center for groups like the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), and Libya trained about 3,000 Patani Malays along with secular Palestinian groups and leftist “revolutionaries” from various lands. The BRN, on the other hand, is inspired by Indonesia's President Sukarno's nationstate building and anti-colonial outlook.
identity. Local Malay Muslims regard the Shafi’i school of thought and Islam as two sides of the same coin and thus will reject any attempt to change that balance. The Thai state and society accept the fact that the three southern-most provinces are a melting pot, culturally speaking, and yet pluralism as a concept was never incorporated
THE THAI STATE AND SOCIETY ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE THREE SOUTHERN-MOST PROVINCES ARE A MELTING POT, CULTURALLY SPEAKING, AND YET PLURALISM AS A CONCEPT WAS NEVER INCORPORATED INTO THE COUNTRY’S NATION-STATE CONSTRUCTION. That wave of armed insurgency ended during the late 1980s, when support from Arab countries dried up as many Sovietbacked countries began to reposition themselves for a post-Cold War world. At the same time, Bangkok also stepped up its diplomatic assaults, urging Arab countries to stop funding Patani Malay separatist movements. Moreover, with the assistance of the Muslim members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) granted Thailand Permanent Observer status in 1998. This status, however, has enabled Thailand to block diplomatic efforts launched by Patani Malay separatist movements to obtain the much needed international recognition in order to make their case known. By the early 1990s, most if not all of the cell members on the ground had either opted for a blanket amnesty from Bangkok or laid down their arms and returned to their villages to resume their former lives. For nearly a decade Thailand mistakenly assumed that the absence of violence meant peace. Although the fighting had stopped, the indigenous narrative that Patani is the homeland of the Patani Malays and the Thais are invaders had not disappeared. The Thai state made no effort to address the historical grievances and mistrust or reconcile the fact that the two people — Thais and Patani Malays — embraced two different sets of historical narratives. Not only did the Patani Malays reject Thailand’s notion of nationhood, but they also viewed the official policy of assimilation as something that comes at the expense of their religious
into the country’s nation-state construction. In other words all Thai citizens, regardless of religion or race, must either embrace the Thai state-constructed identity or, at the least, not challenge it openly. A recent study on the history of Thailand has pointed out that Thai society and the state can be extremely harsh to people who challenge their notion of nationhood and the narrative associated with it. This explains why the local Thai majority, including those Thais who are themselves Muslim, don’t have much sympathy for the Malays’ historical grievances. The current wave of insurgency erupted in January 2004. Unlike the previous wave, this time there were no Arab countries for them to turn to for help. Today, the BRN controls virtually all of the armed combatants and is supported by the local Malay Muslim villagers who take turns cooking for the local cells in their respective communities and serve as their eyes and ears vis-à-vis Thai security forces. In February 2013, the-then government of Prime Minister Shinawatra launched a peace initiative to end the conflict. However, it was seen as something between a big leap of faith and a hoax because the BRN was not involved in the planning from its inception. It did come to the table, but only to sabotage the initiative — a goal that it achieved by the end of the same year. In May 2014, the government was ousted in a coup and the peace initiative for the Malay-speaking South was pushed to the back burner. The coup leaders, who are currently running Thailand, revived the talks and managed to attract the interest of several
long-standing separatist movements that had surfaced during the 1960s. Most, if not all, of the participants were exiled leaders of various separatist groups that had been actively involved at that time but now have no cells on the ground. The BRN, however, refused to join the talks for various reasons. Sources in the movement said that the group will engage in direct negotiations only if Bangkok permits members of the international community to mediate the peace process. The BRN argues that this is in line with international best practices, similar to the peace processes underway in Mindanao (southern Philippines) and Aceh (Indonesia). Furthermore, the BRN demands that the members of their negotiating team be granted legal immunity before they come to the table and that the members of their political wing be properly trained in governance affairs. This means that members of the international community, preferably a foreign government with a strong record of conflict resolution and mediation, must be involved. BRN members believe that both sides could explore ideas that are considered within reach, such as the rules of engagement at the operational level, ceasefire arrangements for various small areas and other confidence-building measures with the assistance of the international facilitator. They regard the international community’s participation as important because it will enhance their legitimacy. But even if Thailand agrees to internationalize the talks, many pending problems still need to be addressed. Family members of the victims, both Malay Muslims who have been unlawfully killed by Thai soldiers and Buddhist civilians murdered by insurgents in an effort to demoralize and discredit the security apparatus, will demand justice. An independent inquiry into atrocities committed by both sides could help build confidence in a peace process. Moreover, Bangkok must stop pretending that it has the situation under control and that it has contained the violence in the far South. Indeed, the BRN has already shown that it is capable of operating outside the traditional theatre of separatist violence and that it is willing to export its campaign to other regions. ih Don Pathan is a Thailand-based security analyst and a founding member of Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com), a civil society organization dedicated to critical discussion on the conflict in Thailand’s far South. He lives in Yala, one of the three conflict-affected provinces in Thailand’s far South.
MARCH/APRIL 2018 ISLAMIC HORIZONS 55