TAR126 Q12024 Extract

LAGOS STATE GOVERNOR BABAJIDE SANWO-OLU

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Critical minerals The race to catch China

African kingdoms Why they are relevant today

N° 126 JANUARY - FEBRUARY - MARCH 2024

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EDITORIAL

END THE CARBON DEBT TRAP

African states are breathing some life into the battered multilateral system. African Union membership of the G20 and wide backing for a seat at the UN Security Council, three seats in the BRICS+ (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and an extra place on the IMF executive board have opened a few cracks in the great power dominance of international organisations.

Geopolitics have paralysed the system’s responses to the disastrous wars in IsraelPalestine and Ukraine. Yet elsewhere African votes are carrying greater weight with the rise of the “middle powers” as arbiters and mediators. Activists, scientists and officials have been pushing the triple woes besieging Africa: devastating climate change, criminal capital flight and debt-trap economics. These are turbocharging global inequality and conflict.

Climate policy is the critical starting point.

The causes of global warming may seem remote on the Equator but their effects are not. They are akin to a military invasion in some of Africa’s hottest and driest countries, destroying lives and deepening fault lines as communities are shunted into new regions.

It is the underlying divide in world power.

Half the world’s people account for just 12% of carbon emissions. That set the stage for

the Loss and Damage Fund negotiations this year. Industrial economies – the biggest carbon emitters – are being called on to concede their responsibility and pay fair compensation.

It was an intense fight. Industrial economies pushed back hard against legal liability, let alone reparations. A compromise just before the UN’s COP28 Climate Summit in Dubai gave the World Bank fiduciary control of the Fund, making all contributions voluntary. This elicited some underwhelming pledges from the world’s biggest economies. Germany and the UAE threw in $100m each while the US managed $17.5m. The pledges for more than 60 countries at the summit amounted to $700m – what it cost the Los Angeles Dodgers to hire Japan’s star baseball player Shohei Ohtani.

The UN reckons the transition to renewables requires $4trn a year of investment, a quarter into developing economies. Surreal?

Yes, until you see the subsidies on fossil fuels.

The IMF calculates the explicit subsidies and tax breaks on coal, oil and gas to have been $1.3trn in 2022. When the implicit subsidies are included – the damage to health and ecosystems – the total nudges $7trn for that year.

Those colossal sums have persuaded the heads of the IMF and World Bank to call for a review of the subsidies. An option is an accountable carbon-pricing scheme, making polluters pay for their emissions. African leaders called for a carbon taxation regime to cover fossil-fuel trade, shipping and airlines; revenues would go to climate investments in the hardest-hit countries.

Such ideas are squashed in the West. A Dutch plan to end fossil-fuel subsidies was cold-shouldered as too politically difficult.

It is time they looked to Africa, where several countries, including its biggest oil and gas producer, Nigeria, are slashing fuel subsidies and making a virtue out of necessity. They should not have to carry the planet alone.

THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

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EDITOR IN CHIEF PATRICK SMITH

WHAT TO WATCH IN 2024

MANAGING EDITOR NICHOLAS NORBROOK editorial@theafricareport.com

Crucial elections in South Africa, Ghana, Botswana and Namibia, investment from the Gulf, COP28 concessions, insecurity in the Sahel, hydropower, judgement debt and the macro outlook for the next year on the continent.

To find the full editorial team, all our correspondents and much more on our new digital platform, please visit: www.theafricareport.com

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76 CRITICAL MINERALS’ ONE-PARTY STATE Why the West finds it hard to compete with China’s mining monopoly in Africa.

86 HOW NIGERIA HELPS FRANCE TURN THE PAGE

102 EAST COAST PORTS ARE RISING

46 WIDE ANGLE / Lagos on the move

How the region is luring in the big ships.

70 HERITAGE / States of grace Africa’s ancient kingdoms hold lessons for the modern world. A new wave of scholarship by Africans for Africa casts light on the trade, statecraft and diplomacy of the Songhai, Kongo, Yoruba, Benin and Ethiopian Solomonic Christian civilisations.

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As France loses its influence in its former colonies, its relationship with Nigeria is blossoming.

FEATURES With 4%-5% demographic growth a year “we are going to have to be radical” says Lagos State Governor Babajide Sanwo-Olu. An integrated rapid transport system, tighter tax collection and urban planning are part of the answer.

The Africa Report explores the city on the cusp of being an efficient, modern metropolis with ambitions to become the continent’s finance hub.

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109 AFRICA’S REGIONS IN 2024 Political and business analysis of the year ahead, region by region.

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ON AFRICA PROCESSING LITHIUM

ON GHANA’S KWABENYA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

I think it is a good move.

With demand being high, the suppliers have more bargaining power than they realise.

Annette Johnson, author A Jazzman’s Tale, by email

The first atomic energy plant at Kwabenya was built by Russia in the 1960s. If corruption is not involved, the Chinese bid for the project will be low. The old reactor’s core was switched from high-grade uranium to low-grade, and we will do cost comparison when offers come in.

The Chinese have been dominant in Ghana’s economy; they provided $1bn to build the Atuabo Gas Plant. They also gave $600m to build the Bui Dam. The US is giving us [aid contingent on] LBGTQ [rights].

Isaac Kusi, New York, by email

ON ZIMBABWEAN IMMIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA The challenge is in how you frame the problem in Zimbabwe. To you, it is about governance. So [poor] governance has led to emigration out of Zimbabwe, and by that logic a change in government would stem the tide on immigration in South Africa. We need a more objective discussion on the Zimbabwe question, beyond partisan base positions that are not taking us anywhere.

There are external and internal challenges.

Besides this, how are Zimbabwean immigrants contributing to South Africa’s development?

We have been tracking the performance of the government of Zimbabwe at zimcitizenswatch.org

since 2018. The five-year report shows the progress that has happened in the midst of the Covid-19 crisis and global inflation. Is that enough?

Definitely not. Is there a challenge of authoritarianism? Definitely yes.

Tendai Murisa, Harare, by email

ON ETHIOPIAN ACCESS TO THE RED SEA There is no war, so we can peacefully, and through diplomatic means, access the sea. We [Ethiopians] never get into conflicts

with our brothers. Eritrea is a sovereign country with its own international boundary, and Ethiopia also has legitimate claims to access to the sea.

These claims are indispensable for the existence of the Ethiopian state.

This is not a luxury but for survival.

Can begging give us what we search for? If laws and history can let us get what we need, we will do it. But if those who have the right fail to consider our claims, we won’t try to secure it by use of force.

We will leave that up to the future generations.

Hailu Minda Chima, Jara, via Facebook

ON A NEW NIGERIAN NATIONAL AIRLINE Despite all our issues with corruption that destroyed the defunct Nigeria Airways, and the fact that we have private airlines like Air Peace that are doing well, we still need a national carrier that operates under best management practices and is devoid of corruption.

Oyasope Augustine, Lagos, via Facebook

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NYESOM WIKE

MASTERPLANNER The powerful former Rivers State governor is a changed man. Now minister of the Federal Capital Territory, he outlines his strategy for Abuja over a coffee Interview by DONU KOGBARA Coffee is a no-frills instant brand. We are in Nyesom Wike’s air-conditioned office in Abuja’s Federal Capital Territory (FCT) ministry.

Wike, a lawyer, political juggernaut and former governor of Rivers State – the capital of the oil-producing Niger Delta region – is one of the most combative, mesmerising, powerful government officials in the country.

And the most discussed member of President Bola Tinubu’s cabinet.

Wike frequently – and loudly – addresses the press and is often embroiled in one fiery drama to the next. Every step he takes is monitored by a public that finds him fascinating. He is said to be mercilessly bullying Sim Fubara, the popular successor he installed as Rivers governor on 29 May. But today, the bombastic, know-it-all maverick his critics complain about is nowhere to be seen. He expresses no interest in undermining his heir or continuing to be the Main Man in a state he is no longer runs. He politely deflects awkward questions about burning political issues.

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When asked how he, a prominent politician in the Niger Delta, wound up controlling the current governor and two main parties in Rivers State, he answers: “Who says so?”

As governor of Rivers State, Wike took legal action to prevent the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) from collecting value-added tax. Is he still a strong advocate of this kind of restructuring? “I won’t advertise my opinions,” he answers. “It’s for the president to lead the way.”

Today, he is a modest, low-key technocrat focused on showing sceptics that he has a lot to offer Abuja and that Tinubu was right to swear him in as FCT minister. While aides

‘[We’ll research] best practices in modern cities, adapt findings to our situation’

THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

hover discreetly, he talks about the challenges he faces.

Abuja, despite inevitable imperfections, is a great Nigerian success story.

It wasn’t incorporated until 1984 and wasn’t officially declared the federal capital until 1991, during the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida.

Established from scratch and in the middle of the huge landmass that is Nigeria, Abuja has gone from strength to strength and has decent roads and impressive edifices. But it still has a long way to go before it can be described as world-class.

“It was built for only 500,000 people. I don’t know why the founders did not think ahead and make allowances for growth. But we now have a population of about five million. And that’s a problem,” says Wike, whose nickname in Rivers State was ‘Mr Projects’.

How is he going to solve it? “By decongesting the centre of town and improving infrastructure in the suburbs – roads and water are my priorities.

Abuja has six area councils. If people who live in them have better facilities, they will not crowd into the centre.”

Another problem is that corrupt civil servants in the FCT ministry’s development control department have been degrading the original master plan by entering into “shady deals” with land purchasers and allowing residential and green areas to become commercialised. Wike is on a mission to restore the integrity of the master plan and amend it where necessary.

He has set up a team that has been instructed to “research best practices in modern cities in the world, adapt their findings to our situation and prepare recommendations that can be presented to the president on or before Tinubu’s first anniversary next May.” Wike is well-travelled but when asked which foreign urban sprawl he would most like Abuja to resemble, he says he isn’t enough of an expert to recommend anywhere.

“I have only been abroad as a tourist or on short business trips. I didn’t go

to study how foreign cities work, so I would rather leave my technical team to do the recommending.”

JEAN-MARC PAU

FOR TAR

What is his management style?

His detractors say it is imperial rather than democratic. But he appears to have found creative ways of extracting support and productivity from bureaucrats without antagonising them.

“I have offered them 2% of any internally generated rev venue they raise, so the ey don’t have to hang aro ound waiting for me to approve working fun nds. They feel em mpowered and are happy. They don’t miind me insisting on n efficiency. They kn now that if they do wh hat they are supposed to do, d they will get ben nefits they are enttitled to.”

Surprisingly for one who has a reputation for spending big bucks, he says he is budget-conscious and operating parsimoniously. “I incentivise staff but I don’t tolerate money-wasting frivolities, especially when foreign exchange is involved,” he says.

“Ministry staff were invited to a British Government workshop in London. I declined because I couldn’t see the value in it … I will not enable anyone to travel for enjoyment and shopping!” ” Investigations reveall that many contractorss and FCT residentss think Wike is perform-ing well compared to o his near-comatose e Buhari-era prede-cessor, Mohammed d Musa Bello. One off the things hiss Abuja fanss

‘I will not enable anyone to travel for enjoyment and shopping’

appreciate is the fact that Wike is big on crime prevention. He is pushing for taxis to be properly registered to minimise attacks by criminals masquerading as taxi drivers and has revoked certificates of occupancy for people who bought land and didn’t develop it within the mandatory two-year window. Vacant plots and incomplete buildings are often turned into shanties and hijacked by miscreants, he says.

Wike has come to agreements with contractors over payment for stalled elite projects (including a controversally expensive residence for the vice president) abandoned decades ago because of cashflow crises. But the real jewel in Abuja’s crown – a top-notch cultural centre, library and museum – is expected to attract thousands of visitors to Abuja.

This project has been stuck on the drawing board since 2002 and will cost N77bn to complete. Wike’s eyes light up as he describes the 2,000 parking spaces and the quality of the architectural drawings.

Wike is equally enthusiastic about preparing food for family and friends.

Who could guess that a man who comes across as irredeemably macho could have such a domesticated hobby?

He laughs when I suggest he writes a cookery book.

Then the coffee session comes to an end because the minister has to rush off to meet a delegation from the Christian Association of Nigeria.

Bidding farewell to the complex and controversial headline-grabber, I am glad to have met him at his best.

THEAFRICAREP PORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

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DO YOU REMEMBER

2023 1 Who was Emmerson

Mnangagwa’s most dangerous opponent for the 2023 presidential elections? a. Constantine Chiwenga b. Nelson Chamisa c. Himself

2 Which Nigerian politician

cooks all his own meals since surviving being poisoned two years ago? a. Nyesom Wike b. Peter Obi c. Ike Ekweremadu

3 Convicted rapist and South

African prison buster Thabo Bester was found in Arusha, Tanzania, in April. He had never been registered as a South African citizen, even though he was born there.

What name and passport did he have on his person when he was captured? a. TK Nkwana, Zimbabwe b. Tom Williams Kelly, USA c. Siabonga Mamba, eSwatini

4 Which sporty president

has become famous for his reggae diss tracks, including one against political opponents and another about his wife’s alleged lover? a. Mokgweetsi Masisi, Botswana b. Mahamat Déby, Chad c. George Weah, Liberia

How well do you know the names making the continent’s news in 2023? The first five people to answer all 10 questions correctly will receive a year’s subscription to our digital edition. Please email your answers to: quiz@theafricareport.com by 1 February 2024. b. Shepherd Bushiri c. Prophet Odumeje

6 Which president’s son

threatened to invade a neighbouring country, yet was also featured in the book Jesus’ Africa, written by his sister? a. Muhoozi Kainerugaba b. Collins Mnangagwa c. Franck Biya

7 Which Nana Benz – Togo’s

legendary female wax cloth traders – was one of the last to depart the Earth in 2023, aged 89? a. Maman Creppy (Dédé Rose Gamélé Creppy) b. Eunice Adabunu c. Patience Sanvee

8 Who called his coup d’etat

a ‘liberation’, and included jumbotrons outside the presidential palace so the masses could view his swearing-in ceremony?

a. Ibrahim Traoré, Burkina Faso b. Abdourahamane Tiani, Niger c. Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, Gabon

9 Which African vice president

published a Tiktok video walking around their $75,000/night penthouse suite in New York, after asking for more aid for Africa at the UN General Assembly? a. Teodoro Nguema Obiang, Equatorial Guinea b. Mahamudu Bawumia, Ghana c. Nangolo Mbumba, Namibia

10 Which Kenyan minister told

citizens complaining about fuel prices to drill their own oil well? a. Moses Kuria, trade and industry cabinet secretary b. Rigathi Gachagua, deputy president of Kenya c. Alice Muthoni Wahome, lands, housing and urban development cabinet secretary

Bonus question: which African president is nicknamed ‘the Crocodile’?

diplomatic passport holder was thrust into the spotlight in 2023 after a moneylaundering scandal in a southern African country? a. Uebert Angel

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THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

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5 Which ‘man of God’ and

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FEATURES /

By SHERIF TAREK ABOUZID, DAMI AJAYI, LAURA-ANGELA BAGNETTO, HONORÉ BANDA, ALISON CULLIFORD, NICHOLAS NORBROOK, KANIKA SAIGAL, PATRICK SMITH, DAVID WHITEHOUSE; maps by CAMILLE CHAUVIN

The year ahead will be nothing if not rich in electoral contest: a sweep of big countries go to the polls, including South Africa and Ghana, as well as a clutch of smaller ones. Will politicians take the opportunity to discuss the challenges facing citizens, from growing Gulf involvement to a Sahel stuck on ‘coup, rinse and repeat’, and the debt mountain certain countries have to climb? No doubt; hopefully they will allow themselves to be distracted by our fine list of books, too.

THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

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OPINION

AFRICA IN 2024 /

WHAT HAS CHANGED FOR THE WEST AND THE REST OF US When Chinweizu Ibekwe, Nigeria’s pre-eminent poet and philosopher, wrote his searing assessment of the global power structure The West and the Rest of Us nearly 50 years ago, the demarcation lines were fraying as governance of the planet and its resources seemed set for seismic change.

As Chinweizu handed in his manuscript, the US had just lost the war in Vietnam against a guerrilla movement backed by Russia and China, leftist officers in solidarity with liberation forces in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique had overthrown Portugal’s military dictatorship, and opposition to apartheid rule in South Africa was gaining global traction.

As African activists and states steer their way through today’s fragmented polities and economies, much of Chinweizu’s analysis of the structure

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of global power stands. Armed camps in Washington and Beijing-Moscow are glowering at each other and fighting proxy wars, although China’s economic weight has changed the pecking order.

Turbo-charged by the pandemic and the subsequent capital drought and debt squeeze, the crassest global inequality has accelerated after positive shifts in the 1990s and 2000s. More than half the world’s eight billion people cannot afford a healthy diet, says a report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation. It rises to 78% in Africa, mocking the UN’s target of “a world without hunger/malnutrition by 2030”.

If the outlines of great-power competition appear constant – despite undulations – over the past 50 years, the landscapes of inter-state relations, technological innovation, climatic disruption and demographic shifts signal much greater upheavals ahead.

This will confront Western states and populations with clear choices about how much longer they want to jealously guard their power and privileges, and to what extent they can change the terms of their relations with “the rest of us”.

THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

The prognosis, to judge from the outcomes of US President Joe Biden’s Africa Summit or the EU’s serial recycling of its Africa policy, is not good.

For African states, this situation offers more fluid associations and alliances as they try to redouble their focus on mobilising capital and technology to strengthen their economies. This will be a matter of political survival for national elites, given that the continent is due to have the world’s biggest population of working age by 2050.

Diplomatic acknowledgement of Africa’s growing demographic weight has triggered a flurry of invitations to global clubs. Every world leader backs a seat for Africa on the UN Security Council. The G20 has given the AU a seat on its board – apparently with the same rights as the EU. More sluggishly, the IMF and the World Bank have given Africa another seat on their executive board. But the voting power of the US and Europe still dominates those institutions and the global financial system.

On the other side of the ledger, an alternative international order is being built on the foundation of China’s headlong economic and military expansion. The BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has opened its doors to more African states – Egypt and Ethiopia – as well as to Argentina, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The total gross domestic product of the expanded BRICS trails that of the US-led G7 economies, but it surpasses them in terms of population and oil production, holding the key members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). China’s President Xi Jinping, in South Africa for the BRICS summit in August, sealed his endorsement of the expanded BRICS grouping. Two months later, Beijing was hosting a 10-year birthday party for the trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative, which has spawned several hefty infrastructure projects in East and Southern Africa.

ADRIA FRUITOS FOR TAR

“When you give roses to others, the fragrance lingers on your hand,” Xi told guests, summing up the trade-offs.

Rather more implausibly, he added: “Ideological confrontation, geopolitical rivalry and bloc politics are not a choice for us.” Only the awkward realities of China’s slowing economy, the ballooning debts of its parallel banking sector and its tightening of financial purse strings for overseas borrowers dampened proceedings.

Chinese finance to Africa has fallen in volume and changed in structure.

Company-to-company deals have replaced the swathe of state-subsidised power stations, railways and ports.

Chinese contractors compete on price and geopolitical side-deals with Brazil, India, Turkey and the UAE. European and US contractors are hardly in the game in Africa. A great compliment to Beijing’s Belt and Road programme is attempts by Europe and the US to imitate it. But the scale is in tens rather than hundreds of billions.

This year, the over-arching failure of both the G7 and Beijing is their inability to agree a mechanism to more speedily restructure developing-country

‘We face neither east nor west,’ said Kwame Nkrumah.

‘We face forward’

debt. Blame falls almost equally on both camps. That countries such as Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana and Zambia are trapped in tortuous negotiations tells its own story about the accounting priorities of the big powers. Middle powers such as the Gulf monarchies, which were meant to mediate debt negotiations, have lacked imagination and enthusiasm. Yet both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have joined in the wooing of Africa.

SaudiArabiahostedasummit with largely unfulfilled promises of cheap money and abundant investments.

The UAE has been buying up ports along Africa’s eastern seaboard and

laundering Africa’s informally mined gold, much to the delight of kleptocrats in the DRC, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Where the UAE may overstep the mark is in its sponsorship of General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (‘Hemeti’) and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan’s devastating civil war. With Hemeti and commanders in the frame for war crimes and genocide in Darfur, questions are aimed at the complicity of top officials in Abu Dhabi.

Among these shifting constellations of states, African governments have their feet in multiple camps. An adage from Ghana’s founding president, Kwame Nkrumah, argues for a more strategic approach: “We face neither east nor west. We face forward.”

Some signs of that are emerging. A good example is Nigeria’s leadership of 125 countries, mainly from the Global South, at the UN General Assembly to establish a UN tax authority, fending off efforts by Britain and the EU to kick the plan into the long grass.

This sets the case for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development to cede control over tax setting. Beyond the bureaucratic battle is the prospect that Africa can start to rein in over $100bn that it loses yearly in illicit financial flows.

That, and the deterrent effect on those whose business model will be threatened by transparency, is cheered by activists who have been pushing for these changes for decades.

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AFRICA IN 2024 /

IS DEMOCRACY TAKING ROOT IN AFRICA, OR IS IT A SHAM? Elections

With significant elections across the continent, six countries stand out. There will be no surprises in some, such as in Rwanda, where President Paul Kagame, in charge since the end of the genocide 30 years ago, still leads the country unopposed. In Mozambique, President Filipe Nyusi has increased his authoritarian stance in the face of waning support for the ruling party, but it is unclear who will lead FRELIMO in the October polls.

While Namibians can vote for a woman president for the first time, Ghanaians can chose from three veterans – Alan Kyerematen, now an independent, Mahamudu Bawumia and John Mahama. Political maturity beckons in Botswana and South Africa, where coalitions could shatter the long-standing majority of ruling parties.

SLATED BETWEEN MAY AND AUGUST – SOUTH AFRICA

AUGUST – RWANDA President Paul Kagame is not hanging up his hat any time soon and is eager for a fourth term. Based on previous election turnouts, the 65-year-old’s chances are better than good: in 2017, he took 98.63% of the vote, making him unstoppable.

His sole opponent is Green Party and opposition leader Frank Habineza, one of a few with the stamina to go head-to-head against the stern president again. While some cite Kagame’s poor human rights record – which the UK nevertheless thought good enough to host migrants – and the lack of a free press, he has categorically stated that he doesn’t care what the West thinks.

RWANDA’S PAUL KAGAME DOESN’T CARE WHAT THE WEST THINKS

The contentious election has around 200 parties participating, including independent candidates – one of the largest party registrations on record. However, according to a 2023 Afrobarometer study, more than 60% of registered voters feel no connection to any political party.

For the first time since 1994, the South African vote seems to be a mixed bag, with analysts leaning towards a coalition government. After the ‘Farmgate’ scandal, the lack of jobs and ongoing power and water failure throughout the country, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) is waning. The electorate will be a hard audience to please for President Cyril Ramaphosa.

If the ANC resorts to a coalition, Julius Malema’s populist, far-left Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) is its only viable option. One that would not please everyone who is loyal to the liberation party.

The centrist Democratic Alliance (DA), led by John Steenhuisen, has formed a coalition agreement with seven smaller parties including the Inkatha Freedom Party. According to IPSOS researchers in October 2023, the Multi-Party Charter for South Africa coalition ‘looks to draw about 31% to 33% of the vote at this stage’.

And on 10 December, a new party was launched.

Change Starts Now is headed by businessman Roger

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Jardine, who has assembled a star-studded crew including Helen Suzman Foundation executive director Nicole Fritz as lead political counsel.

THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

OCTOBER – MOZAMBIQUE

Years of corruption and mismanagement have taken their toll on the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), which has won every election since 1992. The October 2023 municipal elections marked a watershed moment as thousands of voters turned towards the opposition Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO). FRELIMO’s reaction was to declare that it had won in every municipality but one.

‘Electoral bodies changed the results to benefit FRELIMO in towns where the opposition had won. The results showed a surprising victory for the ruling party in Maputo, Matola, Quelimane, Vilankulo, Nampula and Chiure – where the interim count at the stations gave victory to RENAMO,’ says a report by the Institute for Security Studies.

Even some party members have spoken out: FRELIMO Central Committee member and son of the first president of Mozambique, Samora Machel Junior, circulated a letter in which he suggests cleaning “ranks” within the party.

With clear evidence of vote rigging, several district courts decided to annul the election results, but the Constitutional Court ruled against them. The election and the Constitutional Court’s

DPPA/STARFACE; V.FOURNIER POUR JA; EPA-EFE/MADE NAGI

Top job: Some analysts say South African President Cyril Ramaphosa (left) is ‘reluctant’, but will the ANC win? In Rwanda, President Paul Kagame is going for a fourth term with very little opposition. Will Namibians chose a woman president (Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah)?

decision were followed by widespread protests and police violence, including shooting to kill.

Pressure from donors could bring about reforms that give electoral bodies greater independence in the 2024 vote. More likely is that President Filipe Nyusi uses insecurity as an excuse to postpone the elections and increase his authoritarian rule while pushing for consitutional change that would allow him a third term. If he does not achieve this there will be strong jostling within FRELIMO to choose a successor.

The party elects its presidential candidate in the first quarter of 2024.

DECEMBER – GHANA

He will be up against former president John Mahama, who is promising jobs, investment and opportunity. But Mahama’s quest to set the economy straight rings hollow for the NPP, who maintain he lost the race to Akufo-Addo in 2016 due to the rapidly failing economy. The NPP contends it has the power to ‘break the eight’ – end the political pattern of Ghanaians voting out political parties after they have served for two four-year tenures.

It will have to convince voters who protested about scandals and debt in September that it can do better when it comes to the vote on 7 December.

JOHN MAHAMA’S QUEST TO FIX THE ECONOMY RINGS HOLLOW FOR RIVALS

Presidential elections are a year away, but that hasn’t stopped the ruling New Patriotic Front (NPP), or main opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) from stumping on the trail. And there have already been a few surprises. Staunch NPP member Alan Kyerematen took himself out of the flagbearer race, opting to run as an independent after 31 years in the party. President Nana Akufo-Addo will cede the floor to Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia, a shrewd technocrat and the Ashantistrong NPP’s first Muslim candidate.

DATE NOT SET – BOTSWANA

The opposition coalition Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) is poised to take charge in the polls, which would be a stunning turnaround after over 50 years rule by the Botswana Democratic Party. BDP is no longer the party of country founder Seretse Khama, and Khama’s son, Ian, also a previous president, joined the opposition. After naming Mokgweetsi Masisi his successor, bad blood between them resulted in Khama exiling himself in South Africa.

Voters have soured on BDP after allegations surfaced that Masisi and his family benefited

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AFRICA IN 2024 /

from infrastructure projects. UDC success in a 2022 by-election indicates that the people want change. Even if a coalition power comes to fruition, opening the field for a more politically competitive stage, the stable democracy is expected to carry on.

Independent Patriots for Change leader Panduleni Itula is the frontrunner up against SWAPO. Itula, a dentist and lawyer, ran in 2019 and came in second with 29.4% of the vote.

Another possible contender is Job Amupanda, who made his Affirmative Repositioning (AR) movement into a political party. The former mayor of Windhoek is the youngest candidate and may attract the youth vote, as 60% of eligible voters are under 40. On the down side, AR’s promises for land ownership in Windhoek didn’t pan out.

Although SWAPO has been in power since independence, unemployment and corruption have reduced its appeal. It lost its two-thirds majority in 2019 and failed to keep major cities Windhoek, Walvis Bay and Swakopmund. Some analysts say the party will win, as the opposition appears weak and inexperienced in comparison.

DATE NOT SET – NAMIBIA Voters in the Southwestern country are expecting a long ballot paper – the presidential elections have been touted as the most competitive ever, with 14 candidates vying for the top seat, which may result in a run-off. President Hage Geingob, who completes his two terms, named vice-president Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah as the sole candidate for the ruling South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO). Nandi-Ndaitwah, or NNN, is also the country’s deputy prime minister.

WHAT ABUJA’S RELIEF IN $15BN DEBT CASE SAYS ABOUT GRAND CORRUPTION Judgement debt When Justice Robin Knowles in the London High Court ruled that a claim against Nigeria for $15bn by a construction company registered in the British Virgin Islands and a New York hedge fund was mired in corruption, he lifted a colossal threat to the treasury in Abuja.

The ruling in October ended a 10-year saga that could have cost Nigeria a third of its forex reserves – more than it spends on health and education for its 220 million people.

The case of Process & Industrial Developments (P&ID) got so far due to failures of government accountability and vagaries in the national and international judicial systems.

Nigeria’s weak regulatory systems result in tens of millions, even hundreds of millions of dollars of state funds going to settle judgement debts. Contracts between officials and companies make the government

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liable to pay vast sums even when no goods or services have been provided. In some cases, officials colluded with private businesses to draw up ‘bad contracts’ full of hidden costs the state is liable for.

The officials and contractors then share the winnings, records show.

The P&ID case was remarkable because it revolved around something that didn’t happen. Two well-connected Irishmen, who had been selling arms to Nigeria’s military, signed a contract to build a gas plant that would generate electricity in Cross River State. It was not built and Nigeria’s oil ministry was blamed for failing to supply gas.

P&ID claimed compensation, citing a liability clause in the contract.

After officials in Abuja ignored its legal letters, P&ID took the matter to an arbitration tribunal in London in 2016, where it scored its first legal

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victory in the absence of effective representation by Nigeria and was awarded $6bn plus interest. When the case reached the London High Court in 2023, it was estimated to be around $15bn with legal costs.

Attorney General Abubakar Malami and others urged President Muhammadu Buhari to pay off P&ID in an out-of-court settlement.

By then P&ID had the services of lobbying company iNHouse Communications, linked to Britain’s ruling Conservative party. Expecting to make billions, New York hedge fund VR Capital bought a 25% stake in P&ID for $45m.

It was Buhari’s determination to fight the case – having called out P&ID for grand corruption at the UN General Assembly – that turned the tide. The judgement should force a probe into ruinous contracts that are still burdening the country.

MESSAGE

AFRICA’S CLIMATE JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT:

A

frica is turning is reversing the trend on climate justice. 2023 will be a landmark: after the Africa Climate Summit in Nairobi and before the COP28 in Dubai, the Africa Energy Week in Cape Town brought together decision-makers in energy developments on the continent.

Africa has a unique situation. While it emits only 0.7 ton of greenhouse gases per capita (3% of global emissions, 9 times less than Europe, 10 times less than China, 20 times less than the United States and 35 times less than world records), Africa will be most affected by extreme climate events resulting from climate change caused by other continents. This is a situation it no longer wants. To finance its ecological transition and its human, economic and social development,

Africa aims at using all its natural resources. Recent discoveries of hydrocarbons are considerable: they are the indispensable technical complement and the primary source of financing for renewable energies and industrialization. It should be noted that in Africa, the lack of industrialization is the main reason for youth unemployment and the primary cause of the loss of one third of food production.

No one can teach Africa a lesson on climate change. Indeed, it intends to be the pioneer of a model of strong growth but with a low carbon footprint whose ambition is to bring development to 600 million Africans who do not have access to electricity.

If nothing is done, it will rise to 1 billion in 2030 from 150 million in 1960. There are countries where more electricity increases comfort.

In Africa, it makes the difference

between life, survival and death.

This is what forces us to talk about human rights and climate justice. If Africa does not extract its natural resources, if it does not attract new capital quickly, other domain will suffer: there will be a lack of solar, wind, hydro, biomass and especially hydrogen energies everywhere in the world. Raw materials, mainly African, are critical for the energy revolution. All stakeholders must therefore dialogue. African local communities, public authorities and energy partners must work together in additional projects that will create immediate local jobs. This is why Chief Olusegun OBASANJO announced the creation of the Just Energy Transition Leadership Council during the Africa Energy Week on October 17th, 2023.

This initiative will foster dialogue for an equitable and sustainable development of the continent.

JAMG - PHOTOS DR

CHIEF OLUSEGUN OBASANJO ANNOUNCES THE CREATION OF THE JUST ENERGY TRANSITION LEADERSHIP COUNCIL.

AFRICA IN 2024 /

INFLATION DROWNS CURRENCY RECOVERY Macro outlook The trifecta of a pandemic, the Ukraine-Russia war and the Israel-Palestine conflict has caused a global economic slowdown that will continue, well into 2024. The consequences across Africa, however, will be magnified.

African countries, like their developed counterparts, have hiked interest rates to stem inflation.

The results have been glaringly different to what has played out in the US and Europe.

Given the underdevelopment of transition mechanisms, interest-rate hikes have had little impact on inflation in Africa. In Ghana, the projected inflation rate for 2023 is 45.4%, for Egypt it is 21.6%, Nigeria 20.1% and Kenya 7.8%. On the extreme end, Zimbabwe experienced inflation at 172.2%, and has set its sights on a gold-backed digital currency, which will no doubt generate its

GROWTH ACROSS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN 2023

SOURCE: WORLD BANK

2023 est.

-12

2024-2025 est.

-3 -6

-9

0

3

Sudan Equatorial Guinea South Sudan South Africa Angola Ghana Niger Eritrea Zambia Gabon Namibia Nigeria Chad Sierra Leone Rep. of Congo Botswana Madagascar Cameroon Mali Senegal Burkina Faso Mauritania Zimbabwe Liberia Tanzania Uganda Benin Ethiopia Mozambique Côte d’Ivoire DRC Rwanda

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6

9

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own problems. Central banks may have paused hikes in the past few months, but there will likely be more on the horizon next year.

The greatest impact on the continent will be on trade. And thus the (vicious) cycle begins: with developed economies endeavouring to avoid stagflation (a combination of high inflation and subdued economic growth), their ability to buy African exports will fall and export revenue will drop. This will put further dents in Africa’s forex reserves, and Africa’s buying power will fall.

African governments will continue with fiscal consolidation – to shore up revenue and meet development-bank conditions for relief. At the inaugural Forum on Emerging Economies in Nairobi in November, run by emerging market consultancies Botho and PA, one attendee predicted the rise of M&A (mergers and acquisitions) across the region, despite limited capital-market activity in Africa in general.

Dollar drought “Companies don’t have the liquidity, the capacity or even the market they had three or four years ago,” the participant, a consultant, said at the event.

“Many will close up shop or sell their businesses to the highest bidder.”

Renewable energy, raw materials, heathcare and technology will be active in the M&A space, say analysts at the Boston Consulting Group.

Aggressive companies and investors willing to take a punt could win big – or they could fall flat as the risk to investors is sky-high. Inflation has fuelled local currency volatility and has eroded forex reserves, increasing the international debt burden while debt stock stays the same.

In 2023, African countries on the verge of debt distress were hopeful that the G20 Common Framework would provide a blueprint for how sovereigns could manage spiralling debt. Zambia would be the test case.

With 2023 at an end, and three years since the country defaulted, Zambia is still waiting to come to a resolution with its official creditors.

Ghana defaulted in 2022. Ethiopia, reeling from a deadly civil war, also still needs debt relief. At the end of 2022, Kenya’s debt was close to 70% of GDP. If no resolution in Zambia is found, Ghana, Ethiopia and perhaps even Kenya will struggle to bring their debt under control.

If the international creditor community can find a solution to Zambia’s debt problem this could bring new hope to a continent struggling with its international debt obligations. Without it, the vicious cycle will continue. And the outlook for 2024 will be bleak.

ADVERTORIAL

Hasan Khan Standard Bank Group’s Head of Corporate and Investment Banking,Africa Regions

A

frica is at a turning point; with a GDP nearing $3 trillion, Africa’s economic and developmental potential is undeniable, and the continent’s influence is growing globally, notably marked by the African Union’s recent entry into the G20 – now the G21 – a premier grouping of country and regional bloc members shaping international economic cooperation.

Populated by the globe’s youngestdemographic,the continent boasts the world’s largest free trade area, and is rich with vast mineral deposits and natural resources, positioning it favourably for a dominant role in the global energy transition.

Constantly reinforcing misnomers, such as the “African economy”, suggesting the continent is a monolithic unit, creates misperceptions about the real market opportunities that exist on the continent and grossly distorts the risks of doing business here.

In my experience, most African markets provide excitinguntappedpotentialanduniqueopportunities for those who dare to look for it and invest for the long run.Certainly,likeanyintricatesociety,thereare y riskstodoingbussinessinmanyAfricancountries,but this isn’t dissimilaar to the reality of doing business in around the globe. most emerging markets m Standard Bank’ss Corporate and Investment Bank (CIB) recognisess the inherent value of Africa and its people. Our rise to becoming Africa’s premier bank by assets is bbolstered by our presence in major financial hubs across North America, Euurope, the Middle East, and China.

T powerful network allows us This to link clients from these economic epicentres to Africa’s growth hotspots. Beyond moving capital, we enable and foster business relationships, cultivate investment,anddriveAfrica’seconomic diversification and development.

Our approach to doing business on this continent is nuanced by country and region. Through our deep insightsofkeysectors,andbyunderstandingregional dynamics,weareforgingenduringpartnershipswith corporate clients and governments to drive positive impact.

Our emphasis is on industrial evolution with our clients.Thisincludesexpandingagri-processingtosubstitutingimportswithlocalcontentandsubsequently championing the export of soft commodities.We see infrastructure as a backbone for development, and we are actively investing into the expansion of ports, roads, and rail infrastructure to remove barriers to trade. Our support of technological advancements in telecommunication services and the generation and distribution of power is anchored on uplifting the communitiesweserve;in2022,wefinanced$439of renewable energy for every $1 lent towards nonrenewableenergy,demonstratingourcommitmentto harnessing Africa’s naturally replenishing resources to advance its path towards industrialisation.

Ourcollaborationthroughpublic-privatepartnerships (PPPs) signals a progressive move from traditional debt-ledinfrastructureprojects.Westrategicallyalign with local entrepreneurs,recognising their indispensable role in fostering sustained growth and industry diversification.

We pride ourselves on our in-depth product expertiseinInvestmentBanking,TransactionBanking,and Global Markets.Our world class team,equipped with profound local insights and adeptness at navigating the intricate terrains of these markets, sets us apart.

We aim to be the foremost African corporate and investment bank in our selected markets, dedicated to driving positive impact across the continent.

Africa’spotentialisvast. AtStandardBank,wearenot justinaweofthetrajectoryofitsgrowthandpotential – we are actively and passionately shaping it.

https://corporateandinvestment.standardbank.com/

JAMG - PHOTOS DR

Unleashing Africa’s growth: The power of partnerships and targeted investment in delivering sustainable impact

Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi with Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman

RIYADH EYES BROAD OPPORTUNITIES Investment Saudi Arabia has launched an ambitious economic foray into Africa as part of its drive to become a global power that is less reliant on energy.

The monarchy hosted a Saudi-Arab-African economic conference in Riyadh in November, where it committed more than $500m into projects and investments in Africa through the $700bn Saudi Public Investment Fund. The deals included a host of financing and energy-related agreements with Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Senegal and Chad.

One official described the investments the oil-rich kingdom holds in Africa as a “scratch on the surface” as it looks to expand into multiple sectors, including energy, education and agriculture.

The kingdom has been seeking to diversify revenue sources away from hydrocarbons, aiming to increase its non-oil share of GDP from 16% to 50% by 2030. As part of its plan, the country said it will make $25bn in investments, secure $10bn from exports, and finance development projects worth $10bn in Africa by the end of this decade.

“Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification programme seeks to have as many outward-facing investments globally as possible,” says Ryan Bohl, a Middle East analyst at risk intelligence company RANE. “It is trying to develop a mining industry and to seek diverse food supplies. Africa is also a relatively non-political place in which to invest – unlike, say, the US, where regulations and anti-Saudi sentiment can hamper investment.”

With its human rights record under scrutiny, Saudi Arabia has often found obstacles bringing money into Europe and the US. Saudi Arabia is attempting to outmuscle the neighbouring United Arab Emirates, which has a firm footing in Africa. According to property consultancy Knight Frank, the UAE was the largest investor in Africa among the Arab Gulf countries from 2012 to 2022 with foreign direct investment worth $59.4bn, followed by Saudi Arabia ($25.6bn).

Torbjorn Soltvedt, Middle East analyst at Verisk Maplecroft, a global risk-intelligence company, says: “Saudi Arabia also needs to maintain a strong presence in the Horn to establish a secure route for transition minerals as it seeks to acquire mining assets in other parts of Africa.”

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WARPED, WEIRD AND WONDERFUL Afrofuturism Octavia Butler’s Parable of the Sower begins in 2024, in a world grown unstable due to climate change, wealth inequality and corporate greed. If Afrofuturism’s speculative dystopias have caught up with the present, 2024 is going to be a big year to celebrate the genre-defying, global Black creative phenomenon.

In the US, the Smithsonian’s Afrofuturism: A History of Black Futures runs till August offering an immersive journey through space, feminism, fiction, civil rights and more, with an accompanying book. In the UK, the Black to the Future Festival – a biennial hybrid arts festival curated by the Caine-Prize-winning writer Irenosen Okojie – runs in various London venues till February.

Nigerian-American writer Nnedi Okorafor is keeping fans drooling with the promise of She Who Knows, the Trilogy – a prequel and sequel to Who Fears Death, centring on Najeeba.

Zambian rapper Sampa The Great (pictured) is sweeping the world with her collaborations, including with Anjelique Kidjo on Let me be Great. Her album The Return celebrates claiming her Africanness.

Expect to hear more of her in 2024.

MATT WINKELMEYER/GETTY VIA AFP

SAUDI PRESS AGENCY VIA REUTERS

AFRICA IN 2024 /

MESSAGE

OLA ENERGY ANNOUNCES LANDMARK AGREEMENTS AND SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVES

A pivotal moment for OLA Energy’s expansion OLA Energy is expanding in the Middle East through the collaboration with a prominent Saudi company to create a strong presence in the country and offer unparalleled value to consumers in the region.

Mr. Fayed Altwair, CEO of OLA Energy, expressed his enthusiasm for this significant milestone,” We are thrilled to embark on a journey into Saudi Arabia which marks a historic moment for OLA Energy, and we are confident that our partnership with our esteemed Saudi partner will drive sustainable change and innovation in the region.»

introducing new Electric Vehicle (EV) charging points at select service stations. With the installation of these EV charging points, OLA Energy aims to play a crucial role in facilitating the transition to electric vehicles, thus contributing to a cleaner and greener future.

“OLA Energy is in line with the reality of the energy situation on the continent,” added Mr. Altwair. “We are working to facilitate access to energy and are looking to the future by investingintechnologicalinnovationingreenenergy, mobility, solarization, and automation.”

OLA is taking a leap toward energy efficiency by introducing its solar rooftop initiative. This innovative program allows service station partners to transform their rooftops into power-generating assets that save money and benefit the environment. By harnessing solar energy, OLA Energy stations can generate up to 80% of their daytime energy consumption, drastically reducing their annual energy bills by up to 30%.

LPG is one of the core pillars of OLA Energy’s growth.

We are not only focusing on providing LPG

but also to have it reach the consumers that need it the most and contribute to reducing deforestation.

LPG as a clean-burning fuel has gained significant traction in Africa over the past few decades. With low carbonemissionfactor andhigh calorificpower,itprovidesacleaneralternative toenergiessuchascharcoalorwoodwhichare widely used in Africa. LPG is available in large quantities and causes less energy loss as its heating efficiency is around 85%.

OLA Energy invested to increase its storage and extend its filling capacities in Cote Ivoire, Senegal, Kenya, Gabon, Cameroon, Reunion, and Uganda, allowing the group to exceed 100,000 M3 in volumes each year and growing year over year to support the increasing demand.

«These developments reflect OLA Energy’s unwaveringdedicationtogrowth,innovation,and sustainability,» said Mr. Altwair. «They all signify our commitment to delivering cutting-edge solutions while minimizing our environmental impact.»

Innovation is one of the pillars of OLA Energy’s development.

Adapting to the evolving energy landscape, we have taken a bold step toward sustainability by

olaenergy.com

JAMG - PHOTOS DR

OLA Energy, one of the leading Pan-African energy retailing group, is thrilled to announce a series of exciting developments that underline our commitment to sustainability, innovation, and strategic growth.

AFRICA IN 2024 /

CONJURING REAL AND IMAGINARY

Protesters in Nairobi, Kenya, demand action

As we move into 2024, grab some downtime with some of the spectacular reads to emanate from Nigeria and its diaspora in the past year.

Abubakar Adam Ibrahim’s When We Were Fireflies begins with Yarima Lalo, a painter, perceiving from an approaching train that he was violently killed in a previous life. Merging déjà vu, reincarnation and other psychic phenomena into a mesh of rollicking prose, it was hailed by Carl Terver in Afapinen as “perhaps the greatest Nigerian novel written in the first quarter of the 21st century”.

Ani Kayode Somtochukwu’s elegant debut, And Then He Sang a Lullaby, questions the depths to which same-sex love can go in a society grappling with homophobia.

In Small Small, author and physician Ike Anya offers his experience of medical school in Nigeria, which also serves as a communal memoir of a tumultuous period: the twilight of General Sani Abacha’s military dictatorship.

Chika Unigwe’s third novel, The Middle Daughter, examines gender-based violence and the complicity of organised religion in unsettling prose.

Ordinary people morph into colourful, multilayered characters in Obinna Udenwe’s collection of short stories, The Widow Who Died With Flowers In Her Mouth.

From libertine seamstresses to fatalistic plumbers, the 2021 NLNG Prize Finalist’s plush, vibrant, high-octane penmanship provides a window into of everyday life in urban Nigeria.

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BRIAN INGANGA/AP/SIPA

Books

INVEST IN FORESTS, MINERALS AND PEOPLE Climate The final irony of Dubai’s COP in the desert was that it took the CEO of one the largest oil companies to arrive at a global agreement on phasing out fossil fuels – although it stopped short of using those words. The text of the COP28 agreement talks of ‘transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner … so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science’.

The catastrophic impacts of climate change are evident across Africa.

The continent will be disproportionately affected as temperatures rise beyond liveable ranges for humans. Yet, despite the warnings from scientists and endless climate conferences, action has been lacking, especially from richer nations. The main sticking point: the absence of funds to help African countries transition.

Africa has a strong hand in climate negotiations in 2024: its carbonabsorbing forests, minerals required for the renewables revolution and a growing workforce. More assertive stances are emerging. With the choice between a gas plant or chopping down forests, the continent should demand financing for green power.

Africa must unify and articulate its agenda forcefully where it will have influence; the level of response seen for Covid-19 is needed. With promising new leaders at bodies like the World Bank, long-term, lowcost financing to build green infrastructure must be made available.

The price of oil will not drop overnight, but it may lead to incremental policy changes that accelerate investment into green technologies. If there is a step change here in the technology, suddenly the more marginal oil and gas fields will be too expensive to invest in – something that would affect a whole swathe of Nigeria’s indigenous oil sector, for example.

It will also encourage nations like Morocco and Kenya, who have taken an early bold bet on renewables and may yet see themselves rewarded.

This could take the form of a greater research and development dividend, as in the case of Morocco, which has set up a giant solar research site at its Ouarzazate plant; or, as Kenya hopes, with the creation of a carbon credit market.

THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

WATER WORKS – OR DOES IT? Power Africa has an energy problem.

Nearly half of sub-Saharan Africa’s entire population do not have reliable access to electricity. This is stifling economic development and preventing the region from fulfilling its potential.

Hydropower has the potential to turn things around. According to the International Hydropower Association, Africa has around 38GW of installed capacity and is already the main form of renewable energy across the continent.

In hydropower, carbon emissions over the entire lifecycle of a construction are much lower than that from all other renewable sources.

There will be consolidation within sectors, as some companies will not survive and will be bought by others.

Investing in hydro will put Africa on a path of sustainable development and industrialisation and is a win for Africa’s ‘Just Transition’.

The Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Angola, Sudan and Madagascar have all been identified as having substantial hydropower potential.

There have been some major developments in 2023, which could have huge implications for African electrification, such as Cameroon’s Nachtigal dam project, due to become fully operational in 2024. At full capacity, the dam will produce 420MW of electricity to 30% of the country.

Dam solution In Angola, construction of the 2.17GW Caculo Cabaça hydropower project on the Kwanza River began this year. The dam, made possible through German and Chinese funding, will be one of three strategically important dams in the country, which has hydropower potential of up to 18GW in total.

To date, only 11% of Africa’s hydropower is tapped and 60% of the continent’s installed hydropower capacity is more than 20 years old.

Access to private funds for upgrades and new projects are near impossible as investors remain risk-averse and government budgets dwindle.

Geopolitics will also stall development. In September 2023, a second round of negotiations between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) ended in a stalemate, with Egypt and Sudan remaining concerned about how the downstream water flow from the River Nile will be affected – concerns they have voiced since 2011.

Will friction around the GERD be water under the bridge in 2024? Will the floodgates open and investment keep heads above water? Cracks are emerging – and not just in Africa’s antiquated dams.

MABOUP

Construction on the Sanaga River, part of the Nachtigal dam project in Cameroon

THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

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FEATURES /

TAIWO AINA FOR TAR

Marina station on the new Lagos Blue Line metro

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WIDE ANGLE How the former capital city of Nigeria, under the mentorship of then Lagos State Governor Bola Tinubu, fought back against its financial exclusion to become a thriving hub of tax-paying citizens and businesses, attracting global investors

By NICHOLAS NORBROOK and BEN EZEAMALU in Lagos

THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

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MINING DOSSIER

Critical minerals’ one-party state 76

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The West faces a long battle to compete with China’s grip on critical minerals, while African governments are keen to add value locally

By DAVID WHITEHOUSE China has a long head start over Western countries in securing access to Africa’s critical minerals.

That leaves North America and Europe in a weak position to develop value chains, with African governments insisting on adding value to their minerals domestically, executives say.

A key failing has been the West’s unwillingness to put its money where its mouth is on the need for critical minerals, says Luke Knight, CEO of Central Copper Resources (CCR), which has projects in the DRC and Zambia. “There is a disconnect between the rhetoric and where Western capital providers are putting their money,” he says.

“There’s one party playing: China.”

Australian-owned SEK copper solvent extraction plant in Kipoi, DRC

GWENN DUBOURTHOUMIEU FOR JA

Talking heads CCR had planned to list on the Australian Securities Exchange index in 2023. Knight cites market conditions, due partly to global interest rate increases, as the reason for his decision to pull the plug on plans for an initial public offering.

The company will remain private for the foreseeable future, he says.

Knight notes press coverage of the West’s need for critical minerals with a sense of irony: “Everyone talks about the need for copper,” he says, but “a lot of it is

THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

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FOCUS /

President Emmanuel Macron greets President Bola Tinubu in Paris, June 2023

Speaking

one

language The relationship between Europe's fifth-largest economy and Africa's largest has gone beyond oil, with energy services, agriculture, finance and technology becoming the focus of growing investments STEVENS TOMAS/ABACA

By NICHOLAS NORBROOK and BEN EZEAMALU in Lagos

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LOGISTICS DOSSIER

East coast ports to rise again Terminals on Africa’s eastern coastline have entered a phase of renewal, allowing them to absorb increased traffic from Asia and to compete with the dominant west

By OLIVIER CASLIN 102 THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

A new dawn beckons in East Africa for the port sector. For the past 20 years, this industry has been dominated by the ports of the West African coast, including the Gulf of Guinea, which have undergone massive development to accommodate the XXL vessels brought in by shipowners.

“It’s not about catching up, but rather of starting a phase of port renewal,” says Olivier de Noray, director of ports and terminals at Africa Global Logistics (AGL, formerly Bolloré).

DONG JIANGHUI/XINHUA/REA

Thriving Dar es Salaam port is managed in a public-private partnership

In the first decades of the independence era, Africa’s major ports were on the east coast – led by Mombasa in Kenya and Durban in South Africa. This continued until the early 2000s, when the widespread use of containers brought new infrastructural requirements.

Durban and Mombasa, joined in the past decade by Djibouti, still feature in the top 10 African ports with the highest container traffic, but have been displaced by the

major North African terminals, including Tangier in Morocco and Port Said in Egypt, which occupy the top positions on the continent.

Durban joins the top three this year, with Lomé port in Togo close on its heels. From 2014 Lomé became the sub-regional hub for the Mediterranean Shipping Company.

This illustrates a major change in maritime routes, with the ItalianSwiss company sending its giant vessels directly from Asia to West

Africa, rather than passing through the ports on the eastern seaboard.

Trade volumes between Africa and Asia have exceeded those from Europe since 2005.

Spatial and geographical configuration, as well as governments’ port-management policies, partly explain this choice of the west coast over the east, with the former handling twice as much container traffic as the latter in recent years, according to Lloyd’s List statistics.

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LOGISTICS DOSSIER / A lot of hot air?

aviation consultant Sean Mendis, who has held executive roles at Ghana International Airlines and Africa World Airlines. “It’s a very rare government which can focus on a government-owned enterprise with the interests of the enterprise in mind,” he says.

Mendis says Nigeria should be taking steps to allow local airlines to reach their full potential by waiving import duties on spare parts, cutting taxes on aviation fuel and making foreign currency available to airlines.“The problems that are plaguing Nigerian aviation now would not be solved by having a national airline,” he says.

Foster points out that about 70% of variable costs in Nigerian aviation are dollar-denominated.

Grounded Mendis sees some prospects of progress under the administration of President Bola Tinubu. Forex liquidity for airlines has shown some improvement due to the floating of the naira, he says.

But the aviation industry should be playing a much greater role in tackling Nigeria’s logistics issues, Mendis adds. Poor ground infrastructure is a major obstacle, with many airports lacking runway lighting outside certain hours: “To compete in a global industry, it has to adopt global best practices.”

Foster says the lack of a domestic leasing company makes it hard to 2019

2018

18.1

17.2

2021

15.2 2022

16.2

2017

AIR PASSENGER TRAFFIC AT NIGERIAN AIRPORTS in millions

2020

10.5

SOURCE: NBS, NCAAA

14.3

‘A country of 200 million people should not be at the mercy of foreign airlines’ get aircraft to replace those out of action. Most of Nigeria’s 12 local airlines use foreign maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) facilities. She says Nigeria needs an entirely independent MRO to avoid suspicions of maintenance being delayed for competition reasons: “The issue is one of trust.” Foreign private investors, Foster says, are interested in setting up an MRO in Nigeria, in which the government doesn’t need to be involved beyond making land available.

A national airline that provides profitability and wider economic benefits is urgently needed, says Lucky George, executive director at the African Travel Commission (ATC). “A country of 200 million people needs its own national airline,” he says. “We should not be at the mercy of foreign airlines.”

Nigeria’s large diaspora would add to passenger volume and profitability, George says: “As a Nigerian, I want to fly on a Nigerian airline.

There’s no way that a national airline can fail.”

Taking a Nigerian private-sector flight to London would leave him worried whether it would still be operating for the return flight, he says, as private Nigerian operators “don’t have the capacity to compete” with international airlines. In addition, the expertise needed for a modern aviation industry can be developed with national carrier leadership: “If we don’t have a national carrier, the skills will not be there.”

Nigerians need dollars to pay for airline tickets. Having a carrier selling seats in naira would ease demand for foreign currency.

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George points to British Airways flights to Nigeria, which cost more than its flights to Australia.

A search on the British Airways website on 13 November showed prices of up to £1,692 ($2,073) for an economy-class return flight from London to Lagos in December, while the most expensive fare on the same dates for a London to Melbourne return was £760.

Yet, the proposed venture with Ethiopian Airlines is not the best way forward, George says, and it creates the danger that routes will be skewed to ensure transit via Addis Ababa. The airline, he argues, should be 100% Nigerianowned, with the best available executives globally to ensure the operation is free from political interference. “We don’t need Ethiopian to run our national carrier,” George says.

Interference Foster points to regional airports in Nigeria that were established for political reasons, without viability studies and business plans, and which offer very few flights. Many airports lack roads to get passengers in any significant numbers, making them “warehouses calling themselves airports”. She says there is a lack of transit lounges and transit visas for passengers who do not intend to enter the country.

Aviation requires long-term strategy and investment, while Nigerian governments think in terms of the electoral cycle, Foster says: “[Nigeria] needs to break that cycle. The national interest must be put above personal interests.”

The success of Ethiopian Airlines, she adds, is the result of long-term planning: “First comes the infrastructure of the mind.”

Mendis still doubts that the right mentality exists among stakeholders in Nigerian aviation, or that it can be created. “Some would rather be big fish in a small pond.”

Africa in 2024 124

112

SOUTHERN AFRICA

118

EAST AFRICA

128

CENTRAL AFRICA

WEST AFRICA

134 What’s happening next year in Africa?

We give you a concise guide on what to watch across the continent in the year ahead, region by region: from the key election scenarios, the trends moving countries and markets, to the movers and shakers making waves.

NORTH AFRICA

Country reports editors Alison Culliford and Nicholas Norbrook

Country reports contributors Sherif Tarek Abouzid, Marché Arends, Laura-Angela Bagnetto, Honoré Banda, Musinguzi Blanshe, Alison Culliford, Nicholas Norbrook, Kanika Saigal, Chiwoyu Sinyangwe, Patrick Smith, David Whitehouse

THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024 109

Africa’s regions in 2024

SOUTHERN AFRICA With Zimbabwe taking the SADC chair, how will elections fare?

REPUBLIC OF CONGO DRC

CABINDA

TANZANIA

LUANDA

MALAWI Huambo LILONGWE

ZAMBIA

ANGOLA

Nampula

LUSAKA

Blantyre Antananarivo

HARARE

ZIMBABWE

NAMIBIA

BOTSWANA WINDHOEK

MOZAMBIQUE GABORONE

PRETORIA

Johannesburg Kimberley Atlantic Ocean

Beira

Bulawayo

SOUTH AFRICA

ESWATINI

MAPUTO

Indian Ocean

MADAGASCAR

MBABANE

MASERU

LESOTHO

Durban

300 km CAPE TOWN

N

Port Elizabeth

ot only the economy but the politics of South Africa will dominate the region in 2024. The African National Congress (ANC) is facing the real possibility of slipping under the critical threshold of 50%, with a series of deals in the offing that would see the ruling party act as a minority government. It is a failure for President Cyril Ramaphosa, who banked on his slow-burn strategy to rebuild institutions producing a greater economic payoff.

In some respects it has – the tax and prosecutors’ offices are functioning far better, for example. But there is still utter chaos in the majority state-owned enterprises, which acts as a crippling drag on South Africa’s economy.

112 THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

The rudderless, emergency diesel-burning power utility Eskom is still being fought over by ANC officials and others profiting from its status quo. Electricity, roads, trains and ports are broken. Transnet, the pitiful ‘under-resourced’ logistics utility, has stranded around 100,000 seaborne containers outside three South African ports.

Botswana and Namibia also go to the polls next year; with quite different tales, they can point to more measured development and no great upsets are expected. In Mozambique the picture is more mixed, with most hopes pinned on a restart of the vast LNG project to paper over the cracks of the violent conflict in the north and the devastation wrought by relentless hurricanes.

Africa’s regions in 2024 POPULATION (in millions)

Angola 122.78bn (18%)

Zimbabwe

31.49bn (4%)

Botswana 20.35bn (3%) Eswatini 4.84bn (>1%) Lesotho 2.46bn (>1%)

Zambia

29.74bn (4%)

Madagascar 15.15bn (2%)

Total

Malawi 11.54bn (2%)

689.12bn

SOURCE: IMF

Mauritius

12.6bn (2%)

South Africa

405.11bn (59%)

Namibia

12.60bn (2%)

Mozambique

19.16bn (3%)

0

Angola Botswana Eswatini Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Mozambique Namibia South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe

SOUTH AFRICA

CYRIL RAMAPHOSA By accident or design South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, former anti-apartheid activist turned business tycoon, set lofty goals when he took office in 2018. With terms like ‘economic transformation’, ‘social cohesion’ and ‘spatial integration’ at the forefront of his first State of the Nation address, hopes were high that an end to the Jacob Zuma era would bring about change.

Ramaphosa staked much of his success on revitalising economy and society, promising an end to hunger within 10 years, pledging to create two million jobs during his first term and slashing violent crime by half under his leadership.

Has he delivered on his promises?

‘Three decades after the end of apartheid, the economy is defined by stagnation and exclusion,’ says a scathing 2023 report by Harvard University’s Growth Lab, which cites the collapse of state capacity as a main driver of South Africa’s weakening economic performance.

All eyes were on Ramaphosa in 2022 after the ‘Farmgate’ scandal, in which $580,000 of undeclared cash was found in sofas at his Phala Phala game farm in Limpopo Province.

More than just another case of alleged corruption, p , it seemed to hift in Ramaphosa’s tone signal a sh from optim mism to resignation, leaving many questioning q whether he wants the ttop job anymore. ed, he’s lost vigour,” po“He’s tire mentator Justice Malala litical comm tells The Affrica Report. “Phala Phala was damag ging and, at a personal level, knock ked the wind out of him.”

4 national elections are The 2024 drawing ne ear and Ramaphosa is again at the e helm of the African Nattional Congress (ANC) aftter ebeing ree he lected as th ruling party y president in 2022.

10

20

30

40

50

60

37 3 1 2 30 21 1 34 3 60

21 17

As a distinguished negotiator, Ramaphosa has been hesitant to enter races he might lose, but there is nobody who could realistically take his spot. For some, his reluctance is a moot point; it is immaterial whether he wants the role – Cyril is the ANC’s best shot at holding power.

If he is to subdue the rumblings of his ‘quiet quitting’ he must prove to constituents he is engaged and finally ready to make good on his word.

THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024 113

JEAN-MARC PAU FOR TAR

GDP (2022, US$) (% of regional total)

Africa’s regions in 2024

EAST AFRICA Getting connected, building networks … as tension simmers ERITREA

Massawaa

YEMEN

ASMARA CHAD

SUDAN

Gulf of Aden

Gondar DJIBOUTI Dire Dawa ADDIS ABABA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SOUTH SUDAN

Jima

Harar

Berbera Hargeisa

ETHIOPIA

Juba

SOMALIA A

MOGADISHU

UGANDA

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

RWANDA BURUNDI

Obbia

KENYA

KAMPALA Kisumu Lake Victoria NAIROBI KIGALI BUJUMBURA

Mombasa DODOMA

TANZANIA Mbeya

T

300 km

Zanzibar

Dar es Salaam

he march of Kenyan companies across the region won’t be stopped: beyond banks in Kinshasa, Nairobi-headquartered Safaricom switched on mobile money in Ethiopia in 2023, boosting its customer base there to 5 million. That will certainly promote trade and peace over war, but old enmities lie close to the surface. Ethiopia’s painful civil war is dormant, with regional challenges in Oromia and Amhara. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has panicked the region with his calls for access to a sea port – a long-standing foreign-policy ambition that perhaps helps paper over internal divisions. The maritime logistics of the region is led by Emirati investors, while Gulf investors more broadly

118 THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

Kismayo

continue to push diplomatic capital and hard cash towards East Africa. They are not alone. China sees the region as a strategic priority and has been flooding money into digital and hard connectivity. Witness, for example, the fast construction of the Nairobi Expressway.

Elections in Rwanda will lack suspense. The country marks a sombre anniversary – that of 30 years since the 1994 genocide. Relations have improved with neighbouring Uganda, but deteriorated sharply with the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has led to the East African Community parliament grinding to a halt. After joining the EAC in 2022, the DRC says there has been no advancement in EAC operations in the ongoing battle with M23 rebels.

Africa’s regions in 2024 GDP (2022, US$) (% of regional total)

POPULATION (in millions)

Burundi Comoros Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Rwanda Seychelles Somalia South Sudan Tanzania Uganda

30

60

90

120

150

13

3.92bn (>1%) Burundi Uganda

0.8 1 4

Comoros 1.24bn (>1%) Djibouti 3.66bn (>1%) Eritrea

2.73bn (>1%)

48.24bn (12%) 127 55 14

Tanzania

77.07bn (19%)

South Sudan

0.1

Ethiopia

Total

405.18bn

120.37bn (30%)

8.54bn (>1%)

18 11

Somalia

67

Seychelles

49

1.98bn (1%)

Rwanda

PAUL KAGAME Preemptive postures Rwanda will commemorate 30 years after the genocide in April 2024.

The rebuilding of the economy and Rwandan society has been presided over by President Paul Kagame, 66, for the past three decades.

There is much to take heart from.

The Rwandan economy has been reconstituted. From a GDP of $2bn in 2002, it has grown five-fold to hit $10bn in 2109. From the ruins of a civil war, a new society has formed. Predictions are rosy. There are genuine advances in education and health.

There is also much that still needs to improve – some relating to internal politics; some involving Rwanda’s relations with its neighbours.

UN experts confirmed reports that Rwanda supports the M23 rebel group in eastern DRC, pointing to M23’s chain of command being linked to the Rwandan army, with aerial images and witness statements as proof.

Kagame dismisses this, saying the DRC harbours enemies of Kigali.

Kenya

10.42bn (2%)

“In this report, there is little or nothing on the history of the Congo’s problems, on the responsibility of Congolese institutions, on the crimes committed by y the e FARDC [the DRC’s med forces].” arm D Domestic critics ge t short shrift, too o. Or worse. Paul Ru usesabagina, a forrmer genocide herro turned fierce reg gime critic, was relleased from prison n in March, having g been sentenced to jail for 25 years for terrrorism two years ago. Previous gime reg

113.7bn Rwanda 13.31bn (3%)

(28%)

critics have included retired spymaster Patrick Karegeya, who was assassinated in South Africa in 2013.

Of the coups in Gabon and West Africa, Kagame says: “Do these events just happen without any explanation? I think they are often the result of an accumulation of grievances over several years.”

Just days after the Libreville ousting of President Ali Ben Bongo, Rwanda announced the retirement of hundreds of soldiers – including 12 generals and 83 senior military figures.

While officers are pensioned off, Kagame believes he has more to give on the governance side, and has confirmed he will run in the August 2024 presidential elections – likely to be a one-horse race as in 2017.

JEAN-MARC PAU FOR TAR

SOURCE: IMF

0

THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024 119

Africa’s regions in 2024

CENTRAL AFRICA Shockwaves from Libreville; challenges in Kinshasa CHAD

MALI NIGER

Lake Chad

Abeche

300 km SUDAN

N’Djamena BENIN NIGERIA

ETHIOPIA

CAMEROON Douala Malabo

Yaoundé

Bangui

EQUAT. GUINEA Atlantic Ocean

SOUTH SUDAN

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Libreville CONGO São Tomé Port-Gentil SÃO TOMÉ GABON E PRÍNCIPE Brazzaville Pointe-Noire

Kisangani

Mbandaka

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Goma Bukavu

UGANDA RWANDA BURUNDI

Kinshasa TANZANIA

Matadi ANGOLA

T

he elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo will dominate the early months of 2024, with Félix Tshisekedi expected to waltz through a divided opposition. Will that allow him to concentrate on the pressing matters of state – security, meeting the basic needs of the Congolese, the arm-wrestle with Chinese and US investors over control of the critical minerals sector? Certainly we are praying for the quick release of our correspondent Stanis Bujakera Tshiamala, who was still in a Kinshasa jail in December.

Beyond the Congo conundrum, Central Africa will also been looking hard at Gabon; will the transitional government begin to change the pattern of national wealth shared

124 THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

KENYA

Lubumbashi

ZAMBIA

by a tiny elite? Regimes across the region were panicked to see the palace coup in Libreville unhorse what seemed to be such a well-anchored political system. Expect there to be some vigorous cracking down on any potential pretenders to the throne in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo-Brazzaville. Meanwhile, Chad’s Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno is trying to bury the memory of 2022’s unrest as the country heads towards elections and civilian rule.

The economic damage of two years of inflation has been balanced by a rise in oil prices; but not enough.

Africa’s poorest region needs to better connect with its neighbours – Kenyan banks’ investment into the DRC being one positive example.

POPULATION (in millions) 0

20

40

GDP (2022, US$) (% of regional total) 80

100

Central African Republic

0.55bn (>1%)

Republic of Congo

6

13.96bn

18

Chad Democratic Republic of Congo

(8%)

102

Equatorial Guinea

2

Gabon

2

Cameroon 44.32bn (26%)

São Tomé e Príncipe

29

Cameroon

Central African Republic

Total

Gabon

2.46bn (2%)

172.03bn

21.12bn

(12%)

Chad

12.07bn

Republic of Congo

6

São Tomé e Príncipe

0.2

Equatorial Guinea

11.77bn (7%)

(7%)

Democratic Republic of Congo

65.78bn (38%)

Chad

MAHAMAT IDRISS DÉBY ITNO Sorry … now let’s move on Things are heating up in Chad, and it is not because of the large influx of Darfuri refugees fleeing the war in Sudan. Transitional president (and son of the late dictator) Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno has kicked off the stalled election schedule, which was initially meant for the second half of 2022. The latest date for elections is slated for 2024, but in the interim, a countrywide constitutional referendum will be carried out on 17 December, as we go to print.

This is good news for those hoping for some movement in Chad’s puny democratic space, but complaints have already arisen. Those who prefer federalism, the “no” voters, are crying foul after transitional prime minister Saleh Kebzabo set up a “yes” campaign office, violating his duty of neutrality.

While some in the opposition are raising the alarm, Déby has promised to be on his best behaviour after signing a deal in Kinshasa at the end of October granting a blanket

amnesty to Succès Masra, the exiled leader of Les Transformateurs, and other opposition party politicians who had complained of persecution. Masra returned to N’Djamena in early November. The text also promises to engage the opposition in the e dialogue as part of the ess towards elections proce and a civilian government ctober 2024. in Oc his is a marked differTh ence from October 2022, when n hundreds marching to o oppose Déby and the ex xtension of the junta rule ffor two more years were killed d by police and military on wh hat the opposition have dubb bed ‘Black Thursday’.

Many were hs, proyouth ng testin he on th

streets of the capital, N’Djamena.

At least 1,000 demonstrators were arrested, and 400 were placed in the notorious Koro Toro desert prison – normally a facility used to house Boko Haram and Islamic State detainees.

Déby issued a full pardon for those locked up for “insurrection” as well as for police and military who committed atrocities on those days, all in the name of “reconciliation”. However, no police or military personnel involved in the violent crackdown have been incriminated.

THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024 125

JEAN-MARC PAU FOR TAR

SOURCE: IMF

60

Africa’s regions in 2024

WEST AFRICA Leaders struggle to win over deeply disgruntled electorate LIBYA ALGERIA

PRAIA

300 km

MALI

CABO VERDE NIGER

Timbuktu

MAURITANIA

Gao Mopti

DAKAR

SENEGAL

BANJUL

THE GAMBIA

BISSAU

GUINEABISSAU

CONAKRY FREETOWN

BAMAKO

BURKINA FASO BENIN

GUINEA

SIERRA LEONE LIBERIA

MONROVIA

NIAMEY

Zinder

OUAGADOUGOU

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

YAMOUSSOUKRO

TOGO

PORTOGHANA LOMÉ NOVO ACCRA

Maiduguri

NIGERIA ABUJA

Port Harcourt

Abidjan

CAMEROON

Atlantic Ocean

T

he fundamental faultlines between a population left behind by an elite more concerned with patronage than development were exposed by the spike of inflation in the past two years. As living conditions deteriorated and the cost of food and fuel exploded, barely dormant anger at regimes was easily exploited by military middle management. Niger was the latest West African state to fall, in late July, when President Mohamed Bazoum was removed by Presidential Guard commander General Abdourahamane Tiani.

An influx of Russian propaganda has not helped, says Paris. Critics ask: ‘What is it about the French post-colonial environment that is so fragile?’ The rash of coups in

128 THEAFRICAREPORT / N° 126 / JANUARY-FEBRUARY-MARCH 2024

francophone West Africa looked briefly to have spread to Sierra Leone in late November.

But the region rarely lets itself be defined by the Sahel, and along the coastline there are several success stories that should continue to develop in 2024. Long-term thinking in Côte d’Ivoire has resulted in steady economic growth and won the confidence of global investors. A change of government in Nigeria has allowed an economic reset that is tough but looks to be headed in the right direction.

Senegal is set for a growth spurt powered by oil and gas.

And Liberia’s potentially tricky election has been rendered ‘normal’ by the magnanimous handover by the defeated George Weah to his successor Joseph Boakai.

POPULATION (in millions)

GDP (2022, US$) (% of regional total) 8.36bn (1%) Togo Sierra Leone

4.1bn (>1%)

0

Benin 17.55bn (2%) Burkina Faso 18.27bn (2%) Cabo Verde 2.05bn (>1%)

Senegal

Côte d’Ivoire 68.63bn (9%)

27.54bn

The Gambia 2.17bn (>1%)

(3%)

Ghana 76bn (10%) Total

Guinea 19.75bn (3%) Guinea-Bissau 1.62bn (>1%) Liberia 3.9bn (>1%) Mali

Nigeria

504.2bn (64%)

18.43bn (2%)

Niger 14.64bn (2%)

Ghana

JOHN MAHAMA Riding the events escalator What is the greatest challenge for a political leader, a British prime minister was once asked. “Events, dear boy, events,” came the laconic reply. Ghana’s presidential challenger in next year’s elections may concur.

The tragic early death of President John Atta Mills launched John Dramani Mahama, his deputy, into the top job in 2011. But debt, power cuts and economic travails were held against him when he stood for a second term in 2016 and the New Patriotic Party’s Nana Akufo-Addo barnstormed to victory.

High unemployment, government hypocrisy and the excesses of West African elites have set the scene for the recent coups d’état in the region, warns the man whose autobiography, My First Coup d’Etat, talks of the putsch against Kwame Nkrumah by a cabal of colonels, helped by Western intelligence agencies.

Mahama paints a bleak scenario.

“This spate of coups is partly a rebellion against French neocolonialism

… but in Burkina Faso and Mali, the insurgency threat was a trigger.” That is a lesson, he says. “The military felt they were sent to the slaughter an regimes were nott and civilia i doing en nough to provide h the logistics to them with orism.” fight terro Ghana, says Mahama, has launch hed many effective socia al programmes, electrifyin ng rural areas and g secondary eduextending d national health cation and e, but “we need to insurance grow our economy at 8% for 10 y years to sustaiin these initiatives”, he warns.

50

14 23 0.6 29 3 34 14 2 5 23 27 9 9

100

150

200

224

18

“Leaders must take steps to generate enough growth to create jobs … and take the fight against corruption more seriously. The lifestyles of the leaders should be more modest.”

Mahama communicates well and his opponent, Vice President Mahamudu Bawumia, is more technocrat than politician. What is missing from either camp is imaginative ideas for pulling Ghana out of this trough. The Accrab based d Afrobarometer Af b t shows voters want to see more effective policies to fix the economy and less hurling of partisan brickbats.

Will Mahama and Bawumia get the message?

JEAN-MARC PAU FOR TAR

SOURCE: IMF

761.12bn

Benin Burkina Faso Cabo Verde Côte d’Ivoire The Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo

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Africa’s regions in 2024

NORTH AFRICA ‘Forever war’ in Western Sahara: a microcosm of Africa’s woes Algiers Tangier Casablanca Atlantic Ocean

MOROCCO

Fes Oran Rabat

Marrakech Tindouf

Tunis

Constantine

TUNISIA

Béchar

Mediterranean Sea Benghazi Tripoli

Alexandria Cairo

ALGERIA

L I B YA

EGYPT

Nouadhibou

MAURITANIA Nouakchott

MALI NIGER

CHAD

SUDAN Khartoum

SENEGAL

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SOUTH SUDAN

ERITREA

Aswan

ETHIOPIA

400 km

A

bdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces, is engaged in a ‘forever war’ against Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemeti, the head of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

The hyper-destructive standoff between the forces of two warring Sudanese generals is a microcosm of the continent.

There are foreign powers in the Gulf and beyond who are making the right noises but who are supporting opposite sides in the conflict. Greedy eyes see opportunity in Sudanese gold mines. Regional players like Egypt and Libya are finding themselves involved and destabilised by the conflict. African bodies such as the Intergovernmental

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Authority on Development and the African Union are, at best, toothless.

North Africa has a positive side it wants the world to notice: Morocco continues its steady growth, starting to mesh together new centres of learning such as the Mohammed VI Polytechnic University with key industrial zones; Algeria has turned around and diversified its export sector, beyond merely pumping gas to Europe.

Nevertheless, both countries are still at daggers drawn, unable to see beyond the struggle over Western Sahara, as evidenced on 1 September when Algerian coastguards at the maritime boundary between the two countries machinegunned Moroccan tourists on jet skis, killing two.

POPULATION (in millions)

Sudan

33.75bn (4%) Morocco

Mauritania

9.90bn

Algeria

Algeria

(21%)

Egypt

195.06bn

130.91bn

(14%)

0

Tunisia 46.36bn (5%)

20

929.01bn

Mauritania

SOURCE: IMF

(4%)

Egypt

Tunisia

Egypt

ABDEL FATTAH EL-SISI

More pain for the people Presidential hopefuls usually dish out rosy promises, but not Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. In October, when he announced he would run for a third term in December 2023, he said Egyptians should be ready to accept “hunger and deprivation” as the price for development.

The former army chief has enforced multiple austerity measures since 2014, with a crackdown on freedom of expression – in which thousands were jailed – painful reforms and the removal of subsidies.

Sisi is expected to win the election and stay in power until 2030, while Egyptians’ misery deepens.

Global headwinds in recent years have exacerbated Egypt’s economic woes. A major blow to the North African country, which for years relied on carry trading to keep steady hard currency inflows, was the pandemic-induced $22bn exodus of non-resident investors.

120

5 38 48

Sudan

475.23bn (51%)

100

7

Morocco Libya

80

113

(1%)

37.80bn

60

46

Libya

Total

40

The import-dependent economy was hit hard by hikes in oil and food prices due to the Ukraine war. More rrecently, the Gaza conflicct has taken a toll on Egy ypt’s tourism and shrrunk gas m Israel, imports from throwing do oubts on its plan to resume LNG shipm ments to Europe.

Tensions with w Saudi Arabia, once e its strongest financiial backer, continue as Sisi has not fulfilled his pledge to cede sovereignty over Tiran an nd Sanafir islands to the oil-rich monarchy.

12

The value of the Egyptian pound has halved since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as three currency devaluations, in line with a $3bn IMF deal, barely ended the US dollar drought. The informal market has strongly reemerged, portending another currency float in early 2024.

Investors are unlikely to be lured without sufficient greenback supply in the market, say analysts.

Consecutive credit rating downgrades g sent Africa’s second-largest economy deeper into junk status, with high inflation maintaining negative real interest rates and ruling out attracting hot money.

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JEAN-MARC PAU FOR TAR

GDP (2022, US$) (% of regional total)

LAST WORD

GET BACK TO WHERE YOU DON’T BELONG

DAVE STELFOX

DA ANIEL TRILLING Daaniel Trilling is a London-based journalist, contributor to Thhe Guardian and author of Lights in the Distance: Exile annd Refuge at the Borders of Europe (Picador, 2018).

The decision on 15 November by the UK Supreme Court to rule its government’s asylum deal with Rwanda unlawful dropped a bombshell on British politics. It is debatable whether the Rwanda deal could provide the deterrent the UK government desires to migrants crossing the English Channel in small boats. But now the plan is in tatters, with Prime Minister Rishi Sunak scrambling to keep it alive.

Just as important, though, is what the saga has revealed about Britain – and the West’s – attitude to cooperation with countries in Africa.

“We should just put planes in the air and send them to Rwanda,” said the ruling Conservative Party deputy chair Lee Anderson. “I think we should ignore the laws and send them straight back the same day.”

Back? None of the people targeted by this deal come from Rwanda. They are, by and large, asylum-seekers from Afghanistan and the Middle East. Indeed, it was in part Rwanda’s poor record in dealing with asylum claims from those parts of the world, as highlighted by the UNHCR, that led the Supreme Court judges to find that Rwanda could not be trusted to keep them safe.

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Verbal slip or not, Anderson’s bizarre comment belies the underlying logic of the agreement. The deal was conceived amid xenophobic panic in domestic UK politics triggered by the spectacle of refugees reaching the UK by boat. The government’s response was blunt: send these unwanted foreigners far away, to a place just as ‘foreign’ to Britain as wherever it was they came from. Where doesn’t matter.

Outsourcing – whether it is for offshore ‘processing’ of asylum claims, as the EU keeps promising to establish in Africa, or the UK’s more extreme option, in which the right to asylum itself is exported to another continent – is often presented as a clean, efficient and humane way of dealing with irregular migration. It rarely, if ever, works out humanely for the people involved. It is also humiliating for the receiving countries, even if their governments deny this.

Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, has made much of the notion that striking migration deals with the West shows African “leadership”. For him, the deal burnishes Rwanda’s credentials as a modernised country that can punch above its weight internationally.

African states have led the way in extending protection for refugees, not least in the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention.

However, the UK-Rwanda deal isn’t about cooperation. It is about one country using its power and influence to get another to act as the patsy in a plot for domestic political gain.

Of course, there are advantages for the weaker partner: it has kept the UK quiet about the Rwandan government’s authoritarianism and its alleged role in recent atrocities in the eastern DRC. But by entering into the deal, Rwanda has put a crucial element of its social policy at the whims of a fickle, unstable, foreign government.

The power imbalance here cannot be ignored. As more countries in the West seek to strike migration deals, African governments would do well to be wary.