For example, expenses for rebuilding and maintaining infrastructure in Alaska due to climate change would rise by up to 20 percent, costing the US $3.6 to $6.1 billion by 2030. Business cooperation with Russia in the Arctic is likely to intensify in coming years and requires political coordination. With President Trump seeking good relations with Russia, the US might lift sanctions against Russia even despite the recent investigations into Russia’s election interference, justifying this decision through the need to cooperate with Russia on other urgent international issues. Without US support, the future of EU sanctions would be uncertain, given a growing opposition against sanctions in some EU member states due the economic costs of these sanctions. With sanctions removed, Western oil companies would resume their projects in the Arctic and would need support from their governments, facing increased competition from Asian companies. Due to the sanctions, Russia has been seeking cooperation in the Arctic with other countries, signing agreements with China, India, and Singapore. Russia’s increased activities in the North have raised concerns of other Arctic powers. The Kremlin has advanced militarisation of Russia’s Arctic by establishing an Arctic Joint Strategic Command, and modernising the Northern Fleet with a nuclear deterrence system. Russia has also stationed submarines and military vessels in the
Policy Recommendations Closer cooperation with Russia through the revival and deepening work of Arctic institutions should become one of the clear goals for Arctic policies of the EU and the US. The Western countries should officially acknowledge the importance of cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. The EU should update the Integrated EU policy for the Arctic by including cooperation with Russia as a clear and separate goal, recognising the strategic importance of the Arctic region to EU policy towards Russia and sending a credible signal of willingness to engage in a dialogue with the Russian government and Russian public. Similarly, the US should revise the National Strategy for the Arctic Region by highlighting cooperation with Russia. As the current chair of the Arctic Council, the US should promote a meeting between the heads of Arctic states during the next Arctic Council ministerial summit in May 2017. A dialogue on the high political level would reflect the importance of the Arctic issue and demonstrate recognition of Russia as an important partner. Reviving regular meetings of Arctic Chiefs of Defence and Arctic Security Forces Roundtable could help avoid misconceptions by Russia and other Arctic states that could potentially lead to an escalation of conflict in the Arctic. In contrast, the restoration of military cooperation between Russia and NATO in the Arctic does not seem to be a feasible nor desirable goal. In the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, NATO’s rapprochement with Russia would neglect security concerns of NATO members that are alarmed by Russia’s militarisation of the Arctic. Moreover, Russia perceives NATO as a direct threat, rather than as a reliable cooperation partner.
North, and established military bases, carrying out several unannounced snap exercises. Some Arctic countries are therefore pushing to strengthen NATO security cooperation in the Arctic to prevent Russia from expanding beyond its internationally recognized Arctic borders. However, Russia is unlikely to provoke a conflict in the Arctic, given Moscow’s need for Western technology for Arctic oil exploration and cooperation with Western oil and gas companies. Furthermore, a conflict over resources is doubtful, as two thirds of Arctic resources are located within national offshore territories and are therefore uncontested. The main challenge for transatlantic cooperation with Russia in the Arctic is separating Arctic policy from other international issues that have negatively impacted Western relations with Russia. Energy cooperation between the West and the Soviet Union is an example that such cooperation is possible. Pursuing mutual interests in energy security, the West maintained a dialogue with Moscow even in times of severe tensions in other political areas during the Cold War. Engaging in dialogue does not mean, however, neglecting Russia’s military threat to NATO partners in Eastern Europe and in the Arctic. Finding the right balance between deterrence and dialogue is necessary for reaching a better understanding with Russia.
Transatlantic partners should deepen existing Arctic cooperation in soft security, environmental issues, and research to promote confidence between Russia and Western countries. The US Coast Guard, its counterparts in Arctic EU member states, and Russia should deepen soft security cooperation within the Arctic Coast Guard Forum to increase the exchange of information and coordinate work in mass-rescue operations or efforts aimed at preventing vessels from crashing, oil spills, and other accidents and catastrophes. These measures would address joint interests of the EU, the US, Arctic NATO partners, and Russia, as well as build confidence between the Western partners and Russia. Building confidence is important to prevent potential escalation of tensions in the Arctic, as Russia and NATO regard each other as adversaries. Russia feels insecure due to NATO expansion in Eastern Europe, while NATO member states and partners are threatened by the course of Russia’s expansionist foreign policy. Strengthening confidence would allow both parties to avoid misconceptions that could result in new conflicts. The EU Arctic states and the US should invest in strengthening transatlantic research cooperation with Russia in the Arctic and intensify joint environmental cooperation and efforts to create standards for oil exploration and trade in the Arctic. Formulating standards for an effective and environmentally friendly way of doing business in the Arctic would help countries mitigate the potential economic impact of climate change in the region.
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