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African D efense 4 February 2015
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Changing Face of MENA Defense Industry Middle East and African defense markets are drawing attention of manufacturers around the globe. By Dev Mehta
Higher Education Building African Military Professionalism Brigadier Shadrack Moloi (Botswana Defence Command and Staff College) and Colonel Hugues de Roquemaurel (Cameroon International Superior War College) highlight thevalue of education and training.
Use of Protected Vehicles is Spreading Throughout All of Africa Although first deployed in Africa, then off to a slow start, mine-protected vehicles are back home.
Black Hawk as a Solution to Africa’s Medium Lift Helicopter Needs Sikorsky is embarking on a remanufacturing program to refurbish ex-US Army Black Hawks—dependable, proven and affordable options.
The African Peace and Security Architecture: Myth or Reality Resolving African conflicts need solutions that take into account traditional and non-traditional options. By Colonel Alhassan Abu Ghana Army
The ADF InsurgencyNetwork in Eastern DRC: Spillover into Tanzania Threats to Tanzanian security and alternative strategies to defeat terrorism. By Major Erasto S. Babere, Tanzania People’s Defence Force
Communications—A Most Effective Counter-Terrorism Option Uganda and US Military Information Support Operations Counter the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa By Staff Sergeant Myles McCadney
COVER: The Inkas Huron is a tactical attack and defense vehicle, which is able to protect its passengers in high threat environments within any climate condition.
Higher Education Buillding African Military Professionalism
Developing a military professional goes much deeper than teaching the art and science of soldiering—It requires embedding a deeper understanding of roles. Botswana Defence Command and Staff College Brigadier Shadrack Moloi The Botswana Defence Command and Staff College’s (DCSC) aim is to provide professional military and academic education, training and development to selected officers for the assumption of command and staff appointments in order to effectively respond to defence and security related challenges. To achieve the above, the college has adopted a balanced curriculum that addresses both combat related and noncombat related subjects. Warfighting forms the core of the curriculum; however, nonwarfighting subjects such as International Relations, African Studies, and International Security are included to enhance the students’ appreciation of the Strategic Environment. These subjects, coupled with studies in Leadership, Decision Making, Campaign Planning and Operational Art, combine to produce creative and critical thinking leaders who are able to solve complex problems in uncertain environments. The curriculum is also designed to foster an atmosphere of jointness to enable the students to better understand the strategic environment and make them capable of operating in inter-service, inter-agency and multi-national environments. The college recognizes the need to strike the right balance between military and academic training and education, hence the partnership with the University of Botswana for the delivery of the Strategic Studies Program, which earns students a Diploma or Masters Degree in Strategic Studies on completion.
Education and training has systematically been closely associated with growth, development and professionalism. It primarily serves to ensure that there is mastery of a body of specialized knowledge. Training in the context of military service is thus a process which aims to develop and or improve the capabilities of those serving the army at different levels and in their respective roles. While in general this might be perceived to involve a systematic instruction to enhance knowledge of the science and art of service in the military, training in this context is just as broad in other spheres of service. Training of those serving in the army mainly involves the professional preparation of officers to lead armed forces effectively in many of the different contexts in which they may serve. Broadly speaking, it would involve development of both their intellectual, attitudinal and practice oriented skills.
The curriculum is also designed to foster an atmosphere of jointness to enable the students to better understand the strategic environment and make them capable of operating in inter-service, inter-agency and multinational environments.
In other words, it is a means of instilling in army officers, an understanding of some concepts, principles, values, traditions, attitudes, skills and theories aimed at shaping their existing thought patterns and ways of discharging their duties in specified environments. Parallel to the training of officers at our staff college it is also of paramount importance that we conduct training and equip our instructors at the Staff College in order to build capacity within our members of the directing staff thereby arming them with skills and capabilities to effectively deliver instruction. As officers progress through the ranks, it is crucial that they are given an opportunity to gain the necessary experience to prepare them for the assumption of more senior appointments. A deliberate career path that balances command, staff and instructor appointments goes a long way in producing well rounded senior officers. Early exposure to joint and multinational environments also gives officers invaluable experiences that they will need later on as they assume more senior positions, where they will be expected to also have a wider view of the strategic environment (regionally and globally). In today’s globalized environment
African Defense/February 2015
where security threats transcend national, regional and continental boundaries, there is a heightened necessity for continuous interaction and knowledge sharing with regional and international partners. Training is one key platform through which such interaction can be achieved and staff colleges should be at the forefront of establishing bilateral and multilateral partnerships with similar institutions within and outside the region. These partnerships allow institutions to tap into each other’s experiences, leading to meaningful inputs during periodic curriculum reviews. Botswana Defence Force (BDF) officers have over the years attended staff colleges in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Kenya and as well as training in the international arena in
countries like USA, UK, China to mention but a few of the countries that our students have and continue to benefit from their staff colleges. The BDF has also demonstrated its commitment of nurturing partnerships by opening its staff college doors by way of offering slots to the following countries like Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. These partnerships do not only strengthen our bilateral relations between our sister defense forces and further cement the cordial bilateral relations that exist between our peoples and the governments of our countries. In conclusion, the college in its quest for excellence and aspiring to be a world class institute, continue to refine its opera-
tions and curriculum. It has been a painstaking journey for the BDF to set up the staff college as evidenced by visits to various countries on benchmarking mission. The various expert and able teams that were set up to look into many aspects that had ensured the setting and running up of the staff college programmes bear testimony to the determination of the BDF High Command in undertaking this noble cause. The establishment of the BDF staff college is meant to enhance the overall professional competence in the BDF and will further reduce the dependence on other countries in training its officers to be staff qualified in its quest to prepare them for assumption of duty within the ranks and files of the BDF.
Cameroon International Superior War College Colonel Hugues de Roquemaurel The International Superior War College (Ecole supérieure internationale de guerre, or ESIG, in French) trains senior officers from twenty-one armed forces and gendarmeries over a period of ten months to assume senior positions in their services, particularly at joint, combined headquarters. By offering this final stage of education for senior officers, ESIG confers the only war college diploma recognized as equivalent to that of the war college in Paris, France. An International War College A Cameroonian general commands the war college, assisted by a French colonel serving as director of studies who oversees teaching research, and programming. The teaching staff is composed of ten senior Cameroonian officers and four senior French officers who have each completed a war college themselves. The staff is responsible for both general instruction and overseeing operational planning exercises. Forty-five students from twenty-one countries make up the school’s tenth cohort, the class of 2014-15. The participating countries include: Benin, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Djibouti, Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Ivory Coast, France, the United States of America, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, Senegal, Chad and Togo. In re-
African Defense/February 2015
sponse to the growing need for training and greater international interest, ESIG will train 60 students in 2015-16 without significant additional investments from the contributing countries. Eighty percent of the students have already benefited from initial specialty training or staff training in France or at one of the 16 French/African National Schools of Regional Vocation (ENVR), although the first classes at ESIG nonetheless contained a wide variety of preparation among students. Several initiatives have contributed to steadily improving the quality of entering students such as standardizing its prerequisites and using a French security cooperation officer assigned at ESIG to help with pre-arrival preparation. An Adapted Teaching Methodology ESIG’s teaching objectives focus on the exercising high levels of command with
teaching objectives focus on the exercising high levels of command with an understanding of African defense and security issues.
an understanding of African defense and security issues. Although there are students from both within and outside of Africa, the training program’s mission planning exercises revolve around hypothetical missions employing African coalitions on African soil. This methodology stresses improving interoperability during multinational operations, and helps students appreciate the capabilities of partner-nation security and defense forces. Ultimately, ESIG’s priorities are to help students acquire methods and a common operating picture that strengthens their ability to make decisions, to communicate, and to act. These officers must be ready to comprehend changes in national and international environments and adapt to them thoughtfully. In two major regards, ESIG has created training opportunities to help foster thinking about changing circumstances now. First, ESIG encourages students to think about the various theaters of operation on the African continent by assigning students to five groups that monitor crises and reports on them periodically. The groups include: maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea; trans frontier threats in the Sahel region; the transnational threat of
Boko Haram; crises of militant groups in the Central African Republic; and instability in the Great Lakes region. Second, ESIG wants students to think about how they will adapt their armed forces to future security challenges, and accomplishes this by conducting planning exercises using realistic national capacities in specific threat- and means-based contexts. ESIG teaches a single planning method focused at the joint, multinational level that is intentionally very similar to NATO’s method in order to ensure the highest level of interoperability while making comprehension by students as complete as possible. The students conduct exercises on hypothetical African scenarios that are updated annually for each class. Students learn crisis management using a project-management methodology that is practiced through student-led staff work. A Complementary Education Professors from the University of Yaoundé teach academic classes on geopolitics, strategy, and international relations that give the students tools for making informed geopolitical analyses of major
world and continental issues. This teaching is meant to keep looking at the “red line” ability to design a defense policy adapted to these issues. ESIG also allows its students to acquire a master’s degree in strategic studies in Strategy and Crisis Management at the University of Yaoundé. This partnership gives the students a broader exposure to civilian academic thinking and methodology, and accounts for 10 percent of total instructional time. The 70-page professional thesis that students write in fulfillment of the degree is therefore fully integrated into the Military Studies Level 2 (BEMS2) education. A Constant Adaptation of Objectives Considering its immediate objectives, a war college is primarily a vocational school. Students are given major instruction strategy, ethics and operational command, military history, and prospective. The participatory pedagogy promotes sharing past experiences and improving students’ joint skills. Each major module of instruction combines academic teaching with practical applications such as group work or simulated staff exercises. Since 2013, ESIG has adapted its program in the following ways:
1) The school has prioritized mastery of the staff decision-making process by creating fewer, longer exercises in place of more, shorter exercises. The school actively seeks partnerships with other Francophone war colleges to conduct joint combined planning exercises. 2) The school has improved its assessment of training in response to a realistic workforce. 3) Individual meetings are instituted to discover each officer’s professional goals in order to help everyone gain the most benefit from the war college’s education. In conclusion, constantly adapting since 2005, ESIG has reached a high level of maturity and fits perfectly the future African security challenges. Recognized as a center of excellence by the ECCAS since late 2013, ESIG contributes directly to regional security, operational planning, and crisis management by hosting annual forums and training a 100 military and civilian decision-makers to sub-regional planning and decision-making methodologies.
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Use of Protected Vehicles is Spreading Throughout All of Africa
Although first deployed in Africa, then off to a slow start, mine-protected vehicles are back home. Light utility vehicles and medium cargo trucks were designed for specific missions. While in many instances they could end up near the fight, that was not their place. Too lightly armored—if armored at all—to protect the occupants, small arms fire and IEDs were taking their toll. Soldiers have always been at the forefront of innovation and when their vehicles stopped protecting them, they improvised by adding extra armor and shielding—and demanded design changes. Southern Africa became the breeding ground for the MRAPs of today. Where the ingenuity of soldiers left off, the art and science of ballistics and blast protection took over designing vehicles built with the occupant in mind. Industry has risen to the occasion with MRAPs and protected vehicles in every shape and size. From a custommade combat bus to a VIP limo, protected vehicles have a place in Africa.
Task Force–Horn of Africa’s commander. “These vehicles will provide better security and movement to the troop’s contributing countries to complete their mission more effectively.” The MRAPS, Cougar 4x4s, were originally made by Force Protection, later acquired by General Dynamics Land Systems. First deployed with the Marines in 2004, the vehicle can carry six fullyladened soldiers along with a crew of two. The 300 hp Caterpillar C7 diesel engine, connected to an Allison SP series transmission give the Cougar a road range of about 675 kilometers. As with most MRAPS, it is designed to withstand the blast of IEDs and small arms fire. Many components can be fieldrepaired or replaced. The 20 MRAPs will allow the phasing out of 20 Casspirs when all the MRAPs have been delivered. zxxxx Inkas
zxxxx AMISOM The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is no stranger to deploying protected vehicles and have used MRAPtype vehicles from numerous manufacturers. Several southern African manufacturers have seen their vehicles operate in Somalia. In September 2014, 20 former US Marine Corps MRAPS were delivered to Somalia for handover to peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi. American contractor ManTech has been working on the vehicles and was expecting to have all 20 vehicles ready for operational use by March 2015. “The work that has been completed by CJTF-HOA and the other organizations to be able to provide these 20 MRAPs to Uganda and Burundi, has been extremely vital to enabling our East African partners, fight off violent extremist, “said Major General Wayne Grigsby, Combined Joint
Inkas Armored Vehicle Manufacturing has been producing armored vehicles for almost 20 years. “During this period, we have been constantly adapting armoring methods to ever-changing technology,” explained Philip Daskal, vice president of international sales. “Since 1996, our production process has been improved and optimized in a way allowing us to deliver vehicles on time and on budget. By implementing innovative technologies such as laser cutting and advanced armoring materials, we are able to ensure the highest quality of our products and exceed customer expectations.” The company considers its people its biggest asset. “Our engineers have a proven track record of designing and implementing efficient and innovative solutions, which are based on their extensive knowledge of all the aspects of the ballistic protection
industry, including detailed knowledge of potential threats and countermeasures,” said Daskal. “A wide range of Inkas armored vehicles are in demand in Africa, including armored personnel carriers, armored buses, cash in transit vans as well as luxury SUVs,” said Daskal. “Among our customers are banks, global corporations and high profile individuals. Our armored personnel carriers are widely used by law enforcement agencies and military forces. Recently, we have launched a new 16-passenger armored personnel carrier, the Huron, and we believe that our customers will see value in this APC because of its high level of maneuverability and protection to the occupants.” Among armored SUVs the most popular vehicles are Toyota Land Cruiser and Lexus LX570. “Our goal is to keep these vehicles as close to the manufacturer’s original model as possible, so they don’t attract unwanted attention,” noted Daskal. To provide the highest level of protection and comfort, Inkas implements a full assortment of advanced defensive technologies as well as innovative luxurious features. “We employ the latest technologies in laser cutting and bending, which does not affect the metal structure and result in our ability to supply armored vehicles that guarantee safety and security,” said Daskal. “Moreover, Inkas utilizes a new generation of armoring materials that meet international standards in terms of resistance while weighing as little as half of what industry-standard armor plates with similar size and weight. Revolutionary lightweight armor allow us to increase vehicle mobility and speed performance in comparison.” Inkas also offers armored limousines with customized luxurious interiors. With an added center partition, these vehicles can serve as executive offices on wheels or special events venues. All limousines
African Defense/February 2015
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are equipped with an Inkas-developed limo control system allowing passengers to operate the features of the vehicle from an iPad or similar tablet. One of the first models launched on the market was a limousine based on the Mercedes-Benz G63 with a VIP interior package. How is Inkas approaching the African protected vehicle market? “We believe that one of the most effective ways to market yourself is to be able to offer clients support they require while utilizing armored vehicles,” Daskal explained. “We offer a high level of post-sale service to our customers. We think that it’s our duty to educate customers on the proper usage of their armored vehicles in order to use them to their full potential and maximize the added value. If it’s required, our highly trained specialists can hold customized training sessions.” Inkas currently has authorized after-sales workshops and sales offices throughout Western Africa, including Lagos, Nigeria, where they have been on-ground since 2008. They are also expanding to Nairobi, Kenya, which will cover their east African clients. “We are currently devoting focus to begin manufacturing our armored vehicles in Nigeria,” said Daskal. “We plan to finalize this in 2015.” zxxxx Casspir Certainly the most recognizable mineprotected vehicles is the Casspir, a name synonymous with mine resistant for decades before anyone else adopted the concept. The Casspir’s performance in southern Africa’s conflicts created a demand for the vehicle that led Mechem (now a division of Denel) to relaunch production of the Casspir, in the MK II, in 2010. With the same technical and protection levels as the original vehicle, new automotive components created better reliability—and in several variants. Still kicking today with Mechem,in its latest rendering, the Casspir MK IV with a 6.7 liter Cummins BT6 diesel, Allison 3000 automatic transmission, Axletech gearbox, carries a crew of 2 and 10 soldiers. zxxxx Paramount Group Paramount’s armored vehicle range currently comprises the Matador and Marauder series mine protected vehicles, the Maverick internal security vehicle
and the latest addition to the range, a 6x6 armored fighting vehicle (AFV), the Mbombe. Representing a leap in technology, Mbombe’s mine protected flat bottom hull reduces its silhouette delivering significant benefits in its combat profile and against IED attacks. All vehicles in the range provide outstanding performance in survivability, mobility and firepower and are tested to NATO specification with independent certification. They are designed to provide the best possible protection against kinetic energy, IED and RPG attacks, ensuring optimum survivability for the crew. The Paramount Group has access to the extensive blast testing facilities that are well established in South Africa and it makes full use of them to carry out rigorous testing of its vehicles to the highest international standards. zxxxx OTT OTT Technologies (Pty) Ltd (OTT) has been in operation since 1980 and gained its expertise in refurbishing military vehicles as well as the design, development and manufacturing of armored and mine protected vehicles for more than. With two main business lines: new armored vehicles and refurbished vehicles, the company holds an ISO 9001 certification. They offer refurbished Casspirs as well as their own line of Pumas. The V-shaped hull Puma M36 4×4 is an armored personnel carrier with mine and IED protection. It is an evolutionary and larger extension of the Puma M26 and is also built on a commercial truck driveline. The main users are military and police during peacekeeping, homeland security and other asymmetric warfare operations. Other roles include, high mobility mine protected patrol vehicle, ambulance, mine protected weapon carrier and mine protected command vehicle.
monocoque hull and modified to withstand threats encountered worldwide. The vehicle hull consists of two layers of armored steel and a 25 mm cavity to increase ballistic properties within the passenger compartment. The upper hull is supported by a V-shaped bottom plate that is internally reinforced by means of a capping plate for ultimate blast protection. REVA III is described by the company as the most cost-effective and economical MRAP capable of operating in any environment. It is offered in both a long and short wheel base versions. The REVA V is the company’s most popular vehicle carrying a crew of two, plus eight troops. The larger vehicle design opens up the REVA V to a variety of configurations and options. The 6-cylinder engine, connected to a Allison 6-speed automatic transmission, gives the vehicle a range of about 550 kilometers. REVA VI is a custom-built 6x6 recovery vehicle and the REVA ambulance is what it says it is—an ambulance. Some of ICP’s customers include the various contractor companies in Iraq, the US Army, the Royal Thai Army, and in service in South Africa, Somalia, Equatorial Guinea, Yemen, and the UAE. zxxxx WMF In 1998 the government of Namibia acquired Windhoeker MaschinenFabrik with a designed intent of developing a vehicle for internal consumption and export. That same year, a strategic alliance was formed with Military International Limited of Canada. After developing the Wer’wolf MK I evaluation determined that the export market required an improved mineprotected vehicle—the MK II. In 2005 Windhoeker MaschinenFabrik won a $7 million contract to deliver armor-protected vehicles for UN peacekeeping missions. zxxxx Oshkosh
zxxxx Integrated Convoy Protection ICP of South Africa built their first vehicle protected against IEDs and small arms fire in 2004 to protect their security staff in Iraqi. The REVA was born. Success on the battlefield led the company to expand the line of vehicles to include the REVA III, V, VI and the REVA ambulance. The REVA series is manufactured from armored steel, built on a solid V-shaped
The Oshkosh M-ATV Light is designed to rapidly transport operators across unimproved roads and rugged off-road terrain. The vehicle uses the Oshkosh TAK-4 independent suspension system, which is the industry’s gold standard for off-road mobility.. The M-ATV Light features enhanced armor protection and an impressive power-to-weight ratio compared to previous generation special operations
African Defense/February 2015
vehicles. “The Oshkosh M-ATV is a new option for special forces to provide greater protection without sacrificing the air transportability on fixed wing or rotorcraft as required for the most demanding missions,” said Urias. “In this vehicle category, the M-ATV Light offers unprecedented performance.” zxxxx Chaiseri Chaiseri, Thailand’s largest military industry company broke into the MRAP arena with the First Win MRAP. The FW 4x4 armored vehicle is designed with armor protection as a priority. The 360° protection is based on hull of welded ballistic steel with V-shape floor to dissipate mine blast. The V-shape monocoque protection steel cab with composite material allows the vehicle to optimize the vehicle weight and ballistic/ blast protection performance protection performance to customer requirement from STANAG 45699 from level 1 to level 3. The vehicle is powered by a Cummins ISB 300 hp engine coupled to an Allison a 6-speed automatic transmission. First Win is a highly mobile, agile vehicle able to operate in the most demanding terrain. First Win is in service with the Royal Thai Army. zxxxx Hatehof Born in Israel in 1947, Hatehof has built a reputation as a reliable provider of armored vehicles as well as other emergency and service-provider trucks for customers around the world. Although the company has a variety of platforms, we will focus on just two: Navigator and Wolf. Wolf is a 4x4 based on a Ford chassis with STANAG 2 and under belly protection of STANAG 1. Maximum payload is 1,300 kg. The 300 hp Ford 6.7 liter V-8 turbo diesel is connected to an automatic transmission with sic forward and one reverse gear. Wolf has a maximum road speed of 130 kph, but can range out to 500 km if kept to 60 kph. Burst acceleration is 0-40 kph in six seconds. One outstanding feature of Wolf are the number of doors. The vehicle crew has one door on either side for their use, Just behind those doors are two doors—one per side— for the security forces in the rear. There is also a single door on the rear wall.
African Defense/February 2015
Navigator is a larger 4x4 with a 3-ton payload and can carry 13. zxxxx Typhoon-U One Russian entry to the MRAP family of vehicle designs is the Typhoon-U. Designed at the request of the Russian ministry of Defense, Gaz Ural has produced an initial quantity of prototypes currently undergoing tests at the Ural automobile plant, Miass, Chelyabinsk Region of Russia. The three prototypes include As part of the initial batch MRAP vehicles “Typhoon-U” has three versions: with two 6x6 versions—one with a onepiece armored hull and another more modular in design—and a 4x4 with a single armored hull. The 6x6 (Ural-63099) MRAPs can carry 12 troops with eight can be accommodated in then 4x4 (Ural-33099). A primary goal of designers at the Ural Automobile Plant was to develop a highly protected and survivable vehicle, especially against small arms and landmines. A variety of armor was trialed and tested, including a range of ceramics before deciding on the makeup of the protection. Russian sources told African Defense that by going through this process, and reviewing the state-of-theart in armor technologies, they were able to reduce the weight by between 20 and 30 percent over previous technology solutions. The modular version is protected to STANAG Level 3 while the fighting module goes up to STANAG Level 4. Protection against landmine and IED includes under-body armor plates and V-shapes designed to push blast forces away from the troop compartment; multi-layered flooring, careful placement of wheels in relation to the truck, special troop seats with locking head restraints and a five-point safety harness at each troop seat. “We can conclude that in some degree MRAP vehicle Typhoon-U family, developed by designers Ural Automobile Plant in a counterinsurgency war and counterterrorism operations may come to replace armored personnel carriers,” said a Russian source. “They are better able to protect the crew from landmine and IEDs, require little maintenance, can drive on public roads. An important advantage of these machines—a lower cost compared with APCs.” A new six-cylinder in-line turbocharged diesel YaMZ-5267 engine develops 450 hp connected to a Belarussian hydromechanical automatic transmission.
Commonality with commercial engines makes this a good choice from a performance perspective but also from a maintainability perspective. zxxxx Lenco Lenco has two vehicles that are primarily designed for use in military or law enforcement—the BEAR (ballistic engineered armored response) and the BearCat. Since 1981 the company has produced more than 5,000 vehicles for more than 40 countries. According to the company, “Lenco developed its core line of tactical armored vehicles in response to customer-driven requirements for commercial alternatives to military surplus armored vehicles, uparmored Humvees and underperforming armored SUVs.” BEAR, the larger of the two vehicles, was designed to meet needs of US national SWAT teams and can carry 18 fully equipped tactical offices. The BEAR MRAP is a V-hulled designed offering 7.62 AP and .50 cal. ballistic protection and has seats for 12 fully equipped personnel. A roof opening can mount various weapons . Optionally, the BEAR MRAP can be equipped with an internal fire suppression systems and blast mitigating seats. The BearCat is a slightly smaller vehicle, offered in six versions (G2, G3, G4, medevac, VIP and EOD). zxxxx Streit Group Established in Canada in 1992, Streit Group is a privately owned armored vehicle manufacturer with 12 production facilities and 25 offices worldwide. The company produces a large variety of armored personnel carriers, MRAP’s, cash-in-transit, luxury, bespoke luxury and security vehicles designed to provide effective protection in high-risk situations. All our vehicles undergo internationally recognized ballistics and impact tests, with STANAG 3 certification for military tactical vehicles and VPAM BRV 2009 VR7 for luxury and special purpose vehicles. Streit offers a wide range of mineprotected vehicles including the Typhoon 4x4, the Scorpion the Warrior APC and Puma to name a few vehicles .
Black Hawk as a Solution to Africa’s Medium Lift Helicopter Needs
Remanufactured Black Hawks offer powerful, affordable, twin-engine helos for African militaries.
Vertical lift gives a military a host of operational options that are almost a given in today’s battlespace. Even though the benefits are well-known and accepted, the price tag of new helicopters is still a hindrance to many governments. Sikorsky, a United Technologies Company, has been in the helicopter business since 1939, when Igor Sikorsky proved the single rotor design that prevails to this day, and in 1942 received the first-ever helicopter production contract (for 131 R-4 aircraft) from the US Army. Since then, perhaps no Sikorsky military helicopter is more recognizable worldwide than the Black Hawk. Knowing that Sikorsky was in the process of developing a plan for the remanufacturing and marketing of divested US Army Black Hawks, and that the company had identified Africa as ripe for the aircraft, we sat down with George Mitchell, vice president for aircraft support, Defense Systems and Services business unit, and Tom Boland, program manager for aircraft updates to learn more about their plans. African Defense: How is Sikorsky looking at Africa? Mitchell: We see great opportunity in Africa. We’ve been spending a great of time studying the market, and visiting various locations—David Adler, our senior vice president of strategy, has been making regular trips to the region, especially in the last few months. We have been George Mitchell working with various representatives and teammates, particular in northern and southern Africa—but not ignoring central Africa as well—to understand the market better. Although our current market share
is relatively low, we have a really great portfolio of products perfectly suited for the requirements of Africa. Our platforms are durable, reliable, comfortable and in the case of the Black Hawk and Seahawk, are military-hardened and able to take a licking and keep on ticking. We are very excited about the future and have identified Africa as a particular growth area for Sikorsky. African Defense: What’s made Black Hawk such an enduring helicopter and what about it suits it for Africa? Mitchell: If you look back at the history of the Black Hawk, the worldwide fleet has more than 8 million flight hours. It was originally designed and built for the US Army, which is still its largest user, and over the last 30 years has taken off as the utility aircraft of choice for 26 militaries, and more than 30 countries if you include the Seahawk variants It’s the right size aircraft to carry 15-fully loaded troops and cargo pretty much anywhere. Besides the platform’s durability and survivability, which are great traits to have, the modular design with most components being plug-and play make it easy to maintain. The track record of the aircraft speaks for itself as far as being safe and reliable. We are excited about the used Black Hawk market as the US Army begins to retire their UH-60As. We are in the process of starting a program to remanufacture some of those aircraft for resale. The Black Hawk would be a great entry-level, updated helicopter for countries that might not be able to afford a brand new medium-lift helicopter at today’s prices. African Defense: Tell me about the UH-60A remanufacturing program. Boland: We are focusing on the A model
from the 1980s, which we will remanufacture to a modern A model. The other is taking the A model and remanufacturing it into an L model (the US Army, for the most part, flies M models today). Tom Boland At the A level we are going to perform a number of periodic maintenance checks, replace some of the drive train, have General Electric inspect and/or overhaul the engines, and go through the aircraft with a multi-point inspection (fix sheet metal issues, repaint it, cleanup the interior, etc.) and in the end, turn out a Sikorsky-qualified Black Hawk. On the A to L model, we will either modify the airframe or provide a brand new airframe, have the engines upgrade to a newer, stronger version by General Electric, use a similar multi-point inspection for sheet metal issues, improvements to the interior and other checks to bring the helicopter up to current L model standards. A point I would like to make is that the Black Hawk aircraft we are remanufacturing are just recently divested US Army helicopters. They are not boneyard aircraft that have been in long-term storage or cannibalized for parts, but right up until the day they were divested were flying with the US Army. Plus, many of the aircraft have already gone through their US Army reset/recapitalization so they are in very good condition before we even get them. Mitchell: In both cases, we have already identified a bill of materials for 100 percent parts replacement that will bring the helicopters up to today’s standards so they are eligible for factory recertification. Important to note is that all of this work will bring the aircraft back under a Sikorsky warranty.
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African Defense: Is Sikorsky consideringpartnering with local industry? Mitchell: We have given it some thought and consider these opportunities on a caseby-case basis. We are seeing much more of that for new aircraft production where countries require some level of co-production or industrialization programs with some significant procurement contracts. The Turkey Utility Helicopter Program, whereby Turkish industry will build Black Hawk aircraft under license, is a good example of that. The answer is that we will have to wait and see how each program transpires. If a country came in and offered a large order, we would take a look at it. We are always on the lookout for low cost international suppliers to help us with offset options. African Defense: Have you done a market analysis of the African helicopter market? Boland: About two years ago our marketing team did a study and identified Africa as the prime market for the Black Hawk remanufacturing program. The viewpoint being that the helicopter comes in as an extremely affordable, capable aircraft either for a military that lacks a large fleet, or has a fleet of single-engine helicopters but wants to move up into the twin engine arena. The remanufactured Black Hawk is a factory-qualified, pre-owned aircraft perfect for that military. We have matured our remanufacturing program considerably since conducting, our initial market analysis two-years ago. Now we are beginning to get the word out. African Defense: Can the Black Hawk accommodate customer-preferred systems? Mitchell: The aircraft is very open to accessories—things like rescue hoist, search lights, FLIR systems—the Black Hawk is the perfect platform for bolt-on type equipment. Our goal is to standardize these aircraft as much as possible so for major items like avionics, electrical systems, engines, flight computers and so on, the fact that everything is standardized means there is greater reliability and lower acquisition costs. One variation to this is that we are very aware that many countries want their own communications equipment, which we can certainly fit into the cockpit as required. Again, the real benefit to keeping the
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aircraft to a single standard is that it helps to keep the price point low. Once the customer takes delivery they can modify it to meet their specific operational requirements. African Defense: How would you characterize the Black Hawk’s ease of maintenance and sustainability? Boland: We’ve prepared spare parts packages for the Black Hawk that will sustain the aircraft for as along as a fleet wants to keep it in service. Ease of maintenance is something the Black Hawk is known for. Black Hawk helicopters can be maintained on a routine basis without the need for a lot of ground support equipment ladders. A toolbox will pretty much get the job done, and you can maintain the helicopter per the manuals. There is a level of knowledge that is necessary, but that’s where our field service representatives (FSRs) provide an initial boost of capabilities until the customer team is up to speed with training. We are able to provide FSRs to the locations for permanent basing if requested or for a lesser amount of time to get trainers or a unit trained. Here we also tailor our support to the customer needs and requests. Mitchell: We offer formal classroom training as well as in-field support so we are able to work hand-in-hand with artisans as they build their skills with our teams. African Defense: Does Sikorsky own Black Hawk simulators? Mitchell: We have our own simulators but we also partner with some of the biggest names in fight simulation. A lot of the US Army Black Hawk training is done at Fort Rucker so it would be likely that potential customers may have already been through some kind of training there. African Defense: How are you looking to make these sales happen—direct to the country or through a US military sales? Mitchell: We are open to any opportunities. We know how to do direct commercial sales but we also work very closely with the US Army and US Navy for foreign military sales. As long as we are able to provide the customer with the aircraft they are looking for, we can work with them to figure out the contractual and financial requirements.
African Defense: How you approaching the African defense market? Mitchell: We are in the early stages and looking at a variety of options. As I mentioned, David Adler, our senior vice president has been traveling and talking with possible sales representatives and partners in the region. There is a vetting process that has to be moved through our internal sales team so we are moving very deliberately. We are looking for OEM-type partners that in the region and could partner with us. We are exploring every opportunity. African Defense: What about Sikorsky’s other aircraft? Mitchell: We offer a wide range of products that fill a variety of mission profiles. For example, we have the M28, a small utility, fixed wing aircraft that is very durable and is designed to operate from unprepared and dirt airfields. At the other end of the spectrum and is our S-76D helicopter in the medium-size utility and VIP category. We have been very successful with the S-92, our large commercial and head-of-state aircraft, which also is a favorite of the offshore oil market. Coast guards are showing a great deal of interest in the S-92 because of its high reliability, and because it can handle all of the sensors and rescue equipment, such as a hoist, necessary for search and rescue work. We have a number of innovative products in the design stream. The key is to understand the market price points of a particular customer and tailor a solution to fit those parameters. In 2014 we qualified a totally modernized S-61T helicopter, which includes a glass cockpit, composite blades, and a Black Hawk electrical system. This aircraft fits into the same category as the Black Hawk remanufacturing program. It is a very low cost solution that has been flying and time tested for the last 50 years. We recently sold 13 to the US Department of State, which says a lot for the value proposition that a remanufacturing program of a proven aircraft represents. Something else of note is that we can take a customer’s existing fleet and remanufacture their own aircraft. There are a number of S-61s in Africa that would be perfect candidates for this modernization program.
The African Peace and Security Architecture: Myth or Reality
Resolving African conflicts need solutions that take into account traditional and non-traditional options.
The African continent is bedeviled with conflicts, hunger, diseases, poverty, the collapse of governments and ultimately the emergence of failed states. Over the last five decades, Africa has experienced at least 30 major conflicts in which seven million people lost their lives and more than 20 million were displaced. The most enduring and dominant of these conflicts has been the intra-state conflict. These have taken various forms such as oppressive regimes, religious conflicts, terrorism, ethnic conflicts and the emergence of non-state actors benefiting from the insecurity. African leaders made various efforts to find lasting solutions to these conflicts using traditional conflict resolution mechanisms such as ad hoc committees, mediation by African heads of state and mediation commissions as well as the use of chieftaincy institutions. Unfortunately, these mechanisms have not helped much in preventing or resolving the conflicts. Efforts by African leaders to create continental peace and security mechanisms failed miserably. Consequently, Africans depended on the international community to resolve these conflicts despite its inability to achieve lasting results. The international community’s diminished interest in Africa after the Cold War, the worsening security environment as well as the paradigm shift of African leaders to take care of the continent’s security situation forced the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to be more pragmatic towards Africa’s security and development. Therefore, African leaders in July 2002 decided to replace the OAU with a more structurally encouraging supranational organization, the African Union (AU). The
By Colonel Alhassan Abu Ghana Army 14
AU has since then taken bold and promising initiatives towards the formulation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) aimed at providing peace and security by preventing and managing conflicts. It is also meant to avoid over-reliance on the West and seek African solutions to African problems. However, the APSA is confronted with challenges that render it seemingly ineffective. zxxxx Security Threats in Africa State institutions in Africa are weak and their eventual collapse leads to intra-state conflicts. When governments are unable to gain and maintain the popular support of their citizenry, they begin to operate through coercion, dictatorial tendencies of the cult of a strong leader and corrupt practices. The major aspect of this process is the abusive use of the security agencies and the collapse of the judicial and panel systems. This eventually leads to the emergence of warlords, the struggle for political power between different factions, violence and ethnic conflict. Examples of this threat could be traced to Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire and Charles Taylor’s Liberia. Therefore, it is crucial for Africa to develop strong institutions to ensure peace, security and development. Terrorism is another threat to Africa’s security. Africa is gaining grounds as a safe haven for terrorist groups. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar ad Din operate freely in the Sahel and pose a threat to African and Western interests. Al Shabab is still a formidable threat in the horn of Africa. Also, West Africa is threatened by the possible collaboration between AQIM and the Boko Haram in Nigeria. Though efforts are being made to fight terrorism in Africa, a lot more needs to be done. Another source of insecurity and conflicts in Africa is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). There are
huge numbers of SALWs in circulation in Africa due to conflicts. There is also evidence of international and local dealers who exchange arms for minerals (especially diamonds) and other resources. Disarmament during post conflict peace agreement has been ineffective in Africa. So most SALWs imported or manufactured locally before or during a conflict are unaccounted for and thus continue to pose security threats even during post-conflict situations. These weapons end up in the hands of criminals and are used for armed robbery, hostage taking, hijacking and even an insurrection. Drug trafficking is also a source of insecurity in Africa. Africa has become a transit hub for illicit drugs from Latin America and South Asia to Europe and to a limited extent the United States. This is attributed to weak law enforcement, high level of corruption and effective monitoring along the direct routes from the source of supply to the Western markets. An estimated 48 metric tons of cocaine worth $1.8 billion transited West Africa in 2007. Most countries along the West Coast of Africa, especially Guinea Bissau, are believed to be transit centers. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean is a major security threat to Africa, the maritime system and world trade. Pirates emanating from Somalia attack ships in the aforementioned areas taking the crew hostage and ask for huge sums in ransom. This affects the transportation of goods, humanitarian relief to Africa and increases the costs of world trade. Additionally, piracy fuels the rise of militias and destabilizes the Horn of Africa. Also, terrorist groups in that part of Africa may benefit from piracy to finance their activities. Diseases are a threat to Africa’s security and stability. HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, which are among the biggest killers in the world, have adversely affected Africa with financial and demographic implications. For instance, HIV/AIDS is
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having a heavy toll on South Africa with a consequential loss of about $30 billion per annum of its economy. Also, HIV/AIDS has orphaned over 12 million children in sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, it has been estimated that a child dies of malaria every thirty seconds in Africa. Various attempts were therefore made to formulate security initiatives to deal with some of the security threats. zxxxx Evolution of African Security Initiatives Dr Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, proposed the concept of the African High Command during the All African Peoples Conference in 1958. However, his proposal was rejected and he renewed his call in 1963 for the formation of a unified military command to “ensure the stability and security of Africa.” For the second time his idea was not endorsed and instead a permanent military staff directorate was created in the OAU Secretariat. Various attempts to create a Pan-African force were unsuccessful. Despite that, an African military intervention was launched in Chad in 1982 to help end the conflict there. That was seen as an initial phase of instituting a continental military cooperation. Unfortunately, the force faced serious challenges and was withdrawn the same year. The failure in Chad created the impetus for further security initiatives and thus gave rise to sub-regional groupings such as the Front Line States’ Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). That notwithstanding, the OAU chalked some successes in conflict management. These included the border disputes between Mali and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Somalia and Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, and Algeria and Morocco. Despite these efforts, the OAU’s overall record of providing peace and security in Africa from 19631993 was a fiasco. A number of factors account for the disappointing performance of the OAU. These include lack of political will by African leaders at the time, lack of financial support, limited capacity to deal with peace and security issues and the Cold War politics where the super powers injected military and financial resources in Africa in pursuit of their national interests. Another limitation of the OAU was its mandate of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states in order to maintain
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the sanctity of their sovereignty. Pursuant to the worsening security environment in Africa in the early 1990s, the OAU had to reconsider a more pragmatic approach to deal with its security and development agenda. The OAU Secretary General (Salim Ahmed Salim) in 1992 at the OAU summit in Dakar submitted a report on the proposals for an OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in order to adequately and better address conflicts in Africa. The mechanism was inaugurated at the OAU summit meeting of June 1994. The primary focus of the mechanism was to anticipate and prevent conflicts in order to avoid the complex and highly expensive peace support operations that OAU members could not afford. The mechanism had a Conflict Management Center, which was responsible to the OAU Secretary General for the execution of strategies to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. It also had key elements such as an early warning system to identify flash points, gather information and provide an advance warning of likely or impending conflict situations. Additionally, the center had a Peace Fund, which was established to financially support the mechanism’s operational activities. The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution made some strides in its attempt to prevent and manage conflicts in Africa. It helped to broker the Arusha Peace Agreement for Rwanda in 1993 and de-escalated political tensions in Congo-Brazzaville in the same year. The OAU implemented the mechanism in support of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In 1997, it mediated the crises in the Great Lakes Region and supported a mission to monitor the implementation of the Bangui Agreement in the Central African Republic. Unfortunately, the mechanism was beset with some drawbacks and could not make a significant impact in the security landscape in Africa. It was faced with budgetary, organizational and mandate related constraints. Nevertheless, it provided the impetus for the OAU to assume much more responsibility for security issues on the continent. Hence, a more promising continental security initiative, the APSA was established. zxxxx The Structure of the African Peace and Security Architecture
Most probably, due to lessons learned
from the conflicts in Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, the AU Constitutive Act stipulates that the AU has every right to intervene in member states’ internal affairs when crisis such as war crimes, human rights abuses and genocide erupt. This gave rise to the shift from non-interference to what is now commonly referred to as non-indifference. The idea was later endorsed by world leaders in 2005 and labeled the Responsibility to Protect (R2P); even though it was agreed that states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations, the international community can intervene in situations involving genocide, war crimes and human rights violations irrespective of where they take place. In concert with the Constitutive Act’s concept of security, a Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) was adopted in February 2004 by African Heads of State and Government. The CADSP was based on the concept of human security and was integrated with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) into the AU structures. Thus, an overall framework for a promising continental security cooperation called the APSA was established. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the central organ of the APSA, which is composed of 15 elected members. Its role includes promotion of peace, security and stability, provide early warning and preventive diplomacy as well as undertaking peace-making ventures through mediation, good offices, conciliation and enquiry. Also, it provides the lead role in peace support operations, peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian intervention and disaster management. The Panel of the Wise (PoW) is made up of five members selected from highly respected African statesmen and women with distinguished qualities who have made significant contributions to peace, security and development in Africa. They are nominated by the chairperson of the AU Commission in consultation with member states of the nominees but approved by the AU Assembly. They are rotated every three years and may be retained for another term of three years. The PoW is meant to assist the PSC and the chairperson in conflict prevention. The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is to anticipate and prevent conflicts in Africa through an early warning module based on clearly stated economic, political, military, humanitarian and social indicators used to analyze security situations in order
to formulate appropriate course of action. The CEWS entails an observation and monitoring center, which is referred to as the Situation Room where data on the early warning indicators from the regional observation and monitoring units are received, collated and analyzed. The African Peace Fund (APF) is a special fund established to provide financial assistance to peace support missions and activities associated with peace and security in Africa. The sources of funding for the APF include the regular AU budget, voluntary contributions from private sector, civil society, member states, well meaning individuals and fund raising events. It is also funded by sources outside Africa such as the European Union. Member states agreed to increase their contributions to the fund from 6% to 12% of their assessed contributions on incremental basis of 1.5% per annum until the 12% is attained. The African Standby Force (ASF) as one of the major pillars of the APSA is organized on the basis of five regions/Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of Africa. These are the Arab Maghreb Union, ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and the Southern African Development Community. Consequently, the regional standby brigades are designated as North Africa Standby Brigade, ECOWAS Standby Brigade, Force Multinationale de
l’ Afrique Centrale, East Africa Standby Brigade and Southern Africa Standby Brigade. The ASF was expected to be operational by 2010 and capable of undertaking tasks based on six scenarios as indicated in the table below. Another component of the APSA worth mentioning is the Military Staff Committee (MSC). It is made up of the defense advisers of the members of the PSC. The MSC is the sole authority responsible for counseling and supporting the PSC in all issues associated with military and security requirements in order to promote and maintain peace and security in Africa. zxxxx Challenges Facing the African Peace and Security Architecture The AU’s concept of security is premised on human security. Unfortunately, the PSC devotes more attention to military aspects of security at the expense of other threats to security in Africa such as diseases, environmental degradation, drug trafficking and piracy, to mention but a few. The PSC needs to widen its mandate and activities to include these seemingly non-conventional threats to peace and security in Africa. This will enhance peace, security, development and stability in Africa. Additionally, the PSC lacks the requisite human and financial resources to fulfill its mandate. The AU is generally cash strapped
1 AU/Regional military advice to a political mission
AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission
3 Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission
AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peace-building)
AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions missions including those involving low level spoilers
90 days with the component being able to deploy in 30 days
AU intervention, e.g. in genocide situations where the international community doesnot act promptly
14 days with robust military force
and that has a consequential adverse effect on the PSC. Also, most African states would hardly send their talented and experience top level diplomats or bureaucrats to the PSC in particular and the AU in general. Thus, the PSC is not well placed to perform efficiently and effectively. So, African governments need to be more dedicated to the cause of the AU. Another challenge confronting the APSA is the operationalization of the CEWS. Though a number of workshops have been held in that regard, a lot still remains to be done. The AU, ECOWAS and IGAD early warning systems are the only systems to have made significant progress. However, like the other RECs’ early warning systems, they lack adequate staffing and funding to cover their vast regions and the numerous issues to be reported on under human security. They also lack the capacity to effectively analyze the data collected. So their capabilities as effective early warning systems are yet to be realized. For example, the critics of the CEWS are of the view that there is adequate evidence of indicators of state failure and the likelihood of conflict in countries such as Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equitorial Guinea and Zimbabwe, but there is clear lack of early and well integrated preventive efforts by regional mechanisms. The PoW’s mandate is more about preventing conflicts rather than managing conflicts. However, it lacks adequate human and financial resources to perform its functions. Currently, it requires sufficient support staff with expertise in mediation and technically qualified experts on specific conflict zones. This is relevant because the PoW’s limited membership of five may restrict its ability to appropriately respond to likely threatening situations that require its attention. It also allows for continuity when the panel members are replaced at the end of their tour of duty. The ASF is the central tool that the AU intends to use to execute its peace and security agenda. Though the institutional framework and doctrines for the ASF have been completed, the actual implementing structures are still not fully developed due to the slow pace of progress. So far, ECOBRIG, EASBRIG and SADCBRIG have made significant progress. Hence, the ASF could not be fully operational by 2010 as planned. A number of factors accounts for this slow pace of work. The regional mechanisms and the AU in its entirety are cash strapped and
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resource starved. Only a few of the AU member states are up to speed with their payments to the AU regular budget. South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria and Libya pay 15% each of the AU regular budget, totaling 75%. Though African Heads of State endorsed the three year strategic plan of Alphar Konare (first chairman of AU Commission) aimed at enhancing the AU structures to curtail security threats in Africa, they only paid lip service to the plan. The plan included a proposed $600 million annual implementation budget but the Heads of States failed to commit themselves to this proposal. African governments hardly see international cooperation as a policy priority especially when it comes to making financial commitments despite the enormous resources some of them have. That notwithstanding, it is significant to mention that Africa is engulfed in a total debt of about $305 billion, it accounts for barely one percent of foreign direct investment, one percent of global gross domestic product and below two percent of international trade. Africa receives about $22 billion a year in foreign aid and it would cost the continent approximately $64 billion
per year to implement its economic strategic plan, NEPAD. It is equally important to mention that AU member states are among the poorest in the world and their meager national budgets are in most cases mainly financed by international donors. Therefore, the AU cannot sustain its peace and security agenda without the support of donor partners and the international community. For instance, without the EU African Peace Support Facility (APSF), the AU would not be in a position to conduct peace support operations. Also, the AU and the RECs have not yet established logistics depots to support peace support operations (PSOs). Another worrying situation that confronts the APSA is the institutional chaos on the continent where most African states belong to two or more of the web of fourteen intergovernmental organizations in Africa that seek to provide some form of security and conflict management mechanisms. Out of the 54 AU member states, 26 belong to two regional groups whilst 19 belong to three. Even DRC and Swaziland are members of four regional communities. These overlapping memberships tend to adversely affect the common objective as well as the integration goals of the AU as a
result of counterproductive competition and duplication of efforts. Thus some member states end up dissipating their financial, human and material resources and are unable to contribute to the AU’s peace and security effort. So, AU member states must work out their priorities and disengage from some of the regional organizations. The nature and quality of support from Africa’s development partners fall short of the desired capacity building programs required to enhance the APSA. Western and external actors have often used their financial muscle to shape and influence the parameters of security in Africa contrary to what Africans may conceive as an African solution to an African problem. For example, the idea of establishing an AU CounterTerrorism Center is still being debated. Also, international partners focus more on peacekeeping training for AU member states relative to the provision of logistics support such as strategic airlift, communication equipment and armored vehicles. Additionally, there is no coordination and harmonization of the numerous donor support to the AU. Lastly, donor support is geared towards immediate and short-term crisis at the expense of long-term capacity
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building programs such as the ASF and the CEWS. The APSA‘s lack of capacity to handle crisis was demonstrated when it failed to intervene in Somalia after Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006. Eventually, when the AU decided to send a force of 8,000 to Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), only Uganda provided 1,200 troops for the mission in March 2007. There were also delays in the deployment of the force. It took months to set up the force headquarters and the Support Management and Planning Unit. The force lacked adequate financial and material resources. Though some of AU’s development partners pledged substantial financial support, the pledges were far less than the $622 million required for the initial launching of the force. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had similar challenges. There was no adequate planning prior to the deployment of the force. Also, it lacked the appropriate structures for strategic and operational command and control as well as logistics backing. The mission depended solely on assistance from international donors and thus resulting in delays, uncertainty and confusion. zxxxx Prospects of the African Peace and Security Architecture In spite of the challenges confronting the AU and the APSA, all is not gloomy. The design for the realization of objectives of APSA is progressing steadily. African leaders have shown the willingness to institute a paradigm shift in the continent’s peace,
security and development agenda. The AU heads of states, faced with the daunting problems in Africa and the globalized world were moved by the spirit of Pan-Africanism to forge ahead in unity through a viable regional integration. Learning from the failures of the OAU, the AU adopted the pragmatic approach of non-interference to non-indifference. With the legal provisions and structures now in place, the PSC has the legitimate right to authorize intervention in any African country that may be committing grave atrocities against its people. Though, critics of this paradigm shift are of the view that it has not made any major impact on autocratic leaders like Robert Mugabe and Omar al-Bashir, its significance cannot be over-emphasized. As Timothy Murithi said, “the politics of indifference would have continued to perpetuate the conditions that undermine the prospects for peace building on the continent.” It is also heartwarming to mention that the AU adopted a comprehensive, holistic approach to deal with Africa’s peace and security threats. It addresses issues of governance, human rights, social and economic development. The PSC is the pivot and central organ in the APSA. The PSC has chalked significant success in addressing threats to peace and security in Africa despite being overstretched by a wide range of issues vis-à-vis its meager staff level. It has conducted over 250 meetings and briefing sessions on a variety of issues, illustrating the determination and zeal of the AU to resolve security situations on the continent. For instance, the Livingstone formula was adopted to indicate the PSC’s relationship with civil society groups and how to improve the execution of sanctions in cases
related to illegitimate change of government. For instance, the PSC was quick to react to ensure the right thing was done when there was an unconstitutional change of government in Togo, after the death of President Gnanssingbe Eyadema in February 2005. However, the effectiveness of the PSC cannot be sustained with its present skeletal staff. The AU therefore recognized the importance of building partnership with civil society organizations in its quest for peace and security in Africa. An AU-Civil Society Working Group was established with representatives from the five main regions of Africa and the Diaspora. The group serves as a conduit through which civil society organizations can interface with AU on peace, security and development issues. Presently, a good number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both African and international, are involved in peace building, security and stability in Africa and are working closely with the AU and RECs. Notably among them are the West African Network for Peace building, African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, the Institute for Strategic Studies, Center for Conflict Resolution, Global Coalition for Africa, International Crisis Group, Medicin San Frontiers, Oxfam and Care to mention but a few. These NGOs bring their expertise and resources to partner the AU and RECs in policy forums, various projects, early warning, relief and humanitarian initiatives. However, there is the need to coordinate their services to avoid duplication of effort, conflict of interests, accountability and transparency. The AU under the auspices of the APSA launched a number of operations,
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notably in Burundi, Darfur, Comoros and Somalia. The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was the AU’s first mission and seen as a test case for African solutions to African problems. It was hampered by lack of capacity, financial and human resources as well as lack of an explicit mandate to protect civilians. Its contribution to political and economic stability in Burundi was said to be limited. AMIB was almost declared an impossible mission. However, despite the difficulties that beset AMIB, it improved on the security situation and paved the way for the UN Mission in Burundi, ONUB (Operation des Nations Unies au Burundi). It was generally agreed that AMIB performed creditably well. The dependence on good offices, the lead nation role of South Africa and the partnership with the UN were exemplary. That notwithstanding, some lessons were learned that should guide the AU in its future missions. They include seeking different and reliable sources of funding, provision of adequate logistics, adopting a common language within the command and control structures of the mission, and application of a standardized doctrine. The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was seen as the biggest test case for the AU’s peace and security mechanism. In view of the complexities of the situation and atrocities that were being perpetuated in Darfur, coupled with the refusal of the government of Sudan to consent to a UN force in Sudan, the AU had no option but to intervene in Darfur to avert a possible humanitarian catastrophe. The AU’s concept of non-indifference was put into action. It also clearly demonstrated the willingness of the AU to execute its peace and security agenda. Additionally, the AU played a lead role in finding a political solution to the conflict as well as drafting and implementing the ceasefire agreement. However, AMIS was said to be without strategic guidance. It was an ad hoc mission that was launched without adequate planning. AMIS was underfunded and lacked military, logistics and institutional resources. So, there was a call for a transition of the mission to a UN peace support operation. The outcome was the United Nations African Mission in Darfur, AU/UN hybrid mission in Darfur. Despite the shortcomings of AMIS, it demonstrated the increasing determination of the AU to get involve in finding solutions to the continent’s security situation. The presence of AMIS did, at least, bring some measure
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of stability in a greater part of Darfur but on the whole, it failed to achieve the desired peace. However, the mission presents the AU some lessons especially in the area of planning, support from the international community and its collaboration with the UN. The PSC directed the deployment of AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) on 21 March 2006. This was to supervise and ensure peaceful elections as well as prevent the possible breakup of the Union of the Comoros. South Africa played a lead role supported by Rwanda, Mozambique, Nigeria, Egypt and Congo Brazzaville. The mission was very successful and ended on 9 June 2006. As Benedikt Franke stated “it not only reconfirmed the utility of the lead nation concept, but also reminded everyone that there were certain instances in which the AU could make a substantial contribution to Africa’s security without large expenditures (AMISEC merely cost $19 million),…” Another mission, Operation Democracy, was authorized to the Comoros in 2008 to restore the Union government’s authority in Anjouan. The mission known as African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission (MAES in French) was made up of Sudan, Tanzania, Libya and Senegal. Critics of the mission saw it as an easy and low profile situation undertaken by the AU to draw attention from its failure in other missions. On the whole, it was an AU success story in terms of planning, swift reaction and limited reliance on donor partners. AMISOM is another AU mission worth considering. AMISOM was deployed to provide
security in support of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance among others. Unfortunately, like other AU complex conflicts, the initial setbacks were overwhelming. Only Ugandan and a handful of Burundian forces were deployed in 2007. Self-sustainment, lack of logistics, military and financial resources as well as the worsening security situation were some of the underlying factors that discouraged most of the AU member states from fulfilling their troop pledges to AMISOM. Also, there was no political dialogue among the various factions. So, AMISOM had to operate in a hostile environment and there was no peace to keep. As eluded to, financial pledges by Africa’s development partners were far below the required amount of $622 million for the initial deployment of the force. However, of late, AMISOM is making significant gains whilst the formidable militant group in Somalia is suffering significant setbacks. With the increase in the force level by Kenya and Djibouti, an effective coordination between TFG forces and AMISOM, and support from the international community (especially USA), al-Shabaab is in disarray and at its lowest ebb. This clearly shows a marked improvement in the AU’s willingness and capacity to address the security situation in Somalia. Despite the successes chalked by AMISOM, the conflict is far from over. Al-Shabaab could still pose a serious threat through irregular warfare. AMISOM would therefore have to adopt a strategy to deal with this possible emerging threat of al-Shabaab. It is therefore crucial for the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) to assist Africa in its
quest to enhance the continent’s peace and security. When AFRICOM was created, then President George Bush stated that “This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa command will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.” In effect, AFRICOM will support the APSA to promote and sustain peace and security in Africa. However, there were misconceptions about the motives of AFRICOM. It has been confirmed that AFRICOM does not intend to establish military bases in Africa; it will be only a staff headquarters. Africa is already reaping the benefits of AFRICOM as demonstrated in the Horn of Africa (HOA). With the support from AFRICOM and Combined Joint Task Force-HOA, al-Shabaab is being defeated and piracy is on the decrease. AFRICOM can be of great assistance in developing the capacity of the ASF by enhancing Africa’s centers of excellence for PSOs, through information and intelligence sharing, sustaining Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance, provision of logistics and joint training. AFRICOM can also assist African countries to protect their maritime resources by enhancing their maritime security capacities, especially combating illegal fishing which cost African countries billions of dollars annually. Hence, building and sustaining the partnership between AFRICOM and the AU would be of great benefit to both sides. The Joint Africa-European Union partnership is also yielding fruits. The Joint Africa-European Union Partnership has developed a long-term strategic partnership in eight areas of cooperation. These are peace and security, governance, human rights, trade and regional integration, Millennium Development Goals, energy, climate change and environment, migration, mobility and employment, science, information and space. The EU is the main financial backbone of the AU. However, one major challenge facing the APSA is lack of adequate financial support. So far, the Joint AfricaEuropean Union Strategy has supported the APSA with 1 billion euros among other deliverables. Additionally, the EU established the African Peace Facility (APF) to support
the AU’s peace and security agenda. The APF provides 250 million euros, covering a period of three years, to fund AU or regional PSOs authorized by the UN. An amount of 35 million Euros out of the amount is allocated for capacity building of the AU peace and security structures. It is important to note that the facility is financed with funds earmarked for EU development projects in Africa. Therefore, it is key to strike a balance between the amount spent directly on security vis-à-vis funding for development programs which could have a long-term impact on peace and security. The “Group of 8” (G8) also contributes to Africa’s peace and security agenda. The G8 is assisting the AU to strengthen the APSA. They are engaged with African countries whose actions and aspirations reflect NEPAD’s objectives. These include political and financial support for good governance and rule of law, investing in human capital as well as pursuing programs that induce economic growth and mitigate poverty. The G8 has supported and continues to support Africa‘s economic and infrastructural development through their Overseas Development Assistance programs. Additionally, the G8 provides technical and financial support to the AU, RECs and some African countries to undertake peace and security initiatives. However, the G8 concentrates mainly on PSOs relative to developing the capacity of the AU and RECs to conduct effective conflict prevention and resolution. Though they supported AU and UN’s efforts especially in DRC, Sierra Leone, Angola, Burundi, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire and Central African Republic, their financial pledges are not fully honored. Their assistance to Africa is also threatened by ineffective inter-agency coordination and harmonization. zxxxx Recommendations Weak state institutions are one of Africa’s threats to peace and security. In collaboration with development partners, the AU and its member states must develop strong institutions at the continental and national levels. Such institutions as the judicial and panel systems must be well resourced and independent to discharge their mandate without undue governmental control. The PSC, the central organ of the APSA, concentrates on military dimensions of security relative to other threats to peace and security. It must expand its mandate to include non-conventional threats to security
on the continent. These include environmental degradation, diseases (especially malaria, HIV/AIDS and TB), drug trafficking, and proliferation of SALWs. Therefore the PSC and other components of the APSA must be well resourced, financially and with the appropriate staffing. Consequently, African heads of state must be more dedicated to the cause of the AU and the APSA. They should honor their financial obligations to the AU regular budget instead of leaving the financial burden on a few countries. Additionally, they must provide the AU with talented and experienced staff to execute its peace and security agenda. The AU’s overdependence on financial assistance from its development partners causes delays, uncertainty and confusion in its attempt to resolve and manage conflicts especially when deploying troops for PSOs. It also calls to question the ownership of the APSA and contradicts the rhetoric of African solutions to African problems. Therefore, the AU must seek alternative and reliable sources of mobilizing funds to complement the assistance from its development partners. For example, the ECOWAS community levy is worthy of emulation at the continental level. Additionally, Alpha Konare’s proposed $600 million annual implementation budget must be revisited and possibly implemented. So, the AU Peace Fund must be resourced as a matter of priority. The ASF as the AU’s central tool for its peace and security mechanism is still not fully operational. The AU and RECs must adhere to timelines and also establish the continental and RECs’ logistics depots to address the logistics gap. In addition, AU missions must be furnished with clear strategic guidance. Furthermore, the AU and RECs must pursue scenario-based planning with appropriate strategies and contingencies to avoid ad hoc missions with disastrous consequences. Also, the overlapping chaotic institutional membership of most AU member states must be streamlined and harmonized to avoid duplication, dissipation of resources and counterproductive competition. The relationship and connectivity between the CEWS and the regional early warning systems must be strengthened to ensure relevant and speedy passage of information from the RECs to the CEWS and vice versa. The AU must build its capacity to analyze the raw data collected from the field. Thus, the AU must strengthen its partnership with AFRICOM, civil society and its
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development partners to take advantage of the partnership to enhance its capacity holistically in its quest for peace and security in Africa. The development partners’ support must be more than just training. It should include logistics support such as strategic airlift, communication, transportation and long-term capacity building programs. zxxxx Conclusion Intra-state conflicts and other threats to peace and security continue to confront the African continent and will no doubt continue to do so in this twenty-first century. This has brought untold hardships to the continent as a whole. Various security initiatives have failed to yield the desired effects. African leaders have come to the realization that unless Africa puts in place the appropriate effective measures and mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts more seriously than ever before, Africa would continue to bear the disastrous effects of conflicts. Additionally, the diminished interest of the Western powers in Africa prompted the OAU to take serious review of its role in terms of Africa’s economic development and security. The OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution was put in place but it did not lead to a paradigm shift due to the OAU’s financial, organizational and mandate-related limitations. The OAU was then transformed to the AU with a broad political mandate within the parameters of conflict prevention, management and resolution, which includes the R2P. The AU therefore formulated the APSA with the ASF at the center of its peace and security agenda. Unfortunately, the AU lacks adequate financial and logistics resources as well as the capacity to undertake and accomplish its peace and security initiatives. Additionally, African leaders lack the political will and commitment and are not willing to contribute to regional initiatives at the expense of their individual national programs. So, the APF is under resource. It was therefore not surprising that the AMIS and AMIB which were test cases for the AU’s peacekeeping initiative missions faced severe shortcomings until the UN and Africa’s development partners got involved in these missions. Funding, logistics requirements and capacity-building from Africa’s development partners are essential in order to enhance the AU’s capacity to implement its peace
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and security agenda. African PSOs are largely funded by the development partners and are greatly influenced by international advisers and expertise. Thus, the popular rhetoric of African solutions to African problems becomes a dilemma. However, Africa’s development partners do not honor some of their financial pledges to support African peace and security programs, thus creating delays and uncertainty. It was also observed that they concentrate more on providing training assistance to the AU and its member states but failing to provide the badly needed logistics requirements.
Despite the challenges facing Africa, there is hope for the continent in its efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. That notwithstanding, it is equally important to recognize Africa’s limitations in respect of financial and logistics resources as well as its lack of capacity to successfully implement its peace and security agenda. Therefore, African leaders must show more commitment to the cause of the AU. Also, there is the need to continue to solicit and mobilize resources from Africa’s development partners and other alternative sources for the implementation and realization of the objectives of the APSA.
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The ADF Insurgency Network in Eastern DRC: Spillover into Tanzania Threats to Tanzanian security and alternative strategies to defeat terrorism.
How can the United Republic of Tanzania protect itself from the potential spillover effect of the ADF insurgency in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo? In order to answer the central question, minor questions have to be addressed first: 1. What is the ADF insurgency network and how does it operate? 2. To what extent does the ADF insurgency network pose a security threat to Tanzania? By Major Erasto S. Babere Tanzanian Army Tanzania People’s Defence Force
The ungovernability in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has prompted illegal armed organizations to locate there. The minimal presence or absence of government in the region has created a security vacuum. Rebel forces have filled this void—one such organization is the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Tanzania is vulnerable to its attacks because of its attempts to crack down on all illegal forces in the eastern DRC, including the ADF. ADF’s association with the Somalibased al-Shabaab militants in East Africa also increases Tanzania’s vulnerability. Background on the terrorist incidences in East Africa is needed prior to considering the particular ADF threat. Terrorist incidents began shaking the East African region in the late 1990s. They include the coordinated attacks of August 7, 1998 on the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Nairobi (Kenya) by the al-Qaida terrorist group. Another one is the 2010 attack in Kampala, Uganda. It was perpetrated by al-Shabaab and ended up killing 70 people. Al-Shabaab has also launched a series of attacks on Kenyan territory. In another development, on September
2013, al-Shabaab carried out the Westgate shopping mall attack (not shown on map). This was the most devastating attack to be conducted by al-Shabaab in Kenya. Over 60 people were killed in cold blood. All these were retaliatory attacks after Uganda and Kenya deployed their troops to fight the alShabaab militants in Somalia. The Ugandan and Kenyan troops were deployed in Somalia in 2007 and 2011, respectively. They are currently operating under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). To date, al-Shabaab still threatens the security of East Africa. This is evident through the group’s changing tactics; it has broadened the battleground from Somalia to Kenya. Unless Kenya and Uganda pull their troops out of Somalia, the organization has vowed to continue with such attacks. As alShabaab’s message on social media reads: “For long we have waged war against the Kenyans in our land, now it’s time to shift the battleground and take the war to their land.” Despite al-Shabaab’s threat, the organization does not seem to operate alone. The ADF is supposedly associating with the Somali-based al-Shabaab. For example, the group has allegedly assisted al-Shabaab in
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the planning of the 2010 Kampala attack and 2013 Westgate attack in Nairobi. Despite the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Dar es Salaam, no major terrorist attack has occurred on Tanzanian soil. In fact, the United Republic of Tanzania is comparatively safe. It is politically stable and peaceful compared to other countries in the African Great Lakes region. According to a study conducted in 162 countries, the 2013 Global Peace Index (GPI) indicates that Tanzania is the least violent country in this part of Africa, with an overall ranking of fifty-fifth position. It is followed by Uganda (106), Rwanda (135), Kenya (136), and Burundi, which is ranked at 144. By contrast, the GPI found DRC to be the least peaceful country, ranked at 156. For a long period, the DRC has been experiencing violence and a series of struggles by armed groups, especially in the east. Despite its ranking, Tanzania has had some events that threaten its peace. For example, hate speech has helped to fuel sectarian violence and resulted in church arson, persecution of Christian clerics, acid attacks, and bombing attacks. The island of Zanzibar appears to be the hotspot for violence; frequency of violence is based on violent events from 2012 to 2013. Moreover, the security cooperation between the United States and East African countries to counter terror attacks and Tanzania’s participation in the DRC to quell all rebel organizations have increased and put the country at risk. According to Rigobert Minani-Bihuzo, a Congolese socio-political scholar, “Many of these groups are criminally oriented militias seeking to profit from trafficking the region’s natural resources.” Because of this reason, Tanzania faces potential retaliatory attacks when rebel financing is threatened. To get a better gauge on these external actors and the threats they pose to Tanzania, we turn to the negative forces operating in the eastern DRC. zxxxx Illegal Armed Organizations Operating in the Eastern DRC In October 2013, the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) and the Congolese Army conducted a counterinsurgency operation in the eastern DRC. The operation successfully defeated the M23 rebel group. However, it is difficult to substantiate whether or not this is the end of the eastern DRC conflicts. The M23 leaders and some of its militants have run away into neigh-
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boring countries. Despite the defeat, M23 has yet to disarm. This makes the situation on the ground unpredictable. Past events have shown that some armed groups in the eastern DRC, specifically the Tutsi-led rebel group, have continued their rebellion despite the signing of a peace treaty and their integration into the Congolese National Army. Often, the rebel organizations have splintered; they have changed their names and leadership, run away with weapons, started a fresh fight against government forces and launched violence against unarmed civilians. Unless M23 is completely disarmed, subsequent peace agreements have the potential to fail. Should the Kampala peace talks fail to mediate the Congolese government and M23, it is possible that they could stage a comeback at a time of their choosing. Thus, the instability in the eastern DRC will continue to present a potential threat to Tanzania. In addition, other armed organizations also are roaming the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. As of October 2013, here are more than 30 organizations. The notable ones are “the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS),” “the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR),” and the “National Liberation Forces (FNL).” The FDLR and FNL are the Rwandan Hutu rebel group and Burundian Hutu-led rebel group, respectively. Moreover, there are other local and/or ethnic militia groups like the Mai-Mai. These groups were created by indigenous Congolese to protect their communities against the aggression of foreign-armed groups, especially from Rwanda. The Mai-Mai is divided into various factions across the DRC (both the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces). Some of them have made alliances while others operate on their own. Other key-armed organizations, not on the map are “the Allied for Democratic Forces (ADF)” and “the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU).” Both the ADF and NALU are Ugandan insurgency organizations. Among all these negative forces, the ADF is the focus of this thesis. Apparently, it is the only organization that has been alleged to engage in terrorist activities, especially in Uganda.
ousted from power, the Ugandan government took severe measures against Muslims associated with the Tabligh Muslim movement. Later, one of the leaders of the Tabligh movement, Jamil Mukulu, converted from Christianity to Islam. He then formed the ADF. The ADF is a Ugandan Islamist terrorist organization now based in the eastern DRC. It became operational in the mid-1990s. In 1995, the ADF merged with another Ugandan insurgency organization called NALU. In 2002, Ugandan forces successfully managed to drive the ADF out of Uganda. Afterward, it migrated into the eastern DRC where it blended with the local population and other armed groups. Aside from the ADF attacks to delegitimize the Ugandan government, it has failed to topple it.
zxxxx The ADF Insurgency
Ideology: The ADF does not appear to have a well-established ideology; it mixes radical Islam and ethno-politics. The group is empathetic to Ugandan Muslims and the Hutu ethnic group in Rwanda. The ADF’s overall objective is to depose the Ugandan government and supersede it with an Islamic regime. However, the chance of doing so seems to be minimal because it has failed to operate in Uganda since 2007. The group’s main goal is emancipation of the Ugandan people from the perceived threat of Rwandese Tutsis’ domination. Organization Structure: The ADF’s strength is believed to be a battalion plus, with approximately 1,500 fighters. ADF leadership consists of 17 members. The formal structure appears to be hierarchical. The command and control element consists of the following persons. Sheikh Jamil Mukulu, who is the politicomilitary leader, heads the ADF. Mukulu has many aliases, such as David Steven, Arilabaki, Musezi Talengelanamiro, Mzee Tutu, Bruno, Kafeero, and Kyagulanyi. In addition, Mukulu has numerous passports of different nationalities including East African countries and the United Kingdom. He uses them to avoid detection. Another senior leader is Hood Lukwago; he is an army commander and his second in command is Hamis Kashada. The command element oversees the insurgency wing and the training wing. The chief political commissar, Musa Baluku, heads the political wing. The deputy to Baluku is Abdu Hamid Diru. These are the political advisers to Jamil Mukulu.
Origin: The history of the ADF dates back to the late 1980s. Soon after Idi Amin was
Activities: Since it became operational, the ADF has been involved in a wide range of
activities. The group has conducted armed attacks on civilians’ villages, kidnappings, and training of youth to join its forces. The group has also conducted bombing attacks aimed to undermine the legitimacy of the Ugandan government. Besides violent events, the ADF is also alleged to engage in counterfeiting, taxation on illegal timber production, and taxation on illegal mining. Area of Operations: ADF is located in the Ruwenzori Mountain ranges of North Kivu province, in eastern DRC. To a large extent, its operations have remained along the western Ugandan border with the DRC. Occasionally, the ADF militants cross the border into Uganda to terrorize villagers, kidnap youths, and bring them into their base for training. The organization mainly operates on the western Ugandan border with DRC. Its headquarters is located at Makayoba, Eringeti sector, in North Kivu Province. Its training camp is in the Isale Sector in Mwalika. For a decade or so the ADF’s operational impetus has been considerably low. During this time, its activities have been widely linked with the exploitation of mineral resources in the eastern DRC. However, towards the end of 2013, ADF appears to have stepped up its activities. For example, the group attacked unarmed civilians in a town called Kamango in eastern Congo. The attack led to a refugee influx in Uganda. About 60,000 fled to eastern Uganda. The ADF’s Funding Sources: During its early years, the ADF used to obtain funding from Khartoum (Sudan). However, that aid was cut off after Uganda and Sudan normalized their relations. Now it has established financial support cells across the East Africa
and Europe. In East Africa, the ADF raises its funds in the Eastleigh suburb of Nairobi (Kenya), the port city of Tanga (Tanzania), Hutu communities in Bujumbura (Burundi) and Kigali (Rwanda). The ADF also receives finances from its members and sympathizers in London and Northern Ireland. In addition, the ADF generates its funds from established businesses in Beni territory, North Kivu province. How ADF Entered the Eastern DRC: In their book Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism, Angel Rabasa and others define “ungoverned territory as an area in which a state faces significant challenges in establishing control … [which] can be failed or failing states, poorly controlled land or maritime borders, or areas within otherwise viable states where the central government’s authority does not extend.” Rabasa and Peters posit, “In an ungoverned territory, the state is not the primary source of authority.” This definition precisely fits the situation in eastern DRC, the under-governed region— presence of security forces and law-enforcement agencies has been observed to be minimal in the Congo’s east compared to other areas. A sense of insecurity has influenced some civilians in the eastern part of DRC to turn to rebel groups for protection. The area also has provided a favorable environment for the emergence of illegal armed groups including the ADF. These groups commit violent crimes on noncombatants; they kill civilians, rape women, impose illegal taxation, and loot civilian property. Some of the armed groups went further to provoke questioning the legitimacy of the Congolese government. For instance, before it was vanquished, M23 sought to overthrow the government of the DRC. After its defeat in 2002, the group took refuge in the eastern DRC, an area that has been an epicenter of civil wars since 1996. The ADF has exploited the ungoverned space, which enabled it to establish a base from which to continue its rebellion against the Ugandan government. zxxxx The Congolese Conflicts in Historical Context In general, ungovernability is driving instability in the eastern DRC; it has helped to create a suitable environment for illegal armed groups, both local and
foreign, to flourish. These rebel groups not only destabilize the Congo’s east, they also threaten the national security of neighboring states. In an attempt to understand how ungovernability has destabilized the security of the eastern part of the DRC, this chapter presents key drivers. In the first section, we present key factors behind instability in the eastern DRC. The second part presents past peace agreements and their challenges. The third section describes the rebellion of the M23, and the fourth section outlines the effects of civil wars in the DRC. Drawing on this historical foundation, strategies can then be developed to assist the Tanzanian government in responding to these insurgencies and terrorist attacks. More factors might be motivating the protracted conflicts in the eastern DRC, but the key drivers are the colonial legacy, manipulation of ethnic differences, spillover of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and interference of regional actors. Other drivers are state failure and the international peacebuilding culture. Some of the drivers are interwoven with each other. zxxxx Determining Appropriate Response Based on the data analysis, a number of violent acts are the cause for concern. There is a separatist movement in the island of Zanzibar, which is driven by political change. The Association for Islamic Mobilization and Propagation led the violence on the island. The association’s goal is to achieve full autonomy for the island. In addition, in May 2013, violence in Mtwara was perpetrated by hungry mobs of civilians who opposed the government’s plan to construct a gas pipeline from the Mtwara region to Dar es Salaam. The riots resulted in killings and destruction of property. Furthermore, in October 2013, alShabaab sympathizers were arrested in Mtwara while conducting terrorist training. The speculation is that they might have been preparing to sabotage the gas infrastructure they opposed. And finally, the security forces in Tanzania have yet to establish who was behind the bombing attacks in Arusha and what their motive was. Although violent events in Tanzania appear to be isolated incidences, they do put the country at risk. Terrorists may exploit the opportunity presented by local grievances and use the pre-existing groups to induce homegrown terrorism aimed at conducting
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major attacks. As noted by Louise Richardson in her book What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat, a failure to interpret the signals emitted by the hostile security environment and to address such problems may exacerbate a violent culture: a condition favoring the terrorism to flourish. Violent hotspots have the potential to be used by terrorists as a recruitment and radicalization ground to motivate youth to join their ranks. They also have the potential for future violence in Tanzania. In terms of ADF, no evidence was apparent from either the geospatial analysis or temporal analysis that would associate ADF activities with violent events that occurred in Tanzania from 2012 to 2013. However, it appears that there is an intrusion of the ADF and its affiliates within the borders of Tanzania. Additionally, the 11 people arrested while conducting terrorist training with alShabaab training materials substantiate this claim. This suggests that youth radicalization is taking place in Tanzania. Furthermore, the financial support organization at the port city of Tanga appears to generate funds that sustain the ADF’s activities. There is no information that shows the flow of financial resources. In line with this, on March 2013, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime published a report that establishes a correlation between the drug trafficking business and terrorism financing. This suggests that the Tanga-based drug cell might be collaborating with the ADF in operating a drug business in Tanzania, although no available data can establish this link. Overall, there is no organization that appears to be the most central in all measures of centrality. However, the normalized centrality scores indicate that the ADF is the most central organization in terms of closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector. The second most central organization in these three measures is the AMYC. This does not necessarily mean that the two organizations have decision-making power in the combined network. The information only reveals that the ADF and MYC communicate with more organizations than others do. In terms of degrees of centrality, the AMYC is the most central organization followed by the Mai-Mai organization, the ADF, and alShabaab. The structural position of these organizations favors them. More ties indicate greater opportunities, more choices, and less dependence on other organizations. For instance, the ADF can exchange resources
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with terrorist organizations like al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda. It can also do an exchange with insurgency organizations in the eastern DRC, the Tanga-based drug organization, AMYC, and the financial support organization. If one organization ceases to cooperate, the ADF can still exchange resources with another organization, which suggests that the ADF is in a position that provides it with opportunities to either directly influence other organizations or be directly influenced by them. Besides being the most influential organization, the ADF and its affiliates have the potential to influence the radicalization of youth groups and already existing local groups with grievances against the Tanzanian government, although these links have not been established. What is more, ADF is the most central organization in terms of closeness centrality. At this position, it has the shortest communication paths, which implies it is the only organization that can swiftly communicate with all other organizations in the network without depending on any one of them for communications. On the other hand, the insurgency organizations linked to the ADF in the eastern DRC are disadvantaged within the network. This is due to their structural positions; they are incapable of passing information to terrorist organizations or other organizations except through the ADF communication links, if they need to do so. In terms of betweenness centrality, the ADF is positioned between each of the other pairs of organizations. There is no other organization that lies between the ADF and other organizations. If the ADF wants to communicate with terrorist organizations
such as al-Shabaab, al-Qaida, or other organizations, such as AMYC, the Tanga criminal organization, the financial support organization, or with insurgent organizations, it may do so. But the insurgent organizations cannot contact the terrorist organization without passing the information through the ADF. This indicates that only the ADF can broker contacts with other organizations within the network. For example, it might prevent an insurgent organization from communicating with terrorist organizations. This is why Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust note that organizations with maximum betweenness centrality may leverage communications of nonadjacent organizations. Again the ADF was found to have the highest eigenvector centrality. Being the most central organization within the network makes other organizations view ADF as an important organization with which to associate. Since the ADF appears to be the most central organization in terms of closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, and eigenvector centrality, according to the available information, it can be inferred that the ADF’s central position makes it more influential within the combined network. This gives the ADF opportunity to influence or be influenced by other organizations. Likewise, Rodney Muhumuza asserts, “The ADF is like a licensed company which is not operational…. They are available for hire.” In spite of that, the overall results could be due to boundary specification. That is to say, the thesis has focused on collecting ADF data points, which likely made the ADF appear as a more central organiza-
tion. In people-to-people relationships, there was no information to link members of alShabaab and al-Qaeda with other actors in the combined network. Moreover, there is no actor who appears to be the most central in all measures of centrality. However, Sheikh Salim Abdurahim Barahiyan (leader of AMYC) appears to have the highest degree of centrality. This position provides him with the opportunity to influence and/or be influenced by other actors in the network. He also has maximum betweenness centrality, indicative of brokerage potential. Barahiyan might be playing the role of brokering contacts with other actors in the network. In closeness centrality, the most central actor is Jamil Mukulu (ADF leader). This implies that he can quickly communicate and relay information to other individuals within the network without depending on any other actor. In terms of eigenvector centrality, three actors were found to have the highest scores. These individuals are Shehe Rashid Muene (leader of the Tanga criminal organization) and Nassoro Rashid Muene (owner of the Tanga criminal organization related to Shehe Rashid Muene). Another central actor is Sheikh Salim Abdurahim Barahiyan. These actors are viewed as important associates and most likely provide important pieces of information to other actors in the combined network. The findings also indicate that five actors have brokerage potential and 11 individuals are cutpoints. The brokers are in a position to control other individuals who are connected to them. That is, they depend on brokers for information and material exchange. The identified cutpoints, by contrast, are individuals with low constraint; if they were removed the combined network would get disconnected. To a large extent, the ADF terrorist organization operates in the eastern DRC. Its area of operations seems to be far from the borders of Tanzania. Besides, the organization has not conducted any transnational attacks. However, caution has to be taken here. Neither border nor distance is an obstacle to terrorism. This suffices to say that Tanzania may be under less threat, but not safer. At the same time, the ADF does not appear to pose an imminent threat to Tanzania, at least not in the short term. However, in the long term, there is the potential, taking into consideration the collaboration between the ADF and al-Shabaab in the
2010 Kampala bombing and recently in the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi. The alliance between al-Shabaab and ADF in East Africa is also worrisome. The recent resurgence of the ADF indicates that the group has regrouped. It is also believed that the organization has recruited Somali refugees living in Kenya. It is possible for the ADF to use its base in the eastern DRC to harbor terrorists and turn East Africa into a “zombie” territory. For this purpose, the next chapter presents suggested intervention strategies. zxxxx Strategic Choices to Disrupt the ADF Terrorist Organization It was necessary for Tanzania to evaluate alternative intervention strategies and come up with one that could disrupt the ADF insurgency network. The desired end state is to minimize the risk of the ADF exporting terrorism into the borders of Tanzania. The suggested alternative strategies are as follows: • Targeting identified actors • Reducing tangible support • Pursuing a regional initiative Targeting Specific Actors This strategy entails targeting of central actors both at the organizational level and individual level. Organizational targeting can be extended to the most central organizations (AMYC, the ADF, and the Mai-Mai organization). Similarly, targeting could include organizations found to be key players in the network (al-Shabaab, MYC, the Mai-Mai organization, ADF, and Rwandan Hutu insurgency organization). Since Tanzania has troops in the FIB, this implies that its mandate is only applicable to fighting negative forces in the eastern DRC. The organizations like al-Shabaab and MYC are outside the area of operations of the FIB and cannot be targeted as such. A kinetic (lethal) approach and/or a non-kinetic (non-lethal) approach can be employed to target organizations operating in the eastern DRC and Tanzania. The critical set of organizations for removal was found to be al-Shabaab, MYC, Mai-Mai organization, ADF, and the Rwandan Hutu organization. Targeting these organizations would fragment the ADF combined network. On the other side, the government has to regulate the activities of religious organizations, denounce ones supporting terrorist
organizations, and prosecute those engaging in illicit businesses. Moreover, at the individual level, targeting could be conducted on those who have been shown to have brokerage potential or who are cutpoints. These individuals are Shehe Rashid Muene (leader of the Tanga drug organization); Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan (head of AMYC); Fuad Abdulrahim Barahiyan; Sharif Twaibu (kin to Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan), and Amis Kashada (ADF deputy army commander). Others are Muhammad Kayira (ADF chief of combat operations); Musa Baluku (ADF chief political commissar); Mohamadi Bunu (AMYC chairman for Dawah); Mohammed Luminsa (ADF director of training and recruitment); and Hood Lukwago (ADF army commander). Reducing Tangible Support Employing military action to thwart armed organizations in the eastern DRC is a necessary albeit insufficient condition to clear them. So, after gathering more intelligence, the FIB has to identify tangible (internal and external) support to the ADF and reduce it. The center of gravity should be local people in the eastern DRC where the organization has blended itself. That is where the ADF obtains recruits, gets food, sympathy, intelligence, finance, and sanctuary. The FIB can disconnect the group from the populace by conducting information campaigns to delegitimize it. Eventually, lack of support would weaken the ADF insurgents and force them to engage in criminal activity such as looting the civilians. In so doing, the ADF militants would become visible for targeting by the FIB. Money facilitates terrorist operations. Therefore, the ADF’s financial support (from both legal businesses and illegal businesses) in Tanzania has to be scrutinized and shut down. Further effort has to be directed at neutralizing ADF crossborder businesses. This will deter the ADF from operating within Tanzania. Pursuing a Regional Initiative Tanzania could increase diplomatic ties with member states of the East African Community (EAC): Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya. Regardless of the differences in strategic interests and priorities between them, nations become stronger as a group and individually when they work towards common interests. This strategy strives to influence the political will and sincere commitment for all member states to formulate
African Defense/February 2015
a regional strategy to dismantle ADF and its networks across the Eastern Africa region. This strategy will not only ensure sustainable peace and stability in DRC, but also stabilize the African Great Lakes region as a whole. To achieve this, the regional initiative strategy also advocates an increase in security cooperation between members of the EAC. Additionally, the community has to strengthen the Regional Defense Counter Terrorism Centre (RDCTC) based in Nairobi. The Centre has to be adequately funded and furnished with more personnel, especially analysts. Adequate funding will enable the RDCTC to be operational by employing human sources that can be tasked to gather intelligence. For instance, they can penetrate the ADF financial support cells in East Africa. This will assist to obtain intelligence, which can be used to target and completely cut off finances supporting ADF activities. zxxxx Analytical Hierarchy Process The proposed strategies are to be evaluated using the multi-criteria decisionmaking approach, better known as the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). The technique employs four criteria: • Length of Time: How long will the strategy take to realize the desired end state? • Payoff: Is it likely to achieve strategic utility (military and political objective)? • National Security: Is the strategy likely to increase the national security of Tanzania? • Resources Required: What is the number of resources needed to implement the strategy? zxxxx Final Recommendation Based on the final score, the recommended intervention strategy includes the reduction of tangible support to the ADF insurgency network. Other options were Targeting Actors and Regional Initiatives zxxxx Future Research 1. Restated Problem A main consideration of this effort was to ascertain the potential for the ADF to export terrorism into Tanzania. This study was performed based on the contention that Tanzania has contributed a battalion
African Defense/February 2015
Employing military action to thwart armed organizations in the eastern DRC is a necessary albeit insufficient condition to clear them to the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade to clear all negative forces in eastern DRC. Meanwhile, there are numerous illegal armed organizations that have been implicated in the exploitation of mineral resources in the eastern DRC to sustain their activities. These organizations include the Allied Democratic Forces terrorist organization, which has been linked to the Somalibased al-Shabaab, an affiliate of al-Qaeda. Presumably, the profit from illicit business in minerals might be accrued to the terrorist organizations that are associated with the ADF network. So flushing the ADF out of eastern DRC might make the ADF collude with its associates to launch retaliatory attacks into Tanzanian territory. In addition, the ADF might be hired by international terrorist organizations to target Tanzania: 1) to undermine the legitimacy of Tanzania’s peace initiative in eastern DRC; and 2) to divert the government’s attention from Congolese conflicts so that armed groups can continue enjoying the freedom of action and exploiting natural resources in the eastern DRC. 2. Data Collection and Data Structuring The unstructured data were gathered from open-source literature to study the problem that the thesis set out to address. Before actual data analysis was conducted, the unstructured data had to be transformed into a structured format that could be used by visual analytic software (Palantir), as well as social network analysis applications (ORA and UCINET). Data analysis was divided into two parts: visual analytics and social network analysis (SNA). The analysis was divided
into two parts because NSA provides more robust relational analysis. Visual analytics used three methodologies: link analysis, geospatial analysis, and temporal analysis. Link analysis mapped all organizations linked to the ADF terrorist organization. The geospatial study analyzed violent events associated with the ADF that occurred in specified locations. The temporal study analyzed ADF violent events that occurred from 1998 to 2013. Visual analytics also covered defensive events conducted by security forces to neutralize the ADF’s offensive. The second analytic part assessed the social network data using SNA software capable of performing detailed analysis. The analysis was performed at two levels: organizational level and individual level. Sub-organizations were excluded from SNA. In addition, the SNA used four measures of centrality: degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector. The analysis also covered sub-groups and key players at the organizational level, while constraint analysis and cutpoints were only performed at the individual level of analysis. 3. Key Results a. Regarding violent events in Tanzania, there was no evidence to suggest that there is “chain reaction” attributed to the making of the ADF. The geospatial analysis indicated a disconnection between the ADF’s activities and violent events in Tanzania. Nevertheless, the findings from link analysis indicate that the ADF has intruded into Tanzania territory through the port of Tanga. This is where it has sought financial support for its activities. It is evidenced by links between the ADF, the Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC-Tanga), and the Tanga-based criminal organization in Tanzania. b. Overall results indicate that no single organization was found to be central in all measures of centrality. Nevertheless, the ADF was found to be the most central organization in terms of closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector. The Ansar Muslim Youth Centre followed it. Having high centrality scores does not imply that these organizations have more power over other organizations. Nevertheless, their positions within the network provide them with favorable chances to communicate with many more organizations than other organizations do. These organizations with high centrality scores may also sit in a position to broker communication and resource flow. Moreover, they sit in positions favoring them to
be more influential or influenced by other organizations. c. Up to the present, the ADF terrorist organization has shown no capabilities to conduct transnational attacks. However, in the past the ADF has collaborated with al- Shabaab to attack Uganda and Kenya. Consequently, there is good reason for Tanzania to prepare for such attacks in the East African region before they occur on its soil. d. There is no evidence to substantiate assertions that the ADF is planning to attack Tanzania. However, there are red flags that this article has identified: • The ADF financial support at the port of Tanga. The port could be used for money laundering activities and as an illegal transit hub. All these could create a favorable environment for terrorist organizations to plan attacks. • The links between the ADF, AMYC, and Tanga criminal organizations. This alliance can facilitate radicalization and recruitment of youths. Eventually, this could lead to incursion of terrorists into Tanzania. • Risk areas for radicalization are the island of Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam, Mtwara, and Arusha. These areas also have the potential for violence to recur in the future. • There is a possibility that the ADF might use proxy attacks, collaborating with its associates the Somali-base al-Shabaab— just as it did in 2010 in Kampala and 2013 in Nairobi. Not only that, the ADF can calculate a strike that could have a force multiplier because of the already existing extremists in Tanzania. e. Even if the attacks do not occur, Tanzania runs the risk of a diplomatic row with Uganda due to the presence of the ADF financial support in Tanzania. In this context, Tanzania should not allow its territory being used as a base by ADF to launch attacks on Ugandan soil. zxxxx Conclusion The Allied Democratic Forces do not appear to pose an imminent security threat to Tanzania, at least in the short term. However, there is a potential long-term threat for Tanzania. The question to ponder is whether the scenario of the Westgate Mall siege might repeat itself in Tanzania. Within this thesis, three strategies were proposed to respond to
Other Security Concerns There are a couple of security threats to Tanzania’s national security that might emanate from the war-torn state of the DRC. Flushing out insurgency organizations in the eastern DRC does not guarantee that the threat would be cleared completely. For instance, the exmilitants of defeated organizations may turn to other criminal activities. Some of them may run away with weapons and sell them to get money for a living. How does the instability in the eastern DRC pose a security threat to Tanzania? Specifically, the following organized crimes: • Illicit smuggling of firearms: proliferation of small arms and armed killings are on the rise in Tanzania. Is there a small arms smuggling network? Who are they? How do they operate? • Cross-border crime: Tanzania is bordering on the DRC in the west. People living in the western regions have been suffering from armed robbery and piracy on Lake Tanganyika. Do armed groups operating in the eastern DRC perpetrate these crimes? • Another area of interest could be elephant poaching: Is there a link between illegal killing of elephants in Tanzania and terrorism financing in East Africa? Recently, Tanzania sent back illegal immigrants to their respective countries. These immigrants were posing under the guise of refugees. However, it is believed that some of them hid away from being cracked down by Tanzanian security forces. To what extent has this exercise helped to neutralize the threat posed by illegal immigrants? In a real sense, social network data concerning terrorist organizations are either incomplete or seldom found. This is because these organizations are hidden and they conduct clandestine operations. However, they are political and violent. This makes them vulnerable to detection. In this regard, there are still unknowns regarding the ADF terrorist organization. • What are the capabilities of the ADF? • What has recently strengthened this organization? • To what extent does the ADF collaborate with al-Shabaab? • Did the ADF facilitate radicalization, recruitment, and the training of al-Shabaab recruits arrested in Tanzania? Who provided them with al-Shabaab training manuals? What motives were behind their training?
the ADF terrorist organizations. These strategies are: • targeting actors (both organizations and individuals) • reducing tangible support to the ADF • sponsoring regional initiatives. Four criteria were employed to select the most appropriate strategy, which is to cut off tangible support to the ADF. Adopting this action is expected to weaken the ADF terrorist organization—not only in Tanzania, but also in the eastern DRC. zxxxx Additional Strategies Given the network and connections that the ADF has established within Tanzania, the Tanzanian government might pursue these additional strategies beyond the three identified already mentioned, should resources be available:
• Increase counterterrorism awareness through community policing; as put by Phillip Mudd, “see something, say something.” Here Tanzanian citizens have to be encouraged to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behavior and/or activity. • Increase border security. This requires coordinated efforts to neutralize crossborder threats. For example, vigorously patrolling the Tanga coastline. Ensuring that fishing ports in Tanga are not used as a “safe haven” by terrorist organizations or organized criminals (both local and international). • Implement de-radicalization programs to eradicate violent culture. These programs could moderate people already lured by extremist ideology. • Address genuine grievances aired by interest groups. Suppressing local grievances would do more harm than good. Doing so has a tendency to motivate people to find a justifiable cause for revolt against the government.
African Defense/February 2015
Communications—A Most Effective Counter-Terrorism Option
Uganda, US partner using communications to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa
An unknown author once said “Capture their minds and their hearts and souls will follow.” Although a simple short sentence, I believe this quote fully encompasses the mission of military information support operations (MISO). Military information support operations, formerly known as psychological operations (PSYOP) is defined as “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives.” MISO is used during peacetime, contingencies and declared war, these activities are not a form of force, but are force multipliers that use nonviolent means in often violent environments. Persuading rather than compelling physically, they rely on logic, fear, desire or other mental factors to promote specific emotions, attitudes or behaviors. MISO soldiers are assigned under the auspices of the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) (Provisional), a subordinate unit of US Army Special Operations Command which organizes, trains, equips, validates and deploys regionally-expert, campaign capable special warfare elements in support of the theater special operations commands, joint forces commanders, US ambassadors and other governmental agencies as directed. MISO soldiers are given specialized training in language, cultural analysis, counter-propaganda, negotiation, marketing
By Staff Sergeant Myles McCadney 7th Military Information Support Battalion (Airborne) African Defense/February 2015
theory and influence techniques. Prior to deployment, MISO soldiers receive specific training on their area of responsibility to include additional language and in-depth cultural studies to better prepare them for their jobs as force multiplies upon arrival to their area of operations. The training and attributes of the MISO soldier is extremely critical in the mission to counter the LRA. Before discussing MISO’s contribution to the Counter Lord’s Resistance Army or CLRA mission, it’s important to review the history of the LRA as well as their certain characteristics that directly impact MISO planning and targeting. The LRA is the most significant ethnic rebellion to arise in Uganda following the taking of power by Yoweri Museveni at the head of his National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1986. The LRA claims to represent the interests of the Acholi people, who inhabit north central Uganda and number over one million people. However, between 1988 and 2006, the LRA terrorized the Acholi and neighboring tribes in northern Uganda. Their brutality is well known and not pertinent to this article. However, one aspect of their terror does concern us: their use abduction as their primary recruitment tactic which has led to an almost exclusively Ugandan fighting force despite operating outside of Uganda for the past eight years. From 1988 to 2006 LRA relied on abduction and indoctrination to replenish it ranks and as many as 30,000 boys were forced to fight with the group during the 18 years it operated in Uganda. Due to linguistic and cultural differences, the LRA has learned that non-Acholi abductees cannot be trusted or trained as readily as Acholis. Thus the fighting force of the LRA has remained overwhelmingly Acholi even after being pushed out of Uganda in 2006. Males captured today serve as porters and
laborers; they are rarely allowed to carry weapons. This means that each Acholi fighter who willingly leaves the group to return home is a serious, irreparable blow to the LRA. Another factor that must be taken into account is LRA propaganda directed at members designed to prevent them from defecting. In the past, the LRA indoctrination focused on political/ religious issues, i.e. the need to defend Acholi interests by overthrowing Museveni and setting up a state based on the Ten Commandments. During the indoctrination process, the LRA assured to their new fighters that defecting would result in their family members being killed. They often made good on this promise. But, since leaving Uganda, the goal of regime change is no longer serious and retaliation against family members and home villages is impossible. Thus, the LRA has been reduced to four tactics to keep fighters from defecting. First, the LRA will kill or severely punish members trying to escape. Second, Kony’s supernatural powers will find them and hurt them wherever they are. Third, the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces or UPDF kills defectors after taking pictures of them smiling and having them record a defection message or two. A milder variant of this approach (likely developed as a response to our successful counterpropaganda) is that job opportunities are limited and reintegration into one’s former communities is problematic. Fourth, the local populations are so resentful of the LRA that they are likely to harm or kill any LRA member trying to defect. The first approach is a fact and not purely propagandistic. However, it will be seen steps that have been taken to facilitate escapes and increase the security of
defectors. As for the LRA second tactic, we have deemed it problematic to approach the subject of Kony’s supernatural powers. As for the third and fourth approaches, we have developed counter strategies. In May 2010, US President Barack Obama signed into law the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, which reaffirmed the US commitment to support regional partners’ efforts to end the atrocities of the LRA in central Africa. The national strategy to combat the LRA includes four pillars: 1. increased protection of civilians, 2. the apprehension or removal of Joseph Kony and senior LRA commanders from the battlefield, 3. the promotion of defections and support of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters, and 4. the provision of continued humanitarian relief to affected communities. MISO is strongly connected to all four of these objectives, with an emphasis on objectives 2 and 3. In order to accomplish these strategic objectives US Special Operations Command - Africa created Special Operations Command Forward – Central Africa or SOCFWD-CA to direct US C-LRA efforts ISO Operation Observant Compass which is the name of the deployment of US forces to Uganda and other countries in central Africa to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army. The US effort is to help a four-nation partnership (South Sudan, Uganda, Central Africa Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo) counter the LRA. It is a mission that includes training, funding, airlift, logistics, communications and intelligence support. MISO soldiers deployed ISO C-LRA operations usually consist of one officer and the number of enlisted soldiers. The officer is normally based at SOCFWD-CA headquarters in Entebbe, Uganda. The role of the officer is to serve as the information operations (J39) officer for SOCFWD-CA, coordinate plans and activities with the US embassy and NGOs involved in the C-LRA struggle, manage
current MISO activities, and act the primary planner for future MISO strategies. Usually the non-commissioned officers spend the majority of their time in one of the three forward operating sites: FOS Nzara in South Sudan, FOS Obo in Central African Republic and FOS Dungu in DRC. Their primary duties include the execution of MISO activities supporting ground operations (such as aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflet drops), assisting in the planning of MISO, distribution of messages to local radio stations, liaison officer with their United Nations CLRA counterparts, coordinating with NGOs and local community leaders, assisting and advising from a MISO standpoint the United States Army Special Forces operational detachment alphas or ODAs that operate out of each FOS. Our MISO CLRA efforts can be broken down into five approaches: safe reporting sites, leaflets, radio, aerial loudspeaker operations and symposiums. It is important to note that a majority of MISO conducted is in collaboration and partnership with our AURTF partners, the United Nations, the United States Department of State, and various nongovernmental organizations to include: Invisible Children, Voice Project, Enough, Resolve and Bridgeway. Our first approach is safe reporting sites (SRSs). Safe reporting sites are locations where the LRA can safely defect. Members of the LRA learn about these secure locations through leaflets, radio broadcasts, and aerial loudspeaker operations. The messages assure the LRA that they will be peacefully accepted at designated locations. Safe reporting sites are designed to counter LRA propaganda which insists that hostility is high amongst civilians due to LRA actions and atrocities. LRA members are assured by their leadership that they are likely to be killed by local populations to whom they try to defect. Our goal is not to convince civilians to put themselves in dangerous situations. Our SRSs have been chosen because they have AU-RTF collocated with them—affording local populations protection. In order to have a functional safe reporting site, we use a four stage process to achieve our desired end state. Stage 1: Sensitization – Marketing the idea and gaining the interest of the local community leaders.
Stage 2: Assessment – Are the community leaders willing to participate in such activities? Stage 3: Education - Once the communities are willing to become an SRS, the community leaders and community members are educated about the benefits of becoming an SRS (DoD Rewards, LRA is weakened), how to treat and receive defectors, and the repatriation process. Stage 4: Implementation - Once a community is in the implementation phase, safe reporting sites are fully operational and can be advertised as an SRS in MISO messaging. Communities are continually reengaged by United States special operation forces and public service announcements on the radio remind members of the importance of their commitment as well as the rewards involved in helping a defector. In order to sensitize communities, US CLRA forces in partnership with NGOs, most notably Invisible Children have established mobile cinemas. These mobile cinemas display a short film, depicting a young child being abducted into the ranks of the LRA and what he most go through in order to defect. Through visual storytelling, its helps convey that a peaceful solution is the most positive way for defection and reintegration, which benefits all of those involved. Early warning networks are community based stations used to relay information between villages and towns of LRA activity. This gives the populations of the town the ability to accurately report the movements of the LRA and to brace and prepare themselves for a potential attack. The second approach we use are leaflets: Leaflets are a print medium effective for reaching areas that are out of range of FM radio and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. Due to low literacy rates, leaflets are products with short and simple phrases and usually rely on three types of pictures. 1. cartoon narrative of LRA members escaping 2. pictures of recent and former defectors enjoying their new found way of life. It must be noted that LRA members are intensely interested in the fate of recent escapees—so we attempt to have the
African Defense/February 2015
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shortest turn around time possible for products featuring recent defectors. 3. maps to the SRS. The backside of this leaflet displays a map of a few safe reporting sites in the Central African Republic (CAR) with the frequency of CLRA radio stations, both FM and shortwave and phone numbers to call if community members want to report LRA activity or if members of the LRA would like to speak with US or AURTF forces to negotiate their defection. Some leaflets, using a small cartoon, depict the instructions on how to safely defect. For example, in the first stage a potential defector receives a leaflet with the frequency of a CLRA radio station. He, along with a comrade decide to defect in the second stage. In the third stage, he is being welcomed by the AURTF at a safe reporting site. The last image the defector is reunited with his family. Our third approach is the use of FM radio stations. Radio use among the LRA varies from group to group. In some groups, only the top leaders may be allowed to listen to the radio. In others, there may be no restrictions. In any case, a majority of recent Ugandan defectors have stated that they have heard defection messaging on the radio. There are seven CLRA FM radio stations used by those assigned to SOCFWD-CA, the UN, the AURTF, NGOs and local civil society. In the building of a CLRA MISO radio station in Djemah, a MISO team member spent three weeks plus follow-on training with villagers who were unfamiliar with the use of electronic devices, much less state of the art computers. The training included set-up and integration of radio station components (essentially a mast, antenna, broadcast unit and laptop computer). They were also trained in basic computer operations, use of broadcast and media playback software, recording techniques, trouble-shooting and journalism. It should be noted that all the training was conducted in the only language that the MISO soldier and the trainees had in common: French. In order to conduct such training, a Defense Language Proficiency Test rating of 2/2 is needed. Radio Zereda, was re-opened in Obo, Central African Republic by SOCFWD-
Senior LRA Leader Surrenders
Following his surprise January 2015 surrender to US Special Forces, Dominic Ongwen, a senior leader with the LRA, has been placed in the hands of the International Criminal Court. This victim, turned child soldier, turned senior commander recently had the charges (at least seven stemming from as far back as 2005) against him separated from other LRA leaders. CA, in partnership with Invisible Children and the Obo Radio board of directors. These collaborators emplaced new radio equipment at the site of the former radio station in order to increase the propagation radius by over 375 percent, essentially saturating the southeastern portion of the CAR with counter LRA messages. The target audience for radio messages varies but falls into two large groups: the LRA itself and local communities. Messages directed at LRA members consist of appeals from recent defectors, well-known former LRA members or trusted Acholi personalities. They also include advertisements for the Ugandan amnesty law, DoD small rewards, sensitizing the SRSs and songs with a â€œCome Homeâ€? theme. Messages directed to local civilians usually focus on SRS sensitization, advertising DoD small rewards and awareness on general LRA-related issues. The 4th approach is the aerial loudspeaker broadcast. ALS operations fall into two broad categories: surrender appeals used ISO advise, assist and accompany operations, and messages that are broadcasted in areas where the LRA is likely to be operating. The latter type tend to resemble radio broadcasts in content excluding music and long messages. Local inhabitants are not targeted with this media except for civilian non-interference messages ISO AURTF operations. When applicable to the mission, CLRA forces use key communicators to conduct live broadcasts in lieu of prerecorded messages. The final approach we use is to conduct symposiums. Sponsored by the African Union Regional Task Force and SOCFWD-CA, Come Home Symposiums
bring together those involved in counterLRA efforts to include: local civil society, humanitarian groups, military forces, cultural advisors, and state representatives from both Ugandan and US governments. The events provide an opportunity for stakeholders to collaborate with others in the community who share the same goals to create new innovative methods to help those affected by LRA activity. A measure of performance (MOP) is criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs confirm or deny that the task has been correctly performed. MISO soldiers supporting Operation Observant Compass use these four categories to ensure mission success. Although the numbers may be large, it is the quality of the products, which are culturally sound and properly vetted that resonate in effectiveness. A measures of effectiveness (MOE) is criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. The measures of effectiveness is how many people return from the LRA to their homeland and how many LRA fighters can we persuade to defect. Between January 2012 and September 2014, there were 242 confirmed returnees. Every defector since the arrival of MISO soldiers into the area of operations has seen or heard CLRA messaging or has heard of a message from a second party source within the ranks. As we are gain a more robust understanding of the operational environment, the amount of returnees continues to increase. There are fluctuation of the defections due to seasonal changes, which limits the aircraft capabilities needed to conduct leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker operations. There was also a spike in defections between June and September 2014 directly related to the defection of a senior LRA commander. A recent significant blow to the LRA was in August of 2014 when 33 members LRA defected in Digba, DRC. It was the 2nd large group to defect in Digba in August, as a group of 13 had defected just days before. This is a clear indication that CLRA MISO efforts are still proving to be successful and providing the necessary behavior change to erode the ranks of the LRA.
African Defense/February 2015
The Changing Face of the MENA Defense Industry
The Middle East and North African markets are drawing the attention of defense manufacturers with cyber security, C4ISR systems, unmanned platforms and biomettic systems as focal areas.
With the global economic meltdown having resulted in defense budget cutbacks in traditionally strong markets such as the US and Europe, defense suppliers have been forced to pivot east in a bid to offset the fall in demand. The Middle East and North African (MENA) markets have emerged as the next focal points of attention for global defense manufactures. The article below tries to capture the changing landscape and dynamics of the defense industry in the MENA region. The fact that the global defense industry benefitted immensely after the September 11 attacks on the US is widely acknowledged but often downplayed, owing to the feared political and social ramifications that may follow. American companies connected to the military industrial complex such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon and General Dynamics were among the major beneficiaries of the large number of defense and homeland security contracts doled out in the period ensuing. In the decade after the attacks, the military budget of the US was more than doubled to $700 billion and annual industry profits climbed to over $25 billion. European allies such as the UK and France also increased their defense spending, with a focus on capital expenditure. However, in the midst of all this, the world faced an economic meltdown and countries started cutting down on their defense spending. As expected, the US and Europe faced the
By Dev Mehta African Defense/February 2015
major brunt of the economic turmoil and the party seemed over for the major defense corporations worldwide. The US’s withdrawal from Afghanistan marked the beginning of a significant slowdown in spending, with the Iraq pullout further compounding problems for major defense manufacturers, most of which are American. This was when they decided to pivot east and focus on the emerging markets of the Middle East, Asia and North Africa. While Asia has been the growth story that the industry pundits have been focused on, it is the procurement potential of the Middle Eastern and North African markets that is now reshaping company strategies in the US and Europe. zxxxx Market Opportunities The Middle Eastern and North African markets provide an attractive proposition for defense manufacturers owing to their cash surplus which is fuelled by robustly performing economies. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Nigeria are expected to spend a total in upwards of $220 billion on defense procurements during the period 2015-2019, with about 40% of the outlays yet to be awarded in the form of contracts. Algeria and Egypt are the two largest markets in North Africa which is expected to see robust procurements owing to an ongoing arms race in the region and the need to control the rising threat of terrorism. They are primarily focusing on developing their capabilities in the areas of armored vehicles, transport aircraft, ammunition, attack and transport helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The major programs in the North Afri-
can region include Algeria’s procurement of Fuchs armored transport vehicles for $4.7 billion and RG41 MRAPs for an estimated cost of over $600 million, Egypt’s procurement of M1A1 tanks for $400 million and F-16 fighter aircraft for over $2 billion and Libya’s acquisition of different types of armored vehicles for over $800 million. Algeria is expected to allocate around $26 billion in capital expenditure during 2015-2019 with Egypt spending around $6 billion. Major opportunities for foreign suppliers in the Algerian market over the next decade are expected to be in armored personnel carriers and related MRO ($6.6 billion), transport aircraft ($2.9 billion), ammunition ($2.2 billion), UAVs ($1.8 billion), aviation MRO ($1.7 billion) and CBRN systems ($1.3 billion). The Egyptian market too is expected to result in robust demand for fighter and multi-role aircraft with an estimated spend of over $2 billion, diesel electric submarines (over $2 billion), naval surface combatants (over $1 billion) and transport aircraft (over $1.2 billion). zxxxx Offset Opportunities With Western defense companies now looking to tap into the growth potential of countries outside their core markets in the aftermath of the global economic crisis, the procurement dynamics have assumed a different posture. Defense offsets are increasingly becoming vital to secure a contract for companies who are now getting used to this third element in the equipment acquisition process. Even though it’s the countries in the Middle East who have clearly defined their offset
policies with a prime focus on developing their non-oil sector, the North African market is expected to witness significant activity in this domain over the next 10 years. Algeria is already in talks with a few GCC countries to set up a formal offset program, with Egypt also expected to introduce one in the near future in order to develop its indigenous manufacturing. zxxxx Competitive Landscape With the world recovering in the aftermath of the global economic meltdown, procuring countries have now become more price-conscious, with higher military offset obligations and demand for strong technology transfers becoming commonplace. Currently, the North African and Middle Eastern defense markets are dominated by large US and European companies. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have strong political ties with the US and defense procurements from US companies are therefore an obvious strategic extension of the relationship. Russia is a favored import partner of Algeria, while France and the UK also supply in large quantities to the UAE and Saudi Arabia respectively. Total self-sufficiency is probably a far out goal for the entire region but some areas such as ammunition, shipbuilding (particularly for the UAE), armored vehicles, maintenance, repair and overhaul capabilities and spare parts, are fast gaining momentum. One of the most interesting developments has been the entry of China as a defense equipment exporting nation to the African and Middle Eastern regions. China’s rise as a defense goods supplier can also be attributed to the fact that the country follows a strategy of non-interference with regard to the use and deployment of its weapons with the low cost of its equipment being an added advantage. Even though China’s presence in North Africa has been strong due to previous exports to Egypt and Algeria, it is now making a foray into the Middle East market with the SR5 vehicle-mounted universal multi-barrel rocket launcher systems, CS/VP3 type anti-mine anti-ambush vehicle, DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile and the FD-2000 high-altitude long-range air defense missile system. Turkey is yet another country looking towards the burgeoning African market which may not be able to afford the premium grade products offered by the world’s top defense companies. Recently, its De-
fense Minister Ismet Yilmaz said in a written statement that the Turkish defense industry was hoping to secure significant contracts from markets in Africa and South America. zxxxx Recommendations In spite of the tremendous potential of these defense markets, suppliers need to be aware of certain challenges that they are bound to experience all through the procurement process. Complex and drawnout decision making, demanding offset and partnering requirements, bureaucratic lethargy and robust competition from global suppliers are all important factors that need to be taken into consideration while making a pitch. Understanding local business dynamics is absolutely crucial for any company looking to make a foray into a new market and this assumes even more significance when it comes to untapped emerging markets. Factors that need to be closely evaluated when doing business with countries in the MENA region include: • Gain a good understanding of required offsets, export control guidelines and technology transfers before pitching for a contract. • Commit on delivery timelines taking factors such as bureaucratic lethargy and slow decision-making, into consideration.
• Focus on emerging areas such as cyber security, C4ISR systems, unmanned platforms and biometric systems. • Target not only the defense market but also for the highly lucrative homeland security market, which is expected to generate capital procurements in excess of $90 billion (across the MENA region) over the next 10 years. • Be proactive in pitching for contracts instead of waiting for governments to release RFPs. Participation in defense expos and trade exhibitions is one of the best ways to remain abreast of the competition.
Dev Mehta has completed an MBA in Marketing from Middlesex University, London, and joined Progressive Media Group in April 2011 handling the aerospace and defense sector research. Prior experience included stints at Copal Partners as a senior analyst and a business analyst team lead with Clifford Chance, Strategic Defence Intelligence is a real-time business information platform delivering continuously updated customer and competitor intelligence, as well as detailed industry insight and forecast reports on the global defense industry.
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African Defense/February 2015
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African Defense/February 2015