK with their 23 June 2016 vote to leave the EU.

1 Setting the scene 1.1 Brexit results In the wake of the 23 June referendum results many analysts have spent time trying to understand why the country voted the way it did. Many converged on a similar idea borne from the evidence available, Brexit has a lot to do with uneven gains made by glo-

balisation. Torsten Bell (director of the Resolution Foundation think tank) found that the relative levels of pay are strong indicators of how people voted. As an example Mr. Bell says: “[one can compare] a leave vote of 76 per cent in Boston (the local authority with the lowest pay of all last year), to a leave vote of 31 per cent in Richmond-upon-Thames (the highest paid area)”. In September 2016 Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig, assistant professors at Bocconi University, wrote a paper entitled: Global Competition and Brexit. In their research they use disaggregated referendum returns and individual-level data to show that there is a clear relationship between support for Brexit and area regions hit harder by negative aspects of economic globalization. Matthew Goodwin, Professor of Politics at the University of Kent, and Oliver Heath Devoting Reader in Politics at Royal Holloway write for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation that: Amongst the most likely to vote for Brexit were people in lowskilled and manual occupations, people who feel that their financial situation has worsened. Brexit support had strong geographic components where “people with all levels of qualifications were more likely to vote leave in low-skill areas compared with high-skill areas”. Those who had been ‘left behind’ by rapid economic changes were far more likely to vote for Brexit. In fact, people who lack qualifications are at a significant disadvantage in the modern economy and people in low-skilled communities are further marginalised by a lack of opportunities. Many other commentators arrived at similar conclusions including Larry Elliott of the Guardian; Jean-Pierre Lehmann emeritus professor of international political economy at IMD; Nicolas Vron senior fellow at Bruegel in Brussels and a Visiting Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington DC; the list goes on. Clearly we face a challenge to bring marginalised members of society into the modern economy. 1.2 The argument for small and medium enterprises and ‘friendlier capitalism’ It is felt that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are the best way for government to deal with the issues outlined above. Largely because growth in this area easily translates to individuals and local communities. Firstly, encouraging citizens to start their own business is a way for those who feel marginalised to in some sense create employment for themselves. Secondly, SMEs tend to be less able to hire people from outside the country and so jobs remain local. Thirdly, these people tend to buy from stores based locally thus the whole local economy is stimulated. Larger corporations do have an immense role to play of course

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and so one can’t stimulate SMEs at their expense. Furthermore, due to their economic power these corporations have large potential to create change. One must also recognize the influence universities should have in any modern economy and these institutions need to be included in any reasonable proposal involving new business ideas. With this in mind, we arrive at the idea of ‘friendlier capitalism’. In this case, this term means the encouragement of relationships between SMEs, larger corporations and universities in such a way that all parties benefit from the interaction. Admittedly, this term is being used in the spirit discussed by Mrs. May not in her precise meaning of the term. One must also be careful to ensure large cities don’t reap all the benefits. Thus, the second part of this proposal presents an idea that will naturally encourage participation in ‘friendlier capitalism’ throughout the country, an idea that is recognized as necessary by government through policies such as “Northern Powerhouse”.

2 ”Friendlier capitalism” - Stimulating SMEs There are two broad ideas that involve three policy proposals in the attempt to stimulate SMEs. The first is university - accelerator/incubator partnerships. The second is to stimulate larger corporate involvement in the development of SMEs though investment and R&D partnerships. 2.1 University - incubator/accelerator partnerships Summary: Provide money to incubators/accelerators to hire graduate students with required technical expertise and ensure these graduates remain partnered to academic institutions to keep up to date on the latest developments. Foster relationships between incubators/accelerators and academic departments by providing funding for particular research on behalf of the accelerator while the accelerator provides the equivalent in staff time/material/equipment to the partner. Accelerators and incubators of new enterprises offer entrepreneurs the opportunity to obtain funding, contacts and information needed to either start or accelerate the growth of a new business. The government has already recognized the need for funding in these structures (see government proposal Unlocking the sharing economy). The UK space industry in particular has been identified as one that could benefit from assisting incubators and accelerators. This proposal goes one step further than simple investment in these projects. The government should be encouraging ties between universities and incubators. There exist some relationships but this proposal would see the introduction of programmes that mirror pre-existing schemes in Northern Ireland and Scotland that encourage links between general industry and universities (see government’s InterTradeIreland FUSION and Innovation Voucher Scheme in appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively). Many SMEs involve new and creative ideas that can, in many cases, benefit from input from university departments. However to achieve the largest impact with the minimum resources, it is best to provide this relationship directly to the incubators which can then pass on these valuable expertise to the many companies they will have contact with. This is particularly true for STEM subjects that can help provide and create new technologies and business subjects which provide knowledge on managing these SMEs in a modern economy. Furthermore, young people at universities would benefit massively from being involved with incubators/accelerators and their ties to the new businesses in their care. The economy as a whole would see the benefits of an increased base of individuals with vast experiences in setting up a new company. Clearly in isolation this idea may favour businesses in London and other larger cities. This issue is resolved with the proposal in section 3. Details This is a two pronged approach that relates to the InterTradeIreland FUSION and Innovation Voucher Scheme (appendices A.1 and A.2). 1) Graduate students If an incubator can display a particular need for the expertise offered

by a graduate the government should contribute half the fair salary amount for that student for a period of 12-18 months. The graduate in employment will receive mentoring from a partner academic institution that ensures the graduate maintains links within academia and, by extension, keeps up to date with the newest academic techniques and concepts. As this proposal is mirroring InterTradeIreland FUSION, the stipulations laid out in this programme should be applied to the case of incubators. For more details see appendix A.1 but some of the constraints include: Applicant to demonstrate the need for this type of technical support Applicant to demonstrate significant benefits to the company (e.g.. increased sales, efficiency, savings) In the original InterTradeIreland FUSION companies must provide assurance that the total amount of aid does not exceed €200,000 within any three year period. 2) Money to invest in particular academic research. An amount of money is provided to the incubator to spend on the cost of an academic research project that is paid to the university/ department/college that undertakes the project. This could be used to help a new business develop a new idea that requires some novel initial research at the outset. This proposal mirrors Innovation Voucher Scheme and as such see appendix A.2 for further details however some constraints include: Values provided are between £1,000 and £5,000, which covers the academic project costs. The company contributes an equal value in cash or in kind (such as staff time, materials or equipment) or a combination of both to the partner institution. Projects must be innovative (a novel/pioneering idea) and lead to new products, services or processes that will benefit the incubator’s client companies, the academic institution and the economy. 2.2 Large corporation involvement Summary: Encourage larger corporations to invest in SMEs with both money and advice in return for lower rates of corporation tax. Encourage partnerships between R&D departments of larger corporations and SMEs where SMEs join the R&D department for a limited time with the results of research used by both entities. The government provides multiple funds and incentive schemes accessible all over the country in multiple business sectors. However the largest economic players are not being utilized to help stimulate SMEs. To unleash this potential government can provide incentives to both large and small business in order to ensure they assist each other while both can reap the rewards of this partnership. In this way there are two suggested policy changes to begin addressing this issue. 2.2.1 Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) based policy There currently exists multiple schemes for investors to gain from investing in start up firms. These include the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS), see appendix A.3 This proposal outlines a broadening of the SEIS to encourage investment into start-up firms by large corporations. This is an attempt to encourage cooperation for mutual benefits. The advantage for the investor will be, as in the current SEIS, tax relief but now applied too corporate tax related to the size of the investment. In addition to the usual details of the scheme there should also be bonuses for providing advice to the start ups that comes from the investing corporation’s experience. Details A major concern is regulation of the advice given. In theory a company could claim to have provided advice to receive the benefits without actually having done so. To ensure that advice is actually provid-


equality. The bonuses for advice would be based on hours and a perceived usefulness index of the smaller firm. With regards to investment money the usual SEIS rules hold including a cap on the amount of share in the small business available to the larger corporation as well as an upper limit to the tax benefits. A slight variation in this case is that the amount of corporate tax reduction is related to investment size but not necessarily related to returns on that investment alone as in SEIS. Clearly, an important factor is the requirement that no ties exist between the larger corporation and the SME before the investment. Thus, a thorough investigation must be made to ensure the SME receiving the funding in no way belongs to the larger corporation. 2.2.2 R&D scheme There exists a scheme in place which provides R&D tax credits for SMEs (Corporation Tax: Research and Development tax relief for small or medium sized enterprises). The idea is to extend this scheme to allow larger corporations to receive R&D tax credits by allowing new enterprises into their R&D departments. The small firm gains from the resources of the larger corporation whilst the larger corporation would receive the benefits from the R&D. This is envisioned as a project-by-project basis which would create benefits for the two companies when they need the same/similar technology but for differing purposes. Thus both gain from the ideas. An example would be the development of particular machine learning algorithm, which may have multiple applications to both a large pharmaceutical institute as well as an SME in finance. Details This scheme would need to be constructed on a project by project basis i.e. the smaller firm would be brought in if it can be shown that its research will be useful for the larger corporation on a specific project. A thorough investigation into the ownership pyramid of the SME must be undertaken to ensure that the smaller partner is not an owed subsidiary of the larger firm. A special whistle blower hotline should be installed for just such a circumstance. There would be a limited number of repeat sessions between partner organisations to ensure companies don’t simply create a start-up to exploit the scheme.

3 “Northern Powerhouse” - Addressing geographic non-homogeneity of economic development Summary: Multi-stage development of current economic zones. Initially greater benefits for accelerators/SMEs/larger corporations to set up/move to these zones with multiple incentive schemes along with encouraged hiring from local populations. In the longer term a setting up of training centres for locals as well as local school buy in. Finally long term plans include local economic zone experts, school outreach and transport links. As mentioned in section 1.1 the UK tends to have had sustained economic development near large cities and less in further away regions. This has been recognised as an issue by the UK government through its “Northern Powerhouse” policy. To counteract this tendency this proposal introduces the fairly ambitious goal to create hubs, of ‘self-sustaining ecosystems’ of business participation. This will require buy in from universities, investors, entrepreneurs and large businesses. This concept already exists in a diluted form with the government creating special “Economic Zones” (EZs). These are areas that the government offers incentives to set up business in, see appendix A.4 for more details. See figure 1 for a map of the locations of these zones and note the geographic spread of the location involved. The departure point of this proposal is to combine the currently existing EZs with the proposals discussed above and other ideas. With the expansions to this policy we may begin redressing geographical in-

Figure 1: Orange zones were approved in 2011, Blue in 2015. Yellow zones were extended in 2015 and two purple zones came in to being.

Before moving on, there is one more issue that must be raised – proximity to a larger city is clearly advantageous even for an individual EZ. This proposal aims to help create more homogeneous growth so this advantage must be mitigated. To do this, the idea of a band is introduced. Bands will be defined by the proximity to an already existing large city i.e. band one is close to a large city, band two is a designated further distance out etc. An EZ’s perks are adjusted slightly to account for which band it will fall in. Further details of this approach would require more research so exact details of what distances should constitute which band shall remain undefined. This concept of bands is introduced to show that one can further develop mechanisms to help smooth out development in the country. To make this concept more useful and concrete, each band can be though of as having a corresponding band number where the closest is 1, the second closest is 2 etc. For ease of reference band numbers will be referred to as BN. These BNs will be used to multiply tax and other benefits that allow some flexibility in mitigating further geographical advantages. With the preliminaries done, I suggest an overhaul of the current EZs with improvements introduced in a stage by stage process. First stage Utilising the ideas in sections 2.1 , 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 but providing greater advantages to partners that set up in EZs. For example we could construct an incentive along the SEIS for corporations proposed above (section 2.2.1) where a (1+BN*0.2)% decrease in corporate tax rate is given on eligible amounts. There should be special attention paid to getting incubators and accelerators involved in these projects early on by offering them office space along with the usual perks of setting up in an EZ. A first step in the process should be a brief investigation into what perks would cause these companies to move as these should form a corner stone of the whole process. Ensure fast and reliable internet is installed in these areas (along with good network coverage) as most of the business moving will require these media to remain in contact. Provide tax incentives for large currently existing corporations to create branches and satellite offices in these regions. This information should be aimed initially at the tech industry and any others that do not require regular face-to-face meetings as these are the most likely candidates to try this. Tax incentives will be dependent on the number of staff in the satellite branch for example one could define a company with less than 10 employees receives a corporate tax break equivalent to (1+0.1*BN)% of revenue generated from these satellite offices, if the company has between 10-50 employees then (1.5+0.1*BN)% of revenue generated in the EZ etc. If head offices are moved to the EZs further benefits can be accrued. Encourage incubator/accelerator presentations and other entrepreneur related meetings and conferences to come to these zones. This could be done through assistance in setting up the programmes and organising the catering, providing the venues for free and other organisational assistance that occur when setting up conferences. A similar albeit weaker version of this is the government backed Find it in Worcestershire. As an initial stage, to reduce cost to government, it may be best to tap into the student population and offer internships where the interns are used to set up the conferences discussed above. Hiring from the local population should be encouraged through programmes like Scotland’s Employer Recruitment Incentive (appendix A.5). If there are skill short- ages in the local population the government can provide staff training (as is offered in Northern


Ireland through Apprenticeships NI discussed in appendix A.6 or through already existing National Skills Academies as discussed in appendix A.7). People should prove they are local by providing three years proof of residence in the catchment area. As an aside this proposal will help alleviate some of the issues around low skilled communities discussed in section 1.1. Providing national rail cards along the lines of the student rail card to ensure easier movement for people working in these areas. Also the setting up of shuttle routes when/if the worker force exceeds a certain threshold. This should be focussed on BN. Second stage Provide funding for and/or set up special training schools in these areas along the line of the currently existing National Skills Academies (again appendix A.7). Focus should be adjusted along BN. With the setting up of training schools in the area there should be growth of information creation/sharing. Independent enterprises should continue this and eventually the government would ease off this part of the programme. Initiate programmes similar to academic summer schools where the government could organise experts from around the country to talk about technological advances, again a student internship programme may be a very useful form of cheap organisation. This could be aimed at either experts or non-experts from the area.

ibre science, engi- neering or technology graduate”. Furthermore applicant company is partnered with an academic partner with specific expertise that will be used to assist the graduate. The graduate is as any other employee and is based at the applicant company throughout the project term which is 12 - 18 months. The difference with this graduate employee is s/he will receive mentoring from the academic partner and a InterTradeIreland FUSION consultant. To qualify for financial support through our FUSION programme, the applicant business must be: • • • • • • • •

The proposed project should:

Involve local schools in these summer school programs as this will help spread the information to the different parts of the UK.

Send people around to schools and universities advertising these EZs, effectively spreading the word as much as possible. This is a vital step in the process.

Third stage In the longer term set up small focused government backed offices in each EZ that have expert knowledge of funds in the area and advantages of their particular EZ. These services should be free at first but later backed by successful starts ups in the area (although there are many different government backed ways to get expert knowledge and advice these would be more specialised). Utilising local school students in some way may be a great outreach concept. Fourth stage (dreamer stage) In the long term increased transport links should be considered between these zones. One could even consider a particular value of the EZ as the point where automatic investment in transport links are begun. This also provides a very certain long term goal and future for these zones. One could consider trying to set up Max-Plank type of academic institutes in these areas, although this is very ambitious.

Conclusion and notes It is felt that by implementing the ideas in this proposal we can start meeting the large issues facing this country. In particular notice that many of these proposals build off of ideas only found in Northern Ireland and Scotland, two regions which voted to remain in the EU. With this in mind these proposals can be understood as non-radical but simply extensions of pre-existing schemes. However these simple extensions can ‘remake’ the UK into a power house for ideas and entrepreneurship to lead the global stage in the era of a post Brexit reality we face. A growth of SMEs will also have an immensely positive effect on local economies. The UK can show the world how to make capitalism friendlier by encouraging partnerships between SMEs, larger corporations and universities. Furthermore extending the EZs currently in existence will ensure that this time around, any economic advantages can be spread more uniformly throughout the UK. Even better is that this idea doesn’t rely on force by the government but by simple encouragement. A. Details of Existing Schemes A.1 InterTradeIreland FUSION in Northern Ireland FUSION provides support to industry by helping to fund ”a high cal-

A manufacturing or trade-able services company, located on the island of Ireland (North or South) Financially viable 2 year trading history Understanding of and capacity for innovation Indigenous to the island of Ireland 5 - 249 full time employees Able to demonstrate the need for InterTradeIreland FUSION technical support Able to demonstrate the capacity and commitment to support a FUSION project at senior management level

Demonstrate significant benefits to the company including increased sales, efficiency savings, increasing or sustaining employment etc. Include a significant level of innovation for the company or industry.

State Aid implications: • •

SMEs participation in the FUSION Programme equates to 31,000 (12 month project) and 44,250 (18 month project) of aid received. Companies will be required to provide InterTradeIreland with an assurance that the total amount of aid for innovation and advisory support services does not exceed 200,000 within any three year period.

For further information please visit http://www.intertradeireland. com/fusion/. A.2 Innovation Voucher Scheme in Scotland The purpose of a Standard Innovation Voucher is to encourage new first time part- nerships between a company and a university, research institution or further education college. • • •

The value of a Standard Innovation Voucher is between 1,000 and 5,000, which covers the academic project costs and is paid directly to the university, research institution or college. The company contributes an equal value in cash or in kind (such as staff time, materials or equipment) or a combination of both. All SMEs, social enterprises and third sector organisations with main company op- erations in Scotland can apply for a voucher if they are partnering with a research provider for the first time. Projects must be innovative (a novel/pioneering idea) and lead to new products, services or processes that will benefit the company, the academic institution and the Scottish economy. Businesses can also apply together to pool their vouchers to solve a common issue.

Further information can be found at https://www.mygov.scot/ innovation-voucher-scheme-scotland/. A.3 Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) For more details of the scheme please visit https://www.gov.uk/guidance/ seed-enterprise-investment-scheme-background. A summary of what this scheme entails for the investor:


• • •

Income Tax Relief - 45% of the initial investment. There are no exclusions to this tax break and it can also be spread across the current and previous years income tax bill. Capital Gains Tax Exemption - After three years sale of shares in the SEIS business will be 100% exempt from tax on any gains made. CGT Reinvestment Relief - If you have other investments separate from SEIS, and you decide to cash these in to reinvest in a project that qualifies for the scheme, your capital gains on these initial investments will be subject to a 50% reduction on tax. Loss relief - If the chosen investment should fail, the government offers loss relief which can be offset against tax on other income. The loss relief is offset at the level of the individuals highest income tax rate. The amount invested (minus 50% to take into account the income tax relief) is multiplied by the tax rate to work out the amount that can be claimed. Inheritance Tax Relief - 100% Inheritance Tax relief against the value of the shares is granted two years after the date of the initial purchase.

The company receiving funds will receive the following: • • •

Access to Capital - SEIS offers pure capital investment based on equity exchange, so no need to deal with banks. In the Shop Window - Its services/products are placed in front of a huge audience with a vested interest not just in investment, but in innovation. Investor Expertise - SEIS has also linked up new businesses with investors that have contacts and expertise in the sector in which they operate.

A.4 Enterprise Zones (EZs) There is a lot of information about these at http://enterprisezones. communities. gov.uk/. However some important highlights include: • • •

One receives up to 100% rate discount worth up to 275,000 per business over a 5-year period Simplified local authority planning Superfast broadband (if necessary with public funding).

There are also 8 Zones where there is 100% enhanced capital allowances (tax relief) to businesses making large investments in plant and machinery. The location of the zones can be found in figure 1.

plier will provide support throughout the apprenticeship. Usually the employee spends four days a week with the employer and one day with the training supplier. Employers pay you for time spent with the training supplier.

People who can apply for this programme: The person must be employed or be about to take up paid employment for a minimum of 21 hours per week on a permanent contract. Meet entry requirements of the chosen apprenticeship along with a number of eligibility considerations. Over 25 year-olds have certain restrictions. A.7 National Skills Academies The National Skills Academy (NSA) network was established by the Government to address the need for a world-class workforce with better skills than ever before; employer- led centres of excellence, delivering the skills required by each sector of the economy. National Skills Academies work with Sector Skills Councils (SSCs) and other industry bodies to drive change and achieve priorities identified by employers for their sector. They act as a first point of contact for employers to quality-assured training provision. Licensed by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) through the Skills Funding Agency (SFA), Skills Academies work collaboratively to share best practice in their respective sectors. The sectors represented by academies include: Many of the above would easily apply to the applications discussed in stage 2 of section 3. •

Construction

Hospitality

Power

Enterprise

IT

Process Industries

Environmental

Logistics

Railway Engineer-

Technologies

Manufacturing

Financial Services

Materials

Food & Drink

Production &

Health

ing •

Retail

Supply

The website for this initiative is http://www.nsa-network.co.uk/. However when on this site it does seem that this initiative needs to be reinvigorated. The upgrade of EZ’s as proposed provides a great opportunity to breathe fire into the initiative.

A.5 Employer Recruitment Incentive (Scotland) • Up to 4,000 for a company that commits to a new job or new Modern Apprentice (MA). • Funding is a contribution towards the additional costs of recruiting a young person during their first 52 weeks of sustainable employment. • Funding is available to private business or third sector organisations of any size recruiting someone who is 16-29 years old, fitting one or more of the eligible groups, • Applicant must demonstrate the capacity to offer sustained employment. Further details can be found at https://www.ourskillsforce. co.uk/ help-with-recruitment/our-one-stop-skills-shop/ scotlands-employer-recruitment-incentive/. A.6 Apprenticeships NI (Northern Ireland) Apprenticeships in Northern Ireland is a work-based programme designed around the needs of employers. It offers recognised training and qualifications to new and existing employees aged 16 and over, across a wide range of apprenticeships. More information is available at https://www.nidirect.gov.uk/campaigns/apprenticeships however a summary is provided below: • •

An apprentice receives off-the-job training to work towards achieving vocational qualifications and Essential Skills qualifications. The training supplier will meet with the employee and employer to develop a relevant training programme. This sup-

10


T

he post-Brexit economy Charlotte Baker

After a cryptic summer, Theresa May has made a speech outlining her plan for a ‘stronger, fairer and more global Britain’. Once Article 50 is triggered in March, negotiations will be underway, guided by a White Paper that has now passed through the commons. The White Paper does not guarantee the Prime Minister’s aims, as it stands. This is, of course, because only half of a negotiation can ever be predicted by a single party. However, it is also because replacing the 1972 European Communities Act with domestic laws under the Great Repeal Bill will not be an easy task. It is crucial that any ‘legal black holes’ are filled with adequate domestic legislation which mirrors the advantages of the customs union and single market. This policy recommendation therefore attempts to find solutions for trade, business and financial services which will preserve economic progress and increase productivity.

The Customs Union A significant theme in the Brexit campaign was, as Theresa May summarised, ‘the United Kingdom’s place in the European Union came at the expense of our global ties, and of a bolder embrace of free trade with the wider world’. It is important to assess the genuine significance of trade with the EU, and the possibilities for external trade. The European Customs Union ensured free movement of goods with a common external tariff and zero internal tariffs. This kind of reduced protectionism is beneficial to all parties; free trade allows countries to specialise in goods that they can produce most efficiently, meaning their trading partners benefit from goods at lower prices. The White Paper insists that the government will support the EU’s trade liberalising agenda, but turn away from the customs union by increasing trade with the ‘fastest grow-

11

ing and most dynamic export markets in the world’. May plans either to create an entirely new deal or remain a signatory for a part of it. The White Paper highlights that trade with extra-EU countries has been increasing in importance for the UK, while our exports to the EU have declined from 54% to 44% since 2000. As the fastest growing markets between 2005 and 2014 were South Korea, China, Brazil and Mexico, the logic is that greater freedom to trade outside the EU will allow for more opportunities to access these markets. There are a number of problems with this plan, most significantly that the EU still constitutes 44% of our export market, which is too large a proportion to compromise. Only 2 out of 10 of our top export markets – Switzerland and China – lie outside the EU. It is optimistic to believe that the 44% will be smoothly replaced with emerging economies, and it should not be presented as an easy alternative. Nevertheless, the newly-established Department for International Trade is making preparations for deals with China, Brazil and the Gulf, who have all expressed interest in trade deals, along with President Trump. Fresh consumers for Britain’s exports could be the boost the UK needs, but outcomes are far more difficult to predict than the security of the customs union. Future deals with the EU and emerging economies would fall under WTO rules, which follow the ‘most-favoured nation’ principle. This means that the lowest level of tariffs offered by a country must be offered to all countries. Outside of the customs union, the UK would be subject to the EU’s common tariffs, which would likely make imports more expensive for consumers. Replacing tariff-free goods from the EU with goods from emerging economies could therefore raise prices conceivably higher, depending on each country’s tariff policy. Negotiations over the level of protectionism are allowed before the UK leaves the EU, but striking a deal is forbidden. This requires a huge amount of confidence that countries will stay true to their word in the space between leaving the


EU, compromising 44% of British exports, and securing new deals.

The Single Market In her speech, Theresa May confirmed that the UK is leaving the single market. This is the EU’s overarching trade co-operation structure, which guarantees the free movement of goods, services, capital and people; remaining in it, to Theresa May, would mean ‘not leaving the EU at all’. The consequences for business of leaving the single market are significant. It guarantees streamlined non-tariff barriers, making business far easier between EU countries. While the White Paper claims it will maintain a positive environment for businesses, investors and consumers, the commitment to creating a ‘high quality, stable and predictable regulatory environment’ is unsubstantiated. For instance, domestic legislation will lose uniform frameworks for competition, consumer protection or goods standards such as packaging or safety rules, which help to integrate supply chains. The White Paper explains that the UK’s British Standards Institution will remain a part of international regulators such as the International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission, with the British Standards Institution. It insists that the European Standards Organisations are not EU bodies, and the BSI will work with them as much as possible. However, like WTO rules, international regulations constitute the bare minimum of standards, above which the EU implements far more. ‘Red tape’ to some, the opportunity to control the removal of these regulations may be liberating. However, in all likelihood the majority of these regulations will be re-implemented, and businesses may lose out during the process. Speaking for King’s Think Tank, Oliver Vardakoulias from the New Economics Foundation predicted a Singapore-style deregulation to attract business and maintain the City’s competitiveness. This would be a mistake; it would serve to deepen our dependence on services and create pockets of localized wealth, in the absence of Singapore-style social redistribution. Furthermore, liberalising services might detract from efforts to improve productivity in devolved areas and redress our trade deficit. The effect of restricted movement of capital and labour will have a further impact on businesses. Reducing EU immigration is clearly a priority for the Prime Minister, who emphasised her desire for controlled, higher-skilled labour. EU leaders have made it clear that all four pillars of the single market must exist in unison. Therefore, the UK’s inability to accept EU immigration removes the benefits of the single market to the economy as a whole, notwithstanding the estimated net benefit of EU immigration alone. In fact, some companies have reported labour shortages even before Article 50 has come into force, due in part to EU citizens’ uncertainty over their right to work in the UK.

Financial services The UK’s reliance on services means they must be protected at least in the short term. Just as manufacturing is encouraged, financial services should be protected due to their disproportionately large contribution to UK GDP, which reached 9.6% in 2013. ‘Financial Services Passports’ allow firms to deal with a common set of rules and regulations within the EU. By repealing EU law, UK firms can no longer rely on harmonized compliance standards, and vice versa. The White Paper stresses that there will be an interest in mutual cooperation; 27% of the EU27’s capital market is conducted through the UK, while the City does 78% of the EU’s foreign exchange business and holds 85% of EU hedge fund assets. This is supported by a particularly strong legal system, financial infrastructure and language. While it is likely that the EU has an interest in streamlining this practice, it is crucial for the UK to take the lead in maintaining EU standards. If this does not happen, then employers would be likely to move to alternative financial services bases; Dublin, Paris, Frankfurt and Luxembourg are poised to take the helm. Maintaining a lead in areas such as fintech will help to secure London’s position.

Policy Recommendations Remain a signatory in the Customs Union, to maintain low tariffs and protect 44% of our exports. Take advantage of new trade links with emerging economies, aiming for higher standards than WTO rules, but avoid dependence on unsecured deals. Replicate the conditions of the Single Market as far as possible under the Great Repeal Bill, to protect our exports of goods and services with the EU, avoiding reliance on inadequate global standards. Send a clear message to the public about the benefit of these standards and regulations. Maintain a focus on economic diversification and productivity growth through manufacturing, rather than deregulating the City of London as a means for growth. Reassure investors of the priority to retain the characteristics of financial services passports.

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The way forward for England A comparative study of intercultural education at primary school level Anne Siebenaler, Alizah Hameed & Marina Zabelina The King’s Think Tank, Education Policy Centre While immigration provides economic and social opportunities for migrants and host countries alike, it is a contentious issue and presents challenges in terms of how the needs of migrants are addressed in the host country. England’s growing foreign born population and net migration has created heightened pressure on schools and teachers to provide education for immigrant children. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), children from immigrant as well as poorer backgrounds are more likely to be clustered in disadvantaged schools than their counterparts in other countries such as France, Sweden and the Netherlands (The Guardian, 2012). Thus, in order to foster tolerance and close the existing gap between British born children outperforming immigrant children, the religions and ethnicities that the immigrant children come from must be understood and appreciated. Highlighting the importance of developing intercultural competencies through education, the following study has examined the progress made in the implementation of intercultural education at primary school level within three member states of the European Union that is, Sweden, Ireland and Greece. Hence, the main purpose of the present paper is to identify successful and exemplary intercultural policies that have been implemented within the above-mentioned three countries and thus formulate core policy proposals for England to adopt in order to strive for a more inclusive and understanding environment. The study is organised in three sections. It starts by defining what is meant by the concept of intercultural education and in what way intercultural education overcomes the shortcomings of the previously used model of multicultural education. Second, after presenting the countries’ migration patterns and existing intercultural education policy which formed the rationale for choosing these particular countries, the present paper will identify for each case study various successful intercultural education policies that touch upon three principal areas. More specifically, the following study will highlight the importance of introducing mother tongue language classes in primary schools so as to value non-English languages in the host school and support the parallel study of the L1 and L2 language. Another policy put forth is the inclusion and promotion of minority ethnic teachers within the profession and the integration of intercultural education within the initial teacher training. Similarly, the importance of enabling engagement with parents and the wider community beyond the school and include practical possible methods of implementing these varied policies will be emphasised. Lastly, basing itself on the previously identified intercultural policies, the following study will formulate policy recommendations for England to adopt in order to improve its existing intercultural education policies.

Section I

What is ‘intercultural education’ and how is it different from ‘multicultural education’? Although the key importance of education as a means of integration is widely acknowledged, there has been much debate as to whether immigrant children should exclusively adopt the second, mainstream culture of their host communities or keep their original ethnic identity. The assimilation model of education, which dominated education until the mid-1960s, was the very first model presented to solve the problems related to immigrants’ education in the host (Nikolaou, 2000). According to this model, all immigrant pupils irrespective of their national and cultural identity need to acquire the knowledge and skills which will permit them to participate in the society of the host country. Therefore, they have to learn the language of the host country and acquire its culture, too (Papas, 1998). School will help them learn the national language and culture which will lead to their assimilation and which in turn will help them to participate equally in the society. However, although at first this option might have looked attractive, the assimilation model turned out to be highly problematic as it risked leading to a potential marginalisation of immigrant children. According to the assimilation model, if pupils did not manage to acquire the ethos of the educational system of the host country, they were considered to be responsible for their educational inequality and therefore excluded so as not to disturb the balance of it (Katsikas and Politou, 2005). Consequently, if immigrants wanted their children to learn the language and the culture of the country of origin, this was thought of as a personal issue and not an issue for state schools. Towards the end of the 1960s there was a shift from the assimilation model to the integration model in education due to the disadvantages of the first (Katsikas and Politou, 2005). According to the integration model the cultural elements of immigrants should be accepted and respected as long as they did not threaten the cultural principles of the dominant group (Nikolaou, 2000). The supporters of the integration model believed that the introduction of immigrants’ cultural elements could facilitate their integration in the host country. Nevertheless, since cultural elements of immigrants’ identities were evaluated according to the cultural norms of the dominant group, the integration model did not imply any notion of equality of cultures (Papas, 1998). Hence, even though foreign pupils might have had the chance to be taught their first language and elements of their culture, such as music, customs and celebrations, might have been introduced in the curriculum, the emphasis

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was still on the integration of the immigrants into the culture of the host country. The model of multicultural education was actually the first educational model which focused on cultural pluralism compared to the aforementioned models which placed an emphasis on an ethnocentric approach in education (Watkins, 1994). According to multicultural model, which first appeared in 1970 in USA, Europe and Australia, education is a product of social, political, economic and intellectual interests. Multicultural education should therefore focus on the cultivation of tolerance and respect between people of different cultures leading to their harmonious coexistence. To put it differently, the advocates of multicultural education believed that all people are unique parts of a whole community irrespective of their cultural background (Kendall, 1996). Therefore, they should develop positive self-concepts (Blake and Hanley, 1995) and experience equality in schooling (Palaiologou and Evaggelou, 2003). The recognition of pupils’ cultures was thought of as improving their school performance (Markou, 1997) and leading them to academic achievement. In addition, the advocates of multicultural education maintained that multi-culturally educated persons have more respect for people from other cultures (Baker and Jones. 1998) and are not prejudiced towards them (Palaiologou and Evaggelou, 2003). Nevertheless, this model was criticised on the grounds that the coexistence of different cultural groups would not be enough to achieve mutual understanding and communication. As a consequence, emphasising the need of individuals to be able to respond to people from different cultures in a non-judgemental and evaluative way and try to explore under which circumstances each culture was constructed and by which factors it was affected across time, the model of intercultural model was developed. The term ‘intercultural’ implies a dynamic process in which interaction takes place between people or between groups of people having cultural differences. In other words, the concept of intercultural education refers to a dialogic process through which people make an attempt to understand the ‘otherness’, negotiate their differences (Language and Intercultural Communication [LinC] Group — Definition, 2008), resolve their conflicts (Council of Europe: The Concept of Intercultural Dialogue, 2008) and explore their similarities. According to the intercultural education model, there are not ‘good cultures’ and ‘bad cultures’. As all cultures are equal, the advocates of the intercultural model hold that all pupils’ cultural capital is equal and that therefore all pupils should have the right to experience educational equity (Baker and Jones, 1998). Likewise, culture is viewed as something that is constantly evolving and changing. Individuals come in contact with other people who have different cultural identities and they also receive incentives from mass media on a daily basis. It is thus natural to deny some of these incentives and to accept others of those so as to incorporate them in our cultural identity. School must thus be the place where all pupils’ cultures are going to meet each other and be negotiated (Gotovos, 2002). Teachers are responsible for creating opportunities in the classroom for all pupils to communicate by using elements of their cultural background (Batelaan and VanHoof, 1996). The key elements of this meeting and negotiation are the exploration of similarities and differences between cultures (Luchtenberg, 1988), and the exchange of ideas and symbols of other cultural systems (Bereris, 1999), so that pupils can understand that cultures may be different at some points but at the same time they can be similar at other points. Before moving towards the examination of the different case studies, it is important to note that intercultural education can be applied not only to solve issues relating to immigration, but also more general issue related to social diversity in general.

Section II

Case Studies

Country profile – Greece

During the last three decades, Greece, like many other countries in Europe, has experienced rapid socio-demographic changes. More specifically, especially since the 1980s, the Southern European coun-

try has experienced a significant influx of immigrants. The presence of many groups of immigrants, with different national background, as well as the massive numbers of asylum seekers who enter Greece with their children are presenting a growing challenge for the Greek education sector. Foreign pupils mainly come from countries which are adjacent to northern Greece and their parents decided to emigrate to Greece either due to war, as in the case of Yugoslavia, or due to the political situation, as in the case of Albania, Bulgaria and Romania (Markou 1997). Repatriate pupils come from the ex-Soviet Union (Georgia, Kazakstan, Moldavia, Russia, Armenia, Ukraine) and they decided to return to their national homeland, because their ancestors were of Greek origin (Palaiologou, 2000). In northern Greece, Thrace, the pupil population is multicultural. It consists of the native group of pupils and the Muslim group of pupils. The Muslim group includes three different categories of people; those with a Turkish origin, those with a Pomak origin and Roma, that is the existence of the minority group in Thrace is defined institutionally by the criterion of religion. Some

Roma pupils are Christian Orthodox (Askouni, 2006). As shown in Table 1, for which data has been provided by the Directorate of Studies, Programmes and Management of the Greek Ministry of Education and Religion for the period 2010 - 2015, due to the decrease of the main migration flaws from former Soviet Union countries, Albania and Bulgaria to Greece as well as the return of many repatriates who were living in Greece to their home countries in the wake of the financial crisis, there seems to be a rapid decrease in the number of immigrant and repatriate pupils who are registered at public primary schools. Nevertheless, at the same time, given the implementation of relevant educational programmes aiming at their education and social inclusion, there seems to be an important increase in the number of Roma pupils within public schools.

Successful intercultural policies in Greek Primary Schools This cultural and linguistic diversity puts to the test an educational system which, until recently, was dominated by an ethno-centric attitude based on the national, linguistic and religious homogeneity as well as on the continuity with antiquity. In order to abandon the obsolete wish for uniformity and take into account the linguistic as well as cultural diversity which is actually present in Greek primary schools, throughout the years the Greek education system has shifted from an assimilation towards an intercultural education model which allows to accommodate both foreign and repatriated pupils. The first measures for the education of repatriate pupils were taken in 1980 with the foundation of reception classes and intensive classes. From 1980 to 1994 amendments were made in the regulations referring to reception classes and intensive classes to teach Greek as a second language to enable their better organisation and operation. However, both types of classes aimed at pupils’ assimilation, they had not sufficient respect for pupils’ cultural identity and it was difficult for teachers to co-educate repatriate and foreign pupils because they constituted two different groups of pupils that had different educational needs (Sfakakis, 2007). In 1984 and 1985 small schools for Greek immigrants were founded and operated for the children of Greek immigrants from English-speaking and German-speaking countries. Later on these schools were renamed into ‘Schools for repatriates’. However, the term was still problematic because it did not reflect the composition of the pupil population of these schools. Essentially, the operation of these schools constituted a specialised type of education, which did not take into account the needs of foreign pupils who were later accommodated in those schools and


certainly did not meet the needs of intercultural education (Kontogianni, 2002). In this regard, Law 1234/1996, while institutionally recognizing the aims of the implementation of intercultural education in Greece, constitutes a very important step forward. Nowadays there are about 13 so-called intercultural primary schools operating in Greece. They are spread all over Greece and accommodate different cultural groups of pupils. Repatriate pupils come from the ex-Soviet Union (Georgia, Kazakstan, Moldavia, Russia, Armenia, Ukraine). Foreign pupils have come from countries which are adjacent to northern Greece (Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria) (Kokkinos, 1991). There are also a sufficient number of Roma pupils in some of those schools and the intercultural primary schools in Komotini in northern Greece, have the particular characteristic of accommodating Muslim pupils of Turkish origin and Pomak pupils who are also Muslim (Magos, 2004). As regards the successful integration within the Greek society of the above-mentioned groups of pupils, the intercultural primary schools present in Greece have focused on providing a well prepared teaching staff. Besides being well informed about the meaning of intercultural education, teachers are knowledgeable about pedagogical teaching techniques which emphasise the use of cooperative learning and discussions within the framework of group work or pair work as well as the incorporation of the interdisciplinary approach during teaching. Using the above-mentioned techniques, teachers have been able to establish a relationship of trust with the pupils and developing cooperation with pupils’ parents by organising frequent meetings with them. They have stressed the use of pictures and objects in order to facilitate communication with foreign and repatriate pupils, especially in the very beginning when they do not know the formal language of the host country at all. Moreover, teachers have encouraged foreign pupils to use their first language in the classroom either by urging them to bring their school books, fairy tales and myths from their home country and read them in front of their classmates or by encouraging them to write books, diaries or articles for the school newspaper in their first language. This is essential on the one hand for not making pupils feel rejected; on the other hand for their cognitive development and the learning of the second language. Additionally, teachers have made sure to present all pupils’ cultural characteristics in every school subject, aiming at exploring the similarities and differences between different cultures, play an important role. In this way, they managed to make pupils feel that their cultural identity is accepted and valued in the school. Particularly through artistic activities, such as painting and the organisation of theatre plays, all pupils express themselves and share their cultural experiences with their classmates (Tsaliki, 2012).

Country Profile – Sweden

Sweden has one of the highest migrant populations in Europe and its policies are immigration-friendly, often cited as one of the model countries for education. In 2016, Sweden saw an influx of migrants that was 16.5% (per 1000 inhabitants) of the population (Summary of Population Statistics, 2017). This was a consistent and significant rise in immigration form previous successive years with the statistics standing at 13.8% in 2015 and 13.2% in 2014 (Summary of Population Statistics, 2017). Sweden’s immigration population up until the 1970s was largely from countries it shared cultural similarities with. These migrants chose to move to Sweden for economic reasons, seeking prosperity and success (OECD, 2010). However, the shift from a migrant population that arrived on predominantly economic reasons to those who arrived for humanitarian reasons occurred due to major political events around the world. With the change of the political climates in in Iraq, Iran and Poland in the 1980s, and similar significant occurrences in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, migrants left their origin countries and fled to Sweden to build better and safer lives for themselves. Current day Sweden’s migrant population, due to humanitarian reasons, largely originates from former Yugoslavia, Iran, Iraq, Poland and Turkey (OECD, 2016). With this influx of immigrants near the end of the twentieth century, it was imperative that Sweden takes measures to ensure that the immigrants assimilate into society and prosper. Foremost in these measures were the educational needs of the migrant children. As these children did not come from countries with similar ethnic en-

vironments as Sweden, their languages, religions and cultures were vastly different to their new home country. Policy makers were faced with the challenge of ensuring that these children are not left behind in school, as it would weaken their chances of success in life later on. Immigrant students in Sweden, especially first generation immigrants, tend to do poorly in comparison to Swedish students, resulting in poor education outcomes (OECD, 2010). This could be a result of their tendency to be left behind in their studies due to socio-economic reasons along with the difference in language. It highlights the need of a well-rolled out language-oriented migrant policy. Sweden already has a language policy in place for migrant students that can be very effective, however, due to a decentralized government, it faces difficulties in mass implementation of this policy. The importance of languages has been recognized by the government through its support for teaching the host language to migrant students while also allowing them to continue studying their mother tongue. The issue facing this policy is the lack of awareness among the masses, which hinders it from being fully implemented. Furthermore, schools have autonomy in Sweden, which means that they may all have different policies. Immigrant children who go to an expensive school will be able to benefit more as compared to those who go to schools in poorer neighbourhoods with fewer resources at their disposal.

Successful intercultural policies in Swedish Primary Schools Sweden’s Education Act states, ‘all children, including immigrants, shall have equal access to education in the public school system’ (OECD, 2010). This shows the commitment the Swedish government has to protecting the rights of the immigrants and providing them the means to build their new lives. With such a policy in place, there can be no discrimination against these children on any grounds as the government grants them the right to free and quality education. Therefore, even migrant families with very little means can send their children to school, especially in primary years, which further allows them to work without having to worry about their young ones. As mentioned earlier, Sweden provides support for language and culture as part of its curricular aims (OECD, 2016). The reason for this is for pre-school children to be able to continue studying their mother tongues while also learning Swedish. Children at a younger age can pick up languages more easily, therefore, bridging some of the gap in educational outcomes between Swedish and immigrant students. This will result in a foundation for ‘active bilingualism and a dual culture identity’ of the students (Ministry of Education and Science in Sweden, 1999). Swedish legislation also guarantees guidance in mother tongue studies for those who need the extra support (OECD, 2010). This policy allows immigrant children to embrace their roots and ethnic heritage. It shows that Sweden is respectful of the various cultures students bring in to the classroom and is actively working to preserve and promote those cultures. Mother tongue studies are also supported by the national curriculum for pre-schools (Ministry of Education and Science in Sweden, 1999). When allowing children to pursue studying their mother tongues, it is creating a space for younger children to discuss their cultures with their peers and encourage openness towards other cultures and embracing them, while also helping their social and emotional development. The policy to support mother tongue classes for immigrant children in pre-school was introduced in the 1980s and was financed by state grants; more than 50% of the children benefitted from this policy shift (Ministry of Education and Science in Sweden, 1999). In some municipalities of Sweden with large immigrant populations, special half-day language training programs were arranged for immigrant children who did not have access to regular schools. The government arranged for funds to be provided to these areas that were ‘in need of special support’ so that all children aged three and up could have access to these activities and programs (Ministry of Education and Science in Sweden, 1999). The Swedish curriculum for early years outlines the guidance for teaching of the mother tongues and Swedish as a Secondary Language. One of the key components of the guidance structure is how the importance of culture and language is being stressed in the pedagogical techniques. Children should not only be able to speak, read and write both languages but also be able to ‘reflect over traditions, cultural phenomena and social questions in areas where the mother


tongue is spoken based on comparisons with Swedish conditions’ (Swedish National Agency for Education, 2011). It is important to stress this notion so that there is no question of superiority of culture or language, but a drive to seek understanding of both in terms of both languages and cultures. While the language support produces significant advantages for students with different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, there is need for more policy changes and improvements. More peer-learning opportunities should be encouraged so that students can engage with different those from different cultures and learn from one another. It will build tolerance and appreciation. Furthermore, school leaders should be trained for diversity and teachers should be recruited from diverse backgrounds, including immigrant backgrounds, to encourage inclusivity, provide a safe space for immigrant students and enhance the learning experience of the students.

Country profile – Ireland

In order to understand the intercultural education policies that Ireland has chosen to implement at the primary education level, it is necessary to depict the current migration and education background of the country. In the past two decades Ireland has experienced a remarkable change in its migratory patterns. The country has shifted from large-scale emigration, which has characterized Irish development in the 18th and 19th centuries, to receiving a significant number of immigrants from a wide range of ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds (Yoffe, 2011). Currently, Ireland is in 7th place in the OECD in terms of the share of immigrants in its population, with the foreign-born accounting for 17% of the total population. 46% of them arrived in the last 5 years compared with 22% on average across OECD countries (OECD, 2012). Within this statistic is a large portion of EU nationals. According to Eurostat, 59 per cent of migrants in Ireland are EU nationals (RAND, 2016). The highest shares of migrant children under 15 years of age (as a proportion of all children under 15 years of age) are found in Luxembourg (19.5 per cent) and Ireland (9.8 per cent) (Janta and Harte, 2016). However, it would not be accurate to suggest that Ireland has only recently experienced diversity. Significant minority ethnic, linguistic and religious groups have long been part of Irish society (National Council for Curriculum and Assessment, 2006). Ireland’s Department of Education and Skills (DES) has identified the long-standing Traveler community as a one of the key community in need of integration into the Irish education system. To allow these migrant and minority ethnic children to strive in primary education, Ireland’s DES has introduced a number of policies such as intercultural education training for teachers and the increased allocation of resources aimed at providing higher quality English as an Additional Language (EAL) to students in need.

Successful intercultural policies in Irish Primary Schools The last fifteen years has seen Ireland’s government extensively develop diversity and inclusion within educational establishments through legislation. The Education Act passed in 1998 asserts that the national education system will “promote the language and cultural needs of the students” and “promote best practice in teaching methods with regard to the diverse needs of students” (Kelly, 2014). Furthermore, the Equality Act 2004 set out a prohibition on discriminating in access to education on any grounds (Kelly, 2014). Beyond the legislative measures, key steps have been taken to ensure that migrants are given the tools necessary to access mainstream education by providing them with additional English language support. In 2013, Polish became the second most spoken language in Ireland after English, while Irish, the nation’s official language placed third. With approximately 120,000 people speaking Polish as their first language, and with a further 75,000 individuals not speaking English well according to the 2011 census, the number of children entering primary education with proficiency in English is quickly decreasing. (Kelly, 2014) Teachers and education providers alike face serious challenges in accommodating diverse language needs for the thousands

of students who face barriers to success in mainstream education. One response to the challenges facing teachers in providing language support for students in need came in the Statement of Strategy for 2008-2010 (DES, 2008). A central objective of the report was to provide “resources and support for newcomer children” through the distribution of specialized language support teachers as well as curricular support staff. The government’s 2007 long-term development plan, ‘Transforming Ireland- A Better Quality of Life for All’ had promised a total of €637 million for a language support sub-programme that would allow migrants to essentially benefit from mainstream education at an equal level to their English-speaking peers (Government of Ireland, 2007). These funds were for the employment of additional language support teachers and teaching resources. Ireland has recently introduced a profiled allocation model for primary schools that replaces the previous General Allocation Model used to provide EAL teaching support. The new model ensures that all schools maintain a basic allocation of resources to guarantee help for students with learning and literacy difficulties (DES, 2017). This baseline component, which was strongly recommended by the Working Group to be a key component to the new model, will support schools in establishing policies to mitigate low achievement and learning difficulties (DES, 2017). With the baseline, schools can feel confident teaching students with additional learning and language needs and enrolling future students. Furthermore, where it is evidenced by schools they can continue applying for ‘Additional Allocations for Schools with High Concentrations of Pupils that require Language Support (EAL)’ (DES,2017). However, the success of teaching EAL in primary schools does not solely rely on funding for teaching resources, it is also contingent upon training staff and teachers to ensure best practice. From a survey of Language Support Teachers (LSTs), 68% disclosed that they had Continuing Professional Development (CPD) training for language support either through education centres, online courses or in service days organized by the Integrate Ireland Language and Training (IILT). Out of the participating LSTs, “three-quarters of respondents felt they had received a ‘good’ level of training” (Murtagh and Francis, 2012). Evaluation of EAL training shows that attendance and participation have been high, and that teachers found the pedagogical approaches helpful (DES, 2012) On one hand, the feedback as to the quality of EAL training has been favorable, the DES identified an issue in terms of balancing the EAL budget for allocation of resources and CPD (DES, 2012). A review of expenditure for language support published by the Integration Unit of the DES in 2011 found that there was a “mismatch between the funding available for EAL teachers’ salaries (over €136 million in 2008/9) and the funding available for their CPD (under €1 million in 2009)’ (DES, 2012). The recommendation was to rebalance this and increase expenditure for EAL training. This advice can be applied to the United Kingdom in terms of providing accredited and consistent EAL training and by also allocating more funding to ensure high quality professional development. Prior to 2011, EAL funding in the UK stemmed from the Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant (EMAG) that local authorities received. This grant attached the requirements that it would be used to support EAL teaching. In 2011, the funding responsibility was transferred from the Home Office to the Department for Education and this grant was combined into “general school funding” without stipulated requirements to use these funds on EAL support (NALDIC, 2015). Therefore, while a budget existed that could be used for EAL, there was no specific fund to meet the language needs of students. The National Association for Language Development in the Curriculum (NALDIC) have argued that these children’s needs are not properly met without “additional and clearly defined funding” (NALDIC, 2015) The NCCA have also published helpful guidelines for teachers to assist children learning EAL that include creating a buddy system whereby a child will be partnered with another student who may share the same language who can facilitate dialogue and understanding before knowledge of English is developed. Moreover, the buddy system avoids isolating migrant or minority pupils who may yet have knowledge of the English language or local culture. Schools should also involve parents from an extensive array of linguistic back-


grounds to assist with interpretation and translation help for newly enrolled students as well as celebrating their language, customs and culture. Parents can also help with sourcing materials that can be incorporated into the classroom that reflects the child’s culture (NCCA, 2006). Another area in which the United Kingdom can look to Ireland for reform is with the incorporation of intercultural education at the Initial Teacher Training (ITT) stage. Ireland’s initial teacher education curriculum includes modules that comprise the Foundation Disciplines of Education. These modules consist of the History of Education, the Philosophy and Sociology of Education, the Psychology of Child Development, Teaching and Learning and Inclusion and Diversity –an umbrella module that involves meeting the diverse needs of students including those with special education needs and intercultural education (European Agency for Special Needs and Inclusive Education, 2017). The Department for Education recently published a “Framework of Core Content for ITT” following the Carter review of ITT. The Framework, while highlighting the need to adapt to students with diverse needs such as those with EAL, it makes no direct reference to intercultural education. Major organizations have shown their support for intercultural education training for teachers including the Erasmus+ Programme and the Council of Europe who undertook the initiative to provide intercultural education in ITT in the 1970s (Huber, 2012). The UK must look to adopt these provisions into their ITT to ensure quality and uniform training. Equipping teachers with an understanding of intercultural education will nurture a culturally inclusive classroom environment where students can develop into tolerant members of their communities and society.

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Transnational Contention A Comparative Analysis of the Environmental and Labour Movements in the European Union Allana Yurko

T

he emergence of national social movements is intricately related to the rise of the modern nation-state. It is thus unsurprising that, in light of global integration and the decline of national autonomy, new forms of contention have started to develop. This has primarily manifested itself in the transnational social movement (TSM), defined as “sustained contentious interactions with opponents – national or non-national – by connected networks of challengers organised across national boundaries”. The European Union (EU), an explicit illustration of the integrative processes occurring worldwide, provides a useful context within which to investigate these new forms of contention. In an effort to assess the challenges and opportunities associated with contemporary TSMs, I will adapt and apply the traditional concepts of social movement theory in a comparative analysis of the environmental and labour movements in the EU.

Political Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, Framing Processes The study of social movements has come to recognise three factors as central to movement emergence and development: political opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing processes, which independently and interactively shape nation-specific collective action. For example, Voss (1994) found that the interplay of these three components, alongside well-organised counter-movements, explained the failure of the U.S. Knights of Labour movement in the 1890s. As TSMs are an evolution of these national movements, these same factors have been applied to address new forms of transnational contention. Although the efficacy of this approach has been questioned due to the unprecedented complexity and integration of the 21st century, it is the specificities of these factors, rather than their conceptual foundations, that differ in the transnational context. Therefore, this framework, with minor theoretical adaptations, can be used to assess the contemporary character of EU-level social movements. The first of these factors, political opportunities, focuses on options for collective action that depend on political institutions and actors outside the mobilising group. Accordingly, Kriesi et al. (1992) found that new social movements were influenced by the formal institutional structure of the French, German, Dutch, and Swiss political systems. Political opportunities can be both dynamic and fixed, with the former focusing on the presence of elite allies and the stability of elite alignments, and the latter centred around the relative openness and propensity for repression within a political system. Although these specifications were developed in reference to national political systems, they have recently been adapted to the multi-level governance structures of the EU. For example, in her operationalisation of static political opportunities, Parks (1992) develops variables such as the rules on dialogues with third parties and attitudes towards differing opinions within EU institutions. Within the same framework, it is the presence of hostile elites, contingent events, and the electoral instability of the European Parliament and Commission that shape dynamic opportunities. However, social movements will be unable to capitalise on these political opportunities without the internal organisation and resources necessary to sustain mobilisation. This is indicative of the second ex-

planatory factor, mobilising structures, which focuses on the formal and informal collective vehicles through which people engage in collective action. Although informal networks may facilitate initial communication amongst activists, formal social movement organisations can maintain coalitions and long-term campaigns in the later stages of movement development. These formal mobilising structures are thus central to an analysis of the well-established environmental and labour movements in the EU. The concept of a transnational social movement organisation (TSMO), which services a membership active in more than two states, has also been developed to capture the supranational nature of EU-level mobilising structures. The formal governance and organisational structure of these TSMOs, as well as how they promote dialogue among different groups within their membership base, will form the basis of the present discussion. However, a sole focus on internal structures and external opportunities would neglect the ideological nature of social movements. It is for this reason that the preceding factors are complemented by framing processes, defined as the “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves”. In an effort to foster collective identity and solidarity amongst disconnected individuals, social movements must use diagnostic frames to describe grievances persuasively and prognostic frames to present feasible solutions. For example, Cress and Snow (2000) found that the use of well-articulated diagnostic and prognostic frames helped 15 US-based SMOs achieve representation, rights, and relief for local homeless populations. As framing processes are, by definition, less contingent on the surrounding context, this concept can be more directly transposed to the EU arena. This analysis will parallel research on transnational framing processes by examining the internal and external rhetoric produced by TSMOs. I will now turn to a chronological, comparative assessment of these three factors as they relate to the environmental and labour movements in the EU, beginning with static political opportunities.

Static Political Opportunities The EU-level environmental and labour movements have developed in tandem with EU institutions, as enhanced policy jurisdictions have promoted, and to an extent required, transnational forms of advocacy. While the Treaty of Rome limited the European Economic Community’s power to economic matters, from which organised labour groups were largely excluded, the EU’s legislative power in the social and environmental domains has been consistently elevated since 1957. In terms of environmental policy, post-1980 legal and institutional reforms have upheld EU environmental protection as a definitive goal rather than simply a mechanism for internal market competitiveness. For example, the Maastricht Treaty emphasised that “the task of the community is to promote environmentally sustainable growth”. Similarly, efforts have been made throughout the European integration process to develop a more proactive, all-embracing employment policy, as exemplified by the European Employment Strategy launched in Luxembourg in 1997. This development, which was updated in the 2011 “Europe 2020 Strategy”, not only indicates the EU’s ability to legislate on employment matters, but also the normative commitment by these institutions to harmonise national policies in a way that promotes social cohesion and equality. The EU’s policy competence has ushered in concerns about the

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democratic deficit associated with unelected officials and technocratic decision-making. In an effort to enhance the legitimacy of EU governance, institutions have begun to formulate ways to enhance political participation in lieu of elections and party competition. This ‘participatory turn’ has led to the inclusion of civil society organisations, as representatives of multiplicative public interests, in the policy-making process. The most notable development in this regard was the Commission’s 2001 White Paper on Governance that defined principles of good governance, broadened the participation of civil society groups, and extended the range of consultative instruments used by the Commission. In similar vein, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam extended co-decision rights to the European Parliament, giving this more ‘open door’ institution the right to approve and ratify legislation alongside the Council of Ministers. While these are just two aspects of the democratic reforms being implemented across the EU, it becomes clear that, by augmenting the structural openness of the political system, these legitimacy concerns have worked to the benefit of the environmental and labour movements. This trend towards pluralistic decision-making has prompted legislative reforms that enhance the static political opportunities available to the environmental movement. The most impactful development in this regard has been the 1998 Arhus Convention. This convention was aimed at involving citizens, and their representative organisations, in policy-making by providing open access to environmental information, the ability to participate in environmental decision-making, and the right to challenge public decisions that violate environmental law. This non-enforceable UN agreement was corroborated in 2003 by two EU Directives that imposed strict obligations on member states to promote transparency and participation in environmental matters. This institutional openness has been complemented by an inclusive attitude towards differing opinions, as evidenced by the Commission’s desire to counter-balance the influence of well-staffed private sector groups through the provision of financial support to environmental NGOs. These developments, alongside the Commission and Parliament’s initiation of dialogue groups, committees, and policy forums, illustrate the abundance of static political opportunities available to the environmental movement in the EU. While “environmental NGOs are probably the most advanced in terms of the various EU groupings regarding civic dialogue”, the labour movement has also been met with static political opportunities in the social policy domain. Most notably, the Maastricht Treaty provided organised labour with a participatory role in stating that “The Commission shall have the task of promoting the consultation of management and labour at Community level and…facilitate their dialogue by ensuring balanced support for the parties”. Within this same treaty, the Social Protocol allowed the negotiated agreements of EU-level unions and employer associations to be substituted for binding legislation. Compulsory consultation of the social partners by the Commission and Council was also implemented for a vast array of labour market and social policies. Soaring unemployment in the 21st century has led to a greater reliance on this social dialogue. Accordingly, the Commission called upon the social partners in 2002 to formulate agreements on employment issues, such as teleworking and work-related stress, via autonomous work programmes. However, labour organisations continue to be excluded from macroeconomic policy negotiations, rendering them unable to shape the economic conditions that determine their material grievances. Although the completion of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) undermined national wage bargaining systems, workers were largely excluded from EMU negotiations. In fact, EU monetary policy is one of the few areas that has maintained exclusivity from civil society despite the participatory turn of EU institutions. Competition policy is similarly insulated from citizens, labour organisations, and directly elected parliamentarians: the Council and Commission autonomously specify and execute the regulation of company mergers. Indeed, the Commission focuses solely on competition issues when regulating private sector concentration, even though it leads to a breakdown of labour-management relations and collective dismissals. The closure of these domains has meant that EU-level unions “base their work on rather weak political exchange power” in the macroeconomic policy areas that most directly affect them. It is for

this reason that the environmental movement possesses comparatively more static political power than organised labour, as environmental TSMOs are able to comprehensively influence the EU policies that most align with their goals and motivations.

The Decline of Dynamic Political Opportunities The strategic position of organised labour, relative to environmental TSMOs, has been further undermined by the neoliberal orientation of the EU since the 1980s. Prior to the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, neoliberal visions of unbridled capitalism were inhibited by post-war social compromises and economic cooperation. However, stagflation in the 1970s paved the way for conservative business interests, such as the European Roundtable for Industrialists, to push for market-mediated competition that would overcome national labour market rigidities. This neoliberal orientation, combined with the process of ‘mutual recognition’ that dominated policy-making throughout the 1980s, led to a residualisation of the social models enshrined in member states. Furthermore, price stability became the focus of monetary policy, thus apportioning economic gains from the general public to inflation-sensitive financial institutions. Despite the negative integration of labour market policies in this period, organised labour was provided with limited dynamic opportunities by the Delors Commission (1985-94), which endeavoured to balance internal market competitiveness with social cohesion. However, as neoliberal trends have intensified in recent years, even these somewhat ambiguous, non-binding claims have fallen to the wayside. This is perhaps most exemplified by the dearth of consultation responses by EU-level unions to the Commission’s Europe 2020 Strategy, as the renewed focus on private sector concerns disenfranchised labour movement participants. The growing majority of conservative governments in member states also led the Council’s 2005 mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy to focus primarily on competition rather than employment issues. This conservative orientation has been further reflected in the European Court of Justice (ECJ); its landmark decision in the 2007 Viking and Laval cases stating that labour’s fundamental right to strike was secondary to the fundamental right of businesses to supply cross-border goods and services. Thus, in light of recent ideological trends, it becomes clear that social policy has increasingly become a subsidiary of economic policy, over which, as discussed earlier, EU-level unions hold little influence. The impact of neoliberalism on the environmental movement has been relatively more benign due to the political salience of environmental issues and efficiency of market-based regulation. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, virtually all of the major EU institutions betrayed a pro-environmental stance. This environmentalism was manifested in the Commissions’ ambitious First and Second Environmental Action Programmes, as well as member states’ advancement of innovative environmental policies. During this time period, the ECJ also came to be regarded as pro-environment in its interpretation of the law. However, in the 1990s, there was a downward cycle of environmental policies as member states became increasingly concerned about industrial competitiveness and economic crisis. The Commission shifted its approach from interventionist command-and-control regulation to economic instruments and context-oriented governance. Policy initiatives relied on market-based, flexible tools that aligned with the neoliberal wave of global reform. These trends have continued into the present, with the Commission’s environmental stance encompassing the somewhat contradictory motives of sustainability reform, deregulation, and policy diffusion. While many environmental TSMOs have supported a more stringent approach to private-sector regulation, it remains unclear if this neoliberal shift represents an unequivocal decline of dynamic political opportunities. Although the Green 10 (an alliance of environmental TSMOs) strongly criticised the deregulatory structure of the Juncker Commission in 2014, the movement has become increasingly supportive of efficient economic instruments, such as the EU emissions trading system negotiated at the Kyoto conference. Decentralised governance has also allowed environmental TSMOs to play a larger part in policy formation, as evidenced by their central role in deliberations surrounding the 2000 Water Framework Directive. Furthermore, while the ECJ can no longer be proclaimed indiscriminate-


ly pro-environmental, some of its recent rulings, such as the 2001 PreussenElektra decision, could be considered a triumph for the environmental movement. Despite the disproportionately negative impact of neoliberalism on the labour movement, recent contingent events have eroded the dynamic opportunities available to both of these TSMs. The EU enlargements in 2004, 2007, and 2013 added 13 new member states, many of which had weak labour market and energy standards. Many of these countries, such as Poland, are opposed to costly energy efficiency and climate change initiatives, making it increasingly difficult for the environmental movement to promote renewable energy at the EU level. The accession of Central and Eastern European nations also created a large bloc of countries with competitive interests in preventing new employment regulation. Similarly, following the 2007/8 Financial Crisis, policymakers promoted economic restructuring at the expense of social and environmental protection. These dynamic challenges, driven by ideological and economic instability, have undermined the static opportunities afforded by the democratic reform of EU institutions. Therefore, in light of this unreceptive political context, these TSMs will be increasingly required to rely on effective mobilising structures and strategic framing processes to achieve movement outcomes.

Mobilising Structures:

Organisational Forms and Governance within TSMOs The contradictory nature of static and dynamic political opportunities in the EU has amplified organisational tensions within representative TSMOs. In order to participate in EU policy-making processes, environmental and labour TSMOs must become increasingly professional and management-oriented. However, if TSMOs are to fulfil their role as intermediaries between technocratic institutions and the European citizenry, they must also be broadly representative and accountable to their memberships. Furthermore, the post-1990 subordination of environmental and labour interests has enhanced the usefulness of more aggressive forms of contention, such as protests, to achieve movement goals. These tactics necessitate the internal discourse provided by decentralised governance structures. Thus, although some level of bureaucratisation is necessary to influence EU decision-making, environmental and labour TSMOs must also provide their members with opportunities for internal participation and grassroots political influence. The mobilising structures of the labour movement, in comparison to environmental TSMOs, have more adequately balanced these conflicting demands. The largest and most important TSMO representing labour interests in the EU is the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), an umbrella organisation that represents 89 national confederations across 39 countries. It is also made up of 10 European Trade Union Federations that engage in bargaining at the sectoral level. This TSMO comprises three primary functions: to provide information services to members, represent union interests to EU institutions, and negotiate compromises with employers’ organisations in the social dialogue. The heterogeneous character of the ETUC membership base has historically necessitated highly democratic decision-making structures. Within the ETUC, “the number of representatives a national trade union confederation may send to the supreme decision-making bodies is determined by [its] number of individual members”. This is significantly more inclusive than BusinessEurope, the main EU employers’ organisation, and even Friends of the Earth Europe, which adheres to a one member-one vote structure. Within the ETUC Executive Committee, representatives also democratically determine, by two-thirds majority vote, the actions to be taken in support of confederation policies. Permanent committees, such as the Women’s and Youth Committees, also deal with areas of ETUC politics that have traditionally been marginalised in national labour movements. Therefore, the ETUC’s commitment to openness and democracy has not only fostered member involvement in EU politics, it has also smoothed intergenerational and gender tensions within organised labour. The central mobilising structures of the environmental movement are included in the Green 10, a coalition network consisting of ten

environmental TSMOs. This coalition includes well-known groups such as the Greenpeace European Unit, the European Environmental Bureau, and Birdlife International. There is a considerable level of organisational variation amongst these TSMOs, ranging from cohesive international organisations, such as Friends of the Earth Europe, to membership networks, such as the Climate Change Action Network. This diversity is further reflected in the Green 10’s ideological and tactical composition; ecologist organisations tend to be more progressive in their mission whilst conservation groups employ more conventional repertoires of action. Despite this pluralism, the Green 10 organisations have been collectively criticised for their technocratic decision-making processes and professionalised leadership. Due to the technical nature of environmental policy-making, environmental TSMOs have come to be “composed of technocrats and technicians with scientific and/ or business expertise at the top, and also of lobbyists and politically minded individuals” that are disconnected from grassroots activists. This has led to criticisms from smaller, radical environmental groups, stating that political compromises have distanced TSMOs from their memberships and hindered direct confrontation with political elites. For example, the hierarchical structure of the Greenpeace European Unit has been found to hinder coalition work with other groups. Saunders (2008) found that Friends of the Earth’s decision-making processes are similarly bureaucratic. While the EU-level labour movement has faced similar criticisms, the ETUC’s participatory governance structure better balances membership accountability with technical policy expertise. In light of democratic deficit concerns and an increasingly hostile political context, environmental TSMOs would benefit from similarly inclusive organisational forms.

Internal Divisions, Coalitions, and Networks Despite the surface-level inclusiveness of labour TSMOs, the conflation of the unions with national industrial relations (IR) and welfare regimes has led to divergent preferences within the ETUC membership base. For example, Larsson (2015) found that the level of cooperation utilised to influence EU policies varies by IR regime, with Nordic unions’ scepticism towards the EU making them less likely to cooperate transnationally. In their survey of policy officers of ETUF affiliate unions, Glassner and Vandaele (2012) also found that opinions toward European labour regulation and coordinated collective bargaining varied by IR regime. This has led the ETUC to adopt a lowest-common-denominator position on socioeconomic issues and employ unsatisfactory, reactive political strategies. Although to a lesser extent, this heterogeneity is also reflected within environmental TSMOs. For example, the European Environmental Bureau’s loss of power in the 1990s was caused by internal conflict, as members’ national backgrounds and environmental orientations hindered political mobilisation. Furthermore, the lack of environmental protest at the European level has partially been explained by international divisions amongst activists in umbrella groups. In response to these divisions, TSMOs have promoted coalitions and informational networks that sustain transnational interactions and “help cultivate a sense of unity that is essential to group solidarity”. One of Hyman’s (2011) primary recommendations for the survival of the labour movement in the neoliberal era is the promotion of an ‘internal social dialogue’, in which the trade union rank-and-file collectively debate European issues. While extensive cooperation has yet to be established, labour TSMOs have made considerable strides in promoting internal connectivity. The ETUC initiated cooperation with Central and Eastern European unions by conducting trainings on social dialogue participation. The European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) also established an information network to facilitate cross-border wage bargaining and “strengthen its moral weight by a continuous exchange of information and monitoring procedures”. In 2001, these strategic networks proved useful in helping the EMF resist plant closures at General Motors. Although environmental movement networks were underdeveloped in the 1990s, larger TSMOs have recently worked to enhance cross-national collaboration. The Green 10 is itself is a coalition that meets approximately 3 times a year to develop policy networks and coordinate campaigns. For example, the ‘Time to Lead’ campaign


on energy policy was launched by an alliance between the Green 10, Stop Climate Chaos, and other environmental NGOs. Informational networks have also proliferated both between and within these groups, as exemplified by Friends of the Earth Europe’s promotion of information-sharing between its local, national, and transnational groups. During the GMO-free Europe campaign, “European staff picked up on national and local campaigns of a similar nature…and then created a website to share information [and] tactics”. Informational networks and coalitions have thus been effectively employed by both the labour and environmental movements to foster solidarity in antagonistic contexts.

delineating nation-specific advantages. This strategy was particularly effective in the 2006 mass mobilisation against the Bolkestein Directive. Organised by the ETUC, European demonstrations targeted the same social dumping practices that had originally created East-West divisions. Although the ‘country of origin’ principle would offer shortterm gains for Eastern workers, it was framed in such a way that it would produce long-term disadvantages by hindering upward convergence in labour standards. The success of these mobilisations, attracting about 30,000 trade unionists on the day of the first reading, illustrates how strategic framing can be used to overcome national and ideological cleavages within TSMs.

Framing Processes:

The Way Forward: Euro-Democratisation

Overcoming Divisions and Emphasising Injustices Alongside participatory governance structures and cooperative networks, TSMOs can also employ strategic frames to counter socio-political challenges and internal factionalism. Frames can be utilised in public discourse to embellish the seriousness of a particular occurrence, thus mobilising external support in an unreceptive institutional environment. As the environmental movement promotes non-excludable public goods that benefit society as a whole, energising widespread public support may seem somewhat straightforward. The non-economic, quality-of-life issues associated with environmentalism further enhance the inclusiveness of this movement, as it typically relies on notions of shared responsibility that supersede social and economic groups. However, the immateriality of environmental issues has also presented an ideational challenge, in that “environmental matters do not have an impact on people’s lives that is obtrusive, direct, and personally consequential enough to inspire people to surmount obstacles”. Environmental TSMOs have confronted this problem by emphasising the urgency, efficiency, and democracy associated with environmental activism. For example, in recent campaigns for sustainable agriculture and energy efficiency, environmental TSMOs highlighted the irreversible character of climate change. Additionally, in their frame analysis of discourse surrounding the Fifth Environmental Action Programme and Trans-European Transport Networks, Triandafyllidou and Fotiou (1998) found that environmental organisations framed sustainability as a new development model that would reduce unemployment. Environmental TSMOs have also confronted technocratic EU decision-making by highlighting the democratic nature of political mobilisation, as evidenced by the Green 10’s call for activists to ‘vote with their feet’ by participating in 2009 climate change protests in Copenhagen. These strategic frames were met with resounding success: by asserting the urgency of the situation and giving activists the opportunity to ‘vote’ on the issue, environmental TSMOs were able to attract approximately 25,000 supporters. On the other hand, it is the explicit materiality of the labour movement’s grievances that make it difficult to forge collective identities at the European level. Unions’ economic motivations have deepened national divides, as the effects of the internal market are contingent upon national cultures and economic systems. For example, in the 2011 Eurobarometer survey of 26,836 European citizens, it was found that a majority of individuals from Slovakia, Finland, and Bulgaria believed the internal market provided more jobs, while strong levels of disagreement were recorded in Sweden, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Trade unions’ immigration policies are also nation-specific: the institutional entrenchment of organised labour in Austria, Germany, and Ireland led to less inclusive union attitudes towards migrant workers. This diversity has heightened East-West tensions in the labour movement, with Western unions fearing a ‘race to the bottom’ in labour standards and Eastern unions concerned with protectionist policies that restrict labour mobility. This has caused some to question whether a European labour movement is truly possible, as “international solidarity needs to be entrenched in the lower ranks of the trade unions”. In response, national unions have employed general frames, such as slogans promoting ‘decent work’ and a ‘social Europe’. However, these broad statements may not energise individuals to act in the same way as targeted material benefits. For this reason, framing processes have recently emphasised common worker interests whilst

This comparison has shown that multi-level governance, neoliberal ideology, and political instability have presented the environmental and labour movements with similar challenges. The market-oriented nature of EU policy formation, accentuated by the 2007/8 Financial Crisis, has led to a decline in the political power resources held by these movements. Furthermore, while European integration processes have compelled environmental and labour interests to shift their contention to the supranational level, nation-specific identities and values are still very much ingrained in movement participants. In light of these external and internal barriers to mobilisation, it may seem that transnational contention, at least in the environmental and labour spheres, will become increasingly insignificant in modern social systems. However, in considering how these movements have negotiated contested political and organisational spaces, it becomes clear that euro-democratisation strategies may help TSMs overcome these contemporary challenges. Social actors contribute to EU democratisation if they promote a European public sphere, encourage collective action among European citizens, and politicise EU decision-making. In the previous discussion, it was shown that environmental and labour TSMOs have utilised informational networks and coalitions to unite their heterogeneous memberships. Participatory decision-making within TSMOs was also found to foster organisational legitimacy. These mobilising structures allow ordinary citizens to communicate, aggregate their interests, and participate in political discussion, all of which align with the notion of a European public sphere. TSMOs have also used strategic frames to produce collective identities and common grievances. By mobilising participants into collective action, usually in the form of European protest, these frames can smooth internal divisions whilst providing alternative routes to influence the EU political system. In order to be successful, environmental and labour TSMOs must afford their membership the kind of access and acceptance they have been denied by technocratic, market-oriented EU institutions. Rather than submit to intragroup tensions, they must orient themselves towards a more all-encompassing solidarity. In doing so, these movements can confront the socio-political conditions that have constrained their development, promoting a more democratic system of transnational governance that benefits not only their members but the European populace as a whole.


Migration allocation across Europe Does the recast of the Dublin-Regulation provide proper solutions on how to allocate migrants in Europe? Valentina Arnez with research support from Alexander Botashev, Clémence Courteault & Aaron Mile1 The King’s Think Tank, European Affairs Policy Centre

A. Introduction and background In May 2016, the European Commission drafted a proposal to amend the Dublin-III-Regulation2 in order to provide the Member States of the European Union (the ‘Member States’) with a fairer allocation mechanism (the ‘Dublin-IV-Regulation’ or ‘Dublin-IV-Proposal’). According to this proposal, a fairness mechanism will automatically establish if a country is handling a disproportionate number of asylum applications. If a Member State is regarded as disproportionally burdened, all new applications in the concerned Member State are allocated to other Member States. In case a Member State does not want to take part in this allocation scheme, it can make a financial solidarity contribution of EUR 250,000 to the Member State receiving applicants for whom it would otherwise have been responsible under the fairness mechanism. The fairness mechanism shall be based on a reference number, which shall be identified on the basis of a key, taking account of the country’s population size and the size of its economy. Further, it will also take into account any effort being made by a Member State to engage in resettlement programmes. This research project aims to critically assess the recast of the Dublin-III-Regulation and its new allocation mechanism.

B. Current legal framework of the European Union’s asylum system Under Article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) the European Parliament and the Council acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, are competent to adopt measures for a common European asylum system (CEAS), including ‘criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum or subsidiary protection’ (Article 78(2)(e) TFEU). Within this framework, the EU has published a number of Regulations and predominantly Directives, such as the Qualification-Directive4, the Reception-Directive5, the Asylum Procedures-Directive6 as well as the Dublin-III-Regulation. The Dublin-III-Regulation entails a hierarchy of criteria determining which Member State is responsible to review an asylum application, giving prevalence to persons holding a specific link to one Member State, such as minors seeking to reach family members7. Most significantly, however, the responsibility lies with the Member State, the asylum seeker first entered in the European Union. This is usually proved through assessing the identification data of the respective asylum seeker and comparing it with fingerprints collected via the Eurodac8 platform9. One of the objectives of the Dublin-III-Regulation is to identify the responsible Member State as soon as possible, in order to provide asylum procedures which can be accessed fast and effectively.10 The ‘Dublin’-rules intend to disregard asylum applications in ‘second’ Member States, i.e. those Member States where

an asylum seeker travels to after he has already sought asylum in another Member State. The notion to disregard previous asylum applications is based on the ‘mutual trust’-principle, described as ‘the reciprocal trust of Member States in the legality and quality of each other’s legal systems’11. In the context of the CEAS it assumes that all Member States are ‘safe countries for asylum seekers’12. Considering that any Member State represents a safe haven for asylum seekers under the mutual trust principle, persons who move ‘irregularly’ to a ‘second’ Member State while by-passing immigration requirements, shall be returned to the Member State of first entry within the ‘Dublin’-rules. The European Court of Human Rights (the ‘ECtHR’) in MSS v Belgium and Greece13 as well as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in NS v SSHD and others14 recognized that this principle can be rebutted in case Member States lack to comply with guaranteeing basic living standards, such as providing food, hygiene and adequate housing.

1.The 2015 migration crisis and practical failures of the Dublin-III-Regulation In the year 2015 over one million migrants arrived to Europe by the sea.15 Most of these migrants were received just by a few Member States. Regarding the proportion to their population (asylum-seekers per 100,000 nationals) most migrants sought asylum in Hungary (1,797), Sweden (1,667), Austria (1,028), Finland (591) and Germany (587).16 While the German Chancellor announced in September 2015 that all refugees from Syria were welcome to Germany, regardless of their previous stays in other Member States, many European countries were facing severe difficulties to provide appropriate accommodation facilities and access to their asylum system.17 Member States of first entry, such as Italy or Greece, were no longer able (or willing) to register every incoming refugee and its fingerprints to the Eurodac-system, having the effect that a lot of migrants kept travelling further ahead to other more desirable destinations.18 In many cases Member States of final destinations could no longer carry out ‘Dublin’-returns to the Member States of first entry, because of the fact that not all the migrants had been previously registered with the Eurodac-system. Ultimately, these other Member State had to provide refuge and accommodation. In the end 904,255 out of all 1,392,155 asylum applications lodged in the EU+ countries19 in 2015 were dealt with in Germany, Hungary, Sweden and Austria, hence approximately 65 % of all the asylum applications were dealt with in just four out of 30 countries.20 This huge influx of unregistered refugees ultimately lead to the closure of several Schengen borders from September 2015 onwards.21

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However, even if a request for a Dublin-return was lodged it did not ultimately lead to a return of the respected person to the Member State of first entry. Between 2010 and 2014 62,000 outgoing Dublin-requests were made on average per year, out of which only 69 % were accepted by the Member State responsible under the Dublin-rules, but only 23 % of these accepted requests resulted in an actual transfer of the respected migrant to the responsible Member State.22 Hence, on average only 15.87 % actual Dublin-transfers were carried out. The European Commission outlines the delays in processing Dublin-cases as well as the fact that the current system was not ‘designed to deal with disproportionate pressure’23 as further downsides of the Dublin-III-Regulation: ‘Applicants may wait up to 10 months (in the case of “take back” requests) or 11 months (in the case of “take charge” requests), before the procedure for examining the claim for international protection starts’24 and especially Member States, experiencing difficulties in applying the Dublin-rules, miss out on registering asylum seekers and lack internal capacities to deal with the cases in a swift manner.

2. ‘Secondary’ Movements within Europe Although this is not defined in the Dublin-rules, ‘secondary’ movements are considered all travels of a migrant who has launched an asylum application in Member State A and then travels on to Member State B without awaiting the formal outcome of the asylum procedure. The European Commission admitted that especially due to national differences in reception conditions ‘secondary’ movements could not be prevented by the Dublin-rules.25 In fact, the Dublin-IV-Proposal reveals that in 2014 24% of the applicants had previously sought asylum in other Member States, before seeking asylum again in a ‘second’ Member State.26 In its evaluation, the European Commission concluded that most grounds for a Dublin-transfer were set in the fact, that the respective applicant has either been granted previous documentation in another Member State or has entered the EU through this Member State.27 This places a substantial burden on Member States at the external border and has ultimately led applicants to avoid being fingerprinted in order to prevent their transfer back to the responsible Member State after a secondary movement to a more destined Member State.28 Further to that, the European Commission qualifies the lengthy procedures regarding the proof of family connections as a potential driving factor of secondary movements.29

3.The EU’s immediate response to the migration crisis: Council Decisions It is no surprise that these figures led to an outcry of more solidarity to allocate migrants fairly within the Member States. In September 2015 two Council Decisions were reached between the Member States on relocating from Italy and from Greece first 40,00030 and then another 120,00031 persons. Both Council Decisions were based on the condition of relocating only such migrants, who had lodged an asylum application in Italy or in Greece and for whom those States would have been responsible pursuant to the criteria set out in the Dublin-III-Regulation, and did only apply to applicants from a country for which the proportion of decisions granting international protection is 75 % or higher. According to Article 5 of the Council Decisions the transfers of eligible persons should have taken place ‘as soon as possible following the date of the notification to the person concerned’32, while ‘Member States retain the right to refuse to relocate an applicant only where there are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a danger to their national security or public order’.33 In return the Member State of relocation would receive a lump sum of EUR 6,000 for each relocated person.34 As argued by different authors this relocation system could not fulfil the intended aim as only a few actual relocation transfers were carried out: The last communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament revealed that 8,162 persons (6,212 from Greece and 1,950 from Italy) have been relocated under the legally binding Council Decisions until December 2016.35 Hence 15 months after initiation of the relocation programme through the Council

Decisions only approximately 5 % of the intended relocations were executed. The reasons for these low relocation outcomes can be summarized as follows: -the political factor: only limited places were made available; Member States are delaying responses to relocation applications and carrying out extensive security-checks,36 as well as Member States refusal to cooperate37; -the personal factor: in some cases, due to the lack of trust in the scheme the respective persons to be relocated abscond once the destination country is revealed; -the applicability factor: the scheme under the Council Decisions is limited to applicants that have been registered and for whom a Dublin procedure was initiated, which may result in a problem in a country like Greece, where arrivals in 2015 exceeded 850,000 but where registration capacities were below 40,000-45,000 per year38; further the fact that only those migrants from countries with a recognition rate of 75 % (i.e. Syrians, Iraqis and Eritreans) can be relocated means that Italy and Greece are still responsible to process applications from all other nationalities.39 Some authors argue that the Council Decisions failed to provide a practical relocation mechanism, because it was based on the idea of ‘coerced transfer; is premised on a distorted idea of solidarity; and because the EU has neither the mandate nor operational capacity to implement the mechanism’40. Further to that it was not taken into consideration by the Council Decisions whether other Member States have already been taken in a lot more asylum applicants with regard to the proportion to their population, such as Sweden, Austria or Germany.41 4.Alternative Ways to Europe: UN Resettlement Programmes42 The idea of resettlement came after the Second World War when thousands of people found themselves displaced in a levelled Europe. Since its creation in 1950, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has three pillars at its core to provide international protection for refugees: Voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement.43 In practice, the resettlement process involves finding refugees fleeing persecution, violence and conflict, offering them refuge in another country that is willing to take them and then transferring them to that country. Resettlement is relevant to the EU because it refers to the transfer of refugees from the country of asylum to another State that agreed to admit them. This programme could potentially provide solutions or at very least alleviate some of the burden under the Dublin-rules. Eligibility for the programme is multifaceted and at many times complicated. The UNHCR offers a 428-page booklet, including a 62-page booklet on criteria for eligibility, detailing the physical and legal requirements.44 People who are not protected in their country of origin are considered high priority. Many of those that are transferred have health needs that cannot be met in the country they reside in.45 The UNHCR specifies the following categories: “Legal and/or Physical Protection Needs, Survivors of Torture and/or Violence, Medical Needs, Women and Girls at Risk, Family Reunification, Children and Adolescents at Risk, and Lack of Foreseeable Alternative Durable Solutions.”46

i. The EU Member States’ part in UN resettlement programmes Global resettlement concerns about 16.1 million refugees around the world (2015 estimate), however fewer than one percent were resettled that year. The countries with the most refugees being considered for resettlement were from Syria (71,600), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (20,400), Iraq (11,000) and Somalia (9,600).47 The low rate of resettlement is partly due to the fact that only a small number of States take part in the UNHCR’s resettlement programme. The most active countries within the program are the United States, Canada, Australia and the Nordic countries. The United States, for example, admitted 84,995 refugees in the fiscal year ending in September 2016.48 Europe, until recently, accepted relatively fewer. However, while Europe accepts comparatively fewer refugees, the number of EU Member States that have signed up to the UNHCR’s


resettlement programmes is growing. In 2005, only 14 countries were signed up. In 2016 37 are now signed up, including the majority of Member States. Now, the number of refugees they accept exceeds 1 million, but newer estimates are around 200,000.

ii. Potential benefits of resettlement schemes The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has welcomed the EU’s Dublin-system but has also stressed that they are ‘not enough’. He warned in 2015 that if a massive refugee scheme for all refugees, not just Syrians, ‘is not put in place and the tragedy in the Aegean goes on and the Balkan chaotic situation goes on, I must say I am very worried for the future of the European asylum system.’ He added that ‘[i] t is absurd that a continent of 508 million in the EU should find itself unable to deal with what is and should be a manageable number’.49 Some see the UNHCR as a tool to help the EU create legal passage of migrants through their borders. This obviously has benefits that include better protection, controlled immigration, international solidarity, integration, and security (with increased cohesion of biometric data). However, this of course does not come without its difficulties. The UN already has stringent and complex criteria for selecting people for transfer. However, this risk may be mitigated by pointing out that leaving countries to their own devices to process migrants can be used as a tool to evade EU directives (see previous section). Another potential risk is that smugglers can misuse the legal channels. Indeed, this requires a lot of cohesion amongst Member States to ensure the channels are well regulated and that all concerns are addressed. Finally, it may create a bigger draw to the EU than there already is among asylum seekers. This reinforces the need of Europe’s migrant crisis to be dealt with as an international issue.50

C. Commission Proposal on the Dublin-IV-Regulation and its implications Due to the ongoing inflow of migrants to the European Union the Commission evaluated the Dublin-III-Regulation and proposed another recast in May 2016. This proposal aims to establish a corrective allocation mechanism according to which asylum applicants should be relocated fairly whenever one Member State is facing a disproportionate number of asylum applications for which this Member State is the responsible Member State under the Dublin-rules. An automated IT-system shall be established in order to register every asylum application and including the respective Member State responsible to process the application. As a basis of the corrective allocation mechanism the IT-system calculates the percentage of persons the Member State is ultimately responsible for, including the number of persons the Member State would be responsible under the inadmissibility check, safe country of origin and security grounds and the number of persons which have effectively settled in a Member State on a rolling one year basis. This percentage will be compared to a reference percentage based on two equally weighed criteria: the size of the population and GDP if the respective Member State. As a result, the corrective allocation mechanism will be triggered automatically if the number of applications the Member State is responsible for exceeds 150% of the reference key figure. If the allocation mechanism has been triggered, all new asylum applications are allocated to those Member States with a number of applications responsible for which is below the reference key.51 The respective formula in order to calculate when the corrective allocation mechanism is triggered is the following52:

The respective persons will then be relocated proportionally to all that Member States that do not reach the threshold of the reference key. In any case, family members will always be allocated to the same Member State, hence in the event an applicant gets relocated to another Member State, this Member State becomes responsible to carry out the Dublin-check and verify whether the applicant already has family in another Member State, in which case a re-transfer to that country would take place.53

In case a Member State does not want to take part in this allocation scheme for a period of 12 months, it can make a financial solidarity contribution of EUR 250,000 per applicant to the Member State receiving applicants for whom it would otherwise have been responsible under the corrective allocation mechanism. In order to monitor the system and to report to the Commission a European Agency for Asylum shall be established.54

D.‘Destination’ preferences within Europe In 2015 Germany has been the country which attracted the most migrants, receiving 476,510 asylum applicants followed by Hungary (177,135), Sweden (162,450), Austria (88,160) and Italy (84,085). Hence, one in three applicants lodged their claim in Germany compared to one out of ten applicants in Hungary.55 The following chart56 illustrates the asylum applications in numbers during the years 2011 to 2015:

It must be taken into account though, that in Hungary a lot of applications got withdrawn afterwards57, which is why these numbers have to be set aside with the number of (i) withdrawn applications, (ii) pending cases58 and (iii) asylum applications granted in first instance, in 2015:

In 2015 181,895 asylum applicants withdrew their claim in EU+ countries, 83 % of which were implicit, i.e. were carried out mostly through absconding of the applicant. Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq were the three citizenships with most withdrawals (implicit withdrawals: 96%, 97% and 80% respectively). Interestingly, also in destination countries like Germany and Sweden a high amount of withdrawals was registered.59 The table further illustrates the rate of asylum application granted as compared to the number of asylum applications launched. In Italy, this rate would be around 85% followed by Germany (around 52 %), Sweden (around 27 %), Austria (around 24%), while Hungary has a rate of around 2 %. Although, it has to be taken into account that the asylum applications which are granted in 2015 will not necessarily be to the benefit of the migrants who sought asylum in the same period, but rather to asylum seekers from previous years, these figures nevertheless indicate that migrants are rather travelling through countries like Hungary as opposed to awaiting their asylum procedures there.

E. Pull factors: a comparative analysis of pull-factors regarding the UK, France and Austria It does not come as a surprise that refugees travelling to Europe have specific preferences as to where to apply asylum. The following paragraphs provide some background information, on why migrants might rather settle in a particular country.

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1.United Kingdom60 i. Language Courses

Access to English courses for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) in the UK varies depending on whether an individual is an asylum seeker or a refugee whose request for asylum has been accepted. Asylum seekers can only receive funding for courses after waiting six-months for their asylum request to be considered.61 Further, this funding is only ‘co-funding’ where the individual must still pay 50% of the costs.62 If the refugee status is granted to an individual, they immediately become eligible for co-funding, but only receive fully funded access to courses if they are on Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) or Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) which they become eligible to claim if out of work. However, funding for ESOL fell 55% from 2009-2015, wherein despite the announcement of increased funding in September 2016 for the resettlement of Syrian refugees, waiting lists for places are as long as 2 years.63 Government initiatives to integrate refugees and asylum seekers in any significant way are lacking.64

ii. Labour Market Access

Asylum seekers in the UK are forbidden from accessing the labour market unless their application is still being considered after 12 months.65 In these cases, asylum seekers must apply for permission to work in an occupation on an approved shortage list.66 The UK opted out of the recast Reception Conditions EU Directive that reduced the maximum waiting for permission to work from 12 to 9 months. 67 If an asylum claim is approved and an individual is given refugee status, they have full access to the UK labour market at any skill level and do not require a work permit.68 Restrictions on asylum seekers’ right to work have been in place since 2002 on the reasoning that they act as a pull for economic migrants to fake an asylum request to gain access to the labour market.69 However, studies on the issue have found no evidence of a link between the number of asylum seekers and the right to work and even research by the UK Home Office has refuted the idea.70

iii. Social Welfare Benefits

Whilst asylum seekers are not entitled to work in most cases, they are eligible for social welfare assistance. Housing is offered if needed and allocated without individual choice or preference, and a weekly benefit of £36.95 is provided, with up to an additional £3 to £5 available for those who are pregnant or with children under 3.71 This welfare payment is comparatively low at just 50% of the amount of the Job Seeker’s Allowance benefit available to unemployed residents.72 Asylum seekers are eligible for free healthcare under the NHS, as well as free prescriptions, free dental and eye care, and free access to education for children.73 If granted refugee status, the Asylum Support ceases 28 days later and the individual must move out of any accommodation that was provided to them by the state within 28 days.74 However, refugee status allows the individual full right to work as discussed, eligibility to claim unemployment benefit if needed (which is higher than asylum support) as well as access to housing benefit and income support if learning English to find a job.75

iv. Housing and Dispersal

Asylum seekers are offered housing if needed if their claim is considered legitimate. Though a dispersal system is in place in order to avoid overwhelming local authorities, a report by the Guardian found 57% of all asylum seekers were located in the poorest third of the country.76 Individuals often live in asylum hostels procured by private sector contractors.77 No extra assistance is provided to local authorities to accommodate asylum seeker’s access to education and healthcare, where the poorest local authorities take the highest numbers with insufficient support.78 If granted refugee status, individuals must move out of provided accommodation and are free to choose where to live.79

v. Family Reunification

Those granted refugee status can be joined by immediate family under Part 11 of the Immigration rules (HC 395 of 1993-94 as amended)80. This provision allows for adult refugees to be joined by their partners and dependent children under 18 to reunite a pre-existing family unit.81 The refugee essentially acts as a sponsor where unlike

normal family reunification, there is no need for the individual to meet minimum income requirements, the family members do not have to demonstrate English proficiency and the application is free of charge.82 Child refugees however, cannot act as a sponsor for their parents or siblings with the UK government maintaining more generous rules may act as a pull for increased asylum applications as well as the fear of putting children at risk of exploitation and trafficking with the child able to act as a sponsor.83 More restrictive rules are in place for other dependants of the refugee who are not their biological children such as the usual financial requirements and proof of English proficiency although the government has accepted the need to allow for special circumstances on a case-by-case basis.84 It is difficult to find statistics on the number of asylum applications that are approved for family reunification reasons due to the way the statistics are collated in the UK; refugee family reunion applications are not separately recorded in immigration statistics from general immigration statistics.85

2. France86 Compared to other countries like Germany or Sweden, France does not attract refugees so much. This can be explained by the country’s poor performances in terms of employment rates, as well as the administrative policies and the language, French being much less spoken than English among refugees.

i. Labour market and politics

It is first a matter of image. Regarding unemployment rates, France reached an unemployment rate of 10% in January 201787, much above the 3.9% of Germany the same year.88 This of course does not encourage refugees to seek asylum in France, as the perspectives of evolution and success seem low. Although France has one of the best healthcare systems in Europe, most refugees flee their country of origin because of the hopeless economic situation which is why countries like Germany look like a much better option for them to find a job and start a new life. Moreover, the image of France was badly tarnished by the rise of the extreme-right party, the Front National, who did not particularly claim a large support for refugees to enter France. In September 2015, Marine Le Pen even compared the incoming flows of refugees to a ‘barbaric invasion of the 4th century’.89 While the Front National is placed high in the polls for the Presidential election in May 2017, it does not look like there will soon be any more welcoming signs from France towards refugees.

ii. Administrative background

Another argument in disfavour of France is the length of the administrative procedures. OFPRA, the Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides, sets a time limit of 6 months to take a decision to allow a refugee to stay or leave France. However, an additional period of 9 to 12 months can be added in some cases. In general, an asylum seeker application takes about 5 months to be processed, a length which has been reduced in 2016 compared to 2015. However, this length can vary a lot according to regions and in some regions, ‘asylum seekers who had submitted asylum claims at the beginning of 2016 have not been interviewed 6 months later’.90 Moreover, the length of the procedures depends on the nationality of the asylum seeker as well as the type of decision in appeal, which further complicates the process.

iii. Language skills

Finally, the language is also a key reason as to why refugees prefer other Member states to France. The British Red Cross gives the example of many refugees in the Calais Jungle saying they would rather go to the UK than stay in France: ‘if you were forced to flee, wouldn’t you head somewhere people speak the same language, as you look for a job and try to make friends?’91. However, it would be unfair to say that France does not help refugees at all to integrate in the culture. “Thot” is an association which was founded during actions to support refugees and asylum seekers and which provides them with a four months training aiming to teach French and provide refugees with a diploma recognized by the state. The association is run by volunteers and teaching is provided by qualified professors.92 Launched in June 2016 the association already obtained a 93% of success rate from its students in January 2017.


However, further to the problem of migrants, some argue that ‘France should be worried that more refugees do not want to come’93 as this only testifies for the country’s poor economic and social condition.

3. Austria i. Language courses94

People who have been granted asylum or subsidiary protection status have access to subsidised language courses in Austria through the Austrian Integration Fund (‘ÖIF’) or the Public Employment Service Austria (‘AMS’). These entities fund literacy, elementary (A1, A2) and advanced courses (B1, B2). However, if you are still an asylum seeker you may attend German courses, but funding is not ensured. Further to that, refugees have the opportunity to enrol as a non-degree student at Austrian Universities and join selected courses. Under the programme ‘MORE’ Austrian Universities offer selected courses at the 21 state universities in Austria. Participants are admitted as non-degree students and might be able to pursue a degree later on. ‘MORE-Perspectives’ enables refugee academics and scientists to connect with members of Austrian universities. ‘MORE’ is open to asylum seekers, recognised refugees, people who have been granted subsidiary protection and people who have been granted temporary leave to remain (“Duldung”). The benefits of this programme are tuition fee waivers, the admission as a non-degree student, access to the university library and support in the day to day life by student buddies.

of attractiveness of states are not necessarily problematic, as experiences in federal States such as the United States and Germany show. In Germany, a quota is calculated for each Land taking account of tax revenues and population size. In the United States, the federal government works with nine private resettlement agencies. The agencies match the particular needs of each incoming refugee with the specific resources available in a local community, giving priority to the presence of family members and, if these are absent, try to find the best match between a community’s resources and the refugee’s needs.13 Ideally, an allocation system shall take some particular preferences of migrants, such as the location of family members within other Member States or language skills into account. This may not only prevent migrants from travelling further to other Member State, hence, decreasing the burden of transfers within the Dublin-rules for the Member States, but also support the integration of the migrants within one particular Member State right from the start. Although, we acknowledge that we do not live in an ideal world, putting some effort in matching some of the migrants’ needs would not only serve the migrant, but in the end also the Member States, hence the European Union’s migration policies.

A new Integration Act95 shall be introduced and is currently under parliamentary scrutiny. According to this Act so called ‘value and orientation’-courses shall be obligatory for all recognised refugees and people who have been granted subsidiary protection. Further all refugees and people who have been granted subsidiary protection have to commit to attend all courses and comply with the ‘values’ of the Austrian society. In case of a breach, social welfare benefits can be revoked or limited.

ii. Labour Market Access

Asylum seekers may apply for work in Austria after three month after filing their asylum claim.96 However, according to information of the Public Employment Service Austria about 50 % of the refugees granted refugee status will be able to find work within the next five years.97

iii. Social Welfare Benefits

Refugees and people who have been granted subsidiary protection can apply for minimum income in case they have no work and are not eligible to unemployment benefits. Additionally, there are possibilities to apply for housing assistance, in case the concerned persons are not living in refugee accommodations. Currently the minimum income amounts to around EUR 840 monthly, in case the person has minor children additional amounts to around EUR 150 per person can be granted. In some federal states these benefits may be higher. 98

F. Conclusions First of all, the new Dublin-IV-Proposal does not guarantee that the problem of allocation in Europe can truly be solved within Europe. Basically, the relocation under the Proposal relies on the same premises as the previous Council Decisions and it is to be doubted whether Member States will accept to take in migrants, in cases other Member States are overburdened. It may be possible for some Member State to ‘buy’ itself out of any obligation, but does such a system really deserve the title to aim for more solidarity between Member States? Bringing all Member States on board would however be only the first hurdle to jump, because on the other hand, there are also the migrants to be considered. We can see from previous numbers that there are high numbers of migrants who are absconding before the asylum claim has been fully processed. It is difficult to find out the specific reasons for that; in any case, we have seen that factors such as a low unemployment rate, good offers of language courses and substantial social benefits as well as access to the labour market may be important pull-factors for refugees and migrants. Research also shows that different levels

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Credibility & accountability

An interdisciplinary approach to consumer policy for the encouragement of sustainable behaviours

Ryan Lee Vincent

T

he concept of sustainable development has evolved in direct response to what is known as the Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP) – the set of values, behaviours, norms and beliefs which have proliferated since the industrial revolution (Luchs & Thorgersen 2011). The core components of this paradigm include constant, uninhibited economic growth, continued mass consumption, the belief that science and technology will make up for any environmental shortcomings, and the assumption that the earth will continue to provide adequate resources for this world view (ibid.). To reach the end-goal of sustainable development, many components of the DSP require reassessment or abandonment altogether. However, research has found a consistent failure of marketing, policy and business strategy to propose or indeed even conceptualise programmes which address overconsumption directly and effectively, despite acknowledging that the current consumption patterns in the developed world are unsustainable (Tews et al. 2003; Berg 2010). Enacting such a large scale paradigm shift is not possible without the co-operation of the market driving forces which maintain the DSP, namely governments and business. As such, it is crucial to consider such integrated approaches as those considered and outlined in this research in order to address the broad and present dangers posed by environmental degradation onset by the maintenance of unsustainable lifestyles, processes and practices which are facilitated by marketers and policy makers.

Analysis The DSP has been enormously beneficial to business interests as sustained economic growth throughout the developed world has meant sustained profits for those businesses which have been large and profitable enough to maintain their market positions through the ebb and flow of economic developments, downturns, shifts in consumption patterns and the process of globalisation. Those businesses which have the most to gain and the most to lose from the devolution of the DSP are those global corporations which have profited the most from it. Sustainability and its components appear to such multinational businesses as a threat to business as usual as the technological, economic and logistical improvements brought about by globalisation, which have

together disaggregated the value chain and resulted in enormously profitable supply chain structures and manufacturing practices, are the very same processes and practices which would, under a more sustainable model, require the most dramatic changes (Webster 2005; Assadourian 2010; Kotler 2011). It is thus unsurprising that businesses often only subscribe to sustainable policies reactively, rather than proactively (Thorgersen 2005). However, there is an imperative for businesses to act proactively, under the Precautionary Principle, which promotes the “moral characteristic of corporate citizenship” (Murphy 2005) – i.e. the social impetus on businesses to take precautionary measures against potentially damaging practices and behaviours which impact society and the environment (ibid.). While such orientations have been observed, the prevailing managerial practice regarding sustainability is reactive. A second influential force in the macro environment is that of government policy and attitudes towards environmental policy. This force is heavily influenced by the concept of ideological flux, through which prevailing government perspectives, including those concerning the environment, shift alongside the appointment of new administrations (Berg 2010). A further component of government influence is a lack of clear guidance and enforceable environmental regulations (ibid.). While there have been many attempts within a national and supra-national context to develop such guidelines and goals for environmental policy, such programmes or initiatives tend to fall short of their stated goals (Berg 2010; Assadourian 2010; Kotler 2011). This is largely due to a combination of non-cooperative businesses and a lack of oversight and incentive and deterrent structures to enforce regulations or targets (ibid.). Governments and businesses, while often acknowledging the pertinence of environmental issues, are consistently unsuccessful in implementing and maintaining effective policies and practices which address these issues (Mont & Plepys 2007; Berg 2010). What results is a macro environment which constrains “the effectiveness of individual actors” (Thorgersen 2005) in adopting sustainable behaviours and increases the likelihood that “even the willing consumer may be unable to act in a sustainable manner” due to


such large scale systemic roadblocks (Scholl et al. 2010). The present Social Dilemma – by which “it is not individually rational for a consumer to sacrifice short-term advantages for the common good” and the net social cost is greater for all “if too few make the needed sacrifices” – offers an explanation as to why the impetus on businesses and governments to begin the process of norm-reversal in earnest is pertinent (Thorgersen 2005). The case of promoting sustainability and sustainable consumption is a unique challenge in the fields of policy, marketing and business. Unlike the bulk of commercial endeavours and matters of national interest, the communication of environmental issues is a common concern across cultures, and in the implementation of suggested or desired outcomes of such efforts, international co-operation is necessary to achieve the desired results (Assodourian 2010; Kotler 2011). The combined efforts of policymakers, businesses and consumers are necessary to triangulate an effective solution to the dilemma of sustainable consumption. According to Scholl et al., there are two distinct forms of sustainable consumption: “strong sustainable consumption” and “weak sustainable consumption” (Scholl et al. 2010). The former refers to the “reductions in the volumes (rather than quality) of consumption” while the latter refers to the improvement of consumption efficiency, which relates directly to the product itself (ibid.). Herein lies the core enigma for policymakers, sustainable marketers and businesses: how can consumers be persuaded of the benefits of strong sustainable consumption, for which there are significant barriers, over and in addition to weak sustainable consumption? Consumer-facing policy instruments are numerous but difficult to disseminate, popularise, implement and enforce (Tews et al. 2003; Berg 2010). As such, the strengths of marketing theory and practice should be increasingly applied to the development and implementation of environmental policy to create behavioural change which will facilitate the adoption and implementation of successful environmental policy. However, the communications, manufacturing and supply chain practices of the majority of businesses which engage in such marketing activities remain utterly unsustainable

(DesJardin 2005; Kotler 2011). Businesses fail, more often than not, to apply new sustainable practices and policies unless there is significant profit to be made, or regulatory pressure which necessitates such changes (Murphy 2005; Thorgersen 2005). Despite the reluctance on behalf of businesses to implement more sustainable practices, there has been increasing recognition of ‘green consumers’ who are more willing to pay premiums for goods and services which are more environmentally friendly (Molina-Murillo & Smith 2005; Scholl et al. 2010). In addition to the ever-increasing size of this consumer segment, pressures from the wider consumer base and increasing awareness and recognition of environmental issues mean that society at large is demanding the business world implement more sustainable behaviours (ibid.). As a growing body of institutional and stakeholder theory asserts that firms do not always act as profit maximisers, and instead also seek legitimacy in the public eye, the adoption of sustainable practices would necessarily follow any significant shift in the descriptive norms which characterise the DSP (ibid.). Such reversal is only possible, however, with an understanding of the behavioural dimensions of the norm in question as well as the motivational influences – both intrinsic and extrinsic – which weigh on these behaviours. At the heart of sustainable behaviour adoption is self-efficacy theory, which states that an individual will not adopt new behaviours if they do not feel they are in control of the consequences of those behaviours or actions (Koletsou & Mancy 2011). With regard to the adoption of sustainable behaviours, consumers are unlikely to ever feel the effects that their individual actions have on the environment, and are therefore less likely to engage in behavioural change (ibid.). While the process of norm-reversal could lead to large scale adoption of sustainable behaviours which would have perceptible impacts on the environment, the pathway to shaping these behaviours is complex. In shaping sustainability-oriented behavioural change, three core dimensions are considered: (1) raising consumer awareness; (2) making sustainable consumption easy; and (3) greening the markets (Scholl et al. 2010). From a consumer behaviour perspective, the bulk of research deems ‘mak-

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ing sustainable consumption easy’ pivotal to successful behavioural change as “convenience often takes precedence over environmental considerations in daily routines” and results in consumers overestimating the costs (financial and otherwise) of modifying behaviours (Scholl et al. 2010). The theory of ego-depletion, whereby decision-making relating to ethical behaviours draws from limited energy resources, works alongside perceived self-efficacy and self-determination, together making the perceived costs of behavioural change too high for a majority of consumers to subscribe to (Thorgersen 2005). It is arguably the responsibility of firms to tackle these dimensions, alongside government regulation, oversight and policies which promote and support such actions (Miles & Covin 2000; Mont & Plays 2007; Assakdourian 2010; Kotler 2011). Three considerable obstacles obstruct the promotion of sustainable consumption: (1) process credibility; (2) temporal relevance; and (3) noise (Molina-Murillo & Smith 2005). While these three obstacles are not foreign or newly-developed concepts in the field of marketing communications, the development of environmental policy faces unique challenges with regard to each of these obstructions.

Towards a consolidated approach to consumer policy Strategies to mitigate the negative forces of the already difficult environment in which environmental policies operate stems from an understanding of motivational forces. The identification of intrinsically motivating forces (need for competence, relatedness and autonomy), which positively influence behavioural change, allow policymakers to better direct and deploy effective environmental strategies and are heavily influenced by marketing communications activities, though often negatively (Thorgersen 2005). Notably, the impact of noise and the sheer clout of conflicting, misleading and often false environmental claims have greatly detracted from consumers’ abilities to develop any meaningful degree of competence regarding environmentally friendly product choice (Molina-Murillo & Smith 2005). The challenges brought on by over exposure to and confusion surrounding environmental communications reinforce the notion that under uncertainty, individuals are “less likely to make an effort for the common good” (Luchs & Thorgersen 2011; Thorgersen 2005). The development of consistent, transparent and ethical regulations concerning environmental communications is therefore necessary to empower consumers with the tools and knowledge necessary to behave sustainably (ibid.). An interdisciplinary approach which consolidates methods employed by policymakers and sustainable marketers could positively influence consumer awareness, convenience and further green the markets while simultaneously mitigating uncertainty around environmental knowledge by raising consumer competence and reducing noise. Furthermore, as both governments and businesses bear the bulk of the responsibility for shaping consumption and economic behaviours, consumer policy is the ideal mechanism for large-scale norm reversal (Murphy 2005; Sheth & Sisodia 2007; Koletsu & Mancy 2011). Conceptualising consumer policy as a communications tool first requires the acknowledgement that the complex and multi-faceted nature of shaping mass consumption behaviours requires an integrated approach utilising both policy and marketing instruments. While integration has occurred to some degree, a cohesive programme leveraging both forces has yet to materialise effectively (Berg 2010). Instead,

an assessment of tools utilised by policymakers and marketers independently is necessary before addressing any possible interdisciplinary solutions. Policymakers and governments generally favour economic and regulatory instruments, engaging in what is known as ‘choice editing’ to phase out unsustainable products (Berg 2010; Emery 2012). The removal of energy inefficient lightbulbs from the market is a prime example of such regulatory action. Such sweeping and effective measures are few and far between however, as policy tends to delegate responsibility to third parties such as NGOs, business or even consumers themselves (Berg 2010; Scholl et al. 2010). While the threat of ideological flux seems to justify this tendency, a lack of regulatory authority or oversight means that businesses are far less likely to adhere to policy with no effective means of enforcement (Thorgersen 2005; Berg 2010). A more widely accepted form of environmental policy is the widespread adoption of Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP) programmes which tackle the issues of their namesake along three organisational principles: deliberation, efficiency and sufficiency (Berg 2010;). Policy favours addressing deliberation and efficiency, both primarily economic policy instruments which aim to enhance social learning and increase the environmental efficiency of products and services on the market (ibid.). In effect, these instruments address the ‘consumer awareness’ and ‘greening of the markets’ dimensions of sustainable behaviour adoption. Like sustainable behaviours, environmental policy is defined along ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ dimensions, in which weak policy addresses symptoms of problems, while strong policy aims to remedy structural and systemic challenges (ibid.). The bulk of consumer policy falls into the ‘weak’ category, presenting a slew of policy actions which do little in the way of laying out regulatory frameworks, medium-term targets for stated long-term goals and ongoing audits and oversight of the proposed actions (ibid.). Businesses and firms have generally communicated environmental programmes and initiatives through corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting and activities (van de Ven 2008; Alvarado-Herrera et al. 2015). However, CSR programmes tend to favour PR-friendly initiatives which directly target end-users, implementing ‘green labelling’ and the use of vague terminology or puffery (Molina-Murillo & Smith 2005). As consumers are increasingly informed and have access to a constant stream of information, allowing them to be vigilant of businesses, their activities and their ethics, CSR is the favoured instrument for environmental reputation management. Incorporated into general marketing messages or, more frequently, in financial reporting, CSR messaging employs an incredible diversity of “inconsistent metrics, reporting formats and [has] a tendency to promote environmental programs with high public relations value”, only adding to the noise making sustainable consumption more difficult for consumers (ibid.). In addition, while CSR reporting is more prevalent than ever, it remains questionable how truthful, reliable or relevant such activities are. For example, a study conducted by the UK Environmental Agency found that in those companies surveyed, only 12% of companies who made environmental disclosures in their reporting did so in audited sections of their financial and annual reports (ibid.). Combine this with a 1993 study which “found that sixty percent of environmentally based advertisements had unacceptable claims ranging from ambiguous to false” and it becomes clear that there is a credibility problem in the


realm of environmental communications (ibid.). Three principles of strategic planning can be applied to the conceptualisation of integrated consumer policy addressing sustainable behaviours: (1) comprehensiveness and co-ordination of process; (2) commitment behind the process; and (3) clarity of the policy path (Berg 2010). While this largely applies to those policymakers and executives and marketing managers who implement and communicate such programmes, these three principles must be apparent to the consumer in order for the process to be effective (ibid.). An acknowledgement of this imperative would then place communications, cohesiveness and clarity at the centre of any consumer policy. So as to adhere to the principles and antecedents to behavioural change laid out previously, communications would play a pivotal role in ensuring individuals feel empowered as so-called ‘civic-consumers’ and are able to satisfy their needs for competence, relatedness and autonomy (Thorgersen 2005; Such & Thorgersen 2011) . Supra-national authorities such as the UNEP could act as conduits for the global dissemination of environmental marketing communications standards which reinforce, support or influence consumer policy and ensure standardised approaches to environmental reporting, such as the Life Cycle Assessment system - which has standards set out independently across the UK, France and the United States - can be implemented on a global scale by global and multi-national firms. (Molina-Murillo & Smith 2005) When regulatory policies regarding what can and cannot be communicated to consumers, whether it be on labels, in financial reporting or through advertising, have international synergy, consumer awareness, competence, convenience and choice are facilitated by a standardised system of marketing communications which supplement policy and allow consumers to make informed, rational decisions regarding sustainable behaviours and products (Mont & Plepys 2007; Assadourian 2010; Berg

2010; Hepburn et al. 2010; Alvarado-Herrera et al. 2015). Further research and integration of policy development and marketing research could better inform the conceptualisation of such programmes as concepts adapted from both fields could be implemented in tandem, ensuring wide-spread approval, acceptance and adoption that prior environmental consumer policy has not enjoyed.

Policy Recommendations The King’s Think Tank recommends that policy makers address the sufficiency principle and the encouragement of strong sustainable consumption through the creation of consumer policy which: Facilitates the adoption of sustainable consumption patterns through clear, concise and standardised regulations concerning the marketing of products. Develops and enforces standardised environmental audits which consider and communicate environmental impacts along the entirety of the procurement, manufacturing, delivery, use and post-use life cycle of a product. Develops and enforces incentive and deterrent structures to encourage subscription to environmental policies including: (1) adoption of standardised environmental audits in financial reporting; (2) adoption of standardised product labelling schemes; (3) increasing the environmental efficiency of products and processes

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The great divide Siddarth Narayan For many years, small farmers have become increasingly disconnected from markets, and are facing a resulting loss in income. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), a branch of United Nations India, should take targeted measures to ensure long-term independent market access for small farmers in India.

Talking Points:

Small farms are already in danger of dying out. Without support, the quick pace of Modi’s reforms will only worsen their situation Because small farmers generally reside below the poverty line, policies aiming to boost their livelihoods serve as viable poverty reduction measures Prime Minister Modi has pledged to double farmer incomes by 2022; policies specifically targeted at small farmers are critical to this aim Many NGOs and the Indian government taking steps to ensure small farmer access to technology and resources, which would give material access to the National Market. The IFAD campaign would build upon this momentum by focusing upon more upon ensuring efficient use of technology, complementing these access based efforts.

Key Facts:

80% of Indian farms are small farmers or marginal farmers; ensuring that these holdings remain sustainable is critical to preserving India’s domestic food security. Small farmers are vital contributors to food diversity in India. They comprise the majority of domestic producers in milk, fruits and vegetables, which contain vital nutrients. Small Farms are more economically efficient than large-scale farms, and contribute more output per capita Kiranas account for 98% of India’s food sales

Background In India, small farms take up 1-2 hectares. Due to processes of globalization and liberalization, small farmers have found it increasingly difficult to sustain livelihood. Small farms carry high overhead costs and are unable to sustain large volume and high quality production. Moreover, small farmers also disproportionately lack technological and basic literacy skills. As a result, small farmers’ incomes are frequently exceeded by their expenditures, creating an unsustainable financial cycle that can lead to household collapse. Recent developments in

nationwide agricultural policy present an opportunity to rectify this situation. As part of his campaign to eliminate economic inefficiencies, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has launched the online National Agricultural Market (NAM) in March 2016. This platform breaks the barriers between previously segregated state markets, allowing farmers and vendors to locate each other without the use of middlemen. Many state governments have adopted this online platform, which will cover all of India by March 2018. Though the NAM can eliminate many of the inefficiencies associated with complicated supply chains, it also exacerbates the factors inhibiting small farmers for two reasons. First, liberalized markets disproportionality benefit large holdings, which have the technology and resources to occupy a large portion of market space and crowd out smaller players. Second, small farmers lack the technological and literacy skills to successfully negotiate deals on an electronic market, which opens them up to exploitation and unfair bargaining by sellers. However, with proper institutional support, the NAM can help small farmers by connecting them to the broader Indian market.

Policy Idea The National Agricultural Market Proposal should include support mechanisms for small farmers to allow them to take full advantage of the benefits of a shared market. This would involve a two-pronged approach. First, IFAD should provide technical and financial assistance to help small sellers transition to the NAM. Second, IFAD should initiate a campaign to increase technological literacy to help farmers operate effectively on the electronic market.

Analysis

The NAM has the potential to connect small farmers to similarly sized sellers, or vendors, across borders. With the support of IFAD, these small food vendors (Kiranas) can connect to NAM. The digital entrance of Kiranas can provide two benefits to the Indian agricultural markets. First, spurring Kirana market use would increase competition among retailers, reducing the market space of larger players. This would decrease prices for consumers, leading to greater food access, and would also result in a larger amount of retail options for


farmers that increase their bargaining power. Second, Kiranas carry less inventory on account of their small size, which would necessitate short term contracts between them and growers, as opposed to the large volumes demanded by supermarkets. Shorter time horizons create more sustainable delivery schedules for small farmers, who are more vulnerable to India’s volatile growing conditions due to a lack of access to technology such as pesticides and irrigation. IFAD has had great success in promoting self-sufficient development for small farmers, such as tribal landowners in Andhra Pradesh; the digital education campaign can continue this trend. Basic digital literacy will allow small farmers to take full advantage of the advanced search features of an electronic market; for example, the use of filters would allow them to identify nearby sellers and reduce delivery costs. This would also allow farmers to successfully negotiate deals without getting exploited by larger and more powerful retailers, and receive a fair return on their product.

Next Steps To create a successful movement, IFAD must engage with four groups of stakeholders. First, IFAD must launch a systematic effort to locate and engage with individual Kiranas, and provide them with the financial and technical assistance to transition from their local markets to the NAM. Second, IFAD should partner with EKAL Vidyala, an educational nonprofit based in India. This partnership should build upon the EKAL on Wheels project, which provides digital access and computer literacy in mobile electronic stations. Third, IFAD should pressure the Indian federal government to include explicit institutional support for small players in the National Market legislation. In order to create a successful lobbying effort, IFAD should engage with the Agricultural and Organic Farming Group and the Save Indian Farmers non-profits. Support mechanisms can include government subsidies for both Kiranas and small farmers to make the digital transition as well as allowances for agriculture based non-profits to provide financial and digital assistance. Finally, IFAD can work to facilitate initial commercial agreements between Kiranas and small farmers, in the vein of deals it has forged previously between small farmers and private actors such as Tata Corporation.

gage with contacts at the ABC and MSNBC DC branches to run a story on the plight of Indian small farmers to encourage donations. Work with prominent Indian journalists Rajdeep Sardesai and Sagarika Ghose to craft media message for widespread distribution in India. Highlight the large role small farmers’ play in day to day nutrition and health, and also emphasize the lower prices consumers will face with the policy.

Timeline • •

May: Begin contact with Georgetown stakeholders. Engage organization leaders and form leadership team June: Social media chair will begin campaign, outreach chair will begin communications with stakeholders. Executive team will draft proposal for IFAD and craft media messages July: Submit policy proposal. Run US media stories, and use it as a flashpoint for meeting with IFAD representatives. SAS and HAS will begin donation campaign on campus August: Outreach director will set up meeting between interested parties. There are likely to be multiple rounds of talks and discussions in strategy and implementation. All of leadership team will be present September: After finishing negotiations, run Indian media story in major publications such as India Abroad. Coalition will work on joint presentation for the Indian consulate October: After securing initial funds and garnering support, IFAD and coalition can work together to build policy infrastructure and strategy in India, set for implementation in the Spring of 2017

This piece was provided by partner institution Roosevelt Institute, Georgetown University

Action Plan Campus/Community Outreach: The Hindu Students Association and the South Asian Society are social hotspots; work with them to launch a student-centered funding campaign on campus to cover the various costs associated with the policy. Policy Affairs (Legislative/Government/Administrative): Testify before the Indian Consulate, and highlight the major issues faced by small farmers moving forward. Submit proposal to IFAD office in DC and lead a follow up discussion with representatives Coalition: The India Initiative, a Georgetown forum and advocacy group for Indian issues EKAL Vidyala Chapters in Virginia and Maryland Save the Farmers Representatives Include IFAD representatives from previous discussions to engage with above stakeholders Communication: In addition to FaceBook and Twitter, en-

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Industrial strategy for a low-carbon economy Rob Terwel The King’s Think Tank welcomes the Government’s “Building our Industrial Strategy” Green Paper as an important first step in defining a modern industrial strategy for the United Kingdom. On 13th April 2017, the Energy & Environment Policy Centre of King’s Think Tank hosted a roundtable discussion on how industrial strategy can interact with and shape the low carbon economy, and help the Government meet its de-carbonization targets. This meeting brought together representatives from the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS), RenewableUK, Green Alliance, IPPR and the UCL Energy Institute. The discussion was wide-ranging, but highlighted above all the need to develop “a system architecture on a long-term horizon, using current expertise and technology and delivered via informed and structured implementation.”

System Architecture The specific way our energy system has developed over time is both an asset and liability. It has grown in various directions simultaneously, rather than being designed coherently with optimal functioning in mind. Looking at the system holistically, with all its energy carriers, consumers, producers and technologies, should allow us to arrange components to maximise synergies and harness economies of scale and diversity. EXAMPLE. Our grid joins up large power stations with millions of consumers while ensuring a security of supply. It has the potential to be a great source of demand-side and supply-side flexibility. With the advent of volatile decentralised electricity generation and electricity storage technologies, it is all the more important to investigate whether industrial processes can be run flexibly – e.g., run at times of excess electricity, turning otherwise wasted energy into product and profit.

Long-term Horizon Developing a system architecture is a very important element of an industrial strategy. However, it is vital to optimise the system within a long-term framework. Optimising the energy system on a local level or on four or five-year horizons will yield minor improvements; this procedure will have to be revisited in another five years’ time and only results in incremental change. One can however generate exponential change by considering a long- term horizon – say thirty or forty years from now. Working backwards from this point one can then identify steps to induce change that transcend their shortterm value – this is change for greater change. Longer-term industrial strategy can be linked to emission reduction plans to ensure progress is made towards the strategic goal. EXAMPLE. Working on systems architecture for heat infrastructure with a short-term mindset of ten years, one might find the opportunity to create a heat network fed by waste

heat from industrial processes. However, if we extend our horizon to 2050, we might realise that these processes occur in industries without a long-term future, meaning the network would lose its major source of heat. With this in mind, it may be strategically sensible to focus on other infrastructure. Long-term thinking allows us to identify dependencies in evolving systems and prioritise investment.

Current Expertise and Technology Crucial and often underappreciated is that in a long-term framework it might not be necessary to actively develop (or improve) new technologies. Many technologies which can and will make a significant impact on our energy system, and in 2050 still, are readily available. Improving them further is a laudable thing if they can be expected to be a part of the 2050 system, but comes at the cost of delayed implementation. In many ways implementation is more important than development. Especially since the cost of many renewable technologies, such as off-shore wind, and the electricity they generate are expected to decrease rapidly. Implementation also means scaling; the UK is ready to build a supply chain using its renewable technology expertise and harness these changes. EXAMPLE. Currently, more than 5% of UK’s annual electricity demand is met by offshore wind – more than any other country in absolute units. Our coastline allows for a much higher capacity and current projects have demonstrated sufficient electricity at a sufficiently low cost. This source is rightly set to grow - the UK should be ready to build up its supply chain and exploit export markets.

Informed and Structured Implementation Not only is implementation highly important, its method largely determines its contribution. It is one thing to set a goal to build a set number of windfarms, but quite another to see them built by the deadline. Implementation should be informed and structured. That is, implementation should be executed in a controlled manner that, as far as possible, maximises synergies and communicates its objectives to raise awareness and support. EXAMPLE. If every current domestic heat supply - typically a gas boiler with a lifetime of about 15 years - is replaced by a (hybrid) heat pump, massive energy and emissions savings will be achieved. If every boiler that stops working is automatically replaced by such a heat pump, it takes 15 years for the last gas boiler to be replaced. For that to happen, engineers will have to be trained and agreements made with construction companies. Engineers and citizens alike should be informed of the environmental and cost benefits of this. Implementation strategy such as this could therefore have a big impact.


Taking back control or continuing to obey Britain’s difficult task of revisiting the benefits and costs of retaining current EU ecodesign requirements after Brexit Anne Siebienaler In a time of rising sea levels, enhanced coastal flooding and increasingly severe droughts, climate change as a human-induced reality can no longer be denied. Affecting both environmental and social determinants of health, global warming actually represents one of the greatest dangers to modern civilization. While a complete transition to clean and renewable energy remains a very big challenge, a more efficient use of energy generated from fossil fuels could also contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and thus have a more immediate impact on the fight against climate change. Willing to lead the way towards a more energy efficient future, in 2005 the European Union ratified Directive 2005/32/ EC aimed to induce the development of better product design in order to minimise ‘negative environmental impacts’(Directive 2005/32/EC). Although the Directive initiated some positive changes in energy consumption, European policymakers soon came to realise that, in order to optimise the Directive’s potential, the scope of its application had to be extended substantially. Hence, when in 2009 they adopted Directive 2009/125/EC, often simply referred to as ‘Ecodesign Directive’, they made sure it included not only Energy-using (EuP) but also Energy-related Products (ErP) such as windows or insulation materials. Being a framework directive, the EU’s Ecodesign Directive does not establish directly binding requirements for specific products. It much more defines overall conditions for introducing so-called ‘implementing measures’ on a product-by-product basis (Directive 2009/125/EC). Given that those regulations do not only cover industrial products like power transformers but also many consumer goods such as computers, televisions and washing machines, the EU’s regulatory power ends up having a tangible impact on people’s everyday lives (ECOS, ecostandard.org). From the perspective of European policymakers and even great parts of British industry, the Directive has proven enormously beneficial. Not only does it encourage manufacturers to mitigate adverse environmental impacts through improved product design; but it also allows to enhance EU competitiveness by harmonising national laws and thus eliminating barriers to trade (Directive 2009/125/EC). Among British consumers, however, the regulatory nature of the Directive has caused a lot of controversy. While some have valued its ability to successfully expel the least energy efficient products from the European market and thus reduce their negative repercussions on the environment, others have perceived the Directive as being too intrusive into their personal lives.

With Brexit posing major challenges to the UK government, the present policy brief, by critically evaluating the feasibility and impact of each option, seeks to formulate recommendations on whether to abolish, modify or retain current EU Ecodesign regulations.

Policy Option I:

Abolish current EU Ecodesign requirements In Favour Taking into account the current post Brexit-mood and many people’s wish to turn rhetoric into actions and finally ‘take back control’, the policy option of abolishing current EU Ecodesign requirements might be considered as not only a feasible but even a desirable option. The EU’s tendency to limit consumer choice by banning certain products from the European market has been criticised on many occasions. The consumer group ‘Which?’ for instance warned civil society about a possible increase in prices or even decrease in efficiency following the EU’s decision to ban vacuum cleaners that have more than 1,600 watts (Telegraph, 2014). Going even further in its criticism, the Eurosceptic newspaper Daily Express (2014) denunciated the EU’s influence on product design as a threat to ‘the British way of life.’ Thus, by opting for radical change and abolishing current EU Ecodesign requirements, British policymakers could respond to demands coming from parts of British citizens to free the UK from the rule of Brussels bureaucrats. This could help to restore voters’ trust in the government’s democratic legitimacy. Against Whereas in terms of government popularity it might lead to beneficial outcomes, the abolishment of current EU Ecodesign requirements would certainly have negative implications for UK trade and competitiveness. As emphasised by the House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee (2016, p.43), up until now EU standards for energy-related products have proved to have significantly increased ‘the efficiency of electrical goods on sale’. Keeping this in mind, it seems likely that deregulation could turn the UK into a dumping ground for poor efficiency and quality appliances (Brocklehurst and Tait, 2016). However, one could also argue that the UK market is not big enough to justify altering production runs to produce different standards. Hence, European manufacturers exporting to the UK will, wherever possible, try to use EU Ecodesign standards as a benchmark in order to develop a single product that they can sell across multiple mar-

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kets rather than just to the UK. In either scenario, it is certain that, in order for British products to be able to be exported to EU member states, they will still need to meet the EU Ecodesign requirements. Adopting the standards of another region, such as China or the United States, could be considered as a feasible alternative. Besides allowing UK manufacturers to gain access to new markets, this would also enable major exporters like the United States and China to trade significantly more with the UK. Nevertheless, British manufacturers would probably oppose this decision as adjusting their production systems to meet new regulations would involve enormous costs and take years to complete (Brocklehurst and Tait, 2016) and would also make it more difficult, if not impossible, for them to export their goods to the EU.

of Norway gas will further rise, the UK’s indirect dependence on cheaper Russian natural gas remains significant.

Modify current EU Ecodesign requirements

In addition, one might emphasise that, with Ecodesign providing significant economic benefits, the option of retaining existing legislation would likely be supported by the majority of British industry stakeholders. In fact, through the implementation of Ecodesign measures such as the use of recycled materials, many manufacturers seem to have already achieved substantial cost reductions. Likewise, retailers appear to have been able to significantly increase their revenues by selling more and more energy efficient products to stand out from competition and boosting customer loyalty (Plouffe et al., 2011). Finally, it seems worth mentioning that, while enhancing their capacity for innovation and creativity through the adoption of Ecodesign strategies, firms appear to have been able to develop a better brand image and thus increase their chances of qualifying as potential suppliers (Cobalt, 2014).

In Favour One possible way to modify current EU Ecodesign regulations would be to limit their scope of application exclusively to industrial and commercial energy-related products. In this way, the UK government could render common consumer goods such as kettles, dishwashers and freezers exempt from Ecodesign requirements and thus mitigate existing stereotypes about supposedly negative implications of energy efficiency standards on the performance of household products (The Guardian, 2016).

Besides offering some compelling advantages in terms of UK trade and competitiveness, the decision to continue obeying current EU Ecodesign regulations would be very likely to benefit environmental sustainability. Indeed, as emphasised by the European Commission (2015), while yielding yearly savings of up to 600 TWH of electricity in 2020 as well as gradually reducing greenhouse gas emissions and emitting fewer air pollutants, Ecodesign contributes to the development of greener economies and must therefore be seen as a vital tool in the fight against climate change.

Against However, taking into account its long-run effects, the above mentioned option would represent a clear missed opportunity for the UK’s climate and foreign policy goals. By choosing not to follow up any possibility of improving energy efficiency and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the UK government would end up having difficulties to fulfil its responsibilities for tackling climate change and thus risk losing its credibility as a member of the international community. Hence, as demanded by many organisations and consultancies such as for instance ECOFYS, instead of trying to limit the scope of Ecodesign requirements, British policymakers should call for widely used products such as toasters and smartphones to be included within the Ecodesign Working Plan 2016-2019 (Dr Smith, M. et al., 2016).

Finally, with regards to public efficiency, the Ecodesign Directive’s enormously positive impact on consumers’ lives must be highlighted. If correctly implemented, EU Ecodesign requirements are estimated to generate net savings of €332 each year for the average European household (Coolproducts.eu). In addition, by reducing noise as well as the amount of time needed for rework, the products’ high levels of efficiency allow them to eliminate causes of stress and increase consumers’ quality of life (Dr Smith, M. et al., 2016). Thus, by increasing energy efficiency, Ecodesign does not only provide economic benefits but also important health and emotional well-being benefits to consumers.

Policy Option II:

Policy Option III:

Retain current EU Ecodesign requirements In Favour Before evaluating the various benefits of retaining EU Ecodesign requirements, it should be noted that, given the time, money and energy consuming process of drafting and implementing new legislation, British policymakers might lack the necessary resources to develop their own product regulations and thus risk creating a long-lasting policy vacuum. The retention of current EU Ecodesign rules would benefit UK trade and competitiveness in many ways. Not only would it allow British manufacturers and producers to continue exporting to EU member states, but it would also help ensure energy security and thus reduce the UK’s indirect dependence on energy resources from Russia (Coolproducts.eu). This can be explained by the fact that, although gas used in the UK is still largely domestic, UK North Sea supplies are depleting. Norway is the UK’s biggest source of natural gas imports, but it sells to a global market at global prices. Given that the price

Against Taking into account their limited economic as well as creative capacities, the policy alternative of retaining current EU Ecodesign requirements might be criticised by small and medium-sized enterprises who might lack the resources necessary to integrate new constraints and regulations beyond their field of capacity (Deutz et al., 2013). However, while recognising the fact that at first, Ecodesign imposes certain financial burdens upon companies, it might also be important to mention that the government can provide support and thus ensure a smooth transition to new methods manufacturing products. Secondly, given that many Brexit voters associate the European Union with an elite-driven, cumbersome bureaucracy, the option of retaining current EU Ecodesign requirements would probably encounter significant opposition. Far from healing social division, such a decision could in fact further alienate the UK’s citizens from one another. However, unlike impacts on trade, public health or sustainability, the problem related to negative public perceptions could probably be solved quite easily through improved communication. That is to say, rather than letting media-induced fear over the supposedly lower performance of energy efficient products influence


people’s attitudes towards the EU, it might be useful to inform consumers, through the translation of technical details into accessible language, about the real effectiveness of energy saving products.

Policy Recommendations Building on evidence-based research, this policy brief takes the stance that the UK should retain current EU Ecodesign requirements. After critically evaluating the benefits and costs of each of the three options, it became clear that, given Ecodesign’s potential to provide substantial economic benefits in form of energy and net savings, the majority of British industry stakeholders would support policy option III. Likewise, neither environmental nor consumer groups would oppose the government’s decision to retain Ecodesign requirements. Thus, this policy brief concludes that the main challenge regarding the UK’s further implementation of EU Ecodesign standards lies in the conflict between: - environmental sustainability as a vital necessity for ensuring the further existence of humankind and - popular resentment towards the European Union’s regulatory power In order to be able to reconcile negative public perceptions of EU environmental legislation in the UK to the international community’s vision and objectives for environmental protection, British policymakers should implement the following three recommendations: Effectively communicate the benefits of Ecodesign products to the public by organising information sessions on the importance of green economies Receive and critically evaluate consumer feedback by organising so-called Ecodesign Roundtables where different stakeholder groups are represented Regain people’s trust in the government by presenting Brexit as an opportunity to retain the beneficial contributions of the EU, such as Ecodesign, while abolishing the unfavourable policies


Transatlantic cooperation in the Arctic An opportunity for more dialogue with Russia

Irina Aveeda Current tensions between the West and Moscow leave Western countries with very few opportunities for maintaining a dialogue with Russia. However, engaging with Russia is crucial to restoring confidence between Moscow and Western partners, allowing progress in the resolution of current conflicts. Although the West should maintain sanctions against Russia and continue to condemn Russia’s violations of international law, keeping some communication channels with the Kremlin open would help the West to avoid a further escalation of conflicts with Moscow. Given shared interests of Western countries and Russia in the Arctic, as well as the relatively low level of tensions in this region, deepening cooperation with Russia on Arctic issues would allow the West to take a first step towards restoring trust with Moscow and achieving a better understanding with Russian officials. As economic activity in the Arctic increases, setting standards for doing business in the Arctic and establishing mechanisms for preventing natural catastrophes would benefit both the Western countries and Russia. The Ukrainian crisis and a stalemate in negotiations over the Syrian war deteriorated the relations between Moscow and the West, suspending their partnership in numerous areas. Western economic sanctions against Russia over the Ukrainian conflict and Russia’s counter-sanctions have significantly decreased trade and economic cooperation between the West and Russia. Increased Russian military activity in Eastern Europe and the recent increase of NATO presence in the Baltic States and Poland could result in Russia’s confrontation with the West. Western sanctions have severely impacted the Russian economy, but failed to strengthen domestic opposition against the Kremlin and demonstrated limited success in enforcing changes in Moscow’s aggressive foreign policy. President Putin’s domestic approval rating hit a record high of 89 percent, while Russian military forces are still present in east Ukraine. Although the West should draw clear red lines to show the Kremlin that violations of international law will not be tolerated, keeping channels of dialogue with Moscow open is necessary to promote democratic developments in Russia, as the EU and the US would benefit from a more democratic Russia that follows the rules of international law. Current tensions between Russia and the West provide only a few options for a dialogue. Deepening economic ties would require lifting sanctions that would compromise the credibility of the Western countries, as Moscow still does not adhere to the Minsk agreement. Coopera-

tion over the Syrian conflict is also challenging, as making concessions to Russia and tolerating the maintenance of Assad regime would contradict Western principles of protecting human rights. In contrast, cooperation in the Arctic would be feasible, given that relations between the US, EU member states, and Russia in this region are still relatively free from tensions.

Background Background With approximately one third of all global remaining natural gas and thirteen percent of undiscovered oil deposits, the Arctic holds great potential for the future of the international energy market. Despite the global fall in oil prices and expenses related to Arctic oil exploration, investments in the oil sector will remain lucrative, as new technology reduces the costs of oil extraction in the Arctic. With European domestic energy production decreasing, EU countries will continue to rely on oil and gas imports and will be interested in the exploration of Arctic reserves. As the Arctic is a crucial strategic and economic region for several countries, Russia, the US, the EU Arctic countries Denmark, Finland, and Sweden as well as NATO partners Canada, Iceland, and Norway coordinate their actions on regional matters within the Arctic Council, the main institution for Arctic cooperation. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, cooperation between Russia and other countries in the Arctic has decreased. NATO put on hold joint military exercises “Northern Eagle.” Arctic Chiefs of Defence suspended their regular meetings and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable. Several joint projects of Western and Russian oil companies in the Arctic were interrupted. The Western countries cut Russia’s access to technology, such as offshore drilling equipment suitable for drilling under extreme environmental conditions, impeding Russia’s exploration of Arctic oil and gas deposits. However, joint research, environmental cooperation and soft security cooperation of coast guards of the Arctic nations continues. Despite the current tensions between the West and Russia, polls demonstrate that the majorities in the Arctic countries do not want to suspend Arctic cooperation with Russia. The current US and EU Arctic strategies do not specifically emphasize the importance of cooperation with Russia in the Arctic, although the new joint EU policy for the Arctic from April 2016 lists Russia among other important Arctic partners. Issues Issues Climate change presents Arctic countries with new challenges and increasing costs. The temperature in the Arctic is rising twice as fast as elsewhere in the world, opening new sea routes and increasing opportunities for trade and tourism. However, rising temperatures will also cause flooding and result in high costs for Arctic states.


For example, expenses for rebuilding and maintaining infrastructure in Alaska due to climate change would rise by up to 20 percent, costing the US $3.6 to $6.1 billion by 2030. Business cooperation with Russia in the Arctic is likely to intensify in coming years and requires political coordination. With President Trump seeking good relations with Russia, the US might lift sanctions against Russia even despite the recent investigations into Russia’s election interference, justifying this decision through the need to cooperate with Russia on other urgent international issues. Without US support, the future of EU sanctions would be uncertain, given a growing opposition against sanctions in some EU member states due the economic costs of these sanctions. With sanctions removed, Western oil companies would resume their projects in the Arctic and would need support from their governments, facing increased competition from Asian companies. Due to the sanctions, Russia has been seeking cooperation in the Arctic with other countries, signing agreements with China, India, and Singapore. Russia’s increased activities in the North have raised concerns of other Arctic powers. The Kremlin has advanced militarisation of Russia’s Arctic by establishing an Arctic Joint Strategic Command, and modernising the Northern Fleet with a nuclear deterrence system. Russia has also stationed submarines and military vessels in the

Policy Recommendations Closer cooperation with Russia through the revival and deepening work of Arctic institutions should become one of the clear goals for Arctic policies of the EU and the US. The Western countries should officially acknowledge the importance of cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. The EU should update the Integrated EU policy for the Arctic by including cooperation with Russia as a clear and separate goal, recognising the strategic importance of the Arctic region to EU policy towards Russia and sending a credible signal of willingness to engage in a dialogue with the Russian government and Russian public. Similarly, the US should revise the National Strategy for the Arctic Region by highlighting cooperation with Russia. As the current chair of the Arctic Council, the US should promote a meeting between the heads of Arctic states during the next Arctic Council ministerial summit in May 2017. A dialogue on the high political level would reflect the importance of the Arctic issue and demonstrate recognition of Russia as an important partner. Reviving regular meetings of Arctic Chiefs of Defence and Arctic Security Forces Roundtable could help avoid misconceptions by Russia and other Arctic states that could potentially lead to an escalation of conflict in the Arctic. In contrast, the restoration of military cooperation between Russia and NATO in the Arctic does not seem to be a feasible nor desirable goal. In the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, NATO’s rapprochement with Russia would neglect security concerns of NATO members that are alarmed by Russia’s militarisation of the Arctic. Moreover, Russia perceives NATO as a direct threat, rather than as a reliable cooperation partner.

North, and established military bases, carrying out several unannounced snap exercises. Some Arctic countries are therefore pushing to strengthen NATO security cooperation in the Arctic to prevent Russia from expanding beyond its internationally recognized Arctic borders. However, Russia is unlikely to provoke a conflict in the Arctic, given Moscow’s need for Western technology for Arctic oil exploration and cooperation with Western oil and gas companies. Furthermore, a conflict over resources is doubtful, as two thirds of Arctic resources are located within national offshore territories and are therefore uncontested. The main challenge for transatlantic cooperation with Russia in the Arctic is separating Arctic policy from other international issues that have negatively impacted Western relations with Russia. Energy cooperation between the West and the Soviet Union is an example that such cooperation is possible. Pursuing mutual interests in energy security, the West maintained a dialogue with Moscow even in times of severe tensions in other political areas during the Cold War. Engaging in dialogue does not mean, however, neglecting Russia’s military threat to NATO partners in Eastern Europe and in the Arctic. Finding the right balance between deterrence and dialogue is necessary for reaching a better understanding with Russia.

Transatlantic partners should deepen existing Arctic cooperation in soft security, environmental issues, and research to promote confidence between Russia and Western countries. The US Coast Guard, its counterparts in Arctic EU member states, and Russia should deepen soft security cooperation within the Arctic Coast Guard Forum to increase the exchange of information and coordinate work in mass-rescue operations or efforts aimed at preventing vessels from crashing, oil spills, and other accidents and catastrophes. These measures would address joint interests of the EU, the US, Arctic NATO partners, and Russia, as well as build confidence between the Western partners and Russia. Building confidence is important to prevent potential escalation of tensions in the Arctic, as Russia and NATO regard each other as adversaries. Russia feels insecure due to NATO expansion in Eastern Europe, while NATO member states and partners are threatened by the course of Russia’s expansionist foreign policy. Strengthening confidence would allow both parties to avoid misconceptions that could result in new conflicts. The EU Arctic states and the US should invest in strengthening transatlantic research cooperation with Russia in the Arctic and intensify joint environmental cooperation and efforts to create standards for oil exploration and trade in the Arctic. Formulating standards for an effective and environmentally friendly way of doing business in the Arctic would help countries mitigate the potential economic impact of climate change in the region.

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Fostering Peace & Institutionalising Democracy The Case for International Trusteeship of South Sudan Alice Munnelly On 22 March 2017, the Frontline Club hosted an event on ‘South Sudan: The Cost of a Relentless War’. The guest speakers, who included former British Ambassador to Sudan, Sir William Patey, and South Sudanese political analyst, Thomas Mawan Muortat, highlighted the chronic failure of the ruling elite to prioritise the safety of civilians over their own bitter rivalries. The intensity of the armed fighting, the prevention of humanitarian aid, the precarious economic climate, and the deliberate targeting of citizens based on their ethnicity all demonstrate the gravity of the protracted conflict in South Sudan. To achieve an institutional foundation on which a modern peaceful state of South Sudan can be built, the King’s Think Tank recommends the use of international trusteeship.

Background In 2011, with the support of the troika – the United States, United Kingdom, and Norway - South Sudan became the world’s youngest country. Yet, in the six years which have followed, the consequences of civil war have exposed the reveries of independence so as to beg the question: How can independence be reconciled with freedom? Before independence, the divergent forces of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) shared a common enemy in Khartoum. The liberation movement has since demonstrated its lack of organised structure and ideological drive. South Sudanese leaders failed to transition from insurgents to a governing class. Their perception of government as a means of securing wealth rather than state building is the fatal flaw in the nascent South Sudan’s foundations. Despite gargantuan amounts of aid, South Sudan continues to exhibit a lack of governance capacity. South Sudan has been cited in ‘South Sudan’s Capability Trap: Building a State with Disruptive Innovation’ as reflecting “many of the common pitfalls of the “business as usual” approach to institution building in fragile states.” An agenda of human rights protection has gained little traction; pre-genocidal conditions now prevail in the face of international intervention. Prior to the conflict, polls portrayed the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) as one of the country’s most trusted institutions by civilians. Public opinion now dif-

fers sharply, with many civilians recounting a notable increase in abuse suffered compared with the harm inflicted during Sudan’s second civil war (1983-2005). Callous attacks have been meted out on civilians by state forces and allied militia in blatant disregard of the peace agreement between President Salva Kiir and former Vice-President Riek Machar. The emergence of the socalled “gun-class” has led to the deterioration of South Sudan by every metric.

Issues South Sudan has failed to carry out the minimal responsibilities of a sovereign state. Instead, through quests for the personalisation of power, the political elite has reduced citizens from actors in the political marketplace to beings of prey – military forces treat civilians perceived to be loyal to opposing combatants as legitimate targets. A process of ethnic cleansing is arguably under way in the country. However, the root causes of the conflict could also be attributed to the personal rivalries in a diverse group of self-serving individuals within the elite. There is a notable lack of drive from the government to implement the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, Donald Booth, has said: “Fundamentally, I believe we in the United States wanted peace for South Sudan far more than its leaders did, and like the people of South Sudan we have been unable to ensure that the interests of unarmed civilian populations are valued more than those of the leaders who are empowered by personal arm forces”. Neither the government nor the rebels are unified bodies, but rather the nominal leaders of these groups pursue vested interests. The comprehensive challenges cannot be overcome by a government for whom the compromise of power-sharing is perceived as a greater evil than the immense suffering of its people and regional instability. The practice of guerrilla warfare against the north has brought about a warrior culture in South Sudan. The army is undisciplined. United Nations’ reports indicate numerous breaches, from government forces and nonState armed groups, of the principle of distinction between combatants, non-combatants and civilians. In the Protection Strategy baseline survey conducted by the United Nations Population Fund, the vast majority of rape cases were found to be committed by police or soldiers.


Rampant corruption is symptomatic of the disregard of the separation of powers principle. This lack of accountability has fuelled political instability. The government’s purported measures to hold perpetrators of crimes to account are insufficient and lack transparency. For example, the government set up several committees in 2014 which were tasked with investigating human rights violations. Their findings were allegedly consolidated in a report which was submitted to the President, but the report was never made public. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan has also reported that many of the cases tried by the courts martial after violence broke out in July 2016 were inconsistent with the gravity of the crimes committed. SPLA soldiers were charged with lesser offences such as theft and loss of weapons. In terms of its economy, South Sudan is in the development trap - landlocked, resource rich (98% dependent on oil revenues), and poorly governed. The state has witnessed a rapid depreciation of the South Sudanese Pound (SSP); an all-time low of more than 100 SSP to 1 USD was reached in November 2016. The cost of living has increased exponentially; insecure trade routes into South Sudan have caused lower than average imports in a time of pervasive food insecurity (the civil war has disrupted consecutive farming seasons), driving the prices of available food to record highs. Furthermore, the warring parties have adopted the strategy of stealing or destroying the delivery of necessary supplies and humanitarian assistance with devastating consequences for civilians. Continued deterioration in food security is likely during an extended lean season (February – July). South Sudan, referred to in the 1970s as ‘the basket of Africa’ is now home to a man-made famine.

Policy Recommendations The typical form of international support whereby foreign governments work in close cooperation with the national government is non-viable in South Sudan. The potential for an even larger pogrom demands the revision of international intervention. In order to combat the prioritisation of regime survival and pursuance of narrow interests, we must re-conceptualise peace-making efforts as an ongoing process of bargaining designed to demilitarise politics and institutions which sustain the war in South Sudan. In response, the King’s Think Tank recommends the following policies: The electoral contest of 2018 must be postponed and a period of international trusteeship commenced. By establishing an external administration of the country for a finite period of time so as to restore a base level of stability and normalcy, international organisations can act as catalysts for three essential processes: a.reconciliation and accountability; b.the facilitation of a national conversation on how to shape the state; and c.remedy the military’s splintering. This proposal has also been supported by several academics, though they also reference the cautionary challenges faced by countries such as Somalia in this regard. In order to overcome meddling similar to that of Ethiopia in respect of Somalia, the trusteeship should be formalised under the auspices of the UN. The recommendations of two academics in particular are deserving of analysis. Mahmood Mamdani, a Ugandan scholar,

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has suggested the African Union spearhead a transitional government with the support of the United Nations which would last for six years. The Director of the African Centre for Strategic Studies, Kate Almquist Knopf, likens this process to putting South Sudan on “life support.” The central tenet of her argument for international trusteeship is similar to that of Mamdani, whereas the specifics differ. Knopf favours a longer period of trusteeship – between 10 and 15 years – which is arguably more realistic given the extent of political disarray and human suffering. Holding elections in 2018 would risk a violence cycle as the state institutions which are expected to serve as ‘shock absorbers’, such as the judiciary and the military, are perpetrators of corruption. Instead, the potential benefits of international trusteeship would directly respond to the exigencies of the situation in South Sudan. The transitional government could focus on stabilising oil revenue, and establishing a more consistent budget by way of diversification. Stronger oil revenue will result in agriculture development so as to alleviate financial hardship and hunger. A heightened absorptive capacity would facilitate the positive effects of international aid. a. Chapter V of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan provides for the establishment of three transitional justice institutions, among which is a hybrid court for South Sudan. One significant barrier to holding perpetrators accountable is that many of them hold senior decision-making roles, political and military. This compromises the prerequisite of a political will to create an environment which is conducive to credible inquiry into human rights violations. The argument that nation before tribe is unachievable when all parties are linked to conflict is supported by LeRiche and Arnold. The conditions of polarisation of communities and divisive agendas do not augur well with truth seeking, whereas international trusteeship could be an effective transitional justice mechanism.

The aforementioned peace agreement does not stipulate a timeline for the establishment of the hybrid court. However, the African Union did inform the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan that it had secured funding for the process. Trusteeship is key to its success as recent statements from the government have juxtaposed justice and reconciliation as competing objectives. They seek to prioritise ending the violent conflict over ensuring accountability for crimes, whereas in the view of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, “many States in transition have demonstrated, peace and reconciliation can never be achieved without truth and justice.” To argue that peace precedes justice is to ignore their linkage. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and chapter V of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan can authorise the establishment of the hybrid court in lieu of an agreement with the government if necessary. b. In the midst of violence, the social fabric of South Sudan has been torn apart, resulting in little to no opportunity for citizens to discuss the principles to be enshrined by their constitution. A sustainable future of peace depends on the quality of the process which leads to a democratically-endorsed constitution. Through revitalising the Parliament and other means of open dialogue, the trustees would empower citizens to be proactive in shaping the future of the South Sudanese state in a way that has been until now unworkable. There is currently little to no opportunity for the leaders of opposition parties to come to power. The civil war derailed electoral preparations, thus demolishing the route to power for the opposition. Furthermore, the country’s biggest opposition party – the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement for Democratic Change – has been repeatedly threatened with potential revocation of party registration as a result of claims that they support armed groups.


Remember Miamingi, a South Africa-based law expert, has argued for a technocratic administration of South Sudan rather than international trusteeship. However, his approach falls short of addressing the deep-rooted bias of current political authority. The extent of corruption in South Sudan necessitates a will for transparency, which would stem from the requirement for trustees to account to the UN. The establishment of a blueprint for reform of the South Sudanese state would offer an ecosystem of layered accountability. This would instead ensure that formal and informal institutions interact with one another so as to nurture and protect the social compact between the state and society. Bosnia and Kosovo are both examples of the success of such an approach. c. South Sudan is over-militarised and has even been referred to in the Chatham House publication, ‘South Sudan’s Slide into Conflict: Revisiting the Past and Reassessing Partnerships’, as a military with a country rather than a country with a military. For the majority of leaders - both government and rebel – war has been the only reality they have known. The UN Security Council must seek to remedy the military’s splintering through a process of cantonment, which would allow for soldier registration. In order to divert loyalties away from individual commanders, an arms embargo should be implemented together with pay incentives offered to soldiers for their return to base. Public opinion polls have called for the professionalisation of the army. Many of the soldiers recruited post-2012 border war have received almost no training, nor do they exhibit respect for command. Cash incentives in a time of economic difficulty could be a mechanism of enforcing essential skills requirements for soldiers – offering literacy and civilian protection programmes, particularly to field officers – so as to develop an adept and truly national army.

inherent in the securitisation of the state to make use of the influential hold that security institutions have on South Sudanese society and government. Through careful investment in security, its culture can be shifted towards the citizenry.

Conclusion The legitimacy of political authority is defined by Lipset as “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society.” The extreme degree of state failure necessitates improved diplomatic initiative in South Sudan. While national capacity-building should be a long-term goal, the current national system cannot be relied upon to provide accountability for serious international (or national) crimes. Instead, by addressing the political dimensions of the mass violence through international trusteeship rather than solely prioritising a criminal approach whereby responsibility is assigned to individual perpetrators, rule of law will subsist on all-around reform and a viable political order.

Cantonment must be combined with a focus on oversight and leadership, which has to a large extent been neglected in the recent international efforts to transform South Sudan’s security sector. There is an opportunity

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What do the previous Syrian ceasefires imply about the prospects of the current ceasefire? Mireia Raga

T

he Syrian Crisis or Syrian Civil War started in 2011 after Arab Spring revolts deposed Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Peaceful protests surged in Syria due to lack of individual freedom and unstable economic conditions, which were violently repressed by President Bashar al-Assad’s government. Among the consequent discontent in the population, defectors of the Syrian military united and founded the Free Syrian Army rebel group to depose Assad from office. The conflict was further aggravated by divisive religious support; the Shia minority in Syria supported Assad while the Sunni majority sided with the opposition groups. It was not until 2014 when the United States (US) and its allies intervened in the country to fight the terrorist organisation Islamic State and supporting the opposition groups (ISIS). A year later, Russia joined in the intervention against ISIS, but sided with the Assad regime. Hence, the issue escalated and what had been a civil war, is now an issue of international concern. The United Nations (UN) requested the implementation of the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, maintaining the establishment of a transitional government in Syria with “full executive powers formed on the basis of mutual consent.”

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This past year, three ceasefires were agreed of which two failed and one is currently holding. The first ceasefire was initiated in February and collapsed in July. The US and Russia had agreed to end all hostilities, except those directed to militant groups such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra (former Nusra Front) and in cases of self-defence in proportionate measure. However, these were two major caveats since they were used as a pretext by Assad forces to target opposition groups and their supporters. The second ceasefire was the shortest of the three, lasting only eight days, from 12th to 20th September in hopes of a mission with joint cooperation between Russia and the US against ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. US Ex-Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov established an agreement to reduce violence and stop the restriction of humanitarian access to besieged areas during seven consecutive days, after which both nations would install an institution, the Joint Implementation Centre (JIC), against ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. While both sides respected the reduction of violence, the Assad regime continued to restrict humanitarian access, and a number of military strikes escalated tensions leading to the breakdown of the ceasefire. Indeed, on


the 17th of September, the US and its allies mistakenly struck Assad’s military in an operation against ISIS and two days later an aid convoy was supposedly attacked by Russian airstrikes. The US attack was reported in Washington as an intelligence failure, but Russia strongly criticised it since it perceived it as an attack on its allies. The latter attack on the aid convoy was blamed on Russia due to its criticism of the US airstrike. Thus, this escalation of tensions led Syrian and Russian forces to assault eastern Aleppo, thus finally breaking the ceasefire. In December 2016, Turkey and Russia brokered a third ceasefire, pledging the compliance of Assad and the opposition groups. Russia, Iran and Turkey met in Moscow to agree on the principles for a peace deal and talks in Kazakhstan followed. The agreement settles for peace talks in Astana, but it is unclear about Assad’s role in the future of Syria. This new pact highlights a change in negotiations about Syria; the Obama administration was not included in the ceasefire talks and Turkey has signalled a change of strategy since it no longer requires Assad’s overthrow for a common peace. Many of the opposition groups signed the agreement excluding the largest group, Ahrar al-Sham, as well as the jihadist militant groups. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2236 supporting this initiative for peace. Current US President Donald Trump is also open to further negotiations, accepting Russia’s increased influence in the Middle Eastern region. Despite this optimistic forecast, opposition and Assad forces continue to fight in Damascus. A glance at the previous ceasefires makes evident that the end of the civil war and the consequent establishment of a transitional government and a future govern-

ment in the Syrian state will be possible if all sides participating in the conflict are willing to put their efforts into making this a reality. However, the seed of conflict will always be there due to the vast array of actors from different religious and social groups. The Syrian crisis is but a proxy war of one of the many tribal clashes in the Middle East region. Therefore, in order to assess the prospects of the current ceasefire, a comparison with the previous ceasefires is necessary. Firstly, a comparison of the context of all three ceasefires allows for the evaluation of the current one’s prospects of success or failure. Domestically, all three ceasefires have been executed in the context of spoiler attacks that have hindered negotiations among all parties. Spoilers, as defined by scholar Fotini Christia, are groups that “have no interest in seeing the conflict come to an end.” These groups, of which ISIS is the most notorious, have continued their hostilities in different regions of the country, thus instigating the continued use of violence against these groups and providing the opportunity to use them as scapegoats in order to advance into enemy territory. Additionally, all three ceasefires took place in a situation of political and military stalemate with relatively stable front lines, which offered the possibility of opening peace talks, yet these were not successful in the previous two ceasefires. Local leadership, for instance, has been one of the domestic factors affecting front lines and transitions to peace. Hence, as deduced from scholars S. Lucas et al., since local leaders try to ensure the stability of the area they govern, they work towards the maintenance of their front lines against the push of other contending actors in breaking these lines. Thereupon, the implications of the actions of spoilers and stable front lines with the strong presence of local leaders implies that, in order

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for the current ceasefire to work, there needs to be joint agreement on measures towards spoilers and further engagement with local leaders during the peace negotiations to establish stability in the divided territories. On the other hand, there looms an immense difference between the current ceasefire and the previous; the chemical weapons attack on northern Syria. The attack, which has been the greatest recorded, has prompted the international community to put pressure on Assad to provide information on all flights taking place that day, most likely due to suspicion towards the Syrian government. Yet, Assad rejected the use of chemical weapons almost four years ago. Russia has offered another explanation that points to the unintentional release of toxic substances after a Syrian strike of an insurgent storehouse, but this has been deemed as unreliable from Western standpoints. This chemical attack poses a great threat to the survival of the current ceasefire as it seems to escalate tensions. Internationally, conditions surrounding the different ceasefires convey the dispersed nature of actors’ interests in Syria. All three ceasefires have seen the anchored nature of the alliances that only reinforce the stalemate situation previously discussed. Russia is still linked to Assad and is not as interested in fighting ISIS. The US holds a completely different position; it is mainly focused on its fight with ISIS in Syria and Iraq and is less concerned with the Assad regime. Turkey, another key actor, although it opposes Assad, it is much more committed to Kurdish issues and ISIS movements in northern Syria, which hampers its alliance with the US and has drawn the state closer to Russia, as Turkish and Russian call for talks establishing the third ceasefire demonstrated. The immobility of strategic objectives among foreign actors in Syria poses a double outcome; it entrenches the divisions among every side but also opens for the opportunity of bargains between sides since fixed objectives allow for the means in achieving such aims to vary in order to reach a common agreement. However, this very much depends on the willingness of leaders to open their strategies to concessions. Moreover, it is also necessary to compare the processes through which the three ceasefires have come about for the assessment of the prospects of the current ceasefire. Before the first ceasefire was established, three rounds of talks in Geneva took place, the first two of which failed to achieve a common agreement due to the continuation of hostilities and under-representation of the key actors on the issue. Despite the success of the third round which produced the first ceasefire, Kurdish population was completely unrepresented; their participation was, hence, silenced. Thus, despite the success in limited concessions achieved at the third round of negotiations in Geneva, the caveat that under-representation of minorities represented meant that the future of the first ceasefire was doomed to collapse sooner or later. Another important common point between all three ceasefires is the exclusion of jihadi groups such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in the agreement. While excluding these actors translates to labelling them as terrorists and criminals and hence de-legitimises them, it also ignores their agency that influences the peace process and pro-

vokes the continuation of their hostilities throughout the country. These groups are one of the reasons why the ceasefires were interrupted and, thus, a stable peace settlement should establish measures on how to approach such groups. Hence, because the current ceasefire has ignored them as well, it yet contains caveats that could produce fissures on the temporary truce. On the other hand, one of the great successes of the first ceasefire that enabled its relatively long existence was the vagueness of its terms. Indeed, it addressed the Syrian opposition’s terms for the establishment of a transitional government but also kept the possibility of Assad remaining in power an option. Assad is adamant in remaining in power and will not accept any truce that does not make this an option. Therefore, one of the key aspects of success in Syria is keeping the different government options available for future talks in order to first cease arms. The current ceasefire has done so remarkably well and has the possibility of giving way to further negotiations if leaders are willing to comply. Furthermore, the different actors involved in the negotiations process of the three ceasefires cast light on the prospects of the current one. External actors have played a catalytic role in negotiations, prioritising their interests above the local ones. In this sense, Russia backed the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) to enter negotiations for the first ceasefire against the interests of Turkey, who strongly opposes Kurdish independent movements. Despite the invitation from a United Nations (UN) envoy, Turkey objected and threatened to boycott the talks so it was consequently denied. The recent ceasefire, in contrast, shows Turkey and Russia moving closer together as they initiated and brokered the talks process, thus catalysing once more negotiations for peace. This turn that is happening has the possibility to give way to joint cooperation between the different foreign actors and push local actors to the establishment of a peace agreement. On the other hand, the role of local actors has been more varied and controversial in some respects. Local notables often act in favour of the Assad government and maintain secret contact with besieged areas; they act, in a way, as intelligence. This is a matter that, although not thoroughly discussed in the literature, has been present in all three ceasefires processes. These actors can act to enforce or hinder the cessation of hostilities, depending on Assad’s interests and the actions of other local actors. Reconciliation committees are another pivotal actor in the negotiations process since they establish links between the opposition groups and the Assad government as well as enabling the development of frameworks for talks. Once more, the literature does not focus on these local actors, which have been present in all ceasefire negotiations. However, to establish a stable peace framework, it will be necessary to work more closely with them as they provide a liaison between the two largest contending sides in the Syrian Civil War. Lastly, the large number of factions present in the conflict but misrepresented in the three ceasefire negotiations have hindered the power of the two previous ceasefires to ensure compliance at the local level because populations feel ignored. The current ceasefire did not include groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and hence the danger of non-compliance is still present.


In essence, the main barriers to the permanence of the current ceasefire are the impact of spoilers; the wide spectre of minorities, ideologies, and religions that are easily excluded from peace talks; the specificity on matters of a possible transitional government and Syria’s future government; and political willingness to hold the agreements. The current ceasefire presents great risks that can quickly result in its collapse, especially now that chemical weapons attacks have taken place.

Policy Recommendations Inclusion of representation of as many minorities and different ideological or religious groups as possible in the negotiations for the cessation of hostilities, The establishment of a framework of action through joint cooperation of all parties present in such negotiations, external and local, on spoiler actors such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra; The delineation of broad guidelines regarding cessation of violence, the possible transitional government, and the future government of Syria to ensure the agreement from all parties involved in the talks and the establishment of an incentive to maintain political willingness to uphold the conditions agreed; The inclusion of international institutions such as the United Nations to monitor the enactment of the agreements from all parties involved.

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Treatment of opioid drug dependence in Russia and Australia Amally Ding

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pioid drug dependence is a global health problem which does not have a globally uniform approach in terms of treatment. Opioid drug dependence is a multifaceted disease which not only increases the risk of mortality but also contributes to the risk of contracting of a multitude of health problems, namely human immunodeficiency virus or acquired immune deficiency syndrome and hepatitis B and C. These co-morbid states can effectively increase the already heightened degree of mortality. Furthermore, drug dependence from the perspective of the affected person extends beyond their health as seen in the consequential unemployment or homelessness that can occur. The relationships between the dependant and pillars of support, such as family members and friends, can also deteriorate and compound the aforementioned issues. Social, personal and health hurdles can have a broader impact on the nation’s economy. This increased cost is wrought from not only difficulty in maintaining employment but also from potentially engaging in criminal activities, required treatment via rehabilitation and of medical sequelae secondary to the addiction itself. National health policy has great potential to mediate in the management of drug dependence and its associated social, personal and economic impacts. The emphasis in modality changes depending on the country in question. This comparative study will aim to highlight the differences in approach between Australia and Russia exemplify two opposing approaches to the management of opioid dependence, so they will be used in this comparative study to highlight the differences in terms of pharmacotherapy and counselling. The term pharmacotherapy in this paper encapsulates the group of drugs specifically used in substitution therapy which can include methadone, buprenorphine, slow release morphine and levo alpha acetyl methadol.1 Additionally, the study will illustrate how the above-mentioned policies have been effective using an example from the respective national healthcare systems.

Russia The Russian Federation has been facing an increase in heroin use and a consequential rise in drug dependent individuals who have human immunodeficiency virus detected in their blood. Intravenous drug users account for up to 90% of patients with human immunodeficiency virus within Russia. This trend is in keeping with the sta-

tistics pertaining to the injecting opioid drug use of the broader Eastern European region. This is in part attributed to the increase of heroin trafficking which added to the availability of opioids in population which previously were restricted to homemade opioids like Cherny within the Russian Federation. The focus of treatment in Russia is to encourage abstinence. The prohibition of substitution pharmacotherapy in Russia is in keeping with this treatment protocol. To address opioid dependence, there are both free and partly funded programs. The type of funding affects the availability of treatment but at the core of these programs is a step wise approach which consists of approximately a week of detoxification followed with assessment and stabilisation of physical and mental health. Detoxification is the management of opioid withdrawal by healthcare professionals, specifically, induced using naloxone in Russia. The assessments are mandatory given the expectation that the gains of therapy will be compromised by the cravings brought on by withdrawal. The therapy itself is a combination of both psychotherapy and medications which directly address the symptoms of withdrawal, such as antidepressants and anticonvulsants. This stage is ongoing in assessment and duration as there is no substitution therapy to graduate onto for patients. Rehabilitation therapy is ideally the last stage of the process, yet is limited in availability within the public sector and otherwise provided privately. All opioid dependent patients in the above-mentioned programs are tested for human immunodeficiency virus, treated accordingly against their results and often referred onto necessary social services. Despite much evidence indicating the advantages of substitution therapy, such as methadone and buprenorphine, there is no plan to implement these measures within Russia. By forgoing this treatment method, opioid dependent patients ultimately cannot reap the benefits of this avenue of treatment. The benefits include decreased use of illicit opioids and a related decrease in the engagement of criminal activities, behaviours that can infect themselves and others with blood borne diseases, and the risk of overdose. These advantages have been verified through an array of studies including those with longitudinal and controlled trials designs.1 There is also evidence suggesting that substitution therapy correlates with a higher wage when compared to those who are not on pharmacotherapy.1 From a sociocultural and healthcare perspective, there is a negative connotation

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attached to substitution therapy that has been reinforced through various forms of media in the Russian Federation. Replacing one opioid with another is not seen to solve the problem and is instead perceived as a foreign plot against Russia.3 If a pilot program for substitution therapy were to ever be proposed, it would be imperative to begin not with its immediate implementation, but rather the re-education of healthcare professionals and society to bolster support and the likelihood of the program’s success.

Australia At the heart of opioid dependence treatment in Australia is the understanding and tailoring of programs to the individual patient, opposite to the uniform treatment programs available in the Russian Federation. The need for ongoing assessment is a treatment protocol that on face value may mirror what occurs in Russia, yet separates itself by highlighting the need for individualism. This includes factoring changes with the patient’s circumstances and altering treatment accordingly. Of the many treatment options available to Australian patients, abstinence based programs are considered a viable option for only a proportion of them. Abstinence is not seen as a universal goal of therapy; instead, the emphasis is placed on decreasing overall opioid use over time or ensuring that there is no escalation in dose or dosing frequency. Where appropriate, the option of pharmacotherapy in the form of opioid replacement therapy is made available. The mainstays of treatment in Australia are methadone and buprenorphine. Within the Russian Federation, detoxification using the aforementioned medications is seen as the first step of active treatment. This view is disputed in the Australian treatment protocols where detoxification is seen as the precursory phase needed to enable an opioid dependent patient to engage in treatment programs. There are a multitude of options in terms of therapy and rehabilitation available in Australia. The most common types include therapeutic communities, self-help groups and counselling services. Counselling focuses on the emotional issues underlying drug abuse and establishing necessary social and lifestyle changes to bolster either reduced use or abstinence. It is often through counselling that patients can be referred onto ancillary services to assist them, such as legal advice, employment agencies and childcare services. Counselling can be done in a group setting which has the added benefit of hearing the real life experiences of others and understanding which strategies worked for them. Self-help groups are similar to group therapy except they are organised by members instead of healthcare professionals. An added advantage of self-help groups is that they are free, readily accessible and assist patients in creating a social support network that is not affiliated with substances of abuse. Therapeutic communities endeavour to teach their residents life skills, find employment while providing therapy. Effectively, it is the most holistic method and provides the greatest amount of preparation for re-entry into the general community yet this system may not be well suited to someone who cannot cope under

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strict rules or supervision. A common structure for treatment is to use a combination of methods, for example, either detoxification or substitution pharmacotherapy with one of the above described therapies.

Evidence for Effectiveness There is much evidence to support the use of opioid substitution therapies like methadone, buprenorphine and naltrexone. Substitution therapies have shown a statistical improvement in many different aspects of measurable patient outcomes. At one year follow up with abstinent Australian patients, the population was contributed to by 65% of the substitution pharmacotherapy cohort.5 Detoxification had a noticeable, albeit lower, abstinence rate at 52% and only 25% contribution by the non-treatment group.5 Pharmacotherapy also reduces the prevalence of crime engaged in by drug dependent individuals; this positive outcome of pharmacotherapy benefits those on a community level as well. It is estimated that for every 100 individuals being treated with methadone there was a 12 fewer robberies, 57 less incidents of breaking and entering and 56 fewer cases of car thefts.6 According to this study by the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research and the National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, the impact of methadone on criminal activity could actually be understated. This notion is supported in that many crimes are not reported and for those reported a conviction may not be the end result and lead to exclusion from the study population. From a global perspective, the World Health Organization measures the annual impact of pharmacotherapy as being able to prevent 130,000 new human immunodeficiency virus infections, reduce the rate of hepatitis infection and decrease opioid overdose that result in premature death by 90%. Furthermore, the use of methadone, buprenorphine and naltrexone has the added economic and financial benefits of being the most cost-effective treatment in the management of heroin addiction. Naltrexone was found to be the least cost-effective while methadone and buprenorphine are equitable and can be alternate options for each other in terms of cost and therapeutic efficacy.7 Ultimately, it is apparent that by using pharmacotherapy such as methadone and buprenorphine, the Australian patients, communities and healthcare systems are reaping its benefits unlike the limited gains seen in the Russian Federation. Opioid drug addiction is a global problem, yet each country facing this problem has different programs in place. Australia and the Russian Federation are no exception. A similarity that the two share is their focus on therapy as part of the rehabilitation process with a need for ongoing assessment. Differences between the two systems include the perception of detoxification. The Australian system sees it as a prelude to true rehabilitation, while the Russian Federation sees it as a means to abstinence. Another point of difference is the use and acceptability of pharmacotherapy, such as methadone and buprenorphine. Russia steers away from the use of opioid replacement which is a choice that is currently supported by health professionals


Mapping the health of the nation Modernising disease tracking and surveillance in the United States

Grant Rosensteel In order to reduce inefficiencies, eliminate fragmentation, and increase collaboration and preparedness, the Department of Health and Human Services should establish a singular national framework that is based on Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to report, track, and predict all chronic and communicable diseases in the US.

Talking Points

The current system of disease tracking and reporting is outdated and relies on paper surveys and stagnant databases There is no comprehensive system to track and predict diseases in the US; there are many disconnected programs but collaboration is hindered. GIS is a comprehensive program that can be used to report and track disease cases as well as analyze data in comparison to other types of relevant data to predict the spread and emergence of disease.

Key Facts • •

• •

Nationally notifiable diseases are not required to be reported to the CDC on a national level. The spread of Zika into the US was predicted months beforehand, but the information was not widely distributed and caught public health officials surprised and unprepared. Currently, it takes 2-6 months to publish a report predicting the spread of infectious disease, time that could be spent preparing for or combating the disease. GIS has a return on investment of up to 13.8%.

Background Every year in the United States, countless lives and resources are lost because current efforts to report, track, and predict disease within the country do not utilize modern technology. No infectious or chronic disease in the US, including nationally notifiable diseases such as Marburg, rabies, plague, and lead poisoning, is required by law to be reported to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), which means national health authorities never truly know the real state of health in the nation (1). These types of diseases require up-to-date case information in order to be effectively prevented and controlled. Disease reporting throughout the United States is fragmented because there is no standard nation-wide policy for reporting cases and related information, and each state makes its own rules (2). While the CDC maintains many

databases for recording and tracking various chronic and communicable diseases, as well as other vital statistics, such databases are not updated in a timely manner and are also not unified or cross-referenced, as all of the health data that the CDC has are voluntarily submitted by hospitals, labs, and health departments across the country (3, 4). Current efforts to predict the emergence of diseases do not utilize the wealth of information annually collected on topics such as demography, land use, environment, and behavior, which are often the underlying drivers of disease; instead, prediction efforts rely mainly on risk factor analysis (5). Many individual researchers and governmental organizations publish studies that successfully predict the emergence of diseases, but this information is not widely distributed to relevant public health agencies, and the academic publishing process takes 2-6 months which hinders the effective and timely distribution of information. An example of the successful use of GIS to predict an emerging disease was highlighted by NASA where they forecasted the emergence of Zika virus in Southern Florida months prior to the first case (6). A major public health failure that would have benefited from the use of GIS was the Ebola Virus disease outbreak in Western Africa in 2014. Utilizing modern technology to report, track, and predict the spread of Ebola would have saved countless lives and millions of dollars (7).

Policy Idea In order to modernize disease surveillance in the US, all cases of nationally notifiable chronic and communicable diseases should be mandated to be reported to the CDC so that all cases are reported to a central authority. The CDC should create and manage a singular program that utilizes Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and acts as a unified reporting, tracking, and prediction process. This surveillance program should be accessible to any authorized entity within the US in order to increase collaboration, ease of access, and simplicity and would act as a singular, easy-to-use tool for disease surveillance in the country.

Analysis Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are programs that link geographic data with other types of data. These systems are extremely useful when data are location-dependent, as is the case with disease reporting. GIS are unique as data-processing systems because they are platforms that allow for the simultaneous visualization, analyzation, and interpretation of


data, all of which are useful for understanding time-sensitive patterns and trends such as outbreak events (8). Unlike other disease reporting systems, GIS allows for the linkage of demographic, environmental, and other data; these connections facilitate multidimensional analyses of the underlying causes of disease (9). The US government already possesses vast amounts of data, such as infrastructural data from the Census Bureau’s TIGER database or the environmental, land use, and climate data from the US Geological Survey, that are applicable to GIS programs (10,11). The main benefit for using GIS as a disease surveillance system is that GIS will greatly simplify the processes of reporting and tracking diseases. The data used by GIS are dynamic and updated in real-time; as new cases are reported, they will be instantly visible from anywhere in the world, which is useful because data can be easily uploaded via an Internet-connected device which eliminates the slow and wasteful paper style format that is currently used (12, 13). One of the largest causes of delayed outbreak responses in the US is the lack of interconnected data; data for different diseases and for the underlying drivers of diseases are all in separate databases, which makes it difficult to simultaneously analyze different factors and thus leads to inadequate response times (9). Since all data is accessible anywhere via the cloud, GIS as a disease surveillance tool will reduce costs associated with maintaining traditional-style databases as well as lower response time for public health emergencies, which will save lives (14). Replacing outdated disease surveillance systems with GIS will not only save 10-30% in administration costs, but such a change will also minimize waste and inefficiency by allowing for the prediction of outcomes before financial commitments are made and by aiding in the prioritization of resource allocation (8, 9). GIS will not only save money, but it even has the potential to make money because of its Return on Investment (ROI), which is between 9.7-13.8% (15).

Next Steps The first step in instituting a national framework for disease reporting is to form a team of public health and technology experts that will conduct an in-depth report on the failures and waste associated with the United States’ outdated disease surveillance system. This report should be submitted to the Department of Health and Human Services and will advise the Department to grant the CDC the necessary authority to establish a unified national framework that tracks, reports, and predicts disease. After establishing such a program, the HHS should create a mandate for all public health departments, hospitals, and labs that requires all cases of nationally notifiable diseases to be electronically submitted to this program. A grace period should be given so that individuals and institutions can learn how to use and implement the program.

Action Plan Outreach: In order to gather supporters for this program, I will start by speaking with the Dean of the School of Nursing and Health Studies at Georgetown and ask to use his office as a means of reaching out to Georgetown’s students and faculty members and to other campuses in the DC metro area. After using this as an avenue to get in contact with people in the field of public health and disease tracking, I will speak with the scientists, such as the scientists at NASA who predicted the emergence of Zika virus in Southern Florida, who have correctly predicted the emergence of domestic and global diseases by using technology like GIS.

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Policy Affairs: I will appear alongside select members of my coalition before the Department of Health and Human Services and CDC and argue our case for overhauling disease surveillance in the US. I will also go before the DC, Virginia, and Maryland Departments of Health to present our proposal in order to garner support from sources outside the federal government. I will also visit the House subcommittee on Health Care, Benefits, and Administrative Rules to seek allies who will push my proposal through the DHHS. Coalition: I will speak to the directors, such as the director of National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS), of the current programs that are tasked with tracking diseases in the US. I want to gauge the current level of discontent in the public health sector, and in order to do this in a comprehensive manner, I will also reach out to local and state public health departments’ directors, such as LaQuandra Nesbitt, the director of the DC Department of Health. I also want experts who are familiar with GIS, such as employees at ESRI, a GIS development software company. By gathering the support of experts in the fields of public health, disease tracking, and technology, I will have a solid group whom I can use as a source of testimony to include in my proposal to the Department of Health and Human Services during a hearing on the failures of the current surveillance system. Communication: In order to garner attention for this project, I will highlight and publicize the failures of the current disease-tracking system in order to raise awareness that many disease outbreaks, such as Zika or Ebola, could have been handled more effectively. Organize morning show talks with experts, especially those who successfully predicted the emergence of ZIka in Florida. I would create a website dedicated to the issue of ineffective disease surveillance and include a sample GIS program that shows how the software works.

Timeline • • •

December-January: Organize on-campus events and lay the groundwork for outreach to experts in my coalition. January-February: Meet with public health and GIS experts and gather testimony that I can use for a report to the Department of Health and Human Services. February-March: Conduct publicity events, organize morning show talks between experts in my coalition and news anchors, and try to get ads in public health magazines/journals/organization homepages highlighting the issue. March-May: Prepare my report and other supporting documents that I will deliver to the director of the CDC and relevant board in the Department of Health and Human Services.

This piece was provided by partner institution Roosevelt Institute, Georgetown University


Nicklinson vs Ministry of Justice, 2014 The constitutional complexity of assisted dying Brad Albrow

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nder British domestic law assisting the suicide of another person is a crime punishable with a maximum sentence of 14 years in prison. For many years campaigners have fought legal battles to decriminalise assisted suicide by arguing that preventing someone from seeking assistance in the taking of their own life is a breach of human rights. Tony Nicklinson’s Supreme Court appeal attained prominence not just because of the compelling case made for de-criminalising assisted suicide, but also because of the constitutional questions it raised about the superiority of, (firstly) European over domestic law, and (secondly) the judiciary over the legislature. In Nicklinson vs Ministry of Justice 2014 Mr Nicklinson sought a change in the law on the basis that a blanket ban on assisted suicide, set out in Section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (and upheld by the High Court in 2012), was a proportionate response to protecting Article 8 rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). If the Court deemed British domestic legislation to conflict with European law, they could have issued a declaration of incompatibility; this is a statement to Parliament from the higher courts that the judiciary considers a provision of domestic legislation to be incompatible with the rights set out in the Human Rights Act. A declaration does not place any legal obligation on the government to amend or repeal legislation – however, it sends a clear message to legislators that they should change the law to make it compatible with the Convention. In the Nicklinson judgement the Court reasoned that the prohibition in domestic law was currently incompatible with the appellant’s Article 8 rights under the ECHR – however, they ultimately decided against issuing a declaration of incompatibly in this case.

Constitutional Authority in Nicklinson The first element of contention lies in whether the Supreme Court initially had the constitutional authority to issue a declaration of incompatibility in an area of law which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has previously decided lies within the UK’s margin of appreciation – that is, the ‘space for manoeuvre’ which Strasbourg grants nations in fulfilling their obligations under the ECHR. Although there is no prescribed measure of just how much ‘margin’ the courts have, the doctrine is subject to European supervision. If the ECtHR deems that the same effective outcome could be achieved with a less restrictive means, it could rule against the country in question. In other words, A domestic court’s judgment can be declared disproportionate if there is not a reasonable relationship between the means and the aim sought to be realised. This European

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supervision ‘covers not only the basic legislation, but also the independent decision applying it, even one given by a court’.3 If the ECtHR finds the rights laid down in the Convention have been interfered with unnecessarily, or to a greater extent than is strictly necessary through the domestic court’s margin of appreciation, the European court can deem the domestic court’s ruling to be disproportionate. For example, in the Hirst vs UK 2005 case the ECtHR claimed ‘the Court accepts that this is an area in which a wide margin of appreciation should be granted to the national legislature in determining whether restrictions on prisoners’ right to vote can still be justified in modern times and if so how a fair balance is to be struck. [However]… the court cannot accept that an absolute bar on voting by any serving prisoner in any circumstances falls within an acceptable margin of appreciation’. In other words, even if the European Court claims there is a wide margin of appreciation (as in Hirst), British courts could still issue a declaration. Strasbourg may not interpret the laws as being incompatible, but the UK courts could - in which case, there would be grounds to issue a declaration. This situation is evident in Nicklinson because Strasbourg made it clear in a similar case (Pretty vs United Kingdom 2002) that the Article 8 rights on assisted suicide lie within the nation’s margin of appreciation (which is especially wide on this issue); thus there is no incompatibility in the eyes of international courts – meaning the UK is free to form its own judgement. The Supreme Court agreed with this and ultimately found that (whether or not a declaration was issued in the end), the Court could have issued one because the underlying issue of the case was about balancing the relative importance of the right to commit suicide and the right of the vulnerable, especially the old and sick, to be protected from direct or indirect pressure to do so. Thus, the question at the heart of the Nicklinson case is one of proportionality between domestic law (and thus, compatibility at a domestic level), rather than one of compatibility between international ones. The laws in question are simultaneously compatible in Strasbourg, but, unusually, incompatible at a domestic level. Therefore, the first point of contention (whether the Supreme Court is justified in considering the question of compatibility because the ECHR has previously said it falls within the UK’s margin of appreciation) is invalid.

A declaration of incompatibility? The second point of contention lies in precisely how the Supreme Court ruled – and is something I take greater issue


with. Whilst the judges were largely sympathetic to the substance at the heart of the case, the Court ultimately decided by a majority of seven to two that it would be ‘inappropriate’ to issue a declaration of incompatibility without first deferring to Parliament. Only Lords Hale and Kerr believed the law is incompatible, and, more crucially, that it is up to the Court to intervene by issuing a declaration. However, this is the dissenting view; the rest of the Court argued that the issue should be referred to Parliament as the legislature is inherently better suited to deal with what is, essentially, a moral issue. Justice Toulson said, for example, that ‘under our system of government these are matters for Parliament to decide, representing society as a whole, after Parliamentary scrutiny, and not for the court on the facts of an individual case or cases. For those reasons I would refuse these applications for judicial review’.

considering that, at its core, the declaration of incompatibility is a necessarily dialogic and deferential remedy. It gives final word to Parliamentarians by permitting legislative override of judicial invalidation. Indeed, a declaration does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the legislation in respect of which they are issued. However, the Court’s issuance of declarations has always been respected by Parliament, and thus constitutes an essential discursive tool for regulating the relationship between the judicial and legislative branches of government. Thus, to claim (as Lord Neuberger does) that the Court’s stay of execution therefore constitutes a gentle ‘indication’ (as opposed to a ‘firm’ directive) is to ignore the fundamental fact that a declaration functions as exactly the kind of ‘indication’ he refers to here. In this sense, the Court has achieved a particular end, without employing the correct means.

However, Lords Neuberger, Mance and Wilson went on to say that, whilst it would be inappropriate to issue a declaration without first deferring to Parliament, it would no longer be inappropriate to do so if Parliament failed to reconsider the underlying question of the case. In other words, the Court effectively issued a stay of execution, until the legislature reconsidered the issue. Lord Neuberger justified this judgement with case law precedent (namely, Bellinger vs Bellinger 2003), in which the Law Lords concluded that ‘maintaining an offending law in operation for a reasonable period pending enactment of corrective legislation is justifiable’. In other words, it is not inappropriate for the Courts to leave a potentially incompatible law in operation whilst Parliament reconsiders the legislation.

Equally, it is worth questioning why this particular case requires such ‘an indication’ instead of ‘firm words’. Indeed, all cases heard in the Supreme Court which invoke the ECHR are inherently complex and ethically weighty cases. Why is Nicklinson any different? In my view the Court has not adequately justified why it chose to issue a stay of execution in this particular case, and not in others; why, for example, should the Court have permitted a stay of execution in Nicklinson, and not in Hirst (especially when Parliament’s will was so recently made clear in the 2014 case, unlike in the 2005 case)? Lord Neuberger says that there are ‘times’ when a stay of execution is more ‘appropriate’, yet in no way does he outline what particular aspect of this case means it was the appropriate course of action; thus, he does not justify his judgment in this case.

Lord Neuberger invokes this argument with his claim that ‘dialogue or collaboration, whether formal or informal, can be carried on with varying degrees of emphasis or firmness, and there are times when an indication, rather than firm words are more appropriate and can reasonably be expected to carry more credibility’.5 However, the crucial difference between Bellinger and Nicklinson is that the laws in question were deemed out-rightly incompatible in the 2003 case (unlike Nicklinson)– thus, use of Bellinger as case law precedent does not adequately justify a stay of execution. It is especially difficult to digest Lord Neuberger’s argument

Threat to Parliamentary Sovereignty Lord Neuberger’s argument that withholding the declaration of incompatibility is the judiciary’s way of maintaining legislative discretion and Parliamentary sovereignty is therefore problematic. Parliamentary sovereignty is the notion that the legislative branch of government is the supreme legal authority in the UK, and that the courts cannot overrule its legislation. This is a long-standing concept which has been in force in the U.K. since the repeal of Henry VIII’s 1539 Statute of Proclamations. The Court’s ruling in this instance


can be seen to challenge the operation of this concept because the judges effectively refused to accept Parliament’s word as final. To put it in no uncertain terms, a declaration of compatibility would have been the proper and appropriate tool to use in this case. In not using it, then, the Court was, in effect, unjustifiably sidestepping the dialogic mechanism necessary for regulating the relationship between the judiciary and legislature – and thereby bypassing a key safeguard in our constitution’s separation of powers. In some parts of the judgement the Court went as far as to suggest what legislation on assisted dying could look like. Indeed, speaking about a system in which judicial approval is required to facilitate an assisted suicide, Lord Hale recalls a list of eighteen factors which he suggests a court might wish to investigate before deciding whether to grant this right; these include, the aetiology of the condition, the nature of the assistance proposed, and any financial recompense. The significance of this cannot be overstated; in proffering a fairly comprehensive list of factors to consider when granting the right to die, Lord Hale implicitly suggests potential models of legislation which could facilitate assisted suicide. This is the role of Parliament – not the judiciary. Lord Hale justifies this by claiming ‘I put forward the factors with a view only to enabling Parliament to appreciate the scrupulous nature of any factual inquiry which it might see fit to entrust to the judges of the Division’.5 Yet, the extent of debate and discussion about this issue in Parliament was already significant. In reality, the factors Lord Hale puts forward in his judgement are not helpful for Parliament; they do, though, make apparent what he – a member of the judiciary – would like to see addressed in legislation. It is therefore my contention that these “suggestions” go beyond the substantive issue which the Court was asked to address, and thereby contributes to the way in which the Supreme Court overstepped it’s constitutionally-defined role in Nicklinson. The Court does, without doubt, have the constitutional authority to intervene in these issues. That much is clear. However, intervention must be conducted through the proper channels – in this case, a declaration of incompatibility. In effect the Court attempted to influence the legislative branch outside of the established procedures. This represents a perversion of Parliamentary sovereignty. As addressed by former Attorney General Dominic Grieve QC, ‘the courts of this country cannot review primary legislation to determine whether it is constitutional, fair or proportionate’ - and that is essentially what they did in this case. The Court went further than simply addressing whether Section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 and Article 8 of the ECHR are compatible (to have done so would have resulted in a simple issuing, or not, of a declaration). Instead, the Court deferred back to Parliament, and asked it to reconsider the issue of assisted suicide. However, Parliament had (on multiple occasions) already asserted, and very clearly, its view that the law should not change. Most obviously, section 59 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 re-enacted the provisions of section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (ban on assisted suicide) in contemporary terms. As of 2009 Parliament’s position on assisted suicide was clear – it was not wanted. Therefore, if Parliament (through the 2009 Act) has determined that the balance between the risk of abuse of the right to assisted suicide and Article 8 rights is to be struck by means of an outright prohibition on assisted suicide, then why did the Court deem it appropriate to call into question Parliament’s determination?

Looking forward To summarise, the court breached its constitutional authority in three ways; firstly, by choosing to defer back to the legislature in spite of Parliament making its will clear on multiple occasions in recent years; secondly, by doing so outside of the proper mechanism (the declaration of incompatibility); and thirdly, by presenting potential models of legislation. In this way, the Justices – whether consciously or not – used the judgement as an opportunity to influence the Parliamentary process. Indeed, ‘Parliament would not be truly sovereign if the courts were able to exercise oversight of the way in which it made its laws, because it would then follow that the courts, and not Parliament, could determine whether a law had been properly made and therefore whether it should be enforced’.7 This long-standing convention dates back to the 1689 Bill of Rights, which states that ‘proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament’. If the issues at stake are as controversial and sensitive as the Court claimed (and I suggest they certainly are), then surely this warranted extreme caution on the Court’s part when determining whether, in the first place, the legislation is incompatible, rather than a stay of execution which fails to properly address the underlying question. Instead, the Court questioned whether Parliament’s will is appropriate. This calls into question whether the judiciary has transgressed the clearly defined limits of its constitutional authority, and therefore if key principles of the UK’s constitution – necessary for the functioning of British democracy – are being properly observed. The murky legal and constitutional parameters of this case are set to be challenged once again as Noel Conway seeks a judicial on a similar basis to Tony Nicklinson. The Conway case will be heard in the High Court later this year and, whatever the Court’s ruling, is likely to have considerable constitutional implications.


Facing juvenile capital punishment in Saudi Arabia Diana Suciu In 2012, Ali al-Nimr (17), Dawood al-Marhoon (17) and Abdullah al-Zaher (15) were arrested by Saudi Arabian authorities on charges of treason through participation in the Arab Spring protests. Three years later, in 2015, they were sentenced to death by the Saudi Arabian Specialized Criminal Court. This was only one of the juvenile capital punishment sentences handed down by Saudi Arabia in recent years. Amnesty International estimates the real number to be at least 11 between 2013-2016, out of a total of 481 reported sentences. According to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, a juvenile is someone under the majority age of 18. Article 37 of the Convention provides that “neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below 18 years of age”. The aim of this Article is clear; while UN members are allowed some degree of flexibility in maintaining capital punishment as part of their legal systems, children have an unqualified, objective right to life that trumps subjective moral values. Despite having ratified the UNCRC, Saudi Arabia’s lack of compliance with Article 37 can be explained through an analysis of the country’s legal system. The first hurdle is the UNCRC, itself. Upon ratification, a specification was formally made that the country will only comply with the rights insofar as they do not contradict the national legal system stemming from Sharia law. Sharia is the religious jurisprudence deriving from Islamic tradition, guided by the principle of living life according to God’s will. On the issue of death sentences, Saudi Arabia relies on Sharia to identify three categories of criminal offences where the punishment is applicable: ‘hudud’ (prescribed Quranic punishments for certain crimes), ‘qisas’ (retaliatory punishments of the “an eye for an eye” variety) and ‘tazir’ (discretionary punishment for certain crimes). It is important to note that this recommendation does not touch upon the overall permissibility of capital punishment. Rather, the true concern is that Sharia law itself prohibits capital punishment of those under the age of criminal responsibility. Because Saudi Arabia’s age of majority is listed as 18, it becomes apparent that the issue is not the law. Still, the law does not equal the legal system. The specified age of majority sits in antithesis with the wide discretion en-

joyed by judges in determining whether an individual is no longer a juvenile, regardless of physical age. Amnesty International enumerates hoarseness of the voice, body hair and height as factors that judges use to decide when an individual below the age of 18 has in fact reached majority. This discrepancy between the law and its application can largely be attributed to the fact that Saudi Arabia continues to source its legal principles in tradition, without codifying them into concrete legislation. Blaming the law, in this case, would only instigate hatred and discrimination due to a misunderstanding of the situation. Qatar, a country with a legal system as intrinsically based on Sharia law as in Saudi Arabia, has introduced a Juvenile Act explicitly ordering compliance with the prohibition of capital punishment for those under the age of majority of the country. Thus, one could argue that the true root of the problem is the lack of universal application of legal principles. However, Saudi Arabia is not the only one responsible for the incomplete ratification of the UNCRC. By allowing a provision which states that any right shall be overridden by a system which relies almost exclusively on individual discretion, every other Member of the UN actively encourages selective compliance with human rights based on preference. Cherry picking, as it is popularly known, is a dangerous phenomenon due to its potential to limit the UN’s influence in the areas where it is needed most. Indeed, the potential counterarguments are strong. The UN is based on principles of cooperation rather than imposition, and the notion of what is in the interest of the common good varies from country to country. It may also be in the interest of any other UN Member to reserve the option to cherry pick other Conventions or Treaties. However, not all documents have the same impact or set the same example as one which relates to the most basic human rights. With the prohibition on juvenile capital punishment being clearly supported by the vast majority of the other Members, including countries employing the same law as Saudi Arabia, cherry picking should necessitate further attention. There has been little action from the UN or other international organizations. Activist groups such as Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch have publicly condemned Saudi Arabia’s actions but have no legal authority. To this date, the UN has merely made a recommendation that Saudi Arabia halt juvenile execution. Despite these circumstances, Saudi

62


Arabia still stands as an elected member of the Human Rights Council. Its re-election in 2016 is attributed to an unprecedented lack of competition. Namely, for the 4 seats open to the Asia regional group, only 4 countries were put forward. The implications of allowing Saudi Arabia to maintain its position on the Human Rights Council is twofold. Firstly, seeing a lack of action from international bodies encourages reformed States to reinstate capital punishment. Such an example is Iraq, which abolished the death penalty in 2004 but fully reinstated it between 2005 and 2008. Similar movements for reinstatement are currently backed by government officials in Turkey and the Philippines. More importantly, however, is the double standard it creates in respect to human rights around the world. When a country in blatant violation of the universal standards imposed by the Convention on the Rights of the Child is allowed to sit on a Council embodying the very core of universal human rights, the rest of the world is led to believe that the concept of rights shape-shifts. To some extent, this is true. Human values have been subject to distinct cultural approaches depending on the tradition of the particular country. On the other hand, there is a distinction between international human rights values and international human rights law that is not merely descriptive. When a country adheres to international human rights law, it is pertinent to argue that it should do so with awareness of the standard that is intended. In the end, a compromise between individual cultural values and a universal standard of human rights is advisable.

Policy Recommendations Revising the UN Human Rights Council election process to require each regional group to put forward more candidates than the number of seat available. In the most recent UNHRC elections (2016) Saudi Arabia trailed the Asia regional group with the least number of votes, yet succeeded to secure a seat on the Council. Despite being harshly criticized for its human rights violations, its re-election was unpreventable due to the lack of competition. The regional group had a total of 4 seats available and only put forward 4 candidates, rendering the voting process a symbolic one at most. A requirement to propose more candidates than the number of available seats would ensure a fairer election process and a more accurate representation of universal human rights law. On the other hand, the current voting process allows countries that repeatedly abuse human rights to stand unopposed and effectively illustrate that the standard of human rights is a relative one. The proposal would bring the UNHRC back in line with its own mission statement to promote universally equal human rights. An attempt at preventing countries with worrying human rights records from occupying central positions on UN human rights bodies was made in 2006 through resolution A/RES/60/251. The resolution replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) with the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). However, it is recommended that an amendment to the seat allocation process would be a more effective change. Imposing stricter regulations regarding the ratification of UN Conventions, particularly those relating to human rights, as to prevent “cherry picking�. As per Article 41 of the Vienna Convention 1969, the current UN treaty ratification system allows for modifications by individual parties, insofar as they do not affect the rights or obligations of other parties. This recommendation proposes

that a distinction be made between different categories of treaties, concluding that those containing provision relating to fundamental human rights should be closely scrutinized before allowing modifications. It is acknowledged that such a provision may encounter much opposition from Members fearing this will intervene in their internal affairs beyond their desires. While these concerns are noteworthy, credit must be given to the fact that this exercise would only apply to treaties relating to the most fundamental principles of international human rights law. Though seemingly applied differently in their own legal systems, UN Members have already agreed to the implementation of universal human rights principles upon agreeing to become party to the international body that has produced the UN Declaration of Human Rights.


Letter from the President Never has a year been so truly BrUncertain: It began with a Referendum, and will end with a General Election. Globally, there is an increasing shift to the political right, with emerging states leading the changing international order. Regionally, the European Union faces ongoing challenges, with the continuing threat of terrorism, supporting refugees, and respecting the needs of its citizens. Locally, the UK continues to bolster its economy, provide healthcare to all, and support a politically unified, multicultural society. For King’s Think Tank, we continue to go from strength to strength. This year saw for us one of the most successful years to date. It began with our relaunch in October 2016, at which the Rt Hon David Lidington MP gave the key note address. In March 2017, we hosted visiting US Senator Jon Kyl, former Republican Senator from Arizona. Our European Affairs and Global Health Policy Centres held successful educational and lobbying trips to Brussels (European Commission and European Parliament) and Geneva (World Health Organisation and United Nations). We end the year hosting the first UK Student Policy Forum, a symposium of the four leading UK student think tanks: Cambridge Wilberforce Society, Oxford OxPol, and Edinburgh Buchanan Institute. Our seven policy centres –Business & Economics, Defence & Diplomacy, Education, Energy & Environment, European Affairs, Global Health and Law – have all surpassed themselves. This year King’s Think Tank hosted almost 30 expert panel and policy workshop events, reaching both the King’s student community and beyond. We remain recognised for our outstanding contribution within King’s College London, which is reflected in our membership numbers, our representation on key strategic groups, and our policy and blog outputs. Most importantly, we continue to reflect the student voice, working as we always do to empower the students with the tools necessary to have a say before a policy is formulated. This culminates in our annual publication of The Spectrum. This year is our sixth edition, and what I believe is one of the most outstanding to date. As always, our grateful appreciation to our patron, Alderman Timothy Hailes JP, whose continued support and patronage enables us to reach beyond our student activities to achieve outstanding policy opportunities. Also to King’s College London, for their ongoing support: The outstanding calibre of King’s Think Tank members reflects the global reputation of King’s College London. For King’s Think Tank, this has been a year of BrAmazingness!

Hilary Manning President, King’s Think Tank, 2016-2017


King’s Think Tank Committee 2016 - 17 Core Committee President - Hilary Manning Vice President - Anna Shevkoplyas Directors - Dayana Deneva & Minnie Ng Treasurers - Anushar Hemnani & Daphne Friedrich Head of Communications - Betty Gonzalez Deputy Head of Communications - Ryan Lee Vincent General Editor - Rocky Howe Head of Liaisons - Brad Albrow Social Secretary - Angus Swanson

Policy Centres Business & Economics

President - Syzmon Daniluk Liaison - Jedrzej Jan Kardach Editor - Charlotte Baker Researcher - Jason Myers

Defence & Diplomacy

President - Stanislav Skryabin Liaison - Philipp Harnik Editor - Rohan Khanna Researcher - Carina Uchida

Education

President - Marianne Blattes Researcher - Anne Siebenaler Liaison - Ramona Popescu, Liaison Editor / Researcher - Marina Zabelina

Energy & the Environment

President - Liam Taggart Liaison - Wojciech Adamczyk Editor / Researcher - Rob Terwell Editor/ Researcher - Francesca Tripaldi

European Affairs

President - Alexander Botashev Liaison - Clemence Courteault Editor - Aaron Mile Researcher - Valentina Arnez

Global Health

President - Swetavalli Raghavan Liaison - Charlotte Beames Editor - Amally Ding Researcher - Kate Erin

Law

President - Jag Kilmowicz Liaison - Vicky Griffin Editor - Aya Marovt Researcher - Benjamin Soh

Regional Liaisons

Asia Regional Liaison - Jessica Ju-Yi Hsu MENA Regional Liaison - Nathan Ali North America Regional Liaison - Diana Suciu


Credits Thank you to our academic sponsors and our patron for your continued support for the King’s Think Tank, our events, publications and society.

Academic Sponsors Department of Political Economy The Department of Political Economy at King’s College London is a diverse academic institution, made up of world class researchers and lecturers. Specialising in philosophy, economics and political theory, the department strives to install its students with the tools and knowledge to excel in both academic and professional life. They are closely integrated with the student body, supporting various societies as well as the Think Tank. The King’s College London Students’ Union

Our Patron

We would also like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to our ever-supportive patron, Tim Hailes. Alderman Tim Hailes Mr. Hailes is Alderman for the Ward of Bassishaw in The City of London, a liveryman of the Worshipful Company of Solicitors, a freeman of the Worshipful Company of International Bankers, a magistrate (Justice of the Peace) on the Central London bench and a member of The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). Mr. Hailes graduated from King’s College London with a B.A. (Hons) degree in History. He is a Jelf medallist (1990) and served as a member of College Council and a sabbatical officer in KCLSU from 1988-89. He has spent his entire legal career specialising in derivatives and structured products and is currently a Managing Director & Associate General Counsel in the Legal Department of the Investment Banking Division of JPMorgan Chase & Co. based in London.


References The post-Brexit Economy Charlotte Baker

http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7793#fullreport http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/17/theresa-mays-brexit-speech-full/ https://fullfact.org/europe/uk-leaving-eu-trade/ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36083664 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/589191/The_United_Kingdoms_exit_from_and_partnership_with_the_EU_ Web.pdf https://fullfact.org/immigration/do-eu-immigrants-contribute-134-every-1-they-receive/ https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/13/uk-labour-shortages-brexit-aseu-worker-numbers-fall https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-information/ statistics/Documents/an-indispensable-idustry.pdf https://www.ft.com/content/0eba4f78-76b1-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a

The way forward for England

Marina Zabelina, Anne Siebenaler Askouni, N. (2006) The Education of the Minority on Thrace; From the Margin to the Perspective of Social Incorporation. Athens: Alexandreia Publications. Baker, C. and Jones, S.P. (1998) Encyclopedia of Bilingualism and Bilingual Education. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Batelaan, P. and van Hoof, (1996) Cooperative Learning in Intercultural Education, European Journal of Intercultural Studies, 7(3), 5-16. Bereris, M. (1999) Forms of Intercultural Education and Social Integration of Immigrants’ Children in Greece. PhD Thesis, University of Athens. Blake, D. and Hanley, V. (1995) The Dictionary of Educational Terms. Aldershot: Arena. Council of Europe: The Concept of Intercultural Dialogue [no date] http://www.coe. int/t/dg4/intercultural/concept EN.asp (last accessed 12/07/2008) Darmody, M., Kerzil, J. and Van Driel, B. (2016) Education Policies and Practices to Foster Tolerance, Respect for Diversity and Civic Responsibility in Children and Young People in the EU: Examining the Evidence. NESET II report. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Davies, L. (2012) Children from immigrant families ‘face significant challenges’ in UK schools. The Guardian. 11 Sept. [Online]. Available from: https://www.theguardian. com/education/2012/sep/11/children-immigrant-families-uk-schools [Accessed 5 January 2017]. Department for Education: A framework of Core Content for Initial Teacher Training (ITT) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/536890/Framework_Report_11_July_2016_Final.pdf Department of Education and Skills. (2012) Looking at English as an Additional Language: Teaching and Learning in Post-Primary Schools in 2008. Dublin: Department of Education and Skills. Department of Education and Skills: Circular to the Management Authorities of All Mainstream Primary Schools Special Education Teaching Allocation https://www. education.ie/en/Circulars-and-Forms/Active-Circulars/cl0013_2017.pdf European Agency for Special Needs and Inclusive Education: Structure and Content of Initial Teacher Education Courses – Ireland [no date] https://www.european-agency.org/agency-projects/Teacher-Education-for-Inclusion/country-info/ireland/structure-and-content-of-initial-teacher-education-courses Francis, T. and Murtagh, L. (2012) Supporting pupils with EAL and their Teachers in Ireland: The Need for a Co-ordinated Strategy, Journal of Language and Education, 26(3), 201-212. Gotovos, A. (2002) Education and Difference: Issues of Intercultural Education. Athens: Metexmio. Harte, E., Herrera, F. and Stepanek, M. (2016) Education of EU Migrant Children in EU Member States. Cambridge: RAND Corporation. Huber, J. (2012) Intercultural Competence for all Preparation for Living in a Heterogeneous World, Council of Europe Pestalozzi Series, No. 2. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing. Janta, B. and Harte E. (2016) Education of Migrant Children: Education Policy Responses for the Inclusion of Migrant Children in Europe. Cambridge: RAND Corporation. Katsikas, C. and Politou, E. (2005) Gypsy, Minority, Repatriate and Foreign Pupils in Greek Education: IS “Different - out of the Classroom? 2nd edition. Athens: Gutenberg. Kendall, F. (1996) Diversity in the Classroom: New Approaches to the Education of Young Children, 2nd edn. New York: Teachers College Press. Kelly, N. (2014) Does Equal Access Mean Treat the Same? From Theory to Practice in the Classroom Of English as an Additional Language Learner in Ireland – Towards a Transformative Agenda, International Journal of Inclusive Education, 18 (9) 857-876. Kokkinos, D. (1991) The Greek State’s Overview of the Pontian Issue, Journal of Refugee Studies, 4 (4), 312-314. Kontogianni, D. (2002) Bicultural-Bilingual Education in Greece: The Case of “Greek Repatriates’ Schools”. PhD Thesis, University of Crete. Luchtenberg, S. (1988) Language Varieties and Intercultural Education, Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 9 (182), 141-149. Magos, C. (2004) Teachers’ Training in Managing Ethno cultural Differences: The Case of Teachers of the Majority Teaching in Minority Schools in Thrace. PhD Thesis, University of Athens. Markou, G. (1997) Introduction to Intercultural Education: Greek and International Experience. Athens: Electronikes Technes.

Ministry of Education and Science in Sweden. (1999) Early Childhood Education and Care Policy in Sweden. National Association for Language Development in the Curriculum: Do schools get extra money to support EAL learners? https://www.naldic.org.uk/eal-teaching-andlearning/faqs/doschoolsget_extra_moneyto_support_eal_learners/ National Council for Curriculum and Assessment. (2006) English as an Additional Language in Irish Primary Schools: Guidelines for Teachers. Nikolaou, G. (2000) Incorporation and Education of Foreign Pupils in Primary School. From “Homogeneity” to Multiculturalism. Athens: Ellinika Grammata. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. (2010) OECD Reviews of Migrant Education: Sweden. 2010. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development: Indicators of Integration 2012: Key Indicators by Country: Ireland [no date] https://www.oecd.org/migration/integration-indicators-2012/keyindicatorsbycountry/name,218334,en.htm Palaiologou, N. And Evaggelou, 0. (2003) Intercultural Education: Educational, Teaching and Psychological Approaches. Athens: Atrapos. Papas, A (1998) Intercultural Pedagogy and Didactics, Volume A’. Athens: published by himself. Sfakakis, D. (2007) Immigration Policy and Educational Policy for the Children of Immigrants — Their Relationship. MA Thesis, University of Crete. Statistiska Centralbyrån. (2017) Summary of Population Statistics 1960–2016. Swedish National Agency for Education. (2011) Curriculum for the Compulsory School, Preschool Class and the Recreation Centre 2011. Tormey, R. (2006) Intercultural Education in the Primary School, Guidelines for Schools, National Council for Curriculum and Assessment. Tsaliki, E. (2012) Intercultural Education in Greece: the Case of Thirteen Primary Schools, Doctoral Thesis, University of London. Watkins, W. (1994) Multicultural Education: Towards a Historical and Political Inquiry, Educational Theory, 44 (1), 99-117. Yoffe, L. (2011) Managing Diversity in Irish Primary Schools: Recent Developments and Challenges. Tokyo: Waseda Business School.

Transnational Contention Allana Yurko

1 Tarrow, Sidney. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 2 Tarrow, Sidney. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011: 241 3 McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 4 Voss, Kim. “The collapse of a social movement: The interplay of mobilizing structures, framing, and political opportunities in the Knights of Labour” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Edited by McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. 227 – 258. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 5 McAdam, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. 6 Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Marco G. Guigni. “New Social Movements and Political Opportunity in Western Europe.” European Journal of Political Research 22, 2 (1992): 219 - 244 7 McAdam, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. 8 Parks, Louisa. “In the Corridors and in the Streets: A Comparative Study of the Impacts of Social Movement Campaigns in the EU”, PhD diss., European University Institute, Florence, 2008. < http://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/7367/1/thesis_parks.pdf> 9 McAdam, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. 10 Smith, Jackie, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco. Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997. 11 McAdam, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: 6. 12 Caren, Neal. Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Sociology, s.v. “Political Process Theory.” Blackwell Publishing, 2007. Blackwell Reference Online. 13 Cress, Daniel M. and David A. Snow. “The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing.” American Journal of Sociology, 105, 4 (2000): 1063 - 1104 14 Parks, “In the Corridors and in the Streets”. 15 McGiffen, Steven P. The European Union: A Critical Guide. London: Pluto Press, 2005. 16 Knill, Christoph and Duncan Liefferink. Environmental Politics in the European Union. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013: 21 17 Tilly, Pierre. Social Europe and European social policies. Origins, challenges and instruments. Luxembourg: CVCE.EU, 2007. Accessed March 10, 2017: http://www. cvce.eu/ en/obj/ pierre_tilly_social_europe_and_european_social_policies_origins_challenges_and_instruments -en-c1f2b13a-19fb-489a-9e64-fde5fbda5120. html 18 Saurugger, Sabine. “The participatory turn and the professionalisation of interest representation in the European Union.” Paper presented at 4th ECPR Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Riga, Latvia, September 2008. A Research Agenda 19 Kohler-Koch, Beate and Christine Quittkat. De-Mystification of Participatory Democracy: EU-Governance and Civil Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 20 Desiree E. Hurtak. “The European Union and the Environmental Movement in Europe: An Analysis of Insider Status”, PhD diss., New School University, 2007. 21 Ibid. 22 Selin, Henrik and VanDeveer, Stacy D. “EU Environmental Policy Making and Implementation: Changing Processes and Mixed Outcomes.” Paper presented at the 14th Biennial Conference of the European Union Studies Association, Boston, Massachusetts, March 2015: 7 23 Hurtak, “The European Union and the Environmental Movement in Europe”: 290 24 Union Européenne de l’Artisanat et des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises


(UEAPME), Social Dialogue and Employment in the European Union. Brussels: UEAPME, 2004: 9 25 Erne, Ronald. European Unions: Labour’s Quest for a Transnational Democracy. New York: Cornell University Press, 2008. 26 Tilly, Pierre. Social Europe and European social policies. 27 Erne. European Unions. 28 Hurtak, “The European Union and the Environmental Movement in Europe” 29 Erne. European Unions. 30 Ibid.: 41

Migration allocation across Europe

Valentina Arnez, research support from Alexander Botashev, Clémence Courteault and Aaron Mile 1 See ch B(4), E(1) and E(2). 2 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national or a stateless person (recast) [2013] OJ L 180/31, the ‘Dublin-III-Regulation’. 3 Commission Proposal COM (2016) 270 final for a regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast). 4 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) [2011] OJ L 337/9. 5 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) [2013] OJ L 180/96. 6 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) [2013] OJ L 180/60. 7 Article 10 to 12 Dublin-III-Regulation. 8 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (recast) [2013] OJ L 180. 9 Article 13 (1) Dublin-III-Regulation. 10 Recital 5 Dublin-III-Regulation. 11 Evelien Brouwer, ‘Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU and the Burden of Proof’ (2013) 9(1) Utrecht L Rev 135, 136. 12 Id, 138. 13 MSS v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011). 14 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS v SSHD and others [2011] ECR I-0000. 15 Jonathan Clayton/Hereward Holland, ‘Over one million sea arrivals reach Europe in 2015’ (UNHCR News, 30 December 2015) <http://www.unhcr.org/news/ latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach- europe-2015.html> accessed 7 January 2017. 16 Eurostat, ‘Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded)’ <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show. do? dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en> accessed 11 January 2017. 17 See e.g. International Federation for Housing and Planning, ‘IFHP Housing Refugees Report no 1’ <http:// www.ifhp.org/sites/default/files/staff/IFHP%20Housing%20Refugees%20Report%20-%20final.pdf> accessed 16 January 2017. 18 Maarten Den Heijer, Jorrit Rijpma and Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘Coercion, Prohibition, and great Expectations: The continuing failure of the Common European Asylum System’ (2016) 53 CMLR 607, 612. 19 EU Member States plus Switzerland and Norway 20 Annual report 2015 of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). 21 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, ‘Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control’ <https:// ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control_en> accessed 14 January 2017. 22 European Asylum Support Office, ‘Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2015’ <https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/ EN_%20Annual%20Report%202015_1.pdf> accessed 8 January 2017, 30. 23 COM (2016) 270 final, 10. 24 COM (2016) 270 final, 10. 25 COM (2016) 270 final, 11-12. 26 COM (2016) 270 final, 11. 27 Articles 12 and 13 Dublin-III-Regulation. 28 COM (2016) 270 final, 9. 29 COM (2016) 270 final, 10. 30 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece [2015] OJ L 239/146. 31 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece [2015] OJ L 248/80, amended under Council Decision (EU) 2016/1754 of 29 September 2016 [2016] OJ L 268/82. 32 Article 5 (6) Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 and Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601. 33 Article 5 (7) Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 and Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601. 34 Article 10 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 and Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601.

35 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, ‘Eight report on relocation and resettlement’ COM(2016) 791 final, 2. 36 COM (2016) 165 final, 9-10. 37 Steve Peers, ‘The Orbanisation of EU asylum law: the latest EU asylum proposals’ (EU Law Analysis, 6 May 2016) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/05/ the-orbanisation-of-eu-asylum-law.html> accessed 3 December 2016. 38 Francesco Maiani, The Reform of the Dublin III Regulation’, a study for the Directorate General for internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ rights and constitutional affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs <http://www.europarl. europa.eu/thinktank/de/document.html? reference=IPOL_STU(2016)571360> accessed 27 January 2017, 19. 39 Maarten Den Heijer, Jorrit Rijpma and Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘Coercion, Prohibition, and great Expectations: The continuing failure of the Common European Asylum System’ (2016) 53 CMLR 607, 629. 40 Maarten Den Heijer, Jorrit Rijpma and Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘Coercion, Prohibition, and great Expectations: The continuing failure of the Common European Asylum System’ (2016) 53 CMLR 607, 628. 41 See ch B(1) and also Maarten Den Heijer, Jorrit Rijpma and Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘Coercion, Prohibition, and great Expectations: The continuing failure of the Common European Asylum System’ (2016) 53 CMLR 607, 629. 42 Written and researched by Alexander Botashev. 43 See <http://www.migreurop.org/article978.html?lang=fr> accessed 12 April 2017. 44 See <http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf> accessed 12 April 2017. 45 See <http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/what_we_do/refugee_services/resettlement_programme/ refugee_resettlement_the_facts> accessed 12 April 2017. 46 See <http://www.unhcr.org/uk/information-on-unhcr-resettlement.html> accessed 12 April 2017. 47 See <http://www.unhcr.org/uk/resettlement.html> accessed 12 April 2017. 48 See <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/30/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/> accessed 12 April 2017. 49 See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-35130213> accessed 12 April 2017. 50 Legal entry channels to the EU for persons in need of international protection: a toolbox, FRA Focus. 51 COM (2016) 270 final, 18-19 and ch VII, Articles 34 to 43. 52 COM (2016) 270 final, Annex I. 53 COM (2016) 270 final, 18-19 and ch VII, Articles 34 to 43. 54 COM (2016) 270 final, 19 and ch VII, Articles 37 55 European Asylum Support Office, ‘Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2015’ <https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/ EN_%20Annual%20Report%202015_1.pdf> accessed 29 January 2017, 11. 56 European Asylum Support Office, ‘Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2015’ <https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/ EN_%20Annual%20Report%202015_1.pdf> accessed 29 January 2017. 57 European Asylum Support Office, ‘Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2015’ <https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/ EN_%20Annual%20Report%202015_1.pdf> accessed 29 January 2017, 11. 58 The case is considered as ‘pending’, once a person has lodged an application for international protection until a final decision has been issued or the case is otherwise closed, such as in case of a withdrawal; see European Asylum Support Office, ‘Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2015’ <https:// www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/EN_%20Annual%20Report%20 2015_1.pdf> accessed 29 January 2017, 13. 59 European Asylum Support Office, ‘Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2015’ <https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/ EN_%20Annual%20Report%202015_1.pdf> accessed 29 January 2017, 17-18. 60 Written and researched by Aaron Mile. 61 CASCAID (2017) “Article: Refugees and Asylum Seekers (Work and Education)”, accessed 8th April 2017 at: http://www.careerswales.com/en/article/5391/pdf 62 Ibid. 63 Refugee Action (Feb 2017) “Locked out of Learning: A snapshot of ESOL provision in England”, accessed 9th April 2017 at: http://www.refugee-action.org. uk%2Fwp- content%2Fuploads%2F2017%2F02%2FLocked_out_of_learning_briefing_paper_February_2017.pdf 64Jenny Phillimore (Oct 2015) “Where is integration in the refugee crisis?” accessed 9th April 2017 at: http:// blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/where-is-integration-in-the-refugee-crisis/ 65 House of Commons Library (May 2016) “Should asylum seekers have unrestricted rights to work in the UK” accessed 9th April 2017 at: http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN01908 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 CASCAID (2017) “Article: Refugees and Asylum Seekers (Work and Education)”, accessed 8th April 2017 <http://www.careerswales.com/en/article/5391/pdf> 69 Lucy Mayblin (2016) “Complexity reduction and policy consensus: Asylum seekers, the right to work, and the ‘pull factor’ thesis in the UK context’, The British Journal of International Relations, 18(4), p815, p817 70 Ibid, p825 and p826. 71 Gov.uk, “Asylum Support”, accessed 9th April 2017 at: https://www.gov.uk/asylum-support/what-youll-get 72 Lucy Mayblin (2016) “Complexity reduction and policy consensus: Asylum seekers, the right to work, and the ‘pull factor’ thesis in the UK context’, The British Journal of International Relations, 18(4), p815 73 Gov.uk, “Asylum Support”, accessed 9th April 2017 at: https://www.gov.uk/asylum-support/what-youll-get 74 Citizens Advice, “After you get refugee status”, accessed 9th April 2017 at: https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/ immigration/asylum-and-refugees/after-you-get-refugee-status/ 75 Ibid. 76 Kate Lyons and Pamela Duncan (2017), “’It’s a shambles’: Data shows most asylum seekers put in poorest parts of Britain’ The Guardian, April 9th, accessed 9th April 2017 at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/ 09/its-a-shambles-da-


ta-shows-most-asylum-seekers-put-in-poorest-parts-of-britain 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Citizens Advice, “After you get refugee status”, accessed 9th April 2017 at: https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/ immigration/asylum-and-refugees/after-you-get-refugee-status/ 80 Melanie Gower and Terry McGuinness (Nov 2016), “The UK’s refugee family reunification rules: striking the right balance?”, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, p5, accessed 10th April 2017 at: http:// www.researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7511/CBP-7511.pdf 81 Ibid, p3. 82 Ibid, p6. 83 Ibid, p3. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid, p19. 86 Written and researched by Clémence Courteault. 87 Trading economics: unemployment rate in France in January 2017: http://www. tradingeconomics.com/france/ unemployment-rate 88 Trading economics: unemployment rate in Germany in January 2017: http://www. tradingeconomics.com/ germany/unemployment-rate 89 Europe 1, ‘Marine Le Pen compares the arrival of refugees to barbaric invasions of the 4th century which led to the collapse of the roman empire’: http://lelab.europe1.fr/marine-le-pen-compare-larrivee-de-refugies-aux- invasions-barbares-duive-siecle-qui-ont-entraine-la-chute-de-lempire-romain-2514915 90 Asylum in Europe, regular procedure for asylum seekers: http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/ france/asylum-procedure/procedures/regular-procedure and https://twitter.com/Ofpra/status/ 821672542465388545 91 British Red Cross blog: http://blogs.redcross.org.uk/refugeesservices/2015/08/ the-swarm-from-calais-a-horror- movie-not-showing-near-you/ 92 Thot association: http://thot-fle.fr/ 93 The Telegraph, 21 September 2015: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11880391/ Refugees-shun-France-land-of-red-tape-unemployment-and-poor-housing.html) 94 OeAD information (Austrian agency for international mobility and cooperation in education, science and research) <https://oead.at/en/to-austria/oead4refugees/ asylum-seekers-temporary-leave-to-remain/> accessed 12 April 2017. 95 Austrian Parliament, Information on upcoming legislation, accessed 4 April 2017 <https://www.parlament.gv.at/ PAKT/VHG/XXV/I/I_01586/fname_624800.pdf>. 96 § 4 Alien Work Act (‘Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz’). 97 <https://www.rt.com/news/329856-austria-fine-refugees-integration/>. 98 Minimum income levels 2017, accessed 4 April 2017 < https://www.arbeiterkammer.at/beratung/arbeitundrecht/ Arbeitslosigkeit/Mindestsicherung_Wer_bekommt_wie_viel.html#>.

Credibility & Accountability Ryan Lee Vincent

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The Great Divide Siddarth Narayan

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Taking back control or continuing to obey Anne Siebienaler

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Transatlantic cooperation in the Arctic Irina Avdeeva

DG Energy, 2015-2016, Quarterly Report Energy on European Gas Markets, Volume 9 (Issue 1 2015-2016), https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/quarterly_report_on_european_gas_markets_q4_2015-q1_2016.pdf Klimenko, E., Russia and the Arctic: an end to cooperation? Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 26, 2015 https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2015/russia-and-arctic-end-cooperation Krauss, C., Exxon Halts Oil Drilling in Waters of Russia, The New York Times, September 19, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/business/exxon-suspending-700-million-drilling-operation-in-russian-waters.html?_r=0 Larsen, P., Goldsmith, S. (et al.), Estimating Future Costs for Alaska Public Infrastructure at Risk from Climate Change, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Alaska Anchorage, 2007, http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/ JuneICICLE.pdf OPEC, 2016 World Oil Outlook, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/WOO%202016.pdf Smeltz, D., Goncharov, S., Wojtowicz, L., Us and Russia: Insecurity and Mistrust Shape Mutual Perceptions, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, November 4, 2016, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/us-and-russia-insecurity-and-mistrust-shape-mutual-perceptions Stokes, B., Wike, R., Poushter, J., Europeans See the World Divided. 2. Europeans question global engagement, Pew Research Center, June 13, 2016, http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/13/europeans-question-global-engagement/ Thompson, K., What Happens in the Arctic Doesn’t Stay in the Arctic, Greenpeace Research Laboratories Technical Report (Review), June, 2016, http://www.greenpeace.org/espana/Global/espana/2016/report/artico/ArticoEN-LR.pdf US Energy Information Administration, 2012, Arctic oil and natural gas resources http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4650 US State Department, 2013, National Strategy for the Arctic Region, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf U.S. Energy Information Administration, U. S. Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMUS1&f=M Warsaw Summit Communiqué, July 9, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ official_texts_133169.html

Fostering peace and institutionalising democracy Alice Mynnelly

African Arguments, 2016, South Sudan’s Man-Made Hunger Crisis http://africanarguments.org/2016/02/24/south-sudans-man-made-hunger-crisis/ Africa Center, 2016, South Sudan’s Stability Hinges on Controlling the “Gun Class” http://africacenter.org/spotlight/south-sudan-stability-gun-class/ Centre for Civilians in Conflict, 2016, Those who could not run, died http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/CIVIC_-_South_Sudan_Civilian_Perspectives.pdf Centre for International Development at Harvard University Working Papers, 2013, South Sudan’s Capability Trap: Building a State with Disruptive Innovation https://www.hks.harvard.edu/content/download/69085/1249150/version/1/ file/268_Sudan-PDIA.pdf Famine Early Warning Systems Network, 2017, Famine (IPC Phase 5) possible in South Sudan during 2017 http://www.fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/alert/january-18-2017 Financial Times, 2016, To save South Sudan, put it on life support http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2016/07/20/to-save-south-sudan-put-it-on-lifesupport Human Rights Council, 2017, Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/.../A_HRC_34_63_AEV%20-final.docx Jeremy Astill-Brown, Africa Programme Chatham House, 2014, South Sudan’s Slide into Conflict: Revisiting the Past and Reassessing Partnerships https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/ 20141203SouthSudanConflictAstillBrown.pdf Matthew LeRiche and Matthew Arnold, 2012, South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence Relief Web, 2016, South Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan January – December 2017 http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-regional-refugee-response-plan-january-december-2017 Seymour Martin Lipset, 1960, Political Man: The social bases of politics

Sudan Tribune, 2017, Experts warn over placing South Sudan under UN trusteeship http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article61580

What do the previous Syrian ceasefires imply about the prospects of the current ceasefire? Mireia Raga

1. “Syria’s civil war explained from the beginning,” News | Al Jazeera, April 06, 2017, accessed April 06, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html. 2-6. Ibid. 7. “Syria: The story of the conflict,” BBC News, March 11, 2016, , accessed April 06, 2017, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26116868. 8. Arshad Mohammed and Tom Perry, “Syrian rebels see flaws in U.S.-Russian truce plan,” Reuters, February 22, 2016, , accessed April 06, 2017, http://uk.reuters.com/ article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-draft- idUKKCN0VV1NJ. 9. Carla E. Humud, Christopher M. Blanchard, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, report no. RL33487, Congressional Research Service (Congressional Research Service, 2016), 11. 10. Humud et al., Armed Conflict in Syria, 12. 11. Ibid., 12. 12. Paul Rogers, Global Security Briefing -- September 2016. Syria After the Ceasefire, issue brief, Oxford University (Oxrord Research Group, 2016), 3. 13. Ibid., 3. 14. Humud et al., Armed Conflict in Syria, 12. 15. Ben Hubbard, Eric Schmitt, and Michael R. Gordon, “Cease-Fire in Syria Frays but Holds, Giving Hope to Peace Talks,” The New York Times, December 30, 2016, , accessed April 06, 2017, https:// www.nytimes.com/2016/12/30/world/middleeast/ syria-cease-fire.html?_r=0. 16. Humud et al., Armed Conflict in Syria, 13. 17. Hubbard et al., “Cease-Fire in Syria Frays but Holds, Giving Hope to Peace Talks.” 18-19. Ibid. 20. Humud et al., Armed Conflict in Syria, 13. 21. Hubbard et al., “Cease-Fire in Syria Frays but Holds, Giving Hope to Peace Talks.” 22. Humud et al., Armed Conflict in Syria, 13. 23. The Political Science of Syria’s War, issue brief no. 22, Project on Middle East Political Science (Project on Middle East Political Science, 2013), 10. 24. S. Lucas, C. Yakinthou, and S. Wolff, “Syria: Laying the Foundations for a Credible and Sustainable Transition,” The RUSI Journal 161, no. 3 (2016): ,22 doi:10.1080 /03071847.2016.1193353. 25. Ibid., 24. 26. Anne Barnard, “Gas Attack Is Said to Kill Dozens in Syria,” The New York Times, April 04, 2017, , accessed April 06, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/ world/middleeast/syria-gas-attack.html? _r=0. 27-28. Ibid. 29. Rogers, Global Security Briefing -- September 2016. Syria After the Ceasefire, 2. 30. Ibid., 3. 31. Ibid., 3. 32. Pınar Akpınar, “The limits of mediation in the Arab Spring: the case of Syria,” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 12 (2016): 2295, doi:10.1080/01436597.2016.1218273. 33-35 Ibid., 2296. 36. Samer Araabi and Leila Hilal, Reconciliation, Reward and Revenge Analyzing Syrian De-escalation Dynamics through Local Ceasefire Negotiations, publication (Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2016), 29. 37. Lucas et al., “Syria: Laying the Foundations for a Credible and Sustainable Transition,” 25. 38. Ibid., 25. 39. Hubbard et al., “Cease-Fire in Syria Frays but Holds, Giving Hope to Peace Talks.” 40. Araabi and Hilal, Reconciliation, Reward and Revenge Analyzing Syrian De-escalation Dynamics through Local Ceasefire Negotiations, 28. 41. Ibid., 27. 42. The Political Science of Syria’s War, 29. 43. Hubbard et al., “Cease-Fire in Syria Frays but Holds, Giving Hope to Peace Talks.”

Treatment of opiod drug dependence in Russia and Australia Amally Ding

1. World Health Organization, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. Substitution maintenance therapy in the management of opioid dependence and HIV/AIDS prevention. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2004. 2. World Health Organization. The practices and context of pharmacotherapy of opioid dependence in central and eastern Europe. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2004. 3. Elovich, Richard, and Ernest Drucker. “On drug treatment and social control: Russian narcology’s great leap backwards”. Harm Reduction Journal 5 (2008): 23. 4. O’Brien, Susannah. Treatment options for heroin and other opioid dependence: a guide for frontline workers. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2004. 5. Teesson, Maree, Joanne Ross, Shane Darke, Michael Lynskey, Robert Ali, Alison Ritter, and Richard Cooke. “One year outcomes for heroin dependence: findings from the Australian Treatment Outcome Study (ATOS)”. Drug and Alcohol Dependence 83 (June 2006): 174-180. 6. Lind, Bronwyn, Shuling Chen, Don Weatherburn, and Richard Mattick. The Effectiveness of Methadone Maintenance Treatment in Controlling Crime. Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2004. 7. Dolan, Kate, and Zahra Alam Mehrjerdi. Medication-assisted treatment of opioid


dependence: a review of the evidence. Canberra: Australian National Council on Drugs, 2015.

Mapping the health of the nation Grant Rosensteel

1.Ralph Coates, Ruth Ann Jajosky, Martha Stanbury, Steven Macdonald. 2015. Introduction to the Summary of Notifiable Noninfectious Conditions and Disease Outbreaks . Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2.Deborah Adams, Kathleen Fullerton, Ruth Jajosky, Pearl Sharp, Diana Onweh, Alan Schley, Willie Anderson, Amanda Faulkner, Kiersten Kugeler. 2015. Summary of Notifiable Infectious Diseases and Conditions. Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 3.National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion. 2016. Statistics and Tracking. February 17. Accessed August 12, 2016. https://www.cdc.gov/ chronicdisease/stats/. 4.Centers for DIsease Control and Prevention. 2016. Disase Surveillance and Monitoring. February 19. Accessed August 9, 2016. http://www.cdc.gov/about/facts/ cdcfastfacts/surveillance.html. 5.Woolhouse, Mark. 2011. “How to make predictions about future infectious disease risks.” Philosophical Transactions B 2045-2054. 6.Porter, Molly. 2016. NASA Helps Forcast Zika Risk. April 26. Accessed August 12, 2016. http://www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/news/news/releases/2016/nasa-helpsforecast-zika-risk.html. 7.—. n.d. What is GIS? Accessed August 13, 2016. http://www.esri.com/what-is-gis 8.Mark Siedner, Lawrence Gostin, Hilarie Cranmer, John Kraemer. 2015. “Strengthening the Detection of and Early Response to Public Health Emergencies: Lessons from the West African Ebola Epidemic.” PLOS Medicine. 9.Seth Wiafe, Bill Davenhall. n.d. “Extending Disease Surveillance with GIS.” ESRI News. Accessed August 13, 2016. http://www.esri.com/news/arcuser/0405/disease_ surveil1of2.html. 10.United States Census Bureau. n.d. TIGER Products. Accessed August 14, 2016. https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger.html. 11.USGS. n.d. Map Topics. Accessed August 14, 2016. https://www.usgs.gov/products/maps/map-topics/overview. 12.Mann, Rebecca. 2013. GIS Helps Fight World’s Leading Cause of Preventable Blindness. Accessed August 14, 2016. http://www.esri.com/esri-news/arcnews/winter1213articles/gis-helps-fight-worlds-leading-cause-of-preventable-blindness?wt. mc_id=emailcampaign15736. 13.ESRI. n.d. Transform Community Health. Accessed August 14, 2016. http://www. esri.com/industries/health. 14.The Network for Public Health Law. n.d. Health Information Data Sharing. Accessed August 15, 2016. https://www.networkforphl.org/topics__resources/topics__resources/health_information_and_data_sharing/. 15.Richard Zerbe, Gregory Babinski, Dani Fumia, Travis Reynolds, Pradeep Singh, Tyler Scott. 2012. “An Analysis of Benefits from Use of Geographic Information Systems by King County Washington.” Seattle.

Nicklinson vs Ministry of Justice, 2014 Brad Albrow

1 The Supreme Court, “The Supreme Court and Europe”, https://www.supremecourt.uk/ about/the-supreme-court-and-europe.html [accessed 17 February 2017]. 2 Section 2 dictates that ‘A person (“D”) commits an offence if (a) D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person, and (b) D’s act was intended to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide’. 3 Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on Human Rights, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2000), p. 5. 4 Judgement on Hirst V United Kingdom (no. 2) (no.74025/01), http://hudoc.echr. coe.int/ eng?i=001-70442#{“itemid”:[“001-70442”]}, [accessed 17 February 2017]. 7 Dominic Grieve QC, “Speech: Parliament and the Judiciary”, https://www.gov.uk/ government/speeches/parliament-and-the-judiciary [accessed 17 February 2017]. 8 As well as consideration of the Assisted Dying Bills (no. 1 and 2). Greer, Steven, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on Human Rights, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2000), p. 5. Grieve QC, Dominic, “Speech: Parliament and the Judiciary”, https://www.gov.uk/ government/speeches/parliament-and-the-judiciary [accessed 17 February 2017]. The Supreme Court, “The Supreme Court and Europe”, https://www.supremecourt. uk/ about/the-supreme-court-and-europe.html [accessed 17 February 2017]. The Supreme Court, Judgement on Bellinger (FC) (Appellant) V Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldjudgmt/jd030410/ bellin-2.htm [accessed 17 February 2017]. The Supreme Court, Judgement on Hirst V United Kingdom (no. 2) (no.74025/01), http:// hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70442#{“itemid”:[“001-70442”]}, [accessed 17 February 2017]. The Supreme Court, Judgement on R (Nicklinson) V Ministry Of Justice; R (On The Application Of AM) V The Director Of Public Prosecutions [2014] UKSC 38, https:// www.supremecourt.uk/decided-cases/docs/UKSC_2013_0235_Judgment.pdf [accessed 17 February 2017].

Facing juvenile capital punishment in Saudi Arabia Diana Suciu

Article 37, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 2 September 1990 Heyns, Christof, Juan Mendez, and Benyam Mezmur. “Saudi Arabia Must Halt Execution of Children.” United Nations Human Rights Council. UNHR Office of the High Commissioner, n.d. Web. 24 Mar. 2017. “The Death Penalty in Saudi Arabia: Facts and Figures.” The Death Penalty in Saudi Arabia: Facts and Figures. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Mar. 2017.

“Saudi Arabia Must Immediately Halt Execution of Children – UN Rights Experts Urge.”UNHRC. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Mar. 2017. “UN Calls on Saudi Arabia to Halt Child Executions – Reprieve Comment.” Reprieve. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Mar. 2017. “Saudi Arabia Executes 7 for Juvenile Crime despite UN Appeal.” RT International. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Mar. 2017. “How Saudi Arabia Kept Its UN Human Rights Council Seat.” Human Rights Watch. N.p., 03 Nov. 2016. Web. 24 Mar. 2017. Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. SC Resolution 752 (May. 15. 1992) UN Doc. S/RES/752. Report, Campaign. “INHUMAN SENTENCING OF CHILDREN IN QATAR.”


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The Spectrum - Issue 6 (2017)  

Founded in the wake of 2010’s student protests, 'The Spectrum' is Britain's oldest student-run policy journal. It offers students the opport...

The Spectrum - Issue 6 (2017)  

Founded in the wake of 2010’s student protests, 'The Spectrum' is Britain's oldest student-run policy journal. It offers students the opport...

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