International Relations Review: Fall 2021

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW THE 26TH ISSUE: GROUNDED IN HISTORY

FE AT U R IN G :

FEATU RI N G :

5:00 a.m., Kyiv is bombed.

by ERICA MACDONALD

Global Vaccine Inequity for Middle-Income Countries

by MAECEY NIKSCH

Seeds of Empowerment

by AVA RHEEVE

GROUNDED IN HISTORY CONTENTS IN T R O D U CTIO N

03 04

AMERI CAS

10

Letter from the Editor in Chief Farewell from IRR Seniors

16 24

IN T ER V IE W

06

Interview with "Diaries in Exile" Unifying Support for Ukraine

30

Global Vaccine Inequity for Middle-Income Countries

by Maecey Niksch The Ebb and the Flow of the Pink Tide

by Sarah Lopez Red-Stained

by Beaujena Stoyanchev The Necessary Role of Indigenous Peoples in Latin America’s Sustainable Development

by Margaret Vatter

EUROPE

35 41 49 1 SPRING 2022

5:00 a.m., Kyiv is bombed

by Erica MacDonald Controversy, Chaos, and Corruption

by Jessica Swanson Rise of The ‘Ndrangheta

by Jude Hoag

R US S IA & F O RME R SOV IE T U N IO N

56 62 66

The Rose Revolution of 2003 & Saakashvili’s Democratic Reforms

by Azima Aidarov

79 85 90

97 103

Soviet Occupation in Afghanistan in the Late 20th Century

by Mayela Machribie Lumban Gaol Caught in the Crossfire

by Conor Bolz

111

Libya, Yemen, and Foreign Intervention

by Kevin Clenard Tribal Power and Peace Building in Yemen

by Keegan Mitsuoka Will Culture Sell?

by Najla Alsweilem Seeds of Empowerment

by Ava Rheeve

A Moroccan Reformation

by Amy Graham Solidarity Under Surveillance

by Diana Reno The Sound of Democracy

by Bella Newell

ASI A

117

M I D D L E EA ST

74

AFRI CA

125 129

Tibet’s Most Valuable Weapon, Water

by Ashari Bilan-Cooper The 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics

by Sydney Steger Multilateral Security in East Asia

by Joseph Su

APPENDI X

133 134 136

Photography Senior Editorial Board Contributing Staff

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 2

misinformation. From articles on the Italian mafia, the role of agriculture in the Middle East, to the TRIPS waiver, we use history as a lesson and as a framework to guide the future of diplomacy.

Letter from the Editor in Chief Dear reader, Thank you for picking up a copy of the 26th issue of the International Relations Review!

In a sea of international relations literature, we are delighted to bring you the diverse perspectives of Boston University students this spring. As one of the leading undergraduate journals, the IRR prides itself on offering a platform for the next generation of leaders to express themselves and to be catalogued in the Library of Congress.

This issue in particular has a heavy focus on history. We seek not to rewrite history but to redefine it. Our emerging scholars offer critical analysis on myths, misconceptions, and

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At the same time that we’ve engaged with global history, the International Relations Review also has sought to shift our own trajectory. The journal has historically published a print edition every year, but in the 2021 - 2022 academic year, we’ve increased both the quality and quantity of our content. With a team of more than 100 students, the International Relations Review pushes new frontiers with a podcast, blog, and journal.

It has been incredible to see the growth of this organization over the past year and to be able to engage with my talented peers.

Thank you for supporting our journal, and I hope you enjoy paging through what we’ve created together.

BRI DG ET TE L AN G Boston University College of Arts and Sciences, Kilachand Honors College, and Pardee School of Global Studies Class of 2023 and Editor in Chief at the International Relations Review, 2021–22

Farewell from IRR Seniors When I first joined the IRR in my freshman year as a layout editor, I did not know what to expect—nor did I know what to do. Looking back now, so much has changed! For one, the IRR is now way larger and structured. The IRR went from a strictly physical small publication to a 100+ page magazine, with large strides towards digital publishing, marketing and social media, and a podcast! The IRR went from a 15 to 20 member operation to over 70 different contributors. If you told me that the publication would be over 100 pages, I would have scoffed and laughed at the notion. Yet, here we are now—with me having worked on the digital side of the IRR and publishing at least 5 articles a week. Needless to say, I am proud and honored to be entrusted to the task of revamping the website and setting up a robust system to publish articles online. I can’t wait to see what other articles and developments our online publication will have! I’m certain that the IRR will continue to grow and prosper.

Throughout my time in the IRR, I’ve seen the good, bad, and the very ugly—it’s all part of the ride. But this past year, I couldn’t have asked for a better group of people to work with. The ambition and drive from everyone—the senior board, our amazing editors and writers— is awe-inspiring. My time at BU and the IRR is coming to a close, but I’m glad to have been part of the IRR and see it become the force it is today!

It has been a pleasure to be on the IRR Layout Team for all three years of my college experience. The IRR was the place that I was able to continue my passion for aesthetic designs and to further familiarize myself with InDesign: wrestling with different features, agonizing over a crashed file that were unsaved, and having those small moments of excitement when I figured things out. I’m also surprised of how the IRR grew from a small, niche group to a large entity that is also having a lot of visibility to the BU community! Not only that the IRR community grew but also my experience as a layout consultant to Creative Director has been a development. Stepping up to be a bigger person is definitely a transition for more responsibilities and more logistical planning, but that also meant more bonding and more connections with the team. I was excited for every team meeting and will miss those chaotic 7 PMs, scrambling to get more information and confirm with Bridgette for do’s and don’ts. Though layout week was just two weeks ago from the Launch day, I enjoyed my time during those chaotic times by just being present.

TI NG WE I LI

College of Arts & Sciences Class of 2022 and Digital Director at the International Relations Review, 2021-22

ANG EL A SONG

Pardee School of Global Studies and College of Arts & Sciences Class of 2022 and Creative Director of Print at the International Relations Review, 2022 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 4

Joining the IRR my senior year has led me to one conclusion: I should’ve joined earlier. Although it’s only been one year on the team, I’ve enjoyed every second of being the Senior Editor for the Americas section. Working with all of my writers and editors, who share my passion for IR and the region, has been an incredible experience.

I’ve learned so much from all of them; they’ve exposed me to new issue areas in the Americas and crafted perspectives I wouldn’t have otherwise read about. I’m not sure what my plans after graduation will entail, but I know that wherever I go, my experiences and skills from the IRR will prove invaluable.

Of all the communities within Boston University, the International Relations Review is unmatched in its intellectual rigor, passionate staff members, and creative capacity. These are the aspects that I not only love most about this team but what make parting ways most difficult. In my time on the IRR, I’ve had the great pleasure of writing, publishing, and directing the marketing and media affairs.

From working through 4,000 word article drafts with the help of editors to the rebranding and growth of our digital presence, I can confidently leave with the practical research, writing, and media skills necessary to excel post-graduation. The peers who challenge me to think critically about the world are the same people who make the IRR so special, support unwavering through the intensity of print week, article pitches, and even the launching of new endeavors, like our podcast. This journal is not only characterized by academic rigor and professional growth: it is a community of hard-working, supportive staffers, it is a catalyst for global conversations on social change, it is the culmination of diverse passions and unique perspectives. While my time on the IRR has now come to an end, I cannot wait to see how our beloved journal will dynamically develop and flourish in the future.

Becoming senior editor of the Russia & FSU section has been a rewarding experience. I feel lucky to have had the opportunity to go from Zoom calls to in-person meetings and get to know my team better. They motivate and inspire me with their passion for the region and international relations in general. I’ve learned so much by reading and editing their articles; they bring such unique perspectives to the table. Thank you to the IRR for connecting me to a group of such talented individuals and giving me the chance to work closely beside them.

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MARL A HI LLE R

Pardee School of Global Studies, College of Arts & Sciences , and College of Communication Class of 2022 and Americas Senior Editor at the International Relations Review, 2021-22

SYDNE Y PI CKE RIN G

Pardee School of Global Studies and College of Arts & Sciences Class of 2022 and Director of Marketing & Media at the International Relations Review, 2021-22

JACQUE LI NE MO SH KOV ICH Pardee School of Global Studies and College of Arts & Sciences Class of 2022 and Russia/FSU Senior Editor at the International Relations Review, 2021-22

Unifying Support for Ukraine Directly from the Polish-Ukrainian border, “Diaries in Exile” chronicles the personal stories of the Ukrainian refugees and the immigrants who called Ukraine home. Experts predict this to be the largest humanitarian crisis Europe has seen since the 1990s. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aim is to dehumanize the people of Ukraine in order to legitimize his cruel war.

“Diaries in Exile” attempts to reveal the human consequences of forced displacement. As two individuals who have also been displaced by this war, producers Elina Alem Kent and Romana Isabella speak to these individuals not as foreigners trying to extract a quotable story but as fellow displaced people who understand and empathize with their trauma. Bridgette sits down with Alem and Romana to learn more about the goals of their project.

Bridgette: Just a few months ago, what did your-day-to-day life look like?

was writing a musical which I’m technically still supposed to be writing - that was a month ago.

Alem: For me, I was working.

I’m still technically working for the Kyiv Independent. That’s my official job; but what I really love to do is these more documentarytype projects, specifically focused on the east of Ukraine and on Donbas which was the first region to be affected by the war back in 2014. They were projects like films, virtual reality, theater — a very interactive way to introduce the rest of the world to Ukraine and to Ukrainians. So, unfortunately, Putin kind of solved what I was trying to do by putting Ukraine on the map and the main conversation throughout the world. Hopefully, we’ll be able to continue our projects once this is over and we get to return.

Bridgette: In your opinion, could the EU and NATO have prevented what happened? From your conversations, is there any Romana: We were both living consensus in Ukraine about what in Kyiv. I was starting work on a future action the international documentary art film on conspiracy community should take? theories in Eastern Europe, specifically Ukrainian conspiracy Romana: Unfortunately, prevention theories and how they kind of come is not necessarily something from a historical underpinning that is easy to talk about even from the Soviet Union. And I with hindsight. The focus right

now is primarily on diplomatic negotiation, and a lot of the things that people will turn to as saying is a kind of instigator for the conflict escalating to this level is this idea that, “Oh well, NATO had a common understanding that Ukraine and Georgia would never join.” One of the diplomatic agreements that Russia was trying to push was a promise from the United States that they would forever veto or close the door on Ukrainian membership.

Not only is Ukraine a sovereign nation, but it has the right to self-determination… [The war] goes against the very tenants of democracy that EU states and the nation is fighting for. So, unfortunately, I don’t think there is anything diplomatically that could be done. Ukraine could have done a lot to prevent this by dealing with issues of corruption. Since 2004, since independence, you would see corruption that was unfortunately very present in politics for a very long time.

Romana: This is unfortunately, an issue that stems from the very rotten roots of nepotism and oligarchy that was established in the Soviet Union. Ukraine has to eradicate this corruption. So if we’re talking about issues of prevention, I don’t think that this is an easily preventable conflict; this is something that’s been brewing since 2004 in one way, shape, or form. The war has escalated to an insane level right now, and civilian casualties are growing exponentially. I would say that the main things are to fight Russian propaganda in Western media, don’t parrot Russian talking points just because they reinforce your own anti-imperialist logic, and INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 6

give Ukraine weapons. There is not going to be a diplomatic conclusion to this war. Any sort of peace agreement or compromise will fundamentally reinforce a Russian presence in Ukraine that will only lead to another invasion. It’s a very simple statement, but a lot of Ukrainians are saying it: if Russia stops, the war ends. If Ukraine stops, there is no Ukraine.

Bridgette: Did people in your community foresee the war, or did it come as a total surprise? Did you notice differences in how younger and older generations and eastern and western Ukrainians responded? Аlem: That’s one of the main focuses in my work, and [many of] my very pro-Ukrainian friends that are actually from the East. There are some generational differences, some like ideological differences, purely because of the Russian propaganda and the brainwashing that’s occurring for people who are sitting on Russian television channels, and this is people in the east, this is people in the south, it’s people in New York City. One thing that Russia really tries to push is that eastern Ukraine is super pro-Russian and in western Ukraine, super pro-Ukrainian. It’s a perfect tool to polarize people, and I see it happen in the U.S. the same way that it’s happening here. With the invasion, it has united Ukraine. It’s more united than it’s ever been. In 2014, there was a sense of unification; a lot of my friends from the east felt like they were Ukrainian after the war started in 2014, and because they were fighting for their country, they were seeing their communities.

And now it’s become an even larger scale because, yes, there were 7 SPRING 2022

people in the west that assumed that about the east, but for example in Kherson, there are protests every day.

Romana: When you live under capitalism, there will be a lot of marketplace-based issues that turn into ideological issues, so that big divide that people say exists between western Ukraine and eastern Ukraine is primarily based on differences in economic systems. Because of the Soviet Union, a lot of the industries in eastern Ukraine had very deep connections with Russia, and most of western Ukraine developed its industry in tourism. The economic pressures that were established and reinforced by Russian propaganda is this idea that Kyiv takes all of the money but doesn’t care about the fact that the east needs Russia in order to reinforce its manufacturing and energy infrastructures. That idea got reinforced with ideological underpinnings: Western Ukrainians are all ultranationalists who want to destroy Russian language and ethnicity. So the core issue that a lot of people in the East did have was that they have different industries, and different needs; they need to maintain some sort of

relationship with Russia in order to have their industries stay alive as they are currently built and employ the majority of the people in that territory. However, when you take economic insecurity and turn it into an ideological dividing point you can see why things like the January 6 insurrection happened.

They are not because of the actual ideological issues, but they are economic insecurities that are then stoked by strongmen who want to use that population to benefit their own imperialist and economic needs. Putin exported that logic, while playing it out in eastern Ukraine.

Bridgette: Where did the idea for “Diaries in Exile” come from? Аlem: I was in L’viv when the fullscale invasion first started. I was lucky, a lot of people thought that if a further invasion occurred, it would first be focused on the east.

No one expected it to be a full-scale invasion in the whole country.

Unfortunately, both Romana and I are most likely on the kill list for Russia, just because Russia has these lists that are for activists, outspoken people against Russia, journalists, and people in the queer

community. We tick off all those boxes, and my previous work has been called out by the Russian government as pro-Ukrainian and Russian slander. So I had to leave the country because of that, and “Diaries in Exile” is honestly our coping mechanism, because it was absolutely heartbreaking to leave. It felt like we were betraying Ukraine by leaving. And as you can see, we haven’t gone further past the border — that’s how far we can get out of Ukraine. This has been our way of being able to kind of make the situation make sense: staying at the border talking to people, understanding what we’re going through, being able to empathize with them, and finding ways to be useful in some sense and be able to contribute. It’s not just a physical war; it’s an informational war and hybrid warfare that we're dealing with.

Bridgette: How is “Diaries in Exile” responding to the crisis right now?

What do you hope to contribute to the current dialogue?

Romana: Our major contribution to this conversation is to clarify a lot of the misinformation that people have about Ukrainians. If you look at any kind of snapshot of what Ukrainians are right now, what you’re going to see is either the extreme tragedy porn of poor people who have nothing and are just complete victims without any agency or desire to move forward, which is kind of the general idea that people have about refugees as a whole, or you go to the other side where all you’re being told is that… this is a war of two brother nations fighting because the United States pushed them to. These examples are full of hyperbole that do not define

the incredibly nuanced, interesting, and complex people that are Ukrainians. And I think our goal is that we understand Ukrainians to be the interesting, nuanced people that they are, and we want to bring that humanity to the conversation.

Alem: One thing that we’re in the process of is actively contributing to the funding and donations that we have received so far from friends and family and people who are now aware of “Diaries in Exile.”

We’re using that to help people in real time, whether it’s our friends that are still in Ukraine or friends who just made it over the border or people we don’t even know.

We’re in the process of setting up a GoFundMe so that we can have a platform to be able to also physically help people, because some people… We’re also trying to be practical here, because one thing is awareness, hopefully, that awareness will spur action.

Bridgette: Is there anything that the BU community can do to contribute?

Romana: This is not a tsunami, this is not a hurricane, this is not a natural disaster that happened with no fault to anybody. There are people in those planes dropping bombs on children; these are choices that are being made. It means that there are structural issues that are underpinning those choices, and the only way we can defeat the structure is with our coalition and solidarity. The best thing that a BU student can do right now is to establish sources of solidarity and coalition with their actions. And if they are able to gather funds in order to support, whether it’s the Ukrainian army or

if it’s the programs that are helping Ukrainians get out of the occupied cities or over the border, then that would be the best way to go about it.

Bridgette: Where would you like to see this project go in the future?

Romana: I think our goal is to film the last episode in Kyiv. It’s very, very personal for us; we can’t deny that we’re not incredibly biased.

For us, our goal is to film the last episode at a huge techno party in Kyiv with all of our friends.

Alem: Now, we’re at the border.

We’re thinking of maybe going to the German-Polish border, because Germany was one of the first countries to open itself up and now is so full that they’re building refugee camps, so we want to see what’s going on there… we will probably end up going to Berlin for interviews. The moment the war ends, we’re going back. But, until then, while we’re in exile and while everyone else is in exile, we’ll just continue trying to help people speak their truth and eventually make it back to Ukraine. Because once we’re back in Ukraine, we’re not going to be an exile anymore and that mean the project will be over.

Search for "Diaries in Exile" on YouTube to watch interviews and view new content.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 8

A M E R I C A S

Editor's Note

T

his semester’s Americas section delves into just a few of the obstacles the region faces and pays special attention to the challenges Indigenous peoples face, a topic that is often underreported on. These pieces highlight the important historical context of the relationship between Indigenous communities and the state, particularly how the relationship has developed in the face of rising concerns about climate change. The articles in this section also cover the recent string of left-leaning politicians elected in Latin America, the reemergence of a Pink Tide, and the rising popularity of leftist politics.

Similar to the rest of the world, the Americas is still grappling with COVID-19 and, in particular, vaccine distribution.

Dominant Latin American powers, including Brazil, continue to navigate vaccine inequity that plague middleincome countries.

Thank you to everyone on the Americas team who worked tirelessly to create these well-written, informative, and impactful articles. It was a pleasure to spend my last semester at BU working with my peers who share my passion for international relations, specifically in the Americas.

MARL A HI LLE R, CAS & COM '2 2 Senior Editor, Americas

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A ME RIC A S

Global Vaccine Inequity for MiddleIncome Countries Insights from Brazil

by Ma ec ey Niksc h edited by Ba iden Wr ight

D

eveloping COVID-19 vaccines was only one hurdle in the global health response to the pandemic. Once the rollout of COVID-19 vaccines started, the more difficult initiative began: global allocation and distribution. While as of February 2022, 46 percent of the world is estimated to have had at least one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine, it is critical to note the global inequities regarding vaccine access, which have contributed to a delayed rollout in the countries where the vaccine was initially unavailable.1 Those most affected by global disparities in vaccine access are lower and middle income countries (LMICs), who rely on foreign pharmaceutical companies for vaccines.

The COVID-19 pandemic has only further revealed long-existing global vaccine inequities stemming from pharmaceutical conglomerates dominating the global vaccine market. Though these companies do aid in vaccine procurement for LMICs, the ongoing crisis has illuminated technology transfer difficulties as a barrier to sufficient vaccine procurement, in particular for Brazil and other middle income countries (MICs), that necessitate a change in protocol for technology transfer rules in emergency circumstances, focusing on sharing knowledge as well as vaccine procurement.

At the core of global vaccine access inequities are the handful of providers that dominate the market and vaccine nationalism. Vaccine

nationalism refers to the pursuit of vaccines in the national interest, meaning that a vaccine-producing country prioritizes all of their own populations first, even before essential healthcare workers and highly vulnerable populations in other countries.2 This inequitable mentality creates both “winners” and “losers”: resource-rich countries who have control over vaccine production “win” for vaccinating large shares of their population, while poorer countries “lose” out on their own national health because of inability to access vaccine doses.3 Major pharmaceutical conglomerates in the global vaccine market—almost all of which are headquartered in the United States and Europe—account for nearly all of the human vaccines currently in production, and these dominant companies restrict access to their technologies as a part of a competitive business strategy to increase their profits.4 This is evidenced through the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 2020 global vaccine market report, which reveals that for all vaccines only four pharmaceutical companies (GSK, Merck, Pfizer, and Sanofi) accounted for approximately 90 percent of global vaccine sales revenues and five companies (SII, GSK, Sanofi, BBIL, and Haffkine) produced 60 percent of the global vaccine volume.5 Although there is an upward trend both for the vaccine sector’s profit growth rate as well as the number of vaccine manufacturers, particularly in LMICs, INTERNATIONAL RELATIIONS REVIEW 10

few are capable of meeting international quality standards set by the WHO, thus maintaining the oligopoly of pharmaceutical companies who are able to produce and disperse vaccines.6 Because the health innovation process is entangled with global asymmetries that prioritize rich countries, the unbalanced COVID responses around the world are increasingly likely to reveal an “uncoordinated patchwork of immunity” that would allow the rise of more variants, possibly undermining the vaccine’s effectiveness and leading the world farther away from the end of the pandemic.7 Now more than ever, after two years’ duration of the pandemic and multiple variant surges, pharmaceutical conglomerates should recognize the need to assist global vaccination efforts.

In 2020, the World Health Organization, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) established COVAX, a multilateral mechanism aimed at vaccinating all high risk people and health workers equally in every nation.8 However, the COVAX effort to collectively source and equitably distribute vaccines globally has been undercut by vaccine scarcity and underfunding.9 Despite the COVAX agreement for the pooled procurement of vaccines from high-income originator countries and the existence of multiple safe, highly efficacious vaccines, as of August 2021, only 20 percent of people in middle income countries and 0.9 percent in low income countries had received at least one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine, compared to 46 percent of people in high income countries.10 As of February 2022, the numbers have improved but still demonstrate major disparities between different income thresholds: 56 percent of people in middle income countries and 12 percent of people in low income countries have received at least one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine, compared to 78 percent in high income countries.11 Vaccines should be deployed worldwide in order to slow the spread of the pandemic, but vaccine nationalism has persisted in high-resource countries that procure vaccines at excessive rates without much regard for other global populations, much to the detriment of lesswealthy countries.12 Additionally, COVAX may provide zero-cost vaccines to poor countries, but many MICs are ineligible for zero-cost vaccines and 11 SPRING 2022

must participate in pooled procurement as “selffinanced countries,” having to purchase the doses despite being unable to afford to vaccinate their entire populations.13 Aside from vaccine donations, there needs to be a sustainable way for LMICs, especially MICs, to affordably produce their own vaccines to ensure that population-wide vaccination is reached.14 The Brazilian vaccine market in particular faces tremendous pressure from the pandemic because of its reliance on foreign providers for vaccine technology. Due to stricter quality control, the last private Brazilian vaccine manufacturer stopped production in the 1980s, despite the continued demand and role of large pharmaceutical conglomerates for Brazil’s supply of vaccines.15 As of today, Brazilian domestic production of human vaccines is conducted by four main public manufacturers—Bio-Manguinhos/ Fiocruz, Ataulpho de Paiva Foundation (FAP), Butantan Institute (Butantan), and Ezequiel Dias Foundation (Funed)—and supplied to the National Immunization Program. However, these public manufacturers are almost entirely reliant on contracts from foreign laboratories to develop, test, and produce vaccines within Brazil’s public health system, as these foreign laboratories have the vaccine technology and knowledge that public manufacturers need to expand their capacity in vaccine production.16 Brazil’s public laboratories internalize vaccine production through technology transfer agreements, an exchange of technology and knowledge with a foreign laboratory that establishes the expertise needed to enable local vaccine production.17 The size of the Brazilian population— estimated at over 213 million people in 202118—and the breadth of the Brazilian National Immunization Program (PNI) make Brazil one of the world’s largest markets for vaccine doses.19 But, because domestic vaccine production in Brazil is exclusively public and dependent upon foreign pharmaceutical companies’ technology transfer strategies, Brazil is left without much sovereignty or self-sufficiency in the vaccine industry.20 A global focus on technology transfer for cheaper local/regional production, as opposed to the current prioritization of vaccine procurement, which many MICs cannot afford in full, would reduce vaccine access inequities

like those seen in Brazil. The Brazilian vaccine market demonstrates a need for LMICs to seek independence from pharmaceutical conglomerates and develop their own industries in preparation for future emergencies, which increased technology transfer to LMICs could help facilitate.

Brazil has undertaken many complicated attempts at vaccine procurement, obstructed by both local political conflicts as well as technical and legal problems. Because Brazil is only eligible to participate in COVAX as a “self-financing” country, the Brazilian Ministry of Health’s (MoH) primary strategy for vaccine procurement was to combine purchasing doses with making agreements for technology transfers and local production, which would eventually allow Brazil access to more vaccine doses at lower prices.21 Initially in June 2020, the MoH made an agreement with the English company AstraZeneca (AZ) that would allow Brazil’s Biomanguinhos to produce the COVID-19 vaccine locally.22 However, the agreement was not signed until May 2021, almost a year later, due to a long negotiation over the precise terms of the technology transfer agreement.23 Similarly, the MoH was unable to secure a commitment with Pfizer to ensure technology transfer and local production until August 2021, when Pfizer and BioNTech announced a collaboration with Brazil’s Eurofarma to manufacture vaccines for Latin America starting in 2022 [as of early March 2022, no updates have

been found regarding whether manufacturing has indeed commenced].24 Even then, it seems as though Pfizer’s collaboration corresponds to international pressure from the Pan American Health Organization’s (PAHO) program to boost regional production of COVID-19 vaccines in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin.25 The global disparities in COVID-19 vaccine access have put at issue intellectual property (IP) rights agreements inherent to the World Trade Organization (WTO), spurring debate over whether IP protections may be temporarily waived to spread global health equity and procure vaccines more effectively at the global scale. The 1995 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement established within the WTO a minimum protection standard for intellectual property—including patents, industrial designs, trade secrets, and copyright.26 Since then, rulings such as the Doha Declaration have in part clarified the safeguards on patents, especially on compulsory licensing that allows governments to license patents to third parties without consent.27 Despite some rulings that have allowed for more licensing leniency, the TRIPS agreement has greatly increased the difficulty of the international circulation of technology-based knowledge.28 These IP protections extend to vaccine technologies, which affects the quantity, location, and availability of vaccine production.29 The TRIPS Agreement outlines the protocol for issuance of two basic categories of IP licenses to third parties: (i) voluntary licenses, in which the patent owner issues the license to a third party with quality requirements, established payment, and defined markets in which the licensor can use the license; (ii) compulsory licenses, in which the national government issues a third party to produce a patented good without permission of the patent owner, though the patent owner is still paid “adequate remuneration.”30 Ostensibly, there is also a provision of the TRIPS Agreement that accounts for global pandemic scenarios. TRIPS Agreement Article 31b allows national governments to pursue compulsory licensing directly (without first trying to negotiate a voluntary license with the patent owner) “during national emergencies, other circumstances of extreme urgency, or public noncommercial use.”31 INTERNATIONAL RELATIIONS REVIEW 12

Despite the apparent flexibility of the agreement, TRIPS still presents an obstacle to transferring vaccine knowledge with IP restrictions to LMICs abroad. TRIPS Article 31b outlines the issuance of compulsory licensing on a slow caseby-case basis—each patent license would have to be negotiated separately by each country in the WTO and for each product—and this only includes patents, not other IP rights as well.32 Additionally, TRIPS Article 31f restricts compulsory licenses to predominantly domestic supply.33 Therefore, the current provisions of TRIPS do not allow for the swift exportation of vaccine licenses to LMICs that the pandemic requires. The production bottleneck of the global vaccine supply results from IP protections that govern the production of and access to vaccines, which primarily benefits rich nations.34 Because of these global asymmetries in vaccine access and the failures of global health aid, LMICs have taken to challenging established global intellectual property (IP) rules in the hopes of eliminating disparities in vaccine access for their populations. The People’s Vaccine Alliance—a global coalition including UNAIDS, Amnesty International, and Public Citizen—argues that pharmaceutical corporations must share their knowledge of vaccine technology free from patents in order to allow COVID-19 vaccines to be produced as widely as possible.35 Voluntary licenses rely on the moral compass of pharmaceutical companies, which have proven to prioritize profits over equitable distribution, and the glacially slow process of compulsory licensing does not allow countries to produce or export vaccines with the urgency needed to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Being that multilateral efforts to disperse vaccines have fallen short and vaccine inequity persists for poorer nations, a potential option for LMICs, and specifically MICs, is to pursue emergency, temporary TRIPS waivers. Notably, in October 2020, India and South Africa proposed a waiver of certain TRIPS obligations in relation to the COVID-19 emergency, which has since garnered support and launched ongoing WTO discussions in at least sixty other countries, including Brazil.36 Proposed emergency TRIPS waivers, including the one put forth by Brazil, would remove all IP as a barrier on a temporary basis, thus expediting 13 SPRING 2022

vaccine production and allowing the export of vaccines to countries in need without bureaucratic limitations.37 Some in opposition to a TRIPS waiver claim that, regardless of a waiver to IP, LMICs have a limited capacity to produce complex COVID-19 vaccines effectively, which is argued to be the true barrier to global production, rather than IP. A lot of this argument has to do with the mentality that standards and capabilities that exist in the United States cannot be easily replicated or guaranteed, given that vaccine production requires sophisticated processes, procedures, materials, and manufacturing.38 However, this prejudiced assumption underestimates the manufacturing capabilities of LMICs, as several do have the manufacturing capacity to produce complex COVID-19 vaccines, including Brazil.39 In fact, the Pan American Health Organization chose Brazil, alongside Argentina, to become regional production hubs for COVID-19 vaccines in Latin America.40 Additionally, many of those in favor of a temporary TRIPS waiver recognize that a waiver is only the first item on a list of necessary changes, with needs thereafter including the implementation of long-term investment strategies to increase the global manufacturing capacity for developing and producing vaccines. 41 Perhaps the most emphasized opposition to a temporary TRIPS waiver is that it would stifle investment in research and development (R&D).

While a waiver would reduce profit margins on current COVID-19 vaccines, an emergency TRIPS

waiver would be time-limited and only related to COVID-19-related vaccine IP, so there is no compelling evidence that a temporary waiver would dismantle the entire IP system and incentives to invest in R&D.42 While not desirable to the conglomerates at the forefront of the pharmaceutical industry, an IP waiver is a necessary step to codify the responsibility of pharmaceutical companies to transfer life-saving vaccine technology in a time of global crisis. Knowledge transfer from these companies is essential to help suppliers begin vaccine production. Therefore, because it is against the profit interests of companies to conduct knowledge transfers, an IP waiver would allow governments to leverage domestic law with private sector incentives and contract terms with pharmaceutical companies to require technology transfers in exchange for continuing enterprise or avoiding penalties.43 However, attempts to pass temporary TRIPS waivers during the COVID-19 pandemic only reflect a desperate attempt to put in place emergency protocol during the emergency instead of beforehand.

Brazil, along with other LMICs, proposed its own temporary TRIPS waiver to try to ease the technology transfer process integral to domestic vaccine procurement. In September 2021, Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro proposed a domestic law to provide for the compulsory licensing of patents or patent applications in cases of national or international emergency.44 International shortages of the vaccine and high prices had limited Brazil’s ability to combat COVID-19 domestically spurred the proposal of this bill.45 This proposed law, effectively a waiver of the TRIPS agreement, gained traction across the political spectrum; however, Bolsonaro vetoed many sections of the bill, leaving the bill in purgatory pending those vetoes since October 2021.46 Collectively, WTO members’ positions still remain divergent on the issue, and the Twelfth WTO Ministerial Conference was postponed until June 2022 due to the Omicron variant, making it unlikely that WTO members will reach an agreement anytime soon.47 Given the emergency circumstances of the protracted COVID-19 pandemic, Brazil’s attempt at a TRIPS waiver was enacted out of necessity to get the ball rolling faster on vaccine production

in order to overcome the slow legal processes of initiating technology transfer and protect its population’s health. The pursuit of a TRIPS waiver was a symptom of a larger and ongoing problem during this pandemic and beyond: the need for a change in protocol for technology transfer rules in emergency circumstances, for vaccines and possibly other drugs. For further global health preparedness, there is a critical need for protocols to facilitate a more globally synchronized and inclusive response to crisis, particularly by making technology transfer less difficult for middle income countries who need to supplement vaccine doses from multilaterally pooled ones with locally procured vaccines. In order to make global health more equitable, there must be international cooperation to promote international health. A collective, rather than individualistic, mentality needs to be codified for vaccine technology transfer in the future.

References

1 Hannah Ritchie, Edouard Mathieu, Lucas Rodés-Guirao, Cameron Appel, Charlie Giattino, Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Joe Hasell, Bobbie Macdonald, Diana Beltekian and Max Roser. “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccines.” Our World in Data, March 5, 2020, https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations.

2 Thomas J. Bollyky and Chad P. Bown, "The Tragedy of Vaccine Nationalism: Only Cooperation Can End the Pandemic," Foreign Affairs 99, no. 5 (September/October 2020): 97.

3 Ibid., 98-100.

4 Carlos Augusto Grabois Gadelha, Patricia Seixas Da Costa Braga, Karla Bernardo Mattoso Montenegro, e Bernardo Bahia Cesário. "Acesso a Vacinas No Brasil No Contexto Da Dinâmica Global Do Complexo EconômicoIndustrial Da Saúde." Cadernos De Saúde Pública 36, no. Suppl 2 (2020): Cadernos De Saúde Pública, 2020, Vol.36 (suppl 2): 4-5.

5 World Health Organization. “Global Vaccine Market Report.” World Health Organization (2020).

6 Gadelha et al., 4-5.

7 Ingrid T. Katz, Rebecca Weintraub, Linda-Gail Bekker, and Allan M Brandt. "From Vaccine Nationalism to Vaccine Equity — Finding a Path Forward." The New England Journal of Medicine 384, no. 14 (2021): 1281.

8 Gregg Gonsalves and Gavin Yamey. “The Covid-19 Vaccine Patent Waiver: A Crucial Step towards a ‘People’s Vaccine’.” BMJ (Online) 373 (2021): N1249.

9 Parsa Erfani, Agnes Binagwaho, Mohamed Juldeh Jalloh, Muhammad Yunus, Paul Farmer, and Vanessa Kerry. "Intellectual Property Waiver for Covid-19 Vaccines Will Advance Global Health Equity." BMJ (Online) 374 10 Erfani et al., 1.

11Ritchie et al.

12 Katz et al., 1281.

13 Elize Massard Da Fonseca, Kenneth C Shadlen, and Francisco I Bastos.

"The Politics of COVID-19 Vaccination in Middle-income Countries: Lessons from Brazil." Social Science & Medicine. 281 (2021): 114093.

14 Gonsalves & Yamey.

15 Akira Homma. "The Brazilian vaccine manufacturers' perspective and its

INTERNATIONAL RELATIIONS REVIEW 14

current status." Biologicals 37, no. 3 (2009): 174; Gadelha et al., 6.

16 Reinaldo Guimarães. " Vacinas: Da Saúde Pública Ao Big Business."

Ciência & Saúde Coletiva 26, no. 5 (2021): 1850.

17 Fonseca et al., 4.

18 R. Milton Schneider, Richard P. Momsen, E. Bradford Burns, Preston E. James and Luciano Martins. "Brazil." Encyclopedia Britannica, March 14, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/place/Brazil.

19 Gadelha et al., 6.

20 Ibid., 12-13.

21 Fonseca et al., 4.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Pfizer, “Pfizer and BioNTech Announce Collaboration with Brazil's Eurofarma to Manufacture COVID-19 Vaccine Doses for Latin America.”

Pfizer Inc, August 26, 2021, https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/ press-release-detail/pfizer-and-biontech-announce-collaboration-brazils.

25 Pan American Health Organization. “PAHO Will Launch Collaborative Platform to Boost Regional Production of COVID-19 Vaccines.” Pan American Health Organization, August 25, 2021, https://www.paho.org/en/ news/25-8-2021-paho-will-launch-collaborative-platform-boost-regionalproduction-covid-19-vaccines.

26 Erfani et al., 1.

27 Ibid.

28 Guimarães, 1848.

29 Ibid.

30 Erfani et al., 1.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 2.

33 Ibid., 3.

34 Ibid., 1.

35 Gonsalves & Yamey.

36 Shayerah I. Akhtar and Ian F. Fergusson. “Potential WTO TRIPS Waiver and COVID-19.” Congressional Research Service, September 13, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11858.

37 Erfani et al., 3.

38 Peter J. Pitts, Robert Popovian, and Wayne Weingarden. "Waiving COVID-19 Vaccine Patents: A Bad Idea and a Dangerous Precedent." Journal of Commercial Biotechnology 26, no. 2 (2021): Journal of Commercial Biotechnology, 2021-09-02, Vol.26 (2): 22.

39 Erfani et al., 2.

40 Pan American Health Organization.

41 Katz et al., 1282.

42 Erfani et al., 3.

43 Ibid.

44 Library of Congress.“Brazil: Patent Law Amended to Allow for Compulsory Licensing of Patents.” 2021, https://www.loc.gov/item/ global-legal-monitor/2021-10-12/brazil-patent-law-amended-to-allow-forcompulsory-licensing-of-patents/.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 World Trade Organization. “Twelfth WTO Ministerial Conference.”

Accessed March 17, 2022, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/ mc12_e/mc12_e.htm.

15 SPRING 2022

A MER IC AS

The Ebb and Flow of the Pink Tide:

Understanding Honduras’ and Chile’s 2021 Leftist Victories

b y Sa r a h Lo p ez e d it e d by Ma x Fer ra dino

reviewed by AMBASSADOR JORGE HEINE Ambassador of Chile to China (2014-2017), India (20032007) and South Africa (1994-1999) Global Fellow at The Wilson Center Consultant to the United Nations, the Ford Foundation, and the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 16

R

ed and blue confetti, seemingly endless, floats to the ground where there stands a young man, bearded and dressed in a clean blue blazer—Gabriel Boric, selfdescribed as a “moderate socialist,” has become Chile’s youngest president-elect in the nation’s history on December 21, 2021.1 Only a few weeks later and a couple thousand miles away, a woman in a blue and whitestriped sash, vibrant against her burgundy suit, raises her fist to the crowd: Xiomara Castro, candidate of the democratic socialist party called Libre, has been inaugurated as Honduras’ president on January 27, 2022.

Castro makes history as Honduras’ first female president and the first president not part of the conservative National Party or center Liberal Party since 1982. There’s a sense of deja vu when regarding Honduras’ and Chile’s elections as Boric’s and Castro’s victories have marked a turn of the tide towards leftist governments in Latin America once again.

Neoliberalism and the Initial “Left Turn”

At the start of the 21st century, Latin American populations felt the repercussions of the last century (immense poverty, criminality, and extreme social inequality), and as a result, countries in the region began ousting their center-right governments in favor of left-wing administrations. Political scholars refer to this wave of election victories for left-wing governments as the “Left Turn” or the “Pink Tide” (1998–2005). However, a few years after this initial “Left Turn,” rightleaning governments replaced many of the left-wing governments. In the same period, neoliberal policies broadened their reach

17 SPRING 2022

beyond the economic sphere and into the social sphere, severely impacting the ways in which citizens interacted with corporations who influenced social policy tremendously. Under these right-leaning governments, the idea of a “corporate state” began to solidify in Latin America as the business elite in the region increased their political power, creating states that must prioritize corporate interest over social wellbeing due to corporations’ unique ability to influence government policy through economic means.

This conflict of interest between the well-being of the population and well-being of corporations was exposed and dramatically worsened during the pandemic, leading the population to turn towards left-wing governments that work towards social policy instead of fiscal policy. The resurgence of the “Pink Tide” in Latin America is based upon backlash against the “corporate state” and the grievous failures made by the corporate state during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Honduras and Chile provide important case studies for the way in which the “Pink Tide” returned in two countries who faced vastly different social and economic consequences after the implementation of neoliberal policies and the initial “Left Turn.”

Towards the end of the 80s and into the early 90s, many Latin American countries like Chile and Honduras were reaching the end of their dictatorial governments.

In Chile, Augusto Pinochet, who was the dictator of Chile from 1974 to 1990, was forced out of office after 56 percent

of the Chilean population voted in a 1988 plebiscite for Pinochet to step down. In Honduras, a constitutional assembly gathered in January of 1982 after the two decades of military dictatorship and political instability to establish a more democratic constitution for the nation. After decades of dictatorial government and political instability, the Latin American political elite began to look to their neighbor, the United States, for economic restructuring with neoliberal policies, in the hopes that this would help the population transition from eras of dictatorships to democracy. However, this economic restructuring, provided through the Washington Consensus (coined in 1989

by John Williamson from the Institute of International Economics), would prove to have tragic consequences socially.

The Washington Consensus was originally meant as a necessity for the region as many countries in the 80s, after exiting their eras of dictatorship, borrowed from the U.S. and found themselves in extreme levels of foreign debt.2 The Washington Consensus was a policy package of ten tenets that promoted the neoliberal emphasis on free markets, foreign investments, privatization, and trade liberalization, and the consensus was promoted to move the Latin American economies from Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)—an economic structure that prioritized highquality goods and services for export as much of the domestic population could not afford the high-quality goods they produced. The Washington Consensus was intended for

“sustained growth” to create “more flexible and productive economies.”3 However, the consequences of this policy package were varied and, though initially led to growth, never created the sustained and stable growth the policy-makers promised.

As Latin America entered the new millenium, it became apparent that the previous decades of dictatorship had left deep cracks in the foundations of each country’s political system, and these cracks were not addressed by the Washington Consensus. The first “Left Turn” (1998–2005), which encapsulated most of Latin America, happened for three main reasons— economic decline as the neoliberal policies that were implemented failed the majority of the population, deep social inequality due to the region’s colonial past, and the broad population’s lack of access to political processes like voting or local bureaucratic systems.

The downfall of the Washington Consensus was its inability to address the social problems in each country, yet social norms and institutions determine an economic system’s success or failure.4 The Washington Consensus was created and implemented by United States politicians and Global North-centered institutions without an understanding of the already-existing social problems that contributed to the economic crises of Latin American countries in the 80s and 90s. Issues such as limited social mobility, lack of indigenous and Black civil rights, lack of access to education, and distrust

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 18

in the political system were not addressed by the Washington Consensus’ neoliberal policies because, though neoliberalism seeks to define social aspects of life economically, social issues are not fixed by freeing markets and minimizing the role of government.5 However, Latin American governments adopted the policies in the hopes that a move towards fiscal security could lead to political and social security.

The consequences of ISI persisted under the move towards neoliberal economic policies. ISI created regional economic imbalances as the system led to increased urbanization and migration to urban spaces for work in the factories that exported the high-quality goods and services that ISI emphasized. It also increased income inequality as the middle class solidified and continued to grow in this era.6 As the new millenium began and the Washington Consensus’ policies remained the blueprint for economic reform, the corporate state solidified. The concept of the corporate state is a way to understand the complex overlaps in policy, social issues, and corporate interest which creates a relationship between state institutions and civil society as they attempt to balance social problems and private interests that are often in conflict with each other. While the development of the corporate state changed the way government and the private sector interact, it also changed the way in which the state is defined.With the movement of corporate interest into the political spheres of Latin American countries and the neoliberal principles of minimal government

19 SPRING 2022

involvement in the economic sphere and increase in foreign investment, private corporations, both foreign and domestic, have increasingly more political power and influence over policy. This shift then defines the state as the institutions that support any given mode of capital accumulation.7 In the last two decades, the definition of civil society has also shifted towards understanding who is included and how instead of considering inclusion in civil society as a given facet of citizenship.

Recently, there is an understanding that the additional dimension of civil society is understanding how it is shaped. It is shaped “by the ideology, power configuration, class sectors and political context” dominant in any given nation—political context must now include the private sector and its interest.8 Understanding these shifts in the state and in civil society illuminates the ways in which the corporate state has become—within the last two decades after the implementation of the Washington Consensus—the dominant structure in Latin America. If the state is also defined by capital accumulation, which gives power to foreign and domestic corporations, and civil society is shaped by power balances and the dominant ideology, which in Latin America is influenced by neoliberal principles, corporations are now the most important entities in any country.

The first Left Turn occurred during this period of corporate prioritization.

However, after the 2008 economic crisis,

to foreign investment in mining and the development of export sectors.10 However, despite their differences, both Chile and Honduras have experienced social unrest in recent years and have moved towards leftist governments.

Honduras

many Latin American countries immediately turned towards center-right governments—the champions of neoliberalism. Social problems only continued to deepen.

Honduras and Chile as Examples

Two examples of the current resurgence in leftist governments in Latin America are Honduras and Chile. These countries, who suffered varying consequences due to the shift towards neoliberalism in the 90s, recently elected socialist presidents—in Honduras, Xiomara Castro, and in Chile, Gabriel Boric. Honduras and Chile are two extreme ends of the Washington Consensus’ effect and the first “Left Turn.” Honduras experienced little stable economic growth after the implementation of neoliberal policies and saw virtually no change in poverty rates because there was no increase in the amount of formal employment during this time.9 Migration became the only option for most people towards economic stability. Informal and illegal labor sectors (aided by the rise of gangs in the country) became dominant forms of employment.

Chile, on the other hand, was a “poster child” of neoliberal policies’ early success as the country increased its productivity from 1987–2010 due

Honduras experienced a “Left Turn” with the election of Manuel Zelaya in 2005, a center-left candidate from the Honduran economic elite, but this “Left Turn” was met with a violent reaction from the small, elite middle-class. Though Zelaya prioritized the economic elite and neoliberal values during the first few years of his presidency, he was violently ousted by his opposition from office in June 2009. There were several reasons according to the business elite for the ousting of Zelaya, including his work with NGOs and social movements and his attempt to raise the minimum wage in Honduras by 40 percent.11 Zelaya also sought to hold a non-binding referendum to redraft the Constitution, written in 1982, for reasons that are publicly debated.12 Elites viewed these acts as movements towards the left and as alignments towards Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez who had “declared war” on the business class.13 Corporations got nervous, and, due to their funding of the military which allows for influence of the army, the business elite were able to oust Zelaya from office.

This removal of Zelaya, and subsequent exile, illustrates how

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 20

corporate entities maintain their political power through blackmail when administrations propose measures that seem hostile to business interests like raising minimum wage or equity measures for marginalized groups. After Zelaya, Honduran governance returns to la mano dura (the Iron Fist) of increased policing and suppression of social movements.14 Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo, from the Honduran Nationalist Party, returned to power and marked a return to oligarchy after what could have been a shift towards prioritization of social issues and, perhaps, a more inclusive democracy of Indigenous rights, Black rights, LGBTQ+ rights, and women’s rights. La mano dura excluded those in civil society—activists, social movements, organizations concerned with social issues from civil society—and it provided no access to political processes or modes to critique the government. Once again, the corporate state modifies the boundaries of civil society and can exclude any facet of the population, according to their interest. With a change in administration, it is possible to redefine the borders of civil society.

The new president of Honduras is Xiomara Castro—a member of the LIBRE democratic socialist party, the former First Lady, and wife of Manuel Zelaya. Castro’s involvement in politics precedes Zelaya’s career, but her work increased in publicity after the

21 SPRING 2022

exile of her husband. Her platform has been identified as further left-leaning than Zelaya’s. Castro is pledging a referendum to rewrite the Constitution as well as implementing changes to decrease the extreme poverty experienced by 40 percent of Hondurans in 2019—a percentage which has largely increased since the start of the pandemic where about 400,000 Hondurans lost their sources of income.15 Castro’s platform is largely supported by social movements and organizations that focus on Indigenous rights, Black rights, LGBTQ+ rights, and women’s rights.16 Corporate elites share the same anxiety they felt at the end of Zelaya’s presidency as Castro’s platform largely relates to poverty reduction and social inequality, but Castro has said she wants “a social pact with every sector, the productive sectors, with business, with workers, with teachers, with farmers and campesinos, with the informal economy and small and medium-sized businesses.”17 The challenge now is how to operate as a democraticsocialist president in a corporate state where the private sector can make or break a presidency. As it stands now, Castro may have to be willing to compromise her platform to appease the private sector.

Chile

Chile faces a similar situation now. In the 90s and early 2000s, Chile was the picture of neoliberalism—early implementation of the Washington Consensus produced success for the economic stability of Chile and earned the country the name “The Latin American Tiger.”18 Though there was economic progress through foreign investment and in the mining sectors, Chile boasts one of the most unequal economies in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with an income gap 65 percent larger than any other country in the organization—that is, the richest in Chile have an income 13.6 times greater than the poorest of the population.19 There is little social mobility, and though there is some access to education, debt alone is too overwhelming for the middle classes. This inequality sparked many social movements—most led by students—in Chile during the 2000s.

There was a movement in 2006 by Santiago high schoolers because of the incredibly inaccessible and difficult entrance exams for higher education. In 2016, social movements were led by college students, who felt an immense hopelessness at the prospect of debt that they could never hope to pay off and at the limited social mobility offered to them despite their higher education levels.20 Gabriel Boric was a key player in the 2016 movements that paved the way for a decreased or, for some students, free tuition to the University of Santiago.

Though Boric is no stranger to Chilean politics as he moved into the political arena following his university education and the 2016 student movements, Boric’s win was historic. He won by 56 percent of votes against Jose Antonio Kast,

a right-wing politician with familial ties to the Nazi party.21 Boric’s platform is also founded on the basis of social rights, and his main concern is the extreme inequality plaguing many Chileans; he plans to reform Chile’s healthcare and pension, invest in green energy, and block the opening of an iron-copper mine detrimental to the environment.22 As in Honduras, there is fierce contention with investors and the private sector as they fear higher taxes and more government involvement in the economic arena. Once again, Boric may be forced to compromise more than he is willing to do so as the Chilean Senate is split in half into left and right with Boric’s coalition holding five seats and with only 37 out of 155 seats in the lower chamber of Chile’s Congress.23

Is the tide turning?

With this analysis of Honduras’ and Chile’s leftist presidents, can one really say that the tide in Latin America is truly turning? The context of the first “Left Turn” is incredibly important—the corporate state in Latin America had not yet solidified at this point. In the countries where this relationship between the government and the private sector existed, at the time of the initial “Left Turn,” corporate influence was not nearly as strong as it is today.

Though these victories may cause many to jump for joy, it is likely that Castro and Boric will not be as radical as they initially campaigned they would be. Both face two challenges as they learn to work with the political entity that is the private sector: 1) the inclusion of social movements, activists, and marginalized groups in a space that has been historically unsafe for these groups due to the extreme corruption and political influence of private corps and the business elites; and 2) the fierce way in which the

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 22

private sector will prioritize and protect its interests above the social well-being of the country in which it operates.24 There may be a silver lining—many Latin American populations are fed up. With the mishandling of the pandemic and with the repeated neglect of large social issues like extreme income inequality, violence towards marginalized groups, general political corruption, and lack of stable employment. With other large elections on the horizon, we may see more leftist candidates win.

However, the question remains, how leftist can they be and how well can they deliver on their promises?

References

1 “Gabriel Boric: From student protest leader to Chile's president,” BBC, 20 December 2021, https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-latin-america-59694056.

2 Ilan Goldfajn, Lorenza Martínez, and Rodrigo O. Valdés, “Washington Consensus in Latin America: From Raw Model to Straw Man,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 35, no. 3 (2021): 109–10.

3 Goldfajn, Martínez, and Valdés, “Washington Consensus in Latin America,” 109.

4 Douglas S. Massey, Magaly Sanchez R., and Jere R. Behrman, eds., “Quick Read Synopsis: Chronicle of a Myth Foretold: The Washington Consensus in Latin America,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 606, no. 1 (2006): 277.

5 Goldfajn, Martínez, and Valdés, “Washington Consensus in Latin America,” 129.

6 Massey, Sanchez R., Behrman, eds., “Quick Read Synopsis,” 276.

7 Barry Cannon and Mo Hume, “Central America, Civil Society and the ‘Pink Tide’: Democratization or Dedemocratization?" Democratization 19, no. 6 (2012): 1042.

8 Cannon and Hume, “Central America, Civil Society and the ‘Pink Tide’,” 1043.

9 Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid, Esteban Pérez Caldentey, and Pablo Ruíz Nápoles, “The Washington Consensus: A Latin American Perspective Fifteen Years Later,” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 27, no. 2 (2004): 354.

10 Goldfajn, Martínez, and Valdés, “Washington Consensus in Latin America,” 117, 121.

11 Cannon and Hume, “Central America, Civil Society and the ‘Pink Tide’,” 1052.

12 Reasons for this redrafting vary widely as the ousting of Zelaya is a polarizing issue in Honduras. Those who supported the removal of Zelaya say it was a test of democracy as Zelaya wanted to redraft the Constitution to allow him to run for a second term. The other reason, widely-cited by the Pro-Zelaya camp, was Zelaya’s belief that the 1982 Constitution was the root of the extreme poverty in Honduras and so he wished to rewrite it.

13 Cannon and Hume, “Central America, Civil Society and the ‘Pink Tide’,” 1052.

14 Deborah J. Yashar, “The Left and Citizenship Rights,” 23 SPRING 2022

in The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, ed. Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011): 200.

15 Brendan O’Boyle, “Could Honduras Shift Left? A Look at Xiomara Castro,” American Quarterly, 14 October 2021, https://americasquarterly.org/article/could-honduras-shiftleft-a-look-at-xiomara-castro/.

16 Suyapa Portillo Villeda, “In Honduras, Victory of Leftist Woman President Rests on Other Women’s Struggles,” North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), 10 January 2022, https://nacla.org/news/2022/01/10/honduras-xiomaracastro-women.

17 O’Boyle, “Could Honduras Shift Left?”

18 Goldfajn, Martínez, and Valdés, “Washington Consensus in Latin America,” 117.

19 Aislinn Liang, Dave Sherwood, and Fabian Cambero, “Explainer: Chile's inequality challenge: What went wrong and can it be fixed?” Reuters, 24 October 2019, https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-protests-explaineridUSKBN1X22RK. 20 Brendan O’Boyle, “Free College in Chile! So What Are Students So Mad About?,” Americas Quarterly, 28 January 2016, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/free-collegein-chile-so-what-are-students-so-mad-about/.

21 Frank Jordans and Joshua Goodman, “Father’s Nazi past haunts Chilean presidential frontrunner,” AP News, 08 December 2021, https://apnews.com/article/europemedia-caribbean-social-media-chile-44564195379055c3ca 0bcb04e7589216; “Leftist Gabriel Boric to become Chile's youngest-ever president,” BBC, 20 December 2021, https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-59715941.

22 “Leftist Gabriel Boric to become Chile's youngest-ever president,” BBC. 23 “How radical will Gabriel Boric, Chile’s new president, turn out to be?” The Economist, 01 January 2022, https:// www.economist.com/the-americas/2022/01/01/how-radicalwill-gabriel-boric-chiles-new-president-turn-out-to-be.

24 Portillo Villeda, “Victory of Leftist Woman President.”

A ME RIC A S

Red-Stained:

How a Legacy of Violence and Impunity Manifests in the Current Mining Conflicts of Guatemala’s El Estor

by Bea ujena Stoya nc he v edited by Cha r lotte Gre e nhill

B

eneath a haze of teargas lies an everevolving conflict between Guatemala’s Q’eqchi Indigenous population and the state’s vision for economic development. In October 2021, residents of El Estor organized a road blockade in protest of the hotly contested Fénix nickel mine, operated by the Guatemalan Nickel Company (CGN). Recent mining operations polluted El Estor’s Lake Izabal so heavily that the water “turned red,” leader of Defensoria Q’eqchi Sicaján Jacinto said1. With mining threatening the livelihoods of artisanal fishermen and the wider community, Q’eqchi residents took a stand for their environmental safety and the integrity of their sovereignty.

At the core of this conflict lies a complicated negotiation between Indigenous demands for land and sovereignty and the Guatemalan state’s agenda for economic development — a relationship that has evolved through key events in Guatemalan history. Since the Guatemalan Civil War, which lasted from 1960 to 1996, the state has adopted a neoliberal policy orientation that prioritizes economic gains over social demands. This dynamic is presently exemplified in El Estor, where the state # SPRING 2022

continues to respond to Indigenous mobilization with force rather than conversation, resulting in intensified divisions and the exclusion of Indigenous organizers from key decision-making forums. Now, the boom of the mining industry poses new challenges for Indigenous groups, complicating the already tense negotiation with the state.

The El Estor municipality sits within the traditional territory of the Q’eqchi Mayan peoples, who largely populate northeastern Guatemala and northern Belize2. A witness to displacement and violence against Indigenous peoples across Guatemala’s history, the area has been the site of land disputes for centuries3. The current dispute erupted in February 2018, when El Estor’s local fishermen’s guild wrote a constitutional appeal over the lack of consultation with the El Estor community before licenses were issued to the mining company4. The guild claims a direct violation of the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169; the treaty was signed by the Guatemalan government in 1996 and requires a procedural consultation with Indigneous communities whenever the government or any INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 24

corporation seeks to extract resources within their territory5. In 2019, Guatemala’s Constitutional Court officially ordered that all operations cease in response to the appeal. The mine has continued to operate in spite of the order, thus catalyzing an evermore frustrated crowd of Q’eqchi residents to block the flow of CGN’s mining trucks and materials6. On October 23, 2021, hundreds of police officers stormed the site of the protest and met demonstrators with force and tear gas, detaining various Indigenous organizers, journalists, and other anti-mining advocates. Following the initial raid, Guatemalan President Alejandro Giammetti instituted a state of siege in El Estor so that the Guatemalan Nickel Company (CGN) could resume its operations at the Fénix mine without interruption7. Hundreds of military and police officers occupied the municipality until December 13, while key Indigenous leaders and organizers remained excluded from conversations between the affected parties8.

A History of Exploitation and Resistance

This is not the first time that Q’eqchi Mayans have clashed with the state. In fact, Q’eqchi Mayans have engaged in tense negotiations and disputes with the Guatemalan government since the nineteenth century. While Indigenous groups experienced direct violence and displacement under Spanish colonization, Guatemala’s independence in the nineteenth century provoked a change in relations that bears the greatest resemblance to today’s conflict. Beginning in the 1870s, the Guatemalan government redistributed Q’eqchi land and supported a flow of German migrants to establish large-scale coffee plantations (fincas), with Q’eqchi Mayans as indentured laborers9. It was under these conditions that Q’eqchi villagers consolidated a distinct resistance to the social and economic changes occurring on their historic territory10. The Indigenous populations began writing petitions, burning down plantations, and fleeing their homes in an attempt to deplete the landowners’ workforce11. While a large number of Q'eqchi villagers were unable to resist the economic conquest that took place, Indigenous action established the clear conflict between villagers’ ancestral ownership of the land and the 25 SPRIING 2022

state’s competing interests for the land’s lucrative resources. Moving into the twentieth century, the root of Guatemala’s 36-year civil conflict can be traced back to the U.S.-backed 1954 coup of democratically-elected leftist President Jacobo Arbenz, who conducted significant agrarian reform and land redistribution that returned land directly to peasant villagers including Q’eqchi villagers who had lost their land to the German coffee fincas.

It was in this period between 1945 to 1954, when Arbenz was in power, that an effective state social policy was able to unify economic initiatives with social demands12. Arbenz’s state policy focused on inclusivity, which sought to reverse systemic trends in Guatemala’s historically exclusionary democracy.

The military’s takeover of the Guatemalan government ended state redistributive policies and thus reversed the progress Arbenz had made towards social and political inclusion13.

In the coming decades, the gap between the authoritarian state’s visions for economic progress and Guatemala’s social demands would exacerbate tensions and fuel the escalation of conflict into a civil war. In analyzing the cause of the conflict after the fact, the UN’s Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) concluded that Guatemala’s right-wing authoritarian military government was unable to reach a consensus that would allow it to reconcile the social and economic demands of the nation. Instead, it took on an exclusionary orientation on account of race and socioeconomic status in order to maximize state progress14.

Abandoning the role the state had played under the Arbenz administration as a mediator between social and economic interests, the Guatemalan military state operated with economic interests at the forefront and employed tactics of violence and direct massacres against those who posed obstacles to its visions of growth15. The state’s repressive tactics produced protests not unlike current events in El Estor, thus creating a cycle of repression, discontent, and state-led violence that culminated in a full-blown civil war.

The Guatemalan Civil War concluded with over 200,000 casualties, 83 percent of which were Indigenous16. This targeted violence has a legacy in El Estor and surrounding Q’eqchi communities of the Izabal department, peaking with the 1973

Panzós massacre where at least 53 Q’eqchi civilians participating in a land rights protest were gunned down by military officers17. A discussion of these past conflicts helps provide historical context for the present conflict. This history of violence permeates the Izabal region and lives on in the memories of those who resist today. Whether or not current violence is a direct extension of the state’s racially targeted violence of the past, it is necessary to consider historical state violence against Indigeous groups to better understand the concerns which Q’eqchi residents raise today18.

Memories of violent dispossession and direct state-led massacres course through the rhetoric of protesters and organizers, and in general produce a sense of insecurity about the future of their land.

These anxieties permeate their urgent demand for action.

A Tenuous Peace, A Booming Industry

In 1996, the Guatemalan Peace Accords brought an end to the 36-year conflict and civil war. The accords were monumental in that they overtly acknowledged the socioeconomic and systemic inequalities that target Indigenous groups. Furthermore, they promised “firm and lasting peace [...] based on participatory socioeconomic development that is geared to the common good and to the needs of the entire population.”19 However, since the end of the war,

the state’s neoliberal style of economic development has constituted a direct contradiction to these promises20. Indeed, many present-day critics point to the Guatemalan Peace Accords as a “‘Trojan horse’ that permitted a set of policies that deepened a shift to free market (‘neoliberal’) policies of privatization, austerity, market integration, ‘free trade,’ deregulation, and resource extraction.”21 The influx of multinational extractive corporations continues to put pressure on vulnerable Indigenous communities. In Guatemala, the state — rather than extractive corporations — retains rights to the nation’s land and minerals. This complicates the already tense relations between Indigenous communities and the state, since the state enters not as a mediator between corporate and citizens’ interests but rather as a force perpetuating tensions between competing interests.22 Increasing global demand for minerals has attracted governments across Latin America as an opportunity for lucrative growth given the region’s rich endowment of mineral resources. This priority has simultaneously prompted a string of protests over the mining industry’s detrimental environmental impacts, displacement of local communities, and perpetuation of systemic inequalities due to its unequal distribution of benefits.23 In several nations, as demonstrated in Guatemala, protests incite a strong reaction from the state which often end with violent arrests and INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 26

civilian casualties. Despite strong social resistance, states continue to protect corporate interests with hopes to reap benefits from their economic contributions.

Extractive industries account for only 1.2 to 1.5 percent of Guatemala’s GDP.24 For such a small proportion of the country’s gross domestic product, the Guatemalan state goes to great lengths to protect extractive industries in the face of strong public resistance. Particularly in the last two decades, the post-war Guatemalan state has prioritized these industries as a method for rapid economic development. Mining can be a source of valuable fiscal revenue for states to fund government services. It is true that mining, when coupled with redistributive government programs, can promote poverty alleviation and an expansion of the middle class.25 However, as demonstrated across Latin America and particularly exemplified in El Estor, these mining conflicts exacerbate deep-seated divisions over systemic inequalities.

The conflict in El Estor is not just rooted in anger towards the mining industry but rather reflects a long history of land disputes and disregard of Indigenous populations in determining resource use for economic development.26

their presence in their contested work area.

Ownership of the Fénix mine has changed hands throughout its decades of operation, though its effects on local communities have remained similar. Initially known as the EXMIBAL mine, the Fénix mine was subsidized to the Canadian International Nickel Company (INCO) by the Guatemalan military government in 1965 — in the midst of the Guatemalan military takeover and Civil War. It was signed over to various Canadian investment groups before being handed off to Solway Investment Group, a Swedish-Russian corporation, with the Guatemalan Nickel Company (CGN) leading its operations. Today, Solway promises a responsible and sustainable partnership with local communities through their continued investment “in further developing the social infrastructure” of El Estor and prioritizes “building effective communications and providing support to the local communities.”28 But behind this mask of social responsibility lies a reality of state-supported violence that serves the mining company’s interests.

Contemporary Mobilization and Repression

Contemporary opposition to the Fénix mine and subsequent repression of protesters has brought an onslaught of civilian victims. In El Estor’s most Corporate Mining Comes to El Estor recent siege, police and military officers occupying For Guatemala’s rural Indigenous the region raided the homes of two journalists and populations like El Estor’s Q'eqchi, whose at least nine community authorities.29 Amongst territories sit on rich mineral and natural resource them is Germán Chub, a local fishermen and antireserves, neoliberal economic activity has only mining activist whose home was raided early on in opened up a new chapter of state-supported the siege, in late October.30 Chub’s life experiences violence in protection of corporate interests. For El are indicative of El Estor’s multi-year violence and Estor’s local fishermen, catalysts of the community’s conflict with the mining company. In an earlier present day mobilization, the nickel mine’s round of protests dating back to 2009, Chub was pollution of waterways creates immense obstacles shot and paralyzed by the mine’s head of security.31 in their search for economic stability and motivates Chub was playing soccer at the time, caught in the their activism. While pro-mining groups will cite crossfire of a violent eruption of conflict between the creation of jobs as a benefit of the mining local activist Adolfo Ich Chamán and CGN security industry, a crucial issue arises when in reality a forces. Ich Chamán was a local teacher and antimajority of those jobs are outsourced due to the mining activist who emerged as a key voice for the lack of specialized skills in the mines’ surrounding Q’eqchi communities when a land dispute arose communities. In El Estor, for example, only about between residents of the La Paz, La Union and La 51 percent of workers at the Fénix mine are local Revolución communities and the mining company residents.27 But offering financial support and (at the time owned by Canadian company Hudbay benefits to surrounding communities allows mining Minerals).32 When protests erupted over an eviction companies to justify their operations and solidify notice for the local community, Ich Chamán ran 27 SPRING 2022

to warn local residents of the violence and was captured and shot by the mine’s security forces.33 The threat of violence looms like a constant shadow over Q’eqchi residents and victims mobilizing to pursue justice. These stories are underrepresented in the media due to the general lack of coverage on El Estor’s struggles or the suppression of Q’eqchi activism. Moreover, state agents have actively suppressed reporting on the conflict through arrests of local journalists covering the issue, such as Prensa Comunitaria’s Carlos Choc.34 Choc faced a throw of criminal charges after his report on the first round of the fisherman guild’s mining protests in 2017 showed pictures of Carlos Maaz, a victim of the police repression against protesters. Maaz was shot by police who cracked down on protests in May 2017, and Choc’s image negated the mining company’s claims that “no one had been killed” in the protests.35

Negotiations and Contested Representation In El Estor, Q’eqchi Mayan voices and experiences are suppressed by state authorities and corporate actors. Representation of the wider community is lost in the largely performative dialogue between selected parties. In consultations and conversations between the Ministry of Energy and Mines and the Guatemalan Nickel Company, the few Indigenous voices that are included are carefully selected to exclude activist community

members.36 When the Constitutional Court came to their decision in 2019 that the CGN’s license was invalid, negotiations were organized between the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), CGN, El Estor and Panzós municipalities, with Indigenous representation coming from members of the Community Councils for Urban and Rural Development (COCODES).37 Left out of these conversations were 94 Q’eqchi community representatives. Though originally there were Q’eqchi representatives present within COCODES, this council is no longer recognized by wider community leaders on account of its openly promining stance. Indeed, it is believed that certain Indigenous anti-mining organizers have been ‘bought out’ through monetary bribes on Solway’s behalf. As a result, the negotiations were deemed illegitimate by the wider Q’eqchi community and fishermen’s guild because the Indigenous representatives were not democratically elected by the community’s legitimate powers.38 Thus, what the Q’eqchi of El Estor ask for is meaningful communication and consultation between the government and its Indigenous citizens.39 State-Indigenous relations have historically been contorted and dictated by the state’s economic goals. Now, Indigenous groups are mobilizing and demanding to be heard. Frustrated organizers in El Estor note how the Ministry of Energy and Mines, tasked with issuing licenses to the mining companies, has refused to include Indigenous organizers in any of the negotiations since October yet still considers the negotiations a “success.”40 It is the empty promises, lack of conversation, and strong presence of police violence that define this complex chapter.

Conclusion

Scholars of mining conflicts note that for mining to be a successful tool of development in Latin American nations yearning for fruitful growth, institutions must be able to sustain cohesive dialogue and negotiations between varying interest groups and stakeholders.41 Unfortunately, institutions of this strength and quality do not exist in El Estor’s case, and as a result there are few mechanisms to resolve the current conflict through negotiations that represent all the interest INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 28

groups involved. What has emerged is a story of suppressed voices, manipulated information, statesupported violence, and collusive efforts between the state and Solway mining company to exclude Indigenous voices. Indeed, the collusion between the Guatemalan State and Solway was recently confirmed in a joint investigation conducted by various local and international news organizations, including Forbidden Stories, El Faro, and Prensa Comunitaria amongst others.42 Over eight million company documents they released point directly to Solway buying out local police and Indigenous leaders, spying on local organizational efforts, and ensuring that state forces protect the interests of the Guatemalan Nickel Company.43 With coercive tactics and the threat of violence constantly looming over Q’eqchi residents who seek justice, Solway repeats historic patterns of exploitation of Q’eqchi land and targeted violence against its people. Hope for a more positive future in El Estor lies in the elevation–rather than exclusion–of Indigenous voices. When Indigenous citizens and their demands are no longer viewed as an obstacle to progress, but rather a tool for creating the inclusive economy promised in Guatemala’s Peace Accords, space is created for economic growth and social sovereignty to be realized.

References

1 Vaclav Masek, “Guatemala Cracks Down on Q’eqchi’ Resistance in El Estor,” NACLA, November 16, 2021, https://nacla.org/guatemala-mayaresistance-el-estor.

2 Autumn Knowlton, “Q’eqchi’ Mayas and the Myth of “Postconflict” Guatemala,” Latin American Perspectives 44, no. 4 (2017): 140, accessed February 2, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X16650179.

3 Ibid.

4 Masek, “Guatemala Cracks Down.”

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Hector Silva, “La noticia de 2021: La toma de El Estor por la minera suizorusa Solway,” Prensa Comunitaria, December 28, 2021, accessed February 4, 2022, https://www.prensacomunitaria.org/2021/12/la-noticia-de-2021-latoma-de-el-estor-por-la-minera-suizo-rusa-solway 8 Regina Pérez,“ El Estor: concluye “consulta” sobre proyecto Fénix; comunidades Q’eqchi’ la invalidan,” Prensa Comunitaria, December 14, 2021, accessed Febuary 28, 2022, https://www.prensacomunitaria.org/2021/12/ el-estor-concluye-consulta-sobre-proyecto-fenix-comunidades-qeqchi-lainvalidan/.

9 Knowlton, “Q’eqchi Mayas,” 143.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), “Guatemala: Memory of

29 SPRING 2022

Silence,” (Guatemala City: Historical Clarification Commission, 1999), 18, accessed 4 February, 2022, bit.ly/37K32Fh. 13 Knowlton, “Q’eqchi Mayas,” 143.

14 CEH, “Guatemala: Memory of Silence,” 18.

15 Ibid.

16 CEH, “Guatemala: Memory of Silence,” 17.

17 James Rodríguez, “Where Impunity Reigns: Nickel Mining in El Estor, Guatemala,” Latin American Perspectives 48, no. 1 (2021): 290, accessed February 22, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X20982548.

18 Knowlton, “Q’eqchi’ Mayas,” 146.

19 UN Security Council, “The Situation in Central America: Procedures for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace and Progress in Fashioning a Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development,” (1997), 38, accessed February 22, 2022, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker. un.org/files/GT_961229_AgreementOnFirmAndLastingPeace.pdf.

20 Knowlton, “Q’eqchi Mayas,” 147.

21 Nicholas Copeland. "Linking the Defense of Territory to Food Sovereignty: Peasant Environmentalisms and Extractive Neoliberalism in Guatemala," Journal of Agrarian Change 19, no. 1 (2019): 23, accessed February 4, 2022, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joac.12274.

22 Helwege, “Challenges with Resolving Mining,” 80.

23 Ann Helwege, “Challenges with Resolving Mining Conflicts in Latin America,.” The Extractive Industries and Society 2, no. 1 (January 2015): (73), accessed March 2, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2014.10.003.

24 Helwege, “Challenges with Resolving,” 75.

25 Francisco J. Monaldi, “The Mining Boom in Latin America: Rents, Developments, and Democracy,” ReVista, (Winter 2014): 6 accessed February 20, 2022, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/98baf386/ The_Mining_Boom_in_Latin_America.pdf.

26 Helwege, “Challenges with Resolving Mining,” 73.

27 Alejandra Gutiérrez Valdizán, “Fishermen Lost Patience.”

28 Solway Investment Group, “Fénix Project, Guatemala,” accessed March 1, 2022, https://solwaygroup.com/our-business/fenix-project-guatemala/.

29 Sandra Cuffe, “Indigenous Mine Opponents Targeted in Raids during State of Siege in Guatemala,” Mongabay, November 15, 2021, accessed March 8, 2022, bit.ly/34UbyAv. 30 Ibid.

31 Rodríguez, “Where Impunity Reigns,” 294.

32 Rodríguez, “Where Impunity Reigns,” 291.

33 Rodríguez, “Where Impunity Reigns,” 294.

34 Alejandra Gutiérrez Valdizán, “Fishermen Lost Patience,” Tierra de Resistentes, April 23, 2019, accessed March 15, 2022. https:// tierraderesistentes.com/en/2019/04/23/los-pescadores-perdieron-lapaciencia/.

35 Cuffe, “ Indigenous Mine Opponents.”

36 Pérez,“ El Estor: concluye ‘consulta,’” Prensa Comunitaria.

37 Héctor Silva,“ La noticia de 2021: La toma de El Estor por la minera suizo-rusa Solway,” Prensa Comunitaria, December 28, 2021. https://www. prensacomunitaria.org/2021/12/la-noticia-de-2021-la-toma-de-el-estor-porla-minera-suizo-rusa-solway/.

38 Cuffe, “Indigenous Mine Opponents Targeted.”

39 Knowlton, “Q’eqchi Mayas,” 145.

40 Aválos, “La Noticia de 2021,” Prensa Comunitaria.

41 Anthony Bebbington, et. al, “Contention and Ambiguity: Mining and the Possibilities of Development,” Development and Change Forum 39, no.6 (2008): 895, accessed March 12, 2022, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/ epdf/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2008.00517.x.

42 El Faro Daily Briefing , “Guatemala, in Brief,” El Faro, March 9, 2022. https://mailchi.mp/elfaro.net/el-estor-6214192?e=be1190bdc0.

43 Ibid.

A ME RIC A S

The Necessary Role of Indigenous Peoples in Latin America’s Sustainable Development

by Ma rga ret Va tter edited by Cha r lotte Gre e nhill

R

elations between Latin American governments and Indigenous communities have historically been characterized by tension, oppression, and exploitation. Sovereignty of Indigenous people is a right that has been recognized by most of the international community in recent decades. As much as the governments tend to be the perpetrators of this maltreatment against these groups, the responsibility of enforcing and protecting Indigenous rights ultimately falls upon these governments. With climate change, political tension, and globalization changing the sphere of international relations, there are new opportunities for these groups to work together towards a solution for sustainable development and in the process. Most modern states within Latin America have introduced legal instruments to incorporate indigenous groups into national policy and society. Incorporation is successful when states recognize and preserve indigenous land and institutions. However, many mechanisms of incorporation operate as forms of assimilation that have forced indigenous communities to relinquish their established institutions, foregoing

centuries of traditional epistemology, practice, and culture. One example of this is governmental attempts to privatize Indigenous land that has historically existed under communal ownership and stewardship. Mexico and Colombia’s Indigenous populations have experienced the states’ attempts to privatize Indigenous land; both countries have some of the largest Indigenous populations in Latin America. As big business and national governments try to exploit native lands for profit or development projects, there has been strong pushback from Indigenous communities, leading to strong efforts towards community organizing and mass protests to protect traditional Indigenous lands. Oftentimes, these conflicts turn violent and even deadly, resulting in numerous Indigenous rights violations as the government exploits indigenous communities in favor of corporate interests.1 Separate from the national systems in Latin America, a central document that establishes the basis for Indigenous people’s rights is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). This declaration is the first universally recognized instrument for INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 30

articulating and protecting the rights of Indigenous peoples around the world, making it significant to Indigenous populations in the Americas and across the world. The most crucial element of the document is the idea of ‘self-determination’ which underscores the indigenous peoples’ right to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”2 In a political sense, this means Indigenous communities have a right to a large degree of autonomy and the ability to self-govern if they chose to do so. At the same time, Indigenous people have the right to practice and preserve their distinct cultural, political, and religious institutions and practices so that they can pass their traditions on to the next generations.3 However, UNDRIP is severely limited in that it is a non-legally binding framework. While countries have signed UNDRIP demonstrating support for its objectives, they are not legally required to adapt the framework within their national constitutions. Fortunately, there are other legally binding instruments, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 that recognizes Indigenous peoples’ “right to control their own institutions and way of life, including economic development, governance, free, prior, and informed consent [FPIC], religion, language, etc”.4 This concept of FPIC is a pillar of Indigenous rights and should be non-negotiable for any relations with a tribe. Currently, 23 states have ratified ILO 169 in their national constitutions, which serves as a major form of protection for their respective native populations. Every five years member states are required to submit a report to the Committee of Experts demonstrating the implementation of ILO 169 measures in their state.

Also during this report can violations be submitted so that the Committee can take action.5 Even so, there are still discrepancies between the ratification and actual enforcement of these frameworks.

Much of the conflict that arises between Indigenous groups and outsiders is due to a lack of prior informed consultation and consent.

As many Latin American countries attempt to modernize and develop, Indigenous rights and land ownership have been disregarded in favor of projects for infrastructure or profit. These projects 31 SPRING 2022

have seemingly good intentions with the promise of bringing wealth and prosperity to the locals, but that rarely occurs. Most benefits have been found to go to political elites and landowners, while local residents are faced with health concerns, exacerbated income inequality, and environmental degradation.6 An interesting example of this can be found in Mexico, a state that has historically presented itself as a progressive champion for Indigenous peoples and their rights. The Isthmus in Tehuantepec region of Oaxaca has been identified as an area with the potential to generate immense amounts of energy through wind power. As a result, in recent years the region has become of interest to national and foreign investors looking to develop the area and build wind turbines.7 While generally regarded as one of the cleanest and most sustainable ways to harness energy, wind turbines can still cause adverse environmental impacts. Residents of the area — most of them Indigenous people and farmers — have reported various forms of environmental degradation along with other physical health symptoms attributed to ‘wind turbine sickness’ as a result of recent turbine projects. Alexander Dunlap, a researcher who has spent time in the Isthmus region researching this development, has noted how the wind parks have “largely reinforced income inequality, furthered poverty entrenchment and increased food vulnerability and worker dependency” on continued construction.8 All together these factors have contributed to an increase in out-migration of labor and environmental degredation. Based on these reports, there is clear violation of Mexico's constitutional commitment to protect and preserve the interests of its Indigenous population.9 People of Indigenous descent champion many of the environmental justice and sustainable development movements in Latin America. This is most likely related to the fact that Indigenous communities are experiencing some of the most damaging effects of climate change. Most indigenous communities reside in natural resource dense areas and much of their systems have been developed on the basis of their intimate knowledge of the local land. Disruptions to the environment will only amplify the vulnerability and difficulties

experienced by Indigenous communities. These challenges can manifest in a variety of ways such as: increased poverty due to degradation of the local environment and natural resources’ migration, forced displacement, land alienation, and permanent loss of traditional culture. As Indigenous activists bring attention to and speak out against extractive processes in their territories, they are often unjustly incarcerated if not out right murdered. Berta Cáceres was a Honduran environmental activist, Lenca Indigenous leader and co-founder of the Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras who tirelessly organized local communities to fight for their right to the land. In 2016, Caceres was assassinated after speaking out against a dam that was to be built on a river with immense spiritual significance to the Lencas. Just this past year, the heads of the dam project were revealed as Cáceres' killers.10 Injustices, like the murder of of Indigenous peoples, are further compounded by Latin America’s weak law enforcement and overwhelmed justice systems.11 Global Witness, an international watchdog agency, reported that 2021 was the deadliest year for environmental activists with there being a total of 227 deaths around the globe; three out of four of those murders occured in the Americas. Indigenous people made up a third of the deaths globally, despite only making up five percent of the world's population.12 As countries move forward with a sustainable development plan and environmental policy, incorporating Indigenous knowledge of nature can help apply ancient solutions to modern problems. Conventional conservation measures can wholly be improved by understanding the relationships humans have with nature, especially when this does not conflict with the main objectives of sustainability. Studies of land in Latin America and also worldwide have shown that Indigenousmanaged lands tend to have improved resource conservation outcomes and suffer less from pollution.13 This is likely a result of the knowledgepractice-belief complex, which is the idea that a set of beliefs is directly responsible for empirically based results.14 On a general level, traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) is often closely related to indigenous cosmology and epistemology, which

provides a holistic perspective and promotes a sort of one-ness with nature. As a result of this deep and intense spiritual connection with the land, Indigenous groups develop an intimate knowledge of their local environments and ecological systems.

While not every Indigenous group or tribe is alike, it appears that the norms, traditions, and knowledge that are passed down to generations consistently reinforce a holistic relationship with nature. This is reflected within Indigenous languages, food, and medicinal practices as much as it is reflected in spiritual beliefs and ecological knowledge. Together, Indigenous values produce a well connected, even intuitive, land management system and practices.

For foreign investors and local governments, this knowledge should be viewed as a valuable resource as it can help investors become familiar with the area and understand the potential risk that is associated with the land. In doing so, this helps Indigenous communities leverage their position within the development processes and boost transparency between the two groups.

This can be observed in Ticuna managed lands, an Indigenous reserve along the Amazonian river in Colombia. Chagras, a shifting agricultural method that relies on TEK, is employed throughout the land and has allowed the Indigenous communities there to adapt to changing conditions.

In recent decades, globalization and government subsidies have crept into the Ticuna communities.

The establishment of Natura Park Tourist Reserve in 2012 which is adjacent to the Ticuna property has incorporated the community into the tourism industry and has since served as a source of income.

Yet, the Ticuna still depend on chagras for their livelihoods and economic well-being. Using TEK in their strategy, these communities have changed “land-use patterns such as reduction in cultivated area, shortening the cultivation cycles by learning to cultivate without burning, and shorter fallow periods,” which overall, has led to a conservation of natural resources.15 This trend of higher rates of natural resource conservation among indigenous communities is a common phenomenon across Latin America, suggesting that there is much to be gained from the application of traditional ecological knowledge and land stewardship practices when it comes to public policy. TEK can also be used to INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 32

restore land that has been abused by commercial practice. In a project undertaken by the Society for the Ecological Restoration in the Lacandon forest in Mexico. The previously local mayan farmers were displaced by globalization in the 1970s leaving the land under the care of those who were unfamiliar and employed destructive commercial methods.

Combining Mayan TEK with scientific knowledge has helped reinstate a functioning ecosystem and structural diversity while also improving economic vitality and overall livelihoods of the locals.16 A first step towards including Indigenous epistemology in public policy and land management is protecting and enforcing already existing Indigenous rights. Namely, the formal recognition of Indigenous and tribal claims to their respective lands by national governments.17 External actors — like ranchers, drug traffickers, and large corporations — pose the biggest threat to Indigenous lands as they often encroach on sovereign territory with heavy machinery and even arms. It is an unfortunate reality that many of these groups receive support from state governments.

Formal recognition of Indigenous land sovereignty would not only provide more legal basis to prevent this encroachment from occurring but would also incentivize non-Indigenous farmers to maximize and strategically use the land they already have.

Territories where governments recognize the collective land rights of indigenouspeople have lower rates of deforestation, which serves as a costeffective method of decarbonization.18 Without the enforcement of these rights, it is virtually impossible to successfully implement traditional ecological knowledge and land stewardship practices into policy on a large-scale. Going forward, ensuring the survival and fair treatment of indigneous peoples and their rights will require a sort of ‘all hands on deck’ approach. While it is up to national governments to implement and uphold indigenous rights, the duty of monitoring these state actions falls upon international organizations so that they use their platforms to protect and amplify native voices. The main priority of the private sector will always be profit but now is the time to start recognizing the potential of traditional knowledge and how it can be used to benefit society as a whole.

33 SPRING 2022

References

1 Anastasia Moloney, “U.N. Lambasts Latin America for Abusing Indigenous Rights,” U.S., (January 11, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-latamrights-landrights/u-n-lambasts-latin-america-for-abusing-indigenous-rightsidUSKBN1F02J6.

2 United Nations, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” (March 2008), https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/ DRIPS_en.pdf.

3 Dorothée Cambou, “The UNDRIP and the Legal Significance of the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach with a Multidimensional Perspective,” The International Journal of Human Rights 23 (2019): 34–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2019.1585345.

4 USAID, “Indigenous Peoples Regional Profile: Latin America and the Caribbean,” Https://Www.usaid.gov/Sites/Default/Files/Documents/IPRegional-Profile-LAC-Region.pdf, (October 2021).

5 Joshua Cooper, “25 Years of ILO Convention 169,” Culturalsurvival.org, (March 2015), https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/culturalsurvival-quarterly/25-years-ilo-convention-169.

6 Alexander Dunlap, “‘The Town Is Surrounded:’ from Climate Concerns to Life under Wind Turbines in La Ventosa, Mexico,” Human Geography 10, no.

2 (July 2017): 16–36, https://doi.org/10.1177/194277861701000202.

7 Alexander Dunlap, “The ‘Solution’ Is Now the ‘Problem:’ Wind Energy, Colonisation and the ‘Genocide-Ecocide Nexus’ in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Oaxaca,” The International Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 4 (2018): 550–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1397633.

8 Dunlap, 559.

9 Laura Hamister, “Wind Development of Oaxaca, Mexico’s Isthmus of Tehuantepec: Energy Efficient or Human Rights Deficient?,” Mexican Law Review 5 (December 2012): 151–79.

10 The Associated Press, “Alleged Mastermind Convicted in the Killing of Environmental Activist Berta Cáceres,” NPR.org, (July 5, 2021), https:// www.npr.org/2021/07/05/1013216856/alleged-mastermind-convicted-in-thekilling-of-environmental-activist-berta-cace%5C. 11 Paul J. Angelo and David Gevarter, “Who Is Killing Latin America’s Environmentalists?,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 20, 2020, https:// www.cfr.org/in-brief/who-killing-latin-americas-environmentalists.

12 Global Witness, “Last Line of Defence,” Https://Www.globalwitness.org/ En/Campaigns/Environmental-Activists/Last-Line-Defence/, September 2021.

13 Richard Schuster et al., “Vertebrate Biodiversity on Indigenous-Managed Lands in Australia, Brazil, and Canada Equals That in Protected Areas,” Environmental Science & Policy 101 (November 2019): 1–6.

14 15 Fonseca Cepeda, C Idrobo, and Sebastián Restrepo, “The Changing Chagras: Traditional Ecological Knowledge Transformations in the Colombian Amazon,” Ecology and Society 24, no. 1 (January 2019): 8, https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-10416-240108.

16 Society for Ecological Restoration, “México: Applying Traditional Ecological Knowledge to Forest Restoration in Lacandon Forest,” Ser-rrc. org, 2022, https://www.ser-rrc.org/project/mexico-applying-traditionalecological-knowledge-to-forest-restoration-in-lacandon-forest/.

17 FAO and FILAC, “Forest Governance by Indigenous and Tribal People.

An Opportunity for Climate Action in Latin America and the Caribbean.,” 2021.

18 FAO and FILAC

Editor's Note

A

E U R O P E

s we publish the IRR’s 26th edition, Europe is in the midst of war and plagued by a lack of unity and disjointed multilateral responses to transnational issues. These issues are rooted in historical mishaps that have remained relatively unaddressed. The writers of the Europe section sought to further analyze some of these issues.

Focusing on the global expansion of the Italian mafias’ drug trade by analyzing the Italian state’s lack of response, Jude Hoag explains how the ‘Ndrangeta’s structural organization has led to its global success. Pulling from personal experiences and family connections, Jessica Swanson and Erica MacDonald provide unique insights in their articles. Swanson tracks the United Kingdom’s response to COVID-19 and identifies the major faults and scandals of the Johnson administration and its impact on the British government’s credibility. MacDonald makes the case of Ukraine’s historical adversity in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the impact that European disjointedness has on the conflict.

Over the course of the semester, my writers and editors have continued to work diligently despite our geographical distance. I thank them for their hard work, effort, and dedication in capturing a small snapshot of Europe’s current crises in this semester’s issue. We hope you enjoy their pieces.

FI ONA CAPTAN, CAS '23 Senior Editor, Europe

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 34

EUR O PE

5:00 a.m.*, Kyiv is bombed. *"4:00 a.m., Kyiv is bombed": the infamous announcement of German bombardment of the city in 1941

by Er i ca Ma cDona ld e d i t e d by Andrea Gom ez-Wa tso n

F

or most of the world, a twenty-first century inter-European war on the continent seemed like an impossibility. For Ukrainians, it seemed a grim eventuality. Ukraine has taken every step available to prevent war - countless attempts to establish democracy without Russian interference and strengthening their security alliances against Russia's imperialist pull. But the war for Ukraine's independence started centuries ago; it is branded across the country's heartlands. Ukraine's freedom has always been precariously tangled in the balance of global politics and the rise and fall of empires reliant, in some ways, on the democratic support from the West. Since its independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, Ukraine has spent the last 30 years fortifying itself in preparation to stand - once again - against the sword of its neighbor. In February of 2022, the bombs did come. The Russian invasion started. And the world watched as Ukrainians wept.

There appeared a collective, external awe that Russian President Vladimir Putin truly brought war to Ukraine. Superpowers watched the escalation in the months before with concern and reacted with vague threats of economic retaliation.

Even the most pro European citizens and politians of Western nations (those who support deeper 35 SPRING 2022

integration in the European Union (EU) and greater interconnectedness with Europe) previously have shown hesitancy in diplomacy with their Eastern continental neighbors, especially when Russian agression is in play. The overbearing presence of Russia in Eastern European relations has, in the past, instituted an inherent 'tread carefully' policy1 which, in its worst moments, looked an awful lot like appeasement.2 When the warning bells went off in 2014 - with Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea - they fell on deaf ears.3 When Russian troops occupied the Donbas region, the West looked away.

The months leading up to the 2022 invasion were ultimately no different. The world wagered against Russia's willingness to start a multinational war, and it bet incorrectly. Putin's threats were never empty; he showed his hand eight years earlier. Not only could he take Ukrainian territory but he would.

There should be no surprise that this war would come to pass, if he was left to his devices.

The world should have always paid attention to the Ukrainian plight if not out of respect for sovereignty or sympathy to humanitarian crises then at least out of self-preservation. As the second largest country in Europe and a primary agricultural exporter to the EU, Ukraine's health is vital to Europe's.4 More broadly, what happens

in Ukraine is an indicator for the world at large; Ukraine has been the litmus test for changing chapters in history. With its tribulations, Ukraine has reflected major geopolitical shifts in the world.

For example, its independence and the fall of the USSR was a triumph of democracy that marked the age of unipolarity in international relations, with the United States as the hegemon. Putin's rise to power and China's rise on the global stage have threatened the balance - expansionist philosophies once again rearing their heads. Ukraine suffers all the more for it. And it won't be the only one, merely the first. China's expansionist ambitions regarding Taiwan should certainly be kept in mind when looking at the current Ukrainian crisis and the terrifying precedent it sets.5 If imperialist nations are permitted, by global norms to return to their former territories with the intent to reconquer, what consitutes these nations' sovereignty? How, and when, may they truly be freed? In Taiwan's case, they are only formally recognized as an independent state by 15 countries - a far less stable position than Ukraine which was recognized by and large as independent by the world following the fall of the USSR. And look what still happened in Ukraine even with "recognized" sovereignty. If Ukraine is a litmus test, the results are ominous.

In the Ukrainian case, much of its struggle for independence harkens back to classical geopolitics. Halford Mackinder said that who controls the "Heartland" controls the world - thus Ukraine is and always has been a crucial player in geopolitics, one that Russia has always sought to control.6 Historically speaking, Ukraine has suffered tremendously under Russian occupation and influence. Its time in their grip resulted in forced collectivization, the Russification of Ukrainian culture and language, famine, and, ultimately, genocide (the Holodomor). But Ukrainian-Russian tension traces back farther than the USSR - over a millennium - to a larger, unified slavic state: Kievan Rus (c. ninth century Eastern Europe).7 Other sprawling feudal states slowly surrendered their place in time and history; Russia never quite let go of Kievan Rus. Their territorial aspiration - antiquated, aggressive, and a violation of sovereignty - has always been to control slavic states, particularly Ukraine. Putin is the latest in a long line

of tsars, communists, socialists, and dictators whose eyes have been methodically and obsessively trained on Ukraine, waiting for the opportunity to strike.

That opportunity comes to pass every few decades Ukraine's first shot at independence was both recent and short-lived, following the end of the first World War and the collapse of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires.8 In 1917, Ukraine declared independence, and a mere five years later in 1922, it was absorbed into the Soviet Union. And so began the most recent iteration of Ukrainian subjugation (before the 2022 invasion) - forced slave labor, forced military service, forced starvation, forced migration; the list is bloody and claims over 16 million lives in the twentieth-century alone.9 When the USSR fell, it looked like tentative, long-awaited freedom for the Ukrainians. Ukraine declared itself an independent state in 1991 by a sweeping national vote. But as we revisit the ongoing crisis in Ukraine in 2022, we know independence did not stave off their troubles. Even independent, Ukraine is subject to the gravitational pull of its mammoth-powerful neighbor: Russia.

Russian interference in Ukrainian politics never dissipated, and, in the last three decades, such interference continually results in the rigging of elections, the assassination of officials, and the annexation of territory.10 By virtue of its proximity to Russia and its insufficient democratic support from the West, Ukraine exists in a constant state of "free" in word but not in reality.11 Thus it remains one of the largest geopolitical crises in the modern world and now in active war for Ukrainian sovereignty.

To say the West, leading up to the invasion, failed Ukraine with its insufficient reactions to warmongering is a fair statement.12 Some Western nations, including Germany, stayed mostly on the sidelines in the months anteceding war, promising meager contributions to their defense. Sovereignty is this democratic ideal and seeming international mandate, yet Russia's blatant violations of it went unpunished in the last decade, and its recent threats this last year were met with hesitation. In many ways, such hesitancy comes down to the same few core obstacles that inhibit every superficial, wellmeaning global policy: invested interest, fear of war, and money. Germany relies fully on Russian gas, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 36

and conflict threatens their energy supply.13 So they stayed their hand. The U.S. and the United Kingdom feared escalation, so they threatended sanctions as a deterrence tactic. This was destined to fail. While one should not entirely discount the weight of economics as a weapon of diplomacy and war, there should have been little confidence that sanctions would suffice in staving off the newest iteration of a centuries-old war, especially with Russia. Russia has shouldered such economic burdens before, and, recently, they have never impeded their aggression: "when it comes to the vital and core national interest, Russia is ready to bear any amount of economic pain. The very idea that the West could have extracted something out of Putin by forcing him to brinkmanship was fundamentally faulty as Putin loves brinkmanship."14 Putin wants Ukraine.

Anything but staunch opposition proved a fatal miscalculation.

The pain of the West's disjointed early defense of Ukraine is compounded given its diplomatic history with Ukraine regarding nuclear nonproliferation. In 1994, upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine found itself in possession of the world's third largest stockpile of nuclear weapons.15 In the name of nonproliferation, Western nations and Russia, spearheaded by the U.S., entered talks with Ukraine to have them surrender the stockpile. The talks were successful (at least, for the West) culminating in the Budapest Memorandum which promised security for Ukraine in exchange for the nuclear weapons.16 Ukraine's surrender of the weapons was contingent upon very specific protections; most of which have been violated, forgotten, or outright ignored. The memorandum explicitly states that Russia, the U.S., and the U.K. must "respect the indepdence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine," "refrain from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine," and immediately employ the United Nations' Security Council "to provide assistance to Ukraine... if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression."17 The terms are clear. They are just not legally binding.

Ukraine, in good faith, handed over what may have been their only guaranteed deterrence against Russian invasion. When Russia invaded 37 SPRING 2022

in 2014, the memorandum was a dead letter - a betrayal not forgotten by the Ukrainian people, and one that tears now more than ever.18 Ukrainians deeply resent the non-binding nature of the Budapest Memorandum. When states that agreed to the memorandum stood by in 2014, a precedent of the West's willingness to aid Ukraine was set. They abandoned Ukraine, even though "Russia's illegal annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula in 2014 was the first change of internationally recognized borders in Europe through military force since World War II."19 Many countries consider Crimea under hostile occupation by Russia, yet most did little in response to the invasion beyond economic sanctions. In fact, the Crimean crisis proved in the minds of many diplomats (and politicans testing the waters) that ownership of nuclear weapons can, in a way, inoculate a nation against strong retaliatory measures from the international community.20 Such is the tragedy of Crimea. While the optics of abandoning Ukraine were bad, the political implications for an imperialist-minded Russia were far worse - as proven by the 2022 invasion. With thousands dead and millions displaced, the betrayal of the memorandum sits heavy in hearts and on consciences.

War came. Despite the dismal history, the response in defense of Ukraine has been, in many ways, groundbreaking. The European Council of the European Union outwardly condemned Putin's invasion: The EU strongly condems the decision by President Putin to recognise the non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine as independent entities and the ensuring decision to send Russian troops into these areas. This illegal act further undermines Ukraine's sovereignty and independence and is a sever breach of international law and international agreements, including the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act, Paris Charter and Budpest Memorandum.21 The ongoing conflicts in the border regions receive their deserved recognition by the international associations, and, at long last, the Budapest Memorandum is remembered, if not formally invoked. It seems the weight on the global consciousness grew too heavy to go ignored.

Following the European Council of the European Union's statement, many member states finally provided much-needed concrete support. In fact, some view the response to the invasion as the best demonstration of EU unity on such a matter with rapid coordination on sanctions, arms funds, and safe havens for refugees.22 Germany, despite its earlier skittishness, came out strongly in Ukraine's defense once the invasion proceeded. Germany has reversed its historic stance on sending lethal weapons into conflict zones. The German government has committed to sending 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 Stinger anti-aircraft defense systems to Ukraine.23 Germany joins many Western allies in its mobilization of weapons and military material (body armor, helmets, and other defense equipment) for Ukraine including the Netherlands, Spain, France, the U.S., the U.K., the Czech Republic, and many other European countries.24 But Germany's contribution promises potential for even greater mobilization, as the country manufactures many weapons across the European continent and, thus, has legal control over their transfer.25 One can hope that this historic reversal on lethal weapons aid may extend to a greater military support movement across Europe. The turning point for the German government and Chancellor Olaf Scholz was that the invasion marked "an epochal moment that imperiled the entire post-World War II order across Europe."26 And it did. Such largescale disruption ot the balance of power and such a blatant violation of sovereignty were a violent blow to Europe. But this "moment" was clearly foretold.

Too many indicators, from prior aggressions to political rheotric, went ignored. Comparisons have been drawn from Hitler's ambitions to Putin's and from the World War II invasion of Poland to the current Ukrainian crisis. Many of the warning signs were the same. At what point do we recognize the trends quickly enough to mobilize? When do we stop repeating deadly mistakes? With such heavy lessons from history staring global leaders in the face, it's a wonder action only truly came after the bombs dropped.

In a shocking show of solidarity, Switzerland broke over 200 years of neutrality to match the standard of EU sanctions against Russia and Putin.

To be so moved to break centuries of political policy, Switzerland clearly found nonaction to the Russian invasion morally reprehensible.27 This, of all action, might surprise the Kremlin. Putin likely entered into the war expecting backlash from the usual opposition, but Switzerland has had, for decades, robust mechanisms for visa support and many assets for Russian organizations - all of which are now frozen. Russia has quite a bit of wealth tied up in Switzerland, including some of Putin's personal fortune, and its inaccessibility will hopefully be felt strongly in Russia; "Long seen as one of the world's most accommodating countries for Russians to party and do business in, Switzerland will now become one of the least accessible."28 A drastic measure to match the drastic situation.

Still, there are defense mechanisms that have not been triggered. Ukraine does not have a membership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), however, it joined NATO's enhanced opportunity partner interoperability program. In essence, the program serves as a stepping stone for NATO relations on Ukraine's journey to full membership. This is not equatable with having an Action Plan for Membership (MAP) for which Ukraine applied in 2008 or full NATO membership, though both are steadfastly on the agenda for the Ukrainian government.29 As it stands, NATO will not militarily interfere unless a member state is invading, but it continues to send weapons and aid. Though, for the first time in history, NATO has deployed parts of its combat-ready defense force to Eastern Europe as a precaution.30 It seems the world is not preparing for a quick diplomatic de-escalation, and wisely so. NATO's precautionary measures appear like a vote of no confidence.

Ukraine has also formally submitted its application to the EU which has not been fasttracked thus far. Many countries openly voiced their support for Ukraine's admittance, but the EU itself seems to be taking the traditional approach to applications for membership, an approach that takes years of negotiations and red tape - time Ukraine does not have. Eastern European leaders (from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), who are traditional more sympathetic to the Ukrainian plight, published a letter on February 28 that INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 38

asked the EU to admit Ukraine immediately.31 This sentiment is not mirrored across the EU, especially by Germany and other Western European countries that demand standards for admittance be upheld - no exceptions. And so, Ukraine, like with its membership with NATO, is in limbo.

The primary convention that obstructs Ukraine's accession to the EU is known as the Copenhagen criteria which focuses on respect for democracy and rule of law which, given the near-constant Russian interference in Ukrainian politics, has been rather difficult to achieve.32 Even so, Ukraine's made strides to assert and protect internal democracy. It has formed the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) amongst other anti-corruption architecture.33 Such developments might be key in Ukraine's admittance into the EU in the future, but the frameworks in place have yet to meet the EU's standards despite the desperation of the case.

It should be said that a supportive decision on Ukraine here could be essential - an opportunity to truly bolster world-wide campaigns for democracy free of external pressures. In fact, it could be one of those pivotal moments, in which Ukraine is once again emblematic of the course of international relations; "Modern Ukraine is a battlefield of the future against the past, democracy against autocracy.

Losing Ukraine will mean losing the global war for democracy."34 And losing Ukraine will mean, at its course, that long-suffering country only suffers more. That is not its destiny; it cannot be.

War in Ukraine has given the world a cruel reality check. We are not beyond imperial aggression. We are not staunch defenders of democracy. We still fall victim to vested interests and wishful thinking. We are not beyond the age of the larger aggressor pushing down the smaller nation. We have not created the ideal where democracy can thrive and corruption is banished merely through hand word and good intentions.

There are larger forces at play, and the only way to beat them is to face them head on. May we do better

by Ukraine tomorrow than history has done.

39 SPRING 2022

References

1 David Herszenhorn, "Crimea Summit a Reminder: The West Hasn't Undone Russian Annexation," Politico, Politico, August 23, 2021, March 27, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/summit-crimea-highlights-wests-failurereverse-russian-annexation/.

2 "The West Knows the Cost of Appeasement. We Can't Rule Out Any Option for Stopping Putin. Ian Bond," The Guardian, The Guardian News and Media, February 22, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2022/feb/22/west-appeasement-putin-russia-ukraine.

3 "Ukraine," Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed March 27, 2022, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ ukraine/.

4 Ibid.

5 Gage Schmid, "Lessons from Kyiv: China's Expansionist Ambitions," International Relations Review, International Relations Review, February 27, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://www.irreview.org/articles/lessons-from-kyivchinas-expansionist-ambitions.

6 Ezra Sharpe, "Back to the Future: Putin's Return to Classical Geopolitics," Cherwell, Cherwell, January 17, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://cherwell. org/2022/01/17/back-to-the-future-putins-return-to-classical-geopolitics/.

7 Theunis Bates, "Ukraine's Fraught Relationship with Russia: A Brief History," The Week, The Week, January 8, 2015, March 27, 2022, https:// theweek.com/articles/449691/ukraines-fraught-relationship-russia-briefhistory.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Max Fisher, "Everything You Need to Know about the 2014 Ukraine Crisis," Vox, Vox, September 3, 2014, March 27, 2022, https://www.vox. com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know.

11 Pratik Mall, "Deja Vu in Ukraine," The Geopolitics, The Geopolitics, February 26, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://thegeopolitics.com/deja-vu-inukraine/.

12 Ezra Sharpe, "Back to the Future: Putin's Return to Classical Geopolitics."

13 Priyanka Shankar, "Why Can't Europe Agree on How to Deal with the Ukraine Crisis?," Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, January 26, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/26/why-europe-cannot-agree-onrussia.

14 Pratik Mall, "Deja Vu in Ukraine," The Geopolitics, The Geopolitics, February 26, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://thegeopolitics.com/deja-vu-inukraine/.

15 Lee Feinstein and Mariana Budjeryn, "Ukraine Got a Signed Commitment in 1994 to Ensure Its Security - But Can the U.S. and Allies Stop Putin's Aggression Now?," The Conversation, The Conversation, accessed March 27, 2022, https://theconversation.com/ukraine-got-a-signed-commitment-in1994-to-ensure-its-security-but-can-the-us-and-allies-stop-putins-aggressionnow-173481.

16 "How Ukraine Was Betrayed in Budapest," The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, February 23, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/ articles/how-ukraine-was-betrayed-in-budapest-russia-vladimir-putin-us-ukvolodymyr-zelensky-nuclear-weapons-11645657263.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Lee Feinstein and Mariana Budjeryn, "Ukraine Got a Signed Commitment in 1994 to Ensure Its Security - But Can the U.S. and Allies Stop Putin's Aggression Now?" 20 Jen Kirby and Jonathan Guyer, "Russia's War in Ukraine, Explained," Vox, Vox, February 24, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://www.vox. com/2022/2/23/22948534/russia-ukraine-war-putin-explosions-invasionexplained.

21 "Ukraine: Declaration by the High Representative on Behalf of the

European Union on the Decisions of the Russian Federation Further Undermining Ukraine's Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity," Consilium, Consilium, February 22, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://www.consilium. europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/22/ukraine-declaration-by-thehigh-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-decisions-ofthe-russian-federation-further-undermining-ukraine-s-sovereignty-andterritorial-integrity/.

22 "The EU's Unity over Ukraine Has Given It Surprising Heft," The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, March 26, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://www.economist.com/europe/the-eus-unity-over-ukraine-has-given-itsurprising-heft/21808306.

23 David Herszenhorn, Lili Bayer, and Hans von der Burchard, "Germany to Send Ukraine Weapons in Historic Shift on Military Aid," Politico, Politico, February 26, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukrainewar-russia-germany-still-blocking-arms-supplies/.

24 "Which Countries Are Sending Military Aid to Ukraine?," Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, March 3, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2022/2/28/which-countries-are-sending-military-aid-to-ukraine.

25 David Herszenhorn, "Germany to Send Ukraine Weapons in Historic Shift on Military Aid." 26 Ibid.

27 Sam Jones, "Swiss Break Neutrality Tradition to Match EU Sanctions on Russia," Financial Times, Financial Times, February 28, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/80c268fa-61d4-42ac-a9f4-310f12678c43.

28 Ibid.

29 Nik Popli, "How NATO Is Responding to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," Time, Time, February 25, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://time.com/6151115/ nato-russia-ukraine-article-4/.

30 Ibid.

31 Rachel Treisman, "The EU Will Welcome Ukraine But Won't Fast-Track Its Membership Application," NPR, NPR, March 11, 2022, March 27, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/03/11/1086007627/european-union-ukrainemembership-fast-track?t=1647221528118.

32 Ibid.

33 Daria Kaleniuk and Olena Halushka, "Why Ukraine's Fight Against Corruption Scares Russia," Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, December 17, 2021, March 27, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/17/ukraine-russiacorruption-putin-democracy-oligarchs/.

34 Ibid.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 40

E U RO P E

Controversy, Chaos, and Corruption The UK’s Response to COVID-19

by Jessic a Swa nson edited by Ma no Ha r a d a

#41Spring SPRING 2022 2022 STYLEBOOK

W

ith an ongoing police investigation into senior Conservative (Tory) party members, a surge of Tory members of parliament (MPs) are rejecting party leadership.

With plummeting public approval, Boris Johnson’s tenure ​​— and the legitimacy of his party — is on the line. Given the landslide election that kicked off his term in May 2019 and his swift delivery of a Brexit deal in January 2020, this should come as a surprise.

In reality, distrust of Johnson and his cabinet has been high since his assumption of power, with years of Brexit fatigue and partisan divides depleting trust in government. However, when the COVID-19 pandemic sent the UK into a national lockdown in March 2020, trust both in Johnson and in overall government skyrocketed, following what is known as the “rally round the flag” trend. Unfortunately for the Tories, this trust quickly plummeted following a series of scandals: senior aide Dominic Cummings breaking COVID restrictions, loopholes to regulations catering to the Tory elite, and most egregiously, the Partygate scandal, wherein a number of social gatherings violating COVID policies took place among Tory officials on government property.

Not only have these scandals depicted Johnson as a caricature of the hypocritical, self-serving, and corrupt politician, but they have shown him repeatedly and unabashedly breaking the laws he implemented, and, in the process, shattering his relationship with both the public and his own party.

Johnson’s Election and Early Term

After continuous failures in Brexit negotiations and growing discontent among the public, Prime Minister Theresa May resigned in May 2019. Eager to hasten negotiations, Conservative party members elected the staunchly pro-Brexit Boris Johnson as Party Leader and ipso facto Prime Minister. To cement his legitimacy and “get Brexit done” policies, Johnson called for an early election in December 2019, resulting in an additional forty-eight seats for the party, many of which from historically Labour constituencies.1 Despite his electoral triumph, public trust in government remained understandably low; the UK was well into two years of tedious Brexit negotiations with seemingly nothing to show for it. This ‘Brexit fatigue’ eroded public trust; even after the election, 60

percent of surveyed voters reported a lack of trust in the UK government, and 57 percent indicated a distrust for Johnson specifically.2 Initial distrust was short-lived, though, with the early stages of the pandemic quickly transforming public perception of both the UK government and Johnson’s leadership. Political scientist John Mueller hypothesized in 1970 that “intense international events generate a “rally round the flag effect”” characterized by a sharp but ultimately short-term increase in a leader’s popularity.3 While Mueller used Cold War-related foreign policy events to formulate his argument, the COVID-19 pandemic undoubtedly constitutes a similarly ‘intense international event’. Beyond its scale and intensity, the uncertainty surrounding the virus resulted in surmounting public fear. In mid-March 2020, just before Johnson announced the first lockdown, 22 percent of British adults surveyed by the Mental Health Foundation and the Institute of Public Health at the University of Cambridge reported “[feeling] panicked” because of the pandemic, and a further 30 percent reported “[feeling] afraid.”4 On March 23rd, Johnson announced the UK’s first national lockdown.

Unsurprisingly, this move dramatically boosted confidence in government as citizens sought a feeling of security. By the end of March, general distrust both in overall government and in Boris Johnson fell to 30 percent and 14 percent, respectively, according to a 2020 study on changes in political trust throughout the pandemic.5 Unfortunately, these drastic changes were only temporary. The “rally round the flag” effect is inherently unsustainable: once crises become ‘new normals’ and lose their initial shock-factor, public trust in government crashes.6 As such, tanking public trust should be expected. However, there are two factors making the UK a unique case: firstly, precrisis trust in government was already staggeringly low, and secondly, the drop in public confidence followed a high-profile government scandal.

May 2020: The Dominic Cummings Scandal The “rally round the flag” effect predicts that “popularity will continually decline over time” rather than dropping suddenly.7 Johnson’s approval ratings corroborate this theory: after an initial boost in March, it decreased linearly beginning in April 2020 (Fig. 1).8

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 42

Fig. 1: “Approval Rating, PM Boris Johnson (UK)”

However, this was not the case for the UK government as a whole. In mid-May 2020, less than two months into the UK ’s first lockdown, Boris Johnson’s then-chief adviser Dominic Cummings broke COVID-19 regulations to visit a family estate with his symptomatic wife and child, flagrantly flouting the stay at home messages he helped campaign. Despite significant media attention and public outrage, Cummings refused to issue an apology, later stating that he “wasn’t sorry about moving them [his wife and child] out of London” at the time because he thought “it was the right thing to do.” 9 Needless to say, this did not sit well with the British public. Reported distrust in the UK government subsequently doubled to around 65 percent of surveyed Britons​​ : greater than it had been after the election in 2019. 10 Somewhat paradoxically, 54 percent of those surveyed by University College London reported no change in trust levels at this point in the pandemic. 11 For this reason, it is difficult to determine how much of this distrust stemmed from the scandal itself, versus being lingering resentment that the scandal merely revitalized.

For the remainder of the first lockdown, which ended on June 1 2020, Johnson’s approval ratings decreased to just below 40 percent. Although public disapproval of COVID-19 policies is in no 43 SPRING 2022

way unique to the UK, it devolved from merely distrusting policy to 43 percent of surveyed voters disagreeing with the very idea that Johnson “wants to do his best to serve the country in his handling of the coronavirus outbreak.”12 Indeed, just over a third of participants supported the statement that Johnson “[u]sually acts in his own interests in his handling of the coronavirus outbreak.”13 These statistics reveal a far more alarming truth within the UK situation: citizens feel like their own government prioritizes the individual self-interest of top officials over national wellbeing and security.

December 2020: “Christmas is Cancelled”

Evidently, the Cummings scandal precipitated plummeting political trust and fueled the idea that senior Tory party members act in their self-interest, a narrative only exacerbated by Johnson’s refusal to fire Cummings. Moreover, many of Johnson’s policies received criticism for having engineered loopholes allowing him and other senior Tories to bypass tiered COVID-19 regulations.

After the UK’s second lockdown, from October to early December 2020, Downing Street released a tiered system of COVID-19 regulations by region detailing different levels of socio-economic openness based on transmission and positive case rates. The first and least restrictive tier only

imposed the ‘Rule of Six’ for social interactions, mask mandates, and curfews.14 Tiers two and three included domestic travel restrictions and increased limitations on hospitality.15 Despite promising to the public that regulations would be relaxed for Christmas when announcing the end of lockdown, Johnson announced a new fourth tier banning social interaction outside of households.16 These restrictions followed a sudden resurgence in cases and deaths after the dip in November.17 Despite a media frenzy that “Christmas is cancelled,” (Appendix 1) Johnson’s approval rating was not adversely affected.18 While disappointing, the new tier was seen as an undesirable yet ultimately necessary political move.19 Beyond that, the public fairly assumed that Christmas would also be canceled for the Prime Minister, evoking some sense of national cooperation and camaraderie.

This was not necessarily the case. Of course, as with all other COVID-19 regulations, exceptions were made for persons with disabilities, as well as those especially vulnerable to social isolation: namely single parents and people living alone. In the newly-devised Tier 4, the only exception unrelated to these two categories was for households with children “under the age of one… on 2 December 2020.”20 No accommodations had been made for this group in previous lockdowns or restrictions.

Why the sudden change? Coincidentally, Johnson and his then-fiancée (now wife) Carrie Symonds delivered a baby just eight months before, making their household eligible to form a ‘support bubble’.21 Beyond the obviously suspect timing, the exemption, one which applies to over 750,000 households in the UK , was scarcely communicated to the public, calling into question the purpose of this exemption. 22 Although skeptics argue that the newborn exemption targets mothers suffering from postpartum depression, many high-risk mental health groups, including those already suffering from mental illness, were left out from exemptions. That said, it is difficult to argue that the exemption was made for any reason but to serve the Prime Minister. Unsurprisingly, Downing Street declined to comment on whether Johnson actually used the loophole, only reporting that he would spend Christmas day at 10 Downing Street (hereinafter No. 10). 23

For an entire nation to sacrifice their holiday in solidarity only for the Prime Minister to disregard it is shameful. As the figurehead of the UK , Johnson should have led by example rather than alienating himself from his public. But clearly separating himself from the masses was central to Johnson’s policies, with a myriad of other selfserving loopholes delivering blow after blow to public trust. Notably, the exception of grousehunting, a popular social sport amongst the elite, in tiers one through three as a permissible group activity demonstrates a clear atmosphere of Toryexceptionalism within government.24 Fig. 2: ‘ Wine and Cheese Party’ at No. 10 on May 15 2020.

The Partygate Scandal and its Implications

By far the most well-known and controversial of Johnson’s ‘lockdown loopholes’ is Partygate: the ongoing scandal about social gatherings between Tory officials in government offices while COVID restrictions prohibited such socialization. In December 2021, ITV released leaked footage from a mock press conference in No. 10 wherein then-spokeswoman Allegra Stratton joked with fellow staffers about how to handle questions concerning the office’s rumored Christmas party. Remembering that “this is recorded,” she asserts that “this fictional party was

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 44

a business meeting,” adding with a giggle that “it was not socially distanced.”25 Johnson and other Downing Street officials had repeatedly denied such parties had ever occurred. Not only did this unearthed footage reveal policymakers breaking their own rules, but exposed those same policymakers as liars. To make matters worse for the Tory party, major news outlets including The Guardian and The Times began circulating photos of their illegal gatherings.26 While top Tories tried to save face, claiming the events to be work-related, the images depict Johnson with his partner, who holds no political office, and an assortment of Downing Street staff chatting over cheese and wine: a difficult scene to explain as anything other than a social gathering (Fig. 2).27 Funnily enough, the gathering depicted in Figure 2 is one of only four events not being investigated by the police. Regardless, it spurred enough outrage to pressure Johnson into appointing civil servant Sue Gray to conduct an investigation into the alleged gatherings. Her findings outlined sixteen instances ranging from goodbye parties to ‘wine-time Fridays,’ ultimately exhibiting multiple “failures of leadership and judgment by different parts of No. 10. and the Cabinet Office at different times.”28 Beyond just breaking lockdown rules, two of these parties occurred the night before Prince Phillip’s funeral while the country was officially in a state of national mourning.

Of these 16 events, 12 are being 45 SPRING 2022

investigated further by the Metropolitan Police.29 Former Prime Minister Theresa May encapsulated public perception of Partygate: “either [Johnson] had not read the rules, did not understand what they meant and nor did others around him, or they didn’t think the rules applied to No. 10. Which was it?”30 In the eyes of the public, Johnson is either a fool or a hypocrite. For most politicians, this option-set would be hopeless, yet Johnson is seemingly playing into it: by allowing the public to believe him a fool, he may be able to absolve himself of at least some blame. He vehemently denied any responsibility with the childish assertion that “nobody told me and … nobody said that this was something that was against the rules.”31 The PM argues that he thought it was a work event because otherwise “why would it have been allowed?”32 Just as May said, there are two possible explanations for this. Either the Prime Minister has no knowledge

or control of what goes on in his office, or he has yet again lied to the public. It would be imprudent to argue the latter without sufficient evidence, but Dominic Cummings, Johnson’s former top aide, wrote in his blog that “[t] he events of 20 May alone, never mind the string of other events, mean the PM lied to Parliament about parties,” further adding that himself and “other eyewitnesses… would swear under oath this is what happened.”33 Though this declaration only pertains to one gathering, any instance of the Prime Minister lying to Parliament is sufficiently damning.

As evidenced by Cummings’ blog post, Johnson is just as much in the hot seat with his party as he is with his people. At the time of writing, 15 Tory MPs have openly sent letters of no confidence to the 1922 Committee. 54 letters of no confidence from Tory MPs would trigger a vote of no confidence in the House of Commons, where the majority vote of 181 would

Fig. 3: “Boris Johnson and his Policies - Over Time”

determine Johnson’s future as Prime Minister.34 With an irredeemably low approval rating and a sea of condemnations from fellow party members, a no-confidence vote does not seem implausible.

However, with the number of Tories speaking out against Johnson vastly outnumbering those who have submitted letters of no confidence, the Tory party seems to be all bark and no bite.

Granted, there are political reasons for this.

Many Tory MPs are probably awaiting an official decision from the Metropolitan Police on whether Johnson’s actions broke UK law. Demanding his resignation without first respecting the principles of due process would undermine the foundational democratic principles on which the UK is built.

Equally plausible, certain MPs may hold off until their colleagues submit letters first so that, should they choose to submit their own, they can be more confident of the motion actually going through. This makes sense politically, as an unsuccessful motion could put MPs in hot water with the Prime Minister.

Additionally, a collection of MPs are realizing they can take advantage of Johnson’s precarious position for their own political gain. One anonymous Tory MP explained that “[s]ome [MPs] are thinking he’s [Johnson] promised me that I’ll be Minister for Paperclips, so why don’t I give him one last chance to make me Minister for Paperclips?”35 While immoral, it is a potentially promising political strategy: in a last-ditch effort to maintain his position, Johnson plans to replace top Tory officials implicated in the scandal, leaving potential vacancies for MPs who have proved themselves loyal to the PM and his cabinet.36

Johnson’s plan, dubbed Operation Save Big Dog, makes abundantly clear that Johnson’s political decisions are aimed at saving his job rather than serving his country. Though this political opportunism could have been a good thing, with Johnson pursuing policies intended to reestablish goodwill with the public, he is instead seeking favor within his party, and prioritizing the will of the Tories over the will of the people. Beyond damaging the quality of governance, this blatant nepotism will only further damage Johnson and his party’s relationship with the public.

So, with plummeting public support, internal party division and an upcoming local election in May, what does the future look like for the PM and his party? Unfortunately for the Tories, it seems that a massive secession to Labour is imminent. In a 2022 survey determining which characteristics Britons attribute to the Conservative and Labour parties, participants reported more trust in Labour in regards to the National Health Service (NHS), environment, education, unity, trustworthiness, and overall policy.37 The only categories in which Conservatives outranked the Labour party were trust in economic policy, and party division.38 More broadly, 43 percent of surveyed voters reported that they “Dislike both him [Johnson] and his party”, compared to just 26 percent in May 2020 (Fig. 3).39 Evidently, Johnson has already lost in the court of public opinion. In an election, this is the only verdict that matters. His approval rating is at an all-time low of just 25 percent – less than Theresa May’s lowest rating, which culminated in her resignation.40 For the first time since his election in 2019, more Conservative voters reported that

Fig. 4: “How Well is Boris Johnson Doing as Prime Minister?” - Conservative Voters

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 46

they believe Johnson is doing badly in his role as Prime Minister than those who believe he is doing well (Fig. 4).41 With dwindling approval from his own party and increasing support for Labour, the future of the Tories looks grim. For the first time in his tenure, more Britons believe that Sir Keir Starmer, Leader of the Labour Party, would make a better Prime Minister than Johnson. In less than three years since Johnson’s landslide snap election, this is both a shock and a blow. Resentment is stewing among the public, and will only accelerate once the Metropolitan Police announces their findings. Even if they find Johnson innocent, the public has already deemed him guilty.

The Ukraine War

In the past month, though, Johnson has been handed a final shot at redemption: Ukraine.

Optimistic Tories recall a similar situation with Margaret Thatcher in 1982.42 Her wildly unpopular austerity measures led to immense dissatisfaction among Britons, and, much like Johnson, the future of her office looked unstable. Yet, when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, a colony of the UK at the time, she refocused public attention to a morally uncomplicated foreign crisis threatening the remnants of the British Empire. Though the Ukraine Crisis doesn’t implicate the UK in the same way the Falkland War did, it does give Johnson a chance to reinvent himself. And, it is starting to work: in just two weeks since the Russian Invasion, his approval rating has gone up from 36 to 39 percent.43 Even his staunchest critics recognise this; former minister Rory Stewart who resigned upon Johnson’s election said: "I think he's a terrible human being. I think he's a terrible prime minister but I think he's done OK on the Ukraine crisis."44 Even the Labour Party have slowed their demands for Johnson’s resignation, with the war clearly shifting their priorities away from partisan politics.

That said, it is important to remember the inherent fleetingness of the “rally round the flag” effect. While fear surrounding the war remains high, approval for Johnson will continue to grow, but as the situation drags on, it will most likely go down again. More significantly, Partygate is not over: the Metropolitan Police have yet to issue a verdict, 47 SPRING 2022

and Sue Gray has not yet published an unredacted version of her report. While the latter may not ever be published, a police report is imminent, and will undoubtedly put a spoke in the wheel. People have put their anger on the back burner in light of the Ukraine crisis, but any reminder of the situation will reignite their fervor. It is not impossible for the Ukraine War to replace Partygate as Johnson’s legacy, but it’s probably just as likely as the Met finding him innocent.

Appendix 1: “Front Pages of UK Papers on 20 December 2020. Composite: Various.”45

References

1 Carl Baker and Elise Uberoi, “General Election 2019: The Results,” House of Commons Library, UK Parliament, December 13, 2019, https:// commonslibrary.parliament.uk/general-election-2019-the-results-so-far/.

2 Ben Davies, Fanny Lalot, Linus Peitz, Maria S. Heering, Hilal Ozkececi, Jacinta Babaian, Kaya Davies Hayon, Jo Broadwood, and Dominic Abrams, “Changes in Political Trust in Britain during the COVID-19 Pandemic in 2020: Integrated Public Opinion Evidence and Implications,” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 8, no. 1 (2021): 4-5, https://doi. org/10.1057/s41599-021-00850-6.

3 John E. Mueller, “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson,” The American Political Science Review 64, no. 1 (1970): 21, https://doi. org/10.2307/1955610.

4 “Millions of UK adults have felt panicked, afraid and unprepared as a result of the coronavirus pandemic - new poll data reveal impact on mental health,” Mental Health Foundation, March 26 2020, https://www.mentalhealth.org. uk/news/millions-uk-adults-have-felt-panicked-afraid-and-unpreparedresult-coronavirus-pandemic-new 5 Davies et al., “Changes in Political Trust,” 5 6 Ibid, 2-3.

7 Mueller, “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson,” 22.

8 Will Jennings, Viktor Valgarðsson, Gerry Stoker, Dan Devine, Jen Gaskell, and Mark Evans, “Political Trust and the COVID-19 Crisis: Pushing Populism to the Backburner? A Study of Public Opinion in Australia, Italy, the UK and the USA,” Democracy 2025, August 20, 2020, https://www.ipsos.com/ sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2020-08/covid_and_trust.pdf.

9 “Cummings on Lack of Apology for Lockdown Trip to Durham,” BBC News, May 26, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-politics-57255719.

10 Davies et al., “Changes in Political Trust,” 4.

11 Sam Parson and Richard D. Wiggins. “Trust in Government and others during the COVID-19: Initial Findings from the COVID-19 Survey in Five National Longitudinal Studies.” University College London Centre for Longitudinal Studies, October 2020, https://cls.ucl.ac.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2020/10/Trust-in-government-and-others-during -the-COVID-19pandemic-%E2%80%93-initial-findings-from-COVID-19-survey.pdf.

12 Jennings et al., “Political Trust and the COVID-19 Crisis,” 24.

13 Ibid, 24.

14 “Four-Tier Coronavirus Alert Levels: Tier 1, 2, 3 and 4 Rules Explained,” Age UK , last updated July 5, 2021, https://www.ageuk.org.uk/informationadvice/coronavirus/coronavirus-guidance/local-lockdown-tiers/.

15 Ibid.

16 Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, “COVID-19 Map,” accessed February 16, 2022, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html.

17 Ibid.

18 Warren Murray, “‘Christmas cancelled’: what the papers say as UK Covid bubbles burst,” The Guardian, December 19, 2020, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2020/dec/20/christmas-cancelled-what-the-papers-say-as-covidbubbles-burst.

19 “How Well Is Boris Johnson Doing as Prime Minister?” YouGov, accessed February 20, 2022, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/borisjohnson-approval-rating.

20 Jemima Kelly, “Guess Whose Christmas Isn’t Cancelled?” Financial Times, December 22, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/290c234b-e8e34abb-9c71-26ada5a633d9.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 “Leaked video shows Downing Street staff joking about Christmas party they later denied | ITV News,” ITV News,

December 7, 2021, video, 0:46, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=4Ofkm48nv_k.

26 Chris Smyth, Katie Gibbons and Steven Swinford, “Public outraged at No 10 drinks for staff ’s ‘hard work,’” The Times, December 21, 2021, sec, Coronavirus, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/pm-in-lockdown-workmeeting-at-no-10-with-cheese-and-wine-pwsqplh7k 27 Peter Walker, “Chatting over Cheese and Wine: Anatomy of Downing Street Lockdown Gathering,” The Guardian, December 19, 2021, sec. Politics, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/dec/19/chatting-over-cheeseand-wine-anatomy-downing-street-lockdown-gathering-picture.

28 Sue Gray, “Investigation Into Alleged Gatherings on Government Premises During Covid – Update,” UK , January 21, 2022, 7, https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/1051374/Investigation_into_alleged_gatherings_on_government_ premises_during_Covid_restrictions_-_Update.pdf.

29 Ibid.

30 “Theresa May Challenges Boris Johnson on Covid Lockdown Parties after Gray Report,” YouTube (The Guardian, January 31, 2022), https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=l32QN4y5RlE. 31 Boris Johnson, “Boris Johnson denies Cummings’ claims he was warned about Downing St party - video,” The Guardian ,January 18, 2022, video, 1:45, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2022/jan/18/borisjohnson-denies-cummings-claims-warned-about-downing-st-party-video 32 Ibid.

33 Dominic Cummings, “Parties, Photos, Trolleys, Variants,” Dominic Cummings substack (Substack, January 7, 2022), https://dominiccummings. substack.com/p/parties-photos-trolleys-variants?s=r.

34 Tom Ambrose, “Tory Rebels: Mps Who Openly Sent Letter of No Confidence in Boris Johnson,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, February 2, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/feb/02/toryrebels-mps-who-openly-sent-letter-of-no-confidence-in-boris-johnson.

35 Andrew Rawnsley, “Britain Is Trapped in No Man’s Land While Tory MPs Dither over Ditching Boris Johnson,” The Guardian, February 13, 2022, sec. Opinion, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/13/ britain-is-trapped-in-no-mans-land-while-tory-mps-dither-over-ditchingboris-johnson.

36 Anna Isaac, “Operation Save Big Dog: Boris Johnson draws up plan for officials to quit over partygate so he can keep job,” The Independent, January 14, 2022, sec. UK Politics, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/ boris-johnson-downing-street-partygate-b1993433.html 37 Chris Hopkins. “Savanta ComRes Political Tracker Polls,” Savanta ComRes, February 2022, https://savanta.com/industry/politics/.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 “How Well Is Boris Johnson Doing as Prime Minister?”

41 Ibid.

42 Laura Kuenssberg, “Ukraine war has put the brakes on efforts to remove Boris Johnson - for now,” BBC News, March 6, 2022, sec. Russia-Ukraine war, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-60642100.

43 Arnau Busquets, “Politico Poll of Polls - British Polls, Trends and Election News for the United Kingdom and Scotland,” United Kingdom (Politico, March 10, 2022), https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/unitedkingdom/.

44 Kuenssberg, “Ukraine war.”

45 Murray, “‘Christmas Cancelled.”

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 48

EUROPE

Rise of The ‘Ndrangheta

The Structure, Global Expansion, and Drug Trade of Italy’s Mafia Power

by Jude Hoa g edited by Sea n Hronc ich

I

n November 2021, the Italian government uncovered a mass drug trafficking operation of Colombian cocaine by the infamous ‘Ndrangheta (pronounced en-dran-get-uh) mafia of the Calabria region. The ‘Ndrangheta is a highly organized mafia whose focus in the last 20 years has shifted towards the global drug trade. Its actions sprawl across the globe: managing drug producers in Colombia, divers in the ports of Italy, and peddlers all across Europe. Mafias have existed in Italy for centuries, so why has the risk level of the ‘Ndrangheta increased? Its organizational capacity and international ties are key to understanding why the ‘Ndrangehta is so threatening. The Italian state lacks a strategic plan of action; instead of beheading the organizational leaders of the ‘Ndrangehta, the government focuses on dismantling individual drug peddlers. Despite this discouraging history, recent court developments may mark an exciting change from this trend. In examining the Italian state and the ‘Ndrangeta’s strengths and weaknesses, it is clear that this mafia is a daunting issue. Italy is not currently capable of responding to this challenge.

Analyzing the organizational structure of two other mafia organizations, the Cosa Nostra and the Camorra will explain how the ‘Ndrangheta is 49 SPRING 2022

more capable. Looking at ‘Ndrangheta’s success in the Latin American and European drug market shows the impact of the rise of this organization.

The Italian state response–riddled with corruption– has shown little capability of stopping this drug trafficking power from further expanding outside of its borders.

Organization is Key Two other notable Italian mafias – the Cosa Nostra and the Camorra – are critical to understand when analyzing the Ndrangheta's power structure.

The Cosa Nostra, a family based mafia with no central structure, became a nucleus of power in the communities it controlled in the nineteenth century.1 Their expansion into illicit markets in the twentieth century in the United States led them to being the most prominent mafia in Italy at the time. However, crackdowns in both Italy and the U.S. in the 1990s crippled the organization, and the Cosa Nostra never fully recovered.2 The Camorra, prominent in the Campania region of Italy, was far less structured and therefore less significant in organized crime.3 In contrast, the ‘Ndrangheta is a large, hierarchical collection of clans with higher-

level organizational structures creating unity at every level of operation. Based in the most southern province on the peninsula, Calabria, the ‘Ndrangheta was also founded in the nineteenth century. In the late twentieth century, infighting led to the creation of organizational bodies above the families and, with the Cosa Nostra on the decline, resulted in a more powerful syndicate.4 The ‘Ndrangheta is currently the largest and most prominent of the three mafias.5 The three mafias are each composed of a similar, single criminal unit called the “family.”

Hollywood has given a prime example of a mafia’s family structure: Francis Ford Coppola’s 1972 film The Godfather depicts the Costa Nostra’s family dynamics and mafia organization.6 It is difficult to join a family unit if not related by blood; each family is characterized by a well understood hierarchy, with the godfather at the top.7 The Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta represent two extremes to the organization between these units.

The Camorra has independent families with no organizational structure above them, while the ‘Ndrangheta consists of six thousand members organized by blood-tie clans, strategic marriages, and two central bodies.8 The ‘Ndrangheta’s organizational structure vastly differentiates from the Costa Nostra and the Camorra due to two organizational bodies above the ‘Ndrangheta family. The Costa Nostra, like the ‘Ndrangheta, pushed for more vertical power above the family structure in the 1960s and ‘70s. This newly established vertical power, which the Cosa Nostra called the cupola, would serve as a higherlevel coordinating body, but an attempt at a seizure of power by one family crippled the Cosa Nostra’s ability to organize.9 When the Italian state began to crack down on the overt crimes of the Cosa Nostra in the 1990s, the Costa Nostra did not have the capacity to effectively fight back, allowing the ‘Ndrangheta to rise to more prominence.

Despite violating mafia organizational norms, the ‘Ndrangheta’s alliance-controlling unit, which the ‘Ndrangheta call the crimine or provincia, allowed it to be the only mafia with unified organization at every level of operation.10 While the ‘Ndrangheta’s structure speaks to its organizational strength, its strategies and environment has led

to newfound expansion and prominence as not just an Italian mafia, but also an international criminal organization. The ‘Ndrangheta's reliability, flexibility, and expansion outside of the Italian peninsula during the 1990s has led to it becoming the center of Italy’s organized crime.11 Moreover, the ‘Ndrangheta’s expansion to Germany and the rest of Europe,12 Australia,13 and Latin America demonstrates its global power.14 The expansion into Latin America is particularly important for understanding the global impact of this organization because this region is the ‘Ndrangheta’s base of cocaine production.

Impact on Latin America The ‘Ndrangheta does not solely have a regional presence in Europe, its operations in Latin America demonstrates its global impact.

Of the three mafias discussed, the ‘Ndrangheta is the only one with formally organized groups of families in South-Central America, with major focuses in Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Brazil.15 The ‘Ndrangheta’s foothold in Latin American countries creates economic and security threats.

Illicit cocaine trade has extended to international scale like nothing seen in Colombia since the coffee industry.16 There are “links of this organization with criminal groups and terrorists, like Al Qaeda, in which they have exchanged arms for cocaine.”17 The ‘Ndrangheta’s interaction with arms dealers exposes Latin American countries to a terrorist organization that will spread unregulated arms across the region.

The ‘Ndrangheta’s grip on the drug trade creates global ties and exposure that cannot be regulated by the Colombian state. The inherent economic ties INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 50

may make the Colombian economy reliant on drug production. The ‘Ndrangheta has also cooperated with the Brazilian criminal group Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) in Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela. The PCC helped the ‘Ndrangheta with exporting a large amount of cocaine from these countries, with a 2016 bust of seven tons of cocaine destined for Europe alone.18 The cocaine production by the ‘Ndrangheta in these four countries demonstrates the mafia’s global reach and the extent of these economic changes and security threats are worrying.

The Coordinated Drug Smuggling Process With the growth of illegal drug usage in Europe from cocaine imported from Latin America, the ‘Ndrangheta’s structure, namely its capacity for central decision making and its flexibility to spread across nations, allows for the expansion of the existing global drug market. The ‘Ndrangheta is expanding the Colombian cocaine trade into Italy and Europe by organizing multi-kilo drug trafficking in three main steps: (1) a diver retrieves drugs dropped from ships who are unwilling to be searched in ports, (2) a wholesaler is allocated to the region where the final product will be distributed, and finally (3) a retailer sells the final quantity to the user.19 At each point of sale, the ‘Ndrangheta have power to increase the product’s price. This is how the product’s price at the first transaction can be 30 Euros per gram and the final product can sell at a rate of 75 Euros per gram.20 With its hold on the market hemorrhaging money from users, there is no incentive for the ‘Ndrangheta to make this process more effective.

While ‘Ndrangheta may have found it more profitable to sell cocaine from Colombia to the U.S., that country being closer to the wholesale producer, the average selling price for a kilogram of cocaine in the U.S. is $28,000 and in Europe it is $40,000.21 This lucrative markup may have to do with the novelty of Colombian drugs in the market or the ‘Ndrangheta’s ability to control the prices at every level of the European drug market. Either way, the increase in price of cocaine within Europe has led the ‘Ndrangheta to target the European market.

Cocaine bought cheaply in Colombia is imported into Italy, floods across the Northern border into 51 SPRING 2022

Europe, and is profitably sold to a market that will inevitably become reliant on the addictive product.

Impact on European Drug Market Once the cocaine from Latin America is imported to Europe, the ‘Ndrangheta trafficks the drugs out of Italy and into the European market.

The ‘Ndrangheta has developed its European drug trade alongside its overall growth as a mafia. Italy, with its corruption and lack of unified response, is incapable of stopping the spread of ‘Ndranghetaimported drugs from pouring across its borders into Europe. As a result, the drug market in Europe is already experiencing the growing intake dependency caused by the imports of cocaine by the ‘Ndrangheta from Latin America.

While the European drug market is smaller than the U.S.’s, its drug use is increasing at a high rate because of a key factor: the ‘Ndrangheta. A report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has shown that in European countries the prevalence for cocaine usage is 0.87 percent within the population and opioid usage is 0.66 percent, whereas in North America cocaine usage is 2.10 percent and opioid usage is 3.96 percent.22 This comparison shows that the market in Europe currently has an overall smaller number of cocaine and opioid users than the rest of the world. However, drug usage in Europe in general is only increasing, with opioid related deaths rising every year in the last decade, increasing 15 percent between 2014 and 2018.23 The image of the entire European drug market is one of increasing drug trafficking, drug addiction, and ties to the ‘Ndrangheta.

The control the ‘Ndrangheta took of drug importation is a factor in the worrying increase of European addiction. According to Italian drug trade analysts Anna Sergi and Anita Lavorgna, the ‘Ndrangheta “progressively allowed for the… consolidation of the roles of various clans in the drug trade both at the importation and at the distribution stage, as well as … power to influence their partners around the world.”24 The ‘Ndrangheta, with the control of the drug process defined in the above section, consolidated the different clans’ power in the drug trafficking market in order to dominate the expansion of cocaine. The

‘Ndrangheta’s flexible and unified organization allowed for the control and increase of drug importation into Europe.

The ‘Ndrangheta’s expansion into Europe fueled the European drug market and established a multi-million-euro pipeline of cocaine from Latin American countries like Colombia.25 The risk of exposure of cocaine traffickers to Europe cannot be understated. According to Sergi: With stronger and stronger structures… In Italy and elsewhere, the ‘Ndrangheta clans today represent a very complex threat for the global governance of security in which the globalization of markets, communication and transports has played a huge role… Italian prosecutors assert a real hegemony of the Calabrian clans over cocaine trafficking from Latin America.26 The power that the ‘Ndrangheta has over the cocaine supply entering Europe poses a threat difficult to attack due to the market’s complexity.

The ‘Ndrangheta’s stronghold over drug imports to Europe, their ability to evade law enforcement, and the mafia’s expansion with communication technology has made it a force that Italy cannot currently fight.

Implication for Italian State The ‘Ndrangheta’s drug trafficking is a threat that will impact far more countries than Italy.

Despite some recent high-profile busts, Italy does not currently seem poised to take down this threat because of the country’s chronic corruption. There is a documented prevalence of mafia infiltration within local governments, police forces, and

businesses in Italy. Throughout its history, Italy has rarely demonstrated the ability to handle the mafia’s power. In a critical light, Italy demonstrates a crippling level of corruption and marked incapacity to handle the mafia’s aggression. From a more optimistic perspective, the Italian police’s history of large-scale anti-mafia busts and citizen boycotts provides hope for local Italian forces gutting local crime units.

Widespread bribery and corruption weaken state-led efforts to combat the mafia in Italy. Historically, political parties relied on the mafia for municipality elections in exchange for favors.27 For instance, Giacoma Davide de Luca’s study demonstrates how the rise of the mafia in Sicily correlates with a lack of state capacity to secure elections and prevent corruption. The mafia demonstrates this control in every province it operates in with a tight grip on the government’s voting structure.28 The police force, responsible for fighting organized crime, is governed by elected officials. When an elected official is paid by the mafia, it is likely that the official will not direct the police force to fight the mafia. Therefore, the state’s lack of response to mafia control of elected officials creates a negative loop where elected officials win elections through criminal organizations who the officials refuse to attack.

Given the mafias’ influence on the government, anti-mafia policies are practically rendered useless. There are two potential causes behind the failure of state intervention in transnational mafia networks: (1) The police’s limited jurisdiction constrains action on

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 52

international criminal rings and (2) the mafiaallied local government officials hinder anti-mafia policies.29 Further, the disparate nature of police response to mafia crime has led to inconsistencies of implementing policy within the state and ultimately has led to an inefficient system.30 The local police are fighting the mafia without the support of their elected officials or a unified plan by the federal government. Without changing the fundamental structure of state response, it is unlikely that Italy will make any headway against the mafias’ governmental influence.

The Italian police have a limited history of success in financial surveillance,31 evidence gathering,32 and full-scale investigations aimed at ending the mafia threat in Italy.33 The Italian police’s capability in certain areas is often reduced by the lack of organization between localities and the judiciary, leading to more of a piecemeal antimafia policy rather than a united police front.

Consequently, when the police are able to make a major arrest, the ‘Ndrangheta is more resilient.

According to criminologist Francesco Calderoni, “‘Ndrangheta groups may be particularly resilient to law enforcement intervention, since the removal of the most central nodes may be easily remedied through existing network connections, and the arrested individuals may be subsequently replaced with other participants.”34 The uneven approach by the state, therefore, will never be successful because the ‘Ndrangheta will always have people to replace others taken by small-scale arrests.

This incapacity is exacerbated by corruption plaguing all levels of the state response. The Italian people believe that they have significantly higher corruption than the rest of Europe and 28.8 percent of people interviewed reported they had to pay a bribe to a representative of law enforcement recently.35 The expectation by corrupt law enforcement is that they will receive money in exchange for basic public services. This creates both distrust in the public and no incentive for law enforcement to undertake a larger case, such as fighting the mafia.

There have been some recent large scale busts that complicate the evidence that the police are incapable of taking out major leaders in the ‘Ndrangheta. A mass trial in November 2021 began 53 SPRING 2022

prosecuting 350 ‘Ndrangheta members, including some leaders, and this marks an example of the police’s power not seen since the 1990s Cosa Nostra trials.36 37 The trial will behead a greater number of the ‘Ndrangheta’s organizational leaders than convicted in Italy before. However, it is important to note that convictions of high ranking members have occurred in the past without dampening the ‘NDrangheta’s expansion. Researchers have not explored the potential effect of this trial yet.

In this vein, organized crime analysts like Letizia Paol believe the focus on the prevalence of mafias in Italy ignores the successes of law enforcement. The most evident example of this is the Cosa Nostra, which Paol said “has seen all of its high-ranking members of the 1980s and 1990s arrested, has been excluded from most international trafficking and has lost political power.”38 However, Paol notes that, especially when it comes to the ‘Ndrangheta, “The capacity of mafia groups to survive and regenerate should not be underestimated.”39 Focusing on the individual major busts of drug enforcement agencies may lead to an optimistic view of the potential for law enforcement response capacity. But beyond the direct state response, policies that encourage anti-mafia entrepreneurs are also working at excluding mafias from major firms within localities. Economist Christina Jerne noted that anti-crime entrepreneurs have come up with creative branding techniques that have proved more effective than state policy: “...to place an [anti-mafia] sticker in the window of the shops… allowed the reputation of the movement to grow… [directing] money and networks into the organization thereby strengthening its position in the territory.”40 In this anti-mafia campaign, the marketing of a business as anti-mafia will increase the business’s reputation, mutually benefitting the owner and the community. The interpretations of successful anti-mafia policies in the last few decades lends the possibility of a future where the Italian state and citizens have more capacity against these non-state criminal organizations.

The ‘Ndrangheta has shown a marked ability to adapt and expand its power, whereas the Italian response has shown none of the same flexibility and organization. The ‘Ndrangheta’s hierarchical and centralized structure ensures uniform strategies

across its units, unlike its counterparts the Camorra and Cosa Nostra. This has allowed its power to expand into the international drug market, capitalizing on Latin American production and spreading cocaine throughout Europe. Italy has maintained its ineffective response except for a few impressive mass arrests. The cause of this incapacity is the disconnected nature of Italy’s police force and the high level of corruption and criminal infiltration throughout the country. The ‘Ndrangheta’s threat to Italy, Europe, and Latin America is global in nature, and security threats will expand if left uncontested. Without a cohesive plan from the federal government, Italy’s power to respond to the ‘Ndrangheta will never grow strong enough to fight the mafia that presents an increasingly global threat.

References

1 Giuseppe Craparo, Vincenzo David, Giulia Constanzo, Alessio Gori, “Cosa Nostra and the Camorra: Assessment of Personality, Alexithymic Traits, and Attachment Styles,” International Journal of Law and Psychology 58 (2018): 17-26 2 Maurizio Catino, “Italian Organized Crime Since 1950,” Crime and Justice 49 (2020): 7.

3 Maurizio Catino, “Italian Organized Crime Since 1950,” Crime and Justice 49 (2020): 10-11.

4 Maurizio Catino, “Italian Organized Crime Since 1950,” Crime and Justice 49 (2020): 9.

5 Anna Sergi and Annita Lavorgna, ‘Ndrangheta: Glocal Dimensions of the Most Powerful Italian Mafia, Plagrave Macmillian (2006): 2.

6 Jeffrey Scott McIllwain, “On the history, theory, and practice of organized crime: The life and work of criminology's revisionist ‘Godfather,’” Trends in Organized Crime 18 (2015): 22.

7 Maurizio Catino, “Italian Organized Crime Since 1950,” Crime and Justice 49 (2020): 5-6.

8 Maurizio Catino, “Italian Organized Crime Since 1950,” Crime and Justice 49 (2020): 9.

9 Maurizio Catino, “Italian Organized Crime Since 1950,” Crime and Justice 49 (2020): 7.

10 Maurizio Catino, “Italian Organized Crime Since 1950,” Crime and Justice 49 (2020): 9.

11 Anna Sergi and Annita Lavorgna, ‘Ndrangheta: Glocal Dimensions of the Most Powerful Italian Mafia, Plagrave Macmillian (2006): 2.

12 Rocco Sciarrone and Luca Storti, “The Territorial Expansion of Mafiatype Organized Crime,” Crime, Law, and Social Change 61 (2014): 53.

13 Anna Sergi, “The Evolution of the Australian ‘Ndrangheta,” Australia and New Zealand Journal on Criminology 48 (2015): 156.

14 Francesco Calderoni et al., “The Italian Mafias in the World: a Systematic Assessment of the Mobility of Criminal Groups,” European Journal of Criminology 13 (2016): 426.

15 Francesco Calderoni, Giulia Berlusconi, Lorella Garofalo, Luca Giommoni, Federica Sarno, “The Italian Mafias in the World: A Systematic Assessment of the Mobility of Criminal Groups,” European Journal of

Criminology 13 (2015): 421-423, 428.

16 Pedro Bustamante, “Las Redes del Crimen Global y Su Impacto en Colombia,” Analecta Politica 4 (2014): 134 17 Pedro Bustamante, “Las Redes del Crimen Global y Su Impacto en Colombia,” Analecta Politica 4 (2014): 135.

18 Marcos Alan Ferreira, “Brazilian criminal organizations as transnational violent non-state actors: a case study of the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC),” Trends in Organized Crime 22 (2019): 158-159.

19 Jonathan P Caulkins et al., “Modeling the structure and operation of drug supply chains: The case of cocaine and heroin in Italy and Slovenia,” International Journal of Drug Policy 31 (2016): 71-72.

20 Jonathan P Caulkins et al., “Modeling the structure and operation of drug supply chains: The case of cocaine and heroin in Italy and Slovenia,” International Journal of Drug Policy 31 (2016): 71-72.

21 Miles Johnson, “Latin American Drug Cartels in Lucrative Tie-Up with ‘Ndrangheta,” Financial Times (2021): 1.

22 “Annex of the World Drug Report 2019,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2019).

23 Thomas Seyler, et al., “Is Europe facing an opioid epidemic: What does European monitoring data tell us?” European Journal of Pain 25 (2021): 1074.

24 Anna Sergi and Anita Lavorgna, “‘Ndrangheta: The Glocal Dimensions of the Most Powerful Italian Mafia,” Palgrave Macmillian (2006): 76.

25 Cecelia Anesi, Margherita Bettoni, Guilio Rubino, “The ‘Ndrangheta’s ‘Little-Kiss’: Inside an Organized Crime Clan That Moved Cocaince Across Europe,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (2021): 1-2, 8.

26 Anna Sergi, “Traditional Organized Crime on the Move: Exploring the Globalization of the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta,” in The Dark Side of Globalization (Essex: Palgrave MacMillian, 2019): 123-134.

27 Giuseppe Defeo and Giacoma Davide de Luca, “Mafia in the Ballot Box,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9, no 3 (2017): 161-2.

28 Giacoma Davide de Luca, “Weak State: Causes and Consequences of Sicilian Mafia,” Review of Economic Studies 87 (2020): 575-577.

29 Moises Maim, “Mafia States: Organized Crime Takes Office,” Foreign Affairs (2012): 100-111.

30 Baris Cayl, “Anti-Mafia Policies in Italy: The Need for Collaborative Governance and Transition of the Policy Actors from Isolation to Coalition,” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 19 (2011): 35.

31 Yara el Siwa, “Mafia, Money-Laundering, and the Battle Against Criminal Capital: the Italian Case,” Journal of Money Laundering Control 21 (2018): 129.

32 “Threat Assessment: Italian Organized Crime,” Europol (2013): 4.

33 Alison Jamieson, “The AntiMafia: Italy’s Fight Against Organized Crime,” Kirkus Reviews 68 (2000): 450.

34 Francesco Calderoni, “The structure of drug trafficking mafias: the ‘Ndrangheta and cocaine,” Crime Law and Social Change 58 (2012): 341.

35 Sergio Cecci, “The criminalization of immigration in italy: Extent of the phenomenon and possible interpretations” Italian Sociological Review 1 (2011): 37.

36 “Italian ‘Maxi Trial’ Results in Conviction of 70 ‘Ndrangheta Suspects,” The Guardian (London, UK ) Nov. 6, 2021.

37 “Italian Mafia: ‘Ndrangheta Members Convicted as Italy Begins Huge Trial,” BBC (London, UK ): Nov. 7, 2021.

38 Letizia Paol, “Mafia and Organized Crime in Italy: The Unacknowledged Success of Law Enforcement,” West European Politics 30, 4 (2007): 876.

39 Letizia Paol, “Mafia and Organized Crime in Italy: The Unacknowledged Success of Law Enforcement,” West European Politics 30, 4 (2007): 876.

40 Christina Jerne, “Anti-Mafia Enterprise: Italian Strategies to Counter Violent Economies,” in The Handbook Diverse Economies (2020): 87.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 54

R U S S I A & F S U

Editor's Note

I

t is my distinct honor to introduce the IRR’s contribution to research on the international relations of Russia and the former Soviet Union. In this issue, we focus on the impact of Soviet legacy. History gives us the instruments to understand the cause behind issues of the past. We are assigned the position of a scholar, and as a result, have the opportunity to analyze the patterns that are perhaps inconspicuous to us in the present.

Azima examines the transition from Eduard Shevardnadze’s to Mikheil Saakashvili’s Georgia. She analyzes the dramatic mark of the 2003 Rose Revolution, specifically its monumental demonstration that nonviolent regime change is possible in the former Soviet republics. Conor explores the continued strife between ethnic Russians and ethnic Balts; he makes the case that in order for democracy to prevail in the Baltic states, it must incorporate all of the voices it is composed of. Mayela’s piece evaluates the impact of Soviet cooperation and occupation on modern Russian-Afghan relations, highlighting the relevance of constructivism in the international system.

To the writers, thank you for always being dedicated, from your proposals to your final drafts, you have shown such exciting interest in the region and a refreshing eagerness to share your thoughts and ideas. To the editors, thank you for working closely and attentively with the writers, developing their initial brainstorms into concrete ideas. It has been a pleasure working with you all and producing such introspective content.

JACQUE LI NE MOSHKOVI CH, CA S '2 2 Senior Editor, Russia & FSU

55 SPRING 2022

RU SSIA A N D THE FORMER SOVI ET UNI ON

The Rose Revolution of 2003 & Saakashvili’s Democratic Reforms Freeing Georgia from the Legacy of the USSR

by A z im a Aida rov edited by Ma dison Romo , Katy a Tsvirko , Emma Shapiro

T

he small republic of Georgia, bordered by Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey – was once the most prosperous state of all the Soviet republics.1 Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, was formerly dubbed “the Paris of the Soviet Union.”2 Georgia is a mountainous country, with deep rivers and is widely renowned for its history of winemaking. Its advantageous position next to the Black Sea gives it access to crucial natural resources, including oil deposits, which are an important part of its economy. With a population of approximately five million, the people of Georgia are primarily Georgian but there are also Armenians, Russians, Azerbaijanis, Ossetes, and Abkhazians, among others.3 Soon after the fall of the USSR in 1991, Georgia became an independent state. It adopted a new constitution in 1995, and Eduard Shevardnadze became Georgia’s president that same year.

Shevardnadze was a foreign minister in the USSR and a secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia.4 As foreign minister, he had fostered a cooperative relationship with the U.S.5 In 1992, he became the

chairman of the State Council, which was essentially equivalent to the role of the president.6 He was viewed as the most viable candidate for this position because of his experience in politics and his liberalleaning reforms in the USSR.7 Shevardnadze’s regime garnered the reputation of being a “success story of post-Soviet democratization” by Western observers. This title was a result of the fact that compared to citizens in other post-Soviet republics, Georgians had more freedoms — a number of local elections were fair and the media was afforded some liberties. Despite the freedoms’ positive outward appearance, Shevardnadze’s motives for allowing them were disingenuous. He wished to make known internally that his state was superior to other post-Soviet regimes, while still controlling any opposition so that he may remain in power.

Shevardnadze’s failure to fully commit to fostering democracy but still maintain some aspects of it would ultimately contribute to his downfall.8 Life under his regime was adverse — money laundering within the government exacerbated levels of poverty and over 60 percent of the INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 56

population lived on less than one dollar a day.

Shevardnadze also maintained close ties with Russia which stirred resentment against him because Georgian nationalism was on the rise. Citizens wanted their independence after the fall of the USSR to actually mean something — reliance on Russia took away from that.9 It was clear that the influence of the corruption of the Soviet Union on the way Shevardnadze ruled was not compatible with the fresh start that Georgians wanted to see in their lives.10 After 1998, his regime became increasingly authoritarian and nepotism became ingrained in Georgian politics, at the expense of ordinary people. According to the World Bank, Georgians were typically only able to pursue higher education through bribes.11 These bribes were given to faculty to ensure the admission of students — regardless of their qualifications — in universities.12 Throughout the course of his reign, a stagnant economy along with tensions in the violent autonomous regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia reflected poorly on Shevardnadze.13 South Ossetia and Abkhazia are breakaway regions in Georgia that have been marred with instability and violence for many years. Tensions increased when Georgia’s desire for independence grew as the Soviet Union fell apart. South Ossetia proclaimed its independence but the Georgian government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia (the president before Shevardnadze) denounced this. War broke out in 1992 and resulted in Russian “peacekeeping forces” being sent to the region. As South Ossetia and Abkhazia developed close ties with Russia, it became clear that the interests of the Kremlin clashed with those of Tbilisi. While Tbilisi was working to gain control of the breakaway regions, Russia was increasing its military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and caused these regions to be almost completely dependent on Russia economically.14 The Rose Revolution, as it later came to be known, stemmed from the dissatisfaction of the public with the corruption that plagued Shevardnadze’s regime. The ultimate turning point was when it was found that the parliamentary elections of 2003 were fraudulent and rigged in his favor.15 International observers discovered ballot stuffing, and many citizens were missing from voter 57 SPRING 2022

lists in parts of Georgia in which Shevardnadze was not guaranteed to win. Additionally, his opponents claimed that his party, the Union of Citizens of Georgia, was purposefully withholding election results to hold onto power.16 Mikheil Saakashvili was a member of parliament in Shevardnadze’s regime who then became Minister of Justice and worked on anticorruption and prison reforms in 2000 while Shevardnadze was in office. Saakashvili resigned soon after clashing with Shevardnadze, realizing he would not be able to fix corruption within the government. Turning on Shevardnadze, Saakashvili created an opposition movement to counter the regime, called the United National Movement.17 Its platform includes economic and governmental reforms, closer relations with the West, and the integration of South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Georgia — UNM would play a momentous role in the revolution.18 Perhaps, something that impacted Saakashvili’s favorable attitude towards the West and its values was that he was educated in the U.S.; he studied at Columbia Law School and George Washington University and practiced law for some time in New York.19 As protests were escalating, Saakashvili quickly emerged as the charismatic leader of the movement against Shevardnadze.

An effective public speaker, he was able to attract people from diverse backgrounds to the movement, particularly those from provincial regions. He quickly gained widespread popularity and was affectionately called “Misha” by the Georgian public.

An activist group called Kmara also played a big role in mobilizing the Georgian public, specifically youth, to become more civically engaged and join the movement against Shevardnadze.

“Kmara” translates into “Enough!” which represents this group’s quest for getting rid of corruption.

Young people from Kmara participated in marches against the regime and a “graffiti campaign,” in which they spray painted “Kmara” all over roads in Tbilisi. In a country where people felt their voice did not matter because of endemic corruption, the actions of these young people were transformative. They shifted peoples’ view of the power of their participation in politics. Rustavi-2, a Georgian television channel which Shevardnadze unsuccessfully tried to shut down in 2001, played

a critical role in the success of the revolution as well. It showcased the actual results of the 2003 election, so citizens were able to view the real votes before the fraudulent results were released later on.

This was the direct catalyst for the protests, as it demonstrated the importance of independent media in protecting democracy.20 Over one hundred thousand people participated in the protests in the streets of Tbilisi in a span of twenty days.21 On November 22, 2003,22 protesters stormed the Georgian parliament building while Shevardnadze was giving a speech — in this moment, it became clear that a new beginning was on the horizon.23 Shevardnadze ordered troops to quell the protests24 and issued a nationwide state of emergency,25 but most police officers supported the protesters, which is often the case when protests intensify in post-Soviet republics.26 Soon after, Shevardnadze announced that he would resign from office.27 The rose later came to symbolize the revolution and the ideals it stood behind, especially peaceful resolve.28 The revolution was characterized as a “new wave of democratization” and proved to many Western policymakers that nonviolent regime change was possible in the former Soviet republics.29 After the Supreme Court annulled the fraudulent results of the parliamentary elections, Mikheil Saakashvili actively campaigned in the following months to become Georgia’s President.

Despite having gained widespread recognition in the revolution, organizing and advocacy was required to ensure that he would win the election.

He campaigned all across the country and even took the risk of visiting South Ossetia to speak to the ethnic Georgians living there about reunification, many of which desired to become part of Georgia.

His wife, Sandra Roelofs, mobilized women by speaking about key issues such as the need for higher wages. Roelofs believed that women are an indispensable part of Georgian politics, stating that “the most intelligent ones are always the women” and that they are “the most active in Georgia.”

International observers monitored the election, which was new for Georgia. The turnout was massive and Saakashvili ended up winning with 97 percent of the vote. A Georgian citizen asserted the power of Georgia’s civil society, saying that, “If he

doesn’t succeed, people will kick him out [the same way] they brought him in. They have the power to do it.”30 Now that Saakashvili was president, he was eager to implement sweeping reforms with no delay.

One of his primary goals was to decrease Georgia’s dependence on Russia and try to make English an official language in Georgia, taking precedence over Russian. Saakashvili himself speaks many languages, including Georgian, Russian, Ukrainian, English, and French. Because many in Georgia recognized the value of knowing English in terms of being connected to the rest of the world and the economic benefits this could bring, the government invited English speakers to teach students in Georgian schools.31 Another key area of improvement was Saakashvili’s crackdown on corruption, particularly in the area of police reform. In 2003, it was found that only around two percent of Georgian citizens approved of the police. Corruption dominated the police force, which often accepted bribes and engaged in drug trafficking — instead of putting an end to crime, the police force was itself contributing to it. Police corruption was a deep-rooted issue in Georgia that required fundamental, sweeping changes to the system.32 What helped perpetuate the corruption among police were the low wages they received because this incentivized them to look for money elsewhere. When speaking about police corruption under Shervardnadze’s regime, one police officer said that “the government was, in a way, facilitating police to become corrupt.”33 Saakashvili worked to improve the system first by implementing glass police stations which represented transparency and would help improve the public’s perception of police. Police officers were then replaced by those who, in the words of Saakashvili, had “no ties to old, corrupted elites”34 and received new uniforms which was a necessary change from the uniforms from the days of the USSR.35 Saakashvili is known for his strong desire for Georgia to become more integrated into the West and become a part of Europe, breaking away from the tumultuous and corruption-ridden path that most of the post-Soviet states were doomed to be on. Though greater cooperation with the West began under Shevardnadze’s regime, it was INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 58

truly brought to fruition under Saakashvili, who, unlike Shevardnadze, worked to distance Georgia from Russia as much as possible. The relationship between Georgia and the U.S. was mutually beneficial because by establishing pro-Western values in Georgia, Saakashvili was helping advance the influence of the U.S. in a region that had always been dominated by its staunch enemy, formerly the USSR. If the process of democratization could be fully carried out in Georgia, it could potentially inspire governments in other post-Soviet republics to implement changes and chart their own course, irrespective of Russia.

Saakashvili developed personal close ties with the Bush administration which helped Georgia receive a great deal of financial support from the U.S. and accomplish its goals.36 From FY2001 (fiscal year) to FY2007, the U.S. provided over nine hundred forty five million dollars in aid to Georgia which was used to strengthen its institutions.37 Bush had called Georgia “a beacon of liberty” at his visit to Tbilisi in 2005 and said, “Now across the Caucasus in Central Asia and the broader Middle East, we see this same desire for liberty burning in the hearts of young people. They are demanding their freedom, and they will have it.”38 Similarly, in a bilateral meeting with Saakashvili in 2012 which marked Georgia’s twentieth anniversary of independence, Obama praised the progress that Georgia made in the years since the Rose Revolution as well as its institution-building. He characterized Georgia as “a model of democracy and transparency for the region as a whole” and said that a lot of countries would now have faith that they could undergo the same changes that Georgia did.39 Saakashvili undoubtedly created a lot of positive changes in Georgia that have left a lasting impact — he raised the salaries of police officers, helped raise Georgia’s GDP per capita, and decreased corruption among universities.40 There are many critics, though, who argue that the reforms were implemented too quickly and were not properly thought-out and planned for.41 Ironically, he too, was criticized for corruption within his regime when the case of Sandro Girgvliani broke out in 2006, in which Saakashvili sided with the Interior Minister, Vano Merabishvili, at the expense 59 SPRING 2022

of demanding justice for Girgvliani, who had been murdered. It was evident that various branches of government were covering up the real details of his murder — four police officers were made scapegoats and convicted for it. The case severely tarnished Saakashvili’s reputation, who was supposed to be an advocate for transparency.42 Soon after, the RussoGeorgian war broke out in 2008, for which some blame Saakashvili for starting. Yet it is important to remember that war could have been avoided altogether, had Russia not meddled in its affairs and recognized the independence of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.43 In a way, the war was an attempt by Russia to ensure that a state of instability would perpetuate in Georgia, simultaneously making it easier for Russia to maintain its sphere of influence in the region and diverting the attention of Georgia’s government from making democratic progress.

Saakashvili ended up being sentenced to three years in prison for attempting to cover up the murder of Sandro Girgvliani and for other abuses of power.44 In 2013, Saakashvili’s ruling party, the United National Movement, lost the presidential election to Giorgi Margvelashvili, from the Georgian Dream party, an opposition coalition bloc founded by billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili in 2012. Ivanishvili was now the prime minister.45 Despite allegations of corruption in Saakashvili’s government in later years, the significance of this peaceful transfer of power, the first in Georgia’s history, cannot be understated. Saakashvili, like most leaders of post-Soviet republics such as Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, and Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan, among others, could have easily tightened his grip on power and done what his predecessor did a decade ago — falsify the election.

Yet Saakashvili recognized the importance of this transfer of power and its implications for democracy in the long term in Georgia; this set a necessary precedent for the future. After the election, Saakashvili left for Ukraine and continued to be a voice for anti-corruption reforms as the governor of Odessa; albeit since the days of the Rose Revolution, he has been unable to rise to the same level of prominence as public opinion has been shifting and Georgia has been experiencing many changes in his

absence.46 The Georgian Dream party, particularly its leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has played a big role in reversing a lot of the democratic progress that was made under Saakashvili’s regime. Ivanishvili maintained close ties with Russia and as a result, most of Georgia’s economy is now dependent on Russia. There has also been significant crackdown on opposition, particularly on those from the UNM party. The bumps in the road that Georgia has faced since the revolution have been alarming but understandable at the same time. Nino Evgenidze, a Georgian activist, characterizes Georgia as an “island in an authoritarian sea,” referring to its proximity and ties to authoritarian states which make it difficult for Georgia to fully democratize. It is similar to Ukraine in that it also has long-awaited aspirations of joining NATO and the EU, which are yet to be fulfilled because of worries about provoking Russia — which both Ukraine and share a border with. Unlike Ukraine, however, Georgia does not have the same expansive network of oligarchs which means that democratization is more feasible.

Looking back on the progress Georgia has made since the revolution, Georgia went from being a failed state to a modern state with institutions that paralleled those in European countries over an impressively short period of time. Of course, in a rush to create a new Georgia, Saakashvili made his fair share of mistakes in the implementation of these changes.47 Yet the legacy that he left behind — and may still evolve — is one of hope, prosperity, and a firm belief in democracy for Georgia.. The way in which Georgia drastically changed after the revolution shows how the power lies in the hands of the people, and as long as they continue to make their voices heard, they will be contributing to a greater future for their country. This is a sign of hope for other Post-Soviet republics in the region which have the potential needed to make fundamental changes but are lacking in leadership to carry them out. A lot of progress still needs to be made in Georgia, but the Rose Revolution will forever go down in history as a transformative shift from the remnants of the past linked to the suffering of the USSR to a brighter future with democratic reforms and closer ties with the West.

References

1 Christian Zeender, dir. 2012. Georgia: The Rose Revolution. Alexander Street. https://video-alexanderstreet-com.ezproxy.bu.edu/watch/georgia-therose-revolution.

2 Journeyman Pictures. 2007. “After the Revolution - Georgia.” Www. youtube.com. November 29, 2007. http://youtu.be/gvpVWuOHmN4.

3 Christian Zeender, dir. 2012. Georgia: The Rose Revolution. Alexander Street. https://video-alexanderstreet-com.ezproxy.bu.edu/watch/georgia-therose-revolution.

4 Ronald Grigor Suny, and Mikhail Leonidovich Djibladze. 2019. “Georgia | Location, Geography, People, Economy, Culture, & History.” In Encyclopædia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Georgia.

5 Giorgi Kandelaki. 2006. “Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective.” United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/sites/ default/files/sr167.pdf.

6 Ronald Grigor Suny, and Mikhail Leonidovich Djibladze. 2019. “Georgia | Location, Geography, People, Economy, Culture, & History.” In Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Georgia.

7 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. n.d. “Eduard Shevardnadze | Soviet Foreign Minister and President of Georgia.” Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Eduard-Shevardnadze.

8 Giorgi Kandelaki. 2006. “Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective.” United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/sites/ default/files/sr167.pdf.

9 Christian Zeender, dir. 2012. Georgia: The Rose Revolution. Alexander Street. https://video-alexanderstreet-com.ezproxy.bu.edu/watch/georgia-therose-revolution.

10 Nina Akhmeteli. 2014. “Eduard Shevardnadze: Controversial Legacy to Georgia.” BBC News, July 8, 2014, sec. Europe. http://bbc.com/news/worldeurope-28205380.

11 Alex Rodriguez and Mikhail Vignansky. 2003. “Foes in Georgia Force Shevardnadze to Quit.”

Chicago Tribune. November 24, 2003. http://chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2003-11-24-0311240209-story.html.

12 Janashia, Natia. n.d. “Corruption and Higher Education in Georgia.”

Ejournals.bc.edu. https://ejournals.bc.edu.

13 Nina Akhmeteli. 2014. “Eduard Shevardnadze: Controversial Legacy to Georgia.” BBC News, July 8, 2014, sec. Europe. http://bbc.com/news/worldeurope-28205380.

14 Center for American Progress. n.d. “The Georgia conflicts: What you need to know.” www.americanprogress.org. https://cdn.americanprogress.org/ wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/02/pdf/georgia_conflicts.pdf.

15 Giorgi Kandelaki. 2006. “Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective.” United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/sites/ default/files/sr167.pdf.

16 Steve Inskeep. 2003. “Georgia Protests Target Shevardnadze.” NPR.org, November 8, 2003. http://npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1498267.

17 Elizabeth Fuller. n.d. “Mikheil Saakashvili | Biography, Politicians, History, & Facts | Britannica.” Www.britannica.com. http://britannica.com/biography/Mikheil-Saakashvili.

18 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. n.d. “Refworld | Georgia: The United National Movement (UNM; ENM), Including Its Mandate, Leadership, Membership, Representation in the Country and History; Treatment by Authorities and Opposition Party Members, Including the Georgia Dream Coalition (GDC; GDM; Georgian Dream); State Protection Available (2001-April 2015).” Refworld. https://www.refworld.org/docid/557eafb94.html.

19 Columbia University World Leaders Forum. n.d. “Mikheil Saakashvili |

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World Leaders Forum.” Worldleaders.columbia.edu. https://worldleaders.columbia.edu/directory/mikheil-saakashvili.

20 Giorgi Kandelaki. 2006. “Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective.” United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/sites/ default/files/sr167.pdf.

21 Dov Lynch. n.d. “The Rose Revolution and After.” Www.jstor.org. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep07058.6.pdf.

22 RadioFreeEurope. 2013. “The 10th Anniversary of Georgia’s Rose Revolution.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. November 21, 2013. https:// www.rferl.org/a/georgia-rose-revolution/25175878.html.

23 Christian Zeender, dir. 2012. Georgia: The Rose Revolution. Alexander Street. https://video-alexanderstreet-com.ezproxy.bu.edu/watch/georgia-therose-revolution.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser. 2003. “Georgian President Resigns.”

Washington Post, November 24, 2003. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ archive/politics/2003/11/24/georgian-president-resigns/939f220f-b3a4-494c8290-9286f83a28f7/.

28 Christian Zeender, dir. 2012. Georgia: The Rose Revolution. Alexander Street. https://video-alexanderstreet-com.ezproxy.bu.edu/watch/georgia-therose-revolution.

29 Giorgi Kandelaki. 2006. “Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective.” United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/sites/ default/files/sr167.pdf.

30 Christian Zeender, dir. 2012. Georgia: The Rose Revolution. Alexander Street. https://video-alexanderstreet-com.ezproxy.bu.edu/watch/georgia-therose-revolution.

31 Clifford J. Levy. 2011. “Still Fighting Russia, This Time with Words.” The New York Times, January 24, 2011, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/world/europe/24georgia.html.

32 Mikheil Saakashvili. 2020. “I Abolished and Rebuilt the Police. The United States Can Do the Same.” Foreign Policy. June 11, 2020. https:// foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/11/abolish-police-georgia-brutality-crime/.

33 Innovations for Successful Societies. 2013. “Matthew Devlin Innovations for Successful Societies SEIZING the REFORM MOMENT: REBUILDING GEORGIA’S POLICE.” https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/ successfulsocieties/files/Policy_Note_ID126.pdf.

34 Mikheil Saakashvili. 2020. “I Abolished and Rebuilt the Police. The United States Can Do the Same.” Foreign Policy. June 11, 2020. https:// foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/11/abolish-police-georgia-brutality-crime/.

35 Innovations for Successful Societies. 2013. “Matthew Devlin Innovations for Successful Societies SEIZING the REFORM MOMENT: REBUILDING GEORGIA’S POLICE.” https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/ successfulsocieties/files/Policy_Note_ID126.pdf.

36 Franziska Smolkin. 2020. “The Strategic Partnership between Georgia and the United States: Vision Wanted.” German Institute for International and Security Affairs. https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020RP15/.

37 Cory Welt. 2021. “Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R45307.pdf.

38 Lawrence Sheets. 2005. “Bush Receives Warm Welcome in Georgia.”

NPR.org, May 10, 2005. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyId=4647008.

39 The White House | Office of the Press Secretary. 2012. “Remarks by President Obama and President Saakashvili of Georgia after Bilateral Meeting.” Whitehouse.gov. January 30, 2012. https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/30/remarks-president-obama-and-

61 SPRING 2022

president-saakashvili-georgia-after-bilatera.

40 Claire Bigg. 2013. “Mikheil Saakashvili’s Polarizing Legacy.”

RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. October 24, 2013. https://www.rferl.org/a/ saakashvili-mixed-legacy/25146918.html.

41 Dov Lynch. n.d. “The Rose Revolution and After.” Www.jstor.org. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep07058.6.pdf.

42 Robert Coalson. 2013. “Sandro Girgvliani: The Ghost That Haunts Saakashvili’s Legacy.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. June 27, 2013. https:// www.rferl.org/a/girgvliani-saakashvili-georgia-killing-case/25030121.html.

43 Timothy Heritage. 2009. “Georgia Started War with Russia: EU-Backed Report.” Reuters, September 30, 2009, sec. World News. https://www.reuters. com/article/us-georgia-russia-report/georgia-started-war-with-russia-eubacked-report-idUSTRE58T62120090930.

44 Adrian Karatnycky. 2018. “The Rise and Fall of Mikheil Saakashvili.”

POLITICO. February 12, 2018. https://www.politico.eu/article/the-rise-andfall-of-mikheil-saakashvili/.

45 G. Melvyn Howe. n.d. “Georgia - Independent Georgia | Britannica.”

Www.britannica.com. https://www.britannica.com/place/Georgia/IndependentGeorgia#ref1262134.

46 Téa Kvetenadze. 2021. “Georgian Ex-President Saakashvili Returns from Exile, Arrested on Eve of Election.” Forbes. October 1, 2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/teakvetenadze/2021/10/01/georgianex-president-saakashvili-returns-from-exile-arrested-on-eve-ofelection/?sh=22a6db5447c5.

47 Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. 2021. “FSI - News.”

Fsi.stanford.edu. March 4, 2021. https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/what’s-goinggeorgia-democracy-activist-explains-nation’s-current-political-crisis-and

RU SSIA / FSU

Soviet Occupation in Afghanistan in the Late 20th Century

How it Played a Role in the Fall of the Soviet Union and Modern Russian-Afghan Relations

by Mayela Ma c hr ibie Lumban Gao l edited by Ka tya Tsv ir ko

I

n the field of international relations, most scholars would agree that the rise and breakdown of the Soviet Union was one of the most significant and political events of the twentieth century. In particular, the fall of the Soviet Union took most scholars of international relations, comparative politics, and Soviet politics by surprise, perhaps because the Soviet Union had established an image of stability and legitimacy through the regime’s dictatorship, state-owned economy, and the Kremlin’s desire to control its domestic and Eastern European empires. Some would argue that the fall of the Soviet Union was a result of Soviet occupation in Afghanistan in the late twentieth century, while others would argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union was exacerbated by––not an outcome of––Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. But, whether Soviet occupation in Afghanistan was a result of Soviet collapse or not, constructivism tells us that Soviet cooperation and occupation has certainly impacted modern Russian-Afghan relations. Constructivism,

a theoretical lens of international relations, accepts that identities and ideals are what shapes and influences the international system.1 As such, scholars look at history to determine and interpret current foreign policies. In this article, we will explore how Soviet occupation in Afghanistan influenced the collapse of the regime and how this particular event has impacted modern RussianAfghan relations.

Afghanistan has a long history of domination by foreign conquerors and conflict among its domestic groups and factions. At the gateway between Europe and Asia, Afghanistan has been under the rule of empires from the fourth century B.C. to the early twentieth century. In the context of Soviet-Afghan and Russian-Afghan relations, however, Russia’s long-established relations with Afghanistan began in the nineteenth century, when Afghanistan was known as the “buffer-state” between the Russian and British empires––who occupied India at the time–– during ‘The Great Game’. Coined by international INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 62

relations scholars of the time, ‘The Great Game’ was used to describe the confrontation of the two empires as their areas of influence in Central Asia moved gradually closer to one another.2 At the time, imperial Russia was seeking to find trading routes in Central Asia, but its growing influence and activities became a growing concern to Great Britain, who particularly viewed the Russian presence as a threat. With multiple Anglo-Russian wars and treaties interspersed, it was under the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 in which the Russian and British empires agreed on distinct and defined spheres of influence.3 Imperial Russia conceded Afghanistan to the British and was given today’s Central Asia and northern Iran in return.

In addition, Afghanistan was the first nation to officially recognize the Soviet Union in 1919. And, despite their conflicts, Afghan relations with the former Soviet Union remained neutral until the coup of 1973.

In 1973, a coup led by Mohammad Daoud Khan overthrew the Afghan monarchy and established a one-party state.4 As Prime Minister, Daoud Khan implemented social reform and established closer economic and military ties to the Soviet Union. However, Daoud’s sole focus on Soviet-Afghan relations naturally generated an imbalance within the country’s foreign relations, as he was too focused on the West and disregarded 63 SPRING 2022

other issues with Afghanistan’s neighboring countries. To restore the balance of Afghanistan’s foreign relations, Daoud began to distance himself from the Soviets and forge closer relations with the West. Upon meeting Leonid Brezhnev during a state visit to Moscow in 1977, Daoud objected that Afghanistan would remain free and that the Soviet Union would never be allowed to dictate how Afghanistan should be governed. Daoud Khan’s ambitions, however, never came to fruition, as he was later ousted by the leftist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan in 1978.5 Dissatisfaction and instability increased as Afghans protested the government’s socialist reforms, many of which seemed to undermine Afghanistan’s traditional Islamic culture since the fundamental ideals of socialism or communism generally reject religious beliefs. Those who opposed the communist government joined insurgent groups known as the mujahideen––an Arabic term that describes Muslims fighting on behalf of their faith.6 And, as opposition movements grew, the Soviet Union invaded the country to support the Afghan communist regime in 1979.

Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was frowned upon and disputed amongst members of the international community. Most importantly, Soviet interference in Afghanistan made it likely for the Soviets to dominate the Persian Gulf and dis-

rupt the flow of the oil industry in the Middle East.

In particular, U.S. President Jimmy Carter at the time publicly denounced the Soviets; he believed that their actions had violated peace and order in the international system, arguing that their actions were a “blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior.”7 The U.S. President asked American allies to follow suit. In January 1980, 34 foreign ministers from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, an organization promoting peace and coexistence in the Muslim world, called upon a resolution that demanded “the immediate, urgent and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops” from Afghanistan.8 Similarly, the United Nations adopted a resolution that strongly opposed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and, later, voted to demand the withdrawal of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan in 1980.9 Additionally, embargoes and sanctions were imposed on the Soviet Union by the United States,10 including the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics held in Moscow, which later exacerbated Cold War tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.11 Overall, the majority of the world was opposed to the USSR’s involvement in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the USSR began its occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 and, by the time it withdrew in 1989, had virtually no support outside of the Soviet Union.

For the Soviets, the aim of the operation was to merely sustain a communist government beyond the Soviet Union itself; the influence of socialism was a way to expand Soviet control in the foundations of other non-Soviet governments. On the night of December 24, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, sending in around 30,000 troops, and overthrew the short-lived presidency of Hafizullah Amin by replacing him with Babrak Kamral, a puppet of the Soviet Union. Kamral, the son of a well-connected army general, was actively involved in Marxist political activities as a student in Kabul University.12 Unfortunately, despite his aligned ideals with the Soviet Union, Kamral failed to maintain a significant amount of support from the Afghan populace, enabling insurgencies to quickly arise within the state.

The insurgencies, which strongly opposed Soviet communist ideals because they undermined Islamic beliefs, threatened the stability of the Soviets.

These insurgencies naturally viewed the Soviets

as an oppressive central government and a foreign invader. To the Afghans, being occupied by foreign troops seemed unjust and unnecessary.13 To what extent is it necessary for other states to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states? What gives a state the authority to interfere into the affairs of another? To the Soviets, the problem gave further impetus to occupy Afghanistan. Soviet troops tried to suppress the insurgency through various tactics, such as reconciliation, militarization, and negotiation. However, the guerillas generally eluded their attacks, for they were more familiar with the land around them. The war between the Soviets and Afghans quickly settled down into a stalemate, with more than 100,000 Soviet troops deployed across the occupied state.14 At the same time, the Soviet economy had deteriorated in the 1980s, which further proved how Moscow was bogged down into a war they could not win. As a result, Moscow capitulated to sign the “Geneva Accords” with Afghanistan.15 These set of agreements did not only establish the end of Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and settled the conflict, giving way to the withdrawal of troops,16 but it also issued an agreement on non-interference and nonintervention between Afghanistan and Pakistan.17 At first, the Soviet Union successfully solidified its military position in Afghanistan, gaining access to oil and trade routes. However, the war further drained the Soviet Union’s alreadyfaltering economy, tarnishing the strength and legitimacy of the Soviet army and its government

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on the global stage.18 Naturally, Soviet-Afghan relations after the invasion were hostile in nature due to its recent war. But, most importantly, Soviet occupation in Afghanistan had also triggered a chain of events in its neighboring territories: Tajikistan, a newly independent state from the Soviet Union, was a victim of what was in effect a civil war. The insurgencies established during the Soviet-Afghan, mostly known as the mujahideens, resisted Soviet occupation and, eventually, toppled the Afghan communist government. The mujahideens were an alliance of Sunni and Shiite believers who, in the most broadest sense, “fought on behalf of the faith or Muslim community”.19 However, with the mujahideens as an actor in the Soviet-Afghan war, religion, and ideology created another dimension to an already complex conflict.

As such the end of the war was not the end of the mujahideens either, for ideologies are much more difficult to eradicate because they are established and deeply-rooted beliefs; it was only natural that these ideologies passed down and continued to exist through future generations, especially because there is a shared and common identity––in terms of ethnicities and religion––between the two states.

While the newly independent state was in the midst of multiple political and economic changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new conflict created a political divide between “communists” and “Islamists”.

Naturally, one would assume that Russia (now the former Soviet Union) would back the new state’s communist regime. However, we see the complete opposite: Russia had dropped its support for Tajikistan’s communist regime and, instead, developed new relations with the mujahideens, most likely due to the fact that this decision would be most beneficial to Russia in the long run.20 History often gives us the tools to analyze and explain past issues, putting us in a position––as a scholar––to see patterns that might otherwise be invisible in the present. As such, our case study of the Soviet Union and its relations with Afghanistan or modern Russia and its relations with Tajikistan and Afghanistan completely undermines and disproves the “pattern” of relations between the two states. This, however, further demonstrates the relevance of constructivism in the international 65 SPRING 2022

system, in which identities and new ideas shape and influence the international system. In this case, the Soviet Union and modern Russia prioritized their interests and recognized that new alliances had to be made in order to maintain their influence on the world stage.

References

1 Ted Hopf.. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” International Security 23, no. 1 (July 1998): 171–200.

2 Edward Ingram. “Great Britain’s Great Game: An Introduction.” The International History Review 2, no. 2 (1980): 160–71.

3 Tom Lansford. 2017. Afghanistan at War: from the 18th-Century Durrani Dynasty to the 21st Century. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, LLC. Accessed March 7, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central.

4 Martin Ewans. Afghanistan: A New History. 2. ed. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.

5 Martin Ewans. Afghanistan: A New History. 2. ed. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.

6 “Mujahideen | Definition, Meaning, History, & Facts | Britannica.”

Accessed March 9, 2022.

7 Tom Lansford. 2017. Afghanistan at War: from the 18th-Century Durrani Dynasty to the 21st Century.

8 “Pittsburgh Post-Gazette - Google News Archive Search.” Accessed March 7, 2022.

9 Karen DeYoung. “Overwhelming U.N. Vote Condemns Soviets.”

Washington Post, January 15, 1980.

10 Frank Morris. “Farmers Swept Up In Trade Wars Remember ’80s Grain Embargo.” NPR, 16 Aug. 2018. NPR. 11 Frank Morris. “Farmers Swept Up In Trade Wars Remember ’80s Grain Embargo.”

12 Tom Lansford. 2017. Afghanistan at War: from the 18th-Century Durrani Dynasty to the 21st Century.

13 Paul Dibb. "The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Lessons to Be Learned?" Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 5 (2010): 495509.

14 Tom Lansford. 2017. Afghanistan at War: from the 18th-Century Durrani Dynasty to the 21st Century.

15 Editors, History com. “U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan Sign ‘Friendship Treaty.’”

HISTORY. Accessed March 8, 2022.

16 Alvin Z Rubinstein. “The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan.” Current History 87, no. 531 (1988): 333–40.

17 Shahi, Agha. “THE GENEVA ACCORDS.” Pakistan Horizon 41, no. 3 (1988): 23–49.

18 Paul Dibb. "The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Lessons to Be Learned?" Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 5 (2010): 495509.

19 “Mujahideen | Definition, Meaning, History, & Facts | Britannica.”

Accessed March 9, 2022.

20 “Russian Interests in Afghanistan SCEEUS REPORT No.1, 2021.”

Accessed March 12, 2022.

R US S IA /F S U

Caught in the Crossfire: Ethnic Russians in the Baltics Caught Between Two Worlds

by Co n o r Bo l z ed ited by Ma di s on Ro m o , Em m a Sha p iro

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 66

I

n April 2007, a riot engulfed the Estonian capital city of Tallinn.

For three nights between April 26th to the 29th, assaults, vandalism, and large scale clashes with police forces were common occurrences on the streets.1 This had been the first major civil disturbance in the Baltics since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. But unlike the independence movements of the 1980s, which were led by Baltic nationalists, this movement was driven by ethnic Russians. Specifically, these riots were a reaction to the Estonian government's plan to relocate a controversial statue known as the “Bronze Soldier.” The local Estonian population regarded the statue, which is a commemoration of the Soviet soldiers who died during the Second World War, as a symbol of post-war Russian domination of the Baltics. For the local Russian population, the memorial status of the statue is a testament to the strength and character of Russian peoples living in the Baltics. As such, when a relocation of the statue was announced, it brewed a violent reaction from the community that revered the statue. However, the so-called “Bronze Night” riots and the underlying tension between the Estonian government and its Russian-speaking population did not occur in a vacuum.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent reestablishment of the Baltic

67 SPRING 2022

states, the political status of ethnic Russian speakers within the Baltic states has been in limbo. Questions about language requirements in education, the economic status of Russian workers within these states, and preservation of cultural sites like the Bronze Soldier have all permeated the discourse around the status of ethnic Russians in the Baltics. Although attempts have been made to better foster ethnic relations between these populations and their respective governments2, better political and educational representation being some of these reforms, long standing grievances have repeatedly escalated in recent years. The “Bronze Night” was one of the most violent clashes between ethnic Russians and Baltic government, but it is far from the only altercation recorded between the two groups in recent years. Now with multiethnic school reform in effect in the past decade, as well as increasing tension between NATO and Russia in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the political status of ethnic Russians within the blatics is in limbo.

What could the future hold for the millions of ethnic Russians living in the Baltics? How could their conditions and relationship to the government change in the coming years? In order to understand that, there needs to

be a clear picture of how these groups found themselves in the Baltic states and how they interacted with these states during and after the fall of the USSR. Although the complex ethnic history of the Baltic states dates back thousands of years, the rise of a predominant ethnic Russian population within the states can principally be traced back to the region’s history with the Soviet Union. After WWII, the Soviet Union absorbed the previously independent Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia.3 During the process of integration of the states into the Soviet Union, a mass deportation campaign was carried out. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were deported to other areas of the Soviet Union or abroad. In their place, a wave of Russian settlers were sponsored by the Soviet state to move into the Baltics to reinforce an already existing Russian

population.4 These forced migrations, which were largely carried out

by Stalin’s regime shortly before his death, saw the ethnic Russian population within the Baltics triple in number. By 1980, nearly 30 percent of Estonia's population was Russian, and ethnic Russians were close to a third of Latvia and Lithuania's population as well.5 Although one may believe that these deportations and migrations were the product of a larger plan to “Russify” the Baltics, they were actually part of a far more complex population control scheme that occurred. The Soviet effort was primarily focused on delegitimizing the idea of ethnic nationalism in these states through the deportation of certain ethnicities and migrations of new ones. For example, most migration that occurred during the Soviet occupation was between the populations of the Baltic states

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themselves. Many Latvians were forced to migrate to Estonia, many Estonians were forced to migrate towards Lithuania, so on and so forth. An artificial flow of populations occurred during these years and relocated many ethnic Balts away from their homelands.

While much of the population exchange would have occurred naturally, the Soviets accelerated this in an effort to mix up the various ethnicities that lived in the Baltics.6 It was thought that if an ethnic demographic could not hold a majority of a country's population, then the nationalist sentiment of said demographic would wither away over the years. This was the essence of Russification, to change the demographics of the Baltics through forced migrations and deportations in the hopes that the region would become more loyal to Moscow.

In retrospect, the Soviet Union’s plan did not succeed. Many Balts who were moved to new areas quickly adopted the cultural norms and language of the new area they found themselves in. On the other hand, many Russians who moved to the Baltic states during these years found themselves isolated from the communities in which they lived.7 Their fond support for the Soviet Union, sometimes expressed through memorials like the Bronze Soldier, would often put them at odds with ethnic Balts during the years of the Soviet Union.

Throughout Soviet rule, this tension would often turn into violent clashes, riots, and incidents. One of the most notable incidents was in Estonia in 1980, when a punk rock concert led Estonian youth into an ethnic riot against perceived Russification.8 By 1985, the trend of Russification had stalled and

69 SPRING 2022

the ethnic changes had slowed to a halt. The Soviet Union had stopped its forced relocations, Russian citizens were less willing to move into the Baltics, and the secessionist fervor of the various Baltic states were at an all time high.9 By the time of the so-called “Singing Revolution” that would finally separate the Baltic states from the Soviet Union, Russian Balts made up less than 9 percent of the total population of the Baltic states.10 While the trend of Russification failed in bringing the Baltic states closer to the Soviet Union, it did reinforce and define a permanent Russian minority population, a population that totals close to a million people today. Since the separation of the Baltic states from the Soviet Union, the status of these people have changed in drastic ways. Most ethnic Russians in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

now live within the respective capital cities of these countries, working as day laborers and industrial workers. Many ethnic Russians are making on average 25 percent less than average Balts, and some also have to go to state-funded Russian language schools in order to grow accustomed to the states in which they reside.11 Although the experience is different for ethnic Russians depending on which state they reside, a general trend of ethnic tension and discrimination follow in practically all of these states. How these tensions and issues manifest themselves from state to state is of interest, but contemporary issues facing ethnic Russians in the Baltics have much to do with current events surrounding the Baltic states and the larger trends of Eastern Europe. Baltic states, as they stand, have experienced significant problems attempting to accommodate the significant Russian ethnicities within their respective countries, and the various domestic issues that have evolved from this long standing rivalry can very easily transition into issues of sovereignty as well as state security.

In Estonia, these ethnic tensions are by far the most visible. The “Bronze Night,” in its carnage, ostensibly showed how a long standing conflict between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians escalated over the symbolic meaning of a statue. But what really occurred was a long standing feud between the Russian minority and the Estonian government finally coming to violence. In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the Estonian government was quick to not only try to restore the democracy it had before its annexation by the Soviet Union but also to resolve the question of citizenship for the Russians that lived in the now independent Estonian state. During the 90s, Estonia restored the citizenship laws it held before it was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1940.12 These laws stated that ethnic Russians who

were either citizens before the annexation or were direct descendents of people who were citizens before annexation were automatically recognized as citizens. However, the laws did not recognize Russians who moved to Estonia after the annexation or their descendants meaning they would have to apply for citizenship again.

This change in citizenship laws would result in the majority of ethnic Russians at the time having to re-apply for citizenship in Estonia. They would have to renounce their Russian citizenship, learn the Estonian language, and take specialized courses in order to obtain this.13 This change in citizenship laws and the barriers around re-acquiring citizenship immediately set off tension between the government and ethnic russians. To make matters worse, Estonia had segregated its school during the initial period after independence between Estonian language schools and Russian language schools.14 Originally intended to create separate spaces for Russian and Estonian speakers in order to accommodate the wishes of both communities, these schools served to reinforce the majority that Estonians had in the country and attempted to integrate Russian speakers into the country as a whole through language requirements. Although these schools were initially supposed to teach core subjects in Russian, throughout the 2000s and 2010s the government of Estonia has gradually raised the amount of core subjects required to be taught in Estonian to nearly 80 percent.15 The combination of citizenship requirements, as well as an increasingly sparse Russian language presence within education has come to the ire of the Russian community within Estonia. A perceived assault of the history and sovereignty of the Russian community, ethnic violence continues to fester within the community and spreads beyond the border of Estonia itself Latvia mostly followed Estonia's lead in regards to its own Russian minority, requiring

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re-naturalization of Soviet migrants and slowly pushing Russian language requirements out of its schools.16 Although Latvia's own program has also caused distress in its Russian community, it is not nearly as widespread or as violent as Estonia’s, mostly because Latvia's Russian population is significantly smaller than Estonia’s. Nevertheless the program is seen by many in the Russian community of Estonia as another effort of cultural suppression, and tensions between them and the government have continued to run high well into the present day.17 Lithuania on the other hand has not followed any of these examples, opting to give all of its inhabitants citizenship upon separation from the Soviet Union and creating fully mixed language schools.18 However, the rationale for Lithuania's embrace of its Russian minority was not out of altruism, rather it was because the Russian minority in Lithuania was so small it was considered to be not really any threat to the status quo. Still, there is a degree of separation between the ethnic Baltic majority groups that dominate these states, a separation that has not only been widened by the domestic actions of the various governments but also by larger trends of foreign policy.

One of the most notable of these is the Baltics states' early ascension into NATO. Since their accession to the alliance in 2004, the Baltic states have been under constant scrutiny from 71 SPRING 2022

both the East and the West. To policymakers in the West, the Baltic states are an important first line of defense in case of a Russian invasion into eastern europe. As some of the only post-Soviet states to join the alliance, the Baltics serves as an important bulwark against renewed Russian aggression in recent years.19 To Russia, the addition of the Baltic states is a grave threat against themselves, and serves only to further western provocations against them. The continued expansion of NATO is seen as a provocation in itself, and the addition of states with an actual border with Russia is of grave concern to them.20 For the Baltic people themselves, and in the case of ethnic Russians within the Baltics, the presence of NATO is a far more controversial topic.

For some it's a necessity defense, for others it's a provocation. NATO’s presence in the Baltics is necessitated with increasingly threatening postures taken by Russia elsewhere, and the question of how the Baltics’ own Russian minority interacts with this alliance is of paramount importance in this strategic thinking. As seen recently in Ukraine, the Russian government has used the excuse of helping ethnic Russians as a pretense for military action, and the status of the Baltic Russians would come into the line of thought as well.21 Its recent invasion into Ukraine has, according to Putin himself, been motivated by a desire to protect ethnic Russians within the Donbass region as well as Ukraine itself.

Ukraine's dealings with its Russian minority have been far more violent than the Baltic governments interactions with them — having fought a brutal guerrilla war against breakaway rebel groups in eastern Ukraine since 2014 —but the same underlying issues persist within the situations in both regions.22 A disconnected Russian ethnic group within the Baltics that would potentially serve to the advantage of the Russian government if given the opportunity. While there has not been any widespread secessionist movements in the Baltics for Russia to back, the continued tension within the countries provides the hotbed for such a movement to exist. The continued strife between ethnic Russians and ethnic Balts not only serves as a hotbed of violence within the country, but it’s of concern that it may provide a springboard for invasion, just as the situation in eastern Ukraine provided the springboard for Russia's current invasion.

For the millions of ethnic Russians within the Baltic states, their livelihoods and cultural history seem to be a topic of contention. Their memorials are seen as dangerous by the local governments, their language is seen as dated by their schools, and their interests are considered to be barely relevant to national discourse. While it may be argued that the Batlic states have made progress in the last decade or so in trying to reform and make Russian speakers feel more welcome into their democracy through better media coverage and school reform, the cultural and political distance between the groups is clear and apparent to anyone paying attention. It's clear for the various Baltic ethnicities wishing to maintain their independence, it's clear to the Russian minorities who wish to maintain their cultural identity, and it's certainly clear to the Russian state looking to push back NATO expansion. If democracy in these states is to prevail and prosper, then it must incorporate all of the voices it's composed of, regardless of the biases of its ruling class. That is the only way that democracy can prevail in these states, and the only way that the millions of people within these states can continue to prosper and grow within the free, democratic states of the Baltics.

References

1 Martin, Ehala. “THE BRONZE SOLDIER: IDENTITY THREAT AND MAINTENANCE IN ESTONIA.” Journal of Baltic Studies 40, no. 1 (2009): 139–58. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43212867.

2 Ammon, Cheskin. “Identity and Integration of Russian Speakers in the Baltic States: A Framework for Analysis.” Europolitics, July 8, 2014. http:// eprints.gla.ac.uk/95091/1/95091.pdf.

3 William, Maley. “Does Russia Speak for Baltic Russians?” The World Today 51, no. 1 (1995): 4–6. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40396641.

4 Triin Vihalemm and Veronika Kalmus. “CULTURAL DIFFERENTIATION OF THE RUSSIAN MINORITY.” Journal of Baltic Studies 40, no. 1 (2009): 95–119. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43212865 5 Rein Taagepera. “BALTIC POPULATION CHANGES, 1950-1980.”

Journal of Baltic Studies 12, no. 1 (1981): 35–57. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/43211075.

6 idib 7 Epp, Annus. “THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET COLONIALISM IN THE BALTICS.” Journal of Baltic Studies 43, no. 1 (2012): 21–45. http://www.jstor. org/stable/43213067.

8 Martin, Ehala, and Anastassia Zabrodskaja. “INTERETHNIC DISCORDANCE AND STABILITY IN ESTONIA.” Journal of Baltic Studies 42, no. 2 (2011): 213–37. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43213020.

9 idib 10 idib 11 Ott, Toomet. “Learn English, Not the Local Language! Ethnic Russians in the Baltic States.” The American Economic Review 101, no. 3 (2011): 526–31. http://www.jstor.org/stable/29783801.

12 R. G, Gidadhubli. “Growing Discontent in the Baltic Republics: Causes and Consequences.” Economic and Political Weekly 24, no. 1 (1989): 24–26. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4394215.

13 ibid 14 W. Rogers, Brubaker. “Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States.”

The International Migration Review 26, no. 2 (1992): 269–91. https://doi. org/10.2307/2547057.

15 Agnia, Grigas. “The New Generation of Baltic Russian Speakers.” www. euractiv.com. EURACTIV.com, November 28, 2014. https://www.euractiv. com/section/europe-s-east/opinion/the-new-generation-of-baltic-russianspeakers/.

16 Georgi, Gotev. “Latvia's School Language Reform Irks Russian Minority.” www.euractiv.com. EURACTIV.com, June 25, 2018. https://www.euractiv. com/section/languages-culture/news/in-latvia-school-language-reform-irksrussian-minority/.

17 Isabelle, de Pommereau. “Estonia Reaches out to Its Ethnic Russians at Long Last.” DW.COM, February 24, 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/estoniareaches-out-to-its-ethnic-russians-at-long-last/a-42680725.

18 Martin, Ehala. “After Status Reversal: The Use of Titular Languages and Russian in the Baltic Countries.” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 35, no. 1/4 (2017): 473–91. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44983554.

19 Elisabeth, Braw. “BULLY IN THE BALTICS: The Kremlin’s Provocations.”

World Affairs 177, no. 6 (2015): 31–38. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43555267.

20 Anatol, Lieven. “Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion.” The World Today 51, no. 10 (1995): 196–99. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40396653.

21 W. Rogers, Brubaker. “Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States.”

The International Migration Review 26, no. 2 (1992): 269–91. https://doi. org/10.2307/2547057.

22 Institute for the Study of War. “Ukraine: CONFLICT UPDATE.” Institute for the Study of War, 2022. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep39694.

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M I D D L E E A S T 73 SPRING 2022

Editor's Note

F

or the IRR’s 26th edition, the Middle East section has explored the historical and political significance of tribalism in Yemen, the potential for women’s empowerment within the region’s agricultural sector, the failed efforts of international organizations toward statebuilding in Libya and Yemen, and Saudi Arabia’s recent endeavors to expand its cultural tourism industry.

The disinformation flooding today’s news media feels harder to swim through than ever before. The IRR’s efforts to promote independent research at the undergraduate level signals a step forward in the pursuit of accessible, student-driven conversations about the issues currently facing our world.

To my writers, it has been an honor to collaborate alongside such brilliant and hardworking scholars this semester. To our editors, I am forever grateful for your excitement, knowledge, and unending support throughout this process. I cherish every moment I have spent watching you all grow as researchers, thinkers, and team players since we held our very first orientation meeting in December.

On behalf of the Middle East section, we hope you enjoy exploring this body of work as much as we have enjoyed creating it.

HANADI AMI N, CAS '23 Senior Editor, Middle East

M ID D L E E A ST

Libya, Yemen, and Foreign Intervention UN Failures at Post Arab Spring Stabilization

by Kev in Clena rd edited by Gideon Gord o n

D

espite the regime changes resulting from the Arab Spring 10 years ago, Libya and Yemen have struggled to find any semblance of stability in their new forms. Marred by nearly continuous civil wars since their revolutions, both states have failed to grab a foothold in the climb towards peace. Libya not only lacks a constitution, but in the past year alone saw its long-awaited first presidential election delayed, as well as the resignation of its UN Special Envoy after less than a year of service.1 As for Yemen, the country recently faced significant cuts in aid from the World Food Programme — in addition to an end to the United Nations’ war crime investigations, despite still experiencing the world’s worst humanitarian crisis and an ongoing civil war.2 While many attribute such pitfalls directly to the flaws and failures of the United Nations’ missions, the issue rather runs much deeper. Foreign competition and external intervention have significantly constrained the ability of the United Nations to foster viable peace and long term stability in Libya and Yemen respectively, with outside state actors often abusing, hijacking, and exploiting the UN’s very mechanisms to their benefit.

The Failure of Libyan Elections

Libya is no stranger to foreign intervention.

From its time under Roman rule to its occupation

by Mussolini’s forces in the 20th century, Italy has consistently played a significant role in Libya's affairs due to the countries’ geographical proximity, separated only by the Mediterranean Sea. In recent years, Western involvement in Libya has widened, with NATO intervention playing a key role in the fall of Libyan revolutionary, politician, and dictator Muammar Qadhaffi in 2011.3 Since then, the number of foreign actors involved in Libyan politics has only increased during the most recent civil war.

Since the Second Libyan Civil War, which erupted due to disputed election results after the fall of the Qadhaffi regime, the state of Libya exists divided into two spheres, with the country’s eastern and southern portions controlled by General Khalifa Haftar and the National Liberation Army, and the remaining western portions under the jurisdiction of the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli.4 Haftar enjoys support from Egypt, the UAE, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and France, predominantly due to his control over the country’s oil-rich regions, as well as his strong stance against terrorism and political Islamism vis-

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à-vis the Muslim Brotherhood.5 On the other hand, the GNA not only has UN backing and recognition as the country’s official government, but also that of the U.S., Turkey, Qatar, Italy, and most Western powers, largely due to the promise of oil, natural gas, and an end to the migration crisis, in addition to support for the Muslim Brotherhood from Turkey and Qatar in particular.6 From 2020 onward, the ceasefire in place in Libya has unfortunately not prevented these countries and foreign actors from inciting further tensions. In a conference with the Arab Center Washington D.C., Libyan Director of Human Rights Watch Hanan Salah noted that, “the UAE, Egypt, Russia, Turkey, Jordan, and others openly support different factions with military equipment, training, and fighters, which,” she asserts, “violates the [UN] Security Council’s arms embargo on Libya,” initiated in 2011.7 By continuing to provide weapons to the conflict’s opposing sides, these foreign actors provide a stronger sense of legitimacy to each, granting them the power to ignore ceasefires and preventing the consolidation of state authority. In doing so, such intervention undermines much of the UN’s previous efforts, both towards establishing a ceasefire in 2020, and in constructing a definitive plan for a cohesive democratic government since then.

While there have been pushes, particularly

by Germany, to mitigate and control these glaring violations of the arms embargo, such as the First and Second Berlin Conferences in 2020 and 2021 respectively, these have generally failed to produce viable results.8 As stated at the 2021 conference

by Germany’s then-Foreign Minister Heiko Mass, “those who promised to withdraw last time in Berlin have not kept their word.”9 Mass further argues that “for the Libyans to determine the fate of their country again, the foreign forces must leave. The transitional government has also made that clear.”10 However, concrete action by the aforementioned states has failed to extend beyond carrying on with the election plan, while prioritizing their national self-interests over effective peace-building measures in Libya.11 Migration politics have also become increasingly important in Libya’s foreign interests.

In the midst of a migration crisis across the 75 SPRING 2022

Mediterranean Sea, Italy has worked alongside the Government of National Accord to implement stronger measures against refugees from the African continent seeking asylum in Europe. In 2020, these talks produced a renewal of the controversial 2017 anti-migration memorandum of understanding.12 Through this deal, the Italian government has since been providing support to the Libyan Coast Guard in intercepting refugee ships and returning them (often against their will) to the country they were fleeing, where they face “abusive migrant detention centers,” as well as “arbitrary detention and inhumane and degrading treatment,” as described

by Human Rights Watch.13 Italy has ignored these human rights abuses, however, and has continued to use the GNA to shield itself from migrant flows from North Africa, in turn furthering Italian politicians’ domestic political agendas.

Such political intervention is also evident through the sectarian and political split among foreign powers in their support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt have seen the Muslim Brotherhood, a political Islamist giant, as a threat to their governments due to its strong and revolutionary political influence throughout the Arab world.14 Subsequently, these states’ main goal in Libya has been to “prevent a recurrence of the Arab Spring” by opposing its growth.15 To this end, they have gone so far as to designate the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group, and have supported Haftar’s strong stance against political Islamism in the hopes of abolishing it within the country.16 In contrast, Turkey and Qatar have found an ally in the Muslim Brotherhood, as they have supported the spread of Islamist ideals throughout the Middle East. Due to this, they are ardent supporters of the Tripoli-based GNA, where the Muslim Brotherhood experienced a boost in popularity following the Arab Spring.17 This ideological schism between the Middle Eastern countries has caused considerable tension in Libya as each group attempts to strengthen or weaken the Islamist organization for their own gains.

While establishing democracy in Libya is undoubtedly important, doing so under the conditions outlined above would be potentially explosive. These inflamed tensions have carried over into the political ring for the new election

as competing factions strive to take the country’s helm despite many lacking legitimacy as candidates.

Such candidates have varied from the Russian- and French-backed General Haftar, to even Muammar Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam Qadhaffi, despite Saif al-Islam being accused of war crimes and having strong connections to the previous regime. In a recent Foreign Policy article, Middle East Analyst and Observer Research Foundation Fellow Anchal Vohra noted that, “if the election had gone ahead as scheduled on Dec. 24, it’s hardly clear that all sides would have accepted their legitimacy.”18 “There would have almost certainly been clashes among rival political groups and military factions,” Vohra claims, “which could have plunged the country deeper into crisis.”19 By constantly arming and inciting these various groups against each other despite the UN’s attempts to stabilize the country, foreign powers have pushed Libya ever closer to the brink of a third civil war in lieu of a functional democracy.

Even if the democratic process in Libya were to work, however, instability would likely still remain. Under the Berlin Process, the expedition of elections for December 24, 2021 was considered premature by many, such as the Libyan Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA), as Libya lacks a functioning constitution, the foundation upon which a viable system of government can emerge. Although the election plan was based on a process outlined by the UN-born Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), Libya’s constitutional experts in the CDA have heavily criticized the forum itself for “being unwieldy” and “an attempt

by UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya) to sideline the draft constitution by searching for alternative constitutional bases for the elections.”20 The CDA has even gone as far as accusing UNSMIL of using the election to, “manipulate the constitutional path and the people’s will.”21 Subsequently, this mismanaged attempt to hold elections in Libya without a constitution, combined with the constant pressure from all foreign governments involved and the UN’s goal to carry on with elections at the time, has led to a deep suspicion from the Libyan people of the UN’s motives and “actual willingness to ensure a lasting solution.”22

These suspicions do have reasonable ground.

An election without a constitution would make the country more vulnerable to the numerous foreign powers involved in Libyan politics who wish to gain a firm foothold in the country through backing their respective domestic factions. Anchal Vohra reveals in Foreign Policy, “each could have used the election to carve a path toward another era of authoritarianism,” and consequently exploited Libya for their varying economic and ideological interests in the state.23 Although the elections have been indefinitely put on hold by Libya’s High National Election Commission so as to mend these issues, this is still a possible future for Libya if foreign powers continue to intervene in the manner described.24

The Exploitation of Yemeni Suffering

Although Yemen also has a strong history of foreign intervention from its time as a British colony to its split during the Cold War, foreign intervention in Yemen has reached unprecedented levels since 2014 with the eruption of the Yemeni Civil War. The war originates in post-Arab Spring sectarian tensions, which have since then drawn in regional powers. Due to their shared Shia religious identity, Iran has backed the Houthi rebels, who now control the majority of the country’s population.25 On the other hand, a Saudi Arabian-led coalition with eight INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 76

other majority Sunni countries have supported the original Hadi government and have fought to counter this Iranian-Shia influence with American, French, and British support throughout most of the conflict.26 In addition, the UAE endorses its own group in the Southern Transitional Council (STC), whose activities are often at odds with the Saudi-backed Hadi government, thus adding further complexity to foreign intervention in the war.27 As the war in Yemen has escalated, so has its crippling humanitarian crisis. According to British author and academic Helen Lackner, who specializes in Yemeni affairs, two-thirds of the country’s population are in need of humanitarian assistance.28 Furthermore, famine threatens five million lives throughout the country, although the United Nations has failed to classify the crisis as a famine because its efforts to collect the necessary data have been insufficient, revealing the troubling absence of an effective UN response in Yemen.29 Since Lackner’s comment in September 2021, circumstances have further worsened as the United Nations’ World Food Programme announced that they will have to significantly cut aid to Yemen due to a massive funding shortage from donor countries, leaving those affected with only half of their daily minimum rations.30 In a recent statement, the organization announced that they require around an additional $3.9 billion in order to help the millions of people in need throughout the country.31 Although this lack of aid constitutes a major failing of the UN’s humanitarian and stabilization efforts in Yemen, the distribution of aid in general is one of the most divisive elements of the crisis.

For instance, because Saudi Arabia provides most of the funds for humanitarian relief in Yemen, aid has become deeply politicized.32 Since Houthi rule spans the majority of the country, much of the humanitarian crisis has subsequently taken place on Houthi territory. However, due to the Houthis being enemies of Saudi Arabia and the former Hadi government, Saudi Arabia has ensured that Saudi and international aid only reaches the territory under the jurisdiction of the Saudi-backed regime, thus compounding the humanitarian crisis as those most in need have received the least aid.33 In a Center for Strategic and International Studies brief on foreign aid to Yemen, Jon 77 SPRING 2022

B. Alterman states that, “humanitarians are committed to providing relief from suffering, yet they increasingly understand that there are circumstances in which providing that relief may actually prolong the conflict and increase overall suffering,” in relation to where it is distributed.34 Furthermore, Alterman mentions that distribution primarily to Saudi-backed territory “essentially besieges Houthi areas and holds the civilian population hostage,” with the added presumable intention of, “[tempting] Yemenis to expel the Houthis rather than meet the areas of greatest humanitarian need.”35 Although foreign aid should have the ultimate goal of alleviating human suffering, Saudi Arabia has consistently leveraged its power in order to politicize foreign aid and further destabilize the country in suit of its military goals.

However, foreign manipulation of UN tools in Yemen has not been limited to the distribution of aid. In October, 2021, the UN Human Rights Council voted to end the probe into war crimes committed in Yemen, despite overwhelming allegations of atrocities committed by both sides.36 The fact that Russia, China, and Bahrain all voted against the continuation of the probe reveals a distinct pattern of self-interest. 37Given Bahrain's alignment with the Saudi-led coalition, the Bahraini government has a clear interest in ensuring that any war crimes committed by its allies are not revealed to the public.

As for Russia and China, both possess strong motives for opposing criticism of Saudi action in Yemen given the context of US-Saudi relations.

Since current U.S. President Joe Biden took office in early 2021, he has dealt harshly with Saudi Arabian action in Yemen through stopping the sale of arms to the Saudis (thereby reversing Trump’s decision to label the Houthis as a terrorist organization) and appointing a U.S. Special Envoy to organize a cease-fire and peace settlement in the country.38 By straining the United States’ relations with Saudi Arabia, however, Biden has provided Russia and China the opportunity to fill the emerging power vacuum in Saudi Arabia’s relationship with its otherwise strongest Western ally.39 Thus, Russia and China’s leading votes against the war crime probe can be seen as a bid for Saudi favor in light of unusually high U.S.-Saudi tensions. In this case,

the UN’s Human Rights Council became a tool for foreign powers to pursue their own global interests, rather than a mechanism for holding states accountable for inhumane actions. Ultimately, this has set a precedent for such violence to continue without consequence in Yemen.

Foreign intervention in Libya and Yemen has prolonged and escalated the civil wars in these states, leading to countless more deaths and instability for years to come. The United Nations may be a beneficial tool for solving global disputes, in theory. However, its mechanisms are too easily hijacked or bypassed by other external actors, allowing for foreign powers to exploit the states most in need. Although foreign powers have recently interpreted Libya’s elections and Yemen’s humanitarian crisis as opportunities to assert their own goals on the global stage, they dismiss the human costs that each entails. While these powers are embroiled in their own competitions, as Helen Lackner observes, “the main losers in this situation are the people who are suffering and dying.”40 In order to ensure that UN missions do not remain tools for unilateral foreign exploitation, the UN needs stronger multilateral regulatory mechanisms that incorporate all local sides of a conflict into their stabilization policies, thus transferring power to those truly affected.

References

1 Nedra Cherif, Libya’s Elections without a Constitution : A Risky Gamble (European University Institute, 2021), https://cadmus.eui.eu// handle/1814/73434; Anchal Vohra, “Elections Can’t Fix What’s Wrong With Libya,” Foreign Policy (blog), accessed February 3, 2022, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/04/libya-elections-not-solution-haftar-qaddafidbeibah/.

2 “UN to Cut Food Aid to Yemen amid Funding Shortfall,” accessed February 4, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/22/wfp-forced-to-cutfood-aid-to-yemen-amid-lacking-funds; “‘A Major Setback’: UN Ends Yemen War Crimes Probe,” accessed February 4, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2021/10/7/un-ends-yemen-war-crimes-probe-in-defeat-for-westernstates.

3 “ Yemen Crisis: Why Is There a War?,” BBC News, November 2, 2021, sec.

Middle East, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423.

4 Zia Weise, “The Libyan Conflict Explained,” POLITICO, January 17, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/the-libyan-conflict-explained/.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 “US Policy and Global Competition in the Middle East,” Arab Center Washington DC, accessed January 30, 2022, https://arabcenterdc.org/event/ us-policy-and-global-competition-in-the-middle-east/.

8 Karim Mezran and Hafed Al-Ghwell, “Second Berlin Conference on Libya: Where to from Here?,” Atlantic Council (blog), July 15, 2021, https:// www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/second-berlin-conference-onlibya-where-to-from-here/; Khalifa Haftar, “World Powers Meet in Berlin to Discuss Libya Crisis,” accessed February 11, 2022, https://www.aljazeera. com/news/2021/6/23/world-powers-to-meet-in-berlin-to-address-libyacrisis.

9 Haftar, “World Powers Meet in Berlin to Discuss Libya Crisis.”

10 Ibid.

11 Mezran and Al-Ghwell, “Second Berlin Conference on Libya.”

12 “Italy: Halt Abusive Migration Cooperation with Libya,” Human Rights Watch (blog), February 12, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/12/ italy-halt-abusive-migration-cooperation-libya.

13 Ibid.

14 Ito Mashino, “The Bipolar Conflict in the Middle East over the Muslim Brotherhood – Why Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt See the Brotherhood as a Threat –,” Mitsui & Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute, 2021, 6.

15 Ibid.

16 Mashino; Weise, "The Libyan Conflict Explained."

17 Mashino, “The Bipolar Conflict in the Middle East over the Muslim Brotherhood – Why Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt See the Brotherhood as a Threat –.”

18 Vohra, “Elections Can’t Fix What’s Wrong With Libya.”

19 Ibid.

20 Cherif, Libya’s Elections without a Constitution.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Vohra, “Elections Can’t Fix What’s Wrong With Libya.”

24 Ibida.

25 “ Yemen Crisis.”

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Arab Center Washington DC, Conflicts and Great Power Competition: Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Dln58H2vqu8.

29 Arab Center Washington DC. 30 “UN to Cut Food Aid to Yemen amid Funding Shortfall”; “ Yemen War: Funding Crisis Forces UN to Cut Food Assistance - BBC News,” accessed March 11, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-59754152.

31 “UN Says $3.9bn Needed for Help in Yemen as Conflict Escalates,” accessed February 4, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/12/unsays-3-9bn-needed-for-help-in-yemen-as-conflict-escalates.

32 Arab Center Washington DC, Conflicts and Great Power Competition.

33 Ibid.

34 Jon B. Alterman, “Aid and Conflict: Pitfalls in Yemen” (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2018), https://www.jstor.org/ stable/resrep22322.

35 Ibid.

36 “‘A Major Setback.’”

37 “UN Human Rights Council Votes to End Yemen War Crimes Inquiry | DW | 07.10.2021,” DW.COM, accessed February 4, 2022, https://www. dw.com/en/un-human-rights-council-votes-to-end-yemen-war-crimesinquiry/a-59442894; “‘A Major Setback.’”

38 Gregory Aftandilian, “Attaining the Difficult Peace in Yemen,” Arab Center Washington DC, accessed February 4, 2022, https://arabcenterdc.org/ resource/attaining-the-difficult-peace-in-yemen/.

39 Nabeel Khoury, “Biden’s Yemen Conundrum,” Arab Center Washington DC, accessed February 4, 2022, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/bidensyemen-conundrum/.

40 Arab Center Washington DC, Conflicts and Great Power Competition.

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reviewed by Dr. MARIEKE BRANDT Senior Researcher, Institute for Social Anthropology (ISA) of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna Author, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict

M ID D L E EA ST

Tribal Power and Peace Building in Yemen b y Ke e g a n Mitsuoka e di t e d by Anfa nioluw a Law a l

# Spring 79 SPRING 2022 2022 STYLEBOOK

S

ince 2014, the Yemeni Civil War has sparked one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, yet the general public remains unaware of the significance that tribes and tribal relations hold in the ongoing conflict.1 International media outlets largely depict the war in Yemen as a sectarian divide between Sunni and Shia Muslims, or as a proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but there is more to these narratives.

The tribe comprises a foundational element of Yemeni society, intertwining Yemen’s social and political composition with tribal structures, law, and ideology. Yet, many foreign observers unfamiliar with the Yemeni context associate the term “tribe” with antiquity, lawlessness, and traditionalism. Hence, tribalism is often unjustly blamed for Yemen’s political instability. Ultimately, this perspective fails to acknowledge that Yemen’s tribes and state structures coexisted peacefully for centuries prior to the outbreak of the modern wars. As the civil war continues to devastate Yemen, the international community has made numerous failed attempts to facilitate a viable peace process. Although local tribes and tribal leaders are primarily left out of these talks, their inclusion is necessary as tribal affiliations directly correlate to political legitimacy in Yemen, granting tribes the capacity to assist in mediating the conflict and ultimately pulling Yemen out of war. This essay will explore the historical and contemporary context of tribalism in Yemen to better understand how tribes can aid in national reconciliation.

Tribalism in Yemen

Tribalism in Yemen is rooted in ancient culture and tradition and, geographically, is far more pronounced in the country’s northern highland region than in southern and Lower Yemen.2 Yemeni tribes vary in size, stability, and permanence, and are often mobilized in response to both inter-tribal conflict and the country’s broader political tensions.

Households comprise the most basic tribal unit, linking small groups of individuals through shared ancestry. Confederations, such as the Bakīl or the Hashid, comprise Yemen’s largest tribal entities and are formed through alliances between such smaller groups based on perceived shared ancestry and tribal belonging.3 Furthermore, reciprocity is an integral part of the Yemeni tribal system, and tribespeople often engage in mutual assistance action for fellow members. Additionally, key tribal values include self-reliance, honor, generosity, and hospitality.4 Tribal mediation through customary law (known as‘urf ) is often preferred by tribespeople over the state court system with shaykhs (tribal leaders) acting as trusted, experienced mediators capable of finding quick and fair solutions for the involved parties.

The definition of “tribe” in the Yemeni context varies among sources. ACAPS, a Geneva-based organization which provides humanitarian data and analysis, places the number of tribesmen in Yemen at 70 to 80 percent of the population. In a thematic report published in August 2020, the organization regarded Yemen as “one of the most ‘tribal’ countries in the Middle East, if not the world.”5 In contrast, Abdul Ghani al-Iryani, a Yemeni political analyst, believes classifying Yemen as a highly tribal society is a misrepresentation.

He describes “tribal” as “being those whose primary identification is tribal, i.e. if the shaykh calls them to war, they come to his aid.”

Al-Iryani believes this definition applies to “about 20 percent of the population” while “the other 80 percent are either urban or peasants, and are non-tribal.”6 Thus, the perceived degree of tribalism in Yemen largely depends on the definition and connotation ascribed to the word “tribe.” Marieke Brandt, author of Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict, defines “tribes” as entities that are “associated with a territory, homeland, or tribal area”, with “tribal members usually INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 80

[sharing] some dominant idiom of common origin.”7 Ultimately, despite these varying interpretations, tribalism in Yemen carries profound importance by blending historical and cultural influence with social structures and state politics.

On the other hand, the derogatory connotation associated with “tribe” has promoted the viewpoint that Yemen’s tribal culture forms the basis for the country's corruption and instability in the modern era. Urban Yemenis and foreigners alike often negatively stereotype tribespeople as primitive nomads incapable of governing in a centralized way. However, this perspective holds little historical credibility. Tribes in pre-Islamic Yemen enhanced the states’ stability and control of territory, as tribal institutions historically coexisted with the state government.

Conflict management specialist Nadwa Al-Dawsari argues, “due to the political instability that Yemen experienced for long periods of its history, tribes came to function as states, providing stability and economic support for their members.”8 Although contested among scholars, Al-Dawsari’s perception of the role of tribes as quasi-states is indicative of the strong base of power and political legitimacy shaykhs eventually attained in Yemen. Sometimes, powerful tribal leaders successfully united tribes into confederations (or “kingdoms” according to Yemeni-Swiss writer Elham M. Manea), granting these shaykhs the political legitimacy and strength to eventually become kings of such confederations.9 In ancient Yemen, as Manea explains, “a functional separation between the 81 SPRING 2022

ruling monarchy and the tribal institution [became] nonetheless evident.”10 Today, Yemen’s government corruption and weak state institutions, not its tribes, generate instability and vulnerability in the country.

Manea affirms that in the present day, tribes and the state function in separate spheres with the state acting as the political core and its tribes at the periphery.11 However, while Yemeni tribes tend to operate independent of political groups and leaders, in practice, tribal and political identities may overlap. Following the 1962 revolution in which Yemen became a republic, the sādah

social stratum, who were descendants of Prophet Muhammad and led local communities in religious and secular affairs, lost significant political power and were largely overshadowed by tribal shaykhs.12 Today, shaykhs are either elected by fellow tribal members, or simply acknowledged as such for their influence and prestige. Moreover, shaykhs in modern Yemen oftentimes hold concurrent positions as distinguished political leaders within the Yemeni government, gaining prominence by resolving conflicts in their communities and conducting arbitrations. For example, Abdullah ibn Hussein al-Ahmar (1933-2007) rose to prominence as shaykh of Yemen’s Hashid tribal federation, as well as Speaker of the House of Representatives in Yemen from 1993 until his death. During his heyday in the 1970s, Abullah al-Ahmar claimed to be senior shaykh of Yemen, holding “more natural authority than a modern president.”13 A year after he assumed leadership of the Hashids, alAhmar supported then-President Abdul Rahman al-Iryani in preventing the reestablishment of the imamate (the governing office of an imam, or Muslim leader).14 He later amassed even more power by serving as Chairman of the Shura Council. As in al-Ahmar’s case, Yemeni shaykhs often use their tribal affiliations to gain political legitimacy by simultaneously climbing governmental ranks. Hence, Yemen’s tribal leaders have the potential to reconcile the country by using their authority at the local and national level.

Conflict Resolution and Mediation

According to a 2021 UNICEF report, over 15 million people in Yemen do not have access to clean water or sanitation, with more than 11 million Yemeni children currently in need of humanitarian assistance and over 400,000 children suffering from malnutrition.15 Peace talks to bring an end to the war are ongoing, but the international community must change their

approach toward mediating the conflict.

Adel Dashela, a Yemeni writer and academic researcher, argues that “a solution to Yemen’s issues requires new in-depth studies into the tribes’ way of thinking, approaches, and culture that works to adapt and respond to these recent transformations.”16 However, many remain skeptical. Helen Lackner, a British researcher known for her works on Yemen, states that scholars often view tribes as pre-state political organizations incapable of governing sovereign states.17 Western scholars and Yemeni citizens alike oftentimes hold the incorrect belief that tribes hinder modernization and conflict resolution in Yemen. But this is a regressive way to look at tribes. An alternative, progressive perspective views tribes as viable entities capable of large-scale governance and recognizes within tribalism the potential to complement the Yemeni government by mediating between the state and local communities. According to the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, “seeking out and enlisting Yemen’s tribes to facilitate conflict mediation and deescalation should be an obvious choice to begin that new path” toward viable peace-building.18 In this way, the task of national reconciliation is left up to those local actors in closest proximity to the crisis, rather than regional and international entities.

In many instances, local tribes have made greater strides than the United Nations in establishing peace in Yemen. For example, since the war’s outbreak, tribes have successfully exchanged thousands more prisoners of war compared to the single UN-led effort in October 2020 that saw only brief success. During this UN operation, 1,000 prisoners were released following a meeting in Switzerland the previous month.

However, in October 2020, UN Special Envoy

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of the Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths noted that the agreement failed to release thousands of additional detainees.19 In contrast, in 2019, tribal mediation accounted for “more than 350 exchange deals [since March 2015], during which more than 7,000 prisoners were released from both sides,” according to Houthi prisoner affair representative Abdul-Qader Mortadha.20 Local tribal mediation has also facilitated the movement of people and goods across war zones and ended sieges in villages. Thus, tribes have proven time and again their ability to promote order in the midst of the crisis in Yemen. Yet, as the Sana’a Center asserts, “international peace efforts have sidelined them in favor of tried and failed Western institutional approaches.”21 Al-Dawsari further suggests that in a country like Yemen, where the state is weak, the tribal system has the potential to successfully promote national reconciliation and state-building. She encourages the international community to broaden its view

83 SPRING 2022

on what state-building can look like and recognize that ‘traditional’ systems are not inherently primitive or frail; rather, that they have the power to complement and strengthen Yemen’s government.

Al-Dawsari adds, “state-building does not have to be at odds with the traditional system.” “In fact,” she claims, “maintaining the traditional justice system may be the best way to establish and preserve the rule of law.”22 Certainly, this is not to say that international intervention is entirely ineffective in Yemen. Foreign assistance is needed to feed starving civilians, provide medical care to expecting mothers, and prevent the spread of disease (particularly in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic), but external intervention alone will not fix the country’s structural issues. To better aid the Yemeni people, humanitarian action from the UN and other international organizations must recognize the crucial role of tribes.

Shaykhs’ political power and access to complex internal networks can enhance communication between outside organizations and local populations by helping external actors navigate the inner workings of Yemen’s government to the benefit of the country’s most in need.

Some scholars argue that involving tribes in peace talks and meditation may lead to tribal instability.

For instance, ACAPS asserts that, during the current civil war, tribal values have been exploited for political gain.23 The creation and dissolution of alliances, as well as the mobilization of tribal militias, upsets the balance of power in Yemen. It is not unusual for a tribe

to join one side of the conflict in response to their adversary joining another. Members of the Hashid tribe, to which former President Saleh belonged, exerted great political and military influence following the fall of the imamate in 1962. Currently, the Hashid tribe opposes the Houthis for their role in aiding the Yemeni government during the Houthi wars.24 Furthermore, the Bakīl and Madḥij tribes sit alongside the Hashids as major tribal confederations in northern Yemen. Zaydi Muslim factions within the Bakīl confederation have aligned with the Houthi movement due to Saleh’s ties to the Hashid tribe, while the Madḥij people follow Sunni Islam and therefore oppose the Houthis. Certainly, this vast network of tribal hostility does not benefit these tribes’ role as mediators. Nevertheless, the positive role tribal entities can play in conciliation outweighs the potential negatives.

Conflict resolution is not a one-size-fits-all process. Yemen’s social and political systems are vastly different from those of Western countries.

Meanwhile, many Yemeni tribes are pushing for reconciliation. In December 2021, 50 tribal leaders convened in a meeting alongside Western diplomats and the UN Special Envoy to Yemen with the goal of ending the war. Significant resolutions included the call for a ceasefire, the release of all prisoners and detainees, the opening of roads, and immediate political involvement in negotiations between conference members.25 In “ Yemen’s Tribes Offer a New Path Toward Peace,” the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies illustrates how “tribal figures – many representing social groups that have fought on both sides of the conflict and suffered horrific losses in doing so – bridged their divides and came together, united behind the shared desire to end the war.”26 As shown, shaykhs have the potential to be at the forefront of the peace process in Yemen due to their ties to both local communities and national political parties. Conferences like the one held in 2021 as well as tribal-facilitated prisoner swaps are a step in the right direction towards state reconciliation. Historical precedence for the coexistence between Yemen’s tribes and the state rationalizes the belief that the two can one day cooperate again toward viable stability and peace in Yemen.

References

1 “ Yemen War Reaches 'Shameful Milestone' - 10,000 Children Now Killed or Maimed | | UN News,” United Nations, October 19, 2021, https://news. un.org/en/story/2021/10/1103432.

2 Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict, Oxford University Press, 2017, https://oxford. universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190673598.001.0001/ oso-9780190673598.

3 “Tribes in Yemen - ACAPS,” August 2020, https://www.acaps.org/sites/ acaps/files/products/files/20200813_acaps_thematic_report_tribes_in_ yemen_0_0.pdf.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Abdul Ghani al-Iryani, “ Yemen: 'Chaos by Design',” Al. Al Jazeera, March 17, 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/program/people-power/2011/3/17/ yemen-chaos-by-design.

7 Brandt, 18.

8 Nadwa Al-Dawsari, “Peace Building in the Time of War: Tribal Cease-Fire & De-escalation Mechanisms in Yemen,” The Middle East Institute, April 2021, https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2021-04/Peacebuilding%20 in%20the%20Time%20of%20War.pdf.

9 Elham M Manea, “ Yemen, the Tribe, and the State,” October 1996, 1, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5eb18d627d53aa0e85b60c65/t/5ee37ef c06d9dd2c2d859307/1591967486676/Manea-Elham-M.-1995.pdf.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Brandt, 22.

13 “ Yemen: The Tribal Islamists.”

14 Adel Al-Ahmadi, “The Legacy of Abdullah al-Ahmar Continues in Yemen,” The New Arab, December 30, 2014, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/ analysis/legacy-abdullah-al-ahmar-continues-yemen.

15 “ Yemen War Reaches 'Shameful Milestone' - 10,000 Children Now Killed or Maimed | | UN News.”

16 Adel Dashela, “Coercing Compliance: The Houthis and the Tribes of Northern Yemen,” Fikra Forum, November 6, 2020, https://www. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/coercing-compliance-houthis-andtribes-northern-yemen.

17 Helen Lackner, “Understanding the Yemeni Crisis: The Transformation of Tribal Roles in Recent Decades,” Sir William Luce Publication Series, June 2016, https://dro.dur.ac.uk/19545/1/19545.pdf ?DDD35.

18 “ Yemen’s Tribes Offer a New Path Toward Peace,” Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies, January 7, 2022, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/theyemen-review/16164.

19 “Welcoming Mass Prisoner Swap in Yemen as 'A irlift of Hope', Speakers Urge Government, Houthi Rebels to Negotiate Durable Peace, during Security Council Briefing | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases,” United Nations, October 15, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14328.doc. htm.

20 Naseh Shaker, “ Yemeni local tribal mediation succeeds in releasing 135 prisoners,” Al-Monitor, December 27, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/ originals/2019/12/yemen-houthi-saudi-government-prisoners-swap-taiz.html 21 “ Yemen’s Tribes Offer a New Path Toward Peace.”

22 Al-Dawsari.

23 “Tribes in Yemen - ACAPS.” 24 Ibid.

25 “ Yemen’s Tribes Offer a New Path Toward Peace.”

26 Ibid.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 84

M ID D L E E A ST

Will Culture Sell?

Saudi Arabia’s Take on Tourism

by Na jla Alsweilem edited by Gideon Gord o n

F

or more than 80 years, Saudi Arabia has depended upon oil reserves as fuel for its economy. From 1936 to 1938, the CaliforniaArabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) drilled into an oil-rich area in what is modern-day Dhahran. When the American-owned company finally found oil, they also discovered the largest oil reserves in the world. The company, renamed the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) in 1944, currently manages Saudi Arabia’s hydrocarbon projects and oil production, and holds drilling rights over the country’s oil-rich areas. According to the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission, Saudi Arabia contains “nearly 20 percent of the world’s conventional oil reserves.”1 Furthermore, oil revenue accounts for approximately 90 percent of Saudi Arabia’s export income and 45 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Saudi Arabia’s reliance on oil revenue classifies it as a resource-based economy. According to author and economist Rudiger Ahrend, resourcebased economies are defined as “economies where natural resources account for more than 10 percent of GDP and 40 percent of exports.”

2 Countries with resource-based economies profit from their abundance of natural minerals, such as petroleum, iron ore, gold, and copper. However, Saudi’s oil boom cannot last forever, and, in recent years, Saudi Arabian officials and policy-makers have introduced various initiatives designed to replace the country’s reliance on oil exports with more sustainable sources of revenue. As Fahad Al 85 SPRING 2022

Rasheed, managing director and chief executive of King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC), told CNBC at the World Economic Forum in 2018, Saudi Arabia has experienced “lots of growth in areas like the port industry, leisure, as well as residential (construction).” To increase Saudi Arabia’s sustainable economic growth and self-sufficiency, the country has developed a unique strategy capitalizing on its history and culture through the tourism industry.

Saudi Arabia’s modern cultural consciousness stems from 1996, when the royal court, under King Fahad Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s governance, announced the centennial celebrations of Abulaziz Bin Saud’s conquering of the capital city Riyadh.3 The announcement signaled a change in how the government recognizes the history of Saudi Arabia, as well as the history of the Al Saud royal family. This decree inaugurated the state’s first non-religious national celebration, thus birthing a uniquely secular Saudi Arabian national identity.

A major part of constructing such an identity involved tracking the presence and dissemination of, as well as collecting and centralizing, the country’s valuable primary source documents and historical artifacts. With then-Prince Salaman Bin Abdulaziz as President, Saudi Arabia launched the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives (Darah) in 1972, charged with overseeing and managing the ownership and circulation of these historical primary source documents. During Prince Salman’s visit to the King Abdulaziz Palace

in Al-Kharj, he observed: “our heritage sites require us to take care so that young people can draw inspiration from the history of their country.”4 By launching a nation-wide effort toward expanding the historical consciousness of Saudi Arabia’s youth, Prince Salman sparked a national and cultural identity centered on the country’s history.

However, this heritage-preserving process sparked competition among numerous state archivists in Riyadh. According to Harvard University professor and historian Dr. Rosie Bsheer, “archivists and preservationists in state institutions subverted the process of collection, preservation, and cataloging to further their own ideological beliefs.”5 This led to the disruption of the process of collectivization, as some archivists strayed away from the official project and resorted to hiding, destroying, and leaking certain documents. In an effort to resolve this issue, archive consultants in Darah began outsourcing “ordinary functionsscreening and cataloging historical records,” says Bsheer.

Creating a unified national identity in Saudi Arabia simultaneously amplified the role of Saudi Arabian cultural economics, entailing the relationship between economics and a society's beliefs, practices, and environment. Renowned scholars, including economist and philosopher John Stuart Mill, regarded cultural constraints as “sometimes more important than even the pursuits of personal interest.”6 Furthermore, according to Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes? published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, a society’s religious and ethnic background can impact a state’s economy in terms of fiscal policies and wealth redistribution.7 In economist Gary S. Becker's “Accounting for Taste”, he describes the role of culture in economics by illustrating how “individuals have less control over their culture than over other social capital.”8 Therefore, the interconnectedness of a community and their culture, including the environment and ideologies that have shaped its consciousness, as well as its ethnic, religious, and racial properties, heightens the role of cultural awareness in that community’s economic activity. In Saudi Arabia, the cultural consciousness that is strengthened through the proliferation of historic knowledge increases Saudi

citizens’ connection to their country’s history and cements the role of culture in Saudi Arabia’s economic affairs.

The definition of culture in Saudi Arabia has transformed over the years. The revolutionary Islamic Al-Sahwa movement (otherwise known as “awakening”) gave religious figures a more prominent role in the country’s politics. Al-Sahwa emerged in the 1950s when thousands of members of the Muslim Brotherhood immigrated to Saudi Arabia. Motivated by the presence of American troops on the Arabian Peninsula, the Muslim Brotherhood aimed to propagate radical Salafist ideologies throughout the region. The continued influence of Wahhabism on Brotherhood members strengthened the religious-political movement and cultivated a stronger religious identity in Saudi Arabia. Al-Sahwa’s influence peaked in the 1990s, inextricably linking Saudi’s cultural identity to the Brotherhood’s interpretation of Islamic culture and society. While this Islamic influence still exists in modern Saudi Arabia’s cultural identity, the collectivization of historical primary documents in 1996 signified the government’s efforts to increase awareness of the Saudi royal family’s history and country’s traditional tribal and bedouin origins among the general population.

Similarly to its attempts to preserve the history and documentation of the royal family, Saudi Arabia has also undertaken a series of projects designed to realize the convergence of culture and economics in recent years. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 was launched in 2016 by the Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman under the leadership of King Salman. Vision 2030 aims at diversifying the state’s economy by lessening its dependence on oil.

Instead, Saudi Arabia is focusing on developing its social service areas such as health, education, tourism, and entertainment.

Alongside Vision 2030, the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Culture were both assigned the role of cultural preservation. One of Vision 2030’s most influential developments is Diriyah Gate, an urban project aimed at becoming the cultural hub of Saudi Arabia through combining the essentials of a touristic hotspot, such as dining experiences, shopping, and residential areas, with traditional Najdi architecture and historical INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 86

museums. That being said, Saudi Arabian locals have expressed conflicting reactions toward Vision 2030. On the country’s conservative side, some have found it difficult to transition from a traditionalist, religious society to a more secular one. The Crown Prince told the Guardian in 2017, “we are simply reverting to what we followed — a moderate Islam open to the world and all religions.”9 It can be argued that this transition to a “moderate Islam” and its accompanying social and political policies intended to liberalize Saudi Arabian society are motivated by the Greatest Happiness Principle and the theory of Utilitarianism, which claims that actions can be classified by their capacity to promote happiness for the maximum number of people. According to John Stuart Mill, “utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”10 Essentially, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 is aimed at bettering the living conditions of Saudi citizens by investing in areas that promote general happiness and liberalization, such as entertainment, travel, and tourism. In accordance with Mill’s view, this move away from traditionalism might be morally necessary to establish collective societal happiness throughout the Kingdom. When the National Public Radio (NPR) interviewed Saudi youth about these social reforms in 2018, an anonymous 19-year old Saudi woman told NPR “I'm really happy that it happened now that I'm young, and, like, I can live all these changes.”11 Yaser Baker, a Saudi comedian, 87 SPRING 2022

told NPR: “honestly, (the social reforms) is what you need to do. Some of it is dramatic, some of it is extremely fast, but it is the way to do it.”12 The dissemination of cultural knowledge and subsequent increase in patriotic sentiment make Saudi Arabia’s cultural heritage the ideal platform for tourism in the state. On April 16, 2000, a decree signed by the Saudi Council of Ministers established the Saudi Commission for Tourism and National Heritage (SCTH). According to the commission, investing in cultural tourism can “retain the Saudi tourists within the country” and, in doing so will “increase investment opportunities, develop human resources, and expand and create new job opportunities for Saudi nationals.”13 Later in 2008, the Council of Ministers merged the National Heritage and Museums sector with the Supreme Commission for Tourism (SCT).14 Since then, tourism and historiography in Saudi Arabia have become tangibly linked through these institutions.

Moreover, ever since the development of Saudi Arabia’s tourism industry, the capital city of Riyadh has become the forefront of Saudi national heritage.

By centralizing Saudi’s historic resources (such as primary source documents and artifacts) in Riyadh via the establishment of sites such as Diriyah Gate, the state has adopted Riyadh as the symbol of Saudi history.

When the Saudi Commission for Tourism and National Heritage was established in 2000, tourism was restricted solely to local and pilgrimage tourists; hence, the state focused primarily on developing internal tourism. Only on September 27, 2019, when tourist visas finally opened up to recreational travelers from all over the world, did Saudi’s cultural tourism plans come into full effect. Besides oil, Saudi Arabia’s other primary stream of revenue is pilgrimage tourism. In 2011, motivated by the desire to create a safer pilgrimage experience for locals and foreigners alike, the Saudi government initiated an expansion project that required the removal of some historic and religious sites surrounding the Kaaba. Although this move sparked resistance amongst the country’s religious communities and organizations, the government proceeded with the plan. Now, on average, over two million Muslim pilgrims visit Mecca annually to conduct Hajj15, and that number is expected to

increase to 17 million by 2025.16 Pilgrimage remains one of the largest areas of tourism in Saudi Arabia.17 However, since the issuance of the tourist visa in (2018), the state has attempted to diversify its tourist revenue. For instance, government investment in the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Tourism increased exponentially with the Tourism Investment Fund, established in 2020, worth 15 billion Saudi riyals (approximately $4 billion USD).18 The Ministry of Tourism aims to redirect citizens’ disposable income within Saudi Arabia and attract prospective investors from inside the Kingdom. Meanwhile, the Saudi Tourism Authority, also established in 2000, focuses on marketing Saudi tourism to potential partners both within the country and abroad that may assist in developing tourist sites. For example, the Saudi Tourism Authority and Travel Boutique Online (TBO), India’s leading travel agency, signed a joint Memorandum of Understanding “to develop destination knowledge of Saudi through new, innovative programs on the TBO Academy platform.”19 In Saudi Arabia, the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Culture work together to develop cultural sites, and then market such sites to locals and tourists.

Prior to the institutionalization of the relationship between tourism and culture, it was also difficult for Saudi locals to reach most cultural and historical sites located within the country. Hence, Saudis would primarily spend their disposable income abroad. For instance, in 2017, Saudi tourists spent more than one billion dollars in the United Kingdom.20 However, proliferating culture throughout the country through increased opportunities for local tourism has attracted many Saudi Arabian tourists to prominent cultural and historical sites inside the state’s borders. According to the World Tourism Organization, domestic travelers in Saudi Arabia increased from 13.3 million in 2008 to 19.8 million in 2019.21 This resulted in less money leaving the country and more disposable income being spent inside Saudi Arabia. With greater funds recirculating back to institutions that improve Saudi Arabia economically and socially, the country has recently experienced an increase in its domestic economic growth and self-sufficiency.

According to the Statistical, Economic, and

Social Research and Training Center for Islamic Countries (SESRIC), tourism revenue in Saudi Arabia increased from $16,975 million in 2018 to $19,849 million in 2019. Furthermore, the World Travel and Tourism Council reveals that tourism accounts for one in 10 jobs worldwide and delivers one in five of all new jobs created in 2017.”22 Moreover, according to the council, the Middle East region experienced rapid economic growth as a result of developments in the tourism sector, with Saudi Arabia becoming “the fastest growing country not only in the Middle East but amongst all G20 economies in 2019.”23 Although much of the world faced a steep decline in tourism revenue in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Saudi Arabia instilled various economic recovery measures to support its citizens during the crisis, such as a $2.4 billion subsidy to support Saudis’ salaries in the private sector, encompassing the travel and tourism industries.

Furthermore, the process of workforce nationalization in Saudi Arabia (otherwise known as “Saudization”)24 is crucial in advancing the country’s tourism sector by enhancing economic sovereignty and promoting a more competent, skillful society that can contribute to the country’s various developmental goals. Importantly, Saudization is crucial to the tourism industry as the new labor market will require workers with a connected cultural background. To capitalize on local culture in order to promote tourism, Saudi Arabia requires a frontline workforce that is representative of the country’s heritage. Therefore, to increase workforce nationalization without sacrificing skill qualifications, Saudi Arabia must focus on its human capital development fields.

Moreover, to facilitate the transition from an oilbased economy to a knowledge-based economy, greater investments must be made in research and development, human resources, education, and “knowledge networks that enable rapid communication and collaboration among technical professionals,” according to researcher Dr. Mohammad Khorsheed at King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST). A domestic example of such education-based investment is the establishment of international scholarships for Saudi citizens under certain Ministries, such as INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 88

the Ministry of Culture. The cultural scholarships granted by the Ministry of Cultures provide Saudi students a full-paid scholarship to study fields that enhance cultural development such as theater, museum history, literature, and archaeology.

Saudi Arabia’s move away from oil-dependency and resource-based economics has made cultural tourism a new, yet important, component of Saudi’s developing economy. The collectivization of historical artifacts and primary source documents, as well as the increased focus on cultural projects and events, helped Saudi create a national identity that values its national heritage alongside its secular components. Furthermore, the development of the tourism industry in Saudi Arabia has created more job opportunities in the country, which in return will continue to boost the Saudi economy and increase consumer confidence. Social and cultural reforms in Saudi Arabia heighten citizens’ pride and national identity, while diversifying the country’s economy. As a comeback in Saudi tourism unfolds in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Saudi Arabia’s economic and social reforms are expected to lead to economic growth, increased selfsufficiency, and a heightened national enthusiasm for social development.

References

1 “Economy - Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission,” SACM, accessed October 13, 2021, https://sacm.org.au/economy/.

2 Rudiger Ahrend, “How to Sustain Growth in a Resource Based Economy? the Main Concepts and Their Application to the Russian Case,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1010671.

3 Rosie Bsheer, “Archive Wars: The Politics of History in Saudi Arabia,” in Archive Wars: The Politics of History in Saudi Arabia (Stanford, California: Stanford University press, 2020), p. 20.

4 “Prince Salman: Our Heritage Sites Require Us to Take Care so That Young People Can Draw Inspiration from the History of Their Country,” ‫ةديرج‬ ‫ضايرلا‬, December 8, 2011, https://alriyadh.com/689643.

5 Rosie Bsheer, “Archive Wars: The Politics of History in Saudi Arabia,” in Archive Wars: The Politics of History in Saudi Arabia (Stanford, California: Stanford University press, 2020), p. 20.

6 Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, “Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no. 2 (January 2006): pp. 23-48, https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.20.2.23.

7 Ibid.

8 Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Taste (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

9 Martin Chulov, “I Will Return Saudi Arabia to Moderate Islam, Says Crown Prince,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, October 24, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/i-will-return-saudi-arabia-

89 SPRING 2022

moderate-islam-crown-prince.

10 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2022).

11 https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/05/02/607193358/cultureshock-within-their-own-country-saudis-come-to-grips-with-swift-changes.

12 Ibid.

13 “SAUDI COMMISSION FOR TOURISM AND NATIONAL HERITAGE (SCTH),” Saudi commission for Tourism and National Heritage (SCTH), accessed February 5, 2022, https://www.scega.gov.sa/en/pages/aboutscta. aspx.

14 Ibid.

15 Amna Puri-Mirza, “Saudi Arabia: Hajj Population,” Statista, January 7, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/617696/saudi-arabia-total-hajjpilgrims/.

16 https://english.alarabiya.net/business/economy/2016/08/15/Religioustourism-plays-key-role-in-bolstering-Saudi-post-oil-plan.

17 “Hajj Statistics,” Hajj Statistics (Riyadh: General Authority for Statistics, 2019), https://www.stats.gov.sa/sites/default/files/haj_40_en.pdf.

18 “Tourism Investment,” Tourism Investment, accessed February 5, 2022, https://mt.gov.sa/en/TourismInvestment/Pages/TourismInvestment.aspx.

19 “Saudi Tourism Authority Signs Global ... - Saudi Press Agency,” accessed October 29, 2021, https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory. php?lang=en&newsid=2229735.

20 Published by Statista Research Department and Aug 23, “UK Inbound Tourism: Saudi Arabian Tourist Spending 2005-2019,” Statista, August 23, 2021, https://www.statista.com/statistics/515780/uk-inbound-tourism-saudiarabian-tourist-spending/.

21 Amna Puri-Mirza, “Saudi Arabia: Domestic Tourism for Holiday, Leisure and Recreational Purposes 2019,” Statista, September 20, 2021, https://www. statista.com/statistics/1019026/saudi-arabia-domestic-travel-for-leisure/.

22 World Travel & Tourism Council, “Tourism Provides Jobs Where They're Needed Most,” Medium (Medium, June 18, 2018), https:// worldtraveltourismcouncil.medium.com/tourism-provides-jobs-wheretheyre-needed-most-200f11ac2029.

23 Ibid.

24 Adel S. Al-Dosary, “Saudization (Localization) – A Critical Review,” Taylor & Francis, 2007, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ abs/10.1080/13678860500289534.

M ID D L E E A ST

Seeds of Empowerment The Transformative Power of Agriculture for Women in the Middle East

by Av a Rheeve edited by Rhia nnon Tay lo r

I

n the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, agriculture has long maintained a crucial role in social and economic life.

Despite water scarcity dilemmas and arid climatic conditions that impede farming in the region, 28 percent of MENA’s population, or 84 million people, are currently economically supported solely by agriculture.1 Moreover, agriculture is the largest employment sector for Middle Eastern women, its share of the economically active female population having risen dramatically in recent years (Fig. 2).2 Not unlike in discussions of other labor markets, the rise of women in the agricultural workforce has sparked debate among scholars regarding the extent to which this work proves to be empowering in practice. While agricultural work may constitute many rural women’s first experiences with financial agency, participation in paid labor is not the cut-and-dry empowerment some declare it to be. Indeed, in the Middle East, where prominent international organizations have acknowledged systemic gender inequality as a barrier to regional social advancement and economic development, female employment faces complicated challenges to improving women's livelihoods.3 Still, the potential of the agricultural sector to serve as a pathway to the development of women’s economic and social welfare needs not

be ruled out. Policy proposals addressing practical concerns associated with the empowerment capacity of agricultural work for women are integral to supporting the burgeoning progression of women into the workforce of the MENA region.

The Importance of Empowerment

The Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) measures women’s self-determinative capacity within the global agricultural sector in order to support performance monitoring of the United States’ international hunger initiatives.4 Its most heavily-weighted sub-index, the five Domains of Empowerment (5DE), identifies specific facets of empowerment and disempowerment for rural women within the domains of Production, Resources, Income, Leadership, and Time Use, defined in Fig. 1.

Critical analyses of the 5DE provide policymakers with the ability to pinpoint areas of improvement in empowering rural women.

Consequently, effective policy action seeking a transformative and truly empowering experience in agricultural involvement for MENA women must address all five domains in conjunction with regional and sub-regional needs assessments.

The case of Northwest Syria presents a particularly striking analysis along the themes

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 90

Fig. 1: International Food Policy Research Institute

The Five Domains of Empowerment (5DE) Production: Sole or joint decisionmaking over food and cashcrop farming, livestock, and fisheries as well as autonomy in agricultural production Resources: Ownership, access to, and decisionmaking power over productive resources such as land, livestock, agricultural equipment, consumer durables, and credit Income: Sole or joint control over income and expenditures Leadership: Membership in economic or social groups and comfort in speaking in public Time: Allocation of time to productive and domestic tasks and satisfaction with the available time for leisure activities of the WEAI and 5DE index. In the span of just thirty years (1980-2010), the share of women in Syria’s agricultural workforce has doubled from approximately 30 percent to 60 percent.5 However, the accompanying characteristics of this rapid change in labor composition have reinforced many scholars’ reluctance to define agricultural feminization as either strictly empowering or exploitative. Nearly 70 percent of female agriculture laborers in Northern Syria exercise personal control over Income.6 Yet rather than advancing women’s capacity to engage in leisure or invest in their futures, such funds are typically allocated toward household expenses, exemplifying the notion that financial need is generally the factor driving these women’s entry into the workforce, not the desire to work.

Additionally, despite local laws requiring equal pay between men and women, the confinement of Syrian women to lower-skilled 91 SPRING 2022

and culturally-acceptable employment positions considerably hinders their earning potential. Syrian women can sometimes attain Leadership positions as agricultural contractors, exercising modest control over Production decisions and overseeing male and female laborers alike. However, acquiring these opportunities typically requires extraordinary and thoroughly-demonstrated leadership skills obtained through apprenticeships and promotions much more accessible to men.

Despite small steps toward 5DE improvement, particularly in the spheres of Income, Leadership, and Production, it is evident that various factors remain in the way of a definitive designation of Syrian women’s labor as empowering.

Promisingly, the communities formed by Syrian women on-the-job provide an important social asset to women otherwise isolated through societal marginalization: solidarity. Through regular and otherwise inaccessible interaction with other women, female laborers may confide in one another, generating the camaraderie and social capital integral to Leadership development.7 While, at present, such groups are largely social, it is possible that, under certain political circumstances (e.g., heightened awareness of labor rights, social movements, etc.), mutually-beneficial economic cooperation could occur in the future.

Although the growing involvement of women in the MENA region’s agricultural sector is driven largely by necessity as the viability of the region’s single-income household norm is challenged by economic stressors, the acknowledgement of what women bring to the table beyond the family unit is integral to accelerating gender integration in the workforce. The far-reaching benefits of women’s contributions to regional agricultural practices are substantial despite often being overlooked and under-attributed. Women’s empowerment is locally advantageous as well as an asset to the national economic development of MENA countries. In addition to directly contributing to economic growth, indirect benefits of women’s economic participation in the region include decreasing fertility rates and improving quality of life indicators. Furthermore, a growing body of evidence asserts that the degree of inequality seen in the developing MENA region has drastically

hindered its national economies. Female equality and empowerment in the workforce has substantial economic benefits to the broader Middle East and North Africa.8 Recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) research estimates that the economic disempowerment of women in MENA countries contributes to a more than 30 percent macroeconomic loss on average.9

Relevant Challenges

Despite the narrowing gender gap in agricultural labor force participation rates and the demonstrated benefits of female empowerment within the workforce, women in this employment sector continue to face structural barriers to the prerequisite criteria which make this empowerment possible. In Egypt, agriculture employs more than one-third of women and onefifth of men, yet, despite engaging in similar labor efforts, women are not recognized as workers in their own right and are instead categorized as “helpers” to the male laborers.10 Women are also unable to acquire “agricultural workers” designations on their ID cards, barring them from the opportunity to negotiate higher wages and worker protections. Removing these legal and social hurdles, while simultaneously granting women recognition for the work that they do, is a necessary step in expanding the agricultural sector’s empowerment potential consistent with the

Leadership and Time-Use domains of the WEAI. Recent analysis also indicates a connection between rentierism, neoliberal policy efforts, and the disempowerment of rural women.

For example, the parceling of land to large corporations and other extranational entities, as well as the patenting of seeds, generally diminishes the ability of rural women to cultivate a sufficient quantity of food to support themselves and their households. 11 In the midst of the early twentiethcentury oil boom, women in agriculture were excluded from the institution of social programs and protective legislation (e.g. paid maternity leave) enjoyed by only a small population of women in professional and industrial jobs. 12 To support empowerment, future efforts must consider female agricultural workers as crucial recipients of these policy programs.

In the face of accelerating climate changes propelled by fossil fuel combustion, benefits of women’s empowerment, particularly within agriculture, are especially compelling when considering female workers’ contributions to agricultural innovation and sustainability. Various studies predict that the Middle East and North Africa will be among the world regions worsthit by the negative impacts of climate change, including being among the first estimated to run out of fresh water.13 Rural women of the Middle East are uniquely suited to stand on the frontline

Fig. 2: Does the Feminisation of Agricultural Labour Empower Women?

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against impending climate challenges. From their roles as household managers, working to feed family members in food deficit circumstances, they already possess the natural resource management and adaptation skills that are beneficial, albeit at the micro-level, in mitigating climate risks.14 15 As the dangers of climate change escalate and larger-scale mitigation efforts become essential, it would seem irrational to refuse leadership in climate innovation plans to the very members of society who have long developed and guarded this indispensable knowledge. Thankfully, the international green building movement has not left these women behind. Women head six of the nine Green Building Councils in the MENA region.16 Still, integration of women in the leadership of local green initiatives is integral to delivering far-reaching and informed change in the face of increasingly dire climate conditions.

Policy Approaches & Recommendations

The UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW ) has made various policy-oriented recommendations towards the development of rural women’s empowerment in recognition of their growing stewardship of agricultural production and natural resource conservation. Notable inclusions in their call to action address challenges to 5DE criteria, especially in the domains of Resources, Income, and Leadership. Of particular interest, the CEDAW stresses the importance of the provision and extension of social safety networks to rural women, the reduction of labor time and work effort, the development of capital and land access, and the spread of awareness around labor rights and appeal processes. 17 Fortunately, the CEDAW has been ratified by most MENA countries. However, nearly all ratifying countries in the region have imposed reservations on principal articles of the document based on supposed conflicts with national legislation or interpretations of Shari'a law. In addition, recurrent failures to meet deadlines for annual reporting reveal a far from wholehearted commitment to the document in the region. 18 Iraq, for example, has imposed reservations on three entire articles of the document and 93 SPRING 2022

various other subsections. Its objections targeted numerous clauses integral to developing MENA women’s ability to engage in and receive due credit for participation in the workforce. In particular, items aiming to “modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women” and “eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations” were wholly discarded.19 Moving forward, regulatory recommendations in the implementation of CEDAW must address the ability of ratifying countries to impose undermining reservations and evade reporting deadlines.

At present, inadequate accountability measures, in addition to other factors determinative of institutional efficacy, like insufficient funding, political commitment, and established authority within ratifying countries, pose a hindrance to this institution’s capacity to make strides in promoting women’s empowerment within the rural agricultural workforce of the Middle East. 20 The inadequacy of CEDAW ratification to elicit substantive action towards women’s

empowerment in the MENA region is unsurprising when examining the state of the committee within the larger UN establishment. Compared with other treaty bodies, the CEDAW appears particularly constrained by time, budgetary, and geographical concerns even as its workload has surged in recent decades.21 Committee sessions are held over a two-week period– the shortest length of all treaty-monitoring bodies of the UN (three to nine weeks is more typical)– at the Division for the Advancement of Women in New York, rather than at the Geneva Center for Human Rights where all other UN human rights matters are conducted.

Consequently, the CEDAW is both stripped of essential committee time and physically separated from the resources and geographic convenience afforded by the UN to other human rights bodies.

At a bare minimum, affording the CEDAW the same time commitment and advantageous location of its counterparts is necessary to increasing its regional effectiveness. A larger budget could also help address the shortcomings of current regulatory procedures.

Additionally, institutional organization in implementing the CEDAW maY contribute to its efficacy. The universal adoption of single-ministry governmental administration over CEDAW-related efforts, as seen in the Palestinian Terrorities,

for example, may encourage more direct and sufficiently-resourced policy mandates than under the quasi-governmental institutions located outside of the executive seen in other MENA states.22

Conclusion

The 2017 WEF Global Gender Gap Report asserts that women of the Middle East and North Africa will not be on equal footing with men with respect to political representation for another 99 years.23 Notwithstanding, the rapid deterioration of Earth's climate urges that the empowerment of women is needed as soon as possible. While agricultural feminization has facilitated the expansion of some components of women’s agency in the MENA region, it certainly has not come close to fulfilling the standards which would classify agricultural work as unreservedly empowering. Improvements in empowerment within this field constitute not only a viable pathway toward the social and capital development of women in Middle Eastern society, but also serve as an important asset in confronting the impending climate crisis. Policy, at both regional and international levels, must punctually and rigorously respond to these circumstances if the MENA region hopes to successfully weather the challenges of the coming decades.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 94

References

1 Chloe Bernadeaux, “Agricultural Technology in the Middle East: Sowing the Seeds of the Future,” Middle East Institute, accessed January 26, 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/agricultural-technology-middle-eastsowing-seeds-future.

2 Malika Abdelali-Martini and Jennie Dey de Pryck, “Does the Feminisation of Agricultural Labour Empower Women? Insights from Female Labour Contractors and Workers in Northwest Syria,” Journal of International Development 27, no. 7 (2015): 898–916, https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3007.

3 Sanja Kelly, “Recent Gains and New Opportunities for Women’s Rights in the Gulf Arab States,” Freedom House, n.d., 8.

4 “Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index,” International Food Policy Research Institute, 2012, 12.

5 Abdelali-Martini and Dey de Pryck, “Does the Feminisation of Agricultural Labour Empower Women?”

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Naila Kabeer, Ashwini Deshpande, and Ragui Asaad, “Women’s Access to Market Opportunities in South Asia and the Middle East & North Africa,” LSE Department of International Development, n.d., https://doi. org/10.21953/lse.yc6ageewu5yi.

9 “IMF Research on Closing the Gender Gap – IMF Finance & Development Magazine | March 2019,” accessed February 3, 2022, https://www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/03/closing-the-gender-gap-dabla.htm.

10 Dina Najjar and Lone Badstue, “Four Ways of Strengthening Gender Equality in the Agricultural Sector in the MENA Region,” CIMMY T (blog), March 5, 2020, https://www.cimmyt.org/news/four-ways-of-strengtheninggender-equality-in-the-agricultural-sector-in-the-mena-region/.

11 “General Statement of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on Rural Women,” 2011, https://www.ohchr. org/documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/Statements/StatementRuralWomen.pdf.

12 Valentine M. Moghadam, “Women’s Economic Participation in the Middle East: What Difference Has the Neoliberal Policy Turn Made?,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 1, no. 1 (2005): 110–46.

13 Wael K. Al-Delaimy, “Vulnerable Populations and Regions: Middle East as a Case Study,” in Health of People, Health of Planet and Our Responsibility, ed. Wael K. Al-Delaimy, Veerabhadran Ramanathan, and Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 121–33, https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31125-4_10.

14 C Nellemann, R Verma, and L Hislop, Women at the Frontline of Climate Change: Gender Risks and Hopes (United Nations Environment Programme, 2011), https://wedocs.unep.org/xmlui/handle/20.500.11822/7985.

15 Mohammed Abdul Baten and Niaz Ahmed Khan, “Gender Issue in Climate Change Discourse: Theory versus Reality,” n.d., 11.

16 Mohammad Asfour, “Meet the Women Who Are Establishing Green Leadership in the Middle East & North Africa,” World Green Building Council, accessed January 26, 2022, https://www.worldgbc.org/news-media/ meet-women-who-are-establishing-green-leadership-middle-east-northafrica.

17 “General Statement of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on Rural Women.”

18 “Weakening Protection of Women from Violence in the Mideast and North Africa Region/Reservations to CEDAW - AI Report/Non-UN Document,” Question of Palestine (blog), accessed February 4, 2022, https:// www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-205832/.

19 Ibid.

20 “Women in Public Life: Gender, Law and Policy in the Middle East and North Africa” (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, n.d.), https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/women-inpublic-life-mena-brochure.pdf.

95 SPRING 2022

21 Suzanne Spears, “The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,” Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos: IIDH, accessed March 19, 2022, https://www.iidh.ed.cr/ BibliotecaWeb/ Varios/Documentos.Interno/BD_1978751583/Protocolo/PIIII_Committee.htm.

22 Ibid.

23 Asfour, “Meet the Women Who Are Establishing Green Leadership in the Middle East & North Africa.”

Editor's Note

T A F R I C A

his semester, the Africa section explored a wide range of themes to provide readers with a diverse and distinct view of the geopolitical climate in the region. From cultural factors to changing foreign policy initiatives, our writers chose topics that explored unique factions of African international relations and politics.

To begin, Bella Newell dove into the way music was used to support and diffuse political campaigns, analyzing Bobi Wine’s music among other crucial musical movements to examine how culture and politics intersect. Amy Graham investigated changing foreign policy patterns with respect to Morocco’s endeavors in the Western Sahara and a blooming relationship with Israel. Lastly, Diana Reno looked into the history of the Tunisian General Trade Union and its role in North Africa’s most vital civil society. Together, these articles bring forth new sides of African politics and reveal a political landscape influenced by a wide range of cultural, political, and historical elements.

From 3,000 miles away, it was a pleasure to lead a group of such dedicated writers and editors who did not mind sharing their ideas, research, and thoughts across continents. This team continues to reflect a sense of collaboration and has found a way to share their collective knowledge to improve each other's pieces as well as their own. It is through their passion for studying the continent and international relations, that their pieces have become true contributions to the academic landscape.

LEA NAMOUNI, CAS '23 Senior Editor, Africa

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 96

A FRICA

A Moroccan Reformation:

How Moroccan-Israeli Normalization Threatens the Western Sahara

by Amy Gr a ha m edited by Lenny Adonte ng

T

he end of a ceasefire, new arms deals, and remilitarization: a decades-old battle for sovereignty has heated up again. Israel has become a player in the territorial dispute between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Western Sahara, and the United States shifts further away from the conflict altogether. On December 10, 2020, Morocco signed a normalization agreement with Israel, one of several deals Israel has made with other countries under the umbrella of the Abraham Accords.1 Shortly after, the Trump Administration rewarded the effort by issuing a declaration affirming Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara.2 However, Trump’s proclamation did not lay the issue to rest, and Israel, as a newfound Moroccan ally, has the potential to ignite the conflict to the caliber it was fought at in the 1970s. Despite U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim, the Polisario Front, the liberation group representing the native Sahrawi people of the Western Sahara, is prepared to fight once again for what they claim is theirs. While their international support may be limited, recent actions from the U.S. and Israel are enough for them to renew the conflict.

97 SPRING 2022

The battle over sovereignty in the Western Sahara dates back to the 1970s.3 It was during this period that Spain, which had retained colonial control over the region, decided to relinquish its claim over the territory. The decision came with the stipulation that the Western Sahara would remain closely aligned with Spain; however, the subsequent territorial claims by Morocco and Mauritania proved to be a deterrent to Spanish interest in the region. In 1975, Spain handed over the territory to be jointly operated by the two nations, which would soon be followed by a long future of referendums, international appeals, and military conflicts.4 By 1975, Mauritania withdrew from the conflict, signing a peace treaty and abandoning its claims of ownership. Military conflict ensued until 1991 when a ceasefire was called and Morocco agreed to hold a referendum for Western Saharan sovereignty.5 The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established, but the referendum never took place after several extensions of its date.6 The two nations remained in stalemate through the years, but in 2020, a Western Sahara proclamation declared that peace was no

longer an option.

Morocco’s current foreign policy could be described as a subtle isolation, slowly leaving itself in a position where Israel could become its best ally. The United States, once Morocco’s most powerful and influential ally, took a step back from the conflict as President Biden moved into the Oval Office. Without the U.S. as a guiding hand in Moroccan policy, an Israeli partnership could be a crucial factor in directing Morocco’s next move, as they have the potential to slip into the U.S.’ deserted role. However, Israel has yet to reveal its hand on the most pressing issue that threatens North African stability. This is particularly dangerous to an already fragile conflict, where direct adversaries and proxies alike walk a fine line to preserve stability. Israel has the motivation to support a total annexation, as it could set an example for their own goals of encroachment in Palestine. But at what cost to its reputation?

Simultaneously, another important actor is retreating further away from the image of this conflict: the United States. With Israel as a medium between the U.S. and its African entanglements, it could continue to act as a proxy, but now one step removed, further from immediate implication.

Efforts like the Abraham Accords “offer an opportunity to the Biden administration to address deeper problems in the region, without investing as much time or resources.” writes the Wilson Institute.7 “Regional integration enables the United States to transfer some of the burden onto its allies.”

The fundamental question that arises with Israel’s entrance into the North African power struggle: what exactly will change? Furthermore, how do Israel’s interests, both in the Western Sahara and domestically, fit into the struggle at hand? While the conflict still entangles several actors outside of the two at the forefront, such as the United States and Algeria, Israel now has the opportunity to take over as the dominant hand in guiding Morocco's foreign policy. Whether or not it is in their strategic interest to seize the opportunity or not, will only be revealed as the conflict in the Western Sahara continues to develop. A deeper analysis of Israel’s ambiguous leverage in Morocco will become crucial, as both Morocco and the Western Sahara continue to escalate their military presence and veer towards

conflict.

The Polisario Front is the major political group in the Western Sahara, recognized by the UN as the only legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people and leading the fight for sovereignty.8 In 1976, they officially declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as an independent state. Years later, they declared the end of the ceasefire in November 2020 and fighting has since ensued on either side, as Moroccan encroachment has caused Western Sahara officials to announce that peace is no longer an option.9 Morocco’s military spending has remained on the rise, increasing over fifty percent in the last 10 years.10 As the fighting continues to escalate, Morocco’s piqued military desires and Israel’s willing defense cooperation will likely go hand-in-hand. This is especially important given recent developments in the conflict, as the Polisario Front has claimed over two dozen military and civilian casualties, and Morocco has reported over one thousand instances of being fired at to the UN.11 What puts the Western Sahara at a greater risk of isolation, though, is how Morocco has spent years building itself up to be a valuable asset to the rest of Africa through its economic investments, primarily focused on development efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Although Morocco departed the African Union in 1984, when it applied to rejoin in 2017 its bid was easily accepted, with a majority of these nations, namely Sub-Saharan countries, signaling support for Morocco’s sovereignty efforts.12 Morocco spent the majority of its foreign investment in SubSaharan Africa, steadily allying itself with many nations on the continent. This strategic move has served Morocco well in terms of favorability in its sovereignty battle. The Western Sahara, despite unwavering support from Algeria, has faced dwindling support from other African nations. More than half of the members of the African Union now support Morocco in their claims of sovereignty.13 Normalization of Moroccan-Israeli relations was seen as a landmark by some and a threat by others. The U.S. guided the relationship and quickly rewarded Morocco once the agreement was made, signing off on a $1 billion arms deal.14 Shortly following the agreement, President Biden stepped into office, and the U.S. has since turned INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 98

a blind eye to the conflict. For Morocco, however, the agreement comes with the caveat of having to balance providing Arab solidarity to Palestine despite normalization. Still, the agreement could bring overwhelming perks that justify this risk, indicated by the two nations agreeing to cooperate on trade, tourism, and most notably, defense.15 In November 2021, Morocco and Israel signed an agreement that allows for greater defense and security cooperation, including intelligence sharing and arms sales.16 Morocco has already come under scrutiny for what was reported to be illegal usage of the Israeli spyware Pegasus against individuals and states, including Emmanuel Macron and Algeria, an allegation which it quickly denied and promised to investigate. 17These developments in technology sharing between the two nations signal an Israeli willingness to cooperate on matters of defense with Morocco. More alarming for the Western Sahara is evolving arms agreements between Israel and Morocco.

U.S.-Moroccan relations have spanned centuries, and Morocco even boasts of being the first nation to formally recognize U.S. independence in 1777.18 Historically, Morocco has relied heavily on the United States as a defense partner. In 2004, the US declared Morocco as a “Major NonNATO ally,” catalyzing security cooperation that has lived on through joint military training and several defense deals.19 In October 2020, Trump’s Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, signed a 10year defense agreement with Morocco to “support shared goals.”20 Trump served as a major proponent of the Moroccan sovereignty claim, and the U.S. remained an invaluable ally to the Kingdom. Biden’s position, conversely, remains unclear, as both the President and his Secretary of Defense have yet to make a statement and appear to be disinterested in keeping the United States as a dominant voice in this discourse surrounding the conflict. The biggest revelation surrounding the U.S.’ future with Morocco this year has come from the Senate. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the fiscal year 2022 has included Western Sahara under its own header, where it has traditionally been included under Morocco’s.21 Additionally, it seeks to exclude them from bilateral military exercises, unless a peace agreement with the Western Sahara 99 SPRING 2022

is reached. This provision is especially notable, as Africa Lion, U.S. Africa Command’s largest military exercise, has typically been hosted in Morocco.22 This signaling comes at the hands of two specific senators, Republican Jim Inhofe and Democrat Patrick Leahy, who are urging Biden to take action towards a peace settlement in the Western Sahara and reverse Trump’s proclamation of sovereignty.23 Between Biden’s complete silence on the issue and a senatorial opposition, the United States’ historically friendly diplomacy with Morocco appears to be wavering.

Although few specific transactions have occurred between Israel and Morocco, the openended defense agreements lay the groundwork for future arms deals to be made. One notable deal has already been signed. In late 2021, Morocco purchased an Israeli Counter-drone system, titled the Skylock dome.24 A Moroccan military expert, addressing the deal, explained that the system could be useful for countering alleged Polisario drone reconnaissance missions, which seem to have been reported since the end of the ceasefire.25 This specific deal sets an example of the potential for increased military assistance and technology from Israel, which in the face of an ambiguous U.S. defense position, could be crucial for the Moroccans in countering the Polisario. This is especially so given the stature of Israel’s defense industry and its broad reach as a supplier. In addition to receiving incredibly large amounts of U.S. military aid, Israel’s domestic arms industry is on the rise as one of the globe’s main arms suppliers.26 With imports on the decline and exports on the rise, making a customer out of Morocco only advances its goals of expanding its influence via arms sales and further strengthening its domestic industry.

Israel’s connections seem standard enough on their own, but in the context of Morocco’s larger and latest foreign policy, appear nearer to repositioning. Had the resurgence of military conflict at the border not been enough for the Kingdom, they would have made moves to alienate themselves from a list of other nations. Morocco has found itself in a pattern of cutting ties with nations and entities who vocalize support for the Saharan autonomy plea. Morocco had continued diplomatic discourse with Germany in early 2021

after disagreements over the Western Sahara, albeit it then offered to reconcile several months later.27 Iran, another nation supportive of the Polisario Front, saw severed relations. The aforementioned allegations of spyware use prompted Algeria, a longtime foe of Morocco, to officially cut ties.28 Finally, Spain has come under fire from Morocco as well, after hosting a Polisario leader for medical treatment without first informing Rabat.29 The United Nations, unsurprisingly, has had little luck in compelling Morocco to comply with MINURSO and the proclaimed principles of self-determination as well. In cutting ties with nations and refusing compliance with international institutions, Morocco is isolating itself from any resistance to its actions, choosing only to cooperate with countries that are neutral or in support of their full control of the Western Sahara. Within this larger image of Moroccan foreign policy, the true weight behind Israeli normalization begins to emerge. With fewer allies, Israel’s leverage becomes greater. There has been near silence from Israel on the issue of Western Sahara, barring one key document. Following Trump’s proclamation of sovereignty, a joint declaration combining the U.S. recognition and the Israel-Morocco normalization agreement was issued and signed by the three actors.30 The document does not; however, include any Israeli recognition of Western Saharan sovereignty. Nevertheless, no statement of support for the Western Sahara has ever been made by Israel either.

With Israel now involved in the conflict,

it would be dismissive to overlook the parallels between the Western Sahara and Palestine. In addition to being the last major remaining colonial conflicts, the two legal battles for independence or autonomy deal with the same principle of self-determination.31 Whether Morocco should finally be forced into its prolonged ultimatum of cooperating with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and its proposed autonomy plans, or defeating the Polisario Front once and for all, a framework could be created for an Israeli path forward with Palestine. Herein lies an opportunity for Israel to craft a model off which to base its Palestinian claims. A victory for Morocco, where the United States dismisses claims of self-determination (as it already has in this specific conflict), could provide both precedent and justification for Israel’s battle, as both conflicts blur the lines of international laws.

Simply, if the U.S. backs a Moroccan annexation, they could allow an Israeli one as well.32 The relative brilliance of the new U.S. position in the conflict cannot be understated. By maneuvering Israel as Morocco’s bright new hegemonic ally, and Biden’s unwillingness to acknowledge the issue, the U.S. could absolve itself of some of the responsibility it previously held whilst so deeply entangled in the discourse. Researcher Michael Singh writes “there is a possibility for the U.S.’ partners to cooperate on security matters without the intervention of the U.S.”33 This is not to say that the U.S. would be far enough from the flame if or when the conflict INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 100

escalates to walk away unscathed, rather that the U.S. now has at its disposal a new channel through which it is able to execute policy objectives.

One final consideration that makes Israeli recognition of Moroccan sovereignty particularly strategic is preserving the prosperity of their economic agreements, a major incentive of the arrangement.34 Morocco profits off its controlled territories in the Western Sahara, primarily through general investments into its infrastructure, incentivizing Moroccan citizens to move into the area, as well as phosphate mining, and fishing. The Moroccan fishing industry is heavily dependent on the region of controlled Saharan territory, and escalated conflict could put this industry in jeopardy.35 Morocco’s phosphate mining venture, however, has the potential to become even more pivotal, as the world sees an increase in phosphate demands. While the undisputed boundaries of Morocco hold the world’s largest reserve of phosphates, the Western Sahara has the second largest reserve, and lack of access has the potential to severely impact global food production, in addition to being uniquely profitable.36 Ensuring Morocco doesn’t lose access to the reserves in Western Sahara ensures Morocco doesn’t lose out on massive profits from the industry, such as the $5.7 billion in revenue it received in 2020.37 The dynamics of the conflict in Western Sahara stand to change at any moment, and the balance is more fragile than ever. As both sides ready themselves for conflict, Israel is configured to maneuver however they choose with respect to Morocco. An escalating conflict and a rise in violence between the Polisario and Morocco army appears to be the trajectory. Should Israel choose to involve themselves deeply in the battle, they stand plenty to gain and much less to lose. However, choosing to join could be crucial in creating a new precedent as they continue to face a longstanding colonial battle of their own. From administration to administration, the United States remains aimless on the journey towards a resolution for Western Sahara, and the pressure to establish a clear stance on the issue will only build on President Biden. As the NDAA waits on senatorial approval, whether or not the rest of Congress will support the two senators in their fight for peace in the Western 101 SPRING 2022

Sahara remains to be seen. In a power struggle balancing countless factors and which is impossible to predict, only one clear answer truly emerges: the Moroccan position has certainly changed. What use their repositioning will be in their greater plight is, of course, unknown; however, Israel holds the power to change the story, and all bets are off.

References

1 “Morocco latest country to normalize ties with Israel in US-brokered deal,” BBC, BBC Global News Ltd., 10 December 2020, https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-55266089.

2 Trump, Donald, “Proclamation on Recognizing The Sovereignty Of The Kingdom Of Morocco Over The Western Sahara” (US Embassy Rabat, US Embassy and Consulates Morocco, 10 December 2020).

3 “Western Sahara: Background to Referendum” (Congressional Research Service, ProQuest Congressional, 27 July 1995).

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 “UN renews peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara, calls for talks,” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera Media Network, 29 October 2021. https://www.aljazeera. com/news/2021/10/29/un-renews-peacekeeping-mission-in-western-saharacalls-for-talks.

7 “The Middle East and North Africa in 2022: Regional Security and America’s Role,” The Wilson Institute, The Wilson Institute January 27, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/middle-east-and-north-africa-2022regional-security-and-americas-role.

8 Houda Chograni, “The Polisario Front, Morocco, and the Western Sahara Conflict,” Arab Center Washington DC, Arab Center Washington DC, 22 June 2021, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-polisario-front-morocco-andthe-western-sahara-conflict/.

9 “Polisario leader says Western Sahara ceasefire with Morocco is over,” Reuters, The Thomson Corporation, 14 November 2020, https://www.reuters. com/article/us-morocco-westernsahara/polisario-leader-says-western-saharaceasefire-with-morocco-is-over-idUSKBN27U0GE. 10 Safaa Kasraoui, “Morocco: 50% Increase in Military Expenditures in Last 10 Years,” Morocco World News, MWN, 28 April 2021, https://www. moroccoworldnews.com/2021/04/340907/morocco-50-increase-in-militaryexpenditures-in-last-10-years.

11 “Things are heating up again in Western Sahara,” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper Limited, 6 November 2021, https://www.economist. com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/11/06/things-are-heating-up-in-westernsahara.

12 Franck Kuwonu, “Morocco flexed economic muscles and returned to the AU,” Africa Renewal, United Nations Africa Renewal, March 2017, https:// www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2016-march-2017/moroccoflexed-economic-muscles-and-return.

13 Ibid.

14 Elaine Pasquini, "Morocco-Israel Normalization: Implications for Western Sahara and Palestine." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March-April 2021, 52+. Gale Academic OneFile (accessed February 3, 2022). https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A653725181/AONE?u=mlin_b_ bumml&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=c3489039.

15 Karim Mezran and Alissa Pavia, “Morocco and Israel are friendlier than ever thanks to the Abraham Accords. But what does that mean for the rest of North Africa?” Atlantic Council, Atlantic Council, 7 October 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/morocco-and-israel-arefriendlier-than-ever-thanks-to-the-abraham-accords-but-what-does-thismean-for-the-rest-of-north-africa/.

16 Judah Ari Gross, “In Morocco, Gantz signs Israel’s first-ever defense MOU with an Arab country,” The Times of Israel, The Times of Israel, 24 November 2021, https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-morocco-gantz-signs-israels-firstever-defense-mou-with-an-arab-country/.

17 Morocco says it will investigate ‘unfounded allegations’ on spyware,” Reuters, The Thomson Corporation, 21 July 2021, https://www.reuters. com/world/africa/morocco-says-it-will-investigate-unfounded-allegationsspyware-2021-07-21/.

18 Kerry A. Dolan, “Why Morocco Matters to the U.S.” Forbes, Integrated Whale Media Investments, 21 November 2013, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ kerryadolan/2013/11/21/why-morocco-matters-to-the-u-s/?sh=7f1e4d584f75.

19 U.S. Relations With Morocco, Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet” U.S. Department of State, U.S. State Department of Near Eastern Affairs, 5 November 2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-morocco/.

20 “US signs 10-year military cooperation deal with Morocco,” AP News, The Associated Press, 2 October 2020, https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreakafrica-algeria-army-mark-esper-505891ca12a7fd57ecb38248058a03d4.

21 “National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2022,” (Senate Report, US Government Publishing Office, 2021), pp. 247. https://www. congress.gov/117/plaws/publ81/PLAW-117publ81.pdf.

22 Africa Lion 21 concludes after honing multinational operations on land, in air, over sea,” Air Force, United States Air Force, 24 June 2021, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2670759/african-lion-21concludes-after-honing-multinational-operations-on-land-in-air/.

23 Samia Errazzouki, “Morocco’s Diplomatic Morass,” Foreign Policy, The FP Group, 4 January 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/04/moroccodiplomacy-bourita-united-states-western-sahara-2022-budget/.

24 Agnes Helou, “Morocco buys Israeli counter-drone system Skylock Dome,” DefenseNews, Slightline Media Group, 24 November 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2021/11/24/morocco-buys-israelicounter-drone-system-skylock-dome/.

25 Ibid.

26 Usaid Siddiqui, Mohammed Hussein, Owais Zaheer and Mohammed Haddad, “Infographic: What you need to know about Israel’s military,” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera Media Network, 4 June 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2021/6/4/infographic-what-you-need-to-know-about-israels-military.

27 “Update 1-Morocco sees return to normal diplomatic ties with Germany,” Reuters, The Thomson Corporation, 22 December 2021, https://www.reuters. com/article/morocco-germany-idAFL8N2T745B. 28 “Algeria cuts diplomatic relations with Morocco,” Reuters, The Thomson Corporation, 25 August 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/algeria-sayscutting-diplomatic-ties-with-morocco-2021-08-24/.

29 “Morocco escalates row with Spain over Western Sahara,” Reuters, The Thomson Corporation, 27 May 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/ morocco-escalates-row-with-spain-over-western-sahara-2021-05-27/.

30 “Multilateral (20-1222) - Joint Declaration Between the United States, Morocco and Israel,” (US Office of Treaty Affairs, US Department of State, 2020).

31 Ian Williams, "From Palestine to Western Sahara, double standards and hypocrisies." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January-February 2011, 27+. Gale Academic OneFile (accessed February 2, 2022). https://link. gale.com/apps/doc/A246256988/AONE?u=mlin_b_bumml&sid=bookmarkAONE&xid=afa8b06e.

32 Elaine Pasquini, "Morocco-Israel Normalization: Implications for

Western Sahara and Palestine." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March-April 2021, 52+. Gale Academic OneFile (accessed February 1, 2022). https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A653725181/AONE?u=mlin_b_ bumml&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=c3489039.

33 "The Middle East and North Africa in 2022: Regional Security and America’s Role,” The Wilson Institute, The Wilson Institute 27 January 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/middle-east-and-north-africa-2022regional-security-and-americas-role.

34 Sarah Feuer, “A Boost in Israeli-Moroccan Normalization?” Institute for National Security Studies, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33819.

35 Alex Kasprak, “The Desert Rock That Feeds the World,” The Atlantic, The Atlantic, 29 November 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/science/ archive/2016/11/the-desert-rock-that-feeds-the-world/508853/.

36 Ibid.

37 Shaquille Goff, “Morocco’s Phosphate Revenues Grow by $1.5 Billion in Past Ten Years,” Morocco World News, MWN, 26 August 2021, https://www. moroccoworldnews.com/2021/08/344095/moroccos-phosphate-revenuesgrow-by-1-5-billion-in-past-ten-years.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 102

A FRICA

Constrained Resistance

State Interference in the Tunisian General Trade Union

by Dia na Reno edited by Wish Pa ndey

reviewed by Dr. SARAH YERKES Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment Middle East Program Foreign Service Officer, State’s Department’s Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs Geopolitical Research Analyst, J5

# Spring 103 SPRING 20222022 STYLEBOOK

W

hat is the key to implementing democracy?

For decades, Western powers have waged wars and made political bargains with authoritarian states in the name of encouraging transitions to democracy. Recently, however, a new school of thought has permeated these interventionist organizations. Countries, namely the United States, have chosen to begin investing heavily in civil society organizations in targeted Middle Eastern states in order to encourage political mobilization from within.

Unfortunately, these efforts have encountered little success due to the oversimplified assumptions made about civil societies as a whole. Using the Tunisian General Trade Union (UGTT) as a case study, I explore how civil society actors are not simply monolithic advocates of political and social reform. They operate in conjunction with their regimes and are heavily influenced by a variety of social, political and economic factors.

Despite all this, civil society actors like the UGTT have the potential to grow their influence and enact major tangible changes within their country.

Civil Society and Democracy

The term “civil society” refers to all collectives outside the public, government-facilitated sphere of influence. According to Wicktorowicz’s

Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan, “Civil society is generally seen as the constellation of associational forms that occupy the terrain between individuals and the state.”1 Some examples include schools, interest groups, cultural institutions and labor unions. Civil society organizations are remarkably powerful in that they, by their nature, encourage congregation and discussion of common interests, which in time may solidify into unified mobilization in support of a shared cause.

Throughout the second half of the 20th century, states across Europe and Latin America began shaking off their post-colonial authoritarian leadership and establishing democratic elections. Popular organizations intent on bringing about economic, political, and social reform played a major role in finalizing this transition of power.2 As a result, many Western powers came to consider a robust civil society to be an inherently democratizing force in authoritarian settings.3 The United States in particular adopted this theory and began pouring aid and resources into local NGOs located in different Middle Eastern countries with very little success in moving towards democratization.4 These Western states saw much of their efforts go to waste because they failed to recognize the contingencies of democratic support

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within such authoritarian regimes.

In order to properly enact a democratic revolution, civil society actors must first have access to unsurveillable spaces. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Middle Eastern governments, such as Egypt, Morocco and Jordan, were facing crises of legitimacy due to ongoing economic struggles. To feign political liberalization, they became more openly tolerant of the existence of civil society organizations.5 As the quantity of organizations grew, so too did the bureaucratic restrictions they were saddled with. In Jordan, particularly, the regime decided to launch an initiative to politically liberalize their government in response to riots in 1989 over economic reforms. Besides establishing parliamentary elections and legalizing political parties, this shift also made room for a massive increase in civil society organizations.6 However, every collective gathering was required to register with a specific government ministry based on their activity.7 The Law of Public Meetings also required anyone planning to hold a public meeting where political affairs may be discussed to first obtain permission from the government. This law served to effectively eliminate the unsurveilled space where unorganized social mobilization could potentially grow.8 Civil society activism became so regulated and monitored that collective action against the government for any reason became nearly impossible.

In regards to labor movements specifically, support for democratic movements is also often contingent on how the movement will impact their 105 SPRING 2022

material interests.9 Bellin, author of Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in LateDeveloping Countries, establishes this argument, claiming that the degree to which labor movements will support democratization in their state is dependent on both their level of dependence on the state and whether they hold relative aristocratic privilege.10 In states where the government heavily interferes in civil society, labor movements especially need to cooperate to some extent with the ruling body. In some cases, unions receive direct support from their regime in exchange for restraining their political initiatives. Additionally, in those instances of union-state collaboration, unions occasionally gain privileges which disincentivize anti-authoritarian collective action.

Even if the majority of the union’s local branches are united in fighting for labor rights, the highest level of leadership makes the final decisions for the organization and are the most likely to have close relationships with the regime. Many factors can influence the outcomes of civil resistance, including internal resolve and external power to crush dissent. That being said, civil society and labor unions in particular have proven themselves to be powerful instigators of change, whether through defiance of regime control or political mobilization.

UGTT as a Democratic Civil Society Actor During the era of French colonization in Tunisia (1881-1956), the Tunisian General Labor Union

(UGTT) was founded in 1946 by Farhat Hached as the sole union dedicated to native Tunisian workers, as opposed to the more privileged French laborers.11 They fought against the exploitation of vulnerable laborers for French profit. By the time Tunisia gained independence from colonial rule, the UGTT had amassed a following that would rival the power of the ruling body’s for the next half century. Under Tunisia’s first postcolonial president, Bourguiba, political opposition was consistently, and oftentimes violently, suppressed. In response to ongoing clashes, the UGTT organized a general strike in 1978 that would come to be known as “Black Thursday.”12 The state responded by putting all major UGTT leaders on trial and replacing them with state-

sanctioned actors within the union.

Within the context of the riots that followed, government-organized forces released unrestrained violence on the masses, resulting in dozens of deaths.13 The heavy-handed suppression of this insurgency dealt a major blow to the state’s primary threat to power.

Prior to the start of the Ben Ali regime in 1987, the UGTT operated independently of the state. Though Tunisia technically functioned as an electoral democracy, actively participating in continuing democratization carried the stigma of rebellion against the state.14 The UGTT, as the major player in such democratic movements, took on the role of molding smaller social movements into structured, demanddriven demonstrations. A particularly INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 106

important example is the General Union of Tunisian Students, which had worked closely with the UGTT during the mid-to-late 20th century and shared some of its radical leftist influences.15 Over time, protest culture in Tunisia became inextricably linked with unionization, making antiregime movements more efficient and therefore more threatening to those with political power.

A distinct division existed between the oppressive authoritarian regime and the oppressed working class that blurred with President Ben Ali’s ascent to power in Tunisia. Ben Ali deposed President Bourguiba in 1987 in what scholars would later refer to as a “constitutional coup.”16 He cited Article 57 of the Tunisian constitution, giving himself as Prime Minister full presidential authority due to the mental and physical incapacitation of the acting president.17 Ali approached the threat of civil society opposition not through outright persecution but by attempting to integrate the labor union into the state apparatus.

As a result, Ali could not only manipulate oppositional movements from within their general apparatus, but also demonstrate legitimate “democratization” efforts.

President Ben Ali ruled Tunisia from 1987 until he was forced out of power during the Arab Spring in 2011.

In order to build national popular

107 SPRING 2022

support for his new, military-affiliated regime, Ali outwardly feigned support for national unions, while taking more covert measures to reign in their power. He incorporated the UGTT into economic and social councils and other governing bodies and helped instate Ismai’l Sahbani, a conservative, as the UGTT’s new Secretary General, leading to a complete overhaul of the prior leftist leadership.18 Through Sahbani’s direction, many regional branches of the UGTT were run by known members of the ruling party, and other branch leaders encountered bribes, blackmail, and coercion by state security enforcement in exchange for their support of government interests. Many UGTT leaders received benefits, such as tax exemptions and manipulated high school exams for their children.19 Providing these benefits to the union’s leadership gave the Ben Ali regime the power to manipulate the internal politics of the union. The pervasive infiltration of the state into union affairs was met with outspoken resistance from the remaining left-leaning members and local branches, but they could only do so much while faced with the unrestrained coercive apparatus of the Tunisian state. The next UGTT Secretary General Abdessalem Jerad further strove to bring the union to a more “central” political position. He consistently utilized contradictory

rhetoric with both the government and the union members throughout his time in the position, assuring both sides of his unwavering dedication to their interests.20 The Jerad period (20002011), similar to the Sahbani period, fundamentally altered the UGTT’s position in Tunisia’s political and social spheres. On the one hand, Secretary General Jerad was publicly tried for corruption and maintained a close relationship with Ben Ali until the former president fled the country in 2011, creating a public image of disingenuous support for the labor movement. On the other hand, the UGTT’s smaller branches were utilizing their relatively privileged position within the state to protect smaller political movements. These local branches of the union were capable of leveraging the state’s interference in their functions to deny regime requests and to continue providing a safe haven for organized labor movement protests.21 The interaction between the UGTT and the national government during the

Ben Ali period was characterized by mutual cooperation and simultaneous defiance of each other’s ultimatums.

Whereas higher levels of leadership held the majority of complex political relationships, individual regional branches more often cooperated with regime officials only to the extent necessary to secure advances in workers’ rights.

The Arab Spring

The Arab Spring brought the UGTT to a new level of political importance. On December 17, 2010, the collective frustration of the disenfranchised working class in Tunisia was unleashed with the highly public self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi.22 As tens of thousands of Tunisian protestors took to the streets in spontaneous protest, their energy spread to other countries in the Arab world. Working class people across the region were disillusioned with authoritarianism, with political corruption and economic stagnation.

Tunisians broke the dam, and five other countries were subsequently flooded with revolution.23 The UGTT filled their usual role by structuring the revolt into a directed political uprising with the explicit goal of removing Ben Ali from power to implement new democratic leadership. They played a critical role organizing demonstrations and disseminating information.24 Within the month-long Jasmine Revolution (Dec. 17, 2010 - January

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 108

14, 2011), it seemed as though the UGTT had finally committed to supporting the working class, independent of the interests of the government they were helping to overthrow. However, some scholars still speculate that the union restrained the national uprising before it could become a full-scale political revolution. Within the first few days of the revolution, Abdessalem Jerad was voted out of his position as Secretary General of the UGTT and replaced by Houcine Abassi, a more left-leaning, anti-regime leader. Even so, the UGTT actively avoided publicly sharing their support for the protestors and did not permit regional branches to organize strikes.25 It appeared that the UGTT was covering their bases, attempting to ensure that, regardless of how the revolution turned out, they would maintain their hard-earned legitimacy. If the revolution had progressed further, and all authority associated with the banished regime expelled, the UGTT likely would have been next on the list.26 In the wake of Ben Ali’s flight from Tunisia and the general resolution of the uprising, the UGTT took on an official new role: political institution. Though they were not fully integrated into the new government, the union was one of the few major authoritative structures left standing.

Whether they associated with the prior regime or not, they had been a pillar of social reform across the country for the better part of a century and were therefore expected to take the lead in structuring Tunisia’s new democracy.27 At the close of the Arab

109 SPRING 2022

Spring, Tunisia became the only country involved to successfully implement a constitutional democracy, meaning that the whole world was waiting to see it succeed or fail.

In 2013, the UGTT brought the Tunisian government back from near-collapse after the assassination of leftist party leader Mohamed Brahmi.28 As would become their primary responsibility in upcoming years, the UGTT organized a mediated discussion between the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, (comprised of the UGTT, the Tunisian Order of Lawyers, the Tunisian Confederation of Industry - Trade and Handicrafts, and the Tunisian Human Rights League), as well as the major political parties to design a roadmap out of the political deadlock and towards a more consensual system of governance.29 These dialogues went on to produce Tunisia’s official constitution, which led the quartet to earn the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015 and remained relatively unchallenged until late 2021.30 Despite the urging of many Tunisians, the UGTT rejected the concept of becoming a new major political party, claiming that their new role as mediators of political conflicts depended on non-partisanship.31 Regardless, the UGTT held significantly more power than they did before the Arab Spring. Their story of triumph over authoritarianism embodied all the hopes and aspirations of the West’s idealized image of a civil society actor. As the neutral intermediary in all major political disputes, the UGTT theoretically became the custodian of Tunisia’s young democracy.

Conclusion

Throughout its 76 years of existence, the UGTT has gone through a multitude of phases.

Depending on the interests of the regime, the UGTT has been violently suppressed, infiltrated, coopted and, more recently, nationally acclaimed. At times, the overarching leadership and the regional branches had completely different opinions on what the union should strive to achieve. Civil society is clearly not a monolith with the sole purpose of bringing about social reforms. In spite of some misconceptions, civil society under authoritarian

leadership is not always perfectly distinct, separate and oppositional to their governing regime.

Labor movements are obligated to defend their own interests, as well as those of the working class. The UGTT’s history of regime affiliation under Ben Ali specifically demonstrates how these distinctions can easily blur. Currently, the UGTT functions as a mediator for national dialogue, meaning that they function almost as an apparatus of the state. However, they have maintained relative autonomy and continue to question, and when necessary, criticize the governing bodies. Their position within the gray space between civilian-led social activism and national political regulation makes the UGTT the most influential civil society actor in Tunisia. Therefore, researchers must pay special attention to the UGTT and its associated civil society actors now, especially as Tunisia’s democracy hangs by a thread amidst President’s Kais Saied’s ongoing coup.32 Though the UGTT only tentatively condemned Saied’s consolidation of power and slow-moving return to democracy, Saeid still outlawed all foreign funding of civil society actors in order to root out external political influences.33 Future studies should analyze how the UGTT has interacted with President Saeid throughout his time in power and scrutinize their motivations through a historical lens. For better or worse, Tunisia’s civil society will play a major role in the outcome of their governmental restructuring.

However, only by analyzing the precedent set by the UGTT can we predict whether the civil society actors will fight to defend their hard-earned democracy or be complicit in its upheaval.

References

1 Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan.” Comparative Politics 33, no. 1 (2000): 43. https://doi. org/10.2307/422423. 43.

2 Feinberg, R., Waisman, C., and Zamosc, L.. 2006. Civil Society and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. Accessed February 25, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central. 2.

3 Wiktorowicz 43.

4 Hamid, Shadi. “Civil Society in the Arab World and the Dilemma of Funding.” Brookings, October 21, 2010. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ civil-society-in-the-arab-world-and-the-dilemma-of-funding/.

5 Wiktorowicz 43.

6 Ibid 47.

7 Ibid 49.

8 Wiktorowicz 50.

9 Bellin, Eva. “Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries.” World Politics 52, no. 2 (2000): 175–205. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100002598.179.

10 Ibid 183.

11 Omri, Mohamed-Salah. “No Ordinary Union: UGTT and the Tunisian Path to Revolution and Transition .” International Journal on Strikes and Social Conflicts 1, no. 7 (2015): 14–30. 19.

12 Netterstrøm, Kasper Ly. “The Tunisian General Labor Union and the Advent of Democracy.” Middle East Journal 70, no. 3 (2016): 383–98. http:// www.jstor.org/stable/26426626. 387.

13 Ibid.

14 Omri 26.

15 Omri 25.

16 L. B. Ware. “Ben Ali’s Constitutional Coup in Tunisia.” Middle East Journal 42, no. 4 (1988): 587–601. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4327834.587.

17 Ibid 592.

18 Netterstrøm 387-8.

19 Ibid.

20 Netterstrøm 393.

21 Ibid 396.

22 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Arab Spring." Encyclopedia Britannica, January 27, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/event/Arab-Spring.

23 Britannica.

24 Omri 17.

25 Netterstrøm 394 26 Omri 18-9.

27 Van Noort, Sam. “The Organized Struggle over Institutions in Tunisia.”

Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science 26 (2015): 146–63. https:// doi.org/10.22151/politikon.26.10. 154.

28 Bishara, Dina. “Labor Movements in Tunisia and Egypt: Drivers vs.

Objects of Change in Transition from Authoritarian Rule.” German Institute for International and Security Affairs 1 (2014). 6-7.

29 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "National Dialogue Quartet."

Encyclopedia Britannica, September 28, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/ topic/Tunisian-National-Dialogue-Quartet. ; Bishara 7.

30 “Tunisia President Indicates Plans to Amend Constitution.” Politics News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, September 12, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2021/9/12/tunisia-president-indicates-plans-to-amend-constitution.

31 Omri 28.

32 “Tunisian politician accuses President’s monopoly of power and opposition’s inability to develop.” Middle East Monitor, March 15, 2022. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220315-tunisian-politician-accusespresidents-monopoly-of-power-and-oppositions-inability-to-develop/ 33 “Tunisia’s Saied will bar foreign funding for civil society.” Reuters, February 25, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tunisias-saiedwill-bar-foreign-funding-civil-society-2022-02-24/; Amara, Tarek. “Tunisia’s powerful union criticizes president’s roadmap out of political crisis.” Reuters, January 4, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tunisias-powerfulunion-criticizes-presidents-roadmap-out-political-crisis-2022-01-04/.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 110

A FRICA

The Sound of Democracy

The Role of Music in Elections Across Africa

by Bella New ell edited by Libby Ega n

W

hen Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, known professionally as Bobi Wine, announced his candidacy for the Ugandan Presidency in July of 2019, many did not know what to make of him. Wine was already well known to the Ugandan populus as an incredibly prolific singersongwriter whose music had long contained antiregime themes. During his Presidential campaign, music became an integral part of his electoral strategy. But while using music as a tool of political mobilization became a defining feature of the Wine campaign, it did not originate there. In fact, music has been consistently used as a successful organization apparatus across Africa, with groups like Y ’en a Marre in Senegal and Le Balai Citoyen in Burkina Faso being credited with helping bring about regime change to their respective governments. However, while these movements and the role of music in politics has been explored on a national basis, there is less existing research on the degree to which these methods are transferable in different contexts and countries in the same region.

This article seeks to unravel that premise, and answer the question: how can musical movements be effectively mobilized to bring about regime change in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Before discussing how music can play a 111 SPRING 2022

role in creating regime change, it is important to clarify what regime change looks like in the African context. While it’s not unilateral, there are a number of trends within African regime change that set it apart from other regions of the world. For one, there is generally a less strict rule of law, which makes illegal election practices (such as ballot stuffing, election violence, and vote buying) commonplace.1 These deceptive practices have a number of effects, most obviously the rigging of a vote in favor of the candidate with access to said practices. In most cases, the majority of election fraud is carried out by one party which overwhelmingly dominates state politics. Although the party remains somewhat popular, the majority of this success is facilitated through fraud. Even when the country has technically constitutionalized multi-party politics, a singular faction (typically that which comes to power in the original founding of the state) usually controls an unmatched amount of political power.

One leader usually takes power, whether through military or “democratic” means, and attempts to hold it for as long as possible, which has led to the African reputation of “presidents for life.”2 After taking power, presidents for life use their outsized access to state resources, control over constitutional processes, and political will

to make opposition efforts extremely difficult.3 Because of the strength of the incumbent party and ruler, there is often intense opposition to any sort of mobilization by political opponents, which has led to state-sponsored violence against rival parties.4 Leaders, and the senior elites whose support sustains them, also maintain a monopoly over all collective action and efforts to civil society organizations and co-opt local governments are also common.5 Consequently, the state creates a culture of fear around speaking out against any grievances with the regime, which makes mobilization almost impossible. In short, there are a wide variety of unique factors which prevent typical regime change from occurring. Unlike in democratic systems where election cycles are highly standardized and transition of power is expected, many African countries go years, or even decades without a change in regime. As such, any factors that can help overcome the barriers to regime change are heavily scrutinized. Although it is impossible to lay out a standardized formula for how to make change on the continent, it is still helpful to study specific factors which may or may not have led to domestic transitions of power.

Within African studies, many have suggested

that music may be able to play a role in facilitating regime change; however, less concrete study has been done on how that can reasonably happen. In order to analyze the use of music in regime change, one must first assess how music is used in the African political context. When examining preexisting literature on music in Africa, three main political uses of music emerge. The first, supported by authors like Lara Allen and William Rhodes, is the use of music as a means of sending political messages. Although their pieces were written at vastly different times (Rhodes in 1962 and Allen in 2008) both of them highlight the importance of oral tradition to the African political landscape, as well as the ways in which such tradition has translated to modern musical lyricism and broadcasting.6 Rhodes’ article tracks specific examples of this trend back to the 1800’s, but implies that this phenomenon has a much broader history, potentially spanning back hundreds, if not thousands, of years.7 The second use, mobilization, is much more broad but exceptionally difficult to study quantifiably.

Specific countries studies, such as Okeke’s analysis of Nigeria8 and Jolaosho’s writings on South Africa, discuss the impact of music in mobilizing specific contexts; a general overview is largely lacking.9 The third, creating action, is simultaneously an extension and consequence of the previous two.

Each of these methods serves an individual purpose, but when combined, they have proven a strong force against authoritarian and autocratic incumbents.

Sending messages is the most common use of political music and has been used in resistance movements throughout African history. Almost every country in the continent has some form of resistance song, with many of them having originated in decolonization efforts. South Africa’s use of music in resistance to apartheid is particularly well known, and the “liberation music” became a defining feature of the marginalized population’s struggle against an oppressive government.10 Musicians like Miriam Makeba (also known as Mama Africa) used their music to propel African issues to the tops of the charts and the front of people’s minds.11 This concept remains culturally relevant in today's political and social climate, and the expansion of accessibility to music that has come with the growth of the internet has only made music INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 112

a more popular rallying tool. Music also serves as an important tool for overcoming government restrictions on freedom of speech. Although this has changed in recent years as hostile state governments become increasingly attuned to the modernization of resistance efforts, many governments were long unable to recognize the ways in which music with political messages affected and mobilized a people.12 Even now, regimes can arrest musicians and ban airplay of their songs, but they cannot entirely scrub them from the internet. Nor can they prevent use of local radios, which are increasingly popular in rural areas.13 This leaves music one of the most impactful forms of media that is able to exist outside of the realm of government suppression.

Music has also been used as a major tool to increase political mobilization. Two groups have been cited as major examples of this: Le Balai Citoyen in Burkina Faso and Y ’en a Marre in Senegal. Both groups, which were founded by musicians (as opposed to political leaders), used their musical background as a starting point in creating their respective resistance movements.

Leaders from Le Balai Citoyen used radio access and concerts as a tool to spread their political messages amongst their existing fan bases.14 Once they had established a base of support, they worked to expand and build upon their initial efforts and organized a strong administrative structure based around Thomas Sankara-esque reforms and peaceful resistance. Y ’en a Marre functioned similarly and also made use of regional affiliate groups called “L’esprit de Y ’en a Marre”.15 In doing this, these groups expanded past being just groups of musicians or activists, developing into civil society groups in their own right. Often defined as the space between private and public life, involvement in civil society organizations helps bridge the gap of personal and political participation, encouraging turnout and increasing opposition efforts. Because of this, many authoritarian governments, including the Museveni regime, have cracked down on civil society groups, leaving many without space to mobilize.

Mobilization is the key to the last use of political music: action creation. Action creation is difficult to force and relies heavily on the success of the previous two uses in order to function 113 SPRING 2022

appropriately. In these cases, the use of music as a rallying tool moves past consciousness raising and takes the form of actual action against an incumbent regime. Both Y ’en a Marre and Le Balai Citoyen evolved to this level and used their forces to plan sit-ins, protests, and advocacy on the governmental level. This helped them hollow out a space within civil society and garnered them legitimacy against the incumbent governments. Within several years of forming, both groups successfully pushed for democratic regime change. While achievements like that of Y ’en a Marre and Le Balai Citoyen are less common, groups like these serve as major examples of what can be the absolute best case scenario of the escalation of political music.

Wine’s example shows the use of music in a variety of ways. For one, his lyrics have long embodied the fusion of lyricism and political messaging that highlights the struggles of the common people in Uganda. Even before his foray into politics, his songs spoke openly about the struggle Ugandans face against the government and functioned as a call to arms. Often singing in multiple languages, these messages promoted universal appeal, uniting the people against

one common enemy: the state. One particular song, titled “Freedom” speaks to that messaging particularly well, with lyrics such as “This is a message for the government!” and “What is the purpose of the constitution? When the government disrespects the constitution?”16 Within “Freedom” and other songs, he frequently drags Museveni and his allies, calling them “misleaders” and “tormentors.”17 Another song, “Time Bomb”, expresses similar messages, not only by calling out the failures of the government, but also by expressing the need for the people to work against them. He says “Big up to the leaders dem, Bad news is that everything is wrong, But the good news is, You still can fix it.” Through these lyrics, Wine crafts a feeling of unity against a common enemy. In doing so he’s able to publicize the struggles of the people and allow marginalized voices to be heard without directly mobilizing a group. Wine himself believes that his use of music as a medium for political messaging allowed him to evade the attention of the Museveni regime for some time, saying “I never really got into trouble with Museveni, because for a long time there was a disconnect between the

common people and the elite… I was not important to them, and that was advantageous for me.”18 The regime’s inability to visualize the threat of political music until Wine was already far along in his political career highlights a major benefit of using music to spread a message: its covert tendencies.

Once his agenda was established through musical rhetoric, Wine also used his music to mobilize opposition supporters, thus transitioning his role from merely rhetorical to truly actionable.

Prior to joining an official political party, he created a resistance group called the People’s Power, which attempted to rally the youth vote, support opposition candidates, and raise awareness on major issues coming out of the Museveni camp.

He attempted to use support of his music as a lever for support of his group, much like Y ’en a Marre and Le Balai Citoyen. However, the People’s Power failed to capture the same essence that these groups did. Instead of mobilizing around a coalition of ideas, the People’s Power mobilized around one person: Wine himself. As stated by Vassar College Africana Studies Director Zachariah Mampilly, “The movement has to be able to survive beyond any single individual.”19 The Wine story is not a perfect example to follow. His campaign made mistakes: the propensity to build a cult of personality sparked too many similarities to Museveni. He didn’t focus enough on crafting actual policy and thus, was unable to overcome many of the institutional barriers to challenging an authoritarian incumbent. He ultimately lost the election, and following his campaign, Museveni cracked down even further on opposition dissent. Despite this, he came closer to unseating the longtime incumbent than any other candidate in the history of Ugandan politics, and it is the hope of many that in coming elections, Wine may be the one to finally unseat Museveni.

Still, his campaign cannot be observed in a vacuum. Music can be used as a tool to build civil society, and passive resistance can help overcome some of the issues of collective action and mobilization. However, it must be also used alongside a successful strategy.

There have been many pieces written about the ability of music to convey political messaging, and this assertion must run underneath any other INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 114

discussions that are had. Without a strong and consolidated political movement, music can never be used as a tool past just spreading a message.

While spreading messages is an important part of encouraging political participation, it is not enough to effectively mobilize groups to bring about regime change. Rhetoric is important, but what is more important in these contexts is the ability of a group to convalesce around a main problem that can be fixed with actual action. Parallel to this is the necessity of a musically oriented group to remain as a civil society actor, focusing their efforts not on gaining power, but on holding governments accountable and enforcing their political will through democratic practices. Music can, and has, helped bring about democratic regime change on the African continent. But most importantly, it has not done so alone.

Research on how to facilitate regime change in authoritarian contexts will always be vital, but if anything, this study lends hope to the idea that new avenues for political mobilization are spreading in reaction to extensive state control. While Wine was unable to win at the ballot box, his music, and more importantly, the ideas imbued within it, lent him and the Ugandan people international headlines.

While his voice wasn’t enough to break through Museveni’s stronghold, it was powerful enough to force people to listen. In the future, he just may be singing songs of victory.

115 SPRING 2022

References

1 Michael Amoah, “How African Presidents Rig Elections to Stay in Office,” OUPblog (Oxford University Press, March 23, 2020), https://blog.oup. com/2020/03/how-african-presidents-rig-elections-to-stay-in-office/.

2 Claire Felter, “Africa's 'Leaders for Life',” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, June 30, 2021), https://www.cfr.org/ backgrounder/africas-leaders-life.

3 Michael Amoah, “How African Presidents Rig Elections to Stay in Office,” OUPblog (Oxford University Press, March 23, 2020), https://blog.oup. com/2020/03/how-african-presidents-rig-elections-to-stay-in-office/.

4 Inken von Borzyskowski and Patrick M Kuhn, “Dangerously Informed: Voter Information and Pre-Electoral Violence in Africa,” Journal of Peace Research 57, no. 1 (2020): pp. 15-29, https://doi. org/10.1177/0022343319885166.

5 Andrea Carboni and Clionadh Raleigh, “What Causes Regime Change in African Autocracies?” Africa at LSE (The London School of Economics and Political Science, January 21, 2022), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ africaatlse/2022/01/13/what-causes-regime-change-in-african-autocraciesdictatorships-political-cycle/.

6 Lara Allen, “Music and Politics in Africa,” Social Dynamics 30, no. 2 (2004): pp. 1-19, https://doi.org/10.1080/02533950408628682.

7 Rhodes, Willard. “Music as an Agent of Political Expression.” African Studies Bulletin 5, no. 2 (1962): 14–22. https://doi.org/10.2307/523144.\ 8 Remi Chukwudi Okeke, “Politics, Music and Social Mobilization in Africa: The Nigeria Narrative and Extant Tendencies,” International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences 86 (2019): pp. 28-41, https://doi.org/10.18052/ www.scipress.com/ilshs.86.28.

9 Omotayo Jolaosho, “Singing Politics: Freedom Songs and Collective Protest in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” African Studies Review 62, no. 2 (2019): pp.

6-29, https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2018.16.

10 Vershbow, Michela E. “The Sounds of Resistance: The Role of Music in South Africa's Anti-Apartheid Movement,” Inquiries Journal/Student Pulse 2, no. 06 (2010), http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=265.

11 Ibid.

12 Ian Birrell, “Music Is Vital to Political Struggle across Africa – Not Just in Mali,” The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, January 27, 2013), https:// www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/27/music-banned-mali.

13 Mary Myers and Nicola Hartford, “Local Radio Stations in Africa: Sustainability or Pragmatic Viability?” Center for International Media Assistance, June 18, 2020, https://www.cima.ned.org/publication/local-radiostations-in-africa-sustainability-or-pragmatic-viability/.

14 ​​Marianne Saddier, “The Upright Citizens of Burkina Faso,” Africa Is a Country (Africa Is a Country, January 10, 2014), https://africasacountry. com/2014/10/the-citizens-of-burkina-faso/ 15 Stéphanie Binet, “Au Sénégal, Les Rappeurs Contre Abdoulaye Wade,” Le Monde.fr (Le Monde, December 12, 2011), https://www.lemonde.fr/ culture/article/2011/12/12/au-senegal-les-rappeurs-contre-abdoulayewade_1617481_3246.html.

16 “Bobi Wine-Freedom Lyrics,” musixmatch, accessed February 25, 2022, https://www.musixmatch.com/lyrics/Bobi-Wine/Freedom.

17 Ibid.

18 Kimiko De Freytas-tamura.“ 'They're Going to Imprison Some of Us. and, Yes, They Will Kill Some of Us.',” The New York Times, (The New York Times, October 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/world/africa/bobiwine-uganda.html.

19 Allen, Molly et al., “Power of Personality Politics: Can Uganda's Bobi Wine Sustain a Social Movement?,” CSIS Journalism Bootcamp (Center for Strategic Studies, December 5, 2019), https://journalism.csis.org/power-ofpersonality-politics-can-ugandas-bobi-wine-sustain-a-social-movement/.

Editor's Note

A S I A

W

ith political tensions arising world-wide in light of the crisis in Ukraine, it is vital to probe at historical context to comprehend the roots of strained international relations today. As such, the talented writers of the Asia section have thoroughly analyzed the standing of the current South-KoreanJapanese relationship, the Chinese influence on the Northern South-Asian region, as well as the historical role of politics in the Olympic Games and its subsequent effect on the 2022 Beijing Games.

I am grateful to have had the privilege to work with this hardworking team of writers and editors, and thank them for their tireless hours of dedication to this journal. I hope you enjoy their pieces.

SALLONI SUNDE RA J, CAS ' 2 4 Senior Editor, A sia

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 116

ASIA

Tibet’s Most Valuable Weapon, Water

How it is shaping the future of Asian Relations

b y Ash a r i Bi l a n -Cooper e d it e d by Ja m e s Rhee, Julie Lee

reviewed by Dr. CECILIA HAN SPRINGER Assistant Director, Global China Initiative at the Boston University Global Development Policy Center Former Research Fellow, Environment and Natural Resources Program and the Science & Technology and Public Policy Program at the Belfer Center 117 SPRING 2022

I

t is no surprise that over the past few decades, China has emerged as a quickly expanding and developing nation-state, claiming its role on the global stage politically and economically. Through programs like the Belt Road Initiative, the country has obtained regional hegemony status and shifted the pre-existing balance of power in international relations.1 The World Bank states that China had “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history,” which explicitly reveals the unmatched level of growth the nation experienced.2 Having succeeded in penetrating the global stage in terms of trade and diplomacy, China is ambitious to remain in this position of power.

One aspect where China lacks strength stems from their own domestic politics: a geopolitical dilemma regarding access to fresh water. Driven to find alternative solutions to fill this void, China has initiated a series of diplomatic and economic intrusions in Asia that has the potential to stir up the future of the continent’s dynamic.

This key source of regional power that China appears to have its eye on is

its water supply, most notably acquired from the Tibetan Plateau. Not only would this supply China with actual power to fuel their nation, but it also grants them political and economic power in terms of controlling the natural resources of this key Asian territory. Tibet has some of the largest freshwater resources in the world and is therefore extremely valuable to any nation that obtains control over it.3 China has predictably filled this position. Water and, more specifically, water access has existed as an initiator for major points of contention in Asia for decades. China has slowly but surely asserted authority over crucial rivers in Tibet that run through other neighboring Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Recently, with the growing threat of climate change, control over water is more pivotal than ever in establishing stability for future generations. It is becoming increasingly clear that China holds power to determine the future of Asia in the conflict over a resource that many take for granted. Water is a key resource that has the potential to become the new weapon dictating Asian

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 118

diplomacy, especially if China continues its deceptive pursuits in Tibet. How China intends to progress in the next few years, whether that be remaining focused on obtaining their power-hungry agenda, in turn disrupting the environment and livelihoods of millions, or contrastingly reassessing their domestically advantageous plan, has the potential to re-program diplomacy in Asia.

China and Tibet have had a longstanding history governed by border and sovereignty disputes, which impacts the legitimacy of China’s authority over Tibetan rivers. The nature of Tibet’s sovereignty is contested on both sides: the West’s perception and China’s perception.

According to Chinese government officials, Tibet was largely part of their nation from the Yuan dynasty in 1271 and has not been an independent state since.4 However, the other side of the argument claims that Tibet was independent until China formally annexed it in 1950, when they invaded the country. International recognition of Tibet’s sovereignty is still yet to become a part of international dialogue.5 Even so, the Dalai Lama affirmed Tibet’s independence in 1912 and created Tibet’s unique cultural identity, issuing a national flag, currency, stamps, passports, and military, that was distinct and separate from China.6 The invasion in 1950 by the communist Chinese regime was a turning point in the two countries’ diplomatic relations, as the Tibetan government was coerced to agree to 17 points that lay the groundwork for the future authority of the state.7 These 17 points recognized China’s rule, and in turn, China promised to protect Tibetan Buddhism and the present political system.8 The response from Tibetans was one of

119 SPRING 2022

resistance, and most notably, on March 10, 1959, 300,000 Tibetans gathered at the Potala Palace in an act to protect their leader, the Dalai Lama.9 He soon fled to Dharamsala in India due to the failure of the uprising, and an era of repression and brutality followed. Today, there is a lack of acknowledgement from the People's Republic of China; instead, the country’s United Nations Security Council (UNSC) representative has blocked all resolutions regarding Tibet, hoping to deter the international community from bringing the issue of Tibetan sovereignty back into the light.10 Evidently, the PRC is adamant about extending its control past China’s historic borders, only emphasizing Tibet’s inherent geopolitical value.

Increasing influence in Tibet serves as a vantage point to China in many ways; however, one of its biggest strengths is the abundance of fresh water reserves available in the face of China’s growing trouble with securing natural resources within its own borders. The Tibetan Plateau is the largest plateau on the planet and is the root source of several major rivers in Asia, such as the Yellow, Yangtze, Mekong, and the Brahmaputra. China’s other provinces, on the other hand, are at a disadvantage in terms of freshwater, bearing access to only 6 percent of the world's supply.11 Given the size of China’s population, 1.4 billion people, the limited water supply has led to many complications and domestic struggles.12 According to the United Nations (UN), water scarcity affected 40 percent of China’s population in 2020.13 With almost half of the population struggling with access to clean water, it is undoubtedly a priority of China’s

policymakers. The reason for this scarcity is partially due to the fact that 50 percent of China’s population is situated in the northern provinces, yet these areas only contain 20 percent of China’s freshwater sources.14 Though China does occupy major rivers, 70 percent of these rivers and lakes are polluted, due to the state's rapid growth and development; this further hinders access to freshwater for drinking and farming.15 Additionally, 25 percent of China’s land is classified as desert due to its low rainfall. These factors combined reveal the disturbing reality that China faces: limited access to a fundamental source of life.

Domestically, the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) in China has attempted to advocate for water-saving irrigation technologies, yet these have often proved to be ineffective given the lack of aid provided by the national government and limited farmer participation.

Although China has proposed numerous innovative solutions, the incentive from the national government is not enough to drive local governments and citizens to contribute to these programs.16 The only effective solution so far that has been pursued with governmental support and action is harnessing Tibet’s abundant resources.

Fortunately for China, the resolution to its water scarcity issue is not far from home.

With glaciers, lakes, and waterfalls, Tibet is a utopia of sorts for freshwater sources and, therefore, of immense value to China given their detrimental circumstances. According to a UN study, approximately 50 percent of the global population depends on water that comes from the Tibetan Plateau, which clearly demonstrates how essential the resource is to many beyond China’s borders.17 These rivers supply water to China, India, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Pakistan.18 The damming of the Tibetan Plateau has repercussions that extend to individuals all over Asia. It is no

surprise that China is persistent in demanding authority over this region, as it relies so heavily on access to freshwater. Through constructing over 20,000 dams since the 1950s, China has managed to dictate the water flow coming from the Tibetan Plateau.19 This immense power can have the potential to cause serious tension between not only Tibet and China, but also with the neighboring states who also, like China, depend on rivers stemming from Tibet to power their states.

China’s main agenda in Tibet is to generate hydropower through the construction of river dams.

Not only is access to water favorable to the Chinese population's livelihoods, but it also benefits China’s political agenda. In September of 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the nation's goal to be carbon neutral by 2060, using this as a reason for damming efforts on the Tibet rivers as hydropower is more environmentally conscious.20 By generating power, they can simultaneously fuel their economy and boost their status on the international stage as a more profitable trading partner and more environmentally friendly state. China has already built 11 hydro dams on the Mekong River, which supplies water to 66 million people, 10 percent of

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 120

ASEAN’s population.21 China’s infiltration of the Mekong River is alarming as it acts as a lifeline for so many individuals, not just those in China or Tibet but also those residing in neighboring states, such as Vietnam and Cambodia where the river flows through. Similarly, the Brahmaputra river, which runs through India and Bangladesh, has been targeted by China with the construction of 11 hydro dams.22 With these advances, China has harnessed hydroelectricity as their second-biggest source of electricity. Understandably, the most populated country in the world needs a lot of electricity to function, therefore it is abundantly evident that the Tibetan Plateau is China’s underrated lifeline. Yet, the rivers also possess similar importance to other states too, from providing food and water to citizens to fuelling the economy, making China’s plans problematic.

The implications of climate change cannot be overlooked in this context as the new challenges add greater pressure to the central issue regarding water supply, as many states are, now more than ever, prioritizing water security given the rising temperatures. The Tibetan Plateau’s water sources are a limited resource that is disappearing at a faster rate due to the effects of global warming.

The rapid melting of the glaciers reveals that Tibet will no longer store as much freshwater as it once did. According to the previous Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Rejendra K. Pachauri, “At least 500 million people in Asia and 250 million people in China are at risk from declining glacial flows on the Tibetan Plateau”.23 These are not insignificant numbers and demonstrate how many people depend on this region as a source of water and survival. The IPCC predicts that the Himalayan glaciers will cease to exist by 2035 or sooner.24 Furthermore, droughts in 2019 caused the Mekong river water levels to drop to the lowest recorded value in the past century. Other Asian countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam also suffer from this phenomenon.25 The Tonle Sap Lake is Cambodia’s connection to the Tibetan Plateau, and it typically is filled with monsoon water during the autumn months, which lasts approximately five months.26 However, in 2019 the water only lasted five weeks.27 This directly impacted the food production in Cambodia, as the 121 SPRING 2022

lake normally provides them with 70 percent of their protein.28 The MRC had also classified this reduced water flow as a “very critical situation”.29 Similarly, in Vietnam, the river sediment in the Mekong Delta river was one-third of what it was in 2007, impacting the agricultural production in Vietnam because the river normally produces over half of their rice output and 60 percent of their fisheries.30 Evidently, climate change directly affects the rivers that stem from the Tibetan Plateau, making an already tense situation even more unpredictable. The stress that will emerge from these changes is likely to exasperate the involved governments, a phenomenon that has already begun to occur.

China’s domination over these rivers has not come without some response from neighboring countries that are wary of their role in this water supply saga. India and Bangladesh are connected closely to the Brahmaputra river, with it being Bangladesh’s biggest source of water.31 In 2016, it was calculated that Bangladesh has a 91 percent freshwater dependency on China,32 illustrating how the river binds the two states, with Bangladesh largely reliant on China both economically and militarily. China’s policy banks stand as Dhaka’s largest investors, and China is the only country that has signed a broad defense cooperation agreement with Bangladesh.33 Unfortunately, no formal agreement has been made between the two countries on the specificities of managing water resources.34 Neither India nor Bangladesh has engaged in meaningful dialogue on the importance of the rivers in providing energy and economic security to the states. One can infer that this lack of communication has given China the green light to continue its endeavors along the Brahmaputra river, disregarding the impact it may have further downstream in regions such as India and Bangladesh. However, China hasn’t been entirely silent, assuring India in 2013 that the damming would not impact their access to the Brahmaputra.35 China claimed that run-of River projects would only occur downstream in India’s and Bangladesh’s borders, which are essentially stream diversions that also help generate hydroelectricity.36 However, it was soon apparent that this claim hid some truth as these projects require the storage of large amounts

of water, which are later released when electricity is needed.37 This action is not simply a diversion of a stream of water but rather the control of the flow entirely, and thus, the supply of water to the states who depend on the river.38 Yet, the Indian government has predominantly remained passive, only claiming to carefully monitor developments and supposedly conveying their concerns to the Chinese authorities.39 In order to understand the effectiveness of said communications, one only has to look at China’s recent decisions in Tibet, especially the plan to build one of the most ambitious dam projects to date.40 The lack of formal diplomatic discussion between China and neighboring Asian states who are impacted by their advances is evident in their latest proposal for the largest hydropower dam to be built.41 In 2021, China announced its plans for a dam to be constructed at the Medong point of the Brahmaputra river, also known as the Yarlung Tsangpo river in Tibetan territory.42 This project has the potential to change the entire dynamic of the Tibetan Plateau conflict with the opportunity for new tensions to arise granted the sheer size and implications of this development. It has been viewed as one of the riskiest plans for a dam yet and will require a magnitude of effort in order for it to succeed.43 It is not new information that China is capable of blocking water flow by the use of its dams as seen in the blocking of the Xiabuqu river, a tributary from the Brahmaputra river. In response to China’s plans, India appears more cautious than ever after announcing their intentions to explore the potential construction of a 10-gigawatt hydropower dam and reservoir in an attempt to challenge and counter China’s ambitious project. This need to

counter China’s development comes from the lack of diplomatic transparency between the two states and the discrete nature of the Medong bend project. Evidently, tensions are emerging from this advancement as India is actively making plans against China and interfering with their agenda. The only concrete evidence of cooperation can be seen in the two Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) signed between India and China in 2002 and 2005, having since been renewed in 2018, which requires China to reveal hydrological data during the flood season each year.44 Furthermore, the environmental repercussions of such a dam would be catastrophic with greater risks of landslides and damage to the ecology of the ecosystem due to sediment trapping; an occurrence directly related to dam infrastructure, causing reduced water capacity in rivers due to the higher concentration of matter blocking the natural river flow.45 The lack of state cooperation and diplomacy also extends beyond just the concerns of the Brahmaputra river. According to data from the United State Geological Survey, extreme droughts conveniently appeared downstream, outside China’s section of the Mekong river.46 Remarkably, China’s region, further north, retained more water than usual.47 This leads one to wonder whether the dams China has constructed actually do alter the flow between upstream and downstream sections of the river. Although China denies any claims that they actively interfere with the water flow of the rivers, it is unlikely that only neighboring countries are experiencing issues unless China is somehow involved. Eyes on Earth’s research supports this notion especially given the discovery that during monsoon season, China was restricting water

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since 2012 as their dams along the Mekong river prevented the side rivers along the Thai-Laos border from filling.48 Clearly, the dams do have the potential to cause severe collateral damage; even though China ignores this research, claiming it is a U.S. government-driven conspiracy, the reality is that people are suffering, and the repercussions are extreme.49 The nature of the conflict is still in its initial phases, with limited confrontation so far; therefore, diplomacy is necessary to avoid sudden aggression in the region. Yet, China has made this very difficult to achieve as it was one of three countries to vote against the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses.50 China’s plan seems focused on avoiding discussion of the issue and even withdrew its commissioner from the World Commission on Dams in 1998.51 The Mekong River Commission (MRC) attempted to create a space for a dialogue regarding state ambition for the river, yet China still remains outside of this discussion.52 This active neglect is problematic; it leaves room for miscommunication and potential disagreements that could escalate into what is predicted to be a future where full-scale war over water in Asia is a reality. On a more regional level, in 2020, Vietnam attempted to use its chairmanship position in ASEAN to initiate discussions about the Mekong River in the hopes of creating more transparency and understanding behind each state’s intentions.53 However, this conflict was perceived by maritime states as insignificant as they were not directly involved, unlike the mainland states.54 For a solution to emerge, more sub-regional conversations need to take place as more attention will be given to the specific problem between the states immediately involved.

Despite the prospect of further diplomacy , states have forgotten to acknowledge that the Mekong river disagreement and tensions have repercussions that extend beyond the sub-regions and affect a lot of ASEAN’s food security and climate action collectively.55 Globalization has introduced the concepts of interconnectedness and interdependence between states, which has now become the norm; thus, what affects mainland states also affects maritime states. China’s only attempt 123 SPRING 2022

to appear collaborative was in its decision to share its water data with the MRC in October 2020.56 However, this is objectively meaningless without genuine change in China’s water policies. By simply granting access to their data, China can continue its infiltration of the region and, in turn, damage the livelihoods of the neighboring states with minimal repercussions. A legitimate form of water-sharing agreements appears to be the primary solution that will allow the states involved to cooperate.

We are at a critical moment in history where the following decision regarding this issue is vital in determining the future harmony of Asia. As mentioned earlier, climate change is an escalating issue that directly influences the emerging water wars, making the problem even more pressing.

Armed conflicts have dictated our history books for centuries; however, given the shift in international relations and the normalization of mutually assured destruction, the production of new forms of wars is inevitable. The nature of the war is challenging to predict; however, given how precious water is as a natural commodity and the involvement of two major powers in Asia, it’s safe to say the conflict has the potential to become equally destructive as wars we’ve seen before.

References

1 Panda, Ankit. "How Old Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative Exactly?"

The Diplomat. Last modified February 11, 2019. https://thediplomat. com/2019/02/how-old-is-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-exactly/ 2 Demand Progress. "China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States." Every CRS Report - EveryCRSReport. com. Last modified July 12, 2006. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/ RL33534.html.

3 Schneider, Keith, and C. T. Pope. "China, Tibet, and the Strategic Power of Water." Circle of Blue. Last modified May 8, 2008. https://www.circleofblue. org/2008/world/china-tibet-and-the-strategic-power-of-water/.

4 "What is China’s Argument on Tibet?" Free Tibet. Accessed January 26, 2022. https://freetibet.org/about/china-argument.

5 Free Tibet. "Is Tibet a Country?" Free Tibet |. Accessed February 25, 2022. https://freetibet.org/about/legal-status-tibet.

6 Ibid.

7 Arya, Tsewang. "The 17-point Agreement - What China Promised, What It Really Delivered and the Future?" Central Tibetan Administration. Last modified May 23, 2019. https://tibet.net/the-17-point-agreement-what-chinapromised-what-it-really-delivered-and-the-future-2/.

8 "What is China’s Argument on Tibet?" Free Tibet. Accessed January 26, 2022. https://freetibet.org/about/china-argument.

9 Ibid.

10 BBC. "Tibet Profile." BBC News. Last modified April 26, 2019. https://

www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16689779.

11 Silvers, Jack. "Water is China’s Greatest Weapon and Its Achilles Heel." Harvard Political Review. Last modified October 16, 2020. https:// harvardpolitics.com/china-water-policy/.

12 Worldometer. "China Population." Worldometer - Real Time World Statistics. Last modified 2022. https://www.worldometers.info/worldpopulation/china-population/.

13 Silvers, Jack. "Water is China’s Greatest Weapon and Its Achilles Heel." Harvard Political Review. Last modified October 16, 2020. https:// harvardpolitics.com/china-water-policy/.

14 Silvers, Jack. "Water is China’s Greatest Weapon and Its Achilles Heel." Harvard Political Review. Last modified October 16, 2020. https:// harvardpolitics.com/china-water-policy/.

15 Ibid.

16 Yao, Liuyang, Minjuan Zhao, and Tao Xu. "China’s Water-Saving Irrigation Management System: Policy, Implementation, and Challenge."

MDPI. Last modified December 15, 2017. https://www.mdpi.com/20711050/9/12/2339/htm.

17 Schneider, Keith, and C. T. Pope. "China, Tibet, and the Strategic Power of Water." Circle of Blue. Last modified May 8, 2008. https://www.circleofblue. org/2008/world/china-tibet-and-the-strategic-power-of-water/.

18 Palmo, Dechen. "Tibet’s Rivers Will Determine Asia’s Future." The Diplomat. Last modified November 1, 2019. https://thediplomat. com/2019/11/tibets-rivers-will-determine-asias-future/.

19 Doman, Mark, Katia Shatoba, and Alex Palmer. "A Mega Dam on the Great Bend of China." ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation). Last modified May 24, 2021. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-05-25/chinasplan-to-build-mega-dam-on-yarlung-tsangpo-brahmaputra/100146344.

20 United Nations. "China Headed Towards Carbon Neutrality by 2060; President Xi Jinping Vows to Halt New Coal Plants Abroad." UN News. Last modified September 22, 2021. https://news.un.org/en/ story/2021/09/1100642.

21 Eyler, Brian. "Science Shows Chinese Dams Are Devastating the Mekong." Foreign Policy. Last modified April 22, 2020. https://foreignpolicy. com/2020/04/22/science-shows-chinese-dams-devastating-mekong-river/.

22 Dutta, Prabhash K. "New Chinese Dam on Brahmaputra: China Has Already Built 11 in Tibet." India Today. Last modified November 30, 2020. https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/newchinese-dam-on-brahmpautra-china-already-has-already-built-11-intibet-1745422-2020-11-30.

23 Schneider, Keith, and C. T. Pope. "China, Tibet, and the Strategic Power of Water." Circle of Blue. Last modified May 8, 2008. https://www.circleofblue. org/2008/world/china-tibet-and-the-strategic-power-of-water/.

24 Ibid.

25 Eyler, Brian. "Science Shows Chinese Dams Are Devastating the Mekong." Foreign Policy. Last modified April 22, 2020. https://foreignpolicy. com/2020/04/22/science-shows-chinese-dams-devastating-mekong-river/.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Thi Ha, Hoang, and Farah N. Seth. "2021/69 "The Mekong River Ecosystem in Crisis: ASEAN Cannot Be a Bystander"." ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. Last modified May 19, 2021. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articlescommentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-69-the-mekong-river-ecosystem-incrisis-asean-cannot-be-a-bystander-by-hoang-thi-ha-and-farah-nadine-seth/.

30 Ibid.

31 Silvers, Jack. "Water is China’s Greatest Weapon and Its Achilles Heel." Harvard Political Review. Last modified October 16, 2020. https:// harvardpolitics.com/china-water-policy/.

32 Dutta, Prabhash K. "New Chinese Dam on Brahmaputra: China

Has Already Built 11 in Tibet." India Today. Last modified November 30, 2020. https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/newchinese-dam-on-brahmpautra-china-already-has-already-built-11-intibet-1745422-2020-11-30.

33 Samsani, Sumanth. "China–Bangladesh Strategic Linkages." ORF. Last modified May 11, 2021. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinabangladesh-strategic-linkages/.

34 Christopher, Mark. "Water Wars: The Brahmaputra River and Sino-Indian Relations." U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013.

35 Palmo, Dechen. "Tibet’s Rivers Will Determine Asia’s Future." The Diplomat. Last modified November 1, 2019. https://thediplomat. com/2019/11/tibets-rivers-will-determine-asias-future/.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Wuthnow, Joel, Satu Limaye, and Nilanthi Samaranayake. "Brahmaputra: A Conflict-Prone River Takes a Step Backwards." War on the Rocks. Last modified December 23, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/12/a-conflictprone-river-takes-a-step-backwards/.

40 Doman, Mark, Katia Shatoba, and Alex Palmer. "A Mega Dam on the Great Bend of China." ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation). Last modified May 24, 2021. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-05-25/chinasplan-to-build-mega-dam-on-yarlung-tsangpo-brahmaputra/100146344.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Government of India. "India-China Cooperation." Last modified November 12, 2021. https://jalshakti-dowr.gov.in/international-cooperation/ bilateral-cooperation-with-neighbouring-countries/india-china-cooperation.

45 Thi Ha, Hoang, and Farah N. Seth. "2021/69 "The Mekong River Ecosystem in Crisis: ASEAN Cannot Be a Bystander"." ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. Last modified May 19, 2021. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articlescommentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-69-the-mekong-river-ecosystem-incrisis-asean-cannot-be-a-bystander-by-hoang-thi-ha-and-farah-nadine-seth/.

Arthur, Michael, and Demian Saffer. "Sediment Trapping." Penn State and Utah State. Accessed March 14, 2022. https://www.e-education.psu.edu/ earth111/node/888.

46 Eyler, Brian. "Science Shows Chinese Dams Are Devastating the Mekong." Foreign Policy. Last modified April 22, 2020. https://foreignpolicy. com/2020/04/22/science-shows-chinese-dams-devastating-mekong-river/.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Yangtso, Lobsang. “China’s River Politics on the Tibetan Plateau: Comparative Study of Brahmaputra and Mekong.” The Tibet Journal42, no. 2 (2017): 49–58. https://www.jstor.org/stable/90024493.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Thi Ha, Hoang, and Farah N. Seth. "2021/69 "The Mekong River Ecosystem in Crisis: ASEAN Cannot Be a Bystander"." ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. Last modified May 19, 2021. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articlescommentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-69-the-mekong-river-ecosystem-incrisis-asean-cannot-be-a-bystander-by-hoang-thi-ha-and-farah-nadine-seth/.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Strangio, Sebastian. "Amid US Criticisms, China Offers Mekong Nations Access to Crucial River Data." The Diplomat. Last modified October 23, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/amid-us-criticisms-china-offers-mekongnations-access-to-crucial-river-data/.

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The 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics: An Exercise in Sports Diplomacy

A

by Sydney Steger edited by A shley Soeb ro to

s the world was ramping up for the next Olympic season in late 2021, the event’s news coverage wasn’t only the usual short blurb on the front page on the latest qualifying round results, nor was it just the sports section discussion on designer Olympic gear announcements. Instead, the latest iteration of the world’s biggest and most prestigious sporting event was met with coverage far more negative and politically charged. A small group of Olympic participant states, headed by the United States, made their intentions clear to perform a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics.1 With human rights concern as the motivating factor, particularly regarding the Chinese government’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, the boycott has already created a negative media narrative surrounding the Beijing Winter Olympics.2 The International Olympics Committee, facing pressure after the negative domestic media from the Tokyo Summer Olympics, is now under even further scrutiny.3 With most states involved in the boycott otherwise maintaining regular economic and political relationships with China, it could be seen as strange to use a sporting event to take a public stand. However, the reality of masssporting events, especially the Olympic Games, in the world of politics may show this to not be strange at all. Being a symbol of national pride, global cooperation, and intercultural dialogue, the 125 SPRING 2022

pressure of a boycott is certainly a controversial and attention-grabbing move. However, it is much more debatable if this boycott was successful in challenging China on the global stage.

This news has fostered current interest in the presence of sports in the international political sphere. Sports diplomacy is one of many culturebased forms of soft power diplomacy, incorporating the universality of many sports as a tool for building connection between states and people. Sports are important for an individual state’s cultural and national identities, and they offer a common ground for states with all parties playing the same game. Sports diplomacy takes on several different forms, with scholar Stuart Murray dividing sports diplomacy into a traditional and new form.4 Traditional sports diplomacy is the conscious use of sports to facilitate diplomacy, often used in bilateral settings. This is the most “classic” form of sports diplomacy, designed to foster friendly and commonly understood interactions between athletes and the diplomatic team that travels with them.

The newer form of sports diplomacy deals more with non-state actors and the general international sports audience. States use this form of sports diplomacy to foster a positive national image through success in sports, appealing not to states but to the international community. It also involves the interstate interactions that occur in major multilateral sports organizations.5

The Olympics are truly the pinnacle of sports diplomacy, involving both the direct and intentional use of the Olympics to bring together a closed circle of diplomats in one location from traditional sports diplomacy, and the use of the Olympics platform to better national image and create global common ground. Additionally, the Olympics have one of the most important international sports organizations with the International Olympics Committee presiding over the games seeing significant membership.6 The Olympics can really be looked to, given these factors and the Olympics mission of “excellence, friendship, and respect,” as the penultimate event for sports diplomacy.7 This understanding of sports diplomacy and its relationship with the Olympics are important for understanding why this boycott has come to be.

Sports diplomacy has an expansive history, and the 2022 Olympics host nation, China, has its own unique history with sports diplomacy. Over the last seven decades, China has made significant use of both traditional and new sports diplomacy, and it is fair to say that China has more investment in sports diplomacy than many other states. As China was dealing with international affairs under its new communist leadership, sports diplomacy proved to be a useful and more neutral platform for international relations, especially as tensions heightened during the Cold War and a new platform was needed for interacting with non-socialist states. China entered into a period of “friendship sports,” from the 50s to 80s, where Chinese sports teams participated in bilateral competitions and tournaments. Priority was placed on fostering friendly positive interactions as Chinese athletes were told to prioritize diplomatic relationships over any competitive victory. Towards the end of the Cold War, the Chinese government began to

invest significantly into building an international competitive team. This period saw the rise of one of the most well-known examples of sports diplomacy, “ping pong diplomacy,” which helped foster, among other relationships, U.S.-China bilateral relations.8 Finally, as China was seeing its power and presence on the international stage grow, it continued to foster more “new” sports diplomacy, building competitive teams and notably, hosting the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics. The 2008 Beijing Olympics were intended to be a major success for Chinese soft power, giving audiences abroad — particularly in the West — new conceptions of a modern China. Additionally, the Olympics were intended to appease domestic audiences, with the expectation of a new global image of China following the games. Regardless of if there was any change in foreign perceptions of China, the government’s investment in the 2008 Games did, according to available data, culminate in positive reactions from the majority (67 percent) of domestic audiences.9 Generally, Chinese sports diplomacy has continued on from here, focused on a mixture of traditional and new approaches, and additionally using these platforms not just for the stated goal of soft-power diplomacy, but to also serve domestic audiences through promotion of an idealized China to the international stage. This state in Chinese sports diplomacy creates the context for the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, just 14 years after the country’s capital last held the games.

Additionally, China’s dedication and investment to the process of sports diplomacy, particularly in its more challenging relationships, show the level of importance and stake the nation holds in the games.

With China’s sports diplomacy history in mind, it is important to contextualize the nature of an Olympic boycott itself. This is far from the first time an Olympic boycott has occurred, and not even the first to be championed by the United States. The Olympics have seen boycotts from nations large and small, and in multiple forms.

Some have gone beyond the diplomatic boycott, with full Olympic athletic teams skipping out on the games, rather than just government officials.

One of the most signficant examples of an Olympic boycott was during the 1976 Montreal Olympics.

During this period, there were many international INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 126

norms surrounding interactions with apartheidera South Africa, including an informal athletics embargo preventing sports diplomacy. New Zealand chose to violate this norm through participating in bilateral sporting events with South Africa. To oppose this violation, 28 African states chose to boycott the Olympic Games unless New Zealand was removed. This boycott stands out in relation to the 2022 Olympics for its human rights related agenda.10 Another significant Olympic boycott — one that set precedence for the United States to be involved in one — was the 1980 Moscow Olympics.

This was a full boycott led by the U.S. to combat Soviet aggression, mainly regarding its invasion of Afghanistan at a particularly tense point in the Cold War. The boycott saw significant support, including the participation of China, but also saw many significant Olympic power players continue their attendance at the Games.11 The Olympics have also seen smaller-scale diplomatic displays without a full-scale boycott. This was the case during the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics where the United States used the Olympic platform to oppose Russia’s antiLGBT laws by having the President, First Lady, and other adjacent major political figures skip attending the Games.12 With this in mind, there’s a significant history of both China’s stake in the Olympic Games and human rights-centered boycotts of the Olympics, including some championed by the United States. Both parties in this situation have some stake in the success of their actions, but what that success looks like is an entirely different question. In the past, Olympic boycotts have seen very mixed results. The 1976 Olympic boycott, though failing to get a removal, did push New Zealand towards aligning with the athletics embargo, helping to push South Africa towards ending its apartheid policies.13 On the other hand, the 1980 Moscow Olympics failed to make strides towards changing the policy of the Soviet Union.

However, while the boycott failed in its presented goal, it ultimately made significant strides in certain U.S. relationships, including and perhaps most significantly with China, and domestically saw states internalize the boycott to shape rhetoric surrounding the Soviet Union.14 In these cases, the stated goal was either delayed, contributed to by a 127 SPRING 2022

number of factors, or not achieved at all, but with positive externalities for the leading state. It is also important to consider that the stated goal of such boycotts was likely never the ultimate goal of their inception, striving to push rhetorical agendas and foster relationships with other states rather than achieve changes in policy for a host or participant nation. The same is very likely true of the 2022 Beijing Olympic Games, especially as states have opted to continue the participation of their athletic teams, only negating participation diplomatically.

This changes the goal post of the boycott’s success from both sides significantly.

There are two major points of effectiveness to consider in looking at negative effects produced on China as a result of the boycott: disruption of China’s use of soft power sports diplomacy, and the overall policy effect of diplomatic action from the participating states. The first criteria has significant potential effects. Media coverage of the Games — particularly in the West where the majority of participating states are — has been negatively shaped by the boycott, drawing focus away from the Games themselves. However, it is unclear if even this would have a large impact negatively or positively, with shifts in media attention from the 2008 Beijing Olympics abroad being quite limited.15 Domestically, external negative attention on the Games will likely have limited effect, given the tight media control the Chinese government has surrounding the games.16 While China itself does deeply value its perception as a result of hosting such a mass, prestigious event, negative coverage of this event from outside isn’t likely to reach domestic audiences due to Chinese media controls.

In fact, the domestic perception of China may be bolstered, as it was in 2008.17 However, despite the limited effect on the overall perception of China as a result of the boycott, it has already and will likely

continue to bring increased media attention to its central issue of human rights abuses against Uyghur Muslims.18 However, while this issue is significant, it is unlikely the sole motivating factor for this rhetoric from the United States against its closest rival for global power. Additionally, this leads into the potential success of fostering policy change in China’s treatment of religious minority groups. This has not not yet been successful, and has almost no chance of success in the immediate future as these policies are rooted entirely in Chinese domestic policy, with little ability for other states to intervene.

Overall, it seems likely that the benefits received from the boycott have been for the participating states' rhetorical arguments against China, and the disruption of a minor event used by China to shape its international perception. Considering these outcomes, was the boycott worth it? With any significant diplomatic action of this scale, there have been and will be negative consequences, particularly for the de facto leader of the push: the U.S. There have already been calls for a similar boycott of the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics from China, and this move is certain to worsen U.S.-China bilateral relations which are already strained under the Biden administration.19 However, if the U.S. and its fellow states initial goal was to prioritize minimizing Chinese power and reduce any positive benefits from the Olympics Games, it is possible this will remain a stain on China’s image in the long-term.

The Olympics, the world’s largest, most universal sporting experience, is the pinnacle of soft power sports diplomacy, particularly for the host nation of China. The diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Olympics, on the surface, was the specific call for policy changes by the state.

However, the diplomatic boycott is multifaceted, including a domestic and international dynamic, and then two competing lenses in international media: the generous and powerful host nation or the state responsible for human rights abuses within its own borders. Additionally, the boycott is only one part of the larger US-China tensions.

The diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, while thus far unsuccessful in sparking change in the domestic policies that have informed the boycott, will perhaps, in the long-term, limit the Chinese government’s ability to bolster China’s

international image from the Games. However, like previous Olympic boycotts in 1976 or 1980, only time will show if the boycott will be worth the consequences for the participating nations, particularly for the United States.

References

1 “2022 Beijing Winter Olympics Fast Facts.” CNN, 7 December 2021, accessed 30 January 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/26/world/2022beijing-winter-olympics-fast-facts/index.html.

2 Faiola, Anthony. “With ‘diplomatic boycott’ of the Olympics, Biden seeks middle ground.” Washington Post, 13 December 2021, accessed 30 January 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/12/13/olympicsdiplomatic-boycott-analysis/.

3 Matt, Alt. “Tokyo’s Olympics Have Become the Anger Games.” The New Yorker, July 22 2021, accessed 30 January 2022, https://www.newyorker.com/ sports/sporting-scene/tokyos-olympics-have-become-the-anger-games.

4 Murray, S. “Sports Diplomacy.” In C. M. Constantinou, P. Kerr, & P. Sharp (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy. London, SAGE Publications Ltd, 2016, pp. 617-627.

5 Murray, S. “Sports Diplomacy.”

6 “Members.” International Olympic Committee, 2022, accessed 30 January 2022, https://olympics.com/ioc/members.

7 “Olympic Values.” International Olympic Committee, 2022, accessed 30 January 2022 https://olympics.com/ioc/olympic-values.

8 Wang, Guanhua. "“Friendship First”: China's Sports Diplomacy during the Cold War." The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 12, no. 3-4 (2003), pp 133-53.

9 Manzenreiter, Wolfram. "The Beijing Games in the Western Imagination of China: The Weak Power of Soft Power." Journal of Sport and Social Issues 34, no. 1 (2010), pp. 29-48.

10 Rosen, Armin. “The Olympics Used To be So Politicized That Most of Africa Boycotted in 1976.” The Atlantic, 7 August 2012, accessed 30 January 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/ the-olympics-used-to-be-so-politicized-t hat-most-of-africa-boycottedin-1976/260831/.

11 Eaton, Joseph. "Reconsidering the 1980 Moscow Olympic Boycott."

Diplomatic History 40, no. 5 (2016), pp. 845-64.

12 Epstein, Jennifer. “For Sochi: Diversity, not Diplomacy.” Politico, December 17, 2013, accessed 30 January 2022, https://www.politico.com / story/2013/12/billie-jean-king-united-states-delegation-sochi-2014-winterolympics-101253.

13 Rosen, Armin. “The Olympics Used To be So Politicized That Most of Africa Boycotted in 1976.”

14 Eaton, Joseph. "Reconsidering the 1980 Moscow Olympic Boycott."

15 Manzenreiter, Wolfram. "The Beijing Games in the Western Imagination of China: The Weak Power of Soft Power."

16 Mozur, Paul, Lee Myers, Steven, and Liu, John. “Ahead of Winter Olympics, Beijing Moves to Quash Dissent.” New York Times, January 31, 2022, Accessed February 27 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/31/ world/asia/winter-olympics-crackdown. html?smid=url-share 17 Qin, Amy “Bearing an Olympic Torch, and a Politically Loaded Message.”

The New York Times, February 8, 2022, Accessed February 27 2022, https:// www.nytimes.com/2022/02/08/sports/olympics/china-uyghur-olympics.html.

18 Faiola, Anthony. “With ‘diplomatic boycott’ of the Olympics, Biden seeks middle ground.”

19 Crossley, Gabriel and Lun Tian, Yew. “China condemns U.S. diplomatic boycott of Beijing Olympics.” Reuters, December 7 2021, accessed 30 January 2022,

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Multilateral Security in East Asia: Japan, South Korea, and the United States

by Joseph Su edited by Ja m es Rhee, Ashle y So e bro to

J

apan and Korea have shared an extensive history of close cultural, economic and political ties, and especially war, which have inflicted deep wounds on the perception of each other’s nations.

The two nations have been in contact since at least the third century and have waged war on and off since then.1 However, the lasting wounds truly began in the early twentieth century following the Russo-Japanese War, in which Korea would become a colony, and subsequently annexed by the Empire of Japan. In 1905, Japan would coerce Korea into signing the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1905, depriving Korea of its sovereignty, and make Korea an official protectorate of Japan.2 However, Japan would underestimate the rising anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the Korean people and would impose the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1907 to gain full control of domestic affairs.3 Finally, in 1910, the final Japan– Korea treaty would be signed to fully annex Korea into the empire.4 During the period from 1910 to the fall of the Japanese Empire following their defeat in the Second World War, the Korean people would be subject to a number of Japanese policies aimed to erase the Korean national identity, forced labor, and sexual slavery amongst the women.

This period has not left the Korean people’s AS mind, especially AME with RIC a generation still alive who were victims of these crimes, and is unlikely to do 129 SPRING 2022

so for many years. In 1965, the Treaty on Basic Relations was signed between the two nations to establish diplomatic relations and normalize relations, however, the attitudes of the people did not fade. Relations between these two nations have been strained up to this day and in more recent history, a series of court cases from Korea have strained relations further. In 2021, a South Korean court ordered Japan to pay reparations for Wartime Sexual Slavery, which Japan refused.5 Additionally, Japan has made multiple wartime apologies to Korea and other nations regarding its crimes during the war. These are just two cases of a larger trend of unresolved tensions which have lingered for around 75 years.

In 2019, The seventh Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll, collected roughly 1,000 valid responses from each nation to gather current impressions of each respective country.6 The Japanese survey group held a 20 percent “good/ somewhat good impression” while 49.9 percent held a “bad/somewhat bad impression” of Korea. The Korean survey group on the other hand held a 31.7 percent “good / somewhat good impression” while 49.9 percent held a “bad/somewhat bad impression” of Japan. However, these differences have been cast aside in the face of growing threats near their homelands. With an ever hostile North Korea, and

a rapidly modernizing China, who is unafraid of throwing its weight around in the region, these two countries have been forced to work together alongside their shared U.S. ally, to defend their national interests.

Current Regional Security Environment

From 2006 to 2017, North Korea (DPRK) has tested six-nuclear weapons as confirmed by the international community.7 The first tests were met with near unanimous international condemnation, and the UN Security Council swiftly passed sanctions upon the North Korean regime.8 During the initial test, reports estimated that the yield ranged from 0.7 kt to 2 kt,9 roughly seven times smaller than the bomb used at Hiroshima. By 2017, during the sixth and final test, reports estimated that the yield had skyrocketed anywhere between 100 kt to 270 kt, more comparable to more modern nations' arsenals. North Korean officials claimed this to be a fully functioning thermonuclear device, drastically raising their capabilities in this field.10 Within the realm of North Korea’s nuclear tests, the DPRK has also carried out around 150 strategic missile tests since 1984.11 While these tests alone are unanimously condemned by the global community, and even their closest ally China, North Korea has used these weapons to threaten its neighbors, especially Japan and Korea. Even though the North Korean economy is known to be plagued by poor central control, a tiny GDP, and massive unemployment, its ballistic missile program has not suffered the same fate. According to a report from the Union of Concerned Scientists, the 2017

initial test of the 화성-15 (Hwasong) missile is capable of more than 8,100 miles, giving it to hold the contiguous U.S. at risk, and even as far as the western part of the European continent.12 Not only do these missiles have the capability to strike these distances, but their test launches are also splashing down in the Sea of Japan, South Korea’s coast, and even within Japanese-controlled waters. These tests, their locations, have all been made extremely clear in their intended message alongside countless threats to South Korean, Japan, and the United States.13 14 However, North Korea is not the only country undertaking aggressive and destabilizing actions within the region. In 2012, the current President of China, Xi Jinping, rose to power and marked a notable shift in China’s foreign affairs.

In a 2017 report to the Chinese national congress, Xi committed China to producing a “world-class” fighting force capable of not only becoming the premier power in the Asia-Pacific region, but one that can “fight and win” global conflicts by the year 2049.15 China is undergoing a rapid modernization program that is currently unmatched by any other nation. Most notably, the PLA Navy is on track to become the largest naval fighting force overall and is already the largest force by pure ship number.

Additionally, China is the largest shipbuilder in the world, outputting 14 to 16 surface ships in 2017, while the U.S. produced just eight.16 Not only is China producing ships, but they are also producing modern, capable surface vessels. RAND reports that China’s Navy can be considered 70 percent modern, with that number rising each year.17 These developments span the entire PLA and have caused rising tensions amongst the East Asian nations.

Recently, with tensions ever growing in the region, the ruling party of China (CCP), has threatened to use nuclear weapons on Japan and threatened to “break and bloody heads” if China’s red lines were crossed.18 19 Additionally, China has implemented government sanctions on the Korean industry since 2016, due to the deployment of air defense batteries in the country.20

Trilateral Cooperation

These actions undertaken by these two neighboring nations have raised fears within the INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW 130

Korean and Japanese people and governments.

In China and North Korea’s aims to fray ties between the U.S. and the East Asian nations, they have in turn only brought them closer to the U.S., and forced rare cases of cooperation between the two nations. From 2016 through 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) spent about $20.9 billion in Japan and $13.4 billion in South Korea to pay salaries, construct facilities, and perform maintenance. The governments of Japan and South Korea provided $12.6 billion and $5.8 billion, in their cost-sharing agreements.21 Additionally, in 2019 alone, the DOD authorized the transfer of $5.7 billion dollars in arms to Japan with Korea authorized for roughly $1.1 billion worth of arms sales. In Japan’s case, these arms sales spanning from 2016 to 2020 made up 97 percent of Japan’s national defense equipment.22 These arms are some of the most complex and essential technologies in the current U.S. arsenal.

Japan and Korea both operate advanced missile-defense systems from the U.S. Korea and Japan both operate the Patriot and Aegis systems with Korea having an additional layer of protection with the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system, the same one which caused China to implement economic measures against the nation.23 Japan is one of the few nations that is a supplier of manufacturing to the F-35 program.

From Lockheed-Martin’s Japan page they quote, “Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), Mitsubishi Electric Company (MELCO) and IHI Corp. contribute to F-35A production in Japan. The three companies provide the F-35A Final Assembly and Checkout (FACO), production of Mission Systems radar and EODAS components, and F135 engine component production and FACO, respectively.”24 Japan is one of the most critical allies in the Pacific, being entrusted not only with the operation of the fifth generation multi-role fighter, but also with the technology behind it.

In the 21st Century, the U.S. has been one to bring together these two nations in joint-military exercises in key aspects of national defense. In 2016, following a missile-test from North Korea, Japan, South Korea, and the United States had a historic first ever joint-missile defense exercise. This exercise was marked as historic by senior officials and 131 SPRING 2022

entailed aegis warships from each nation working together against hypothetical missile attacks.25 This trend has continued into last year as well. In June of 2021, the three nations sent their respective Air Forces to Alaska to join in America’s Red Flag exercise in Alaska. This exercise would comprise roughly 2,000 service members in total once again marking security cooperation between the three nations.26 These are just two examples of one of the few areas where the two nations cooperate, and this has been a lasting trend since the increased action from China and North Korea.

A Hopeful Future

Even despite the historical and lasting tensions between the two East Asian nations, they have been almost forced together from their shared geographical threats, and shared U.S. ally. Japan and Korea both are massive arms importers, and key allies in U.S. strategy in the region, not only from a security standpoint, but from an economic one as well. Recent polls from South Korea, from a known pro-China newspaper, showed that 68 percent of South Koreans chose the U.S. as the country they supported over China’s 4 percent.27 This is not alone a Korean trend, a Japanese poll showed that 89.7 percent of the Japanese public held a, “relatively negative or negative” opinion on China.28 Even as numbers show that the two nations hold a roughly 50 percent negative view of each other, it is clear from everything else that the two nations see each other as partners in combating their shared aggressors. While there is much to be done amongst public opinion on other matters which cannot be

solved as easily, the two nations have demonstrated the ability to work together in key matters, and many hope that this can be a path towards more friendly relations between the two nations.

Security in East Asia is one of the most prominent issues which has the potential to degrade diplomatic relations globally. South Korea and Japan both face shared threats and hold very similar ideals yet are separated by their history. As the situation in the region grows ever more tense, more secure and integrated international partnerships between western-style democratic societies could lead to a better outcome for all. With no signs of China backing down from throwing its influence around and the repeated cycle of North Korean missile tests, both Japan and South Korea seek reassurance that their people and their interests will be safe from harm. Not only does this relationship serve to advance security concerns for the two countries, it additionally allows the U.S. to rebuild and reassure its longstanding alliances after a drastic loss in confidence abroad. The path ahead of these two countries is not one to be solved within even ten years, but one which must slowly be built on compromise and trust facilitated by their extensive shared values and international partnerships.

References

1 21세기한반도와주변 4 강대국: 중국, 일본, 미국, 러시아와의관계 사를중심으로. South Korea: 가람 기획, 2005. Translated, “The 21st Century Korean Peninsula and the Four Great Powers”.

2 “Isshi Hogo Joyaku”. Ratification on, November 17, 1905. https://www. japanese-wiki-corpus.org/history/The%20Eulsa%20Treaty.html 3 “Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty of 1907”. Ratification July 24, 1907. https://www.japanese-wiki-corpus.org/history/Japan-Korea%20Annexation%20Treaty%20of%201907.html 4 Japan–Korea Annexation Treaty”. Effective August 22, 1910, https:// international.ucla.edu/institute/article/18447 5 Sang-Heun, Choe. “South Korean Court Orders Japan to Pay Compensation for Wartime Sexual Slavery.” The New York Times, January 7, 2021.

6 “The 7th Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll (2019) Analysis Report on Comparative Data June, 2019.” The Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll 2019. The Genron NPO & East Asia Institute, June 19, 2019. https://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5489.html.

7 “North Korea.” The Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 22, 2021. https:// www.nti.org/countries/north-korea/.

8 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res 1718 (14 October, 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1718 9 “BGR - Presse - Nordkorea: BGR Registriert Vermutlichen Kernwaffentest.” n.d. Www.bgr.bund.de. Accessed January 29, 2022. https://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Gemeinsames/Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/

Pressemitteilungen/BGR /bgr-160106_nordkorea_BGR_kernwaffentest.html.

10 publisher. 2011. “BGR /Seismologie/Erdbeben Aktuell.”. October 23, 2011. https://www-seismologie-bgr-de.translate.goog/sdac/erdbeben/ kernexplosion/nkorea_20170903_deu.html 11 “North Korea.” The Nuclear Threat Initiative 12 Wright, David, Stephen Young, and Cameron Tracy. “North Korea's Longest Missile Test Yet.” All Things Nuclear, November 28, 2017. https:// allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/nk-longest-missile-test-yet/.

13 Kim, Jack, and Kiyoshi Takenaka. “North Korea Threatens to 'Sink' Japan, Reduce U.S. to 'A shes and Darkness'.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, September 14, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles/ north-korea-threatens-to-sink-japan-reduce-u-s-to-ashes-and-darknessidUSKCN1BP0F3.

14 “North Korea Threatens Japan with 'Real Ballistic Missile'.” BBC News.

BBC, November 30, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50613051.

15 Jingping, Xi. Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, n.d.

16 Heginbotham, Eric. “How Is China Modernizing Its Navy?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 24, 2022. https://chinapower.csis. org/china-naval-modernization/.

17 Heginbotham, Eric, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Tao Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, and Lyle J. Morris, The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392. html. Also available in print form.

18 Seidel, Jamie. “China Threatens to Nuke Japan If Country Intervenes in Taiwan Conflict.” news.com.au, July 19, 2021. https:// www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/china-threatensto-nuke-japan-if-country-intervenes-in-taiwan-conflict/news-story/ d9af14dc6b90628082e79ab4c77629e1.

19 Jinping, Xi. "Speech at Tiananmen Square." 2021.

20 Meick, Ethan, and Nargiza Salidjanova. Rep. China’s Response to U.S.-South Korean Missile Defense System Deployment and Its Implications.

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016.

21 GAO-21-270 Benefits and Costs Associated with the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea § (2021).

22 Direct Commercial Sales Authorizations to Foreign Countries and International Organizations for Fiscal Year 2019, 2019.

23 THAAD on the Korean Peninsula. Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2017.

24 Martin, Lockheed. “Japan.” Lockheed Martin Corporation. Accessed January 31, 2022. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/f35/global-enterprise/ japan.html.

25 Kwon, KJ, and Dugald McConnell. “South Korea, Japan to Join U.S. for Missile-Defense Exercise.” CNN. Cable News Network, May 17, 2016. https:// www.cnn.com/2016/05/16/asia/south-korea-japan-missile-defense-exercise/ index.html.

26 “Japan and South Korea to Join U.S. Military Drill in Alaska.” The Japan Times, June 5, 2021. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/06/05/ national/japan-south-korea-us-military-training/.

27 “South Koreans Side with Us over China, Especially on Covid-19, Poll Suggests.” South China Morning Post, January 21, 2022. https://www. scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3164276/south-koreans-sideoverwhelmingly-us-over-china-especially.

28 The 16th Joint Public Opinion Poll Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2020. 16th ed. The Genron NPO , 2020.

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SENIOR EDITORIAL BOARD B R IDG ET TE L ANG Editor in Chief Class of 2023 International Relations

FIO N A CAPTAN Senior Editor, Europe Class of 2023 International Relations

MA RL A HI LLER Senior Editor, Americas Class of 2022 International Relations & Journalism

J ACQUELI NE MOSHKOVI CH Senior Editor, Russia & Former Soviet Union Class of 2022 International Relations & Russian

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GROUNDED IN HISTORY CONTRIBUTING STAFF E D I T O R IAL B OA RD BRIGETTE LANG Editor in Chief LÉA NAMOUNI Senior Editor, Africa HANADI AMIN Senior Editor, Middle East SALLONI SUNDERAJ Senior Editor, Asia MARLA HILLER Senior Editor, Americas FIONA CAPTAN Senior Editor, Europe JACQUELINE MOSHKOVICH Senior Editor, Russia & Former Soviet Union I N T E R N AL ITZEL SANTANA Chief of Staff

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A NOTE ON THE TYPE

The IRR is set in Minion 3, an expanded and updated version A NOTE ON THE TYPE of the serif typeface designed by Robert Slimbach and The IRR is set in Minion 3, an expanded and updated version released by Adobe Systems. It is based on late Renaissanceof the serif typeface designed by Robert Slimbach and era type for extended reading, and named for the traditional released by Adobe Systems. It is based on late Renaissancenomenclature for type sizes, in which minion is between era type for extended reading, and named for the traditional nonpareil and brevier at 7pt. nomenclature for type sizes, in which minion is between nonpareil and brevier at 7pt.

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