April 2012, Vol. 4 No. 2
CROSS-STRAIT TRADE DEAL
PRESIDENT MA’S STRATEGIES TO PROMOTE ECFA IN TAIWAN
TIME FOR A NEW PARADIGM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
USING A NEW PRISM
PRESENTING RESEARCH FINDINGS AT THE ISA MEETING IN CANADA
and prospects for war in the wake of China’s rise
WHEN A BILLION CHINESE JUMP BY JONATHAN WATTS
from the editor
fter the positive response to the last issue of the AsiaPacific Newsletter, I was excited and a little bit apprehensive about taking up the challenge to meet or exceed the standards that the IDAS students set in that issue. I think readers will be pleasantly surprised by the outstanding content and engaging writing that our students have produced for this issue as well. Much of the thanks goes also to members of the IMAS student body, who have contributed several engaging pieces to this publication. I am pleased and honoured to include their work, and look forward to the growth of this project as a joint IMAS/IDAS newsletter from now on. This is only appropriate, for as we work to take down the barriers that have artificially separated our programs in the past and work toward more collaboration and joint projects like this one, it is my hope that IMAS and IDAS will one day come together in the form of a graduate institute of sorts: there is a worldwide community of Asia-Pacific Studies academics out there, and if we are to become a part of it, we stand a much better chance working together than apart. It has been an interesting semester, with its ups and downs. One of our fellow IDAS students was attacked by one of the stray dogs that seem ubiquitous on campus, reminding us of the often dangerous realities of dorm life. Meanwhile, so many of our student body have achieved great victories in getting their work published, their papers presented at conferences, and moving ahead in their academic careers. Through the good times, as well as the hard times, it’s important that we stick together, and help each other out. I am proud that this spirit of collaboration is so strong in our program, and that places it head and shoulders above the sometimes cutthroat competitiveness that too often marks the academic milieu in the West. As such, my goal for this publication is, in some small way, to reflect who we are, and the articles in this issue do just that. IMAS student Samantha Sprole offers an insightful analysis of the institutions that mold the emergent class structure in China to explore why the promised democratizing forces have stalled. Michael Sun Shao-Cheng runs down the various strategies employed by President Ma Ying-jeou to promote ECFA in Taiwan, and John Schmeidel provides an analysis of the likelihood of success of a Chinese military attack upon Taiwan. We are also lucky enough to have a beautiful essay on the traditional Buddhist allegory of Indra’s Net by visiting scholar Laura Lygaityte, with original art provided by our own Igor Sitnikov. And as always, we have a book review, of Jonathan Watts’ When A Billion Chinese Jump, by newly-minted PhD Candidate Sebastian Biba, as well as more recipes from our own IDAS big sister Janet Tan, who has been proudly representing us this semester on an exchange at Berkeley. We all hope she is happy there, but equally look forward to her return to the nest. Once again, I want to take this opportunity to urge each and every IDAS and IMAS student to take on a leadership role—no matter how small—to help build our community, be it by working in campus outreach, assisting fellow classmates, or simply by posting your thoughts, questions, information, and stories on our new blog, the ASAP Communiqué: Just by virtue of being an IMAS or IDAS student, you are automatically a member of ASAP, and this is your virtual space. I hope you enjoy this issue of the Asia-Pacific Newsletter, and I look forward to many more.
We need your talent for the next issue! Do you want to contribute to the Asia-Pacific Newsletter? Contact us at email@example.com to have your stories, photos, essays or art featured. Remember, this is your newsletter! -Ed
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
This issue’s cover photograph was generously provided by TC Lin, a local photographer. More of his work can be seen at www.flickr.com/poagao. All other photographs used in this publication are used courtesy of the photographers, or through a creative commons licence. All are attributed appropriately. The Asia-Pacific Newsletter is a creative-commons publication by the student body of the International Masters and Doctoral Programs in Asia-Pacific Studies at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. This is purely amateur and informal collaboration, and this is a strictly non-commercial publication that is not for sale under any circumstances. We do not derive advertising or sales revenue, or donations of any kind.
Table of Contents April 2012, Vol. 4 No. 2
Explaining Red Capitalists Using ethnographic methods and constructivism.
Indra’s Net And Western Alchemy A new perspective on the Buddhist metaphor.
Of Peace and Appeasement On whether China’s peaceful rise may lead to war.
Promoting ECFA Within Taiwan Strategies used by President Ma Ying-jeou.
Economic Integration ...and the role of the state in East Asia
Taking Taiwan Would a military attack succeed?
International Anarchy Too many years the dominant paradigm.
Institutional Reform in China A look at the pressures, pace and policies. DEPARTMENTS
The IDAS Cookbook Recipes for the grad student from around the world.
Book Review Sebastian Biba reviews When a Billion Chinese Jump by Jonathan Watts.
Asian Relations Through a Prism A student reports on the Montreal conference.
Discovering the Taipei Flora Expo A photostory counting down the top nine Ps.
Ambedkar Paper Makes Big Splash IMAS/IDAS professor nominated for best paper at South Asian Studies conference in California.
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 3
From the Director
am very happy to be able to welcome you to the newest issue of our student newsletter, which provides a forum for our students to express themselves on a number of topics, share some of their academic research, and talk about life as students, many of them from overseas, at National Chengchi University. The University continues to show its commitment to internationalization and this publication, as well as the students who produce it, are the embodiment of that effort. Our PhD students come from 20 different countries, travel around the region, and some also take classes at one of Chengchi’s 350 partner universities. This issue is also especially important as it is the first to include work from students in the MA, as well as the PhD, program. This is in keeping with the philosophy of the past year of bringing the International Doctoral Program and the International Masters Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS and IMAS) closer together. In addition to the launch of our exciting new revamped IMAS/IDAS website, we now have more cross-listed classes available to both IMAS and IDAS students, thanks to the commitment and efforts of IMAS Director Ping-yin Kuan, Dean Yih-chyi Chuang of the College of Social Sciences, and of all the professors who have graciously opened up their classes. As the IDAS program matures and moves into its fifth year, we are making great progress on a number of fronts. We are honing our program requirements such as Qualifying Exams and Dissertation Research Proposals, and I am extremely proud of all the publications of our students, including in SSCI-ranked journals. We have implemented our new, diversified track structure and added new, advanced methods and elective courses. Our program aims for rigor and meeting the high global academic standards, and we are also launching a new globalization research project that will provide funding and opportunities for our students and professors to collaborate on original research that will eventually see publication in top journals and contribute to the sum of human knowledge. To learn more about our IDAS and IMAS programs, please visit: www.asiapacific.nccu.edu.tw, and also the student blog: asiapacificstudents.wordpress.com. You will find both highly informative! I hope you enjoy this issue, and if you have any questions about our programs, please feel free to contact me or Angel, our dedicated program assistant, at firstname.lastname@example.org. We look forward to hearing from you.
Our program aims for rigor and meeting the high global academic standards.
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
Evan Berman, PhD Director
By SAMaNtha SpRoLe
uch to the delight of Renaissance men and women in academia, political economists have jumped on the bandwagon of interdisciplinary theory and methodology. Positive assertions that truth emanates from immutable facts are going by the wayside. Many leading scholars challenge both logic and quantitative analysis as sufficient methods for understanding social phenomena. Scholarly conjecture arising from ethnographic methods and constructivist theory are becoming more and more prominent in the literature. It was this spirit of interdisciplinary exploration that led me to wonder about the stalled democratizing forces of China—the forces that it was promised would arrive with a blossoming middle class. Can analysis of the institutions that mold the emergent class structure tell us anything about the psychology of its members? First, a brief description of some constructivist assumptions to help define the contours of our argument. At its most basic, the constructivist school of thought weighs the value of ideas in human behavior. It refutes the notion that all actions spring from rational calculation, or biological impulse, or other forms of universal programming. You are not what you eat. This theoretical openness leaves constructivist thinkers free to consider the role of culture, religion, and relationship dynamics in human and institutional behavior. A common critique of constructivism is that there are as many incompatible theories as individual thinkers, but I’ll make this easier by sticking to a couple. Alexander Wendt cares about identity. In his “structural ideation” theory, he asserts that shared ideas are the primary rubric under which the identity and interests of institutions and their members are defined. Again, this is a far cry from the rationalist assumption that underpins other studies of institutional decision making. If China’s entrepreneurial middle class is not purely motivated by self-interest, then what drives it? Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 5
Of course, a common assertion among proponents of modernization theory is that economically self-sufficient classes will gradually seek the satisfaction of liberal political ideals. Unfortunately for these theorists, contemporary research in China has repeatedly challenged this expectation. Indepth qualitative studies of entrepreneurs, public relations communiqués, interviews with heads of regional chambers of commerce, and other related source material continually reiterate the same themes: stability, national economic growth, and the importance of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) governance. Sound familiar? This brings us to yet another theme of constructivist logic: intersubjective practice. Ideas do not spring fully developed from the void. According to Friedrich Kratochwil, they are mostly cultivated through interaction between groups and individual subjects and the rules and norms that define behavior. The aforementioned studies conclude that one mode of interaction tends to dominate the intersubjective practices of elite entrepreneurs in China: interaction with the government. China’s government intervention in private enterprise goes far beyond registration, taxation, and law enforcement. The political infrastructure of China subsidizes private industry to a remarkable extent, even going so far as to deploy infrastructure development professionals to Africa to pave the way for the arrival of Chinese entrepreneurs on the continent. Domestically, local officials act as gatekeepers to important contracts, land grabs, and preferential tax policy implementation. Indeed, members of the Chinese business class that succeed at home only do so
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
with the blessing of the central government. “Many Western media have considered [that] the nonpublic sector is choosing its spokesperson so that its voice will be better heard in the political arena. I don’t share this point of view. It means that the private sector is developing against t h e gov-
ernment … but the private sector in China didn’t develop in [the same types of] conditions as [the] Western market economies. From the very first day, we developed with the support of the government.” (Zhongguo qiye jia, 2003) Is the previous statement excerpted from a government communiqué? No, these are the words of private entrepreneur Yin Mingshan of Chongqing, Sichuan. On the other hand, Yin served as president of his local industry and commerce federation and vice chairman of the Chongqing Political Consultative Congress. As ideas and interests begin to
merge between capitalists and the ruling party, their respective identities start to blur. At this point we come to a dead end with our application of constructivist theory. Again, Wendt advocates the study of interviews, internal circulars, constitutions, and other texts that convey the ideological structure of institutions. Reliance on these materials assumes that their content reflect the internal value systems of subjects. Can we assume this in an authoritarian China? If CCP benefaction holds the key to economic success for Chinese entrepreneurs, rather than run-of-the-mill competitive advantage, then companies and their representatives have lots of incentive to convey a particular image to social scientists and Chinese society at large. This is not to say that the private sector never speaks out of turn. Still, with so many compelling reasons to deceive, it may be impossible to separate the true believers from ambitious fakers. The application of constructivist theory is not only complicated in China’s private sector: What kind of capital-seeking institution is not motivated to project a certain image to ensure its survival and generate economic success? Lo and behold, rationalist assumptions about human nature emerge from the ashes. Although we have made a theoretical 180-degree turn, the facts remain more or less unchanged: China’s capitalist class is not making strides toward bringing Western democratic practices to their country. This may be because the interaction of CCP governance with the private sector molds alignment with Communist Party identity. Perhaps it’s simply a rational move on the part of entrepreneurs hoping to ensure their economic survival. Whatever theoretical model best explains the cause, the effect is one less popular election for social scientists to fail to predict. n About the author Samantha Sprole brings a degree in philosophy to bear on her research in political economy and the Chinese welfare state as a student in the IMAS program.
Indra’s Net and Western Alchemy
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 7
n infinite network of precious gems is said to hang above the palace of the Hindu god of war, storms, and rainfall. Indra’s Net, as it is known, is so arranged that the gems in the web reflect not only each other, but also the reflections of every other gem. The final effect is described in the third-century scriptures of the Avatamsaka, or Flower Garland, Sutra—one of the most influential Mahayana sutras and elaborate texts of East Asian Buddhism. In essence, the entire universe can be apprehended not only in each pearl, but also in each reflection of each pearl, and so on, ad infinitum. Also commonly known as Indra’s Jewels or Indra’s Pearls, it is a metaphor cultivated by the Mahayana Buddhist School that comprises the powerful notion of reflections within reflections, and worlds without end, and is used to illustrate the Buddhist philosophical principles of interdependence and interpenetration which hold that all phenomena are intimately connected. The net of Indra, for Buddhists, was a conception of the cosmos in a single image. David Mumford, Caroline Series, and David Wright describe the effect in their geometry book titled Indra’s Pearls: The Vision of Felix Klein: “In the heaven of the great Indra is said to be a vast and shimmering net, finer than a spider’s web, stretching to the outermost reaches of space. Strung at the each intersection of its diaphanous threads is a reflecting pearl. Since the net is infinite in extent, the pearls are infinite in number. In the glisten-
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
ing surface of each pearl are reflected all the other pearls, even those in the furthest corners of the heavens. In each reflection, again are reflected all the infinitely many other pearls, so that by this process, reflections of reflections continue without end.” Between the sixth and eighth centuries, the metaphor of Indra’s Net was developed further by the Chinese Hua-yen school, which was fond of the parable and alluded to it quite often in its literature. In his book Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra, Francis Cook describes how Hua-yen uses an image of Indra’s Net to explain the manner in which things exist. “Far away in the heavenly abode of the great god Indra, there is a wonderful net which has been hung by some cunning artificer in such a manner that it stretches out indefinitely in all directions. In accordance with the extravagant tastes of deities, the artificer has hung a single glittering jewel at the net’s every node, and since the net itself is infinite in dimension, the jewels are infinite in number. There hang the jewels, glittering like stars of the first magnitude, a wonderful sight to behold. If we now arbitrarily select one of these jewels for inspection and look closely at it, we will discover that in its pol-
ished surface there are reflected all the other jewels in the net, infinite in number. Not only that, but each of the jewels reflected in this one jewel is also reflecting all the other jewels, so that the process of reflection is infinite.” To adherents of the Hua-yen school (Hua-yen is the Chinese translation of Avatamsaka�������������������������������� ), Indra’s Net symbolizes a cosmos where an infinitely repeated mutual relationship exists among all members of the cosmos. According to Cook, this relationship is one of simultaneous mutual identity and mutual inter-causality. The Vietnamese Zen Buddhist monk and teacher Thich Nhat Hanh describes the idea of inter-causality and inter-being from the poet’s perspective: “If you are a poet, you will see clearly that there is a cloud floating in this sheet of paper. Without a cloud, there will be no rain; without rain, the trees cannot grow; and without trees, we cannot make paper. If we look
even more deeply, we can see the sunshine, the logger who cut the tree, the wheat that became his bread, and the logger’s father and mother. Everything co-exists with this sheet of paper. So we can say that the cloud and the paper ‘inter-are.’ We cannot just be by ourselves alone; we have to inter-be with every other thing.” In the entire universe, each individual is at once the cause for the whole and is caused by the whole. On the one hand, Indra’s Net is an image for how each living part is interdependent on the cosmos. At the same time, it benefits one to understand the human connection to everything and everyone. Cook argues that such a model of the universe, as it exists in the Far East, is unfamiliar to the Western mind. However, a similar conception of how things are related to each other in the universe may be found in the fundamental ideas of chaos theory and Western alchemy. Chaos theory is a comparatively new discipline in the West. It was first recognized in the 1960s, in early computer models of weather patterns developed by meteorologist Edward Lorenz. In one of his first papers, the chaotician asked a provocative question that may sound more like a zen koan than a meteorological query: “Does the flutter of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil set off a tornado in Texas?” Lorenz argued in the affirmative, emphasizing that even very tiny changes in a system can lead to large and unexpected outcomes. His finding was termed “sensitive dependence on initial conditions,” but is now perhaps better known as the butterfly effect.
Thus, chaos theory is based on the idea that nature continually feeds back actions into themselves. Before the appearance of chaos theory, Western alchemists were the first who tried to model such behaviour in a practical way, by performing a series of operations in which a developing object is taken apart and then put together. The most ancient alchemical symbol of feedback is the image of the Ouroboros, the snake that swallows its own tail. According to cli���� nical psychologist, university professor and writer Robin Robertson, the first mention of alchemy may have been in China, as long ago as the fourth century BC, whereas in the Western world it appeared during the first through the third centuries, reaching its peak in the 15th and 16th centuries, and declining during much of the 17th and 18th centuries as the scientific method took hold. The core ambition and the great desire of the alchemists was to discover the lapis philosophorum, or philosopher’s stone, which was key to the transmutation of base metals into gold—the highest and most noble metallic element. After centuries of endeavour in this Great Work, alchemists realised
that in order to turn ordinary metal to gold, one has to be pure of heart and conduct his experiments for the glory of God, not for personal gain. Accordingly, the transmutation of the ordinary into perfection became understood as an inner transformation, and the achievement of illumination. In this way the Western conception of alchemy is akin to the Eastern metaphor of
Indra’s Net, which illustrates the interpenetration and inter-connectedness of the universe, insofar as the chaos-theory notion of the butterfly effect serves to illustrate this inter-connectedness, and that the alchemists’ idea that the philosopher’s stone is within the alchemist as much as it is without, reveals that microcosm and macrocosm are infinitely related, and that only through such a transformation can we discover the true nature of the universe, and of ourselves. n
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 9
Honing Research Focus at the 2011 International Studies Association Convention in Montreal
By Ian T.Y. Chen
oo often, when we speak of ASEAN or ASEAN countries, the implicit assumption is that the 10 members that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations should be treated as a single entity: a group that shares similar foreign policies, or even a common one. A close look at the foreign policies of Southeast Asian countries, however, reveals the narrow-mindedness of that approach. A salient example goes to divergent responses toward the ASEAN-China free trade agreement implemented January 1, 2010. Although several countries welcomed the closer relationship to China, Indonesia and Malaysia voiced concerns. In addition, Southeast Asian countries vary in their perceptions of the US military presence in the region: While Vietnam seeks to balance a rising China Positive Economic Expectation with a continued US presence in the region,
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
Burma bandwagons with China. Observing Southeast Asian countries’ divergent external behavior prompted me to construct a theoretical framework to disaggregate the myth of ASEAN being a coherent, unified body. I have been fortunate here to be working with Alan Yang, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University. Our work was embodied in a research paper presented at the 2011 convention of the International Studies Association held in Montreal, Canada. In our paper, titled “A Harmonized Southeast Asia? Explanatory Typologies of Southeast Asian Countries’ Strategies to the Rise of China,” we developed our theory by examining Southeast Asian countries’ divergent responses to China’s rise. Negative Economic Expectation
photo: Bill Rosgen
We challenge four traditional explications on this topic and propose an alternative approach to explain the divergence. We argue that each country’s foreign policy toward China depends on its distinct economic and security conditions embedded within the region; therefore each would confront different security and economic relations with China. Each countries’ response can be characterized into one of four scenarios, which are conditioned by the combination of a high or low degree of threat perception (HT or LT) from China, as well as positive or negative economic expectations (PE or NE) from China. We thus hypothesize that ASEAN countries in the HT-NE situation would adopt a soft-balance approach to
China; those in the LT-PE situation would bandwagon with China; and those in either the HT-PE or LT-NE situation would hedge against China (see figure 1). In this initial project, we use qualitative data to test our hypotheses. The case of Vietnam fits well into our schema in the sense that Vietnam’s soft-balancing against China derives from a high threat perception coming from China and an expectation that economic losses will follow deeper economic cooperation with China. The case of Cambodia exemplifies the other extreme on the spectrum in the sense that Phnom Penh’s bandwagoning with Beijing derives from a low threat perception and expected economic gains. In our panel, we received valuable comments from participants, especially from Professor Yasumasa Komori, who is affiliated with Michigan State University. He rightly pointed out that examining cases that represent the extremes of soft-balancing and bandwagoning is easy: What is more challenging is explaining the hedging behavior of those countries that fall in the middle. Are there any differences between countries confronting HT-PE and LT-NE? With this in mind, we plan to extend our theoretical scope to include many kinds of hedging behaviors, instead of just one. While some countries resort to forging equidistant relationships with regional great powers as a hedging strategy of diversifying risks, others rely on the formation of a
coalition in which secondary states participate or focus on strengthening one’s own capabilities. The factors that differentiate hedging strategies could be an interesting and underdeveloped topic for us to study. In addition, finding ways to appropriately operationalize, or quantify, conditions and behavior for our research would be another emphasis of this research project. We hope our efforts on developing an operationalized dataset can contribute to the international relations literature by providing reproducible information for scholars to replicate and improve upon in the future. n
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 11
In Xiamen Harbour, China.
harles Glaser brings to light many interesting points that reflect the complex debate on whether China’s rise will be peaceful or whether it will lead to military confrontation as a consequence of the clash between Chinese expansionism and US interests and commitments in the Asia-Pacific—a clash that would ultimately trigger the use of nuclear weapons in a war between Beijing and Washington. Glaser convincingly argues that, given the nuclear deterrent that both countries possess and the virtual impossibility of an invasion conducted by either of the rivals, war is unlikely because under current circumstances both countries are able to protect their vital interests without posing a major threat to each other. Thus, if both countries can manage mutual relations without resorting to military action then the danger of conflict taking place stems from security alliances maintained by the United States in Asia. The crucial point in Glaser’s analysis is that backing away from US ties to Taiwan would remove potentially the most dangerous issue between Washington and Beijing and pave the way for better relations. It is the purpose of this essay to critically assess Glaser’s arguments in regards to US policy toward both Taiwan and China.
Nuclear escalation Glaser voices the fear that if the United States decides to comply with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that ambiguously imply US support in case of an unprovoked Chinese attack on Taiwan, such a crisis may very well escalate to full-scale nuclear war between China and United States. This is indeed a point that has been discussed on many occasions by an extensive number of scholars who provided stepby-step scenarios leading to use of nuclear weapons. Glaser’s thesis is that since Taiwan is a less-than-vital US interest, the risk of conflict over Taiwan is simply not worth it.
Of Peace and Appeasement
COMMENTS ON “WILL CHINA’S RISE LEAD TO WAR?” BY CHARLES GLASER
By Michal Thim photo: Hario Seto Supranggono
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
However, one should carefully assess such scenarios. Firstly, as capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) increase (which Glaser acknowledges on several occasions) Chinese leadership would be less tempted to resort to the use of nuclear weapons since its conventional forces will eventually be capable of countering those deployed by the United States. Secondly, if a crisis escalates, the United States may opt for extending its support for Taiwanese forces by direct attacks deep inside Chinese territory. Under such circumstances, hawks in the PLA and Politburo may indeed push for nuclear retaliation. But in this case they would knowingly opt for massive reaction at the hands of US strategic forces. A senior Chinese general once pointed out that, in the end, the United States cares more about Los Angeles than Taipei, implying that a Chinese attack on the US homeland would not be ruled out. Yet, any Chinese strategist should follow up with the question “do we care about Taipei more than we do about Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, or Chengdu?”
this issue will inevitably require the commitment of considerable resources. Moreover, an arms race does not necessarily produce instability. Lessons from Cold War can serve as an example. The extensive nuclear arms race in the 1950s and 1960s between the United States and the Soviet Union eventually reached a state of mutually assured destruction (MAD), a situation which effectively prevented conflict between the two superpowers. A second round of the arms race appeared to undermine Soviet economic performance and eventually led to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. Undoubtedly, this is a lesson that Chinese policy makers have to bear in mind.
It is clear that due to advanced weaponry on the PLA side, Taiwan no longer enjoys air superiority as used to be the case from the 1950s to the early 1990s. China also has the advantage of strategic depth, whereas the whole of Taiwan’s territory is exposed to Chinese air and missile attack. Development of the PLA Navy (PLAN) increases China’s capability to impose a naval blockade of the island. Yet, it should not be forgotten that invasion from sea is not an easy undertaking for any power, and it is hard to imagine effective Chinese control of Taiwan without putting boots on the ground. Any other military option may succeed in forcing Taiwan to make concessions but without the effective direct occupation of the island any such achievement will have limited impact and may be reversed at any time in the future. Furthermore, carefully crafted
This point relates closely to the previous one. Glaser is correct when pointing out this issue, but is this necessarily a bad situation? In the end, states can commit as many resources to an arms race as are available to them. China may be worried about Japan (as Glaser argues) but it is more worried about social unrest and tackling
A military solution
photo: Sierra Nancy Pelosi and a Congressional delegation meet with President Hu Jintao to discuss issues of mutual concern on 23 March, 2010. Missile launchers on display in a Beijing Parade.
photo: Philip McMaster Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 13
Taiwan Strait SAM and SRBM Coverage. This map depicts notional coverage based on the range of land- and sea-based missile systems, including advanced SAMs that China would likely employ in a Taiwan conflict. A single PLA Navy destroyer is used to illustrate the range of sea-based SAM coverage. Actual air defense coverage would be non-contiguous and dependent upon precise deployment sites. If deployed near the Taiwan Strait, the PMU2’s extended range provides the PLA’s SAM force with an offensive capability against Taiwanese aircraft.
Public Domain Image: US DOD
defense strategy on the part of Taiwan may discourage Beijing from the temptation of a military solution. Taiwan can and should
and its US security partner: If China resorts to the use of force, it will face the burden that anything but Taiwan’s full compliance with Beijing’s demands will be considered a failure. Taiwan and the United States on the other hand do not have to defeat the PLA; they need only prevent a Chinese victory. In regards to the previous point, it is the presence of a means to defend Taiwan that would prevent Beijing from opting for war because the likelihood of failure may be too high to be risked.
“States simply do not feel particularly enthusiastic about conceding to territorial demands and tend to choose to defend themselves instead.” adopt Chinese AA/AD (anti-access/area denial) strategy, designed to keep US forces out of Chinese waters, to China’s disadvantage. Development and deployment of Taiwanesemade ballistic or cruise-missiles on land or sea-borne platforms (particularly efficient could be stealth-capability high-speed boats) may turn the Taiwan Strait into a “no-go” zone for Chinese vessels. Development of more efficient missile defense systems either domestically built or imported from the United States may reduce the impact of a saturation missile attack on Taiwan (though defense will never be 100 percent efficient). In any case, US technological assistance will be needed but it does not necessarily have to be more than that. Despite numerous disadvantages, there is one issue favorable to Taiwan
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
Territorial concessions Glaser argues that “not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are not, accommodation can be an effective tool,” adding, “When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead not to further demands but rather to satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension.” Yet, he fails to provide any support for his argument, especially in regards to the issue of limited territorial goals. Moreover, his argument about Hitler is based on knowl-
edge of the consequences of Nazi German expansionist policy. In fact, when France and the United Kingdom agreed with the annexation of Austria and forced France’s ally Czechoslovakia to concede to German territorial demands (the case that Glaser obviously has in mind here) there was a widely shared belief that Germany’s territorial demands were limited to those territories inhabited by Germans, which resulted in the policy of appeasement. Glaser argues that backing away from commitments to Taiwan would prevent war between the United States and China, but it by no means excludes war between China and Taiwan. States simply do not feel particularly enthusiastic about conceding to territorial demands and tend to choose to defend themselves instead. The United Kingdom opposed limited territorial demands raised by Argentina in 1982 (despite facing an immense strategic disadvantage), just as Bosnians and Croats opposed Serbian limited territorial demands in the early 1990s. War might have been prevented if those demands were appeased; however, it was not acceptable for the other side in the conflict. Glaser simply does not acknowledge the possibility that Taiwan could decide to oppose Chinese demands even if it finds itself abandoned by the United States. And Taiwan may very well make such a decision after taking into consideration the burdens
that China may face if Taiwan adopts elements of an AA/AD strategy. In such a case, the United States may face a situational dilemma when its (former) ally is attacked by China and US forces are simply standing by and watching.
Credibility Glaser’s argument that a United States concession of Taiwan to China would not result in serious damage to its credibility is similarly dubious. Further in his article Glaser argues that the United States may prevent such a situation by reassuring its allies through strengthening particular elements of military cooperation (joint drills, deployment of more troops, and increases in technology cooperation). However, this may mean little either for Japan or Korea, or nations in Southeast Asia when they are confronted with a US retreat from Taiwan or, in a worstcase scenario, the United States standing by as China actually attacks Taiwan. Glaser acknowledges that US influence over Taiwan’s behavior is limited (implying that Taiwan may be tempted to declare independence while still hoping for US support) but is not the United States equally limited in the case of other allies? What would prevent Japan and Korea from increasing military spending, which would contribute to the arms races Glaser appears to be so worried about? Joint drills and reinforcement may work for a time, but is this a sustainable strategy? Glaser also downplays Chinese territorial demands in the East China Sea that directly concern Japan. His argument that China would be
photo: Jacob Ehnmark
satisfied with gaining only Taiwan sounds more like wishful thinking. What if China raises the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands issue or other claims in the East China Sea? Would the United States oppose China, or would it push Japan to make concessions because war needs to be avoided at any cost? To argue that the impact of concessions on the Taiwan issue will have no impact on the perceptions of US allies is not convincingly supported.
Conclusions It is certainly legitimate to argue that US commitments to Taiwan are not worth the possibility of war with China, and it is reasonable that American scholars question such commitments. However, Glaser does not offer convincing arguments that making concessions on Taiwan would produce desirable results: accommodating China and reassured credibility vis-à-vis its allies, notably Japan and Korea. A policy of appeasement may work … and it may not. Glaser chooses the former but fails to support his arguments.
Activists march in Roppongi, Japan to protest China’s claim over the Senkaku Islands.
The author of this essay strongly opposes the idea that current US commitments may easily lead to full-scale nuclear war. A combination of nuclear and conventional deterrence (developing Taiwan’s AA/AD and missile defense capabilities with US technological assistance) and strategic restraint in the case of a break-out of war (i.e. limiting US response purely to Taiwan’s defense) may keep a potential conflict limited to conventional warfare. Moreover, enhancing Taiwan’s defensive advantages and limiting disadvantages should be enough to make Chinese leaders think twice about choosing a military solution. At the end of the day Taipei may reach an agreement with Beijing that would prevent war once and for all. Moreover, such an arrangement is foreseen as a desirable outcome within the current framework of US policy vis-à-vis Taiwan. However, abandoning Taiwan in the hopes that it will concede its territory to China without resistance does not seem to be a viable strategy. n
Warships steam in formation during Rim of the Pacific 2010. RIMPAC includes ships from Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, France, Canada, Australia, and the United States.
photo: MC1 Scott Taylor Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 15
s ’ u o e j g n i Y a M t n e d i s e r P President Ma Ying-joem ou’s e t o r P o t s e i g e t a r t S Strategies to Promote n a w i a T n i A F C E ECFA in Taiwan By Michael Sun Shao-Cheng
his paper examines President Ma Ying-jeou’s motives for promoting the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in Taiwan. The research findings suggest that if leaders in Taipei are more aware of the concerns of the opposition parties, as well as those of the general public, through better strategic collaboration and communication skills, the public will be more likely to acquiesce to new government trade policies. This paper contributes to both the theoretical and empirical perspectives. It considers Ma’s intention of creating a working group to formulate policy, to understand the relevant organizations that can create useful strategies for promoting the importance of ECFA, and to implement government strategies for consensus-building. The main theme of this paper is how Ma recruited an economic team to create and implement the strategies that are presented as preventive measures against a potential economic crisis in Taiwan.
there would be “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” during his term in office as president of the Republic of China (ROC). He called for a return to crossstrait negotiations based on the so-called 1992 consensus. Ma’s goodwill gesture received a positive response from his Chinese counterpart, President Hu Jintao. On March 26, Hu stated that China would be willing to resume dialogue with Taiwan under the 1992 consensus. Both sides then resumed talks in June through Taiwan’s quasi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). These two organizations have produced agreements on a wide range of functional and economic issues. Primary among these is the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which is a preferential trade agreement that aims to reduce tariffs and commercial barriers. The pact, signed June 29, 2010 in Chongqing, China, has been called the most important cross-strait agreement arrived at since 1949. Taiwan’s Executive Yuan approved ECFA July 2, 2010 and it went into effect January 1, 2011. Under the 16-article agreement, Taiwan and China will attempt to reach a zero-tariff goal on goods within two years after implementation. However, Taiwan’s main opposition parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), believe that ECFA will lead Taiwan down the same road taken by Hong Kong, and that increased economic dependence on China
will eventually lead to the loss of Taiwan’s sovereignty. The DPP demanded a nationwide referendum, prompting fierce debate all over the island. Ever since ECFA became a pressing issue on Ma’s agenda, the relevant government organizations have devoted tremendous effort to shaping a positive message on ECFA in an attempt to rally public support. This paper explores how the Ma administration attempted to build public support through strategic collaboration between the government and the general public. All decisions made by the Ma administration were made behind closed doors, and as such the details were not made known to the public. This paper thus adopts a new research framework that tries to better understand these relationships and will rely on literature reviews and interviews to provide an empirical assessment. This study attempts to contribute with the following results: 1) to expand upon strategic-collaboration and consensus-building studies from both theoretical and empirical perspectives; 2) to understand the reasons why Ma wants to raise awareness of a potential economic crisis in Taiwan; 3) to explore the relevant organizations which created strategies to promote ECFA; and 4) to understand how the government implements strategies to build domestic consensus. The research question of this paper is: how did the Ma administration devise and implement strategies to garner support for ECFA from the general public?
ECF Normalizing relations
After the 2008 presidential election, the normalization of Taiwan-China relations became a top priority for President Ma Ying-jeou’s administration. The ruling Kuomintang (KMT) believes that an improved cross-strait relationship will not only reinforce Taiwan’s national security, but more importantly, increase Taiwan’s economic opportunities in China. In his inaugural address, Ma asserted that
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
Theory and framework
As the international economy becomes more closely integrated, regional groupings of states have also increased their cooperation in order to improve their bargaining positions, and to promote political and economic objectives. According to Robert Gilpin, economists are convinced that free trade is superior to trade protection. They believe that trade liberalization produces a number of specific benefits: 1) Trade liberalization increases competition in domestic markets as well as consumer choice. 2) Free trade increases national wealth by enabling countries to specialize and export those goods and services from which they can claim to have a comparative advantage. 3) Free trade encourages the international spread of know-how and thus provides developing economies with the opportunity to catch up in productivity with more advanced economies. 4) Free trade entails the prospects of world peace, according to the theory laid out by Robert Gilpin in “Trading System.” Although free trade offers many economic incentives, trade inevitably involves culture and sovereignty issues that do not easily lead to solutions acceptable to all parties. As trade penetrates deeply into national societies, it becomes increasingly entwined with politically sensitive matters and at times comes into conflict with domestic interests. Gilpin’s argument reflects cross-strait economic realities. Even though most people in Taiwan agree that free trade with China would be beneficial to the domestic economy, they are worried that China’s economic incentives to Taiwan serve only to prevent Taiwan from asserting independence, and in the process speed up Beijing’s goal of unification. The two sides have been separate since 1895, and people in Taiwan have developed their unique identity and culture, which is different from those of the people in China, who have likewise developed their own unique culture since the communist period began some 65 years ago. Hence, the different and conflicting voices of signing ECFA with China are becoming an interesting case study on Taiwan. This study uses strategic-collaboration theory to assess the perception of government leaders with respect to the establishment of strategic collaboration and the promotion of important policies to the general public. It explains why leaders have to be better attuned to the feelings of the opposition par-
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 17
ties and improve their communication skills with the general public. Building credibility with those who will be affected, identifying public concerns, building consensus among affected parties, making better decisions, and enhancing democratic practice are common goals in ����������������������������������� any efficient government policymaking exercise. While all these goals are difficult to achieve, a few of them may be attainable. According to Dorothy Norris-Tirrell and Joy Clay in “Strategic Collaboration in Public and Nonprofit Administration,” successful strategic collaboration within an organization generally proceeds in the following manner: 1) an idea emerges; 2) a set of individuals is recruited and meetings to discuss the idea are held; 3) the group brainstorms; 4) a decision is made whether strategic collaboration is appropriate; 5) participants are recruited for collaboration; and 6) decisions are made based on a common vision. In “Catalytic Leadership: Strategies for an Interconnected World,” Jeffrey Luke adds that a good leader also prescribes a core set of strategies—creating an inspiring vision, enlisting followers, and aligning stakeholders to facilitate their performance—before implementing any government policy. Based on these observations, a broad-based framework is proposed. First of all, raise the general awareness about a potential crisis: A capable state leader will raise the issues which are closely related to the lives of the general public and which are of great concern to them. Individuals will naturally pay more attention to the problems relevant to their lives. Thus the leader can elevate the On a visit to Taizhou, Zhejiang Province, SEF vice chairman Kao Koong-lian said the signing of ECFA will create opportunities for the two sides.
problem to priority status by creating a sense of urgency. Secondly, form working groups. A leader first identifies the full spectrum of stakeholders and knowledgeholders, then enlists the core working group members and designs multiple levels of participation to allow for a broader reach. A process that allocates time for defining and redefining the problem is also needed. Thirdly, create strategies. After convening the stakeholders, the leader helps them to convert and transform their concerns and interests into viable action strategies to which they can commit energy and resources. The stakeholders in turn facilitate agreements on specific strategies, projects, and initiatives that are intended to achieve the desired results. Fourthly, implement strategies. After building constituent support and erecting an advocacy coalition, the leader starts to mobilize resources while maintaining a commitment to life-long learning. Finally, evaluate the outcome. After implementation, policymakers should evaluate the outcome with the purpose of improving the decision-making process in the future.
Photo courtesy SEF
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
Photo courtesy jamesonwu
ROC President Ma Ying-jeou has been the prime mover behind the adoption of the ECFA deal between Taiwan and China.
Raising crisis awareness
A popular leader highlights the potential crisis that is closely relevant to the concerns of the general public. He can prioritize the issue and allocate government resources accordingly to prevent the crisis from materializing. For example, compared to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has signed Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with China, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and India, Taiwan has signed only five bilateral FTAs, these with its diplomatic allies from Central America. Taipei has long sought to sign FTAs with other governments, but so far it has made little headway. Only five governments in Central America have signed. The problem is primarily political opposition from Beijing, and the fact that Taipei’s major trading partners are not diplomatic allies. These mutual agreements signed with Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador only account for 0.187 percent of Taiwan’s total global exports. So far Taipei has not signed any FTAs with its regional partners. Ma perceived that the Taiwanese economy would be in a weak position because Taiwan is blocked by Beijing from entering into bilateral FTAs
with the United States, Europe and East Asian countries, which presently constitute 89 percent of its total exports. In 2008, the Taiwan trade surplus with China and Hong Kong was US$66.7 billion, while that with the rest of the world was a mere US$14.8 billion. Since China lowered tariffs on ASEAN imports in 2005, its imports from ASEAN countries have surpassed those from Taiwan in value for the first time. As regional integration continues, Taiwan’s competitiveness will continue to decline until it reaches a level at which the economy will suffer greatly. Given that signatories provide tariff exemptions on a reciprocal basis, failing to sign FTAs with key trading partners puts Taiwan at risk of being marginalized and thereby losing its competitiveness in major markets. Given these w������������������������������������� orries������������������������������� about Taiwan’s economic situation, Ma held an important meeting with his economic team on February 21, 2009. The president’s economic advisors suggested liberalizing Taiwan’s major trading markets as a means to recover and increase economic growth. Some major Taiwanese business tycoons—including those leading the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce, Chinese National Federation of Industries, Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association, National Association of Small and Medium Enterprises, General Chamber of Commerce of Republic of China, and Taiwan Federation of Industry—have urged Ma to take measures designed to enhance business competitiveness in China. Indeed, both government and business were concerned about the impact of ASEAN+1 and ASEAN+3 on Taiwan’s competitiveness in the Chinese market. In Ma’s reckoning, improved cross-strait relations would lead to free-trade negotiations with China, which in turn would help Taiwan break out of its trade liberalization isolation by convincing Beijing to allow Taiwan’s major trading partners to sign FTAs with the island nation. The Ma administration initially decided to propose that a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Arrangement (CECA) be signed with China—a campaign promise he made during the presi-
dential elections. There were strong objections from opposition parties, however, not least because of the name: the name CECA is very similar to the CEPA (Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement) pacts that China signed with Hong Kong and Macau when it was given sovereignty over the two former colonies. The opposition parties accused the ruling party of diminishing the status of Taiwan. To prevent the sensitivity of names from turning into an unnecessary political dispute, Ma decided to change the name of CEFA to ECFA. If Taiwan is unable to sign FTAs with its major trading partners it will gradually loses its competitive place in the Chinese market, and its economy will suffer greatly. Ma
therefore decided to promote ECFA in order to improve Taiwan’s stagnant economy. To build consensus within the halls of government, Ma warned that an economic crisis would be the likely result if the deal with Beijing were not signed. He also warned of other threats to the domestic economy and the general livelihood of Taiwanese people. In this manner he elevated ECFA to a top priority of his China policy. One can see that when a leader foresees a potential crisis, he must bring the issue to the public’s attention in the hopes of winning public support and paving the way for implementation.
Forming working groups
After addressing the possibility and consequences of an economic crisis, the leader starts to identify the stakeholders who can form the working group. This group will then define the problem and propose solutions. Having acknowledged a possible gloomy economy, Ma began to recruit his working team by selling ECFA as a means to make good on his campaign promise of improving Taiwan’s econ-
Photo of ROC Presidential Office courtesy Wunkai
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 19
Photo courtesy SEF
Taiwan’s Huang Chih-peng (right) shakes hands with his Chinese counterpart Tang Wei at the second ECFA negotiations March 31, 2010.
omy. The signing of ECFA will no doubt have an enormous influence on domestic industries and may even touch upon sensitive cross-strait issues, and Ma acknowledged
rather than security, issues. The ECFA deal is expected to have a significant impact in Taiwan. It is seen as Ma’s most important policy since assuming the presidency. Various levels of government organizations responsible for cross-strait affairs, the economy, agriculture, and labor issues have been actively recruited to promote ECFA. Ma assigned thenPremier Wu Den-yih, the head of the Executive Yuan, the task of supervising the ECFA process while the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) handled agendas, negotiation, and implementation, according to Dr. Chao Chien-Min, MAC’s deputy director. According to the official MAC website, the agency is responsible for planning policies, enacting regulations, and implementing ECFA policies from the strategic and political perspectives, while the MOEA shouldered the responsibility of determining the content of the agreements and negotiations with China for the technical and legal aspects of ECFA. The quasi-official SEF is in charge of dealing with technical or business matters with China, and serves as a crucial player in direct contact with its Chinese counterpart, ARATS, which was set up by Beijing for the purpose of handling technical and business matters with Taiwan in the absence of official contacts.
Other government organizations that have been tasked by the Ma administration to actively promote ECFA are the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Council of Agriculture, Council for Economic Planning and Development, and Council of Labor Affairs. Within these organizations, the Council of Agriculture and Council of Labor Affairs are particularly important. According to studies from some academic institutes, ECFA might have a negative impact on certain weaker Taiwanese industries, as well as on the livelihood of farmers and workers. These two councils have been called in to initiate countermeasures to mitigate the negative impacts of ECFA. To come up with scientific evidence, think tanks such as the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, the Foundation on Asia-Pacific Peace Studies, the Crossstrait Interflow Prospect Foundation, and Academia Sinica were asked by the administration to study the pros and cons of ECFA, and provided with government financial assistance to do so. In addition, universities such as National Taiwan University, National Chengchi University, and National Sun Yat-
“To come up with scientific evidence, think tanks ... were asked by the administration to study the pros and cons of ECFA, and provided with government financial assistance to do so.” that the successful promotion of ECFA required cooperation and coordination of policies within the various agencies of the ROC government. The National Security Council (NSC) is Taiwan’s highest defense policy advocacy organ. Like the NSC, the KMT think tank National Policy Foundation also offers suggestions and research papers on security issues to the Ma administration. The NSC, however, could not play a leading role in the ECFA negotiations because this agreement ostensibly involves only economic and legal,
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
courtesy jmywuaco A flyer advertises an academic debate on the merits of ECFA.
sen University have done their part to help, holding seminars and debates on ECFA. The results of these academic studies have been used as references for improving policymaking on ECFA-related issues.
Ma realized that this cross-strait economic agreement would encounter opposition. The DPP and TSU have strong grassroots support, so the KMT government had to double its efforts to convince them of the benefits of the deal and to allay their suspicions that ECFA was merely a first step toward a political deal with China. More importantly, the scale of ECFA included comprehensive aspects requiring the cooperation of vari-
to Cross-strait Relations,” former DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen pointed out that the people of Taiwan have the right to be informed about the details of any agreement that will have such a major impact on their way of life. To counter accusations of opacity in the ECFA negotiation process, the Ma administration created the following strategies: First, it has been presenting the agreement as a way to benefit Taiwan’s economy. The ruling party has chosen a strategy of enthusiastically promoting the benefits of ECFA by utilizing official spokesmen. They highlighted the main theme of ECFA as a purely bilateral economic agreement which can “richly benefit Taiwan while linking it Photo courtesy pseudolapiz up with the world.” The Ma administration has declared that this freeWhile leader of the opposition, Tsai Ing-wen trade pact will facilitate Taiwan’s recovery opposed the Ma administration on ECFA. from the global financial crisis. Although in itself ECFA is not a panacea, it can help ous organizations. So far, Ma has recruited Taiwan avoid being marginalized in the proorganizations and think tanks to evaluate, cess of economic globalization and regional promote, and implement the ECFA deal. Ma economic integration. After it is put into efhas also identified the stakeholders, enlisted fect, Taiwan can facilitate its economic rehis working group members, and designed structuring and boost the competitiveness multiple levels and methods of participation of its economy. Government organizations to ensure a broader reach before creating have used the research reports compiled by feasible strategies. MAC and the Chung-Hua Institution for
Economic Research to show that ECFA will add around 1.7 percent to Taiwan economic growth and created approximately 260,000 jobs. They highlighted the fact that entering the Chinese market before other trade competitors can lead to more foreign direct investment (FDI). Taiwan will then have an inflow of new FDI totaling $8.9 billion over the next seven years, they predict. ECFA can also enable Taiwan to become a partner for foreign businesses seeking to invest in China, according to the International Trade Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In this way, Taiwanese companies in China can expand their purchases from Taiwan to raise the competitiveness of local industries and keep Taiwan in the manufacturing supply chain. It can further accelerate Taiwan’s transformation into a regional industrial operations center. Second, the Ma administration is promoting the government’s contribution to Taiwan’s security: Security planners in the administration have stressed that ECFA will not touch upon the sensitive issue of unification, nor will it depend on any political premises. They underlined that the agreement would not contain any political language and it would only regulate cross-strait trade activities. As China presents a challenge to Taiwan’s security, Ma believes that the best approach to alleviating that threat is a hedging strategy. This means staying strong economically in the face of a rising China. He repeatedly stressed that if Taiwan Protestors march against ECFA in 2009.
After identifying stakeholders, leaders convert their concerns into feasible strategies to achieve their objectives. In Taiwan, ECFA has already received strong criticism, and the KMT has been accused of selling out Taiwan’s interests in exchange for closer ties with Beijing: that the deal is tantamount to the “Hongkongization” of Taiwan. Opposition political parties and other opponents of the deal have decried the shroud of secrecy under which it was negotiated. In a May 6, 2005, speech at George Washington University titled “Approaches
Photo courtesy WaDaNaBe
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 21
A government website provides education on the advantages of signing ECFA.
remains weak there would be no point in talking about autonomy. Taiwan is a fully democratic country, and should serve as a role model in guiding China toward adopting democracy. Ma underlined that Taiwan’s security is best served by making the Taiwanese economy more valuable to China. If ECFA can produce the desired outcome, it will make China and Taiwan stakeholders in each other’s economies, thereby providing incentives for maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The way Ma sees it, ECFA can create favorable conditions for bilateral exchange and cooperation, which in turn can provide the prospect of a peaceful resolution of their differences on political matters. Third, the administration has been highlighting international support for ECFA, and many countries have welcomed the ECFA initiative. The American Chamber of Commerce stated in its 2009 Taiwan White Paper, “The conclusion of this trade agreement with China would pave the way for Taiwan to participate in regional trade blocs and enter into bilateral FTAs with additional trading partners.” In a July 7, 2010 speech, US Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs David Shear said that he expected the ECFA signing would lower or eliminate tariffs on hundreds of commodities. “The US welcomes the increased trade and people-to-people ties that will necessarily result from this agreement,” Shear said. A report by a US think tank, the Peterson Institute for International
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
Economics, predicted that Taiwan’s GDP would grow by about 4.5 percent from its current level due to the effects of ECFA. A 2009 Taiwan White Paper Issue released by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry opined that, “If ECFA comes into being, it should form a great opportunity for Taiwan and Japan to discuss signing an FTA. Hence, Japan looks forward to progress being made in ECFA negotiations.” The European Chamber of Commerce also had its fair share of positive comments in its 2009-2010 Position Paper, which read, “The sooner Taiwan signs ECFA with China, the quicker political impediments to other countries (including the EU) signing economic agreements with Taiwan will be removed.” Ma continues to stress that ECFA will enable the Taiwanese economy to integrate with other countries in the region. China currently uses its political and economic clout to block Taiwan from signing trade agreements with other countries, but eventually that opposition will soften, proponents of ECFA hope. As evidence, Taiwan and Singapore have already begun discussing a trade deal, and Japan, the Philippines, and Malaysia have likewise expressed an interest in discussing investment protection deals with Taiwan, it has been reported. The favorable response to ECFA from Taiwan’s major trading partners has been highlighted by the Ma administration as evidence that the fears expressed by opponents of the deal are without merit. The administration has tasked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to form strategies to convince foreign countries of the benefits of the ECFA deal. Fourth, the Ma administration has taken
an incremental approach to meeting Taiwan’s best interests. As a framework agreement, ECFA needs a long process of gradual implementation. Though the deal is expected to yield long-term benefits, there will also be short-term impacts. Thus, the ROC government has adopted an incremental approach. Ma emphasized that ECFA negotiations would proceed from simple to complex issues; dealing first with highly complementary sectors and urgent items, and only later tackling more controversial issues. An Early Harvest approach in conjunction with an adjustment period would meet Taiwan’s urgent requirements, taking into account the short-, medium- and long-term economic development needs. The Ministry of Economic Affairs stated that it would strengthen the risk-management system by enhancing the monitoring of imports from China and setting up a cross-strait trade relief system in place of the present commodity alert mechanism. Ma’s strategy is intended to send a clear message to the public that the government has been taking a careful, flexible, and incremental approach in line with the best interests of Taiwan. From the above observations, promoting the normalization of cross-strait economic relations while avoiding the marginalization of Taiwan and elevating its position as an attractive venue for regional investment are three important objectives for Ma in selling ECFA to the public. With the aim of rebutting criticisms from the deal’s opponents and seeking the approval of the general public, the KMT government has come up with strategies to showcase the favorable side of the agreement: contributing to Taiwan’s security, highlighting international support, and adopting an incremental approach.
After various government agencies proposed their strategies for promoting ECFA, decision makers will evaluate the pros and cons of each and then choose the strategies they think will offer maximum value at a lower cost. The leader will then mobilize the government’s resources to implement those strategies. Ever since the Ma administration announced its decision to sign the ECFA deal with China, the executive branch has proposed various options. After screening out unfeasible options, government agencies started to conduct various planning activities and launched the active promotion of
ECFA was a major focus of the televised debate between President Ma and thenDPP Chairwoman Tsai April 25, 2010.
ECFA through various channels. The implementation strategies included the following approaches: 1) Highlighting a favorable survey: ECFA has aroused widespread attention and become a focal point for debate in Taiwan. The MAC commissioned Berkeley Business Information Greater China to conduct a public opinion survey from April 8 to 11, 2009. The result shows that people in Taiwan have
a positive view of ECFA. According to the poll, about 60 percent of the public believes the signing of ECFA would be conducive to the negotiations and signing of free trade agreements with other countries. In addition, over half of respondents said they believe ECFA is aimed at dealing with economic issues and will not dwarf Taiwan’s sovereignty. On July 6, 2010, MAC released another survey which found that nearly 61 percent of respondents support the results of the ECFA negotiations. Another 79.3 percent endorsed the government’s handling of cross-strait affairs via the institutionalized negotiations. MAC Deputy Minister Chao Chien-min said the survey results prove that the Ma administration had achieved its goal of obtaining at least 60 percent of public support for ECFA. It also revealed that over 59.2 percent of respondents saw the agreement as being
beneficial to Taiwan’s long-term economic development. The ruling party obviously utilizes this favorable survey to sell its policy in the hopes of garnering support from all sectors in Taiwan. 2) Increasing communication with people in all walks of life: In keeping with Ma’s directive to prioritize promotion of the pact’s advantages, a series of measures has been put in place aimed at informing the public and affected industries about ECFA and its potential impact. Based on their area of responsibility, ministries have produced television commercials, established a pro-ECFA website, held forums to communicate with the residents of central and southern Taiwan, broadcast radio programs in different dialects, and published easy-to-understand brochures in an effort to promote the benefits that ECFA will bring. The KMT took part in its first-ever televised debate June 25, 2010 on the ECFA issue, during which Ma sparred with then-DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen over whether the deal is good for Taiwan. The above promotional campaigns were aimed at helping people develop a better understanding of ECFA and thereby support the government’s position. Wearing green, the color of the opposition DPP, farmers protest the signing of ECFA.
Photo courtesy Yufu Lin
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 23
3) Gaining support from lawmakers: The KMT government states that it will abide by three criteria of “meeting the nation’s need, winning the support of the public, and proceeding with legislative oversight concerning the issues of ECFA.” The government has promised to report the details of cross-strait negotiations to the speaker, the party caucus, and various committees within the Legislative Yuan to ensure legislative oversight. ECFA was passed by the KMT-controlled Legislative Yuan August 17, 2010, despite a boycott by DPP lawmakers, and went into effect January 1, 2011. 4) Emphasizing the rights of farmers and laborers: In deference to the criticism that ECFA will damage the livelihood of farmers and workers, the Ma administration ar-
ing an influx of Chinese white-collar workers to find jobs in Taiwan, which would exacerbate unemployment in Taiwan and put at risk the job security of currently employed locals. To justify its claim that people should have a voice on important government polices, the DPP demanded that the ruling party hold a referendum on ECFA. They succeeded in getting the initial quota of signatures needed for their draft proposal calling for a referendum. However, the Referendum Review Committee of the Executive Yuan rejected the proposal, calling it “vague and premature.” Given that ECFA is an economic pact, the government claims that it should be discussed on rational grounds through a democratic mechanism so as to establish consensus among all segments of society. Considering such a pact involves highly technical issues, it would be inappropriate to resort to a referendum of the people. The government added that referenda are time-consuming and expensive: It would cost around NT$500 million to hold one. If the government were to hold a referendum for every major policy, it would be very hard for the government to operate, the Ma administration argued, stating that ECFA is purely an economic matter that does not involve the issue of sovereignty or politics. The KMT has used various methods to stall DPP attempts to hold a referendum on ECFA. In sum, after the Ma administration laid out its strategies for pushing ECFA, agencies of central and local governments started to establish communications using various approaches to reach the people of Taiwan. They implemented the strategies of presenting favorable surveys, increasing communications, gaining support from legislators, and promising compensation to affected industries. Now that ECFA has been in force for nearly a year, it appears that the Ma administration has been successful in promoting its economic pact with China. Nevertheless, due to remaining divisions on the value of ECFA, the Ma administration will continue to be cautious in dealing with this issue in view of future cross-strait relations. The realization of ECFA had the following phases: 1) individual research phase: Taiwan and China engaged their individual researchers to pinpoint the pros and cons of
“The Ma administration will continue to be cautious in dealing with this issue in view of future cross-strait relations.” gued that the former DPP government under former President Chen Shui-bian also caused damage to the livelihood of farmers by lifting restrictions on Chinese agricultural imports to Taiwan without first engaging in any cross-strait negotiations. Since Ma took power, his administration has been working hard to remedy the damage inflicted upon farmers. At present, more than 830 Chinese agricultural products previously allowed under the DPP administration have been blocked, and the KMT government will not ease restrictions on such imports. In light of ECFA’s potential negative effects, the Council of Agriculture and Council of Labor Affairs have come up with a budget of NT$95 billion as well as non-financial assistance to upgrade the competitiveness of farmers and workers expected to be affected by the deal. 5) Stalling attempts to hold a referendum: There is much controversy in Taiwan over the ECFA about the potential effects on local Taiwanese businesses and the manner in which ECFA was imposed upon the public by the KMT government. The DPP and other pro-independence groups believe the ECFA is a cover for unification with China. These opponents also have concerns about allow-
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
the agreement. Both sides wrapped up their individual studies and made the results public in July and October 2009, respectively. 2) Collective research phase: Taiwan’s ChungHua Institution for Economic Research and China’s Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation conducted a collaborative research program. They made their results public January 20, 2010 by asserting that ECFA would be beneficial for cross-strait economic activity. 3) Signing ECFA: Representatives from Taiwan and China inked the agreement in China June 29, 2010. 4) The review by the Legislative Yuan: Lawmakers then reviewed the content of ECFA and then enacted the agreement a few weeks later. 5) The implementation of ECFA: The pact became law January 1, 2011 going into full effect.
The findings of this study are as follows: At the initial stage of raising awareness, Ma highlighted the idea that if Taiwan failed to sign FTAs with the major trading partners, Taiwan’s economy and the lifestyle of the people would suffer greatly. This proves that when a leader foresees a potential crisis he should raise the issue for public consumption to gain support from people and pave the way for the government to implement its policy. At the stage of forming working groups, Ma enlisted working group members from among his administration. Based on their own areas of expertise, government agencies then created feasible strategies to realize and promote ECFA. At the stage of creating strategies, the government actively promoted the bright side of the pact and underlined the rights of the people that would need protection and compensation. At the stage of implementation, the Ma administration implemented the policies of increased communication with the people and gained the support of the KMT-controlled Legislative Yuan. This study shows that the theories of strategic collaboration can be applied to President Ma Ying-jeou’s strategies to promote ECFA in Taiwan. n About the author Michael Shao-Cheng Sun is an Assistant Professor at Tamkang University. He is also a student in the IDAS program, working on his second PhD. Dr. Sun specializes in cross-strait relations and U.S. foreign policy in the Asia Pacific.
Jaded Tur key By Janet Tan
Ingredients: 2 cucumbers
1/2 lbs ground turkey 2 tablespoon dr y black beans (o ptional) 1 diced green on ion 2 diced garlic cl oves 1 egg 1 teaspoon salt 1 teaspoon pepp er
photo: Peter Smith
1. Crosscut cu cumbers into 2 -inch long pieces without poking and spoon out th through the bott e seeds of each om. (Be sure to because the en piece trim the two en ds are bitter.) ds of the cucumbe 2. Mix the grou rs off nd turkey and al l the rest of the 3. Stuff a spoo ingredients well. nful of the grou nd turkey mix in 4. Put all filled cu to a cucumber pi cumber pieces in ece. Fill all pieces a plate and plac 5. Steam on high . e the plate in a for 15 minutes steamer. . Ready to serve with rice.
photo: F Delventhal
Spring 2012â€‚ Asia-Pacific Newsletterâ€‚ 25
pped with fla ne a A Halifax donair is Variations on the do d Turkey, but as and a sweet sauce. s oe at m to d an abian Peninsula an ns Ar e onio th , nt va Le e lifax. Note e Balkans, th rth are made in Ha ea on found in Greece, th es on st be e pints of beer. will tell you, th , following several am 3 t any good Canadian ou ab at d ye s Donair. are best enjo apted from All Thing ad re to cuisiniers: They we w lo be e uc meat and sa The recipes for the m All Recipes. ead was adapted fro br e th r fo e cip re e Th
on to By Judy Mackinntbread pita filled with spiced ground beef, r kebab can be
photo: Kris Griffon
photo: Ryan Jones photo: Martin Norris
photo: Lisa Risager
photo: Shai Barzilay
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
The Sauce portant sauce. The first is the traditional way. There are two different ways to make the all-im a thick sauce using this recipe takes a light It requires evaporated milk and sugar. Achieving tened condensed milk, and achieving a thick hand, and it can be tricky. The second uses swee sauce with it is easy. Recipe #1 Ingredients: • 2/3 cup canned evaporated milk • 2/3 cup white sugar • 1/4 cup white vinegar powder • 1 clove finely minced garlic or 1/2 tsp garlic in a bowl until the sugar is dissolved. Add c Directions: Stir canned milk, sugar and garli the vinegar and the less you mix, the thicker vinegar and continue mixing. The faster you add the consistency to be at least that of yogurt. the sauce will be. Do not over stir. You’ll want ving that. Let sauce sit for at least one hour The less you stir, the better your chance of achie in refrigerator before using. may start to separate. DO NOT STIR IT. If you If you do not use the sauce for several days, it the thick sauce off the top. It tastes fine, do, it will become very thin. Instead, simply skim seeped out of it. despite the appearance that all the vinegar has Recipe #2 Ingredients: • 2/3 cup canned sweetened condensed milk • 1/4 cup white vinegar powder • 1 clove finely minced garlic or 1/2 tsp garlic add 1/2 cup vinegar, and 1 tsp garlic powder) milk, d (Or for a 14oz tin of sweetened condense a above, except that you really need to stir for Directions: Follow the same instructions as ing Stirr ed. ar mixed properly. Do not be alarm long time to get the condensed milk and vineg Leave set for a few minutes and you will be able thin. this recipe for a long time will not make it pour out. to turn the bowl upside down and none of it will recipe will likely last two servings at most. this in Please note, the amount of sauce provided a long time in the fridge. This sauce can be made in large batches and last
The M e
at Ingredie nts: • 3 pound s le • 3/4 cup an hamburger * bread cru mbs • 2 tsp p epp • 1-2 tsp er ca • 1 1/2 t yenne red pepper (d sp oregan epending o on your ta • 3 tsp p aprika ste) • 2 tsp o nion powd er • 1 tsp g arlic powd e r • 1/2 tsp sa *The finer lt ground th e grinder s everal tim meat, the better it photo: Vancity Allie e wil s grind tha t you find for you, or you can l be for slicing. Yo u in the sup do it your Directio self with can ask a butcher erma ns a food pro t tightly fo : Combine all ingre rket. cessor. O o run it through a dien rm r, you can heit. Cool ed, firmly packed lo ts in a large bowl just use t and loa av he the donair ves. The loaves ca es. Bake on a broile knead until they a n be used re well-ble r pan for 2 s, slice th right awa e loaves t nded. Sha to 2 1/2 flavour an y hinly and d texture brown the or wrapped and fr hours at 300 deg pe into two . oze ree slices in a non-stick n. When you are re s Fahrenady to ma pan. Extr a brownin g improve ke s the
photo: Martin Norris
owboy bread,’ n make your own ‘c ca The Bread u yo or d ea br ta e with pi Donairs can be mad
. which is even better
ad Recipe Cowboy Bre
Ingredients: ter • 1/2 cup boiling wa ilk m ld • 3/4 cup co sugar • 1 teaspoon white active dry yeast s on po • 1 1/2 teas • 1 egg, beaten oled tter, melted and co • 2 tablespoons bu lt er the top, and • 1/4 teaspoon sa rinkle the yeast ov Sp r. ga su d ur an flo , d ilk ea • 4 cups br ther the water, m rge bowl, stir toge . Mix until Directions: In a la ssolve. 2 cups of the flour di d an to s lt te sa e inu th m 5 by r d ay from the followe let stand fo the dough pulls aw the yeast mixture o til un int e er tt tim a bu d at p an g cu Stir the eg ning flour, 1/2 ended. Mix in remai a greased everything is well bl ace the dough into Pl s. te inu m . wl 10 r bo fo knead for another 20 side of the ured surface, and and let them rest , flo a lls to ba 8 on o h ug int h do e ug Turn out th ze. Divide the do e until doubled in si -high heat. bowl, and let it ris skillet over medium ick st nno y av he a er. Heat own spots apminutes. light to medium br 10 inches in diamet til to un 8 or to , t de ou si ll ch ba Roll each seconds on ea bag until serving. bread for 30 to 60 or store in a plastic , th clo p spoon over the m da Cook each piece of a th o a piece of bread, d covered wi int ea t br ea m ed d ok ne co e ow br th pear. Keep rous amount of ir by placing a gene and enjoy. Assemble the dona d matoes an onions to d pe op ch d ad d sauce, an
photo: Kristine Leuze
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 27
By Any Other Name...
Story and photos by Natalie Pretzer-Lin
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 29
. or anyone living in Taipei this past year, it has been hard to avoid the brightly colored ads on billboards, buses, and trains trumpeting the 2010-2011 Taipei International Flora Exposition. Others have investigated the Expo’s political and economic significance: Is it an effective example of the Republic of China’s soft power, or just a resume-builder for Taipei Mayor Hau Lungbin? How should the Expo’s revenues be dispersed? Setting aside the academic and political debates for now, I’d like to offer my personal impression: The Flora Expo’s Top nine Ps. Hey, everyone else is doing top-10 lists, so I made mine a top 9. A photography enthusiast lines up the perfect shot.
“pai dui” (to queue)
A Bonsai tree demonstrates perfection in miniature.
The Flora Expo site was easily accessible by shuttle bus, as well as by the city’s Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) system, either via the Danshui Line’s Yuanshan Station or the new Wenhu Line’s Zhongshan Elementary School Station. The Expo grounds sprawled over the existing Dajia and Xinsheng parks and the area around the Taipei Fine Arts Museum. The park occupies a prime piece of non-mountainous, central Taipei real estate, however its proximity to the Songshan Airport created an interesting phenomenon: About once every 15 minutes an aircraft heading in to land buzzed the entire Expo site. While this can be disconcerting at first, a close-up view of the underbelly of the occasional plane and its landing gear provided an excellent distraction while waiting in line.
Schoolchildren from one of Taiwan’s elementary schools sit and rest during a field trip to the flower show.
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
Waiting in line is standard fare for any event of the Flora Expo’s size, and compared to stories about monster queues at Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo or Hong Kong’s Disneyland, the lines at Taipei’s Flora Expo were nothing to complain about. Organizers took care to direct queuing visitors in an orderly fashion, post interesting facts on signs, and offer plenty of benches along the line. Moreover, they had the foresight to keep long lines of visitors in comfortable shade under well-placed trees. Managing visitor expectations by posting approximate wait times also made the experience more enjoyable.
Queuing offers time for another pastime: people watching. The official Flora Expo website reports a “remarkable” level of foreign visitors, at just under six percent of the more than 8
million attendees. What about the other 94 percent, you may ask? Personal observation leads me to the conclusion that tour groups made up primarily of retirees and school field trips involving scores of children constituted the majority of Flora Expo visitors. Preschoolers in their brightly colored matching sweat suits at times outshone the flowers in front of which they posed for photos. The interaction between the two groups could be fascinating as well: I witnessed an elderly A-bei scold a rowdy middle-schooler for the ruckus he was causing.
A topiary whale was one of the most popular, and most photographed, attractions at the expo.
A cultural product from the Philippines, these masks added color to the many pavilions at the show.
Recreational photographers no doubt represented another significant group of Flora Expo visitors. Walking around National Chencgchi University’s campus on the weekends, it becomes apparent that the recent affordability of digital single-lens reflex (DSLR) cameras has led to a significant increase in recreational photographers. What better place to test out your budding photographic skills then the Flora Expo? Photographers crowded around displays trying to get the perfect close up of intricate blooms and snap away as their significant others modeled in front of
a field of flowers. Occasionally, they decided to capture strangers in their more candid moments—I caught three such paparazzi in
the act of taking my own picture. In the spirit of “if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em,” I found myself likewise taking pictures of fellow visitors. Many were as interesting as the plants.
The Expo boasted 14 eateries offering a variety of meals, drinks and desserts. Surprisingly, snacks at the Expo were not unreasonably overpriced. The variety of international food was somewhat limited, but the best of Taiwanese delicacies, including beef noodles, pig knuckles, and oyster omelets, was widely available. Even the snack food looked to have been arranged by professional florists.
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 31
Embracing the flower motif, one shop offered milk tea with multi-colored, multi-flavored (including lavender and rose) pearls. Promoting environmental awareness, the Taiwanese Gourmet Delight strip broke with night-market tradition and served delicacies
eco-products and Ideas
One of the main focuses of the Flora Expo was eco-awareness. Emphasizing recycling and energy efficiency, the Expo debuted some futuristic ideas for eco-friendly living. Each of the Expo pavilions incorporated energy-conserving techniques and environmentally friendly building materials. Popular gift-shop souvenirs included collapsible, reusable dinnerware, such as cups, bowls, and chopsticks.
Orchids grown in Taiwan were among the most beautiful and popular flowers on display at the flora expo.
on reusable tableware. The self-service dish repository seemed to go over well, and the picnic area stayed clean, with less rubbish than there would have been had traditional disposable containers been used.
Scattered throughout the Expo grounds were seven specially built pavilions, with the true star of the show being the Pavilion of Dreams and its interactive displays that allowed visitors to “experience the aural and tactile sensations of flowers.” Unfortunately, to visit this popular pavilion, guests had to arrive early enough to get tickets, as only a limited number were sold each day. The six remaining pavilions did not require special ticketing. Two that
Some pavilions defied explanation.
stood out were the Pavilion of New Fashion and the Pavilion of Future. The Pavilion of New Fashion was built from recycled construction materials including bamboo, recycled steel I-beams, and more than a mil-
Countries like Thailand showcased their treasures at the various pavilions.
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
Even the humble cactus had a place of pride at the flora expo.
lion and a half plastic bottles. The modern, two-story construction housed a reflecting pool filled with water lilies, children’s art projects, and attire from the 2010 Vogue Floral Fashion Show, held at the pavilion in November. The Pavilion of the Future was a giant greenhouse featuring a variety of different climatic conditions all in one convenient place. In one building, visitors could experience desert, high-mountain, and rainforest climates. The pavilion also housed an impressive display of thousands of orchids.
In addition to exploring diverse climates, visitors could also journey to other countries. The Global Garden Area showcased a floral parade of nations. The most eye-catching attraction was Thailand’s national flower, the Ratchaphruek, completely covering a golden boat and life-sized elephant. The impressive display representing the Philippines featured foliage, cultural artifacts like painted masks and fans, and a replica of the ruins of the old San Ignacio Church at Intramuros. Omar’s castle replica and rose garden showcased the
floral beauty of an arid nation. Canada’s simplistic, futuristic design highlighted hydroponics technology, while the United States’ garden was an unimpressive hodgepodge of different types of plants with a not-so-subtle “buy American” message.
Blooms, buds and blossoms were the main attraction at the Flora Expo. Being a person from a northern clime, I found the overabundance of fully blooming orchids to be a show-stopper. The official Flora Expo guide offered a handy list of ten intriguing plants, including Taiwan’s signature calla lilies, tiny bonsai trees (some over a century old), and the Codariocalyx motorius, or dancing grass, whose leaves quiver in response to sound. The Expo also provided a close look at edible plants, including different types of tea, pineapples, and the curious-looking dragon fruit. According to municipal officials, many of the outdoor plants and some of the pavilions will stay in place, so you may still have the opportunity to visit Dajia Riverside Park and take a walk through the other parks to enjoy these blooms for yourself. n
In case you missed your chance to visit the Flora Expo (or if you want to relive the memories), tune into the Discovery Channel, which feature Taipei’s Flora Expo in one of its Focus on Taiwan episodes.
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 33
Economic Integration in East Asia and the Role of the State By Sebastian Biba
n theory, there can basically be three different forces behind economic cooperation and integration processes, namely the market-driven, functional and institutional approaches. To begin with, market integration (which, in a sense, might also be termed regionalization) describes a process that happens more or less spontaneously. In this form, integration is characterized as a consequence of uncoordinated private sector-led processes. Trade and investment patterns are the main drivers here. In contrast, both functional and institutional integration could be defined as variations of regionalism: that is, cooperation and coordination processes that are self-consciously driven consequences of political, state-led activities. Further distinguishing the latter two forces, when governments launch regional cooperation on particular fields and agree to execute collective action plans and programs, they are promoting functional cooperation that might lead to functional integration. Institutional integration, on the other hand, seeks to establish some form of regional structure as an overarching framework, generally grounded on binding agreements. East Asia, unlike Europe, has largely been An observer follows the movement of Tokyo stock prices on the board.
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
a region where market forces constitute the mize the dead end of East Asian integration. single most important key driver of coopYet, has East Asian economic cooperation eration and integration. Accordingly, the and integration really been purely marketfirst wave of regionalism in East Asia after driven from the outset? On the one hand, it World War II started off with Japan’s busi- is certainly correct that without the hollowness conglomerates and was later succeed- ing out of the Japanese economy as a first ed by the economies of the Four Dragons step (as with the shifting abroad of labor(Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) LIMITED ENTHUSIASM setting up what has been called Factory Asia. This development mainly refers to the establishment of regional production networks and supply chains by multinational corporations (MNCs) and the emergence of triangular trade that also spanned the United States and other Western markets. Only after the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of intensive stages of production in order to 1997, which was, among other things, fol- lower manufacturing costs), integration prolowed by the foundation of the ASEAN Plus cesses would have been very unlikely to get Three (APT) mechanism, observers saw the started. On the other hand, however, there beginning of more functional cooperation remain limitations to an all-encompassing under the aegis of regional governments—a explanatory power of market-driven integraprocess that has been gathering momentum tion theory in East Asia: Besides the fact that ever since. Finally, institutional integration Japanese MNCs had (and continue to have) has, up to this day, been deemed to epito- very close relationships to the state, it is also quite evident that the hierarchical Flying Geese pattern that shaped East Asian integration during its early phases (and, in some modified way, until the AFC) was heavily promoted and financially supported by the Japanese government. To facilitate Japanese companies’ penetration of East Asian markets, the Japanese government clearly used foreign aid as one of the tools. Additionally, at the onset of regional integration (and even today), most of the regimes in East Asia were, and are still, non-democratic. Their enthusiasm for the neoliberal economic growth model has always been limited. Instead, these countries have become famous for their “developmental state” model. In this model, the state has more independent, or autonomous, political power, as well as more control over the economy. Therefore, the developmental state
“Most of the regimes in East Asia were, and are still, non-democratic. Their enthusiasm for the neoliberal economic growth model has always been limited.”
photo: D.C. Zwick Geese fly in formation in a pattern famously reminiscent of Asian industrial development.
is characterized by strong state intervention in the economy, especially in terms of regulation and planning. Given these circumstances, the role of the state in pre-AFC East Asian economic cooperation and integration seems to have been undervalued. Even though the business community led the way, the state was following close behind. This is not to say that the early stages of East Asian integration already witnessed forms of functional integration, though. The governments acted rather unilaterally and independently from each other. That is to say, describing the takeoff of East Asian economic cooperation and integration as purely market-driven is misleading to some extent. The turn toward functional, and thus more officially government-led, integration in East Asia indeed required what the theoretical literature terms a “critical juncture:” a crisis that breeds stimulus for change in order to address a common problem under immense time pressure. The AFC can be seen as such a critical juncture, without which a more functional and government-led approach toward regional integration would have been unlikely to gain momentum. It was certainly not amity among East Asian countries, nor was it a long-term agenda, that helped ignite the more recent drive toward regional cooperation. Instead, the mutual realization of the collective vulnerabilities that each state faced
without some form of institutional buffering played a critical role. Today, the APT can be said to have evolved into the most promising vehicle to enhance functional regional cooperation, despite all its shortcomings. Especially in the financial realm, the Chiang-Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Market may well serve as catalysts for future integration in other fields, too. As a result, while business continues to spin ever more dense webs throughout the region and therefore keeps contributing to further and more integrated cooperation by increasing intraregional trade figures, governments have become much more active in consulting each other and trying to move ahead with economic integration along a commonly set developmental path. Functional integration in East Asia is thus likely to consolidate and intensify in the future. Whereas implementation has often remained slow, the rhetoric—so important in East Asia—has clearly begun to lean in this direction. Summing up, economic cooperation and integration in East Asia has often been regarded as solely stirred by market-driven forces. While there is no doubt about the vital and positive role of business, the region-
al states have been playing important roles right from the very start. With the end of the Cold War and, even more prominently, in the post-AFC period, East Asian governments have no longer only played an informal and invisible role. Members participate in the 44th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Asian Development Bank.
photo: Asian Development Bank
With these governments entering the stage more formally, a “selfish” functional cooperation seems to have taken the driver’s seat in economic integration in the region. Marketdriven forces remain important and useful, however, as they continue to offer private (and less regulated) channels that have the potential to spill over into more functional cooperation in the future. Still existent limits to functional integration are a second reason for the continued importance of businessdriven efforts. n
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 35
Taking Taiwan By John Schmeidel Photos by Martin Norris 36
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
How Likely to Succeed is a Chinese Military Attack upon Taiwan? Until the last several years, the orthodoxy in strategic circles was that either an all-out invasion of Taiwan by China, or actions of war short of invasion would be unlikely to succeed, due to Taiwanese superiority in weaponry, training, and the natural strong points of an island nation. This analysis suggests that, while these considerations still are weighty, all advantages are radically smaller than five years ago. Mounting a successful defense is not only less likely than it was ten or even five years ago,
it shall be less likely still in five years if present military trends in China continue. It is therefore at least prudent for the Taiwanese military to make contingency plans for a rapid loss of air and naval superiority in the Taiwan Strait, a partial or full amphibious invasion, and a last-ditch guerrilla resistance by Taiwanâ€™s reserves and other able-bodied men, fighting with electronic media publicity, to obtain the best possible terms for Taiwan against China or to force them to withdraw under threat of US intervention.
The Seizing of the Presidential Palace, Chen Yifei and Wei Jingshan, 1977
he Confucian overtone of the quote by People’s Liberation Army (Navy) Admiral Jiang Zhijun, specifically the phrase “bequeathed to us by our ancestors,” nicely underlines the mystical resonance of the professional military literature in China that is unknown to the casual Western reader. The practical significance of this problem of a possible invasion of Taiwan is apparent not only from the strategic studies literature, but also from perusing either of the two major Taiwanese daily newspapers in late 2010 and early 2011. In the state of chronic tension between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1949, notwithstanding a certain amount of détente of late that may or may not last, the question is most germane. This short exploratory paper projects a scenario that could come to pass if a three-way game of
chess goes wrong, and the most powerful side with the most pieces throws away the rule book to attack the weaker opponent by coming right over the chess board.
“The Korean War distracted the Chinese from 1950 to 1953, the last really dangerous time when the Chinese Communist Party contemplated invasion in hot pursuit of the vanquished Kuomintang.”
The Republic of China (ROC), its ally the United States, and the PRC are engaged in an intricate three-way balancing act of differing interests and mutual counterclaims of sovereignty. The playing field shifts from year to year in each country, as US and ROC administrations change. In the PRC, the posture alters as different leaders rise and wane in influence, and the relative power of factions like the military and party shifts. The ascension to the status of presidential heir-apparent to PRC President Hu Jintao by the very orthodox
Naval artillery sits on display in front of the Museum of Marine Exploration near the Port of Kaohsiung.
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
Xi Jinping in October, 2010 (when he was named vice chairman of the Central Military Commission) arguably makes a war against Taiwan encouraged by the hardline People’s Liberation Army (PLA) an even more real possibility. Asian perceptions about a good reason to go to war do not correspond to rational Western ones. Nor does their strategy, or definition of defeat, or notions of cutting losses, as America found to its cost in Vietnam. The military balance is moving month by month, as new weapons systems come on stream and existing ones are augmented. How much one can threaten has a lot to do with how much one has the muscle to demand. Land-based short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and cruise missiles (LACM) pointed squarely at this island are the most glaring fact on the ground that the ROC must contemplate. The PRC has today over 1,250 short range, non-nuclear ballistic mis-
siles poised at bases in Fujian, Guangdong and Zhejiang, all aimed at Taiwan’s economic and political centers, with no sign of the pace of accumulation slowing; there were only 350 such missiles in the middle of the last decade. Without going into the details of megatonnage and circular error probable (CEP) calculations, each is thought to carry a 500 kilogram high-explosive warhead and to be remarkably accurate compared to five years ago, just using Newtonian ballistics of falling to terminal velocity from an apogee. Two per target is customary for insurance; this would obliterate an area roughly 100 yards in radius, including underground bunkers, with roughly a forty-yard radius of anticipated accuracy—quite high by any standard. Cruise missiles are perhaps twice again as precise. RAND Corporation calculates as little as five yards CEP for the latest class of ballistic missiles. Imagine a first wave of
200 landing on downtown Taipei’s government district and the city’s elevated outskirts like Yangmingshan and southern Xindian, where communications command-and-control towers are placed. The pace of China’s military innovation, focused largely upon land, air and naval hardware suitable for use against a nearby adversary within 300 kilometers of its coast, makes it difficult to escape the conclusion that the PRC is preparing either contingency plans for an outright invasion of Taiwan or is massing its forces to such an extent that it expects compliance from Taiwan without having to fire a shot, according to an assessment by the US Department of Defense. This source is by no means a hawkish one, incidentally: Other scholars have criticized it for being too soft on the gravity of the Chinese military buildup.
Credible military deterrent For Taiwan to maintain its sovereignty, assuming it wants to, it must display a credible military deterrent in conventional, non-nuclear terms. Taiwan has no nuclear arms to employ against China, whose use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is beyond the scope of this study. This essay examines what is known in the open literature about the order of battle of both sides and the details of the most likely attack scenario for a full-fledged invasion, or an attack just short of that aimed at intimidation into a political solution favorable to Beijing. “The old order passeth:” strategic assumptions accepted since 1949 are now outmoded. From the arrival of the mainlanders in Taiwan after their defeat at the hands of Mao Zedong and the Communists in 1949, the ROC and the population of the island have considered themselves to be in a safe redoubt impervious to PLA assault. The Korean War distracted the Chinese from 1950 to 1953, the last really dangerous time when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) contemplated invasion in hot pursuit of the vanquished Kuomintang (KMT). By the mid1950s, Taiwan’s position as an anti-Communist bastion placed it under American protection that the Communists had neither the means nor the will to challenge. As late as 2000, when Taiwanese or US planners examined the question, they discounted the ability of the Chinese to threaten Taiwan, thanks to: peculiar weather conditions and geology of the Taiwan Strait and coastal waters; the coastal geography of Taiwan that funneled any probable naval and amphibious attack into a readily defended kill zone; the PRC’s technically inferior air plat-
forms and naval vessels compared to the ROC and most especially compared to the Americans; the relatively poor training and doctrinal development of the Chinese land, air, and naval forces for power projection outside of China’s land mass, especially the demanding symphony of a combined amphibious operation coordinating three service branches; a highly motivated ROC naval, air and land force. It seemed axiomatic that given the advantages of static defense of an island, even one only 100 kilometers distant from Fujian, the PLA could never hope to prevail without a Normandy-style flotilla of half a million to one million men that would take weeks to land; and an avowed or understood security guarantee from the United States that would fling the full weight of the United States Seventh Fleet, the Air Force and Marine Corps against a PRC attack that looked like it had more than nuisance value. To be sure, Taiwan’s geography has not changed, and local weather, geology, and oceanography continue to be the island’s best friend against its bellicose neighbor. As the distance from Taiwan to China is about the same as that from southern England to France, there is more than a passing resemblance to the “castle moat” effect that served England so well for centuries. In the combat zone of the Taiwan Strait and north and south, water is uniformly shallow, which cuts both ways for submarines and sub hunters of either side. They cannot hide in the deep blue waters beloved of submariners, but the busy commercial traffic up and down the strait and the South China Sea makes identifying submarines amidst the clutter once they have left port very difficult for other subs or for anti-sub sonar.
Choke-point straits North and south there are choke-point straits—the only blue water is east of Taiwan, stretching all the way to the Second Island Chain of Guam and the Marianas. Varying tides and unpredictable weather in the strait, especially the high winds that cripple landing craft, make launching an invasion fleet a matter of chance. The Pescadores Islands are a formidable defensive lookout point, as long as they remain in friendly hands. Although dated in other respects, especially order of battle, a close analysis published in 1999 by strategist Paul Eremenko of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is persuasive that topography would allow the ROC to either retain the Pescadores air and naval bases against any foreseeable assault or readily destroy it should it fall to the Chinese.
There are very few beaches on the west coast of Taiwan suitable for landing craft, in terms of gradient, calm conditions, firm sand that could support armor, and that have enough contiguous land roads to enable a breakout from the beachhead. Hsinchu, just south of Taipei, is the only suitable shorefront of any size, a fact long prepared for by the ROC armed forces. Nearly the entire west coast of Taiwan is fronted by mud flats at low tide, where landing craft would run aground. The east coast is steep and mountainous with a steep downward gradient—a coastal defender’s paradise. Since 2005, however, and at an accelerating rate, at least one of the other strategic underpinnings begins to look dubious: qualitative military superiority. This is not intended to strike an alarmist note and proclaim that Taiwan’s defense is a lost cause, but that it is plain that time is against it. All trends are favoring China: None seem to be running the other way. If the ROC does not make a deliberate effort to reverse the tide, inside of a decade the conclusion appears inescapable that China could seize the island at will, with minimal loss to China itself, albeit at a ghastly cost to the Taiwanese and to China’s international reputation.
Force-size disparity The deterioration of the order of battle in China’s favor is the most concrete example of the trend of relative slippage between the two countries. The vast size disparity of the two nations has always tilted a raw-numbers comparison ludicrously in China’s favor over Taiwan. A mainland army of 1.25 million active-duty men, with 400,000 in the three provinces opposite Taiwan alone, confront 130,000 active-duty ROC troops. Three airborne divisions are matched against none, two amphibious divisions versus two brigades, 15 destroyers to four, 32 attack submarines to four, 160 bombers to 22. Only in fighter planes and in coastal patrol craft are the two countries anywhere near comparable in numbers. However, Taiwan’s historical advantage has been in the quality and modernity of its weapons and the skill of its personnel. For example, Taiwanese pilot-hours in the air for training, aerial patrol and mock sorties—considered a good proxy for estimating pilot proficiency—still far outdistance the opposition. While the ROC’s training and education level is acknowledged to be still formidable, the PRC is catching up on all fronts. The modernity of military technology has also spiked upward for the mainland in the all-important domain of missiles, fighters, and attack aircraft. Under the most likely Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 39
and most dangerous scenario, air power that could punch its way to aerial control of the strait in the first day of the conflict in conjunction with missiles to clear an air corridor could initiate a decapitation Blitzkrieg well within the three days it could take the main battle forces of the US Navy to arrive from Guam or Hawaii, let alone the seven days from the West Coast of the United States. By that time, a cowed Taiwanese population and dispirited leadership might have signed the country away. The important thing to grasp about the order of battle in the air or anywhere else is that China has advanced by leaps and bounds, albeit from a smaller qualitative base, while Taiwan has at best stood still. Chinese military spending in this last austerity year of 2010 still represented a real increase over the previous year of more than 8 percent. Generally, it is an upward ratchet of between 10 percent and 14 percent in real terms, a full 14.9 percent in 2009. Outgunned and surrounded, Taiwan is now cutting its military budget. The United States spends 4.7 percent on defense as a percentage of GDP. Taiwan has trouble spending 3 percent. To some observers, this indicates either a creeping death wish or an unwarranted faith in total American support under any circumstance.
Growing fleet China has quadrupled its fleet of so-called “3.5” and fourth generation aircraft with advanced avionics and missiles in ten years, for a total fleet size of aircraft of cuttingedge technology of over 400. The acquisition trend for these crown jewels is not expected to slacken for years, any more than it is for ballistic and cruise missiles. The PRC now owns state-of-the-art Russian “Flanker” Su-30s, Su-27s, and J-10s for which Taiwan has no riposte. The best in the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) are the A and B versions of the F-16, and only 200 of them. Obtaining C and D versions that could go up to meet the Su-30s and Su-27s with confidence is years away and mired in the usual Washington-Taipei diplomatic mud. The ROC’s fifty odd French Mirages are fine, fourth generation platforms all, but over half are generally down for repairs. China has continued to upgrade its SAM anti-aircraft missile defense systems from land and sea bases in interlocking arcs that extend A decommissioned ROC Bofors M1 40mm Gun sits on display in Hualien.
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
over the entire island of Taiwan, covering a ROC aircraft from the moment it leaves the runway. See map. Russia has sold them the most advanced system in the Russian inventory, the SAM SA 20-PU2 air defense battery. Airborne warning and control aircraft from a Russian template that are superior to Taiwan’s are in the late design and test phase.
Ballistic missile threat Even more disquieting in the aerospace balance between the two countries is a proliferation of short-range ballistic missiles at what can only be described as a frenetic pace. The missiles operated by the very prestigious military formation of the Second Artillery Corps and reporting directly to the Central Military Commission are the unspoken “elephant in the room” that no one discusses when the topic of Chinese air power is the theme. This whimsical observation was made repeatedly at recent conference on the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in Taipei by at least three participants on the podium in one day on October 30, 2010. It is not sufficient to say that the short-range missiles aimed at Taiwan are just a force multiplier for the PLAAF or the PLA—they are an equal partner vis à vis the PLA or PLAAF, and perhaps even the senior service. This is because Second Artillery throws the ultimate punch of counterforce and countervalue nuclear warheads at the American enemy. The Second Artillery’s rocket force has come in the last ten years to be the major complicating factor in deciding how to defend Taiwan.
Written in 2006, the most recent booklength study of Taiwan’s vulnerability to invasion projected a ceiling of only 800 shortrange missiles in place by 2008. With just under 1,300 arrayed at the time of writing, China looks set to double that 2006 projected figure by 2012, at current rates of production. No commentator has found a benign explanation for this, other than the intention to use them or to intimidate to the point of forcing submission. As noted above, the newest class of missiles, the CSS 7, has leapfrogged accuracy upward in a logarithmic and not linear degree. And for the purpose they might best be used for in the scenario offered below—cutting military runways— the older classes of missiles with CEPs half a football field long are still more than accurate enough to ground the ROCAF. The naval balance at least is not so radically worse today compared to a decade ago. The Chinese submarine service is rapidly becoming a nuclear club like the US Navy, and the big news here is the deployment ahead of schedule of the JIN class (Type 094) nuclear powered strategic missile submarines (SSBN), whose nuclear tipped intercontinental SLBM’s can threaten the heartland of the United States and give China the untouchable second-strike capacity against soft targets like cities that discourages pre-emptive attacks. China’s lead in diesel attack submarines (including the very able if not new KILO class
Russian attack sub) has already been mentioned. Of journalistic scare value but for the moment of academic interest only is the campaign to build first a landbound aircraft carrier for pilot training cobbled from Russian surplus, and then an indigenous model designed for true maritime power projection on the American model. Even pessimistic analysts do not expect a prototype to be ready before 2015 or 2020.
An M41 Walker Bulldog light tank sits on display in front of an ROC military base in Hualien.
Nuclear option unlikely Nuclear weapons are not considered here and by common agreement are most unlikely to be used in the China-Taiwan context, unless exchanges between the Chinese and the US Navy escalate dangerously. One could imagine a successful surprise attack on a Seventh Fleet carrier prompting an American hit back at a Chinese military land target, and so on up the escalation ladder. Although the Americans will take pains to avoid this spiral, it is not clear that the Chinese would. Imposing Western military doctrines of rationality upon an Asian opponent who does not count the material damage has cost America one war already. A final development to note is that the PLA is putting its money where its mouth is about power projection of infantry boots on the
attack. To date, however, it has been confined to internal security operations and appears to be more of a Praetorian Guard for the Beijing central Communist Party elite.
A bolt from the blue To step back into the realm of theory for a moment, a small state like Taiwan has only a limited number of options in a world dominated by just a few competing superpowers: They can join an alliance dominated by a hegemon, be a loyal if subordinate ally, and hope the hegemon does not jettison them for reasons of state when the shot begins to fly. The risk, other than being left to stand alone on the battlefield, is being dragged into a large power’s devastating conflict that the small state would rather avoid. This is the piper that must be paid for having the alliance protection of the hegemon in good times. Alternatively, they can strive for autonomy via a purely defensive policy of limited deterrence. The aim is to make occupying the small state more troublesome than any benefit a large conqueror could expect to gain. This is the strategy adopted by Switzerland and to a very limited degree in the Cold War, Sweden and Norway. The British might suggest that since 1922, Ireland has had it both ways, notably during the Second World War, garnering protection while avoiding all obligations. Americans have been known to
“A compelling opinion is that time works against the attacker, especially when the attacker is China going against Taiwan.” ground, whether to Taiwan, disputed islands or Vietnam. A crash building program has been underway for four years to produce Landing Ship-Tank (LST) and lighter class amphibious vehicles suitable for a Marine Corps, WWII-style invasion. The two marine divisions headquartered at the Southern Fleet’s base closer to Hong Kong than near Taiwan are being beefed up, as is the coastal 15th Airborne Corps. CCP military journals have mentioned this latter unit as an effective cradle for overseas-tasked special forces and a decapitation blade for the Taiwanese political elite, to take the island in a surprise
observe the same about Western Europe during the Cold War since 1945. Taiwan since 1949 has clearly chosen the first option, of wedding its fortunes to the United States, as a plucky front-line Cold War confrontation state. Those historic ties shape its strategy to this day, and its expectations of American help, if China attacks. There are differing views about the runup to hostilities. One eccentric scholar suggests abandoning air supremacy altogether and focusing solely upon keeping a sea line of communication open from an east coast port. This latter view is not taken seriously. One significant school of thought—among the optimists and the diplomats who like slow movement—sees a gradual and deliberate ramping up of tension by the PRC, to give a plausible reason for moving naval, air, infantry and paratroop assets within closer transport range of the Taiwan theater of operations. Manufactured incidents in the air and at sea, arrests of real or fictitious spies, and general harassment could prompt Chinese demands for negotiation. Saber rattling and open threats would hope to sow dissension in the ROC population. A negotiated solution might or might not come to pass. A vocal peace party in the island would be encouraged, not hard given the network of Chinese agents already in place. By contrast, a compelling opinion is that time works against the attacker, especially when the attacker is China going against Taiwan. Every hour and every day provides more time for coalition-building against China. A more convincing and more auSpring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 41
dacious hypothetical to gradual buildup is a Chinese “bolt from the blue,” a phrase usually associated in the Cold War with a pre-emptive Soviet nuclear attack on the US homeland. This could be called the majority and informed view about China’s best option today. In this Taiwanese reprise of “bolt from the blue,” the opening bell would be rung by a salvo of up to 500 missiles from the Second Artillery to suppress Taiwan’s air defenses, darken command-control-communicationscomputer facilities, and hit symbolic power centers in a display of shock and awe. If the ability of the ROC to respond is hampered, and an air corridor could be opened over the Taiwan Strait, conventional Chinese air could complete the job of destroying hard military targets and pre-emptively crippling beach defenses. They would pulverize all ports save one desired for capture to disembark the PLA. A likely candidate would be the port of Taichung. Chinese fighter bombers would finish off any remaining airfields available to the ROCAF.
Air supremacy essential Air supremacy is by general consent the necessary condition for either command of the sea or prevailing in a land conflict. So the strategic debates over Chinese-Taiwanese superiority focus more and more now upon the air: No flotilla whose airspace above is insecure will last long. In the modern age, since precision guided munitions and ships protected not by armored hulls but electronics, air supremacy over a body of water determines naval supremacy for all vessels save submarines. Land-launched short- and medium-range missiles are a hybrid weapon, having analytic aspects common to both artillery and of tactical or strategic air platforms. In the problem at issue here, they are crucial determinants of control of the air by their capacity to cripple planes, their facilities and radar on the ground. A very thorough operations research analysis by RAND concluded that, with what is
First introduced in the early 1960s, this M108 self-propelled howitzer saw service in the ROC Army.
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
now known about PRC missile accuracy, between 60 and 200 short-range ballistic missiles could ground the ROCAF for days by the simple expedient of knocking out vulnerable runways faster than they could be repaired. The logic of this attack plan is rehearsed with conservative assumptions, in technical detail and with statistical rigor at Shlapak 32-51. Fighting will likely go on for 24 hours a day over several days until the air supremacy issue is settled, which it will be in this time horizon.
Existing analysis This Blitzkrieg attack by China is counted both the most likely and most dangerous by the most authoritative government and private analysts in the United States. No open-source Taiwanese strategic literature yet discovered treats it, although this is surely due to this researcher’s limitations, a function of a search limited to English and not Mandarin source documents. The explicit statement of this loss of Taiwanese air superiority by the Defense Intelligence Agency appears definitive, in a sober and little-read government report by professionals for professionals that is not compelled to be mealy mouthed in the manner of a State Department press release. The aim of these nonstop 72 hours of firepower would be to cow the surviving Taiwan leadership and population, to induce them to sue for peace on Chinese terms. US intervention is the great imponderable. Even if it seemed likely, the key of the strategy would be to extract a political agreement from the ROC government inside of a window of three days, before US air and naval power was fully on station. A convincing way to do so would be to threaten a second missile or bomber wave on the “soft targets” of indefensible population centers, assuming the first missile attack and fighter sorties had established working air superiority. It is just to keep the Americans away during that politico-strategic window that the Chinese Navy and Air Force has embarked upon a concerted policy of access denial, suitable either for interdicting US warships, or the much easier task of stopping Taiwan’s commercial shipping and military resupply dead in its tracks. One cargo ship destroyed by a missile or a mine would make insurance rates so prohibitive that incoming cargo to Taiwan like oil would stop, absent a US or ROC naval offensive to clear the hazards or break the blockade. It is conceivable that after a complete capitulation, the PRC would attempt to occupy, pacify, and garrison Taiwan. In the spirit of the opening epigraph from Admiral Zhijun,
the sea power advantages of the open ocean east of Taiwan accessible from an eastern Taiwan port would be stunning for China from a strategic view. Amphibious invasion is possible but not probable for several reasons. First, moving troops in sufficient numbers depends on total air supremacy for the troop ships to survive. RAND’s exhaustive analytical treatise and all other secondary literature indicates that this is so fraught with uncertainty that it would represent a colossal risk to the PLA compared to an air blitz. For example, Chinese daily sea lift capacity under the most optimistic construction is only 35,000 men per day, if all went perfectly and not a single ship was lost. This would happen only if the Taiwan defenders numbering roughly 100,000 on the beaches after at least a day of warning from the embarkation of the PRC armada raised their arms high and surrendered. Missiles can defend as well as attack. The inexpensive and plentiful means available to a defender concentrating on ships within visual range of the beach and just beyond the horizon, thanks to mass-produced and portable weapons like the Hellfire, make the lifespan of any surface ships delivering troops those last several kilometers very questionable. Carrying onboard live munitions and vehicles like tanks loaded with fuel would make for a nervous ride. When one considers that 3:1 or 5:1 is the minimum ratio of attacker to defender for a successful landing, this implies that, all things being equal, PLA requires a full week to ten days of nonstop, round-trip convoys shuttling the army and marines across the strait from the mainland, all without losses at sea. This is hardly likely.
The will to resist Whether the Chinese leadership contemplates the full scale invasion option or the far more probable “bolt from the blue” attack and high-pressure ultimatum to remaining Taiwan politicians, the question the Politburo must ask themselves before embarking upon an adventure so fateful for China is the will of the Taiwanese to resist. Bombing from the air has never broken the back of civilian spirit in any war, until the war was known by the civilians to be already lost. World War II and Vietnam illustrated this. A publicized program of national preparedness by Taiwan could be the most effective way to make the Chinese think twice in the planning phase. In the crucial days after the first missiles, if the Americans are still dithering about whether to intervene, the effect of media portrayals of gallant stands in Taiwan will be a powerful stimu-
lus to congressmen or a president on the fence. The electronic media in a Taiwanese guerilla campaign would in effect be a third combatant. The anti-authoritarian bias of the media and the photogenic nature of hard pressed insurgents confronting the Goliath occupier suggest that the international press will bring much more pressure to bear on the occupier than upon the rebel. This would be especially so in the story so appealing from a news producer’s point of view: little Taiwan taking on the weight of the red Chinese juggernaut: every city a Stalingrad, every jungle clearing a Little Big Horn. Whether the Taiwanese population in early 2012 is prepared to accept a program of civil defense, let alone training in militia combat, is a very real question. One former naval officer interviewed by this author remarked with some acerbity about the Taiwanese: “They have never resisted an invader, whether the Qing in the 17th century, or the Japanese in the 19th century and through World War II when they even fought for them. They never seriously fought the mainlanders when they came in 1949. They are not going to start now.”
Questionable motivation It always has been an issue of questionable motivation, and this is not the first time the idea of partisan resistance to the red Chinese has been suggested. Opinion on the island is divided along party and regional lines, with KMT loyalists and the house view of the US State Department applauding current trends of creeping absorption by China. Observers of a less sanguine disposition suggest that ROC President Ma Ying-jeou is skillfully initiating a Finlandization of the country. Motivation of young men of military age who are veterans of national service are an important variable. They will not only be called up at once in a state of tension preceding hostilities but form the nucleus of resistance groups under officer cadre leadership, in the extreme case of going into the hills. In summary, on account of a Chinese military buildup on all fronts that has undermined the once unquestioned air supremacy of the ROC, winning a war with the PLA is less likely than it was five years ago. If current trends of Chinese arms spending and Taiwanese stagnation continue, victory will be even less certain five years from today. It can do no harm and only good to project a resolution to the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army to institute a cost-effective and not ruinous program of civilian self-defense, to prepare for the day one hopes will not come, of fighting behind the lines in occupied Taiwan. n Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 43
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
i relat n international ions
f o s r a e y y n a m o o t 44
The concep t
come a con anarchy” seems to hav stan Relations si t in the study of Intern e bence it began ational in the mid as a field o dle of the f study 20th the differen t theories an century. Most of d approach understan din es to the ognized th g of world politics h e anarchic ave reccharacter o tional affai f internars. not necessa However, this situat ion does rily mean th conflict ha s to be ma at an emphasis on de, as has been the ca histori se in 1985’s “A for Realists and Neo cally realists. chieving C Anarchy,” R o obert Axel operation Under rod and Rober t Keohane tried to depict h ow instituti ons had risen in and how co relevance, operation, although st ill difficult to achieve, ha s often bec ome the preferr ed conflict as option over the Cold War er end of the a and nation approached s became m uch more interd ependent. The increa si and accepta ng creation nce of norm to regula s te tional behav the internaio the form of r of states in regional an d global go together w vern ith appeared to multilateralism in th ance, e world, b panied tho e the processes that se trends in accomth as the anat omy of the e following years in tutions dev eloped, foll ternational instiowing the ployed by logic emJoh The Anato n Ruggie in “Multilat my of an In eralism: stitu Today the world seem tion.” s anarchic th an 50 years indeed much less trends over ago, and th w e lematizing hat these authors wer new in the 1980 e probs the reality and 1990s that charact ar erizes most e now political
fact and economic relations. In spite of the ton ofte e mor r that cooperation may occu able vari as ains rem it re, day than it did befo over as always, especially among issues and to nt vale equi be ot cann it why is That time. of n visio ian the idea of harmony in a utop reld wou That tics: homogenous world poli ests quire a complete consensus over the inter le. who a as y of humanit
“Cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests. In such situations, cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others.” - Axelrod and Keohane ains In this context, even today anarchy rem poli l iona a constant in the world of internat is it e sinc es, oach tics in most theoretical appr global still defined as the lack of a common plete com a ly imp not does This government. e an sinc , ever how , on zati ani org of lack and s, exist ally international community actu c ecifi e-sp issu ral seve it is structured along ce rnan gove and n latio regu areas through of that have stemmed from a wide spectrum ote prom and institutions in order to secure cooperation. ency over In fact, there is a nominal tend has his-
the concept of anarchy that by torically been the terminology used perand lars, scho s International Relation opthe offer not did s year haps the last 20 prac d edde emb this don aban to y portunit this , ever tice in this field of study. How ernew decade offers prospects for an und that tion gura confi ld’s standing of the wor ept is untethered to this old-fashioned conc rnaof anarchy, which has ruled the inte . tional system and its study for too long of ition trad list Rea the To continue with in ” , rld wo ical rch ana “ an referring to l iona rnat Inte of y stud the ts limi , my view l tica Poli l Relations and Internationa gie Rug s, 1990 the in Economy today. Already ons, explained how, against realist expectati ed help ns tutio insti and s norm multilateral of end the to stabilize the consequences of apns tutio insti the Cold War: “Norms and in the pear to be playing a significant role and nal regio of y arra d broa a of management te. wro he ” y, toda ld wor the in ges chan global
This is especially true at the level of the global economy, which has increasingly involved difficult domestic and transnational issues that are now subject to international rules. Even in the realm of global security, although only in some areas like nuclear nonproliferation, there has been some multilateral success. Thus, many authors acknowledge today the need for new points of view that depart from the classical notion of anarchy, as I just proposed. For example, Ruggie explains that through the lenses of conventional International Relations theory, the roles being played by normative constraints and institutions on the current international stage must emerge as paradoxical, since norms and institutions never matter too much in a world characterized by anarchy and conflict. However, today they do matter. What also seems to be paradoxical is the fact that the scholar who has contributed more to the new institutionalism in International Relations theory, which holds that norms and institutions do matter, is none other than Robert Keohane, who is still attached to the notion of an anarchical world. Perhaps because of the long anarchical tradition in the analysis of international politics, this author together with Axelrod in their 1985 work could only try to “fit in” the real possibility of achieving cooperation in a state of anarchy. Several years have passed since then, however, and multilateralism is what characterizes the world’s political economy nowadays, which Keohane and Axelrod define in general terms as the coordination of the “relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles.”
In addition, togeth er with globalization, the parallel phenomenon of regionalization ha s brought about new tensions betw een the appearance of regional in stitutions and the traditional co nfiguration of the world, under th e nation-state system and its prin cip ereignty. These tensio le of sovns become more evident when trying to understand the manne r in which governance is being crea ted, not just at the global level, but als o at the regional one, with increasin g significance for governmental actio n and policy options that ultimate ly affect their citizens the most. Even though some key bilateral relations have remain ed as powerful bargaining tools sti ll used by many countries today, all these overlapping formal and inform al interactions are following a similar trend towards institutionalization th rough creation of governance, and th us allowing new scholars to imagine a world where anarchy is not the pred ominant characteristic of internatio nal affairs. Indeed, we have lived too many years under anarchy. n
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 45
Institutional Reform in China: Pressures, Pace, and Policy photo: Matthew Stinson A bust of Deng Xiaoping in the Beijing Military Museum.
he institutional legacy of China comes from the Maoist era, when the national goals were directed toward the creation of a classless society and equality in an explicitly communist system. Since the implementation of the “reform and open policy” at the end of the 1970s, there have been institutional reforms focusing on modernization and economic growth, highlighting the promotion of inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the development of technology and even the internationalization of Chinese enterprises.
It is important to highlight that Deng Xiaoping’s reforms had as a principle the fight against the concentration of dictatorial authority that Mao Zedong had achieved. Under Deng, political bodies met with metronomic regularity, for example the annual convocation of the National People’s Congress since 1979. After three decades of institutional reforms, some analysts argue that the Chinese Government’s institutional context is a source of misperception, and is considered a source of potential aggression in the world. For instance, China is accused of being a powerful centralized state; but actually it is less powerful than some governments that have followed the developmental state model, given its characteristics of having an expansive geography and therefore, based on that fact, less state capacity than either Japan or South Korea. Despite liberal reforms and privatization, state-owned companies still dominate the
By Jhon Valdiglesias industrial landscape in China. Thus, the current generation of indigenous technology and internationalization processes is dominated by them. Therefore, the government has relevant competence with the industrial and internationalization strategies of diverse sectors, including automotive, electronics, machinery, iron and steel, oil and petrochemical, aviation and aerospace, pharmaceutical, construction, and so on. In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) consequently integrating successfully into the global economy. This global integration and its race to market and economic growth have pushed China’s convergence toward internationally accepted norms and standards of economic integration. In that context, China has emerged as a source of dynamic international trade and Xinhuamen, the “Gate of New China” built by Yuan Shikai, is the formal entrance to the Zhongnanhai compound.
photo: Jorge Láscar
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
A Chinese worker puts together the lens assembly for a TEK4 digital camera in Ningbo, China.
legal framework for maintaining social order and to keep the state machine functioning normally. This also offers a way of constraining party power over the market. The existence of “rule of law” in a society entails having laws that would apply to the government as well. The improving indicators of governance quality could be seen as a sign of this trend, but on the other hand, the improvement of only few indicators is not sufficient to assume the rise of an institutional environment that would do much more than ensure economic growth and attract foreign investment. According to the World Bank, the “rule of law” measures the extent to which law enforcement personnel have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particu-
outward FDI supported by its inward FDI. The World Bank has tracked improvements in government effectiveness in China. The body measures the quality of public services; the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures; the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. In these measures, China has reached the 50 percent mark. It is imCATCHING UP portant to point out that Organisation for Economic Cooperation and photo: Robert S. Donovan Development (OECD) countries have standards above 90 percent. Though improving, institutional quality in China is not yet good enough. To the Chinese government, the private sector has become a powerful engine for economic growth, and the Chinese Communist lar the quality of contract enforcement, the Party (CCP) has sometimes neutralized potential opposition to private police and courts, as well as the likelihood economic growth. Thus, in different party congresses, the regime has of crime and violence. China does not score highlighted the importance of the private sector to development. At the well in this regard. As is already widely known, China’s local level, the private economy often enjoys amicable treatment by lomain economic goals are related to playing cal governments. Some scholars see the economic growth experienced in China as having catch-up with the developed world, basia strong potential for institutional reform in order to ensure continued in- cally in terms of industrialization. Within vestments. Even though the CCP remains the undisputed central power, the framework of its objective of economic there is a political relationship between the center and the local levels in development—and specifically of economic what political scientist Dali Yang calls a market-preserving federalism. growth—China has attracted huge amounts Liberalization has created an incentive for trade and investment among of foreign investment, as well as transfers both domestic and foreign forces, but there is still a lack of interest in of technology and industrial goods, mostly democracy. Political scientist Chen An interviewed successful entre- from the United States and Japan. It is impreneurs and found nearly half of them would prefer “rule of law” over portant to highlight that even China has not democracy, and are looking for an institutionalized free-market order had excellent relations with these powers, as a means of preserving their profits. but its pragmatic foreign policy has allowed Even the middle class share the same ideas about the necessity of re- it to achieve the results it desires. n pression and control over China’s large, poor population, and tamping demands for egalitarian policies in order to protect their wealth and About the author social status. Chen’s survey found that the most important value to the Jhon Valdiglesias is an economist middle class in China is social stability. from National Major Peruvian San Marcos University. He is currently a Entrepreneurs feel threatened by political reversal and popular anstudent in the IMAS program with ger over “unjustifiable” economic inequalities, whereas some institua concentration in China and an interest in economic development tional tools such as the adoption of the “rule of law” would provide and international relations. them with legal protection. Thus, in cases of emergency such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, the “rule of law” could provide a
“China’s main economic goals are related to playing catch-up with the developed world, basically in terms of industrialization.”
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 47
Ambedkar Paper Earns Plaudits in CA
ost IDAS and IMAS students will be familiar with Dr. David Blundell, and will likely have taken one of his classes, be it Ethnography of Communication, Anthropology of Religion, or Belief Systems of Taiwan, among others. One of the pleasures of these classes is the fact that Dr. Blundell likes, whenever possible, to get out of the classroom and go on field trips, to one of Taipei’s many museums, temples or other unique hidden gems that only he seems to know about. Dr. Blundell recently returned from a field trip of his own, representing NCCU at the South Asia Studies Association (SASA) Conference held April 13-15 at Claremont Graduate University, in
legacy of Ambedkar.” For those who don’t know him: Dr Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar was born in 1891 to a family in India’s dalit “undercaste” community. He rose from the traditional low stature assigned to the untouchable cast by educating himself both in India and the West to eventually become a national leader in India’s struggle for equality and justice. Ambedkar framed the Indian constitution, declaring it a secular state and providing it the national emblems of state, in particular the Asoka lions and the dharma wheel seen on the national flag. Ambedkar served as India’s first Minister of Law. The film project commemorates the 50th anniversary of Ambedkar’s embrace of Buddhism—along with 500,000 others—in Nagpur, India, on October 14, 1956. This event ushered in a new path for social welfare in India. Just weeks later, on December 6, 1956, he passed away in New Delhi. of Buddhism and ancient sources and inspiThe story of Ambedkar and his choices rations from India. working in India is the story of a uniquely The goal of the project is to reach an interSouthern Asian experience, with its sense national audience worldwide for telling the of taste based on a prevailing ethos lived by story of Ambedkar. The resulting knowledge Ambedkar, as well as by Gandhi and Nehru— could then possibly assist people of the unregardless of their differences. Ambedkar’s derclass untouchable community. selection of Buddhism for his followers was a conTHE LAW OF LIFE scious decision to embrace the tradition of a native son in South Asia living more than 2,500 years ago: what it meant then, and what it means for contemporary democracy and unity in India today. “My thesis is that Dr. Ambedkar considered himself to be a South Asian in the sense of its unity in past, present and future,” writes Dr. Blundell. “As I The over-arching objective of the SASA work on the film project, my process is given conference is to advance the understanding to a cohesive weave key for the understand- of South Asia’s history, cultures, societies, ing of concepts found in rasa: a holistic aes- politics, issues and opportunities in a prothetic value system. In the case of observing fessional environment. It was a stimulating the story of Dr. Ambedkar’s life, these quali- and intellectually refreshing confluence of ties work as an overarching guidance. The scholars from around the world. SASA enresults come from seeded fundamental ideas joys a solid reputation as the place to netfor life I have found prevailing in the region.” work in the most congenial, relaxed atmoThe film project looks in-depth at sphere to be found in academia. According the historical and sociological implica- to the organizers, just by attending this contions of Ambedkar’s peaceful revolution. ference, participants helped send a strong Ambedkar’s story unfolds from a narrative signal that South Asian Studies programs about his leadership and a social humanitar- need to figure prominently in university life ian movement with reflections on the roots across the globe. n
“There is nothing fixed, nothing eternal … everything is chang-
ing, change is the law of life for
individuals as well as for society.”
Claremont, California. At the conference, he delivered a paper titled “Dr B.R. Ambedkar and His Choice for Buddhism in the Perspective of the Cultural Unity of India,” which was extremely well-received, and had the distinction of being nominated for best paper at the conference. The paper follows on Dr. Blundell’s work visually tracing the life of Dr Ambedkar as a project series titled “Arising Light,” the centrepiece of which is a film called “Dr B.R. Ambedkar and the Birth of a New Era in India.” According to Dr. Blundell, “My purpose for the research is to present strategies for a continuation of socio-economic transformation in India as models for mobilizing world development based on the
Asia-Pacific Newsletter Spring 2012
— Dr B.R. Ambedkar
Book Review When a Billion Chinese Jump By Jonathan Watts
hen a billion Chinese jump at the exactly same time, it will shake the Earth off its axis and kill us all. So goes the apocalyptic saying is most likely a bastardization of Napoleon’s famous quote, “let China sleep, for when she wakes, she will shake the world.” It provides the title of a recently published book that extensively covers the current state of the environment in China. Its author, Jonathan Watts, is a prize-winning journalist and the Guardian’s Asia environment correspondent. “The two biggest challenges facing humanity [these days are] the rise of China and the damage being wrought on the global environment,” Watts explains as he sets out to illustrate, in plain language, the domestic impact China’s rise has so far had, and will likely have, on its own environmental situation. Written as a travelogue, this book cannot primarily be considered an academic work. Rather, in almost 400 pages (plus another 100 pages for notes), the author’s prose brings the reader along with him on a long, but interesting, journey through the Middle Kingdom. In doing so, his travel-report style of writing shows ambivalent features: On the one hand, some chapters idle with Watts’ frequently embedded short personal stories, such as one about how he could not cope with Tibet’s thin air and had to throw up all night. On the other hand, this work not being constrained by the academic style, it is accessible and enjoyable, with many interviews included in direct speech. The volume is divided into four parts, with 16 chapters altogether plus an afterword. Each part is concentrated on one geographical region of China, to which a broadly conceived thematic focus is attached. Accordingly, the author starts to describe the southwest of China in connection with nature, then deals with the country’s southeast before he moves on to imbalances in the northwest, and, finally, discusses alternatives he witnessed in the northeast. While sometimes a bit incoherent, this division of the book already discloses an interesting pattern behind China’s environmental problems.
After traveling more than 100,000 miles, the author succeeds in revealing China’s richness in ecologies, economies, and cultures at play, as well as the horrifying scope of the country’s environmental problems. Watts certainly makes a knowledgeable impression, even though his findings and the causal relations he presents may not be particularly new to readers who have some familiarity with China’s environmental dilemma. Yet for those who are interested in an introduction to the topic, this book should meet expectations. In general, Watts manages to tackle all the big, important issues, such as deforestation and diminishing coverage in grass- and wetlands, the outsourcing of environmental problems from the West to China, the latter’s GDPism that sacrifices everything in order to maintain its growth rate, as well as the incredible consumerism mentality of its growing middle class. Add to these China’s rapidly increasing urbanization and problems of overpopulation, air and water pollution and the resulting health problems in “cancer villages,” expanding desertification, and advancing water scarcity. As a journalist, Watts is especially skilled at integrating short pointed paragraphs that either explain or sum up certain complex circumstances quite vividly. He does so, for example, when describing the contending
philosophical roots of China’s environmental approach over the centuries, when showing how the 1980s deregulation of herd sizes in Tibet brought along an acceleration of climate change on the high plateau, and when illustrating why hydroelectric plants sometimes are the beginning of environmental havoc around their areas. Toward the end of the book, the author also touches upon renewable energy potentials, new technologies (such as liquid coal) and the prospects for a future environmental trend reversal in China. As his brief afterword discloses, Watts is not particularly optimistic about this happening. He opens a quick debate on values and, quite correctly, finds that even though China’s leaders have clearly signalled a political decision to tackle the country’s huge environmental problems, they have set somewhat wrongheaded priorities, as key words such as “ecology” and “sustainability” remain off the agenda, it is through technology and growth that China seeks to escape its impending environmental disaster. The success of this path is questionable; the consequences of failure would be huge, and not only for China. Apart from that remark, the regional and international arenas are largely excluded throughout the book. All in all, Jonathan Watts has written an insightful and exhaustive introductory volume on China’s environmental problems, its root causes, and possible ways out of the crisis. The primary value of this work lies in the many interviews conducted by the author and the personal opinions and experiences expressed by the interviewees. The author himself contributes through his own firsthand observations, fluent writing, and profound environmental knowledge. n When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind – Or Destroy It London: Faber and Faber, 2010, 496 pages, US$24.14. About the author Sebastian Biba is an IDAS student with a Master’s degree in Chinese Studies, Political Science, and Law from the University of Frankfurt in Germany. He is interested in security-related topics centering on China. He worked at the Institute of International Relations in Taipei.
Spring 2012 Asia-Pacific Newsletter 49
International Masters Program in Asia-Pacific
About IMAS The International Master’s program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IMAS) at National Chengchi University, located in Taipei City, is Taiwan’s first English-taught master’s program in Asia-Pacific Studies. IMAS specializes in an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the important aspects of the region. The program places an emphasis on the combination of theory and practice. As part of NCCU’s College of Social Sciences, IMAS utilizes the talent of accomplished English-speaking faculty throughout the campus to enhance the program’s educational goals. As a top university in Asia, NCCU also offers enrichment groups and activities to enhance students’ understanding of Taiwan’s history and culture. “Welcome to IMAS! This brochure gives a synopsis of essential program information, which I hope you find useful. Please contact us at email@example.com.” – The Director
The Program IMAS students are required to complete a minimum of 36 credit hours of graduate course work, including 12 credits for required courses and 24 credits for elective courses. The majority of IMAS courses focus on either Taiwan or mainland China and fall under one of three disciplinary tracks: political economy, socio-cultural studies, or cross-strait/international relations. Students can take at most 9 credits outside of the IMAS program. In addition, all students will complete a thesis in their final year.
NCCU Facts - Dedicated to social sciences, international relations, communication, business, law, education, languages. - About 16,000 students - About 1,000 international students - About 650 faculty members - Big, wooded campus, 15 minutes from downtown Please visit: www.asiapacific.nccu.edu.tw
Curriculum Elective Courses China
Chinese Philosophy and Religion
Economic Development of Mainland China
Spatial Development of Mainland China
Financial Policy of Asian Pacific Countries Taiwan-China and East Asia Regional Development Political Development of Taiwan
Elective Courses Taiwan
Political Development of Mainland China
Ethnic Development of Mainland China Social Development of Mainland China
Cross-Strait / IR International Status of Mainland China Sino-Russian Relations Research Methods in China Studies
Environmental Protection in Asian Countries Cultural Ethnic Structure of Taiwan
International Relations of Taiwan
Economic Development of Taiwan
Financial Policy of Asia-Pacific Countries
Spatial Development of Taiwan
The Cross-Strait Relationships between Mainland China and Taiwan
Taiwan-China and East Asian Regional Development
Social Development of Taiwan
Environmental Protection in Asian Countries Research Methods for Social Sciences / Thesis Writing / Development Policies of the Asia-Pacific / Asia-Pacific Regional Development
National Chengchi University
College of Social Sciences
Taiwan Scholarship Substantial scholarships in an amount to be determined by the Taiwan government will be awarded to qualified students who want to pursue their Master’s degrees at universities in Taiwan.
International New Student Scholarship New degree-seeking international students who are not recipients of other government scholarships are eligible for the Scholarship for New International Students. IMAS Scholarship The purpose of this scholarship is to recognize and reward individuals with a record of academic excellence. Applications are accepted from prospective students and IMAS students each year. The number of scholarships and level of financial support varies from year to year. Feel free to visit the IMAS website for details on how to apply for the scholarships and financial assistance available to students: www.asiapacific.nccu.edu.tw
Director, IMAS Coordinator, Social-Cultural IDAS Track Department of Sociology PhD, Sociology, University of Virginia, USA w Sociology of Education w Social Stratification w Research Methodology/Statistics
Evan Berman Director, IDAS Distinguished Professor PhD, Public Policy, The George Washington University , USA w International Public Administration w Governance w Leadership and Performance w Human Resources Management
Fu-kuo Liu Institute of International Relations Coordinator, International Relations IDAS Track PhD, Politics, University of Hull, UK w Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific w South China Sea and Regional Security w The Development of Regionalism in the Asian Pacific Area
Ching-Ping Tang Coordinator, Political Economy IDAS Track Associate Dean, NCCU College of Social Sciences PhD, Public Administration, University of Southern California, USA w Democratization w Technology Policy w Community Development in the Asian Pacific Area
Don-Yun Chen Coordinator, Public Governance IDAS Track PhD, Political Science, University of Rochester, USA w E-government w Bureaucratic Politics w Citizen Participation and Democracy
Mei-Chuan Wei Graduate Institute of Development Studies PhD, Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK w Politics and History w Political Culture
Tsung-Jen Shih International Master’s Program in International Communication Studies (IMICS) PhD, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin-Madison w Internet and Civic Life w Culture and Public Opinion on Scientific Issues w Data Analysis in Communication Studies
David Scott Ackerman International Master’s Program in International Communication Studies (IMICS) PhD, Marketing and Consumer Behavior, University of Southern California, USA w Consumer Behavior w Marketing and Maintaining Research in Social Influence w Cross-Cultural Research
Yuang-Kuang Kao Graduate Institute of Development Studies PhD, Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taiwan w Methodology of Social Science w Comparative Political Institutions w Local Government and Autonomy w Political Development
… and other faculty who teach in our program!
National Chengchi University
Masters in Asia-Pacific Studies Student Organization and Activities IMAS degree candidates are welcome to participate in a wide variety of on- and off-campus groups and events, including academic lectures and symposia, athletics, language learning, cultural festivals and performances, and travel. Each student receives regular notification of upcoming events in his or her email account, and on-campus groups widely publicize their agendas. For more information, visit the website of the NCCU International Association: http://nccuinternational.wordpress.com 1. Personal information form 2. Copy of diploma 3. Official transcripts of post-secondary education 4. Two letters of recommendation 5. Required essays (Other writing samples are welcome) 6. Two letters of recommendation 7. Photocopy of valid TOEFL/IELTS/TOEIC scores (for non-native English speakers) For more detailed information on admission requirements, please visit our website and click on “Admission”: www.asiapacific.nccu.edu.tw If you have any further questions, Please contact firstname.lastname@example.org
Estimated Tuition and Fees* Program Costs Registration Fee (per semester) Credit Fee Estimated Tuition (per academic year) Other Costs (per academic year) Information/Equipment Fee Insurance Foreign Student Health Insurance Health Insurance Campus Housing Off-campus Housing Living Expenses Subtotal: Campus Housing Subtotal: Off-campus Housing
NT$ 12,300 NT$ 5,500 NT$ 123,600 Approximate Amount NT$1,248 NT$316 NT$8,988 NT$8,988 NT$40,000 NT$108,000 NT$120,000 NT$ 170,552 NT$ 238,552
Total (per year) Approximately US$8,900—US$11,683 (based on US$1:NT$31) *Tuition, fees, and expenses are subject to change and annual adjustment.
Contact Us 12F, North Wing, General Building of Colleges No. 64, Section 2, Zhi-nan Rd., Wenshan District Taipei City 11605, Taiwan (ROC) Tel: +886-2-2938-7421 Fax: +886-2-2938-7449 E-mail: email@example.com Please visit the IMAS website for more information. www.asiapacific.nccu.edu.tw
This is the Fall, 2011, issue of the Asia-Pacific newsletter: the magazine put out by the students of the International Masters and Doctoral...