Apn spring [2015]

VOLUME 7 / ISSUE 1 / SPRING 2015

INSIDE THIS ISSUE: Book Review: China’s Strategic Interests in the South China Sea: Power and Resources Ecotourism in Indigenous Communities Taipei City Parks in Perspective Finding a Solution in the South China Sea From Grain to Beer: Taipei’s Traditional Shops

EDITOR

Lucy Gunn GRAPHIC DESIGNER

Mark Henderson COORDINATOR

Angel Li CONTRIBUTORS

Filippo Maranzana de Filippis Mark Henderson Roi Ariel Adam Hatch Kelvin Chen Bryn Thomas Chris Jeng-Shun Hung Mark Schriver Olga Daksueva

Call for Papers The Asia-Pacific Newsletter publishes a diversity of content created by IDAS/IMAS students and faculty as well as others interested in regional affairs. This content includes original research, opinion and editorial columns, book reviews, conference reports, alumni experiences, current events briefs, blurbs, photography, graphics, and other creative work. Submissions, including text and images, must not have been previously published in other media, either in print or online.

Text submissions should be sent in an editable format (not .pdf). Endnotes and bibliography should be kept to a minimum and follow the Chicago Manual of Style’s “Notes and Bibliography” system. Please include the citations in brackets directly in the text (i.e., [1]), and do not use the software-based footnote tools. Please also include a brief biosketch and portrait photo.

Submissions, questions, and other ideas for inclusion should be sent to nccu.apn@gmail.com.

For complete and updated Submission Guidelines, please visit: goo.gl/eoVNz2

This issue’s cover photographs are courtesy of James Tarentino (top and middle), and Bryn Thomas (bottom). All other photographs used in this publication are used courtesy of the photographers, attributed appropriately, and licensed as indicated.

The text of the Asia-Pacific Newsletter is licensed as Creative Commons BY-NC-SA. The Asia-Pacific Newsletter is a publication by the student body of the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan. It is a purely amateur and informal collaboration, and it is a strictly non-commercial publication that is not for sale under any circumstances. We do not derive advertising or sales revenue, or donations of any kind.

1 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

Contents LETTERS

BOOK REVIEW

3

25 China’s Strategic Interests in the SCS

DAVID HOLM IDAS Director’s Welcome

FEATURED ARTICLES

FILIPPO MARANZANA DE FILIPPIS

CONFERENCE REPORT

4 Ecotourism in Indigenous Communities 27 ADAM HATCH PHOTO SERIES 11 Taipei City Parks in Perspective KELVIN CHEN 15 Finding a Solution in the South China 29 ROI ARIEL

OLGA DAKSUEVA Conference on India-China Relations

JAMES MORRIS Taiwan as I’ve Seen It So Far

Sea

21

THOMAS, HUNG, AND SCHRIVER Taipei’s Traditional Shops

VOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 2

It always gives me great pleasure to write a short note on behalf of the IDAS program for the Asia-Pacific Newsletter. I also look forward to reading the articles in this issue. The APN is always so full of interesting material, by and large well-written, perceptive, and genuinely innovative. I expect the present issue will continue in this tradition.

IDAS Director’s Welcome

as usual, and methodology as usual, and narrow disciplinary boundaries, is coming to an end, one hopes, or at the very least making way for a time when fundamental assumptions and established procedures are open for question, reevaluation, and re-formulation. In the future, the kind of scholarship that best serves the public interest in any national jurisdiction will be the kind that is broadly based, transcends and re-evaluates assumed knowledge, and is prepared fearlessly to seek the truth from The APN serves a num- facts. Future scholarship will also ber of useful functions be more profoundly international in the Asia-Pacific stud- at all levels. ies community at NCCU. It serves as an outlet for In the IDAS program, which student writing and publi- by its very nature is international cation, it allows contribu- and involves interactions of young tors to circulate and get scholars from all over the globe, feedback on their ideas one begins to see the promise of and approaches to im- this new world of scholarship takportant problems, and ing shape. it helps both professors and students from a very David Holm wide range of disciplines a chance to read something outside their own particular area of interest. With its attractive format, the APN also serves internationally as excellent publicity material for the program and for NCCU. The freshness of outlook and wide diversity of opinion that the APN conveys and bears witness to are our best advertisement.

This is particularly so because the world outside and the regional balance of power are now well into a period of momentous change.

These changes are bound to affect the social and humanistic sciences at all levels. The time for business 3 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

Dr. David Holm DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL DOCTORAL PROGRAM IN ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES

A view over the mountains in Hsinchu County, pictured on January 10, 2015.

Photo: Lucy Gunn

Ecotourism and Awareness-raising in Indigenous Communities: Case study of Taiwan’s Cinsbu Atayal Community Roi Ariel In 2009, the Taiwanese government proposed plans to build a water reservoir in Bilin Valley in Hsinchu County’s Jianshih Township. The project was met by the local community with a determined campaign to halt planning and construction.

In 2012, the project plans were suspended. But what happens now that the campaign has been a success? Are there any guarantees that the project will not be restarted in the future? Through ecotourism and educational activities the area’s Cinsbu Atayal Community keeps expanding the network of supporters for its cause against the reservoir in case planning is resumed.

In simple terms, social movements are organized groups trying to bring about change, or resist change, in their respective communities. Often these movements consist of people who have no access to routine institutionalized channels of participation (McGehee, 2001; McGehee

& Santos, 2005; Mcgehee, Kline & Knollenberg, 2014).

The concept of consciousnessraising, which is an important notion in this case study, originated from social-psychological theoretical explanations of social movements.

Consciousness-raising refers to “an

individual’s identification with, and awareness of, the ‘battlegrounds’ of social conflict. This is an important ‘first step’ to identification with, participation in, and commitment to social movement activism” (Kline & Knollenberg, 2014).

This awareness is strengthened through interaction with others who hold similar attitudes and values.

Awareness of one’s involvement in a larger movement gives a person a sense of the possibility of success and more reason to participate (McGehee & Santos, 2005).

Consciousness-raising can occur over an extended period, or can be the result of sudden or dramatic events. Consciousness-raising also occurs through interactions with members of other social or political movements, as well as through relationships with political parties and the media.

An important element of conVOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 4

Trees in Cinsbu Xinguang Elementary’s “Forest Classroom,” pictured on December 19, 2014.

Photo: Roi Ariel

Yuri Yupas demonstrates traditional Atayal weaving techniques in Cinsbu’s “Tkyu” on December 19, 2014.

Photo: Roi Ariel

5 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

sciousness-raising is seeing “the personal as political.” Sometimes consciousness-raising experiences may not immediately result in participation in social movements, but do influence support for activism. In other words, consciousness-raising experiences may not always result in action, but they may increase sympathy for a cause (McGehee, 2001; McGehee & Santos, 2005; Mcgehee, Kline & Knollenberg, 2014).

Ecotourism The term “ecotourism” was coined in the late 1980s in acknowledgment of increasing sustainability and global ecological awareness and practices.

In January 2015, The International Ecotourism Society (TIES) updated its definition and principles of ecotourism to better reflect its experiences with this form of tourism over the past 25 years.

Ecotourism is now defined as “responsible travel to natural areas that conserves the environment, sustains the well-being of the local people, and involves interpretation and education” (TIES, 2015). Furthermore, “[e]ducation is meant to be inclusive of both staff and guests” (TIES, 2015).

Ecotourism represents a set of principles that have been implemented in various global communities and are supported by extensive industry and academic research. “Ecotourism is about uniting conservation, communities, and sustainable travel. This means that those who implement, participate in, and market ecotourism activities should adopt the following ecotourism principles: (1) Minimize physical, social, behavioral, and psychological impacts; (2) Build environmental and cultural awareness and respect; (3) Provide positive experiences for both visitors and hosts; (4) Provide direct financial benefits for conservation; (5) Generate financial benefits for both local people and private industry; (6) Deliver memorable interpretative experiences to visitors that help raise sensitivity to host countries’ political, environmental, and social climates; (7) Design, construct and operate low-impact facilities; (8) Recognize the rights and spiritual beliefs

of the Indigenous People in your community and work in partnership with them to create empowerment” (TIES, 2015).

An important part of ecotourism is the process of educating guests about the host’s political, environmental, and social climates. In the case of social movements, ecotourism activities can help integrate guests into the movement’s network.

If a campaign arises in the future, they might then support the host community’s cause.

Taiwan’s Atayal Located in the high mountains of northern Taiwan, the communities that would be most affected by the Bilin reservoir are mainly Atayal people (Tayal/Daiyan), one of the nation’s

Lin,Yih-Ren, Lahuy Icyeh & Da-Wei Kuan, 2008).

According to their legend, the Atayal people sprung out from a rockface on the side of a mountain.

Today most follow the Christian faith, and to varying degrees the gaga, a core value of traditional Atayal culture.

Bilin Reservoir In 2009, the Water Resources Agency (WRA) planned to construct a reservoir in Bilin Valley in Hsinchu County’s Jianshih Township, aimed at ensuring adequate water supplies for people living and working in Hsinchu for the next 120 years.

In order to supply the proposed Bilin reservoir with enough water, the agency suggested digging a tun-

An important part of ecotourism is the process of educating guests about the host’s political, environmental, and social climates.

Aboriginal groups. They reside in what is considered the “inner mountainous area,” at an altitude of between 800m and 1600m, distinguished from communities in the “outer mountainous area” by their greater distance from the larger coastal cities. Ancestrally, the Atayal migrated from Nantou County to the northern part of Taiwan in search of more space for their growing population to hunt and farm.

The Atayal originally subsisted off slash-and-burn agriculture and hunting. The former has disappeared, but hunting still continues even though it is illegal in these areas (Simon, 2005; Reid, 2010a).

The Atayal are thought to be the oldest indigenous group to inhabit Taiwan. Currently, there are around 85,600 Atayal people in Taiwan, making them the nation’s second-largest indigenous group (Simon, 2005;

nel from the Dahan River on the other side of Jianshih Mountain, and including a second dam at Xiuluan, which is in the upper catchment area of the Shimen Reservoir (Tang, 2009; Reid, 2010b).

Experts questioned whether the reservoir and tunnel would not cause the same damage as Chiayi County’s Zengwun Reservoir did, impacting the region’s geology, rivers, landscape, and ecology. They also criticized the construction plans by pointing out that there are other, safer options available such as implementing existing water conservation policies more strictly, recycling wastewater from industrial zones, building desalination plants to process seawater, and cutting water leakage, which currently causes losses of 22 to 37 percent of the water. In addition, the storage capacity of existing reservoirs could VOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 6

Traditional tools and models of Atayal houses in Cinsbu’s “Tkyu”, pictured on December 19, 2014.

Photo: Roi Ariel

Cinsbu resident Ataw Yupas shows an edible mushroom during a walk on the Cinsbu Cypress Trail on December 20, 2014.

Photo: Roi Ariel

be increased by 30 percent just by dredging them (Tang, 2009; Hsu, 2010; Lee, 2012).

The project would not damage just the environment. The dam wall would be 138m high, meaning that five indigenous communities would be forced to relocate, severely harming the Atayal’s precious cultural heritage.

The Atayal communities expressed their opposition to the Bilin Reservoir plan as they believe the government is trying to push them out of the mountains (Reid, 2010b), bearing in mind previous projects such as the Shimen reservoir. During the construction of the Shimen reservoir in the 1960s, the Kalashe community was evicted from its lands.

The community’s migration to a different location eventually led to its disappearance (Li, 2007). In addition, Atayal residents also believed they would not reap any benefits from the two reservoirs because they would cater only to the water needs of the Hsinchu Science Park (Hsu, 2010).

Battle for land For them it was more than an environmental campaign, it was a battle for their land. A meeting was arranged between the head of the WRA and Atayal elders. According to one of the elders, during that meeting, the community leaders did not let the government representative speak at all, and said that if he ever enters their territory again, they would do what they did decades ago as fierce warriors and headhunters; kill those who threatened them. The government representative allegedly never came back to the area.

However, the community remained watchful. If they saw engineers surveying the area, skilled Atayal, both physically and verbally, would be sent to meet them (and usually to scare them away). The region’s outer and inner mountain communities came together to protest, which helped to strengthen the sense of connection between the different communities.

For example, on March 14, 2012, representatives from about 20 groups, including the Jianshih Anti-Dam Association, and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Chiu Wen-

yen, marked the International Day of Action for Rivers by urging the government to undertake a re-evaluation of the nation’s water resource policies and calling for policies dealing with the high rate of water leakage as an alternative to building more reservoirs and dams (Lee, 2012).

Eventually, in late 2012, the plans were put on hold. The government said this was due to budget problems.

The campaigners and local Atayal, however, believe it was their cam-

classes and ceremonies with community members and outsiders, as well as a “forest classroom” on the grounds of its local elementary school. There are a few buildings in the Tkyu. Each building shows a different aspect of Atayal life and culture, such as traditional weaving techniques, a model of the community’s traditional territory, tools, baskets, and models of traditional Atayal houses.

The Tkyu also features a big dining hall and a kitchen where guests can

After visiting and immersing oneself in the welcoming community, consciousnessraising experiences can increase visitors’ sympathy for the community. This sympathy can also be translated into actions and activism. paign that brought this project to a eat meals made with locally grown halt. The truth probably lies some- produce. There is also a hut where a where in between. bonfire can be made, and guests can spend the evening around the fire, attend a presentation about the area Cinsbu and its social-environmental activiIn Atayal language, Cinsbu means ties, and make fresh millet cakes with “the place where the first rays of the honey. The Tkyu is also a place for sun shine and land of fertile soil.” the community to gather and educate Cinsbu has around 80 families and a local children. strongly developed sense of its AtayDuring a visit to Cinsbu with its al heritage. guided activities, whether a hike to With its beautiful mountainous the forest or activities in the Tkyu, landscapes and hiking trails, Cinsbu guests are introduced to local knowlhas been involved in ecotourism for edge and traditions, and can learn over a decade. The famous Cinsbu about the current issues and probCypress trail leads to an ancient for- lems the mountainous Atayal comest, with huge cypress trees that have munities face, including the story of survived Japanese and KMT logging. the Bilin reservoir.

Other services include homestays Although the campaign against and lodging, a weaving workshop, the construction of the Bilin resrestaurants, educational spaces, and ervoir has been successful and the organic farming. project was suspended, the project Cinsbu also boasts a Tkyu, a gath- might still be resumed in the future. ering site dedicated to passing on tra- The anti-Bilin reservoir movement is ditional knowledge and skills through still active and continues to expand VOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 8

Yuri Yupas stands next to her father, Elder Tali Behuy, and shows the cloth that was used by her mother to carry her and her siblings, pictured on December 19, 2014.

Photo: Roi Ariel

Ataw Yupas shows a map of the community’s traditional territory, pictured on December 19, 2014.

Photo: Roi Ariel

9 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

its network. Social movements rely on networks to gain resources, social support, and awareness. As such, tourists to Cinsbu, who are informed about the issue of the Bilin reservoir, play a crucial role based on the concept of “personal as political.”

After visiting and immersing oneself in the welcoming community, consciousness-raising experiences can increase visitors’ sympathy for the community. This sympathy can also be translated into actions and activism. The tourists (who can be individuals, students, or NGO-led groups) then become part of the movement’s network.

Supporters On January 10-11, 2015, a two-day field trip was conducted as part of a graduate level course at National Chengchi University (NCCU), taught by Dr. Kuan Da-Wei. The participants all had different personal and academic backgrounds. After returning from their visit to Cinsbu, students shared their feelings and ideas during the last seminar of the course. Two doctoral students explained how the visit had influenced them.

One said that it was an “eye opener,” and made her think about how she could help the community’s cause. She said that already a couple of days after returning to Taipei she talked with her friends and shared her experience, stating that she would support the community’s cause in the future if construction plans are resumed.

The other doctoral student, who considers himself an environmental activist, started a Facebook group called “NCCU Friends of the Atayal People,” in order to stay in touch and share pictures, ideas, experiences, and future activities. Other students expressed their support for the community, and explained how there is much for city dwellers to learn from the mountainous Atayal community.

These examples show how Cinsbu’s ecotourism initiatives can help educate visitors and raise awareness about political, environmental, and social issues. Visitors become part of the community’s network after they sympathize with its cause and feel the desire to help.

If plans to build the reservoir are resumed, there could be a larger network of supporters, which includes individual tourists and university students, both Taiwanese and foreigners. In the case mentioned here, it was a mountainous indigenous community, but the same principles can be implemented in other rural communities with a healthy ecotourism industry.

Sources:

Research, 32 (3), pp. 760-779.

McGehee, N. G., & Norman, W. C. (2001). “Alternative Tourism as Impetus for Consciousness-Raising.”

Tourism Analysis, 6 (3-4), pp. 239-251.

Reid, David Charles (2010b). “Trip to Marqwang and Smangus.” Reid on Formosa commentary on all things Taiwanese — Taiwan Blog. [online] http://blog. taiwan-guide.org/2010/08/trip-tomarqwang-and-smangus/.

Butcher, J. (2008). “Ecotourism as life Reid, David Charles (2010a). Indigpolitics.” Journal of Sustainable Tourism, enous Rights in Taiwan and the Smangus 16 (3), pp. 315-326.

Case. Master’s thesis, College of Social Science, National Chengchi UniCoria, J., & Calfucura, E. (2012). “Ec- versity, Taipei. otourism and the development of indigenous communities: The good, Simon, Scott (2005). “Scarred Landthe bad, and the ugly.” Ecological Eco- scapes & Tattooed Faces: Poverty, nomics, 73, pp. 47-55.

Identity & Land Conflict in a Taiwanese Indigenous Community.” In Hsu, Jenny W. (2010). “Dem- Indigenous peoples and poverty: an interonstrators slam government national perspective. Robyn Eversole, plans to build new dams.” Taipei John-Andrew McNeish, and Alberto Times. [online] http://www.tai- D. Cimadamore, (eds.). London: Zed peitimes.com/News/taiwan/ar- Books. chives/2010/03/13/2003467917.

Tang, Mau-Tsu (2009). “For water, Lee, I-Chia (2012). “Groups waste not, want not is golden rule.” call for action on water.” Taipei Taipei Times. [online] http://www.

Times. [online] http://www.tai- taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/arpeitimes.com/News/taiwan/ar- chives/2009/12/13/2003460826. chives/2012/03/15/2003527836.

TIES (The International Ecotourism Li, Huei Huei (2007). Community Ex- Society) (2015). What is Ecotourism? perience and Cultural Change – the Immi- http://www.ecotourism.org/what-isgration History of Atayal Communities in ecotourism [accessed Jan. 18, 2015].

Shimen Reservoir Inundation Zone. Master’s thesis, Department of Ethnol- About the Author: ogy, National Chengchi University, Roi Ariel is an ecotourism advisor Taipei. and an IMES student at NCCU, Lin,Yih-Ren, Lahuy Icyeh & Da-Wei where he researches sustainable Kuan (2008). “Indigenous Language- tourism practices implemented by Informed Participatory Policy in Tai- indigenous people, in Taiwan and wan: A Socio-Political Perspective.” elsewhere. After completing his BA Documenting and Revitalizing Austrone- thesis at the Hebrew University sian Languages, University of Hawaii of Jerusalem on the effects of ecotourism on the Millennium Press, pp.134-161.

Development Goals, Roi has been McGehee, N. G., Kline, C., & Knol- working on promoting the practice lenberg, W. (2014). “Social move- of ecotourism, helping develop ments and tourism-related local ac- locally led ecotourism initiatives tion.” Annals of Tourism Research, 48, in Madagascar and China, and has provided consultancy services pp. 140-155. to programs in Tanzania, Nepal, McGehee, N. G., & Santos, C. A. Sri Lanka, and Israel. More (2005). “Social change, discourse and information about his work is volunteer tourism.” Annals of Tourism available via www.roiariel.com.

VOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 10

Taipei City Parks in Perspective A Comparison of Two of Taipei’s Most Iconic Parks Adam Hatch 2/28 Memorial Park and Da’an Forest Park are two of the most significant landmarks in Taipei. As city parks they are important sites on the urban map, but it is their history and development that make them so fascinating. 2/28 Park is a historical hotspot in central Taipei — it exhibits layers of history and symbolism. Da’an Park, opened in 1994, is a splash of green on the border of Taipei’s rapidly developing East Side. While these parks seem different in terms of history and function, they were created under similar circumstances, had similar effects on the urban landscape, and are both pertinent reflections of Taiwanese society.

Da’an Park, pictured on April 19, 2015.

Photo: James Tarantino

Given their geography, development, and function, parks are a clear representation of the circumstances of a community and illuminate the social, cultural, and political realities of their neighborhoods. 2/28 Memorial Park is named after an infamous government crackdown central to Taiwan’s history. Meanwhile, city officials often compare Da’an Forest Park to 11 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

New York’s Central Park, as if by establishing a relationship between the two, Taipei’s leaders can render the city akin to NYC in the eyes of the world.

The purpose of comparing the two parks is to establish the degree to which they mirror Taiwanese history and society. They are products of their environment, and by exam-

ining them we can distinguish some of the seemingly anachronistic fabric of Taiwanese culture.

2/28 Memorial Park is a veritable stack of Taiwanese history. Under Qing rule, the site of the park was originally Taipei’s Tianhougong (the main temple). Visitors can still go to the park and see the bases of the former pillars outside of what is now the National Taiwan Museum (Allen, 2012). Under Japanese rule, as a means of instilling “Japaneseness” in the minds of Taipei’s residents, authorities demolished the temple and designated the site as a park; it was to be an early centerpiece of Japan’s new colony. The park still features essentially the same Japanese design, albeit with some important additions and changes. The National Taiwan Museum was constructed by the Japanese, based on neo-classical European styles (making it a sibling of many important buildings of the era).

In the thinking of the Japanese authorities, the park was a symbol of modernity and a means of making the Taiwanese more “Japanese:” Similar to their construction of modern railways and roads, a public luxury like a park, influenced in design by more “modern” societies, was a way of bringing Taiwan out of its “underdeveloped” past and into the benevolent sunshine of the fledgling Japanese Empire (Allen).

After the Second World War, the park was somewhat ironically renamed “New Taipei Park.” Apart from removing as many Japanese elements as possible, the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) essentially ignored the park. During this time the Chinese pagodas were built and busts of Chinese/Taiwanese national heroes were installed as a way of inserting a Chinese mentality into the public space of Taipei.

Due to government neglect during the period of Martial Law (19491987), the park took on a more local flavor and an unapproved temple was built. During this time the park also became the main cruising spot for homosexuals in Taipei. Due to the KMT’s claim that homosexuality did not exist in the Republic of China, the government was even more apt

to ignore the park and what happened there, allowing Taipei Park to become an important site for the gay community (Allen).

With the emergence of democracy and Taiwanese consciousness, the park again took on an important civic role. It was renamed 2/28 Memorial Park in the 1990s after a prolonged debate about where to place a memorial for this event. Placing the memorial so close to KMT government buildings was a significant step toward addressing the difficulties of Taiwan’s history. The park’s current role is still mixed in many ways — it is both a place for families to spend some free time and a site of major political rallies and memorial events.

While each successive government has tried to displace the designs of their predecessors, 2/28 Park survives in its current form due to the multifaceted history it symbolizes.

Da’an Park Da’an Park is also a site of profound displacement and a lens into the history of Taipei. The park’s history deals less with national ideology and more with neoliberalism and gentrification (Clark).

The area that came to be known as Da’an Park was originally called “Park Number 7” in Japanese colonial urban plans (Braester, 2010). The plans were drawn up in the early 1930s but

The reclaimed Military Families’ Village near Taipei 101 is a good example of what veterans’ villages looked like, pictured on April 19, 2015.

Photo: James Tarantino

were never executed as Japan became increasingly preoccupied with war in China and the Second World War. After 1949 and KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek’s flight to Taiwan, the site “hosted the veterans’ village known as Jianhua Xincun” (Braester).

Veterans’ villages were sites of semi-legal settlement built by ROC veterans, typically filled with poor, unskilled men. These veterans typically worked in the informal economy, intermarried with local women — often also from poor families — and created households “burdened with economic hardship and cultural misunderstanding” (Braester).

The veterans’ villages are often remembered not as housing for veterans, but as huge shantytowns the

government allowed to exist, for a while, but mainly just ignored.

As Taiwan moved toward democracy in the 1980s it also moved toward greater neoliberalism. This, at first, was as a way to wrench power from the KMT which maintained control through state-run enterprises (Chen/Kwok).

A corollary of neoliberal development policy, however, was the reassignment of land use for greater profit. As the veterans’ shanties were illegal and in central locations, they could easily be erased from the city’s landscape and the sites could be redesignated to maximize the land value of surrounding neighborhoods (Braester). Thus was the fate of Jianhua Xincun and Da’an Park.

This Buddhist statue in the northwest corner of Da’an park is the only remaining structure from before the establishment of the park, pictured on April 19, 2014.

Photo: James Tarantino

VOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 12

The hypermodern design of the MRT station at Da’an Park, pictured on April 19, 2015.

Photo: James Tarantino

The development plans worked well. Although it took years of legal battles and police action to remove the “squatters” (Clark), today Da’an Park and the surrounding neighborhoods are sleek, modern, and notably affluent. Following the extension of Taipei’s metro system, the park now features a subway station, public bike rentals, and is surrounded by restaurants, stores, and high-rise luxury apartment buildings. The gentrification of the area has been so effective that in 2012 apartment prices near the park exceeded $13 million (Clark).

As bleak as the history of the park is, it still plays a role as a community centerpiece. With the introduction of nearby public transit, it is accessible to all visitors, not just those with cars or who live in the surrounding neighborhoods. The park is used for a range of formal and informal activities, from documentary screenings in one corner to Christian concerts in the amphitheater.

Da’an Park role as an engine of gentrification and a symbol of the power of profit over the well-being of the poor showcases important aspects of Taipei’s history and culture.

Still, it is also a symbol of a community-minded city where suburban 13 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

The veterans’ villages are often remembered not as housing for veterans, but as huge shantytowns the government allowed to exist, for a while, but mainly just ignored. sprawl is abandoned for a sense of civic pride.

The two parks are different in many ways. 2/28 Park is older and is the product of multiple eras, with more layers of history. Conversely, Da’an Park features no imperial-era Chinese arches, no temples, and no museums. Furthermore, 2/28 Park is a symbol of the different political authorities that controlled it throughout its history. Beginning with the Qing, then the Japanese colonial and Nationalist eras, followed by the modern, democratic “New Taiwan” multiparty government, all have left an indelible mark on its landscape.

Da’an Park, on the contrary, is

more modern and designed to fulfill the role of a “central park,” with more greenery and open space.

While these differences are important, the similarities between the two parks are more interesting.

Both parks are simultaneously symbols and examples of cultural, political, and literal displacement.

Da’an Park’s history of gentrification is its own form of political displacement, akin to that so evident at 2/28 Park: The eviction of thousands of residents from Jianhua Xincun was the result of a shift in political thinking in Taiwan. 2/28 Park exhibits the shift from Qing to Japanese to Nationalist governments, but Da’an sim-

ilarly encapsulates a shift from stateled development to one of neoliberal privatization and public policy. 2/28 Park, like Da’an Park, underwent actual physical displacement when it first became a park after the destruction of the old Tianhougong. As symbols of displacement, the parks are clearly siblings.

Furthermore, both parks are centerpieces of their neighborhoods.

2/28 Park is close to the most important government buildings in Taiwan. It is also a site of rallies and memorial events that are significant on both local and national levels. Da’an Park functions as a similar gathering point; concerts and events are common there. Da’an Park also straddles the main thoroughfare of the hypermodern Xinyi District, with Xinyi Road, located at the northern end of the park, leading directly to the heart of Taipei’s most upscale commercial district.

Comparisons between Da’an Park and New York’s Central Park are not unfounded. Da’an Park may have been built to increase real estate values in Xinyi District, but the fact that it has become a Taipei institution — a free and public one — speaks to a sense of civic pride in the face of neoliberal privatization so globally in vogue.

parks project the priorities of their society. 2/28 Park stands as a beacon of remembrance, tolerance, and the need to preserve the nation’s history.

February 28 is now a national holiday, and every year there is a memorial event held on the park’s grounds — a clear indication of its purpose in the Taiwanese psyche. But even more than just housing the 2/28 Memorial, the park embodies negligence under KMT rule and attempts to re-write history, Taiwan’s gay subculture, the ambivalence toward memories of Japanese development, and drives to emulate the West.

Da’an Park, in a similar vein, points to where Taipei wants to be — affluent, accessible, and ultimately noticed and appreciated on the global stage. In this way, the park does play the role of a “central park.” Furthermore, while its past is one of profit for profit’s sake, that seems to no longer be the rule. The ease of access to the park indicates that it is open to everyone; Taipei’s citizens are not interested in complete privatization to the detriment of public space. Da’an Park is free, open to all, and a beautiful place to spend a sunny day.

Da’an Park and 2/28 Park are multifaceted institutions that both signify where Taiwan has come from and where it wants to go. While the

While the histories of both parks can be seen as relatively dark, they also signify a resurgent sense of pride and optimism about Taiwan’s potential.

In Painting the city red: Chinese cinema and the urban contract. Durham NC: Duke University Press.

Chen, Y. (2005, January 1). Chapter 5: “Provision for Collective Consumption: Housing Production under Neoliberalism.”

One of the pagodas with a bust of a Taiwanese national hero, Da’an Park’s duck pond, and the 2/28 Memorial, all pictured on April 19, 2015.

Photo: James Tarantino

2/28 Park is similarly located on prime real estate and offers important public services through its museums, memorials, and open space in central Taipei. These are indications of a society that emphasizes economic development alongside civic pride and an acknowledgment that not only does a city need some open, green space, but that space should be free and easily accessible.

Most importantly, however, these

histories of both parks can be seen as About the Author: relatively dark, they also signify a resurgent sense of pride and optimism Adam Hatch is an IMAS student at NCCU. Adam holds a BA degree in about Taiwan’s potential. geography from the University of California at Berkeley. His research Sources: focuses on human and urban Allen, J. (2012). A Park in the City. In geography and its more practical Taipei: City of displacements. Seattle: applications. He can be reached at adamnmn86@gmail.com.

University of Washington Press.

Braester, Y. (2010). Angel Sanctuaries.

VOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 14

Finding a Solution in the South China Sea Kelvin Chen Territorial disputes in the South China Sea are nothing new: There have been centuries of conflicts in the area, resulting in a turbulent regional history. China’s rapid rise over the past decade has forced the issue once again back into the spotlight as a major concern in Asian relations. As a leading military and economic powerhouse in East Asia, China has begun expanding its influence offshore into the South China Sea through aggressive and controversial territorial claims over islands in the region. Relations with China have quickly deteriorated for the countries who also lay claim to the same islands, and tensions have escalated to an all-time high.

Wanting to avoid a major conflict, the involved countries have been rather calm and collected and have been pushing to improve relations with China. While observers might expect the claimant countries to respond by stockpiling weapons and allowing tensions to continue, they have instead pursued a less confrontational method known as hedging; this tactic involves increased cooperation with China, both bilaterally and multilaterally, as well as increased military spending.

China’s territorial claims over the islands in the South China Sea can be traced back to 1947, when the Republic of China (Taiwan) published a map featuring an eleven-dotted-line to justify its claims in the South China Sea. After the Chinese Communist Party took over mainland China and formed the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the line was adopted and revised to nine dashes. This ninedash line has served as the primary rationale for its claims ever since (Morley and Nishihara, 2015). Matters drastically changed once it was speculated that the area around the islands was rich in natural gas and oil deposits; though there are no agreements on the volume. According to the US Energy Information Administration, the region’s total discovered and undiscovered oil reserves 15 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

amount to approximately 28 billion barrels (Eia.gov, 2015). The possibility of oil deposits renewed interest in the area and prompted China and other claimant countries to enforce their territorial claims more actively.

The current countries involved in the dispute include Brunei, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The largest source of regional tensions are the competing claims of the Philippines and Vietnam with China.

China claims sovereignty over the entire South China Sea and all its minor outlying islands, including the Paracel and Spratly islands. The Paracel Islands are occupied entirely by China, but are also claimed by Vietnam. Of the Spratly Islands — which are claimed by the Philippines, China, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Viet-

nam — China only occupies certain small islets.

While these islets may seem insignificant, China has developed them into strategic outposts in order to maintain a permanent presence in the region. In 2012, China consolidated all of the islets it controls into a new prefecture within Hainan Province, called Sansha. According to Xinhua News, “the city government is located in the Paracels on the 2.13-square km Yongxing Island, which contains a small military airport, a seaport, roads, a clinic, a post office, and an observatory” (Lague, 2015).

In January 2014, China decided to conduct regular naval patrols near the islands it controls. China has demonstrated to the other claimant countries that it has no plans of withdrawing from the region. As a result, tensions have only increased with each aggressive action by China.

Although there had been confrontations throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Chinese regional aggression only reached its pinnacle in 1974 when it took control of the Paracel Islands in a bloody battle with Vietnam. The battle was an attempt by the Republic of Vietnam Navy to expel the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) naval vessels from some of the Paracel islets (Pike, 2015). As a result of the battle, China established permanent control over the Paracel Islands and asserted its “Nine-dotted line” claim. Since then China has been involved in a series of conflicts, particularly with Vietnam and the Philippines, which have both been the relatively vocal in this territorial dispute.

Over the past five years, the number of conflicts has increased as China has significantly built up its armed forces and consequently become more brazen. Most of these hostilities are aimed at Vietnam and the Philippines, due to their active involvement in, and close proximity to, the disputed islands.

In June 2011, the PLA Navy conducted three days of exercises, which included live-fire drills, in the disputed waters (Demick, 2011).

According to an article in the LA Times, 14 vessels participated in the maneuvers, staging antisubmarine

As a leading military and economic powerhouse in East Asia, China has begun expanding its influence down into the South China Sea through aggression and controversial territorial claims over islands in the region.

The Chinese Navy conducts drills in the South China Sea. Photo: Gao Yi, AP / (CC)

and beach landing drills aimed at defending atolls and protecting sea lanes (Demick, 2011). This was a major concern to Vietnam, which had also conducted live-fire drills near the Spratly Islands in the same week.

On March 2, 2011, the government of the Philippines reported that two Chinese patrol boats attempted to ram one of its surveillance ships near Palawan Island (China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea, 2015).

The Philippines responded by sending two aircraft to investigate.

Following the incident, the Philippine foreign affairs undersecretary

launched a protest against Beijing (China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea, 2015). In addition, the Philippine government announced a halt to further surveying and ordered its coast guard to provide security for oil and gas exploration activities.

More recently, in May 2014, a Chinese vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat about 17 nautical miles southwest of a Chinese oil rig that was drilling off the coast of the Paracel Islands, without consulting the other claimants (Perlez, 2014).

Despite differing accounts from both sides, it would seem that China

is the aggressor, and that it has been testing the claimant countries’ patience with its brazen moves.

With so many incidents occurring one after another, the region has quickly come into a state of insecurity, and it comes as no surprise that anti-China sentiment is rampant among the populations of some of the claimant countries.

In July 2013, the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) coalition organized a global protest regarding the South China Sea dispute, in which protesters gathered outside the Chinese embassies in Manila, London, Rome, Sydney, Copenhagen, as well VOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 16

as multiple cities in the US, among other locations (Keck, 2015).

According to former Philippine interior secretary Rafael Alunan III, “this protest rally is only going to be the start of something that we intend to become bigger… in order to tell the world what is happening in our backyard – the bullying that’s being done by our big neighbor” (Keck, 2015).

In response to the presence of a Chinese drilling rig in waters claimed

by Vietnam, anti-China protests erupted in May 2014. During these protests, at least 15 foreign-owned factories were set on fire in industrial parks in southern Vietnam. An estimated 20,000 protesters stormed the streets and targeted Chinese-affiliated buildings (BBC News, 2014). The protests later spread to the Philippines, where people gathered to vent their resentment toward Chinese intimidation in the region.

Wanting to bring the dispute into

the international spotlight, the Philippines in January 2013 asked the UN’s Permanent Court of Arbitration to consider its case with respect to the dispute with China over the maritime jurisdiction of the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, 2013). China, so far, has refused to take part in the arbitration and has warned that the case would damage bilateral ties.

Vietnam has also strived to internationalize this territorial dispute and has lodged protests of its own with the UN. In June 2014, Ambassador Le Hoai Trung, Vietnam’s Permanent Representative to the UN, met with UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman in New York to discuss the developments in the South China Sea. Although the governments of Malaysia and Brunei also lay claim to the disputed islands and have occasionally protested China’s presence

in the area, they have kept a relatively low profile because of their economic reliance on China and regional natural resources. Beijing has doled out multi-billion dollar loans, investments, and grants to Brunei and has become increasingly involved in its crucial oil and gas sector (Heydarian, 2012).

Meanwhile, China has become Malaysia’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade projected to top US$60 billion in 2014 (Chang, 2014).

With such dependence on China, it is clear why the two countries have, up to now, been so quiet on the issue.

However, this is already changing as certain factors have dramatically altered the state of the dispute, making it hard for Brunei and Malaysia to remain silent.

While reactions among the populations of the claimant countries have sometimes been antagonistic and violent, official responses have been composed, yet stern. In the past year

Maritime claims in the South China Sea. Image: (CC) Wikimedia Commons

alone, Vietnam has stepped up talks with China, sending high-level government officials to meet with their Chinese counterparts to encourage a higher degree of trust.

In August 2014, Vietnam sent Le Hong Anh, special envoy of the Secretary General of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP), to Beijing to meet Secretary General Xi, resulting in three agreed points (Thayer, 2015).

Both Chinese and Vietnamese leaders realize that their respective communist parties are the key players in promoting stable bilateral relations, and they stress the importance of obtaining consensus on the steps needed to restore Sino-Vietnamese ties.

Meanwhile, the Philippines has turned to soft power in the form of cultural diplomacy and sports in order to neutralize tensions with China and equalize a traditionally asymmetrical relationship between the two countries. The Philippine Department of Tourism (DOT) has been intensifying tourism promotion in China, resulting in a recent increase in Chinese tourists traveling to the country. According to the nation’s DOT, over 400,000 Chinese visited the country in 2013 (Wong, 2014).

In August 2013, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs invited members of the Chinese media to an event called the “Chinese Media Familiarization Tour,” during which participants were introduced to Philippine history, politics, and foreign policy with the aim of enabling them to produce more accurate and unbiased news reports on the country (Wong, 2014). These types of cultural and media events are an effective measure to promote closer ties between the two states and establish a base of mutual trust.

In addition to bilateral exchanges, the claimant countries have also used ASEAN as a means to engage in multilateral talks and push for a possible resolution to the dispute.

ASEAN-China Dialogue relations started in 1991 and have regularly taken place ever since. Through ASEAN, the claimant countries have been able to increase cooperation with China in multiple areas including the environment.

In terms of cultural cooperation, some of the involved countries organized a seminar on Safeguarding Cul-

Sunset on the South China Sea off the coast of Vietnam.

Photo: (CC) BY-SA 3.0

tural Heritage in August 2012 and the ASEAN-China Cultural Forum with the theme “Asian libraries: Resource Sharing, Cooperation and Development” in September 2012 (Asean. org, 2015). These collaborative initiatives were aimed at preserving a collective sense of Asian history and culture, which ultimately ties the rival nations together despite their political differences.

Regarding the environment, the China-ASEAN Environmental Cooperation Centre (CAEC) was officially inaugurated in May 2011 in Beijing. In addition, an ASEANChina Environmental Cooperation Action Plan was adopted by ASEAN and China in 2011 (Asean.org, 2015).

This action plan entailed establishing an environmental cooperation mechanism, promoting cooperation on environmental issues, and promoting joint research.

In addition, China established the 2009 China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund and provided US$15 billion to support more than 50 infrastructure development projects in ASEAN member states (Asean.org, 2015). The significant progress the claimant countries have achieved individually and multilaterally through ASEAN with China proves that soft power cooperation can transcend politics.

Nevertheless, there has been very little progress made regarding the dispute itself. This is due to the fact that apart from China, the claimants have all adopted the principles of the 1982 UNCLOS (United Nations Conven-

Vietnam has stepped up talks with China, sending high-level government officials to meet with their Chinese counterparts to encourage a higher degree of trust.

VOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 18

tion on the Law of the Sea). This set of laws was completed in 1982 and defines the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the world’s oceans. China has ratified the document, but picks the parts that are advantageous to its interests and opposes the rest, which has resulted in frustration among the claimant countries (Asean.org, 2015).

ASEAN has been seeking a more binding code of conduct, but China remains uncooperative in terms of following UNCLOS law.

One thing it has done is to sign the Declaration on the Conducts of Parties in the South China Sea in November 2002 in Phnom Penh, which reaffirmed many aspects of the 1982 UNCLOS (Asean.org, 2015).

Another factor that has prevented further progress in ASEAN-China relations is the disunity that has muddled the organization in recent years.

This has raised doubts about the organization’s ability to steer regional integration and manage complex securityrelated conflicts (Heydarian, 2012).

Some analysts and ASEAN states have blamed Cambodia’s decision to prioritize bilateral ties with China over ASEAN’s multilateral interests, but it is hard to identify one single ex-

By choosing a hedging strategy, the claimant countries have taken an alternative route to diffusing tensions in the region.

19 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

planation (Heydarian, 2012). However, things are looking more optimistic as Malaysia’s leadership over the organization has begun (Parameswaran, 2014), bringing a welcome wave of new policies and goals.

Meanwhile, as dialogue and cooperation with China have taken the forefront, the claimant countries are also careful not to let their guard down, increasing military spending and military cooperation with the US as a precaution.

In December 2011, Boeing received a US Navy contract under the Foreign Military Sales Program to begin the long process of upgrading Malaysia’s fleet of F-18 fighters. The upgrade entails the design, development, and installation of retrofit kits that will provide enhanced navigation, targeting, and situational awareness (Boeing.mediaroom.com, 2011).

By strengthening its fighters, Malaysia is seeking to ensure air superiority over its territory and borders and to prevent China from encroaching on its coastal waters.

In October 2014, the US eased its ban on weapon sales to Vietnam to aid its maritime security and to support its ability to defend itself from China in the South China Sea (Pen-

nington, 2014). This allows for sales of lethal maritime security capabilities and surveillance on a case-bycase basis. This move was welcomed

by Vietnam, as it can now begin to effectively contribute to maritime security in the South China Sea. In April 2014, a new 10-year security pact between the US and the Philippines was signed which would moderately increase US weapons sales in the coming years, especially regarding maritime surveillance equipment, new aircraft, and missiles (Shalal, 2014). This is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, as it serves as a show of force to deter China from continuing its brazen acts in the region.

By choosing a hedging strategy, the claimant countries have taken an alternative route to diffusing tensions in the region. Instead of completely antagonizing China and instigating an arms race, these countries have pursued a two-pronged strategy of dialogue with China — bilaterally and multilaterally — and increased independent military spending as a necessary precaution.

With this approach, the claimant countries hope to avoid an escalation of violence and to see China play a

Vietnamese protesting against China in Hanoi Photo: (CC) VOA

more cooperative role in the South China Sea. While it is difficult to predict the outcome of the dispute, there is a sense of optimism about the coming years. Malaysia’s recent ASEAN chairmanship has been a welcome change, as many hope it can restore unity within the organization and make it more assertive when engaging with China.

Furthermore, the claimant countries will feel the effects of the US pivot to Asia through increased weapons sales and more military exchanges. This will serve to deter China from continuing its aggressive confrontations with its Southeast Asian neighbors. These two factors will hopefully bring changes that will encourage China to adopt a more cooperative role in finding a peaceful resolution to the island dispute.

Sources: BBC News (2014). “Factories burnt in Vietnam-China row.” BBC News. [online] http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-asia-27403851 [Accessed Jan. 7, 2015].

BBC News (2014). “Case filed against China sea claims.” BBC News. [online] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-asia-26781682 [Accessed Jan. 7, 2015].

Boeing.mediaroom.com (2011).

“Boeing: Boeing Receives Contract for 1st Major Upgrades to Malaysian F/A-18D Hornets.” Boeing.mediaroom.com [online] http:// boeing.mediaroom.com/index. php?s=20295&item=2057 [Accessed Jan. 7, 2015].

Eia.gov (2015). US Energy Information Administration (EIA). [online] http:// www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs [Accessed Dec. 20, 2014].

cel Islands in South China Sea.” Taipei Times. [online] http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/01/22/2003581843 [Accessed Jan. 4, 2015].

Heydarian, R. (2012). “Brunei in the South China Sea hot seat.” Asia Times Online. [online] http://www. atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/ NL22Ae07.html [Accessed Jan. 7, 2015].

Thayer, C. (2015). “China and Vietnam Eschew Megaphone Diplomacy.” The Diplomat. [online] http:// thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinaand-vietnam-eschew-megaphonediplomacy/ [Accessed Jan. 8, 2015].

Lague, D. (2015). “China’s hawks gaining sway in South China sea dispute.” Reuters. [online] http://www. reuters.com/article/2012/07/25/ u s - ch i n a - s o u t h ch i n a s e a - i d U S BRE86O1P020120725 [Accessed Jan. 4, 2015].

The Washington Post (2012). “Timeline: Disputes in the South China Sea.” The Washington Post. [online] http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-srv/world/special/south-chinasea-timeline/ [Accessed Jan. 4, 2015].

US-China Economic and Security Morley, J. and Nishihara, M. (2015). Review Commission (2012). “China’s Vietnam Joins the World. East Gate Global Quest for Resources and ImBooks, p 124. plications for the United States.” Center for a New American Study, p 2.

Pennington, M. (2014). “US. Eases Ban On Weapons Sales To VGN News (2015). “Vietnamese Vietnam.” The Huffington Post. diplomat lodges protest against [online] http://www.huffing- China at UN - Vietnamese diplomat tonpost.com/2014/10/02/us-weap- lodges protest against China at UN.” ons-sales-to-vietnam_n_5924728. VGP News. [online] http://news. html [Accessed Jan. 8, 2015]. chinhphu.vn/Home/Vietnamesediplomat-lodges-protest-against-ChiPerlez, J. (2014). “Vietnamese Vessel na-at-UN/20146/21283.vgp [AcSinks in Clash Near Oil Rig.” Nytimes. cessed Jan. 7, 2015]. com. [online] http://www.nytimes. com/2014/05/27/world/asia/viet- Wong, A. (2014). “Philippines - Chinam-boat-sinks-in-clash-near-oil-rig. na Relations: Beyond the Territorial html [Accessed Jan. 4, 2015].

Disputes.” Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies. 1(3), pp.1, Permanent Court of Arbitration 2. [online] http://fsi.gov.ph/wp(2013). The Republic of the Philippines v. content/uploads/2014/07/2014The People’s Republic of China. [online] 07-Philippines-China-Relationshttp://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage. Wong.pdf [Accessed Jan. 7, 2015]. asp?pag_id=1529.

Zachary Keck, T. (2015). “Philippine Pike, J. (2015). “South China Sea / Group Plans Global Anti-China ProSpratly Islands.” Globalsecurity.org. tests.” The Diplomat. [online] http:// [online] http://www.globalsecurity. thediplomat.com/2013/07/philiporg/military/world/war/paracel. pine-group-plans-global-anti-chinahtm [Accessed Jan. 4, 2015]. protests/ [Accessed Jan. 7, 2015].

Center for Strategic and International Studies (2015). “China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. [online] http://csis.org/files/publication/110629_Thayer_South_China_ Shalal, A. (2014). “US-Philippines Sea.pdf [Accessed Jan. 4, 2015]. pact could modestly boost American arms sales.” Reuters. [online] Chang, F. (2014). “A Question of Re- h t t p : / / w w w. r e u t e r s. c o m / a r t i balancing: Malaysia’s Relations With cle/2014/04/27/us-philippines-usaChina.” Foreign Policy Research Institute. arms-idUSBREA3Q0LA20140427 [online] http://www.fpri.org/arti- [Accessed Jan. 8, 2015]. cles/2014/07/question-rebalancingmalaysias-relations-china [Accessed Taipeitimes.com (2014). “China Jan. 7, 2015]. to start regular patrols from Para-

About the Author: Kelvin Chen is an IMAS student at NCCU. He received his BA in Chinese History from the University of Vermont. His current research involves US military sales to Taiwan and Taiwan’s UN strategy. He can be reached at kychen415@gmail.com.

VOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 20

From Grain to Beer Taipei’s Traditional Shops Bryn Thomas, Jeng-Shun Hung, and Mark Schriver Taiwan’s capital, Taipei, is in a constant state of transition, simultaneously presenting a mixture of old and new. Tucked between modern high-rise apartment buildings and touristoriented ancient markets are some of the last vestiges of old Taipei: Its local traditional shops. While this type of business has often changed with the city’s landscape, it is also disappearing. “Traditional shops” are a mixture of convenience and grocery stores and often serve as local hangouts. These shops are typically owned and operated by Taipei’s older generations. Traditional shops are privately owned, non-standardized, and non-chain stores that sell food products, drinks, and cigarettes. These businesses, known locally as za huo dian, can often be recognized by a Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor License displayed on their storefront. The roles these stores play are affected by the changing circumstances among Taipei’s many different districts. By interviewing shop owners in Xinyi, Da’an, and Wanhua districts — areas that demonstrate varying economic, demographic, and social conditions — one can discover how location affects bussiness, as well as the role and self-perception of the owners of these shops.

Xinyi

In Xinyi District, both stores were previously different types of shops.

One had previously been a rice wholesaler, while the other had been a bakery. Their respective operation periods were 40 years for the bakery and 10 years for the rice wholesaler.

The shops sell similar products and have traditionally relied on the sale of eggs, grains, and rice. The Xinyi shop owners both said their store serves as a local gathering spot, attracting “gossiping housewives and elderly neighbors” and that they relied heavily on local returning customers.

One owner had at one point attempted to run for local political office, but had not been elected. The owner of this shop was responsible for certain community tasks, including organizing parking spaces, trash collection, and lease brokering.

Decreasing profits combined with a declining customer base has 21 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

made hiring new staff difficult and impractical. The owners of the two Xinyi shops, both over sixty, have difficulty lifting bags of rice and heavy vats of oil, but cannot afford to hire help. As such, only one of the stores continues to offer a delivery service. In spite of a weak back, one shopkeeper continues this service because he feels that “the people around here could not feed themselves otherwise.” In addition, the delivery service is an important draw, as chain grocery stores do not offer such services.

One shop owner mentioned a shift in the preferences of local customers who have started purchasing more grains, such as job’s tears, mung beans, and barley, and buy fewer rice products due to a health food craze.

The other proprietor stated that he currently sells more pre-packaged and processed goods, such as chips, cola, beer, and less rice. Selling these

pre-packaged products is less labor intensive as they are not as heavy or difficult to place on the shelves.

When asked about competition, both owners said they did not see modern convenience stores, such as 7-Eleven, as a threat. Both shopkeepers stated community relationships as being an important draw for customers.

“We sell a higher quality, local product at a lower price,” one store owner said. In addition, customers are given greater control over portions at these shops.

Regarding the use of the Internet or social media to advertise their shops, they responded that their customer base had not changed, and that they rely on repeat local customers, so advertising would be ineffective.

As for future prospects, two trends quickly became apparent. The owners said they consider their work “very arduous” and do not wish this lifestyle upon their children as they

Ms Lee conducts business in her store in Wanhua District, Taipei, on January 10, 2015.

Photo: Bryn Thomas

both feel that they can find better employment than running a shop, which requires working long hours and manual labor. There is a general perception among the owners that after this generation, these stores will cease to exist in Xinyi.

Da’an The three stores we visited in Da’an are all approximately 40 years old and all of the owners were over the age of 60. Two of the owners only spoke Taiwanese (not Mandarin).

One shop was previously a candy store, while the other two had always been dry goods grocers. Although all three shops had previously relied on the sale of rice and grains, they now mainly — and in some cases begrudgingly — sell processed food, beer, and cigarettes.

All three shop owners believed they hold special positions in the community: One previously served as district chief (lizhang), which he felt was a source of pride and beneficial to his business, while the others indicated they enjoy their role as a community meeting place and regularly help local residents with certain

All three shop owners believed they hold special positions in the community: One previously served as district chief, which he felt was a source of pride and beneficial to his business, while two others indicated they enjoy their stores’ role as a community meeting place and regularly help local residents. tasks, such arranging real-estate deals.

One elderly proprietor, whose shop is located near a hostel, boasted about regular foreign clients buying beer: She particularly enjoys selling to these customers and speaking Man-

darin to them.

The shop owners in this district perceived competition differently than the owners in Xinyi District: They cited chain grocery stores and local Hi-Life convenience stores as VOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 22

from the candy shop owner who said: “I do not want it to be busier than this, I am happy with things the way they are.”

Wanhua

their biggest competitors.

These shops, like those in Xinyi, typically ran 12-hour shifts, six or seven days a week. Although the shop owners described their work as increasingly exhausting, they felt the need to work long hours in order to maintain a customer base. Our last interviewee stated that other dry good stores are by far her biggest competitors, adding: “If I close for just one day, they will steal my business.”

The neighborhood previously boasted 400 grocery stores, but now only 120 remain, one owner said, adding that the area is most affected by a declining elderly customer base.

As people pass away, and younger residents adopt different consumer habits, these stores face increasingly smaller profits, made worse by rising rents in the area.

All three owners said that they did not expect their children to take over the business after they pass away as they did not view this as an acceptable lifestyle for young people, citing long hours and low profitability. One of the interviewees even stated that her children wished she would close her business.

Under increasingly difficult circumstances, these shops demonstrated different motivators to stay in business. One interviewee said that 23 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

Wanhua is Taipei’s oldest commercial district, known for its traditional businesses and elderly population.

A notable difference in Wanhua concerned the age of the shops, with two of the three having been in operation for over 60 years. All three stores are on their second (or third) generation of ownership.

One shop had previously been an egg store, whilst the other had changed location to maintain and facilitate business.

Mrs Lee and her grandchild in their shop in Wanhua The owners in Wanhua said that District, Taipei, on January 8, 2015. they do business primarily with elPhoto: Bryn Thomas derly and middle-aged people — in particular housewives. The shops we visited in Wanhua were all multigenerational, with the children of one of the owner’s working at the shops. Most of the stores were doing well, and the proprietors indicated they were optimistic about the future.

Although the proprietors did not maintain any (local) political positions, they did perceive themselves as holding special positions in their community. “People come by and ask for advice on recipes and food preparation,” one owner said. “The shop has become a repository of local culinary knowledge.”

The owners did complain of a slowly declining customer base, but stated different reasons. One important factor is aging of the residents in the neighborhood. Another factor is that the modern youth are not willing to observe traditional festivals and are thus not purchasing traditional running the shop is a way for him to temple offerings from their store, kill time and stay busy, while another one owner said. found great joy in her work. “When my husband died a few years ago I was very sad, but my business made Future prospects? me happy again,” she said.

Although all the store owners we The final shop owner wanted to spoke to agreed that the work is tiring close the business, but she said her and arduous, they indicated they are husband enjoys the social aspect of able to find happiness in their roles. running a store and having a place Most of our interviewees indicated to drink with his friends. The most they would continue their business charming response we received came until the end of their lives, but that

Another Da’an shop owner stated that the neighborhood previously boasted 400 grocery stores, but now only 120 remain.

Mr Zhen’s store in Muzha District, Taipei, on January 8, 2015.

Photo: Mark Schriver

after this generation it is likely that Taipei’s traditional dry grocery shops will further decline in number, and possibly disappear, marking the end of one of the city’s traditional characteristics.

Sources:

About the Authors:

Taipei Municipal Population and Housing Census 2010. http://ebas1. Jeng-Shun Hung graduated from ebas.gov.tw/phc2010/english/re- the National Defense University, home.htm (Accessed January, 2015). Taiwan, where he majored in management information systems.

He is currently an IMAS student at NCCU. His interests include digital technology, humanities, and electronic cultural maps. He can be reached at 103926009@nccu.edu. tw.

Mark Schriver holds a degree in political science from Radford University, Virginia. He is currently an IMAS student at NCCU. He can be reached at markschriver@gmail. com.

Bryn Thomas is an IMAS student at NCCU. He holds a BA degree in International Studies from Saginaw Valley State University, Michigan. His research interests include Taiwanese architecture and indigenous rights. He can be reached at bryn.thomas.1987@ gmail.com.

Mr Chen sits behind his desk holding a ledger in Da’an District, Taipei, on January 8, 2015.

Photo: Bryn Thomas

• 24

Book Review: Sigfrido Burgos Caceres (2013).

China’s Strategic Interest in the South China Sea: Power and Resources. Routledge, London.

Filippo Maranzana De Filippis If one wants to make sense of China’s foreign policy in recent years, China’s Strategic Interests in the South China Sea is certainly an excellent addition to the already existing literature. The need for such a work is justified by the notorious difficulty in interpreting Beijing’s policy with regards to its future power projections in Asia and other continents.

Sigfrido Burgos Caceres, a consultant who worked for the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), has written extensively on China’s quest for natural resources in Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America.

The book is divided into three parts: Part I introduces the political, economic, and social backgrounds that serve as a foundation for the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) foreign policy formation; part II is made up of case studies involving countries that have diplomatic and economic interests in the South China Sea; part III sums up the book’s main topics and attempts to draw conclusions on the basis of policy lines regarding the South China Sea so far observed among all the actors involved, which can help build hypotheses about future scenarios on the international stage.

A look at a China map today helps get an immediate idea of its current diplomatic and military situation.

After decades of rivalry, suspicion, and fear, the PRC has finally reached a state of relative security at its land borders: No foreseeable threat is expected from neighboring countries, from whose territories once arrived 25 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

all the ‘barbarian’ invasions that destabilized and eventually toppled centuries-old dynasties.

Part I explains how China’s control of the four non-Han buffer territories of Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, Tibet, and Xinjiang offers “layers of protection against India from the

velopment for China’s burgeoning population.

Growth and development are then the pillars on which the PRC regime stands, allowing for (1) domestic stability to prolong its political continuity, (2) the necessary funding to finance the ongoing military build-up of the army, air force, and navy, conducive to an effective political and military influence on the world stage.

A quick glance at the vast bodies of water that open in front of the Chinese coastline reveals that the most important areas are not the East China Sea, which separates the PRC from the Korean Peninsula, or the Sea of Japan, but the South China Sea and its shipping routes.

It goes almost without saying that China was bound to set its eyes on this region sooner or later.

As it happens, though, the South China Sea is also a very crowded area,

After decades of rivalry, suspicion, and fear, the PRC has finally reached a state of relative security at its land borders: No foreseeable threat is expected from neighboring countries. west, South-East Asian countries from the south-east, Russia from the north, or any attack across the western steppes” (p.5) aimed at the core of China, where most Han citizens, cities, industrial sectors, and military centers are now concentrated.

This being finally achieved, the PRC is now ready to project itself overseas, where the last ‘barbarians’ that caused the “century of humiliation” (1840-1945), and eventually the collapse of the last Chinese dynasty in 1911, came from. This “going-global” foreign policy is driven mainly by the imperative of ensuring the constant and free flow of energy sources, raw materials, and natural resources to sustain growth and de-

lined with nations claiming, in turn, their own sovereignty over both small and large sections of this stretch of water.

In this regard, Part II of the book presents the case studies of four countries — Japan, the Philippines, the US, and Vietnam, respectively — that are affected directly or indirectly by territorial disputes with China.

Two of these nations, Japan and the US, are important and distant and both consider it of strategic importance to restrain Chinese ambitions in this region by means of diplomatic and military suasion.

The other two nations are relatively weak and geographically uncomfortably close to the Asian giant,

with which they have had numerous skirmishes over territorial disputes, including strife over the Paracel Islands (between Vietnam and China) and the Spratly Islands (between the Philippines, Vietnam, and China).

The importance attributed to the South China Sea derives not only from the fact that one-third of the world’s shipping trade passes through its waters: It is believed that this area’s seabed holds huge unexplored reserves of oil and gas.

It is no wonder then that China forcefully included 80 percent of the South China Sea within the famous nine-dash line — the U-shaped line first drawn by the Kuomintang government in 1947 — refusing to acknowledge any international arbitration on that matter.

The author concludes Part III of the book by stating that the South China Sea will be a political, diplomatic, and military test for the PRC in view of its emerging economic power vis-à-vis the declining trend of US power.

While it will still take years of investments and preparation from the Chinese side to be on a par with the US’ present military apparatus, it is clear that established balances and

spheres of influence will inevitably come to an end, and will be replaced by a still uncertain scenario which likely sees China at its center.

Caceres argues that the “soft power” displayed so far by the PRC in its foreign policy is the result of the balancing between two modes of diplomacy apparently contradictory but often used simultaneously or alternatively, depending on the circumstances: (1) passive and behind-the-scenes, or (2) proactive and stage-managing, both craftily employed when dealing with crises.

At times, this adds to mistrust and suspicion among China’s closest neighbors, while puzzling distant Western observers.

This work is clearly aimed at a well-educated readership, but is not strictly for academics, as it lacks extensive theoretical foundations. It would certainly be useful for institutions that deal with China from different perspectives, be they diplomatic, military, or economic.

Moreover, the simple, direct language used throughout the book has the purpose of reaching a wider audience. The supposedly academic shortfall can be viewed as a fresh opportunity to judge the situation from

a practical angle, without too much theory.

Nevertheless, as is often the case when analyzing China, Sigfrido Burgos Caceres’ well-written book does not reach any firm conclusions regarding China’s future policies, instead reiterating concepts and ideas that have already become part of general conventional wisdom.

In addition, much of the PRC’s nationalistic propaganda — such as China’s moral right to assert its dominance and redress its past of humiliation suffered at the hands of colonial rulers — is accepted and reproduced at face-value without any comment or critique from the author.

About the Author: Filippo M. De Filippis holds an MA in Literature from Florence University, Italy, and an MA in Asia-Pacific Studies from National Chengchi University (NCCU).

He is currently a PhD student at NCCU. His primary research interests include Southeast Asian state formation and policy, with a particular focus on Thailand. He can be reached at fmdefilippis@ yahoo.it.

VOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 26

Conference Report: International Conference on IndiaChina Relations Implications for Peace and Prosperity in Asia Olga Daksueva

In October 2014, I visited India, the subject of my research for five years.

My trip was motivated by a number of reasons, though largely led by my interest in “mysterious India” which looks beyond India’s foreign policies toward its traditions and ongoing social transformations.

India is a highly diversified and complex state, which presents a great variety of research topics, a number of academic conferences, workshops, and seminars to share your viewpoints and exchange ideas with your 27 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

counterparts.

In fact, the opportunity for exchange of ideas and views with my Indian counterparts was a major driver for my visit. My seniors in the IDAS program, who had already attended the India-China Relations conference in previous years, encouraged me to visit the country and experience it for myself. While there, I was able to combine the conference with an exceptional trip to the northern part of India, Dharamsala,

to attend a lecture given by the Dalai Lama XIV, in my opinion one of the most outstanding people of the twentieth century.

After hearing His Holiness’ lecture and spiritual encouragement, I flew to the southern part of India, where the conference took place.

The conference was held over three days and was attended by professors and students from all over the world.

The annual conference is devoted to relations between the two Asian

giants, India and China. It delved into their relationship from various theoretical perspectives and touched on important strategic, political, and economic aspects of Sino-Indian relations.

Distinguished guests In attendance were many outstanding scholars, and it was a great opportunity for me to discuss several sensitive topics and share my own opinions. Among them, Ambassador C. V. Ranganathan, who served as Indian ambassador to China between 1987 and 1991, was the most prominent person I met at the conference.

His remarkable experience impressed all scholars and researchers. He was the ambassador to China during the normalization of Sino-Indian relations after the first official state visit of then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing, and had served at other diplomatic posts in Russia and France.

The presentations were very engaging, debates between participants were intense, but constructive, and contributors provided stimulating observations and remarks.

At this conference I presented a paper, “Balance-of-threat theory: Implications for the South China Sea,” my first experience attending a conference abroad. I was pleasantly surprised that all auditors actively participated in conference sessions and asked numerous questions or made comments regarding the presentation.

The host university also organized a morning trip to one of the most famous ancient Hindu temples, Tirumala Venkateswara Temple, where you can witness a number of Hindu traditions and customs, which provided a deeper understanding of the country of my research.

Information:

Location: UGC Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati, India.

Date: October 11-13, 2014.

About the Author: Olga Daksueva is an IDAS student at NCCU. Her research interests include the South China Sea, India’s Look East policy, and international relations of the Asia-Pacific. She can be reached at daksueva.olga@gmail.com.

VOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 28

Photo Series James Morris

By James Morris

What is IDAS? The International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at National Chengchi University, located in northern Taiwan, is the first to offer an English-taught doctoral program in Asia-Pacific Studies in Taiwan. The IDAS program brings an interdisciplinary understanding of the Asia-Pacific region and offers students courses and research related to many aspects of the region.

We offer four tracks — political economy, society and culture, public governance, and international relations — that take advantage of NCCU’s excellent academic talent as one of Asia’s top universities. This program focuses on training professionals and places an emphasis on the combination of theory and practical research.

For students who want to broaden their horizons and stretch their boundaries, we offer a learning environment to equip students with well-rounded research skills and enhance their professional abilities. We are part of NCCU’s College of Social Sciences, and draw on English-speaking faculty throughout the campus. We also offer the opportunity for students to study abroad, and those who come to NCCU can also take advantage of our excellent language center for learning Mandarin.

To learn more about IDAS, IMAS, admissions, and the scholarships available, visit: asiapacific.nccu.edu.tw

30 • ASIA-PACIFIC NEWSLETTER

Our comprehensive Asia-Pacific Studies program involves: • Taking a minimum of 33 credit hours • Completing the qualifying exam for the selected track • Publishing at least one academic paper in English in an approved peerreviewed academic journal • Presenting a paper at an international conference • Writing a dissertation consisting of original research • Completing all requirements within 7 years, excluding 2 years for an approved sabbatical VOLUME 7 | NUMBER 1 | SPRING 2015 • 30

Send submissions to nccu.apn@gmail.com See inside front cover for submission guidelines.