Holland & Knight – China Practice Newsletter: July - August 2021

期刊 JULY - AUGUST 2021 2021 年 7、8 月刊 Copyright © 2021 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

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Table of Contents CHINA PRACTICE NEWSLETTER ............................................................................................................. 3 DRAFTING CHOICE OF LAW AND CHOICE OF FORUM PROVISIONS FOR U.S. AGREEMENTS ....... 4 起草美国协议的适用法律及管辖法院选择条款 ........................................................................................... 10 IMPORTANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DILIGENCE FOR REAL ESTATE AND CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS....................................................................................................................................... 15 环境尽职调查对不动产和公司交易的重要性 .............................................................................................. 17 FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE AND IMPOSSIBILITY DOCTRINES IN THE COVID-19 ERA ............... 19 合同目的无法实现和履行不可能理论在 COVID-19 期间的适用 ................................................................. 23 TAX LIABILITY ISSUES TO CONSIDER FOR HIGH-NET-WORTH COUPLES IN DIVORCE ................ 26 高净值夫妇离婚应考虑的税务责任问题 ...................................................................................................... 29 ABOUT THIS NEWSLETTER.................................................................................................................... 31 有关本期刊 ................................................................................................................................................. 31 ABOUT THE AUTHORS............................................................................................................................ 31 关于本期作者 ............................................................................................................................................. 31

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China Practice Newsletter Holland & Knight is a U.S.-based global law firm committed to provide high-quality legal services to our clients. We provide legal assistance to Chinese investors and companies doing business or making investments in the United States and Latin America. We also advise and assist multinational corporations and financial institutions, trade associations, private investors and other clients in their China-related activities. With more than 1,400 professionals in 27 offices, our lawyers and professionals are experienced in all of the interdisciplinary areas necessary to guide clients through the opportunities and challenges that arise throughout the business or investment life cycles.

We assist Chinese clients and multinational clients in their China-related activities in areas such as international business, mergers and acquisitions, technology, healthcare, real estate, environmental law, private equity, venture capital, financial services, taxation, intellectual property, private wealth services, data privacy and cybersecurity, labor and employment, ESOPs, regulatory and government affairs, and dispute resolutions.

We invite you to read our China Practice Newsletter, in which our authors discuss pertinent Sino-American topics. We also welcome you to discuss your thoughts on this issue with our authors listed within the document.

霍兰德奈特律师事务所是一家位于美国的全球性法律事务所，我们致力于向客户提供高质量的法律 服务。我们向在美国及拉丁美洲进行商业活动或投资的中国投资人及公司提供他们所需的各类法律 协助。我们也向跨国公司、金融机构、贸易机构、投资人及其他客户提供他们于其与中国相关活动 中所需的咨询和协助。我们在 27 个办公室的 1400 多名对各领域有经验的律师及专业人员能够协助客 户处理他们在经营或投资过程中所遇到的各种机会及挑战。 我们向中国客户及从事与中国有关活动的跨国客户提供法律协助的领域包括国际商业、企业并购、 科技法律、医疗法律、房地产、环保法律、私募基金、创投基金、金融法律服务、税务、知识产 权、私人财富管理法律服务、信息隐私及网络安全、劳动及雇佣法律、员工持股计划、法令遵循及 政府法规、及争议解决。 我们邀请您阅读刊载我们各作者就与中美有关的各议题所作论述的 China Practice 期刊。我 们也欢迎您向本期刊的各作者提供您对各相关议题的看法。

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Drafting Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Provisions for U.S. Agreements

By Charles A. Weiss Fully elaborated commercial contracts typically identify the governing law and specify the forum that would hear any dispute. They may also provide that disputes will be resolved by arbitration instead of judicial litigation.

In the United States, contracts are governed by state law: with rare exceptions (such as certain contracts to which the federal government is a party), there is no such thing as U.S. contract law. However, the laws of the 50 U.S. states — as well as those of the handful of U.S. territories — are generally consistent in applying a "freedom of contract" approach to commercial agreements between sophisticated (or presumed to be sophisticated) parties. Accordingly, choice of law and choice of forum provisions in commercial agreements are generally enforced in accordance with the contract language.

Nevertheless, because disputes over the intent and application of such provisions still arise on occasion in commercial cases, lawyers who draft commercial agreements with connections to the U.S. should be aware of some recurring issues that complicate what may seem to be straightforward matters. This article explores some of the more common issues that arise in this context.

THE NEED FOR CHOICE OF LAW PROVISIONS, AND HOW A U.S. COURT DETERMINES FOREIGN LAW In part because the U.S. court system is highly fragmented — with each state and territory having its own court system in addition to the federal courts — both state and federal courts routinely apply the substantive law of a different jurisdiction. For example, a suit for breach of contract between a New York company and a New Jersey company might be brought in either state, but the location of the court does not itself control which law applies. Either way, the court in which the case is filed will have to determine whether to apply its own law or the law of the other state.

The same principle applies to international cross-border disputes, e.g., a U.S. court hearing a contract dispute between a U.S. company and a Canadian company will have to determine whether to apply domestic contract law or Canadian contract law (which itself can vary from province to province). When the issue comes up, the litigants may expressly or tacitly agree which law governs, or will agree that the choice of law does not matter because the governing principles are largely the same under each possible choice. In these cases, the court will generally rely on the contract law of the state in which it sits.

Oftentimes, however, the litigants are unable to reach agreement on which law applies, with each perceiving that its preferred choice will result in a better outcome. When this occurs in the absence of a choice of law provision in the contract under dispute, the court will apply its own choice of law rules, which themselves vary from state to state, to select what jurisdiction's substantive law governs. (As to procedural matters, the court will apply its own laws and rules.) If the case is being heard in a federal court, it will apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it is located. The outcome of this determination can be unpredictable.

As noted above, U.S. courts routinely apply laws of other jurisdictions. When the other jurisdiction is a different U.S. state, doing so is straightforward: the court will read the statutes and caselaw of the other state that are cited to it by the parties' respective attorneys, just as it would read its domestic statutes and cases in applying its own law. Nor is it usually challenging for a U.S. court to apply the contract law of a common law jurisdiction Copyright © 2021 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

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such as England and Wales, given that the source material will be in English and the legal principles will be familiar.

Things get harder when the governing contract law is that of a non-English speaking, non-common law jurisdiction. In such cases, the court will rely on treatises and translations cited to it by the parties, supplemented by its own research if necessary, and on the testimony (usually written, but on occasion oral) of expert witnesses hired by the parties to opine on the laws of the jurisdiction at issue. Readers of our article on cross-border issues concerning attorney-client privilege may recall discussion of a case in which a federal court in New York had to determine the scope of attorney-client privilege under Chinese law. Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 979 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). To do so, it relied on affidavits submitted by the parties from a law professor and Chinese lawyer, as well as the conclusions reached by other U.S. courts. (See "A Primer on Attorney-Client Privilege: Part 2," Holland & Knight's China Practice Newsletter: March-April 2021.)

For purposes of increased predictability and reduced expense in the case of a dispute, it is desirable for commercial contracts to specify what law governs.

BREADTH OF CHOICE OF LAW PROVISIONS Once a decision is made to include a choice of law provision in a commercial contract — and the parties have agreed what law this should be — the issue becomes one of drafting. The drafting attorney should be aware of certain nuances that may not be entirely obvious to one who has not encountered them.

Perhaps the most important point to remember is that a U.S. court may apply different law to different issues presented in the same case. In commercial disputes, one circumstance involves claims that arise under the contract in combination with extra-contractual claims. For example, a defendant may argue both that it did not breach the terms of the contract, and that the plaintiff intentionally misrepresented certain material facts | in the course of negotiations. The former defense (no breach) is contractual, while the latter defense (fraud) is extra-contractual. Thus, if the contract's choice of law provision states simply that "This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the law of the State of California," but the alleged fraud occurred while the parties were negotiating the contract in New York, a New York court is likely to apply California law to the defense of "no breach," but New York law to the fraud claim. See, e.g., Krock v. Lipsay, 97 F.3d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Under New York law, a choice-of-law provision indicating that the contract will be governed by a certain body of law does not dispositively determine that law which will govern a claim of fraud arising incident to the contract. ") (emphasis in original). Other states require less exacting language than New York in order to conclude that the simple choice of law example given above was intended by the parties to apply to all aspects of their relationship, but at the drafting stage there is no reason to leave room for dispute if this is the intent.

Thus, if the drafting attorney intends that his or her preferred law is to govern all aspects of the parties' relationship and not just the limited question of contractual rights and obligations, a broader choice of law provision is desirable. For example, one might provide that: This Agreement, and all claims or defenses based on, arising out of, or related to this Agreement of the relationship of the Parties created hereby, including without limitation those arising from or related to the negotiation, execution, performance, or breach of this Agreement, whether sounding in contract, tort, law, equity, or otherwise, shall be governed by, and enforced in accordance with, the internal laws of the State of _____ including its statute of limitations, without reference to its choice of law rules or any principle calling for application of the law of any other jurisdiction.

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An attorney who views this degree of elaboration as unnecessary or provocative, but who wishes to have a provision that is still likely to apply to extra-contractual claims, may prefer a choice of law provision along the lines of the following: Any disputes arising out of or related to this Agreement, or the Parties' relationship created hereby, shall be governed by the internal law of the State of ________.

Of course, the drafter may in certain cases prefer not to have an all-encompassing choice of law provision.

For example, if the counter-party insists on its preferred choice of law and there is no room to negotiate this, the narrow provision given as an example above ("This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the law of the State of ______") may give some latitude to argue for application of different law to extra-contractual claims.

EXCLUDING THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS The U.S. is a party to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which by its terms applies to commercial agreements for the sale of goods entered into between nationals of contracting states. As a matter of U.S. law, because the CISG has been adopted at the national level, it is automatically part of domestic law of all U.S. states and territories.

At the same time, each U.S. state and territory also has its own state-level law governing contracts for the sale of goods. In virtually all of them, this is Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), sometimes verbatim and sometimes with modest variations. Because federal law preempts any conflicting state law under the "supremacy clause" of the U.S. constitution, the CISG will by default supersede the UCC in the case of any agreement which by the terms of the CISG falls within its ambit.

However, consistent with the "freedom of contract" approach that prevails in the U.S., parties to a commercial contract that would by default be governed by the CISG are permitted to opt out of the CISG, in which case the applicable provisions of the pertinent state's adoption of the UCC would apply.

The desirability of opting out of the CISG is beyond the scope of this article, but lawyers drafting a contract to which the CISG may apply should take this into account when considering the choice of law provision.

Because the CISG is part of the domestic law of all U.S. states and territories, a choice of law provision that specifies the law of a U.S. or territory without reference to the CISG includes the CISG by default. If the intent is to exclude the CISG and apply only the state's version of the UCC, a phrase such as "but excluding the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods" should be added after the name of the state whose law is chosen.

THE NEED FOR CHOICE OF FORUM PROVISIONS At the risk of stating the obvious, no article on drafting choice of law provisions would be complete without noting that choice of law does not necessarily control choice of forum. Even though these provisions are usually in the same section of an agreement, and are sometimes included in a single sentence, they are in U.S. jurisdictions legally distinct. Thus, while all of the examples of choice of law provisions given above — from simplest to most elaborate — may suggest that the parties contemplated the possibility of litigating in the specified state, none of them require a lawsuit to be brought or heard in that state.

The drafting attorney should also keep in mind that the choice of forum may have a greater impact on the outcome of a dispute than the choice of law. For example, the choice between New York and Swiss law may be immaterial in the case of most commercial contract disputes, but the differences between litigating a case Copyright © 2021 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

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in New York versus Zurich are legion. Procedural differences such as the availability of fulsome pretrial discovery and the mode of taking evidence could well be outcome determinative. The choice of forum takes on even greater significance if there is a concern about the competence or fairness of the courts in a potential jurisdiction. Even if such concerns are unfounded, a client that believes that it cannot get a fair hearing in a certain jurisdiction will be disadvantaged in negotiating a fair settlement in the event of a dispute. On the flip side, a client or counter-party who believes that he or she "can't lose" in a certain jurisdiction may be intransigent during settlement discussions without regard to the accuracy of that belief.

DRAFTING CHOICE OF FORUM PROVISIONS Once a decision is made to specify the choice of forum and agreement is reached on what that forum will be, the drafting itself is relatively straightforward. Still, care should be taken to consider a few issues that can be problematic.

First, the issue of breadth or scope of the choice of forum provision is similar to that discussed above with respect to choice of law provisions. Usually, the intent will be for any dispute to be heard in the chosen forum.

Second, care should be taken to make the selected provision mandatory or exclusive. A provision stating that disputes "may" be heard in a specified court does not require the dispute to be heard only in that court. Unless the intent is to leave other options open, the verb "shall" should be employed instead of "may" or "will." The mandatory nature of the selected forum can be made even clearer by starting that disputes "shall be heard only" in that court "to the exclusion of all other courts and fora." Commonly added is a consent to jurisdiction and a waiver of defense or objections, so the final provision is along the lines of the following: Any disputes arising out of or related to this Agreement or any other aspect of the Parties' relationship shall be heard only in the courts of ________ to the exclusion of all other courts and fora. The Parties irrevocably consent to the jurisdiction of, and venue in, such courts and waive any objection that such courts are an inconvenient forum.

Third, when choosing courts in the U.S., it is best to avoid limiting the choice to a federal court. In the U.S., the state courts are courts of general jurisdiction versus the federal courts that have limited jurisdiction. In brief, a federal court has jurisdiction in civil cases only if the claims arise under federal law, or are between parties of completely diverse citizenship. Ordinary contract claims do not arise under federal law, and diversity jurisdiction is not always available. If an agreement's choice of forum provision is limited to federal court but the resulting dispute is not within the federal court's limited jurisdiction, the provision may be treated by other courts as a nullity, with the result that the agreement is deemed to have no choice of forum provision at all. It is best to avoid this risk by specifying the state or federal courts in the given U.S. jurisdiction, or providing the state courts as a fallback to the federal court, for example: Any disputes arising out of or related to this Agreement or any other aspect of the Parties' relationship shall be heard only in the state or federal courts located in the State of Delaware, to the exclusion of all other courts and fora. or Any disputes arising out of or related to this Agreement or any other aspect of the Parties' relationship shall be heard only in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware if federal subject matter jurisdiction exists, or if not only in the state courts of the State of Delaware, in each case to the exclusion of all other courts and fora.

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Fourth, keep in mind that many U.S. states have more than one federal court, and virtually all have more than one state court. New York has four different federal trial courts; New York City alone has two federal trial courts and five different state courts that hear general commercial cases. Thus, if the intent is to choose the courts located in Manhattan (which is New York County), one should specify the "federal or state courts located in New York County, New York" and not simply the "federal or state courts located in New York."

Fifth, what if the parties negotiating a contract cannot agree on a choice of forum? One option is to omit a choice of forum provision, with the hope and expectation that a dispute leading to litigation is unlikely to occur.

This is an entirely reasonable approach. Another compromise is to select a "neutral" forum that is foreign to both parties but considered by each to be fair. For non-U.S. companies, New York is a popular choice, especially if the agreement is also governed by New York law.

A different approach seen on occasion is one that conditions the choice of forum on the identity of the party that sues, i.e., a party may bring suit only in the other party's home jurisdiction. One perceived virtue of this approach — that is discourages the parties from suing in the first place — is also a potential drawback if the result is that an aggrieved party that in all fairness should bring suit feels constrained from doing so. It can also lead to gamesmanship with each party trying to provoke the other into suing first. As the reader can tell, the author generally dislikes this approach, but offers it as an alternative to silence in the right circumstances.

Finally, lawyers will sometimes include a jury waiver in the section of a commercial contract that includes choice of law and choice of forum provisions. Most states will enforce jury waivers in commercial contracts.

A notable exception is California, which holds that parties may waive their right to a jury trial only after a lawsuit has been filed. There is also some concern that a California court may not honor the choice of law provision in a contract that includes a jury waiver if the outcome would be that a dispute with a meaningful California connection would be heard in a different state that recognizes the validity of jury waivers. Assuming that the possibility of litigation in California is largely off the table because the agreement has no meaningful connection to California, a lawyer who wants to include a jury waiver in the agreement may consider language such as the following: EACH PARTY IRREVOCABLY WAIVES, TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, ANY AND ALL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY SUIT, ACTION, OR PROCEEDING ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT OR THE TRANSACTIONS CONTEMPLATED HEREBY. or EACH PARTY HEREBY WAIVES ITS RESPECTIVE RIGHTS, IF ANY, TO A JURY TRIAL OF ANY CLAIM, CONTROVERSY, OR CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON OR ARISING OUT OF THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY OF THE TRANSACTIONS CONTEMPLATED HEREBY. EACH PARTY REPRESENTS THAT IT HAS REVIEWED THIS WAIVER AND EACH KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVES ITS JURY TRIAL RIGHTS FOLLOWING CONSULTATION WITH LEGAL COUNSEL. These examples are provided in capital letters because some states require that a jury waiver must be conspicuous in order to be enforceable. For this reason, lawyers may include the jury waiver as the last provision of the agreement so that it appears on the same page as the signatures, or have the parties separately sign or initial the jury waiver to minimize any argument that it was overlooked.

As with other provisions discussed above, a court may find that the jury waiver in a contract does not extend to extra-contractual claims such as fraudulent inducement. This potential exception should not, however, be a reason to omit a jury waiver if the drafting attorney otherwise believes that a jury waiver would be desirable.

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OPTING FOR ARBITRATION When opting for arbitration as the chosen forum for disputes, some issues concerning the scope of the provision are similar to those concerning scope of choice of law and other choice of forum provisions, i.e., if only contractual claims subject to arbitration, or if extra-contractual claims are also subject to arbitration.

An additional issue that is unique to arbitration is a dispute over arbitrability is to be resolved by the arbitrators or in court.

As a general proposition, U.S. courts hold that the threshold question of whether a dispute before a court should be resolved by the court or remitted to arbitration is for the court to decide. However, if the arbitration provision at issue is drafted broadly, the court may determine that the issue of whether the dispute is arbitrable is one for the arbitrators.

For example, in the recent case of Ashland Global Holdings, Inc. v. Speedway LLC, 2021 NY Slip Op. 31899(U) (June 4, 2021), the litigants disputed which of two agreements applied to their dispute. One agreement provided that disputes would be resolved in court in New York, the other provided for arbitration.

The arbitration provision in the second agreement was very broadly drafted: [A]ll controversies, claims or disputes that arise out of or relate to the Agreement or the construction, interpretation, performance, termination, enforceability or validity of the Agreement, or the commercial economic or other relationship of the parties thereto . . . shall be resolved [by arbitration].

Id. at 7 (emphasis added). Given what it characterized as "this very broad grant of power to the arbitrators," the court held that the question of which agreement governed the parties' dispute — the first one that provided for litigation in New York or the second one that provided for arbitration — was delegated to the arbitrators.

The relative desirability of arbitration to litigation is beyond the scope of this article. However, if the intent is to provide for a broad delegation of power to the arbitrators, including the power to make the threshold decision of whether the dispute is arbitrable in the first place, the provision excerpted above provides an adjudicated example.

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起草美国协议的适用法律及管辖法院选择条款 原文作者：Charles A. Weiss 详尽的商业合同通常明确规定适用法律，并指定将审理任何争议的管辖法院。它们还可以规定争端将通过仲裁而 不是司法诉讼解决。 在美国，合同受州法律管辖：除了极少数例外情况（例如联邦政府参与的某些合同），没有存在所谓美国合同法 。然而，美国 50 个州以及少数几个美国领地的法律在对复杂（或被推定为复杂）的当事人之间的商业协议适用 “合同自由”做法这方面大体上是一致的。因此，商业协议中的适用法律和管辖法院选择条款一般按照合同语言 执行。 尽管如此，由于在商业案件中仍会不时出现关于此类条款的意图和适用的争议，起草与美国有关的商业协议的律 师应意识到一些反复出现的问题，这些问题使看似简单的问题复杂化。本文将探讨在这种情况下出现的一些更常 见的问题。

适用法律选择条款的必要性，以及美国法院如何确定外国法律 部分原因是美国法院体系高度分散，除了联邦法院外，每个州和领地都有自己的法院系统，州法院和联邦法院经 常适用不同司法管辖区的实体法。例如，纽约公司和新泽西公司之间的违约诉讼可以在这两个州提起，但法院所 在地本身并不控制适用哪一个法律。无论哪种方式，受理案件的法院都必须决定是适用本州法律还是适用另一州 法律。 同样的原则也适用于国际跨国争端，例如，审理美国公司和加拿大公司之间合同争端的美国法院必须决定是适用 国内合同法还是加拿大合同法（而加拿大法律本身可能因省而异）。当问题出现时，当事人可以明示或默示地同 意适用哪一种法律，也可以同意法律的选择无关紧要，因为在每一种可能的选择下，适用的原则基本相同。在这 些案件中，法院一般将依据所在国的合同法。 然而，诉讼当事人往往无法就适用哪一种法律达成协议，双方都认为自己的首选会产生更好的结果。当发生这种 情况时，在有争议的合同中没有法律选择条款，法院将适用其自己的法律选择规则（这些规则本身因州而异）， 以选择哪一个管辖权区的实体法律来管辖 (至于程序问题，法院将适用自己的法律和规则。）如果案件在联邦法 院审理，法院将适用其所在的州的法律选择规则。这个决定的结果是不可预测的。 如上所述，美国法院经常适用其他司法管辖区的法律。当另一个司法管辖区是不同的美国州时，这样做很简单： 法院将阅读当事人各自律师引用的另一个州的法规和判例法，就像在适用自己的法律时阅读其本州法规和案例一 样。美国法院通常也不难适用英格兰和威尔士等普通法管辖区的合同法，因为依据的文件将使用英语，法律原则 也是很熟悉的。 当管辖合同法是一个非英语系、非普通法管辖区时，事情就变得更难了。在这种情况下，法院将依靠当事方引用 的论述和译文，必要时辅以自己的研究，并依靠当事方聘用的专家证人的证词（通常是书面的，但有时是口头的 ）来就有关管辖区的法律发表意见。我们关于律师-客户特权保护的跨境问题的文章的读者可能会想起一个案例 的讨论，在那个案例中，纽约的联邦法院必须根据中国法律确定律师-客户特权保护的范围。Wultz 诉中国银行 股份有限公司，第 979 卷第 479 页（S.D.N.Y.2013）。要做到这一点，它依赖于当事人提交的一位法学教授和 中国律师的宣誓书、以及美国其他法院得出的结论。（请参见 2021 年 3、4 月份 Holland & Knight's China Practice Newsletter）。 Copyright © 2021 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

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为了在发生纠纷时提高可预见性和减少费用，商业合同最好规定适用何种法律。

适用法律选择的广度 一旦决定在商业合同中列入一项适用法律选择条款，并且当事人各方商定了这项规定应是那个法律，问题就变成 了起草问题。起草律师应该意识到某些细微差别，这些细微差别对于没有遇到过它们的人来说可能并不完全明显 。 或许最重要的一点是，美国法院可能会对同一案件中提出的不同问题适用不同的法律。在商业纠纷中，一种情况 涉及合同下产生的索赔以及合同外索赔。例如，被告既可以辩称自己没有违反合同条款，也可以辩称原告在谈判 过程中故意歪曲某些重要事实。前者的抗辩（无违约）是契约性质的抗辩，而后者（欺诈）是属契约性质以外的 的抗辩。因此，如果合同的法律选择条款仅仅规定“本协议应根据加州的法律进行解释”，但所谓的欺诈行为发 生在双方在纽约谈判合同时，纽约法院很可能适用加州的法律审理“无违约”的抗辩，但对欺诈的主张适用纽约 州的法律。例如，见 Krock 诉 Lipsay 案，《联邦地区法院判例汇编》第三编第 97 卷第 640、645 页（第二巡回 法庭，1996 年）（“根据纽约法律，表明合同将受某一法律体系管辖的法律选择条款并不决定性地决定该法律 也适用于合同附带的欺诈主张。”）(强调原文）。其他一些州并不要求与纽约一样明确的规定以导出上述简单 的适用法律选择例子下当事方打算适用于其关系的所有方面的结论，但在起草阶段，如果这是意图，就没有理由 留下发生争议的空间。 因此，如果起草律师打算，他或她的首选法律是管辖当事人关系的所有方面，而不仅仅是合同权利和义务的有限 问题，则最好有更广泛的法律选择条款。例如，可以规定： 本协议、以及基于本协议的、因本协议产生的或与本协议有关的、与本协议所产生的双方关系的 所有索赔或抗辩，包括但不限于因谈判、执行、履行或违反本协议而产生的或与之相关的索赔或 抗辩，无论是在合同、侵权行为、法律、衡平法或其他方面引起的索赔或抗辩，均应依据______ 州的州法，包括其诉讼时效，而不参考其法律选择规则或要求适用任何其他司法管辖区法律的任 何原则。 如果律师认为这种程度的详细说明是不必要的或具有挑衅性，但希望有一个仍然可能适用于合同之外请求的条款 ，则可以考虑按照以下方草拟选择法律条款： 因本协议或由此产生的双方关系引起或与之相关的任何争议，均应适用______州的州法律。 当然，在某些情况下，起草者可能不希望有一个包罗万象的法律选择条款。例如，如果对方坚持其首选的法律选 择并且没有协商的余地，则上述示例中的狭义条款（“本协议应根据______州的法律解释”） ) 可能会给予一 定的自由来争论将不同的法律适用于合同外的请求。

排除《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》的适用 美国是《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》（《联合国销售公约》）的缔约国，该公约的条款适用于缔约国国民之 间订立的货物销售商业协议。根据美国法律，由于《联合国销售公约》是在国家层级通过的，因此它自动成为美 国所有州和领地的法律的一部分。 同时，美国每个州和领地也有自己的州及领地层级的法律来管理货物销售合同。而实际上，在几乎各个州那就是 《统一商法典》（UCC）第 2 条，而各州依 UCC 第 2 条制订的法律有时逐字相同，有时略有变化。由于依照 美国宪法的“至尊条款”，联邦法律取代任何有冲突的州法律，如果任何协议根据《联合国销售公约》的条款属 于《联合国销售公约》的管辖范围，则《联合国销售公约》将自动地取代 UCC。 Copyright © 2021 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

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然而，与美国盛行的“合同自由”做法相一致，在违约情况下受《联合国销售公约》管辖的商业合同的当事人可 以选择排除《联合国销售公约》的适用，在这种情况下，将适用有关州所采纳制订的《UCC》的规定。 是否合适选择排除适用《联合国销售公约》超出了本文章的范围，但起草《联合国销售公约》可能适用的合同的 律师在考虑法律条款的选择时应考虑到这一点。由于《联合国销售公约》是美国所有州和领地的法律的一部分， 因此在未提及排除适用《联合国销售公约》的情况下指定美国或其领地的法律的法律选择条款将包括《联合国销 售公约》。如果有意排除《联合国销售公约》的适用而只适用该州所采纳的《UCC》，则应在选定法律的州的 名称之后加上“但排除《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》”等语句。

选择管辖法院条款的必要性 冒着显而易见的风险，如果不注意到法律选择并不一定控制管辖法院的选择，那么关于起草法律选择条款的任何 条款都是不完整的。尽管这些条款通常在协议的同一部分，有时甚至包含在一句话中，但在美国司法管辖区，它 们在法律上是不同的。因此，尽管上述从最简单到最详尽的法律选择条款的所有例子都可能被认为当事方考虑到 在指定国家提起诉讼的可能性，但没有一个例子会被认为要求在该州提起诉讼或审理诉讼。 起草律师还应记住，管辖法院的选择可能比法律的选择对争端结果的影响更大。例如，在大多数商业合同纠纷中 ，在纽约和瑞士法律之间的选择可能无关紧要，但在纽约和苏黎世提起诉讼的区别是巨大的。程序上的差异、如 是否有开庭前的揭露程序和取证方式的一些差异很可能对结果有决定性的影响。如果对潜在管辖区内法院的管辖 权或公平性存在担忧，那么管辖法院的选择就具有更大的意义。一个客户如果认为自己不能在某个司法管辖区得 到公正的听证，如发生纠纷时，在谈判一个公正的解决办法时也会处于不利地位。即使这种担心是没有根据的， 另一方面，认为他或她在某个管辖区“不会输”的客户或交易对手在和解讨论中可能会不妥协，而不考虑这种信 念的准确性。

起草管辖法院选择条款 一旦决定具体指定管辖法院的选择，并就管辖法院将是一个达成协议，起草工作本身就相对简单。不过，还是应 该注意考虑一些可能的问题。 首先，管辖法院选择条款的广度或范围问题与上文关于法律选择条款的讨论类似。通常，目的是由选定的法院审 理任何争端。 第二，应注意使选定的条款具有强制性或排他性。规定争议“可”在指定法院审理的条款并不要求争议只能在该 法院审理。除非目的是留下其他选择，应使用动词“应”而不是“可”或“将”。开始时规定争议“只应在该法 院审理”，并排除所有其他法院和法庭可以更清楚地说明选定管辖法院的强制性。通常并添加同意管辖权和放弃 抗辩或异议的文句，因此，最终条款大致如下： 因本协议或双方关系的任何其他方面引起的或与之相关的任何争议，应仅在 ______ 法院审理， 并排除所有其他法院和法庭。双方不可撤销地同意该法院的管辖和审判权，并放弃主张该法院审 理不方便的任何异议。 第三，在美国选择法院时，最好避免将选择权局限于联邦法院。在美国，州法院是具有一般管辖权的法院，而联 邦法院是具有有限管辖权的法院。简言之，联邦法院在民事案件中只有在根据联邦法律提出索赔、或在完全不同 州或国籍的当事人之间提出索赔时才具有管辖权。一般合同索赔不会因联邦法律而产生，且不同州籍或国籍的管 辖权也并不总是可用的。如果协议的管辖法院选择条款仅限于联邦法院，但由此产生的争议不在联邦法院的有限 管辖权范围内，则该条款可能被其他法院视为无效，其结果是该协议被视为根本没有管辖法院选择条款。最好通 过指定特定美国司法管辖区内的州或联邦法院，或将州法院作为联邦法院的后补法院，来避免这种风险，例如： Copyright © 2021 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

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因本协议或双方关系的任何其他方面引起的或与之相关的任何争议只能在特拉华州的州或联邦法 院审理，并排除所有其他法院和法庭。 或 因本协议或双方关系的任何其他方面引起的或与之相关的任何争议，如果存在联邦管辖权，则只 能在特拉华州的美国联邦地方法院进行审理，如果不存在联邦管辖权，则只能在特拉华州的州法 院进行审理，在每种情况下，排除所有其他法院和法庭。 第四，请记住，美国许多州都有不止一个联邦法院，而且几乎所有州都有不止一个州法院。纽约有四个不同的联 邦审理法院；仅纽约市就有两个联邦审理法院和五个不同的州法院审理一般商业案件。因此，如果目的是选择位 于曼哈顿（即纽约郡）的法院，则应指定“位于纽约郡的联邦或州法院”，而不是简单地指定“位于纽约的联邦 或州法院” 第五，如果合同谈判各方不能就管辖法院的选择达成一致怎么办？一种选择是省略对管辖法院条款的选择，希望 和期望导致诉讼的争端不太可能发生。这是一个完全合理的方法。另一个折衷办法是选择一个它对双方而言都是 外州、且双方都认为是公平的“中立”的法庭。例如，对非美国的公司而言，纽约是一个受欢迎的选择，特别是 如果协议也受纽约法律管辖的话。 有时会看到一种不同的做法，即根据起诉方的身份来决定管辖法院的选择，即一方当事人只能在另一方当事人的 本州管辖区提起诉讼。这种做法的一个明显优点是首先不鼓励当事方起诉，但也存在一可能的缺点，即是让平心 而论应提出诉讼的受害方感到压力而不提诉。这也会导致双方采取试图挑起对方先起诉的策略。正如读者所知， 作者通常不喜欢这种方法，但在适当的情况下，也是一种选择。 最后，律师有时会在商业合同中的适用法律选择和管辖法院选择条款中加入放弃陪审团的文句。大多数州将在商 业合同中执行陪审团弃权条款。一个值得注意的例外是加州，该州认为当事人只有在提起诉讼后才能放弃陪审团 审判的权利。还有人担心，加州法院可能不遵守合同中的法律选择条款，其中包括陪审团弃权，如果结果是与加 州有重大关联的争议将在另一个承认陪审团弃权有效性的州审理。假设在加州提起诉讼的可能性很大程度上是不 可能的，因为该协议与加州没有任何有意义的联系，希望在协议中加入陪审团弃权的律师可以考虑以下语言： 在适用法律允许的最大范围内，各方不可撤销地放弃在因本协议或本协议项下拟进行的交易引起 的或与之相关的任何诉讼、行动或程序中由陪审团审判的任何和所有权利。 或 各方特此放弃其各自的权利（如有），对基于或产生于本协议或本协议项下任何交易的任何索赔 、争议或诉因进行陪审团审判。各方声明，其已审查了该弃权书，并在咨询法律顾问后，在知情 的情况下自愿放弃陪审团审判权。 这些例子以大写字母提供，因为有些州要求陪审团弃权必须明显才能执行。为此，律师可将陪审团弃权书作为协 议的最后一条规定，使其与签名出现在同一页上，或让双方分别签署或签署陪审团弃权书，以尽量减少任何被忽 视的论点。 与上文讨论的其他条款一样，法院可能会发现，合同中的陪审团弃权不适用于欺诈性引诱等合同外索赔。然而， 如果起草律师希望获得陪审团弃权，则这一潜在的例外不应成为省略陪审团弃权的理由。

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选择仲裁审理 当选择仲裁作争议处理的方式时，有关该条款范围的一些问题与有关法律选择范围和其他管辖法院选择条款的问 题类似，即如果只有合同索赔需要仲裁，或者如果合同外索赔也需要仲裁。仲裁特有的另一个问题是关于可仲裁 性的争议，应由仲裁人或在法庭上解决。 作为一项普遍主张，美国法院认为，在法院审理的争议是应由法院解决还是提交仲裁，这是一个由法院决定的基 本问题。但是，如果争议的仲裁条款措词宽泛，法院可以裁定争议是否可以仲裁的问题由仲裁人处理。 例如，在最近的阿什兰全球控股公司诉 Speedway LLC 案，2021 NY Slip Op.31899（U）（2021 年 6 月 4 日） ，诉讼当事人对两项协议中哪一项适用于他们的争议提出了异议。一份协议规定争议将在纽约的法庭上解决，另 一份协议规定仲裁。第二份协议中的仲裁条款起草得非常广泛： [A] 所本协议所生或与本协议有关的争议、索赔或纠纷，或本协议或双方在本协议下的商业经济 或关系的解释、解释、履行、终止、可执行性或有效性应[通过仲裁]解决。 同上，第 7 页（强调部分已添加）。鉴于法院将其描述为“这种非常广泛地授予仲裁人的权力”，法院认为，哪 一项协议管辖当事方的争端——第一项协议规定在纽约提起诉讼，第二项协议规定仲裁——的问题被交给了仲裁 人。 仲裁相对于诉讼的相对可取性超出了本条的范围。然而，如果目的是规定将权力广泛地下放给仲裁人，包括首先 决定争端是否可仲裁的权力，则上文摘录的例子就是一个已被作成裁决的例子。

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Importance of Environmental Due Diligence for Real Estate and Corporate Transactions

By Letitia D. Moore and Meaghan A. Colligan Every transaction – whether related to the purchase, sale, lease or investment in real property, assets, buildings or businesses – has potential environmental issues. Performing environmental due diligence, the practice of identifying potential environmental issues and obligations, is paramount to a purchaser's ability during negotiations to mitigate the risks present with property that is currently, or was formally, used for commercial, industrial or manufacturing operations. This article outlines how environmental liabilities may arise from historic and current operations, what risks may be absorbed by a purchaser when it becomes the current owner and operator after closing, and how due diligence can assist a purchaser mitigate current and future risks and take advantage of potential liability protections.

IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING POTENTIAL LIABILITIES FROM HISTORIC RELEASES OF CONTAMINATION Environmental liability arising from releases of contamination falls on past and current owners and operators of property and businesses, even if the releases of contamination occurred prior to closing by a different party.

Lenders and investors may also be considered current owners after the deal closes in certain situations.

Potentially all such owners and operators may be held strictly liable for cleaning up historic contamination.

Historic environmental liability can arise when there have been releases of chemicals to the environment during historic or current routine operations; activities performed with or without proper permitting; equipment, container or pipeline failures; and during accidental or catastrophic events. Environmental risks related to historic contamination can cost in the hundreds of thousands of dollars – and even in the millions – depending on the situation at hand. Potential liability can arise from the costs to cleanup historic contamination; third-party litigation between government and private parties regarding which parties should pay for cleanup costs; civil or criminal penalties advanced by governmental agencies pursuant to environmental laws; and allegations of exposure to contaminants by tenants or members of the community.

The first line of defense in limiting liability for historic contamination when acquiring or investing in real property is a pre-acquisition Phase I Environmental Site Assessment Report prepared in accordance with the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard Practice for Environmental Assessments (ASTM E152713). A Phase I Report will provide information on the environmental conditions and potential environmental contamination impacting the property. Importantly, a timely Phase I, prepared pursuant to ASTM E1527-13, can assist a prospective purchaser with securing protection from the strict liability imposed by the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) for historic contamination.

During post-acquisition the party that performed the Phase I will need to take additional steps to "maintain" its liability exemption from CERCLA, beyond obtaining the Phase I. For example, the new owner must ensure that there are no new releases of hazardous substances; must cooperate and comply with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and existing cleanup requirements; cannot impede any land use restrictions or institutional controls; and must take "reasonable steps" with respect to historic releases of hazardous substances affecting the property. Furthermore, a party must understand where any existing hazardous substances are located to ensure that it does not disturb or spread existing contamination during development or stormwater management efforts – EPA will consider the relocation of historic contamination a "secondary disposal," which EPA will consider to be a release of hazardous substance. These ongoing obligations should Copyright © 2021 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

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be understood prior to closing using the Phase I, and any follow-up sampling that occurs, so that a proactive plan can be instituted when the purchaser takes over ownership or operations.

In addition to securing liability protections for a purchaser, the Phase I is an important resource for evaluating other business risks, potential construction or design limitations, negotiating transaction terms (for example, indemnity provisions, disclosures, and representations and warranties), as well as satisfying requirements from lenders and environmental insurance carriers.

IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING POTENTIAL LIABILITIES FOR ONGOING OPERATIONS In the context of ongoing operations, past and current owners and operators may be held liable for costs associated with noncompliance with environmental laws. Every business has operational obligations under environmental regulations, including product handling-related regulatory requirements, industry-specific regulations and many types of permits. Environmental due diligence to evaluate any operational noncompliance with environmental laws would consider the operations of the business entity, the business' assets and any tenants. Inquiries would review the materials handled or manufactured; the wastes generated, handled and disposed of; current and potential emissions or other releases to the environment; the general industry risk profile; regulatory and permit compliance requirements and status; and the impacts on neighbors and community. Community impacts or environmental justice concerns can give rise to challenges during permitting, zoning or environmental review applications submitted by new tenants, new businesses or during the expansion of existing operations.

Liability for noncompliance with environmental laws for ongoing operations may arise when products are not handled or stored properly at a facility; when waste materials are generated, stored, transported or disposed improperly; and when the proper permits are not in place, expired or not being followed at manufacturing or industrial facilities. There are even regulatory requirements for how owners, operators and tenants utilize and handle their equipment and build and maintain their facilities. New owners may incur costs related to an operation's noncompliance with environmental laws to bring a facility into compliance with all requirements, from civil or criminal enforcement penalties advanced by governmental agencies, from health and safety injuries or damages to tenants, and from community and environmental justice concerns, which may delay development or expansion of a business. Noncompliance could also give rise to property damage, impact property value and create natural resource damages.

The results of the environmental due diligence can be used by a purchaser to negotiate transaction terms, evaluate disclosures, identify transfer requirements (permits, licenses and notifications), and evaluate business risks and future obligations, including compliance requirements, anticipated expenses and potential enforcement for past or future violations.

CONCLUSION Environmental due diligence is an important tool for evaluating and managing risk in any transaction that involves the transfer of ownership or operational interests in real property, assets and buildings. Environmental issues can present unexpected costs or additional obligations if they are not fully understood before closing.

Every deal should include a scope and plan for a comprehensive environmental due diligence involving a team of environmental engineers and legal professionals.

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环境尽职调查对不动产和公司交易的重要性 原文作者：Letitia D. Moore 及 Meaghan A. Colligan 每一项交易——无论是关于不动产、资产、建筑物或企业的购买、出售、租赁或投资——都有潜在的环境问题。 进行环境尽职调查 ，即为发现潜在环境问题和义务的做法，对买方在谈判期间如何降低其对目前或之前存在于 作为商业、工业或制造业运营的财产的风险至关重要。本文章概述了过去和当前运营可能产生的环境责任、在交 割后成为当前所有者和经营者的买方可能需承担的风险、以及尽职调查可如何帮助买方减轻当前和未来的风险及 利用潜在的责任保护等问题。

发现和处理历史污染物释放的潜在责任 因污染释放而产生的环境责任将由过去和现在的财产和企业的所有者和经营者承担，即使污染释放发生在另一方 关闭污染物之前也是如此。在某些情况下，交易交割后贷款人和投资者也可能被视为当前所有者。所有这类所有 者和经营者都可能对清除历史污染承担无过失责任。 化学物质释放到环境中时可产生历史环境责任，无论其发生在过去或现今的日常操作中、在有无适当许可的情况 下发生、在设备、容器或管道故障时发生、或在意外或灾难事件中发生。与历史污染相关的环境风险根据情况可 能会导致数十万美元甚或数百万美元的费用。可能会产生清除历史污染的费用、政府和私人之间关于哪一方应支 付清理费用的第三方诉讼、政府机构根据环境法提出的民事或刑事处罚、以及租户或社区成员接触污染物的指控 等潜在责任。 收购或投资不动产时限制历史污染责任的第一道防线是根据美国材料与试验协会（ASTM）环境评估标准实践（ ASTM E1527-13）编制的收购前第一阶段环境现场评估报告。第一阶段报告将提供有关环境条件和可能影响物 业的环境污染的信息。重要的是，根据 ASTM E1527-13 编制的及时第一阶段报告可以帮助潜在购买者确保免受 《联邦综合环境反应、赔偿和责任法》（CERCLA）对历史污染规定的无过失责任的保护。 在收购后，进行第一阶段报告的一方除获得第一阶段的报告外，还需要采取额外措施以“维持”其在 CERCLA 下的责任豁免。例如，新的所有者必须确保没有新的有害物质释放、必须配合并遵守美国环境保护署（EPA）和 现有的清理要求、不能妨碍任何土地使用限制或机构控制、且必须采取“合理措施”处理影响财产的有害物质的 历史释放。此外，当事方必须了解任何现有危险物质的位置，以确保其在开发或雨水管理工作期间不会干扰或扩 散现有污染——EPA 将把历史污染的迁移视为“二次处理”，而 EPA 会将其视为是有害物质的释放。在使用第 一阶段报告交割前应了解这些持续的义务，以便在买方接管所有权或运营时制定积极的计划。 除了确保买方的责任保护外，第一阶段报告也是评估其他业务风险、潜在施工或设计限制、谈判交易条款（例如 ，赔偿条款、披露、陈述和保证）的重要资源、以及用来满足贷款人和环境保险公司的要求。

发现和处理持续经营的潜在责任 在持续经营的情况下，过去和现在的所有者和经营者可能要承担与不遵守环境法有关的费用。每个企业都有环境 法规规定的运营义务，包括产品处理相关法规要求、行业特定法规和多种类型的许可证要求。为评估任何不符合 环境法的经营行为的环境尽职调查将考虑到企业实体、企业资产和任何承租人的经营情况。调查将审查处理或制 造的材料、废弃物的产生、处理和处置、当前和潜在的排放或其他对环境的排放、一般行业风险概况、监管和许 可证合规要求和状态、以及对邻居和社区的影响。在新租户、新企业提交的许可证、分区或环境审查申请期间， 或在现有业务扩张期间，社区影响或环境正义问题可能会引起挑战。

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违反有关持续经营的环境法的责任可能会发生在产品未在设施中正确处理或储存时、废弃物的产生、贮存、运输 、处置不当时、及当适当的许可证不到位、过期或在制造业或工业设施没有遵守时。甚至对业主、经营者和承租 人如何使用和处理他们的设备以及建造和维护他们的设施都有监管要求。新业主可能会因经营活动不遵守环境法 而承担如下费用：将施改善至符合所有要求的费用、因政府机构提出的民事或刑事执法处罚的费用、对承租人的 健康和安全伤害或损害承担的费用、社区和环境司法问题而产生费用，而这可能会延迟业务的发展或扩张。不合 规还可能导致财产损失，影响财产价值，造成自然资源损失。 环境尽职调查的结果可供买方用于协商交易条款、评估披露、确定转让要求（许可证、执照和通知），以及评估 业务风险和未来义务，包括合规要求，过去或将来的违法行为的预期费用和可能的执法。

结论 环境尽职调查是评估和管理涉及不动产、资产和建筑物所有权或经营权益转让的任何交易风险的重要工具。如果 在结案前没有完全了解环境问题，环境问题可能会带来意外的成本或额外的义务。每一项交易都应包括一个涉及 环境工程师和法律专业人员团队的全面环境尽职调查的范围和计划。

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Frustration of Purpose and Impossibility Doctrines in the COVID-19 Era

By Charlotte Floyd and Karl J. Lott In a survey of cases in federal, state and bankruptcy courts, commercial tenants seeking to delay or excuse the payment of rent because of pandemic-related downturns in business sometimes looked to the equitable doctrines of frustration of purpose and impossibility for relief. Both of these doctrines allow for the argument that a default is excusable under circumstances that were unforeseeable to the parties at the time of the contract's formation. While commercial tenants sometimes use these doctrines in tandem, they are distinguishable in their underlying aims. The impossibility doctrine looks at whether the underlying action to be performed in a contract was possible under the circumstances, while the frustration of purpose doctrine analyzes whether the parties can achieve the stated or implied purpose of the contract.

In recent cases where tenants have sought to avoid rent during the pandemic, state and federal courts have looked to the specific terms of each lease, rather than the highly unusual circumstances, to decide whether tenant performance under the lease was excusable due to either frustration of purpose or impossibility. As a result, cases from around the country have come to differing conclusions as to whether to grant the requested relief. The focus of the courts on the specific language of each lease highlights the importance of careful and specific lease drafting.

This article summarizes several recent cases dealing with this topic.

U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT In re: Cinemex USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc, et al. (U.S. Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida, Miami Div., Jan. 27, 2021, 2021 WL 564486) In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of Florida, CB Theater, an operator of upscale dine-in movie theaters, sought to delay or excuse the payment of rent due to government-mandated theater shutdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic. CB Theater argued that both frustration of purpose and impossibility doctrines should excuse or delay their obligation to pay rent under the lease.

CB Theater argued that the purpose of their movie theater lease, which they identified as operating a movie theater to show new-release films, was frustrated from the time the Florida state government shut down theaters until the theater's actual reopening. The court held that as to the period of time in which CB Theater was closed by government order, the purpose of the lease was indeed frustrated. CB Theater further argued that the lack of new film releases due to suspended film production as well as consumer reluctance to return to the theater continued to frustrate the purpose of the lease even after the state government approved theater reopenings at reduced capacity. The court rejected this framing, pointing out that as it was possible for CB Theater to operate a movie theater after the partial capacity reopening, CB Theater could still fulfill the purpose of the lease. Thus, the court focused on whether or not CB Theater was prohibited by government order from opening at all. It granted rental relief under the theory of frustration of purpose only for those periods when CB Theater was legally prohibited from opening and not for periods when CB Theater had the legal right to open but chose not to due to a diminished business environment.

Turning to the impossibility doctrine, in response to CB Theater's argument that performance of the contract would have been impossible to perform under the circumstances, the court declined to apply the impossibility Copyright © 2021 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

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doctrine to the period in which the theater was fully shut down by government order. Instead, the court looked to specific language of a section of the lease titled, "Effect of Unavoidable Delays," which was separate from the lease's force majeure clause. That provision included "governmental action" as one of the factors excusing a party's obligation to perform. The court identified state shutdown orders as governmental action and held that because of the specific language of this provision, rather than requiring CB Theater to pay back rent for the period of government shutdown, the remedy provided in the lease is to extend the lease term by the amount of time for which the theater was fully closed. The court also took care to distinguish the "Effect of Unavoidable Delays" clause from a force majeure clause, under which the failure to timely pay rent would not have been an excusable default.

In re CEC Entertainment Inc. (U.S. Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Div., Dec. 14, 2020, 2020 WL 7356380) In this case, CEC Entertainment, the operator of the children's entertainment-focused pizza parlor Chuck E. Cheese, sought rent abatement or reduction under leases for venues in North Carolina, Washington and California. Once again, the court looked to the specific language of the leases to reach its conclusions. After concluding that the force majeure clauses in the leases in all three states specify that the nonpayment of rent is not a default that would be excused under the clause, the court turned to frustration of purpose under the laws of Washington, California and North Carolina. The court found that in all three states, parties may specifically delegate the risk of frustration of purpose by contract. While none of the leases specifically enumerated the risk of a pandemic, in all three states the leases did have force majeure clauses that contemplated the risk of governmental regulations disrupting permitted uses. Thus, the court held that in all of the leases, since the leases did specifically contemplate the risk of disruption by governmental regulations and allocated that risk via the force majeure clauses, the force majeure clauses superseded the frustration of purpose doctrine. Further, the court noted that nothing prevented CEC Entertainment from opening pizza restaurants or different styles of businesses in the leased space that did not involve arcade games. This suggests that the court here took quite a broad view of the underlying purpose of this lease.

FEDERAL COURT The Gap Inc. v. Ponte Gadea New York LLC (S.D.N.Y., March 8, 2021, WL 861121) In this case, The Gap Inc., operators of The Gap and Banana Republic retail stores, sought rescission and reformation of the lease contract based on frustration of purpose and impossibility among other remedies.

The New York state government ordered the closures of nonessential businesses in March, and The Gap temporarily closed all of its stores in the United States, Canada and Mexico the same month.

The Court here addressed The Gap's frustration of purpose argument first and posited that the possibility of a government-mandated shutdown wasn't unforeseeable, because it was contemplated in the lease's force majeure event clause. As the force majeure event clause of the lease identified "governmental preemption of priorities or other controls in connection with a national or other public emergency" specifically, the court found that The Gap's frustration of purpose argument fell short (The Gap at 8). Further, the court pointed out that since The Gap eventually commenced curbside pickup sales at the Midtown Manhattan locations in question, the lease's purpose of operating retail stores in Midtown Manhattan was also not frustrated by pandemic itself.

The court relied on these same facts – the foreseeability of a government-mandated shutdown and the stores' curbside pickup sales – to also deny The Gap's impossibility doctrine argument.

1600 Walnut Corporation, General Partner of L-A 1600 Walnut LP v. Cole Haan Company Store LLC (E.D. Penn., March 30, 2021, 2021 WL 1193100)

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Here, tenant Cole Haan, a footwear and accessories retailer, permanently vacated one of its storefronts in March 2020 and had not paid rent since that time. Landlord 1600 Walnut Corporation sought to recover rental payments owed. Cole Haan argued that its duties under the lease were discharged or in the alternative limited under the frustration of purpose doctrine. The court here dismissed Cole Haan's frustration of purpose argument, citing the lease's force majeure clause, which stated that the tenant was not relieved of its duty to pay rent even in the event that restrictive governmental laws or regulations prevented performance under the contract. The court granted 1600 Walnut's motion to dismiss Cole Haan's counterclaims.

STATE COURT UMNV 205-207 Newbury LLC v. Caffé Nero Americas Inc. (Mass. Superior Ct., Feb. 8, 2021, 2084CV01493BLS2) In this case, the landlord, UMNV 205-207 Newbury LLC, sought to recover unpaid rent and liquidated damages for the rest of the lease term due to the nonpayment of rent. The tenant, Caffé Nero Americas Inc., the operator of a Massachusetts café, argued under the frustration of purpose and impossibility doctrines that the sought-after rent payments were excused. The court in this case focused on the particularly specific statement of the lease purpose when examining Caffé Nero's frustration of purpose argument. The lease provided that Caffé Nero may use premises solely for "the operation of a Caffé Nero themed Café under Tenant's Trade Name and for no other purpose" (Caffé Nero at 2). Per the lease, services at this location must be consistent with other Caffé Nero locations in Greater Boston area. Further, under the lease, the café was permitted only to offer takeout from its regular sit-down menu. The court interpreted these conditions as evidence that the café's purpose is to serve customers food and coffee inside the café.

The court rejected UMNV's argument that the lease's force majeure clause barred the frustration of purpose defense, noting that while the force majeure clause contemplated impossibility, it did not contemplate the risk that the performance could be possible while the purpose of the contract was completely frustrated. The court ultimately held that, under the frustration of purpose doctrine, Caffé Nero's obligation to pay rent was discharged during the period in which the café could not serve food and beverage on the leased premises.

35 East 75th Street Corporation v. Christian Louboutin LLC (2020 WL 7315470 (N.Y. Sup.), 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 34063(U)(Trial Order)) In this case, tenant Christian Louboutin, a luxury shoe store, sought rescission of the remainder of its lease on the grounds of frustration of purpose and impossibility in light of decreased foot traffic in Manhattan due to pandemic shutdowns. In applying the frustration of purpose doctrine, the court here found that while the economic forces surrounding the pandemic were unforeseen by the parties, they amounted to a market change rather than a frustration of purpose. Addressing Louboutin's impossibility argument, the court points out that the pandemic did not bar the tenant from selling its products – it merely reduced foot traffic in the store's area. The court further noted that the lease's force majeure clause specifically provided that the nonpayment of rent was not an excusable default but instead extended the period of performance for the amount of time the delay caused.

CAB Bedford LLC v. Equinox Bedford Ave Inc. (2020 WL 7629593 (N.Y. Sup.), 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 34296(U)(Trial Order)) This is an order on a Motion for Summary Judgment by CAB Bedford, the landlord. The tenant, Equinox Bedford Ave Inc. operated a gym on the premises and argued that frustration of purpose and impossibility excused their obligation to pay rent during the New York state government shutdown that closed gyms. In assessing the tenant's frustration of purpose argument, the court looked at the lease holistically, stating that a shutdown lasting a few months does not frustrate the purpose of the entire 15-year lease. The court similarly Copyright © 2021 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

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rejected the tenant's impossibility argument, finding that while the gym's business was temporarily hindered, operation of the gym had since resumed, and thus the impossibility doctrine was not applicable.

Simon Property Group L.P. v. Pacific Sunwear Stores LLC (2020 WL 5984297 June 26, 2020 (Ind. Super.)(Trial Order)).

Retail apparel store owner Pacific Sunwear sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction to compel landlord Simon Property Group to allow Pacific Sunwear to reenter its 16 stores in Simon Property Group malls, on which Simon Property Group had changed the locks due to Pacific Sunwear's nonpayment of rent. Pacific Sunwear argued that its rental payments were in fact not delinquent due to the impossibility doctrine. The court found that since the malls were closed during a portion of Pacific Sunwear's nonpayment period, Pacific Sunwear had established a likelihood of success on the merits in its impossibility doctrine argument.

CONCLUSION These tests of the frustration of purpose and impossibility doctrines across a broad spectrum of courts highlight the importance of negotiating a well-drafted commercial lease. Although courts across the country have varied in their interpretations of the frustration of purpose and impossibility doctrines, the language of the underlying lease contract is universally paramount.

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合同目的无法实现和履行不可能理论在 COVID-19 期间的适用 原文作者：Charlotte Floyd 及 Karl J. Lott 在对联邦、州和破产法院的案件进行的一项调查中显示，由于与新冠肺炎大流行相关的业务低迷而要求延迟或免 除租金支付的商业租户有时会以合同目的无法实现及履行不可能的公平原则来寻求救济。这两种理论都支持这样 一种论点--即合同成立时当事人无法预见该违约的情况时，该违约责任是可以免除的。虽然商业租户有时会同时 使用这些学说，但它们所各支持的目标是有区别的。履行不可能原则着眼于合同中所要履行的合约规定的行为在 这种情况下是否可能，而合同目的无法实现原则则分析当事人是否能够实现合同明示或默示的目的。 在最近的案例中，租户在大流行期间试图避免租金，州和联邦法院已根据每份租约的具体条款，而不是基于极不 寻常客观情况，来决定租户在租约下的履行是否可以适用合同目的无法实现或履行不可能的理论而以免除。而结 果是来自全国各地的案件就是否允许所要求的救济得出了不同的结论。法院对每份租约的具体文字规定的关注凸 显了仔细和具体拟定租约的重要性。 本文章总结了最近处理这一问题的一些案件。

美国破产法庭 关于 Cinemex USA Real Estate Holdings, Inc. 等。（美国破产法院、佛罗里达州 南区、迈阿密分部，2021 年 1 月 27 日，2021 年 WL 564486） 在其向佛罗里达州南区美国破产法院提交的第 11 章破产申请中，经营室内用餐的高档电影院运营商 CB 剧院寻 求延迟或免除因政府强制在 COVID -19 大流行期间关闭剧院而需支付的租金。CB 剧院辩称合同目的无法实现 和履行不可能原则都应免除或延迟他们根据租约支付租金的义务。 CB 剧院辩称电影院租赁契约的目的是经营电影院以放映新上映的电影，而该目的在从佛罗里达州政府关闭剧院 到剧院实际重新开放这段期间无法实现。法院认为对于 CB 剧院被政府命令关闭的时间段，租约的目的确实无法 实现。CB 剧院进一步辩称，即使在州政府批准剧院以减少容量的方式重新开放之后，由于电影制作暂停而导致 缺乏新电影发的发行以及消费者不愿返回剧院的情况，继续造成租赁目的无法实现。法院驳回了这一论述方式， 指出由于 CB 剧院在得以部分容量方式重新开放后可以经营电影院，CB 剧院仍然可以实现租赁目的。因此，法 院重点关注政府命令是否完全禁止 CB 剧院开业。法院仅对 CB 剧院被法律禁止开放的时期（而非 CB 剧院拥有 合法权利但由于商业环境恶化而选择不开放的时期），根据合同目的无法实现理论给予租金减免。 谈到履行不可能原则，针对 CB 剧院关于在这种情况下不可能履行合同的论点，法院拒绝将履行不可能原则应用 于剧院被政府命令完全关闭的时期。而作为取代的做法，法院查看了租约中标题为“不可避免延迟的影响”部分的 特定文字规定，该部分与租约的不可抗力条款是分开的。该条款将“政府行为”列为免除一方履行义务的因素之 一。法院将州政府命令关闭认定为政府行为，并认为由于该条款的具体文字规定，与其要求 CB 剧院支付政府命 令关闭期间的租金，租约中提供的补救措施是依据剧院完全关闭的时间将租期延长。法院还注意将“不可避免延 迟的影响”条款与不可抗力条款区分开来，根据不可抗力条款，未能及时支付租金不会成为可免责的违约。

关于 CEC Entertainment Inc. （美国破产法院、德州南区、休士顿分部、2020 年 12 月 14 日、2020 年

WL 7356380）

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在本案中，以儿童娱乐为主的比萨饼店 Chuck E. Cheese 的运营商 CEC 娱乐寻求减免其在北卡罗来纳州、华盛 顿州和加利福尼亚州的场地的租赁合约的租金。同样地，法院参考租约的具体文字规定来得出结论。在得出结论 认为所有三个州的租约中的不可抗力条款都规定不支付租金不是根据该条款可以免责的违约后，法院转向华盛顿 州、加利福尼亚州和北卡罗来纳州的法律中关于合同目的无法实现的规定。法院发现在所有三个州，当事人都可 以通过合同明确处理合同目的无法实现的风险。虽然没有一项租约明确列举了大流行的风险，但在所有三个州， 租约都包含考虑到政府法规扰乱许可用途的风险的不可抗力条款。因此，法院认为，在所有三个租赁合约中，由 于租赁契约确实考虑了政府法规造成的中断的风险并通过不可抗力条款对该风险的承担进行了分配，因此不可抗 力条款取代了合同目的无法实现原则。此外，法院指出，没有任何因素阻止 CEC 娱乐在不涉及游乐场的租赁空 间内开设比萨餐厅或不同风格的企业。这表明本案法院对该租约所约定目的的解读采取了相当宽泛的看法。

联邦法院 The Gap Inc. 诉 Ponte Gadea New York LLC

（纽约南区、2021 年 3 月 8 日、WL 861121）

在本案中，The Gap Inc. 是 The Gap 和 Banana Republic 零售店的运营商，基于合同目的无法实现和履行不可 能原则寻求解除和重新修订租赁合同及其他救济。纽约州政府于 2020 年 3 月下令关闭非必要事业的实体经营， 而 The Gap 于同月暂时关闭了其在美国、加拿大和墨西哥的所有门店。 法院在此首先处理了 The Gap 对合同目的无法实现的论点，并假定政府强制关闭的可能性并非不可预见，因为 租约的不可抗力事件条款中已经考虑到了这一点。由于租约的不可抗力事件条款明确规定了“政府对有关国家或 其他公共紧急情况预先采取了优先或其他控制措施”，因此法院认定 The Gap 的合同目的无法实现论点不成立 （The Gap 案第 8 页）。此外，法院指出，由于 The Gap 最终开始在曼哈顿中城的相关地点进行街边取货的销 售，因此在曼哈顿中城经营零售店的租赁目的也没有因大流行本身而无法实现。法院根据这些相同的事实（即政 府强制关闭的可预见性和商店的街边取货的销售）也否定了 The Gap 的履行不可能原则的论点。 1600 Walnut Corporation，LA 的普通合伙人 1600 Walnut LP 诉 Cole Haan Company Store LLC （宾夕法尼亚 州 东区、2021 年 3 月 30 日、2021 年 WL 1193100） 在这个案件，鞋类和配饰零售商租户 Cole Haan 于 2020 年 3 月永久腾出其中一个店面，此后一直没有支付租 金。房东 1600 Walnut Corporation 寻求追回所欠的租金。Cole Haan 辩称，根据合同目的无法实现原则，其在 租约下的义务已被解除或受到限制。法院在此驳回了 Cole Haan 的合同目的无法实现论点，引用了租约的不可 抗力条款，该条款规定即使在限制性政府法律或法规阻止履行合同的情况下，租户也没有被免除支付租金的义 务。法院批准了 1600 Walnut 驳回 Cole Haan 反诉的申请。

州法院 UMNV 205-207 Newbury LLC 诉 Caffé Nero Americas Inc. （马萨诸塞州高等法院、2021 年 2 月 8 日、 2084CV01493-BLS2） 在这个案子中，房东 UMNV 205-207 Newbury LLC 因未支付租金而寻求剩余租赁期间的租金的支付和违约金。 租户 Caffé Nero Americas Inc. 是马萨诸塞州一家咖啡馆的经营者，辩称根据合同目的无法实现和履行不可能性 原则所要求的支付责任已被免除。本案中，法院在审查 Caffé Nero 的合同目的无法实现论点时，重点关注租赁 目的的特别具体约定。租约规定 Caffé Nero 仅可以将场所用于“以租户的商号经营 Caffé Nero 主题咖啡馆，不得 用于其他目的”（Caffé Nero 案第 2 页）。根据租约，该地点的服务必须与大波士顿地区的其他 Caffé Nero 地点

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一致。此外，根据租约，咖啡馆只能从其一般的店内食用的菜单中提供外卖服务。法院将这些条件解释为咖啡馆 的目的是在咖啡馆内为顾客提供食物和咖啡的证明。 法院驳回了 UMNV 的论点，即租约的不可抗力条款禁止合同目的无法实现的抗辩，并指出虽然不可抗力条款考 虑到履行不可能的情况，但并未考虑在合同目的完全无法实现的情况下可能履行的风险。法院最终裁定，根据合 同目的无法实现原则，Caffé Nero 支付租金的义务在咖啡馆无法在租赁场所供应食品和饮料期间应被免除。 35 East 75th Street Corporation 诉 Christian Louboutin LLC (2020 WL 7315470 (NY Sup.), 2020 NY Slip Op. 34063(U) (庭审命令)) 在这个案子中，豪华鞋店租户 Christian Louboutin 以大流行停工导致曼哈顿的人流量减少为由，以合同目的无 法实现和履行不可能作为根据，要求撤销其剩余租约。在适用合同目的无法实现原则时，法院认为虽然大流行所 伴随的经济力量是各方无法预见的，但它们相当于市场变化，而不是合同目的无法实现。针对 Louboutin 的履行 不可能性论点，法院指出，大流行并未禁止租户销售其产品——它只是减少了商店区域的人流量。法院进一步指 出，租约的不可抗力条款明确规定，不支付租金不是可免责的违约，而是根据延迟造成的时间延长履行期限。 CAB Bedford LLC 诉 Equinox Bedford Ave Inc. (2020 WL 7629593 (NY Sup.)、2020 NY Slip Op. 34296(U)(庭 审命令)) 这是对房东 CAB Bedford 提出的简易判决申请的命令。租户 Equinox Bedford Ave Inc. 在该处所经营着一家健 身房，并辩称在纽约州政府关闭健身房的关闭期间，他们支付租金的义务因为合同目的无法实现和履行不可能的 原则应被免除。在评估租户对合同目的无法实现的论点时，法院从整体上审视了租约，指出持续几个月的停工并 不会破坏整个 15 年租约的目的。法院同样驳回了租户的“履行不可能”的论点，认为虽然健身房的业务暂时受 阻，但健身房的运营已恢复，因此履行不可能原则不适用。 Simon Property Group LP v. Pacific Sunwear Stores LLC (2020 WL 5984297 2020 年 6 月 26 日 (Ind. Super.)(庭审命令))。 零售服装店所有人 Pacific Sunwear 寻求临时限制令(TRO) 和初步禁令，以迫使业主 Simon 物业集团允许 Pacific Sunwear 重新进入其位于 Simon 物业集团购物中心中由于 Pacific Sunwear 未支付租金 Simon 物业集团 已变更钥匙的 16 家门店。Pacific Sunwear 辩称，由于履行不可能原则，其租金支付实际上并未拖欠。法院认 定由于购物中心在 Pacific Sunwear 的部分未付款期内关闭，因此 Pacific Sunwear 已根据其履行不可能性原则 论点建立了其道理有可能被支持的可能性。

结论 许多法院对合同目的无法实现和履行不可能原则的适用情形彰显了协商一个仔细起草的商业租赁合同的重要性。 尽管全国各地的法院对合同目的无法实现和履行不可能原则的解释不尽相同，但在每一个情况中租赁合同中的文 字规定都至关重要。

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Tax Liability Issues to Consider for High-Net-Worth Couples in Divorce

By Carolina Nuche, Liam D. Crane and Stewart L. Kasner

HIGHLIGHTS  Advisors to high-net-worth individuals with substantial assets located in the U.S. and abroad should consider the potential tax implications involved in a divorce, in particular, the tax treatment of alimony payments and transfer of property.  When property transfers and payments are between former spouses of different nationalities or residing in separate countries, additional factors and considerations may be taken into account.  This Holland & Knight article examines certain tax planning opportunities that should be considered to minimize the tax liabilities for wealthy individuals resulting from a divorce. ________________ Divorce is not a topic most clients or tax advisors enjoy discussing. Nevertheless, it is important in today's day and age to advise clients, especially high-net-worth individuals with substantial assets located in the U.S. and abroad, of the potential tax implications involved, in particular, the tax treatment of alimony payments and transfers of property as a result of the divorce. Depending which party you are representing in a divorce proceeding, certain tax planning opportunities should be considered in order to minimize the tax liability resulting from a divorce.

ALIMONY OR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS Prior to the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), alimony or separate maintenance payments were included in the income of the recipient ex-spouse, while being deductible by the payor ex-spouse. Because the recipient ex-spouse was generally in a lower tax bracket than the payor ex-spouse, this effectively resulted in an overall preservation of wealth. Moreover, when the payor ex-spouse was a U.S. federal income tax resident and the other ex-spouse was a nonresident alien for U.S. federal income tax purposes, the alimony or separate maintenance payments made by the U.S. payor ex-spouse to the non-U.S. payee ex-spouse were subject to a 30 percent withholding tax, unless an applicable tax treaty reduced or eliminated the withholding tax obligation.

As part of the TCJA, Congress repealed the sections of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) that provided for the deductibility of alimony or separate maintenance payments for the payor ex-spouse and removed the inclusion in income of alimony or separate maintenance payments for the payee ex-spouse. Pursuant to the TCJA, alimony or separate maintenance payments made pursuant to divorce agreements entered into after Jan. 1, 2019, are neither deductible by the payor ex-spouse nor includable in the income of the payee ex-spouse. Thus, payments by a U.S. payor ex-spouse to a non-U.S. payee ex-spouse are no longer subject to U.S. federal withholding tax because the alimony or separate maintenance payments are no longer treated as U.S. source income in the hands of the non-U.S. payee ex-spouse.

PROPERTY TRANSFERS RESULTING FROM DIVORCE Aside from alimony and separate maintenance payments, property transfers resulting from divorce can have significant tax implications for both parties if not structured properly (especially for situations in which one ex-spouse is a U.S. person and the other ex-spouse is a nonresident alien). Generally, no gain or loss is recognized on transfers of property if: 1) it occurs within one year after the date of the end of the marriage Copyright © 2021 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

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or 2) is related to a cessation of marriage. A transfer is treated as "related to the cessation of the marriage" if the transfer occurs pursuant to a divorce or separation instrument and occurs not more than six years after termination of the marriage. Similar to transfers of property received by gift, the transferee ex-spouse will generally have a carryover basis in the property received. However, the foregoing general rule does not apply if the spouse/former spouse of the individual making the transfer is a nonresident alien.

In the event the transferee ex-spouse is a nonresident alien, the transfer of property by the transferor ex-spouse will be subject to gain recognition. The nonresident alien recipient ex-spouse also should receive the transferred property with a stepped-up basis. Counsel for the U.S. transferor ex-spouse should consider negotiating with counsel for the nonresident alien ex-spouse to transfer property that has not significantly appreciated so as to minimize the amount of gain recognition subject to tax for the U.S. transferor ex-spouse.

Counsel for a nonresident alien transferee ex-spouse should understand how the receipt of property will be taxed, if at all, in the nonresident alien transferee ex-spouse's home country and how he or she will be taxed in the U.S. and the home country on income earned or gains recognized from the operation or future disposition of the property received (including under any applicable U.S. tax treaty).

In the event the transferor is classified as a nonresident alien and the transferee/recipient is classified as a U.S. person for U.S. federal income tax purposes, the transfer of property will result in the U.S. transferee ex-spouse receiving the property with a carryover basis and possibly an underlying built-in gain. Counsel for the U.S. transferee ex-spouse should consider negotiating with counsel for the nonresident alien transferor ex-spouse to have the nonresident alien transferor ex-spouse engage in pre-transfer activity to step up the basis in the property being transferred in order to minimize the built-in gain in the property received by the U.S. transferee ex-spouse. More specifically, the nonresident alien transferor ex-spouse could contribute appreciated foreign real estate into a foreign eligible entity, and the U.S. transferee ex-spouse could check the box to treat the foreign eligible entity as a disregarded entity effective as of a date prior to U.S. transferee ex-spouse's receipt of the shares of that foreign eligible entity (with the consent of the nonresident alien transferor ex-spouse). Local tax laws applicable in the jurisdiction of the transferring ex-spouse do still need to be considered, as transfers to an entity prior to a transfer to an ex-spouse could be taxable in the transferor's home country.

The type of asset transferred also can result in additional tax to a nonresident alien transferor ex-spouse.

Specifically, the transfer of a U.S. real property interest (USRPI) by a nonresident alien ex-spouse is subject to Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) withholding tax if the transferee ex-spouse is also a nonresident alien. In such case, the nonresident alien transferor ex-spouse will need to recognize gain on the disposition of a USRPI and the nonresident alien transferee ex-spouse will be requested to withhold 15 percent of the "amount realized." Often this withholding tax exposure is not identified and the burden will then fall on the nonresident alien transferee ex-spouse. However, in the event the transferee ex-spouse is a U.S. person, no withholding tax should be triggered as the transfer is effectively treated as a gift with a transferred basis.

U.S. GIFT TAX TREATMENT OF PROPERTY TRANSFERS RESULTING FROM DIVORCE In addition to the U.S. federal income tax consequences that should be considered when transferring property as a result of divorce, the gift tax treatment of property transferred pursuant to a divorce settlement or agreement also must be considered. Generally, where a husband and wife enter into a written agreement relative to their marital and property rights (and divorce occurs within the three-year period beginning on the date one year before such agreement is entered into) any transfers of property or interests in property made pursuant to such agreement to either spouse in settlement of his or her marital or property rights or to provide a reasonable allowance for the support of children of the marriage during minority shall be deemed to be transfers made for full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth.

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Essentially, so long as the requirements discussed above are met, a transfer of property pursuant to a divorce settlement or agreement will not be considered a taxable gift in the United States. In the event the requirements discussed above are not met, such transfer may be subject to U.S. federal gift tax and the transferor ex-spouse will have to utilize their lifetime unified credit exemption amount (if such ex-spouse is a U.S. citizen or U.S. domiciliary) or potentially pay U.S. federal gift tax (regardless of the tax residency of the transferor ex-spouse and the transferee ex-spouse) depending upon the type of property transferred (i.e., U.S. real estate or tangible personal property located in the United States).

TREATMENT OF GRANTOR TRUSTS POST-DIVORCE (REPEAL OF I.R.C. §682) In 2017, as part of the TCJA, Congress repealed I.R.C. § 682 and established that said Code section no longer applied to divorce agreements executed after Dec. 31, 2018. Accordingly, from 2019 forward, a grantor trust created for the benefit of an ex-spouse prior to the couple's divorce shall continue to be classified as a grantor trust for U.S. federal tax purposes. This causes the grantor/transferor ex-spouse to continue to be liable for the income tax on that trust's income going forward. Therefore, in drafting new trusts, decanting or deemed death of the beneficiary spouse on divorce clauses should be considered in order to protect from this harsh result.

Once the ex-spouse is no longer considered a beneficiary (and provided the grantor is also not a beneficiary), the trust will generally become a non-grantor trust for U.S. federal income tax purposes and its own separate taxpayer.

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高净值夫妇离婚应考虑的税务责任问题 原文作者：Carolina Nuche 、Liam D. Crane 及 Stewart L. Kasner

重点摘要  作为在美国和国外拥有大量资产的高净值人士的顾问应考虑离婚可能涉及的税务问题，特别是赡养费支付和 财产转让的税务处理。  当财产转移和支付发生在不同国籍或居住在不同国家的前配偶之间，可能还需考虑额外的因素和问题。  Holland & Knight 的提示文章审查了某些应被考虑以最大限度地减少因离婚而产生的富人的税务责任税务规 划机会。

_______________ 离婚不是大多数客户或税务顾问喜欢讨论的话题。尽管如此，在当今时代，向客户（特别是在美国和国外拥有大 量资产的高净值人士客户）告知可能涉及的税务问题（尤其是离婚后赡养费支付和财产转让的税务处理）是非常 重要的。根据您在离婚程序中代表哪一方，应考虑某些税务规划机会，以尽量减少因离婚而产生的税务责任。

赡养费或单独抚养费 在《减税和就业法》（TCJA）颁布之前，赡养费或单独抚养费包括在作为接受方的前配偶的收入中，而由作为 支付方的前配偶扣除。因为接收方前配偶通常比支付方前配偶的税率低，这有效地造成财富的整体保值。此外， 如果支付方前配偶是美国联邦所得税居民而另一前配偶是美国联邦所得税目的的非居民外国人，美国支付方前配 偶向非美国接受方前配偶支付的赡养费或单独抚养费应缴纳 30%的预扣税，除非适用的税收协定减少或取消预 扣税义务。 作为 TCJA 的一部分，国会废除了《国内税收法》（I.R.C.）中规定支付方前配偶的赡养费或单独抚养费可扣除 的部分，并取消了赡养费或单独抚养费包含至接受方前配偶的收入的规定。根据 TCJA，根据 2019 年 1 月 1 日 后签订的离婚协议支付的赡养费或单独抚养费既不可由支付方前配偶扣除，也不包括在接受方前配偶的收入中。 因此，美国支付方前配偶支付给非美国接受方前配偶的款项不再需要缴纳美国联邦预扣税，因为赡养费或单独抚 养费在非美国接受方前配偶手中不再被视为美国来源收入。

离婚所导致的财产转移 除了赡养费和单独抚养费之外，离婚导致的财产转移如果没有适当规划，可能对双方都会产生重大的税务影响 （特别是在一方前配偶是美国人，另一方前配偶是非居民外国人的情况下）。一般情况下，在下列情况下，财产 转移不会被视为产生收益或损失：1）在财产转移发生在婚姻结束之日后一年内，或 2）财产转移与婚姻终止有 关。如果根据离婚或分居文书进行的转移发生在婚姻终止后不超过六年，则该转移被视为“与婚姻终止有关”。与 通过赠与方式取得的财产的转让类似，作为受让人的前配偶通常会接续该财产的税基。但是，如果做出财产转移 的个人的配偶/前配偶是非居民外国人，则上述一般规则不适用。 如果作为受让人的前配偶是非居民外国人，则作为转让人的前配偶转让财产时将造成所得的产生。非居民的外籍 接受人前配偶也应在财产税基提高的基础上取得移转的财产。美国转让人前配偶的律师应考虑与非居民外籍前配 偶的律师协商，以转让未大幅升值的财产，从而最大限度地减少美国转让人前配偶应纳税的所得产生金额。非居 民外国受让人前配偶的律师应了解收到财产将如何在非居民外国受让人前配偶的原籍国被征税（如果有的话）、 Copyright © 2021 Holland & Knight LLP All Rights Reserved

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以及他或她就收到的财产的营运及未来的处分所获得的收入或产生的所得在美国和原籍国（包括根据任何适用的 美国税收协定）被征税。 如果转让人被归类为非居民外国人，且受让人/接受人被归类为美国联邦所得税目的的美国人，则财产转让将导 致美国受让人前配偶在接续该财产的税基的基础下接收财产，并可能产生潜在的内在收益。美国受让人前配偶的 律师应考虑与非居民外国转让人前配偶的律师协商，让非居民外国转让人前配偶参与转让前活动，以提高被转让 财产的税基，从而将美国受让人前配偶收到的财产的内在收益降到最低。更具体地说，非居民外国转让人前配偶 可以将增值的外国房地产交给一外国合格实体，而在非居民外国转让人前配偶的同意的前提下，美国受让人前配 偶可选择在美国受让人前配偶收到该外国合格实体的股份之前将外国合格实体视为一可不被计入的实体。仍然需 要考虑适用于进行转让的前配偶管辖区的当地税法，因为在转让给前配偶之前转让给实体可能在转让人的母国被 征税。 转移的资产类型也可能导致对非居民外国转让人的前配偶征收额外的税负。具体而言，如果受让人前配偶也是非 居民外国人，非居民外国人前配偶转让美国不动产权益（USRPI）需缴纳《外国不动产投资税法》（FIRPTA） 预扣税。在这种情况下，非居民外国转让人前配偶需要确认 USRPI 处置的收益，而非居民外国受让人前配偶将 被要求预扣“已实现金额”的 15%。通常这种预扣税风险没有确定，然后负担将落在非居民外国受让人前配偶身 上。但是，如果受让人的前配偶是美国人，则不应征收预扣税，因为转让实际上被视为以随附税基移转的赠与。

美国对离婚财产转移的赠与税处理 除因离婚而转让财产时应考虑的美国联邦所得税后果外，还必须考虑根据离婚安排或协议转让的财产的赠与税处 理方式。一般来说，丈夫和妻子就其婚姻和财产权利签订书面协议（而离婚发生在该协议签订之前一年开始起算 的三年内时），根据该协议向配偶任何一方转让财产或财产权益，以解决其婚姻权利或财产权利，或为未成年的 婚姻子女提供合理津贴或支持，应视为以金钱或金钱的价值为充分和足够的对价而作出的转让。 基本上，只要满足上述要求，根据离婚安排或协议转让财产在美国将不被视为应税赠与。如果不符合上述要求， 此类转让可能需要缴纳美国联邦赠与税，且转让方前配偶必须使用其终身统一免税额（如果该前配偶是美国公民 或美国居民）或可能缴纳美国联邦赠与税（无论转让方前配偶和受让方前配偶的税务居住地如何）取决于转让的 财产类型（即美国房地产或位于美国的有形个人财产）。

离婚后授予人信托的处理（《国内税收法》第§682 条的废除) 2017 年，作为 TCJA 的一部分，国会废除了《国内税收法》第 682 条且 2018 年 12 月 31 日之后签署的离婚协 议不再适用上述法规。因此，从 2019 年起，在夫妻离婚前为前配偶设立的授予人信托应继续被归类为美国联邦 税务目的的授予人信托。这导致授予人/转让人的前配偶继续对该信托未来的收入承担所得税。因此，在起草新 的信托时，应考虑到受益人配偶因离婚而被撤销或视为死亡的条款，以避免这种严酷的后果。一旦前配偶不再被 视为受益人（前提是授予人也不是受益人），信托一般将成为美国联邦所得税目的的非授予人信托，并成为其自 己的独立纳税人。

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About This Newsletter 有关本期刊 Information contained in this newsletter is for the general education and knowledge of our readers. It is not designed to be, and should not be used as, the sole source of information when analyzing and resolving a legal problem. Moreover, the laws of each jurisdiction are different and are constantly changing. If you have specific questions regarding a particular fact situation, we urge you to consult competent legal counsel. Holland & Knight lawyers are available to make presentations on a wide variety of China-related issues. 本期刊所刊载的信息仅供我们的读者为一般教育及学习目的使用。本期刊并不是为作为解决某一法律问题的唯一 信息来源的目的所设计，也不应被如此使用。此外，每一法律管辖区域的法律各有不同且随时在改变。如您有关 于某一特别事实情况的具体法律问题，我们建议您向合适的律师咨询。美国霍兰德奈特律师事务所的律师能够对 许多与中国相关的问题提出他们的看法及建议。

About the Authors 关于本期作者 Meaghan A. Colligan focuses her practice in the areas of environmental, land use, energy and municipal law. She advises real estate, manufacturing, transportation and corporate clients regarding a breadth of environmental matters, including providing permitting and remediation advice for real estate and brownfield development projects, litigation in state and federal courts, and regulatory compliance counseling. She also performs due diligence and evaluates environmental risks in commercial transactions, drafting environmental provisions in a variety of agreements to protect clients' interests across a wide range of industries.

Liam D. Crane focuses his practice on domestic and international estate and tax planning. On the domestic side, he counsels high-net-worth clients and their advisors on implementing sophisticated estate planning techniques designed to effectively accumulate, preserve and transfer wealth in accordance with the client's wishes. As part of this process, he develops advanced estate plans and prepares a wide range of estate and tax planning instruments, including wills, revocable trusts, insurance trusts, dynasty trusts and related documents. He has particular experience working with hedge fund and private equity principals in the process of planning with carried interests in a tax efficient manner.

Charlotte Floyd is a Los Angeles real estate attorney and a member of the firm's West Coast Real Estate Practice Group.

Stewart L. Kasner is a private wealth services attorney who focuses primarily in the areas of international taxation, trusts and estates. He routinely advises foreign and domestic clients on U.S. federal income, gift and estate tax matters associated with their cross-border investments, including U.S. real estate investments and business activities, as well as pre-immigration tax planning. His practice also includes forming and overseeing complex international corporate and trust structures, as well as implementing international reorganizations. He has extensive experience in offshore trust instruments, U.S. fiscal information reporting, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), Common Reporting Standard (CRS), voluntary disclosures and withholding tax compliance.

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Karl J. Lott has 30 years of experience as a commercial real estate attorney, and his practice focuses on all aspects of commercial real estate transactions. He regularly advises clients in matters of real estate finance, representing lenders, borrowers and joint ventures, as well as representing lending entities established to participate in the EB-5 immigration program. He regularly assists clients in forming joint ventures and in the management of limited liability companies. In addition, he handles all types of leasing matters, including office leases, retail leases and industrial leases, representing owners of office buildings and shopping centers in various locations in California in all matters relating to the leasing of their properties, and also representing major national and international tenants in their leasing negotiations.

Letitia D. Moore has more than 25 years of experience addressing complex environmental, regulatory and land use decisions. Her experience as a senior managing attorney with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and planning commissioner and mayor of the City of El Cerrito, California, gives her a deep understanding of government decision-making, allowing her to offer an insider's view for her public, private and nonprofit sector clients. She focuses her practice on complex redevelopment projects, land use permitting, environmental compliance and government advocacy. She is well versed in matters involving local land use and state housing laws, compliance with environmental regulations, and the implementation and enforcement of federal and state environmental laws.

Carolina Nuche is a private wealth services attorney who focuses her practice on international and domestic taxation for high-net-worth individuals, trusts and estates, as well as tax planning for multinational corporate and trust structures. She advises foreign and domestic clients on U.S. federal income, gift and estate tax matters, including cross-border investments, U.S. real estate investments and business activities.

Charles A. Weiss concentrates his practice on technology-driven litigation and transactions, primarily in pharmaceutical, biotechnology and adjacent fields. He also counsels clients on questions of patent validity and infringement, provides a litigator's perspective on prosecution matters, and assists with regulatory and compliance matters. He litigates patent, trade secret, license and false advertising cases in diverse technical areas. He has handled cases over the years involving expression of recombinant proteins and antibodies, controlled release pharmaceuticals, medical diagnostic agents, endocrine and hormone products, nutritional supplements, industrial control systems, food chemistry, nucleic acid diagnostic assays and commercial detergents. He also has extensive experience in the investigation of product counterfeiting and pursuit of those responsible.

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Contact Our China Practice Attorneys | 与我们的 China Practice 律师联系 Primary Contacts 主要联系人： Hongjun Zhang, Ph.D. 张红军博士 Washington, D.C. +1.202.457.5906 hongjun.zhang@hklaw.com

Mike Chiang 蒋尚仁律师 New York | +1.212.513.3415 San Francisco | +1.415.743.6968 mike.chiang@hklaw.com

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Christopher W. Boyett | Miami +1.305.789.7790 christopher.boyett.@hklaw.com

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Alejandro Landa Thierry | Mexico City +52.55.3602.8002 alejandro.landa@hklaw.com

Jeffrey R. Seul | Boston +1.617.305.2121 jeff.seul@hklaw.com

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Vivian Thoreen | Los Angeles +1.213.896.2482 vivian.thoreen@hklaw.com

R. David Donoghue | Chicago +1.312.578.6553 david.donoghue@hklaw.com

Anita M. Mosner | Washington, D.C. +1.202.419.2604 anita.mosner@hklaw.com

Shawn M. Turner | Denver +1.303.974.6645 shawn.turner@hklaw.com

Jonathan M. Epstein | Washington, D.C. +1.202.828.1870 jonathan.epstein@hklaw.com

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Matthew P. Vafidis | San Francisco +1.415.743.6950 matthew.vafidis@hklaw.com

Leonard H. Gilbert | Tampa +1.813.227.6481 leonard.gilbert@hklaw.com

Douglas A. Praw | Los Angeles +1.213.896.2588 doug.praw@hklaw.com

Stacey H. Wang | Los Angeles +1.213.896.2480 stacey.wang@hklaw.com

Enrique Gomez-Pinzon | Bogotá +57.1.745.5800 enrique.gomezpinzon@hklaw.com

John F. Pritchard | New York +1.212.513.3233 john.pritchard@hklaw.com

Charles A. Weiss | New York +1.212.513.3551 charles.weiss@hklaw.com

Paul J. Jaskot | Philadelphia +1.215.252.9539 paul.jaskot@hklaw.com

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Jose V. Zapata | Bogotá +57.1.745.5940 jose.zapata@hklaw.com

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