Introduction:WorryingaboutWMDTerrorism
StephenM.Maurer
Theideathatterroristswouldsoonacquirenuclear,chemical,andbiologicalweaponswaswidespreadbythelate1940s.Sincethen,generationsofnovelistsandfilmmakershavepopularizedtheidea(see,e.g.,Fleming[1959]2002).Sixtyyearslater, however,verylittlehashappened.Giventhisevidence,itisonlyfairtoaskwhether WMDterrorismisworthworryingabout.
Thequestionisfurtherconfusedbydefinitions.SincetheIraqWar,thealwayselasticphrase‘‘weaponsofmassdestruction’’or‘‘WMD’’hasstretchedtothepoint whereitincludesasingleartilleryshellofmustardgas(FoxNews,2004).This usagewas,ofcourse,inevitablegiventheBushadministration’safter-the-factefforts toshowthatitsIraqWarargumentswerecorrect.Thereisalsoacertainverbalappeal:ifWMDisconventionallydividedintochemical,biological,radiological,and nuclear(collectively,‘‘CBRN’’)categories,thenitissurelytempting—thoughnot, strictlyspeaking,logical—toreversethedefinitionbysayingthatanyweaponbased ontheseprinciplesqualifiesas‘‘WMD.’’Finally,itmakesakindoflegalsense. Nation-stateshavetriedtolimitthespreadofnewweaponstechnologiesthrough normsand(morefitfully)treatiessincethelatenineteenthcentury.Butwhat,exactly,qualifiesasaviolation?Inthisenvironment,itmaybeacceptableandeven desirabletokeeptheouterlimitsofWMDvague.Atthesametime,noneofthisis satisfying.Aterminventedtodescribenuclearexplosionsisnowusedtodescribe weaponsthatmaybelesslethalthanhighexplosives.Worse,itrewriteshistory. Sixty-sixmillionchemicalweaponsshellswerefiredduringtheFirstWorldWar. Doesitreallyaddanythingtocallthese‘‘weaponsofmassdestruction,’’particularly when‘‘ordinary’’highexplosivesseemtohavebeenslightlymorelethal?(Harris andPaxman2002).
Clearly,thereisnothingtostopusfromsayingwithHumptyDumptythatWMD ‘‘meanswhatIchooseittomean’’(Carroll[1872]2000).Butweshouldatleast chooseameaningthatisuseful.Forpurposesofthisbook,atleast,wereturnto ouroriginalinstinctthat‘‘WMD’’isqualitativelydifferentfromordinaryweapons.
2StephenM.Maurer
Thisimmediatelysuggestsviolenceonadramaticallylargerscalethanthe2,752 deathscausedbyhijackedairlinersonSeptember11(9/11Commission2004).This benchmarkisalreadyusefultotheextentthatitsuggestscasualties(oratleastpsychologicalimpacts)muchlargerthanthosethatprecipitatedtheWaronTerror. Nevertheless,itispossibletosharpentheintuitionstillfurther.Thisis,afterall, abookaboutWMD terrorism.Atwhatleveldoestheabilitytopracticeviolence produceaqualitativechangeinterrorismitself?
1.1TheOldTerrorism
Inthebroadestsense,terrorismisnotnew.Therehavealwaysbeensmallgroups liketheSicarii(firstcentury),Assassins(eleventhtothethirteenthcenturies),and Thugs(seventeenthtothenineteenthcenturies)whousedthethreatofviolenceto intimidatemuchlargeropponents.Callingthesegroupsterrorists,however,isnot reallyaccurate.Theirunderstandingofviolencewaslimitedtorelativelysimple strategieslikecarryingouttit-for-tatthreatsorpursuingreligiousgoalsthattranscendedpoliticsaltogether.Whattheydidnotdo—whatnooneseemstohave evenimaginedbeforetheeighteenthcentury—wastounderstandthatterrorcould becomeasocialphenomenoninitsownright,separateandapartfromtheviolence thatspawnedit.StilllesscouldtheyhaveimaginedtheexampleoftheFrenchRevolution,inwhichacarefullymanipulatedTerrorachievedpoliticalgoalsoutofall proportiontothenumberofactualvictims.
Eventhen,suchtactics—likealllarge-scaleviolence—seemedtobeastate monopoly.Theideathatsmallgroupscouldalsopracticeterrorrequiredafurtheractofimagination.Thefirsttheoreticalsuggestionthatsmallgroupscould amplifytheirinfluencethroughterrorismdatestoKarlHeinzenin1848.Actual effortstopracticeterrorismbeganagenerationlaterwiththePeople’sWillinRussia(1870s)andvariousEuropeananarchistgroups(1890s).Evenifterrorcould beachieved,however,itwasneverentirelyclearhowgroupscoulduseitto achievetheirends.Nineteenth-centuryterroristsassumed,somewhatdoubtfully, thatassassinatingperhapsadozenkeyleaderswoulddestroythestateandallowa newandbetterordertospringup.Actualexperiencewas,tosaytheleast,discouraging.Foronething,ministersshowedanastonishingwillingnesstoreplace theirassassinatedcolleagues.Morefundamentally,evensuccessfuleffortstotopple governments(e.g.,Russia)invariablyendedbyinstallingmorereactionaryregimes. Bytheearlytwentiethcentury,terrorismhadlargelyfallenoutoffavorwithorthodoxMarxistsandevenanarchists.Formodernrevolutionaries,terrorism—when mentionedatall—isalmostalwayssubservienttopoliticalagitation(Laqueur 2002).
Table1.1
Terroriststrategies(1870–1990)
AnnouncedstrategyExamplesSuccess
Destroyingthestatebyattackingthe government Russia(1870s) Poor
Destroyingthestatebyattackingthe economy
Publicizingideology
Italy(1970s),Germany(1970s)Poor
Germany(1970s),Italy(1970s)Moderate
Extortingconcessions Russia(1870s) Moderate
Forcingforeignoccupierto withdrawfromregion
Provokingacrackdownand resultingbacklash
Provokingforeigndiplomatic intervention
Cyprus(1950s),Palestine(1940s), Aden(1960s) Moderate
Germany(1970s),Italy(1970s)Poor
Armenia(1890s) Poor
CatalyzingconventionaldiplomacyMiddleEast(1970s) Moderate
Ancillarytotraditionalmilitary operations
Blockingpoliticalsolutions
Obtainingoperatingfundsand attractingrecruits
Holdingterritoryagainst conventionalmilitaryforces
Labordisputeswithprivate employers
Sources:Laqueur2002,Carr2006
Vietnam(1960s),Turkey(1980s)Moderate
Russia(1917),Palestine(1970s–), Ireland(1990s) Moderate
Russia(about1905),SouthAmerica (1990s) Moderate
Algeria(1950s),Peru(1970s) Poor
U.S.,Spain(early1900s) Moderate
Ifterrorismcannotplausiblytopplethestate,however,itremainspossiblethatit couldachievelessspectacularaims.Twentieth-centuryterroristgroupshavefollowedmanydifferentstrategies,althoughusuallywithoutsuccess(table1.1).
Thereallystrikingthingaboutthesediversestrategiesisthatnoneofthem requiresviolenceonanythinglikethescalenormallyreservedtostateactors.Indeed, formanypurposes—forexample,publicizingacauseorgarneringinternational sympathy—massviolenceiscounterproductive.Bythelate1980s,scholarsoverwhelminglyagreedthatterroristshadnorealinterestincausinglarge-scalecasualties.Thiscomfortingassessmentwasalsoreasonable.Asearlyas1973,atleastone groupofPalestinianterroristsunderstoodthatitmightbepossibletoflyahijacked Boeing747jetlinerintocities—andevenmountedanabortiveplottoimplementit
4StephenM.Maurer
(Tinnin1977).Remarkably,theattemptwasneverrepeated.Insteadofencouraging theirfollowerstotryagain,terroristleaderssteppedbackfromtheabyss.
1.2AlQaedaandtheNewTerrorism
Clearly,AlQaedaisdifferent.Thequestionishow.Here,itisprobablybetterto startbysayingwhatis not new.Tobeginwith,thechangeisnotamatterofrhetoric,evenincludingAlQaeda’scelebrated1997‘‘declarationofwar’’againstthe UnitedStates.Terroristgroupshavealwaysinvokedthesymbolismof‘‘war’’and ‘‘combat.’’Norisitaboutcapability.Technically,atleast,theIRAwasalmostcertainlybetterorganizedtobombtrainsandmotorwaysandsetoff2,000-pound truckbombs(Coogan2000).Nor,finally,isitevenaboutWMD.Inthepopular imagination,atleast,terroristshavesoughtWMDforyears.Atthewilderfringes, itisalmostimpossibletosaywherejournalisticclaimsthat,say,AumShinrikyo testedanuclearweaponintheAustralianoutback(Pinkney2006)ortheBaaderMeinhofgrouptriedtostealaU.S.nuclearwarhead(Harclerode2000)endand Goldfinger begins.
Andyet,AlQaeda is different.TheIRAmayhavebeenabletokillpeople,but itwassignallyreluctanttodosoandinsomecasesevenapologizedafterward (Coogan2000).AlQaeda’sdemonstratedrecordofmassviolenceisqualitatively different.Givenrecenthistory,wehavetotakeitsstateddesiretokilltensand evenhundredsofthousandswithatomic(9/11Commission2004)andgerm weapons(Leitenberg2005)seriously.1 Whathaschanged?
1.2.1LimitedWars
Perhapsnothing.SomeaccountsarguethatAlQaedamountedtheSeptember11 attacksbecauseitwantedtodrawtheUnitedStatesintoanAfghanWarlikethe onethatitclaimsdestroyedtheUSSR.Inthistelling,AlQaedaonlymountedthe September11attacksbecausetheUnitedStateshad—againstallexpectation— ignoreditsearlierprovocations(9/11Commission2004).Despiteunprecedented casualties,thelogicforsuchanattackisnotmuchdifferentfromtraditionalterroriststrategiesofusingattackstoforcenation-stateopponentsintooverreactionupto andincludingwars.Twowarslater,therecanbelittledoubtthattheprovocation didindeeddrawaU.S.militaryresponse.Inthissense,AlQaeda’sSeptember11 strategywasrationalandtraditional.
Thejuryis,ofcourse,stilloutonwhetheritwillachievethebroaderstrategic goalofweakeningU.S.influenceintheMiddleEast.Thatwillultimatelydepend ontheAmericanpublic’swillingnesstoprosecutetwowarswherenationalsurvival isnotatstake.Historysuggestsgreatpowersmaybedeflectedbyevenmoderate
numbers(tensofthousands)ofcasualties.DuringtheBoerWar,theBritishEmpire suffered21,000soldierskilled.Thisfigure—roughly0.5percentofthepopulation atthetime—wassufficienttobringaboutanegotiatedpeace.ThelessonsofVietnam(58,000killed,0.03percentoftheU.S.population)aresimilar.RecentexperienceinIraqsuggeststhatevensmallernumbers(4,000killedasthisbookgoesto press,0.004percentoftheU.S.population)maybesufficientinsomecircumstances. Significantly,AlQaedadoesnotreallyneedWMDtoinflictsuchcasualties.Indeed, oneofthemainvirtuesofaterrorism-as-provocationstrategyfromAlQaeda’s standpointisthatmostofthekilling(anddying)willbedonebyothers.Nevertheless,AlQaedacouldreasonablyconcludethatpossessionand/oruseofWMDon U.S.soilcouldhelpitwinalimitedwar.
Thereare,however,atleasttwoproblemswiththisscenario.Thefirstinvolvesa kindofCatch-22.Toattainitsgoals,itisnotenoughforAlQaedatocausecasualties.Itmustalsobeableto stop causingcasualtiesifandwhenitsdemandsaremet. SuchdisciplinemightnotbepossibleforanorganizationasdecentralizedandilldefinedasAlQaeda.Historically,ofcourse,perfectdisciplinehasnotbeennecessary.Instead,ithasusuallybeenenoughforterroriststoshowthattheycould significantlyreducetheviolenceeventhoughsomesplintergroupsremained.2 IfAl QaedalimitedWMDknowledgetoatightinnercircle,Westerngovernmentscould decidethattheprospectofconventionallyarmedsplintergroupsdidnotmatter.In thiscase,WMDwouldmakeAlQaedaa more plausiblenegotiatingpartnerthan traditionalgroupsliketheIRA.Thesituationwouldbeverydifferent,however,if WMDknowledgewasknowntobewidelydistributed.Inthatcase,theleadership’s willingnesstonegotiatewouldmeanverylittleandhostilitieswouldcontinue.3
ThesecondreasonAlQaedamightnotbeabletoexploitWMDinalimitedwar ismorefundamental.Atleastpublicly,thereisverylittleindicationthatAlQaeda’s goalsarelimitedtoIraqandAfghanistan.Tothecontrary,itclaimstowanta‘‘caliphate’’thatstretchesfromAfghanistantoNorthAfrica.Ofcourse,thiscouldbe rhetoricandprolongedwarfaremightinanycasechangeAlQaeda’smind.Tothe extentthatthepositionisserious,however,U.S.leaderswouldalmostcertainly makethejudgment—justastheydidwithNaziGermany4 —thatsomethinglike nationalsurvivalwasatstake.Inthiscase,theconceptofa‘‘limitedwar’’would becomeirrelevantandAlQaedawouldneedtoinflictenormouslymorecasualties toachieveitsgoals.InthisenvironmentaWMDcapabilitywouldbecomenotjust usefulbutessential.
1.2.2TotalWar
IntheweeksfollowingSeptember11,therewerefrequentsuggestionsthatAlQaeda mightbeabletomountfollow-upattackseveryfewmonths.Eightyearslater,this
6StephenM.Maurer
Table1.2
Nation-statecasualties(1789–1945)
ConflictNation
Deaths (includingcivilians)
NapoleonicWars(1789–1815)France1.4million—5% oftotalpopulation
AmericanCivilWar(1861–1865)Union
Confederacy
WorldWarI(1914–1918)
France
BritishEmpire
Germany(includingcivilians)
Austria
WorldWarII(1939–1945)UnitedStates
UnitedKingdom
USSR
Germany
Japan
Sources:Merridale2000;White2005,2006;Keegan1998
360,000—1.4%
200,000—2.5%
1.4million—3.6%
0.8million—1.9% 1.7million—3.1% 1.5million—2.9%
405,000—0.4%
300,000—0.6%
25þ million—15%
4.5million—6%
2million—2.7%
fearwasclearlyunreasonable.Onecanstillimagineconventionalattackskilling thousandsofpeoplebutnottensofthousands.Wehaveseenthatsuchcasualties areonlymarginallyusefulinthecontextoflimitedwars.Theyseemwhollyinadequateforlargerprojects,includingAlQaeda’sstatedgoalofreorganizingthe MiddleEast.
ThequestionremainshowmanycasualtiesAlQaedawouldhavetoinflicttofill thisgap.Ifhistoryteachesanythinginthisregard,itisthatmodernnationstatesare astonishinglyresilient.Acasuallookatmodernhistory(table1.2)suggeststhat nation-statescanroutinelyabsorbcasualtiesamountingto2or3percentoftheir totalpopulationandinmostcasescontinuefighting.Indeed,thefactthatmost warsendnotwithpoliticalcollapsebutwithphysicaloccupationofthelosingstate suggeststhatevenhigherratesarepossible.5 Simplecasualtyfiguresdonot,of course,tellthewholestory—theextraordinarylossessufferedbytheUSSRinWorld WarIIreflectmanyintangiblefactorstoo,notleastfearofextermination—butthese figuresdoprovideausefulbenchmark.InAmericantermsthisimpliesthatapopulationbentontotalwarcouldcontinuetofunctionuptoperhapstenmillioncasualties.6 WhilethisnumberismuchlowerthanColdWarestimates,itisnearlyfour ordersofmagnitudehigherthanSeptember11.IfAlQaedameanstoprosecuteand winawar,WMDistheonlyoption.
Indeed,AlQaedacannotsurviveinitspresentformwithoutit.Inthelong run—admittedlydecades7 —terroristgroupsneedtoshowresults.Otherwise,demonstratedfutilitywilleventuallychokeoffrecruits.AlQaedacannotaffordastalemate.Evenifsuccessful,additionalSeptember11attacksarenotenoughtochange thegame.OnlyWMDcandothat.
1.3Irrationality
Tothispoint,Ihavediscussedterrorismasifitwerearationalmeanstoarational end.Howeverwellthisworksasanapproximation,itissurelynotthewholetruth. Fromthebeginning,practicallyallterroristgroupshavesharedstrikinglygeneric features:
• Terroristsviewviolenceasasymbolicstatementratherthanasarationalinstrumentforachievingspecificgoals.
• Terroristsarealmostneverrecruitedfrompeopleoverthirtyandareusuallymuch younger.
• Terroristsattractdisproportionatenumbersofcriminalsandthementallyill (Laqueur1999,2004).8
• Terroristsholdunusual,extreme,andmillenarianbeliefs.
• Terroristgroups,likecults,enforcebeliefsthroughincessantindoctrination.
• Terrorists’internalpoliticsarefractious,bitter,andfrequentlybloody.
• Terrorism—likesuicide—followsa‘‘Werthersyndrome’’9 inwhichinitial,spectacularactsgeneratewavesofimitators.
Itisnothardtoseesignsofmadnessinthisevidence.Attheveryleast,suchregularitiessuggestthatterrorism’spsychologicalrootsareimportant.Ifso,itisnot hardtotakethenextstepbyaskingwhetherAlQaeda’sinterestinWMDisbased onsomethingmorethanrationalcalculation.Certainly,technologicalgimmicks havelongfiredterroristimaginations.Theprototypicalexamplewas,ofcourse, dynamite—areactionperhapsbestexemplifiedbyaradicalBrooklynnewspaper’s decisiontocallitself TheIreland’sLiberatorandDynamiteMonthly (Laqueur 2002).Butitdidnotendthere.Nineteenth-centuryterroristsalsoplacedordersfor submarineswellbeforetheU.S.Navydid(Coogan2000),dreamedofattackingthe HousesofParliamentwithosmiumgas,debatedthemeritsofJamesBond–style poisonedstilettosand,in1906,talkedofinventingairplanestocarryoutattacks (Laqueur2002).Evenincludingdynamite,noneofthesetechnologiesevercame closetojustifyingterrorists’hopes.
ItisnothardtoseehowthepursuitandverypossiblytheuseofWMDcould possessasimilarglamourinthetwenty-firstcentury—andcouldevenbecomean
8StephenM.Maurer
endinitself.Indeed,somethinglikethisseemstohavehappenedtoAumShinrikyo, theJapaneseextremistsectthattriedtoacquireanthraxandchemicalweaponsless forpoliticalreasonsthanbecauseitthoughtthatWMDattackswouldusherinthe millennium(Tucker2000a).ThenexusbetweenmadnessandWMDmaybehardto quantify,butitclearlyexists.
1.4Conclusion
Overthepastdecade,ithasbecomecommontopredictthatbiological,chemical, andradiologicalattackswilleventuallyoccuronU.S.soil.Whilethisseemsasafe bet,scalealsomatters.Ontheonehand,policyinterventionscandolittletoprevent trivialattacksandthereisnotmuchpointinthinkingaboutthem.Ontheother hand,wehavearguedthatWMDisunlikelytomakeaqualitativegeopoliticaldifferenceunlessitcausescasualtiesthatareatleastanorderofmagnitudelargerthan September11.10 Succeedingchapterswillalmostalwaysadoptthisdefinitionof WMD.
ReaderswillhavetojudgeforthemselveswhetherandtowhatextentWMDterrorismisfeasibleand,ifso,whereitshouldrankonAmerica’slistofpriorities. WMDterrorismmayhavelowprobability,butthatdoesnotrelieveofusofthe obligationtothinkaboutthethreatandtakesensiblemeasurestomeetit.
Notes
1.The9/11CommissionreportsthatBinLadenlost$1.5millioninanattempttopurchase weapons-gradeuraniumfromtheSudan.BinLadinreportedlytalkedofwantinga‘‘Hiroshima’’withatleast10,000casualties.ManywithintheCIAsimilarlypointtoaKhartoumsoil sampleasevidencethatAlQaedatriedtomakenervegas(9/11Commission2005).
2.ThepointiswellillustratedbytheBelfastconflict,inwhichtheUnitedKingdomrepeatedlydemanded—andreceived—temporary‘‘cease-fires’’fromtheIRA(Coogan2000). Clearly,theIRA’sabilitytomountattackswasnotenough.Italsohadtoshowthatitcould stopall,oratleastmost,oftheviolenceifitwantedto.Foritspart,theBritishgovernment clearlyunderstoodthatnoIRAcease-firewouldeverbeperfectandthatanegotiatedsolution wasboundtoproducesplintergroups.Negotiationsmightstillbeworthwhile,however,if IRAleadersspokeforenoughmemberstosignificantlyreducethelevelofviolence.
3.DuringtheColdWar,NATObuttresseddeterrencebydeliberatelyplacingphysicalcontrolofnuclearweaponsinthehandsoflow-levelcommanders.Itsgoalwastopersuadethe SovietsthatWesterngovernmentscouldnotpreventaconventionalwarfromturningnuclear.ThismadetheotherwiseimplausiblethreatthatNATOcountrieswoulduseatomic weaponsontheirownsoilcredible(Bracken1983).
4.GermanpolicybetweenthefallofFranceandtheinvasionofRussiaclearlyassumedthat theworldwouldnotbeneatlypartitionedintotwohemispheresandthatfurtherconflictwith
theUnitedStateswasunavoidable(Goda1998).Americaneliteswerethereforejustifiedin thinkingthatnationalsurvivalwasatstake.TotalwaralsorequiredthattheAmericanpeople tounderstandandaccepttheargument.PresidentFranklinD.Rooseveltmadethecaseon December12,1940,famouslyarguingthat‘‘ifGreatBritaingoesdown,theAxispowers willcontrolthecontinentsofEurope,Asia,Africa,Australasiaandthehighseas—andthey willbeinapositiontobringenormousmilitaryandnavalresourcesagainstthishemisphere. ItisnoexaggerationtosaythatallofusintheAmericaswouldbelivingatthepointofa gun’’(Kennedy1999).
5.Ofthethirteenstateslistedintable1.2,onlythree(WorldWarI–eraGermany,Austria, andRussia)sufferedapoliticalcollapse.WorldWarII–eraJapansurrenderedbeforebeing occupied.TheFrenchArmysufferedwidespreadmutiniesin1917butsubsequently recovered.
6.Estimatesbypoliticiansareinstructive.WhenthreenightsofRAFbombingkilled60,000 to100,000Hamburgresidents,Hitlerreportedlyspeculatedthatfurther,similarattacks mightforceGermanyoutofthewar(USSBS1945).U.S.leadersinthefinalyearofthewar similarlyseemtohavethoughtthatthepublicwouldacceptanadditional100,000to 300,000battledeaths(Frank1999).
7.Oncestarted,terrorismisnotoriouslylong-lived.Remnantsof1970s-eraMarxistgroups likeGermany’sRedArmyFactionandItaly’sRedBrigadescontinuedtomountsporadic attackswellintothe1990s.EvenifAlQaedaisdestroyeditsremnantsandimitatorswill continuetomountattacksforyears.
8.EasilythemostobviousexampleinvolvestheSocialists’PatientsCollective,whichseized Germany’sStockholmEmbassyin1975.Theterroristshadpreviouslybeentreatedbya Heidelbergpsychiatristwhobelievedthatviolencecouldcurementalillness.
9.Theterm Werthersyndrome referstothewaveofsuicidesthatfollowedthepublicationof Goethe’snovel TheSorrowsofYoungWerther in1774(Phillips1974).
10.Chapter16does,however,examinethecommonargumentthatevenasmall-scalechemical,biological,orradiologicalattackwouldinflictadebilitatingpsychologicalimpact.
ProfilingtheWMDTerroristThreat
JeffreyM.BaleandGaryA.Ackerman
Formorethantwodecades,policymakersandacademicshavebecomesteadily moreconcernedaboutthethreatposedbyWMDterrorism.Thisconcernbecame evenmoreacuteinthewakeoftheMarch20,1995,sarinnerveagentattackon theTokyosubwaysystembyanapocalypticmillenarianreligiousgroupknownas Oumu(orAum).Shinrikyo (AumSupremeTruth),aneventthathasbeendescribed asthe‘‘firstmajorsub-stateuse’’ofsuchaweapon(Cameron1999b).1 Many expertsarguedthatAum’sblatantandindeedtraumaticviolationoflong-standing societaltaboosagainsttheuseofWMDbynonstateactorsrepresenteda‘‘qualitativeleap’’thatwouldsooninspireotherterroristgroupstoemploytheseweapons, whereasotherspecialistsinsteadinsistedthatterroristswerelikelytocontinueto relyontried-and-trueconventionalweapons.2 Asitturnedout,neitherofthesepositionswasentirelywarranted(Jenkins1997).Althoughnosignificantspikeinactual incidentsofWMDterrorismhasyetoccurred,thereareincreasingindicationsthat certaintypesofterroristgroupsareplanningWMDattacksand,moreworrisome still,severalapparentWMDplotshavealreadybeeninterdicted.Thereistherefore anurgentneedtoseparatefactfromfictionbyexamining,synthesizing,andcriticallyevaluatingtheexistingscholarlyandpolicy-orientedliteraturethataddresses WMDterrorism.
Thischapterexaminesthisliteratureinanefforttoidentifybroadertrendsand assessthecurrentWMDterrorismthreat.Section2.1clarifieskeybasicconcepts, includingboth‘‘terrorism’’and‘‘WMD.’’Section2.2describesthevariousmotivationsthatmightleadaterroristgrouptotrytoacquireandemployWMDandidentifiesthetypesoforganizationsmostlikelytobetemptedtodoso.Section2.3 examinestheorganizationalandsocialcapabilitiesthataterroristgroupwould needtosupportacredibleWMDprogram.Section2.4reviewsthespecializedassets andtechnicalskillsthatwouldbeneededtocreateWMD.Section2.5buildsonthis analysistoconsiderhowlikelyWMDterrorismcurrentlyisandwhatthetrendsare fortheimmediatefuture.Finally,section2.6presentsabriefconclusion.
12JeffreyM.BaleandGaryA.Ackerman
2.1BasicConceptsandDefinitions
Governmentsandcitizensarepresentlyconcernedaboutanyandallsubnational groupsthatmayendupcarryingoutactsofWMDviolence.Forthisreason,this chapterwillconsiderallviolentnonstateactorswhomightacquireWMD,including thosewhomightnotqualifyasterroristsinthestrictsenseoftheterm.Similarly,the terms WMD and WMDterrorism willonlybeappliedtolarge-scale,high-impact usesofchemical,biological,radiological,andnuclear(collectively,CBRN)weapons thathavethepotentialtocausesubstantialnumbersofcasualties.3 Aswewillsee, however,thereareseveralreasonswhyterroristsandotherviolentgroupsmightdecidetocarryoutCBRNattacksthatdonotinflictenoughcasualtiesordamagetofit thecriteriaof‘‘massdestruction’’(Bale2004b).Wewillthereforeconsidertheprospectsofboth‘‘WMDterrorism’’and‘‘CBRNterrorism,’’withtheunderstanding thatthelatterphrasemayapplytoattacksthatinflictlimited(or,inthecaseof radiologicalweapons,possiblyzero)casualtiesordamage.
Givensuchterminologicalproblems,itishardtoanalyzetheliteraturewithout firstsayingafewwordsaboutthemeaningoffundamentalconceptslike‘‘terrorism’’and‘‘WMD.’’Indeed,widespreadconfusionaboutthosetermsroutinelyhampersanalysisandpolicyformulation.Suchadiscussionisnotatrivialexercise,since thesetermsareassociatedwithanumberofconceptualproblemsthatpolicymakers oftennimblycircumventorexploitfortheirownends.Thisalmostinevitablyoccurs attheexpenseofanadequateassessmentofthepotentialforWMDterrorism.
2.1.1Terrorism
Terrorism isatermthathasagreatdealofemotionalresonanceandisoftenusedin ablatantlypartisanfashion.Amoreneutraldefinitionisthereforerequired.Perhaps thebestwaytodistinguishbetweenterrorismandotherformsofviolenceistorecognizethatmostactsofviolencearedyadic—thatis,theyinvolveonlytwoparties orprotagonists,theperpetrator(s)andthevictim(s).Incontrast,allbonafideactsof terrorismaretriadic,inthattheyinvolvenotjustperpetrator(s)andvictim(s)but alsowidertargetaudience(s)whoseattitudesandbehaviortheterroristsareconsciouslyseekingtoinfluence.Terrorismis,asBrianJenkins(1997)andothershave aptlypointedout,violenceforpsychologicaleffect.4 Here,themostimportantnexus isbetweentheperpetrator(s)andthetargetaudience(s)theyaretryingtoinfluence. Forthisreason,targetedassassinationsasanendinthemselves(e.g.,murdersof particularlyeffectiveorbrutalpolicemen)orattackssolelydesignedtokilllarge numbersofpeople(e.g.,massacres)arenot,strictlyspeaking,actsofterrorism.
Accordingtothisdefinition,terrorismisnothingmorethanaviolenttechniqueof psychologicalmanipulationand,likeothertechniquesortactics,itcanbeusedby
virtuallyanyone.Itcanbeemployedbystatesorinoppositiontostatepower;by left-wingers,right-wingers,orcentrists;bytheirreligiousorthereligious;andfor analmostinfinitevarietyofpotentialcauses.Itisthereforenottrue,asmanyassert, that‘‘oneperson’sterroristisanotherperson’sfreedomfighter.’’Instead—and regardlessofwhetheronesympathizeswithorabhorstheunderlyingmotivesor proclaimedcauses—aterroristcanbeidentifiedpurelybythemethodsheorshe employs.
2.1.2WeaponsofMassDestruction
Unliketheword terrorism ,theuseoftheterm WMD inpopulardiscourseisgenerallymisleadingratherthanpolemical.Traditionally,theWMDlabelhasnormally beenconfinedtoCBRNweapons.Thisusageisstillstandardininternationalacademicpractice,andhencewewillemployithere.5 However,theusageisimprecise inthatthetermcanencompassbothagentsthatarespecificallydesignedforusein warfare(e.g.,nuclearwarheads,sarinnerveagent)andtoxicmaterialsthatare developedfornonmilitarypurposesbutcanbemisusedinwaysthatcausesignificantharm(e.g.,pesticides,radioactiveisotopesusedforindustryorresearch).
CurrentU.S.militaryusageisconsiderablybroader.ItdefinesWMDasweapons thatcancause‘‘ahighorderofdestruction’’and/or‘‘destroylargenumbersof people.’’Thiscanpotentiallyincludehigh-consequenceconventionalweaponsother thanCBRN.6 Further,themilitary’sdefinition‘‘excludesthemeansoftransporting orpropellingtheweaponwheresuchmeansisaseparableanddivisiblepartofthe weapon’’(DoD2008).Thiswould,forexample,excludeamissileorartillerytube thatlaunchedachemicalshell.Thisusageisunfortunateinasmuchasitobscuresthe fundamentalpointthataCBRNagentmustnotonlybecapableofinflictingharm, butalsobedeliverabletoitsintendedtargetbeforeitcanqualifyasapractical WMD.Indeed,exceptfornuclearweapons,theefficacyofWMDdependsalmost entirelyondelivery.7
Thenotionof‘‘mass’’casualtiesalsoleadstodifficulties.Howmanypeoplemust aweaponbecapableofinjuring,anddoesitmatteriftheanswerdependsonhowit isused?8 Theanswertomanyofthesequestionsissubjective,makingattemptsat quantificationseemarbitrary.WhilesomeCBRN(nuclearwarheads,nerveagents) cancausethousandsofcasualtiesandthereforeunequivocallyqualifyas‘‘WMD,’’ smaller-scaleterroristattacksusingotherCBRmaterialsdonot.Similarly,theterm WMD isespeciallydeceptivetotheextentthatitobscuresdifferencesbetweenthe variousagentsandtheeffectstheycause.Theproblemisrootedintheword destruction,whichtraditionallyconnotesannihilationandphysicalruin.Unlikeanuclear weapon,areleaseof Bacillusanthracis bacteriawouldnotleavealargecrater. Moreover,sincenucleardevicesarethehardestofallweaponstoacquireor ProfilingtheWMDTerroristThreat13
14JeffreyM.BaleandGaryA.Ackerman
manufacture,manyscholarsandpolicymakerstendtobundleallCBRweaponsas ‘‘low-probability,high-consequence’’events(Falkenrath1998a).Itisoftenmore illuminatingtoemphasizethesedistinctionsbypointingout,say,thatcrudeattacks withtoxicchemicalsare‘‘higher-probability,lower-consequence’’eventsthana nuclearattack(Pilat1998).
ThedistinctionbetweenWMDandotherweaponsdoes,ofcourse,containan elementoftruth.Obviously,alltrueWMDhavethepotentialforrelativelyhigh casualties,anditmightbemoreaccuratetocallthem‘‘masscasualtyweapons.’’ Theyalsoshareagenericpotentialfordisruption,bothpsychologicalandinterms ofaffectingexistinginfrastructure.Forinstance,achemicalweaponsattackwould immediatelycontaminateanareaandhinderthefunctioningofessentialservices. Also,CBRNagentsareinherentlymorefrighteningthangunsandbombs.Thereare manyreasonsforthisphenomenon,includinganaturalhumanfearofcontaminationandtheinvasivenessofmanyagents,particularlybiologicalorganisms.Akey anxiety-provokingfactorisalsotheintangiblenatureofmostoftheseagents,which canleadbothtognawingdoubtsoverwhetheronehasbeenexposedandasenseof powerlessnessagainstanunseenhazard.The1995Tokyosubwayattackkilled twelvepeople,butover4,400ofthe5,510ostensiblecasualtieswhoreportedto medicalfacilitiesshowednosymptomsofnerveagentexposureandwereclassified asthe‘‘worriedwell’’(SmithsonandLevy2000).Thatsameyear,thebombingof thefederalbuildinginOklahomaCitykilled168peopleandinjuredmorethan 500.Yettherewereno‘‘worriedwell,’’indicatingthegreaterpsychologicalimpact ofWMDrelativetocomparablylethalconventionalweapons.Inprinciple,thisimpactcouldbebluntedthrougheducation.Inpractice,constantmisuseoftheWMD conceptactually increases publicanxietysothatevensmall-scaleCBRattacksbecomeincreasinglyattractivetoterrorists.9
2.1.3AnalyticFramework
Beyondtheseconceptualdifficulties,thecurrentWMDterrorismdiscussionhas frequentlybeenmarredbyhastyevaluationsandcoloredbypublicandpolitical anxiety.Thishasledtothreatevaluationsthattoooftenexcludekeyaspectsfrom consideration.Abasicthreatassessmentincludesestablishingthevalueandvulnerabilityoftheassetunderthreat(here,Americanlives),aswellasthecapabilityand motivationofthepotentialattacker.Yetmostcurrentdiscussionsfocusalmost exclusivelyonterroristcapabilitiesfordeployingCBRNoronourphysicalvulnerabilitytothoseagents.Thisobscuresthefactthatlessquantifiableaspects,including thestrengthoftheterrorists’motivationtousesuchweapons,areequallyifnot moreimportant.Onecannotsimplyassumethatbecauseterroristshateusand wanttoattackusthattheywillnecessarilychooseWMD,evenwhentheiraimis
ProfilingtheWMDTerroristThreat15
tocauselargenumbersofcasualties.Thevariousbranchesofathreatassessment interactinseveralways,andbyconcentratingdisproportionatelyononlyoneor twoofthese,wemaywellmisssynergiesthatcanhelpreducethethreat.10
ThischapterseekstopresentamorebalancedassessmentoftheWMDthreat posedbyparticulartypesofterroristgroups.Inparticular,weconsiderboththeir objectives(ideologicalandoperational)andcapabilities(operationalandtechnical). Accordingtothisanalyticapproach,thelikelihoodofaWMDattackisrepresented astheproductofterrorists’motivationsandtheircapabilities.Furthermore,the term motivations canbefurthersubdividedintothreeinterrelatedelements.First, thereisagroup’s ideologicalagenda,whichwedefinebroadlyasitscomplexoffundamentalpolitical,social,cultural,and/orreligiousbeliefs.Second,thereareits overallandspecific operationalobjectives,whichrefertoallofthoseresultsthatterroristsseektoachievebycarryingoutaparticularattack,bothintheshorttermand inthelongerterm.Andfinally,therearethegroup’s psychologicalpropensities, thoughthesearerarelynoticed,muchlessexplicitlyanalyzedbytheterroriststhemselves.Theseincludetheindividualandcollectivepsychologyofitsmembersand, aboveall,ofitsleaders.Thesepropensities,inturn,influence(andareinfluenced by)thegroup’sorganizationaldynamics.
2.2TerroristMotivationsforUsingWMD
Oneofthepeculiaritiesofthe‘‘WMDterrorism’’literatureisthedisparitybetween thelargeamountofattentionpaidtoterroristcapabilitiesandtherelativelysmall amountofattentionpaidtoterroristmotivations.Indeed,‘‘absentaclearunderstandingoftheadversary’sintentions,thestrategiesandtacticsdeveloped[to counterthem]arebasedprimarilyonknowledgeofterrorists’technologicalcapabilitiesandgiveinsufficientweighttopsychologicalmotivations’’(Post1987).The sameobservationislikewisetruewithrespecttotheideologicalmotivationsand operationalobjectivesofdifferenttypesofterrorists.
2.2.1Motivations
Aswesawinsection2.1,attacksthataresolelydesignedtokilllargenumbersof peoplearebetterdescribedasactsofmassmurder(orperhapsasactsofwar,if onetakesthehyperbolicandoftenmetaphoricalrhetoricofterroristsandlawenforcementagenciesatfacevalue).Incontrast,thephrase‘‘masscasualtyterrorism’’ referstoattacksthatintentionallyinflictlargenumbersofcasualtiesprimarily inordertoaffectawidertargetaudience.Bothtypesofmotivesseemtohave beeninvolvedonSeptember11.Inthisinstanceal-Qa‘idaapparentlyhadmultiple aims,noneofwhichweremutuallyexclusive—todestroythephysicalsymbolsof
16JeffreyM.BaleandGaryA.Ackerman
Americanpower,todamagetheU.S.economy,tokillmilitarypersonnelinthePentagon,tocommitmassmurder,and/ortocommitatraumaticactofmasscasualty terrorism(Bale2004b).11 Ofcourse,September11wascarriedoutusingmoreor lessconventionalmeans.However,itisnothardtoseehowCBRNweaponscould likewisebeemployedforthese—andmanyother—materialandpsychologicalreasons.NorwouldCBRnecessarilybeusedtoinflictmasscasualties.Indeed,inthe pastCBRmaterialshavemostoftenbeenusedtotargetspecificindividuals.12
Inshort,theobjectivesforcarryingoutCBRattackscanvarygreatly,bothin termsoftheactualimpactsoughtandthepoliticalorreligiousgoalsbeingpursued.13 Intermsofimpact,theycouldbeseenasameanstovariousends,including smallorlargenumbersofcasualties,minororseverematerialdamage,orvarying levelsofpsychologicaltrauma.Alternatively,theycouldconceivablybecarriedout asanendinthemselves,especiallyiftheperpetrator(s)hadsomesortoftechnologicalfetishorwereotherwisedrivenbyaninnercompulsiontoutilizeunconventional weapons,inthesamewaythatsettingfiresappealstocertaintypesofarsonistsfor idiosyncratic,psychologicalreasonsratherthanrational,instrumentalones(e.g., cheatinginsurancecompanies,gettingrevenge,andsoon).
AlthoughmostanalystsmentionpossibleterroristmotivesforemployingCBRN inanadhocway,therehavebeenfewattemptstoenumerateandevaluatethese motivessystematically.14 Thissectionbeginsthatprocess.Wehavealreadyexplainedthatmotivationcanbefurthersubdividedintooperationalobjectivesand ideological/psychologicalfactors.Weexamineeachinturn.
2.2.2OperationalFactors
Themostobvious—andtocasualobservers,seeminglytheonly—operationalreasontoacquireCBRNistoinflictmasscasualtiesondeclaredenemies.Certainly, terroristgroupsthatwishtokilllargenumbersofpeoplemightwellbeinterested inacquiringCBRNbecausetheybelieve—rightlyorwrongly—thatsuchweapons wouldhelpthemreachtheirgoal(Falkenrath,Newman,andThayer1998).
Someobserverssimplyassumethatsince‘‘new’’typesofsubnationalgroupsincreasinglyseemtobeinterestedinmasscasualtyattacks,andsincetherequired technologicalinformationisincreasinglypublic,CBR—ifnotN—attacksareinevitable(Falkenrath,Newman,andThayer1998;Foxell1999;Marlo1999).Even apartfromthedifficultiesinvolvedinovercomingtechnicalhurdlesortransgressing long-standingmoraltaboos,thereareseriousproblemswiththisassumption.The mostobviousissueiswhetherviolence-pronegroupsreallyneedCBRNtoinflict ‘‘masscasualties,’’howeverdefined.Ifterroristsaresatisfiedwithkilling‘‘only’’ dozensorhundredsofpeople,theywilllikelyfinditbotheasierandlessriskyto continueemployingpowerfulconventionalweapons(aboveallmilitary-grade
explosives)tocarryoutattacks.15 Ontheotherhand,ifterroristshopetokillhundredsofthousandsormillionsofpeople,theywillalmostcertainlyturntoWMD. Inthatcase,however,aviolence-pronenonstategroupmightwellseektoacquirea nuclearorhigh-endbiologicalweaponbutberelativelyuninterestedinother,much lesspowerfulformsofCBR.
Nuclearand(perhaps)somebiologicalweaponsapart,thesinglemostimportant factormotivatingterroriststoemployCBRNweaponscouldbethedesiretoexerta disproportionatepsychologicalimpact.Inprinciple,suchanattackmightstunifnot cowenemieswhileimpressingandinspiringsupporters(Falkenrath1998a;McCormick2003;Claridge1999;GurrandCole2002).Iftheprimaryaimistotraumatize awidertargetaudience(ormultipleaudiences)psychologically,terroristsmayprefer touseCBRprovidedthattheyhavethetechnicalcapacitytodosoandthecostisnot toogreat.Duetothelaypublic’sprimalfearsofcontaminationandinfectionfrom unseenagents,aCBRterroristattackthat‘‘only’’causedseveraldozendeathswould probablyhaveamoretraumaticandterrifyingimpactthanaconventionalterrorist attackthatkilledhundreds(TuckerandSands1999;Falkenrath1998b).Thisis certainlythelessonofbothAumShinrikyo,whichattractedinordinateattentionby usingCBWagents,andthe2001 B.anthracis lettersintheUnitedStates.Giventhe growingfrequencyofmasscasualtyIslamistterroristbombings,itcouldbeargued thatconventionalattacksmustnowadaysproducethousandsofdeathstomatchthe psychologicalimpactoftheserelativelyisolatedexamplesofCBRterrorism.16
ThesearenottheonlypossibleoperationalmotivesforcarryingoutWMDterrorism.Forexample,asubnationalgroupmaywishtocontaminatekeyareasor facilitieswithinthetargetnation’s‘‘criticalinfrastructure,’’economy,andpolitical system(Falkenrath1998b;GurrandCole2002).CertainespeciallypersistentCBR materialssuchas B.anthracis andCesium–137wouldbeparticularlyusefulinthis context.Similarly,certainCBRNagentsareunusuallywellsuitedforcovertdelivery (Falkenrath1998a,1998b;Cameron2000;TuckerandSands1999).Asmallvialof biologicalpathogensorasmallcontaineroftoxicchemicalscouldeasilybetransportedtoacrowdedlocationandreleased,allowingthebearertodepartunnoticed. Indeed,asuddenoutbreakofdiseasemightinitiallyberegardedasnatural,enabling theperpetratorsand/ortheircovertsponsorstomaintain‘‘plausibledeniability’’— assumingthattheyactuallywanttokeeptheirinvolvementsecretinsteadofboastingabouttheattack(Claridge1999).Thismightoccur,forinstance,whereterroristsseekonlytemporarydeniabilitytoensureasafeescapeorwanttomake theintentionalcharacteroftheattackknown—andthuscausegeneralizedfear— withoutrevealingtheiridentities.17
Althoughterroristsandothernonstateactorsrarelyifeverengageinthesort offormal‘‘cost-benefit’’analysesthatsocialscientistsseektomodel,andtheir
18JeffreyM.BaleandGaryA.Ackerman
‘‘rationality’’maynotbecomprehensibletooutsiders,theynormallycarryoutviolencetoachievemoreorlesscalculatedoperationalobjectives(Crenshaw1998; McCormick2003).Totheextentthatthisistrue,terrorists’interestinCBRN weaponswilllargelydependonwhether‘‘theoperationaladvantagesthattheiruse mightbeperceivedtoconfer’’seemtooutweigh‘‘theoperationaldisadvantagesthat theirusemightincur’’(GurrandCole2002).Fromthisperspective,agroup’sdecisiontouseCBRN,likeitsotherdecisionsconcerningtargeting,weaponry,andtactics,willoftenbebasedonsomedegreeofrationalstrategiccalculationorchoice.
2.2.3IdeologicalandPsychologicalFactors
Thatsaid,terroristmotivationsalsoderivefromvitallyimportantideologicaland psychologicalfactors.Inadditiontoactsthatcanbecharacterizedasbroadlyrational,extremistgroupstendtoinflictviolencebecauseofmorearcaneideological, subjective,impulsive,orpartiallyconsciousandhenceostensiblylessrational needs.18 Theselatter‘‘expressive’’motivesincludedoctrinalobsessions(e.g.,compulsionstoattackdesignated‘‘evildoers,’’longingstoprecipitateaprophesied Armageddon,adesireforindividualorcollectivemartyrdom,ortechnologicalfetishism),grouppathologies(e.g.,excessiveinsularity,charismaticand/orauthoritarianleadership,extremepeerpressure,thepromotionof‘‘groupthink,’’andoutright suppressionofinternaldissent),andcollectiveemotionalimpulses(e.g.,aburning desireforrevenge,glory,orpublicity,thechancetodemonstrateprowessoroutdo rivalgroups,oradesiretoevokepasttriumphsortragedies).For‘‘lonewolf’’terrorists,potentialmotivationscanencompassanunusuallywiderangeofpersonal idiosyncrasies.19
Ideologyplaysadecisive,andperhapsevenpreeminent,roleintheselectionof targets,tacticalmethods,andweaponsbyterroristgroups.Mostimportantlyfor currentpurposes,the‘‘philosophicalandideologicalviewsofagroup—including boththeespousedphilosophyoftheorganizationandthe‘actual’philosophy revealedbythegroup’sactions—are...criticalindeterminingwhetheritwillseek outnewtechnology’’(Jackson2001).Thewaygroupsselecttargetsisaninvolved processthatnecessarilyvariessomewhatfromgrouptogroup,butcangenerallybe characterizedasaprogressivenarrowingofpossibilities.First,agroup’sideology, byexplicitlyestablishingwhatthegroupisforandagainst,essentiallydelimitsthe outsiderangeoflegitimatepossiblehumanandnonhumantargets.Thislististhen furtherlimitedbythegroup’sspecificoperationalobjectivesforlaunchinganattack, itsoperationalcapabilities,andtheresultsofclosesurveillancetodeterminewhich targetsaremostvulnerable.Alloftheseprocesseswillbeheavilyinfluencedinparticularcasesbothbythenatureofthegroupanditsinternaldynamics,aboveallthe characteristicsofitsleadersandtheirstyleandmethodofmakingdecisions,aswell
asbyexternalfactorssuchaschangesinthesecurityenvironmentandthegroup’s linkstootheractorsofferingassistance(WMDTerrorismResearchProgram2004).
Inconsideringwhycertaintypesofterroristgroupsmightbemoreinclinedto carryoutCBRNorWMDattacksthanothers,itisusefultodividepostwarhistory into(1)anearliereradominatedbysecular(oratleastsecularized)politicalterrorist organizationsdemandingpoliticalindependenceorespousingutopianrevolutionary ideologies,whetheroftheleftorright;and(2)amorerecentperioddominatedby groupsinspiredbyreligiousdoctrinesandimperatives.Wewillseethatthefactors inhibitingandfacilitatingtheuseofCBRhavechangedsignificantlyovertime.
Thefirstofthesetwoperiods,whichlastedroughlyfromtheearly1960stothe early1980s,wasdominatedbyethnonationalistterrorismontheonehandand ideologicalleft-andright-wingterrorismontheother.Asfarasethnonationalist groupsareconcerned,thereweregenerallytwofactorsthatseemtohaveespecially militatedagainsttheuseofWMD:
• Theyandtheirethnicgroupoccupiedarelativelyvulnerablepieceofterritoryand werepotentiallysubjecttoharshretaliation.
• Theyhopedtoelicitbroaderinternationalsupportfortheircauses,whichwould havebeensignificantlyerodedbycrossingtheWMDthreshold.
Onemayobjectthatethnichatreds(especiallythoseinfusedwithreligioussectarianism)oftenleadtoatrocitiesagainstdesignated‘‘out-groups’’andthatthereare severalinstancesofethnonationalistgroupscarryingoutorthreateningtocarry outCBRattacks.20 Furthermore,anumberofthesegroups,includingradicalfactionsofthePalestineLiberationOrganizationandIrishRepublicanArmy,didconductcold-blooded,brutalactionsthatprovedcounterproductiveinthesenseof alienatingpotentialinternationalsympathizers,ifnotalwaystheirownconstituents. ButitremainstruethatcasesinvolvingCBRactionsbysuchgroupshavebeen extraordinarilyrare.
Thedesireforinternationalsympathyandsupportmaysimilarlyhaveputabrake onColdWar–eraideologicalterrorists’ambitionstocommitWMDandCBRNterrorism.Hereadistinctionshouldprobablybedrawnbetweengroupsthatembraced Marxistoranarchistdoctrines,andthosethatadheredtoneofascistorneo-Nazi doctrines,21 eventhoughbothdisplayedutopianrevolutionaryideologieswith quasi-religiousovertones.Theformergenerallytargetedspecific‘‘classenemies’’ orrepresentativesofthe‘‘imperialiststateofthemultinationals,’’claimedresponsibilityfortheirattacks,andeschewedbothWMDterrorismandCBRterrorism, whetherformoralorpurelyinstrumentalpoliticalreasons.22 Ingeneraltheirrightwingcounterpartsweremorelikelytocarryoutmasscasualtyattacks(suchas bombingsofbanks,publicsquares,commutertrains,andtrainstations)butwere
20JeffreyM.BaleandGaryA.Ackerman
alsolesslikelytoclaimresponsibilityandattimestriedtoimplicatethefarleftby conductingcovert‘‘falseflag’’operations.23 Despitethis,theytoorarelydisplayed anyseriousinterestinCBRterrorism.24 Theselastremarksareclearlyapplicableto theveteranneofascistterroristsinEurope,butarenotnearlyasapplicabletorightwingradicalselsewhere,whohaveoftenbeendrivenbymarkedlylesssecular worldviews(e.g.,idiosyncraticChristianparamilitarygroupsintheUnitedStates). Thereare,ofcourse,awidevarietyofinternalandexternalfactorsthatmight causesecularterroristgroupstoriskalienatingtheirproclaimedconstituenciesand would-besympathizers.Thesepotentiallyincludeaperceivedneedtodemonstrate continuedoperationaleffectiveness,rallythespiritsofdisillusionedmembersand hardcoresupporters,orteachapointedlessontotheiropponents.Nevertheless,the foregoingdiscussionstronglysuggeststhattheyhavehistoricallyconsidered—and willlikelycontinuetoconsider—certaintypesofactionstobe‘‘beyondthepale,’’ whetherforprincipledmoralreasonsorbecausetheytendtohavearationalunderstandingofcause-and-effectrelationshipsnomatterhowManichaeantheirworldviewsorutopiantheirultimatepoliticalgoalsmaybe.25
Thingshavebeenratherdifferentsincethe1980s.Duringthislatterperiod,‘‘a surgeofreligiousfanaticismhasmanifesteditselfinspectacularactsofterrorismall acrosstheglobe...[a]waveofviolencethatisunprecedented,notonlyinitsscope andtheselectionoftargets,butalsoinitslethalityandindiscriminatecharacter’’ (Ranstorp1996).26 Thefactorsthathavesofarkeptthe‘‘new’’religiousterrorists fromdeployingWMDhavesometimesbeensimilarandatothertimesradicallydifferentfromthosewhichinhibitedearliergroups.Someanalystshavesuggestedthat religiousterroristsaremarkedlylessconstrained,seeking‘‘toappealtonoother constituencythanthemselves,’’(Hoffman1998)orhavingaprimary‘‘constituency’’ limitedtothegod(s)theychoosetoworshipandseektoplease(Jenkins1997).Certainsuchgroups,giventheirseeminglackofconcernaboutthepsychologicaland practicaleffectsoftheiractionsintheprofaneworld,arelikelytobeparticularly dangerousbecausetheyaremoreorlessunconstrainedbyexternalforces.Not surprisingly,Jackson(2001)arguesthathighlydestructiveCBweaponswouldbe particularlyappealingtoagroup‘‘seekingmaximaldestructionforthebenefitofa divineaudience.’’
Thisconcerncanbeoverstated.Inpractice,mostreligiousgroupsareatleast partiallyconcernedwitheventsontheterrestrialplane,andsomemaybeassensitivetotheeffectsoftheiractionsonwideraudiencesassecularterrorists(Dolnik andGunaratna2006).Forexample,asignificantnumberofIslamistterroristsseek toconvertotherMuslimstotheirownradicalbrandofIslaminthehopesofrecruitingnewmembers.Incertaincontexts,thishasprobablypersuadedthemtorefrain fromcarryingout‘‘beyondthepale’’actionsthatwouldhaveverylikelyalienated
ProfilingtheWMDTerroristThreat21
largenumbersofrecruits.Furthermore,groupsthatfailtoconsiderpotential supporters’viewsareoftenself-limiting.OneexcellentillustrationofthiscanbeobservedinAlgeria,wherecertainIslamistterroristsbecamesoappalledbytheGroupe IslamiqueArme ´ ’s(GIA:ArmedIslamicGroup)systematicatrocitiesthattheybroke awayfromthatorganization,formedtheirownrivalgroup,theGroupeSalafiste pourlaPre ´ dicationetleCombat(GSPC:SalafistGroupforPreachingandFighting), andthenforgedanalliancewithal-Qa‘ida(Gunaratna2003;Burke2003).27
Thatsaid,thegeneralconsensusamongexpertsseemstobethatreligiousterroristsaremorewilling—andthereforelikely—toviolatetraditionalmoraltaboos againsttheuseofCBRNweaponsthantheirsecularcounterparts(Hoffman1993a, 1997,1998;Cameron2000;Campbell2000;GurrandCole2002;Tucker2000a; Zaman2002;Marlo1999;RonfeldtandSater1981).28 Thisdistinctionbetween religiousandseculargroupsdoesnotmeanthateveryviolence-prone‘‘religious’’ groupisequallylikelytopursuemassviolence.29 Theological,historical,andculturaldistinctionsalsomatter.30 Inthisregard,groupsmotivatedbyapocalypticmillenarianreligiousdoctrinesseemtobeparticularlydangerous,sincesuchdoctrines postulate(1)theimminentdestructionoftheexistingworldorder,whichisviewed asthoroughlyandirremediably‘‘evil’’;(2)aterriblefatefortheimmoral,unenlightenedmajority;(3)akeyroleforaselectgroupofveryspecialpeople—thetruefollowersofthedoctrine,namely,themselves—whowillbesparedthefateofothers; and(4)thecollapseoftheexistingorderfollowedbythecreationofaworldlyparadiseinwhichthesamespecialpeoplewillbefreedfromwant,hardship,suffering, strife,oppression,immorality,andeverythingelsethatis‘‘evil’’(Daniels1999).Althoughsomeadherentswillwaitpassivelyforthefulfillmentofprophecy,others maydecidethatitisbettertohastenthedestructionbyattackingthe‘‘satanic’’ forcesthatruletheworld.ThiswascertainlythecasewithgroupssuchasAum Shinrikyo andtheCovenant,theSword,andtheArmoftheLord(CSA).31
Religiouscommunitiesthatbelievethatself-sacrificecanatoneforearthlysins andleadtoaheavenlyparadisearelikewisemorepronetoextremeviolence.This caneasilyleadtothecommissionofhorrificacts,includingsuicidebombings.For example,dedicatedmembersofbothSunnı andShı‘ı Islamistgroupsnowroutinely carryoutmartyrdomattacksinthebeliefthatdyingwhilewaging jihad willguaranteethemimmediateentrytoparadise,therebybypassingtheMuslimequivalent ofpurgatory.Ontheotherhand,believers’violencedoesnotnecessarilytakethe formofattacksonexternalenemies.Instead,itmaybedirectedinward,ashappenedwiththeHeaven’sGateUFOcult(Balch1995;BalchandTaylor2002;Hall 2000;Wessinger2000;PerkinsandJackson1997;Partridge2006).
However,religiousgroupsarenottheonlytypesofextremiststhatmightbe attractedtousingCBRNmaterials.Someanalystshavearguedthatgroupsbenton
22JeffreyM.BaleandGaryA.Ackerman
revenge,assortedright-wingextremists,adhocgroupsoflike-mindedpeople,and disturbedloneindividualsarealsoespeciallypronetoadoptingsuchweapons.In truth,however,thisobservationislargelyspeculativeandrestsononlyahandful ofcases(TuckerandSands1999;Falkenrath1998b).Terroristorganizationswith scientificandtechnologicalpretensionsorevenfetishesmightbemoreapttoemploy high-techweaponslikeCBRN,assumingthattheycouldactuallyacquireordevelop them.32 Whethersuchatechnofetishistheproductofasecularorreligiousideology maynotmattermuch.
2.2.4Ideologyvs.Deterrence
Asinearliereras,evenveryextremereligiousimpulseswillnormallybemoderated somewhatwheregroupsarefirmlyensconcedwithinanexposed,vulnerablepieceof territoryoractivelyengagedinabroaderarrayofconventionalpoliticalactivities. Howeverfanaticalsomeoftheircadremaybe,itwouldbeextremelyriskyfor establishedIslamistgroupslikeHizballah(thePartyofGod),theHarakatalMuqawwamaal-Islamı (HAMAS:IslamicResistanceMovement),andal-JihadalIslamı al-Filastını (PalestinianIslamicJihad)toengageinWMDattacks,whether againstIsraelortheUnitedStates,sincetheirentirelandscouldconceivablybe occupiedorphysicallydestroyedinresponse.33 Inthissense,itmaywellbepossible todetersuchgroupsfromcarryingoutWMDattacksinthesamewaythat‘‘rogue’’ nation-statesare.However,thiscouldchangequicklyifthegroupsdecidedthatthe timehadcometolaunchaglobaljihad,thatitwasimpossibletoachievetheirgoals usingconventionalmeans,orthattheirexistencewasthreatened.
Theserestrainingfactorsaresignificantlyweakerforothertypesofreligious groups.First,transnationalIslamistgroupslikeal-Qa‘idaarespreadacrossthe globe,andtheirsurvivaldoesnotdependonthecontinuedoccupationorcontrol ofspecificterritories.Inrecentyearsseveralleadersofal-Qa‘idaanditsaffiliated groupshaveopenlyboastedoftheirintenttoacquiresuchweapons.Forexample, BinLadinhimselfhassaidthatacquiringweaponsofalltypes,includingCBRN, isaMuslim‘‘religiousduty.’’34 Moreover,evidencefoundinal-Qa‘idacampsand insideinformationprovidedbyjihadistscapturedinAfghanistanbothindicated thatthegrouphadacquiredandtestedchemicalagentsandalsoplannedtoproduce variousbiologicalagentsincluding B.anthracis,botulinumtoxin,plague,andhepatitisAandC.35
Asecondmajorcategoryofreligious(andalsopolitical)organizationsthatare relativelyimmunetoexternalfactorsareinsularcultlikegroups.Suchgroupstypicallyviewexternaleventsassignsandportentsofprophesiedcosmicevents,and arelikelytobecomeevenmoreparanoidandapocalypticinthefaceofhostility frommainstreamsocietyorrepressivestateaction.However,theyseemtobedriven
primarilybytheirowninternalimperatives,andoftentheiractshavelittleornothingtodowithspecificdevelopmentsintheoutsideworld.Instead,theyfrequently displayacombinationofidiosyncratictheologicalconceptionsandauthoritarian intragroupdynamics.ForgroupsliketheOrdreduTempleSolaire(OTS:Orderof theSolarTemple)inSwitzerlandandQuebecortheMovementfortheRestoration oftheTenCommandmentsofGodinUganda,suddenactsofhorrificviolenceseem tobetriggeredmainlybyinternalprocessesandmechanisms.36
2.2.5WarningSigns?
Finally,Campbell(2000)andTucker(2000a)havepointedtovariousorganizationalandbehavioralwarningsignswhichcouldindicatethataparticulargroup wasinclinedtoproduceoruseWMD.Acombinedlistofthesesignsincludes groupsthat
• Havesadistic,megalomaniacal,ordelusionalbutnonethelesscharismaticand authoritarianleaders
• Aresociallyisolated,donotseriouslyaimtoappealto—muchlessclaimto represent—abroaderconstituency,andarethereforerelativelyunconcernedabout the‘‘blowback’’fromtheiractions
• Insistentlyurgetheirmembersandsupporterstocarryoutunrestrainedviolence againstdemonizedanddehumanizedcollectiveenemies
• Employlevelsofactualviolencethathaveprogressivelyescalatedovertime
• Consistentlydisplayinnovationintheiruseofweaponsand/ortactics,oratleasta willingnesstotakehigher-than-normalrisks(Jackson2001)
• Gooutoftheirwaytorecruitpeoplewithrelativelyadvancedtechnicalorscientificskills
• Havesufficientfinancialresourcestosubsidizetheacquisitionordevelopmentof CBRNweapons
• HaverelativelyeasyaccesstoWMD-relatedmaterials;and/or
• Areinsuchdesperatestraits,realorimagined,thattheyfeeltheyhavenothingto losebyemployingeverymeansattheirdisposal(Sprinzak2000)
Needlesstosay,terroristgroupsthatdisplayseveralofthesecharacteristicsare particularlyworrisome.
2.2.6WhyHasn’tItHappened?
GiventhatseveraltypesofsubnationalgroupsseeminterestedinusingCBRNand/ orWMD,theobviousquestioniswhysofewattackshaveoccurredthusfar.Here, theprimaryargumentisthattherarityofcatastrophicmasscasualtyattacksreflects thedifficultiesofcarryingthemoutsuccessfully,whichareespeciallyacuteinthe
24JeffreyM.BaleandGaryA.Ackerman
caseofWMD(section2.3).Itislessclear,however,whywehavenotseenmany morecasesofcruder,small-scaleCBRattacks,whichshouldbefeasibleforalmost anyreasonablyprofessionalterroristgroupthatwasreallydeterminedtoexecute them.Severalanalystshaveexplainedthisbyclaimingthatterrorists,whatevertheir ideologicalpredispositions,tendtobe‘‘conservative’’inadoptingnewtechniques andtechnologies(Jenkins1986;Hoffman1993b;Clutterbuck1993).Theevidence forthisisdebatable.Eveniftrue,however,onewouldexpectthatoffsettingincentivestoacquireWMDwouldeventuallyovercomethisconservatismforatleastone group.Oncethishappened,itmightbeexpectedthatothergroupswouldfollow suitifthetacticwasshowntobefeasible,especiallyiftheyfeltaperceivedneedto mimicrivalsorevenstates(Falkenrath1998b).
Thereseemtobethreemainmotivationalreasonswhythesetypesoflow-grade butnonethelessfear-inducingattackshavebeenrelativelyrare.First,wehavealreadyexplainedthatgroupsmaybereluctanttoalienateconstituentsandinternationalsupport.Second,conventionalweaponsremainamuchmoreefficientwayto damagehumanbeingsandproperty(intermsofharmcausedperunitoflimited resources)thanprimitiveCBRattacks,andhencewillnormallybereliedonunless thecreationofadisproportionatepsychologicalimpactisthegoal.Finally,terrorist groupmembers—likethegeneralpublic—maylackthespecializedscientificknowledgeneededtodistinguishCBRNrealitiesfromtheirownphobiasaboutcontamination,infection,anddisease.Thisreluctanceisreinforcedbypopularculture,with itsgruesomeEbolacoveragefromAfricaandfictionalWMDaccounts.Suicideterroristsmayalsohaveanaestheticpreferenceforexplosives,whichallowthemtogo outinasudden,painless,andseeminglygloriousbangratherthan,aswithcertain germs,alingering,painful,andingloriouswhimper(Dolnik2004).Then,too,suicidebombingisoftenimitative.Evenassumingthatafewvolunteerscouldbepersuadedtocontractandthereafterspread,say,smallpox,theirgruesomeensuing deathswouldlikelyactasadeterrentforotherprospective,self-styled‘‘martyrs.’’ Unfortunately,allthreeoftheserestrainingfactorsmaybegraduallybreaking down.Asnotedabove,certain‘‘new’’categoriesofterroristsareseeminglyless concernedaboutlocalorworldopinionthantheirtraditionalcounterparts,andthe biggerpsychologicalpayoffthatwouldsurelyresultfromevenasmall-scaleCBRattackmayincreasinglyappealtotoday’sterrorists,especiallygiventhetemporary panicsthatfollowedthe1995Tokyosubwayattacksand2001 B.anthracis letter mailings.Afterall,al-Qa‘idaonlybegantolookseriouslyatWMDaftertheTokyo subwayattacks.37 Finally,greaterlevelsofscientificandtechnologicalliteracycould graduallyreduceterrorists’phobias(nottomentionthetechnicalobstaclesthey face),increasingtheirreadinesstoassumeCBR-relatedrisks.
2.2.7LimitsofAnalysis
Theoperationalmethods,tactics,andweaponsusedbyterroristsinthepastcannot, inandofthemselves,allowustopredicttheirfuturebehaviorwithanycertainty. Theyprovide,atbest,anindicationofthemanyfactorsthatinfluenceterrorists’ choices.Furthermore,historydoesnotreallyrepeatitself,anditwillbeveryhard tosayhowtoday’sterroristsdifferfromearlieronesunlessweinsertinformants intotheirranksorinterrogatecapturedmembers.Finally,thehistoryofwarfare hasrepeatedlydemonstratedhowweaponsandtacticsthathavebeenstandardfor longperiodscanbesuddenlyandunexpectedlytransformed,sometimesforreasons thatonlymakesenseinhindsight.38 Theseforecastingproblemsareboundtobe compoundedinourcurrenteraofrapidtechnologicalchange.
2.3Capabilities:SocialandOrganizational
WMDdevelopmentrequiresbothalargesupportingorganizationandasmall-butskilledR&Dteam.Here,wereviewthegeneralsocialandorganizationalcapabilitiesthataterroristorganizationwouldneedtosupportaplausibleR&Deffort. WedeferdiscussionoftheskillsthatanR&Dteamwouldneedtosection2.4.
2.3.1Organization
TheabilitytomountacredibleR&Dprogramdependsonmultiplefactors,includinggroupsize;leadershipmechanisms,centralizedauthority,andinternaldynamics; andtheabilitytoinnovateandabsorbnewtechnologies.Becauseofthetechnical andtacticalsophisticationassociatedwithWMD,aneffectivegroupwouldmost likelyrequirea substantialmembership,a centralleadership tocoordinateR&D andacquisition,andsufficient discipline tomaintainsecrecy(Zanders1999).DisciplinewouldalsobeneededtomaintainfocusoverthelongplanninghorizonsassociatedwithWMD.Forexample,action-orientedgroupsthatdependonconstant operationstomaintaincohesionareunlikelytomaintainaWMDprogramthat takesmonthsoryearstobearfruit(Jackson2001).Zandersarguesthatreligious sectsaremostlikelytodisplaythe‘‘verticallyorganized,highlyintegratedandideologicallyuniform’’structuresneededtoproduceclandestineCBWinbulk(Zanders 1999).Thatsaid,itisprudenttothinkthatsomeothergroups,includingcertain ethnonationalistterroristgroups,mightalsoqualify.
2.3.2Logistics
CredibleR&Dwouldalsoneedreasonable logistics ,includingtheabilitytoacquire rawmaterialsandequipment,transportthecompletedweapontoitstarget,and ProfilingtheWMDTerroristThreat25
26JeffreyM.BaleandGaryA.Ackerman
maintaincommunications.Therewouldalsoneedtobea developmentsite either beyondthereachofWesternsecurityforcesor,ataminimum,inaplacewherecovertactivitiescouldproceedwithonlyasmallchanceofdetection.Unfortunately, thisisnotaparticularlyhighbarrierforchemicalorbiologicalagents,sincesmallscaleproductioncantakeplaceinasizablebasement.Continuedproductionover manymonthscouldthenyieldlargequantitiesofagent,althoughthiswouldput additional,nontrivialdemandsonprocesssafetyandagentstorability.
Severalmodernterroristgroupingshaveplausiblydemonstratedthattheycan meetthesecriteria.Forexample,variousorganizationshavesuccessfullymaintained covertfacilities,includingal-Qa‘ida,whichreportedlymaintainedseveralsmallscalebiologicalandchemicalweapons–relatedproductionfacilitiesinAfghanistan undertheTaliban,andAum,whichbuiltandoperatedaclandestine,state-of-theartlaboratorynearMountFuji.Similarly,the clandestinenetworks neededtoacquireandtransportmaterialsacrossbordershavebeendemonstratedbymultiple organizations,includingPakistan’sA.Q.Khannetwork,Russia’sillicitnuclear materialstraffickingnetworks,andMexico’ssmugglingnetworksthatroutinely movepeopleandmate ´ rielintotheUnitedStates.Thatsaid,CBRactivitieswould becomeincreasinglydifficulttohideasproductionbecamelargerandmoresophisticated(GurrandCole2002).Historically,lawenforcementhasagoodtrackrecord ofinfiltratinggroupstryingtodevelopCBRweaponsinsidetheUnitedStates (Tucker2000a).
Finally,demandsonlogisticswouldbeespeciallygreattotheextentthataWMD plotrequiredterroriststooperateandblendintothetargetsociety.ThiswasanontrivialhurdlefortheSeptember11plotters(9/11Commission2004),andterrorists mightnotbesoluckyasecondtime.Theproblemwouldbeparticularlyacutefor plotsthatwerecomplexand/orrequiredterroriststooperateforlongperiodsof timeintheWest.
2.3.3Financing
AcredibleWMDdevelopmentprogramwouldneedsubstantialfundingtobuy materialsandequipment,trainwould-bedesignersandworkers,operatefacilities, and/orpaypersonnel.Someobserversarguethatthisfundingisprohibitive (Cameron2000),butthisseemsdoubtful.Estimatesfromtheliterature(table2.1) suggestthattypicalcostswouldrunintohundredsofthousandsofdollarsfor CBRandmillionsofdollarsforanuclearweapon—notterriblydifferentfromthe estimatedbudgetforSeptember11.Inprinciple,terroristscouldalsocutcorners byrentingand/orstealingmaterialsandequipment,orreceivingin-kinddonationsfromsupporters.However,mostoftheseoptionswouldincreasetheriskof detection.
ProfilingtheWMDTerroristThreat27
Table2.1
EstimatedcostofacquiringCBRNweapons
WeapontypeCost
NuclearFissilematerial—likelytocost$1millionperkilogramormore).Other costsforacrudeweapon—afewhundredthousanddollars.
RadiologicalRadiologicalmaterial—unknowncostontheblackmarket. BiologicalLessthanafewhundredthousanddollars(e.g.,theproductionof botulinumtoxinfor$400perkilogram).
ChemicalLessthan$10,000forabasicproductioncapability.Moreexpensive agentslikesarincouldbeproducedforapproximately$200perkilogram.
Source:Falkenrathetal.1999b;Purver1996
Financialresourcesdonot,ofcourse,guaranteesuccess.AumShinrikyo possessedbetween$300millionand$1billioninassetsbutstillfailedtodevelopa viablebiologicalweaponortoproducechemicalweaponsinbulk.Nevertheless, strongfinancingallowedbothAumandal-Qa‘idatopursueparallelweaponsprogramsasahedgeagainstfailureandtosetupfrontcompaniesto‘‘buytheirway outoftechnicaldifficulties’’(Cameron1999a).Inadditiontoal-Qa‘ida,ahandful ofothergroupshavesufficientresourcestomountacredibleWMDprogram.These includetheLiberationTigersofTamilEelam(LTTE,orTamilTigers),Hizballah, andtheFuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia(FARC).
2.3.4EducationandResearch
AsuccessfulWMDprogramwouldalsorequire humancapital —thatis,technical knowledgeandskills.Thiscouldcomeeitherfromeducatinggroupmembersor recruitingspecializedpersonnelfromoutsidethegroup.Ineithercase,therequired learningwouldconsistofboth explicitknowledge —thatwhichcanbewrittendown intextbooksormanuals—and,equallyimportantly, tacitknowledge derivedfrom experienceorpracticalinstruction(Jackson2001).Inmostcases,severaldistinct scientificandtechnicalskillswouldbenecessary.Forexample,eventhoughAum Shinrikyo recruitedatleastonescientistwithabackgroundinmicrobiologyormolecularbiologytoworkonitsweapons,theprojectwouldprobablyhavebeenmore successfulifAumhadalsodeployedapathologist,anengineer,ameteorologist,and anaerosolphysicist.Moreover,weaponsworktypicallyrequiresspecializedengineering‘‘tricksofthetrade’’thatevenskilledgeneralistsareunlikelytoknow.This impliesasignificantlearningcurve(GurrandCole2002).
Severalauthorsarguethatterroristscannowobtainexplicitknowledgeof CBRNfrommanysources,includingtextbooks,academicandindustrypublications,
28JeffreyM.BaleandGaryA.Ackerman
andtheInternet.Thispotentiallymakesthemmorecapablethantheirforebears (Cameron2000;Falkenrath1998a;GurrandCole2002).AumShinrikyo ,forexample,isknowntohaveperformedanextensiveliteraturesearch,includingdownloadingBrookhavenNationalLaboratory’sentireproteindatabank,inaneffortto findthechemicalbreakdownproductsofvarioustoxins.Similarly,severalpublicly availablepoisonmanualsdescribehowtoprepareCB(Stern1999),andtechnical informationongrowingpathogensiswidelyavailableinthescientificliterature.PerhapsthemostobviouschangeistheInternet.Inprinciple,theWebcanprovidevaluableinformationthatreportedlyincluded,someyearsago,thedeclassifiedpatent forVXnerveagent(GurrandCole2002).This,however,isanambiguousgiftsince theInternetalsoofferssignificantmisinformation.39
Terroristsalsocouldacquireknowledgeandskillsthroughlegitimateeducational programs.U.S.universitiesalonegraduatethousandsofPhDsinthephysicaland lifescienceseveryyear,manyofthemforeignstudents.Forexample,Ramzı Yusuf laterappliedhiseducationatatechnicalcollegeinWalestobuildingsophisticated bombs.AumShinrikyo’srecruitersarealsoknowntohavetargeteduniversitygraduateswithscientificandtechnicaldegrees.Onbalance,itisprobablysafetosaythat thebarrierstoacquiringexplicitknowledgehavebeensignificantlyerodedinrecent yearsandthatmostoftheremainingchallengesinvolvetacitknowledge.
Finally,oneobviousshortcutwouldbetorecruit formerstateweaponsprogram employees. Zanders(1999)arguesthataterroristgroupwouldbereluctanttohire scientistsandtechnicianswhodidnotsharetheirideologicalbeliefs.Ontheother hand,historyisrepletewithexamplesofpersonswhohaveundertakenthemostnefariousoperationsforsimplematerialgain,fromCarlostheJackaltothechemists thatsupporttheillegaldrugtrade.Therehasbeenmuchtalkaboutthedesperate needormercenarybentofscientistsintheweaponsprogramsoftheformerSoviet Union,SouthAfrica,Pakistan,andIraq.GurrandCole(2002)citeseveralreasons whysuchscientistswouldprefertoworkforstates.However,theworlddoesnot offermanystate-leveljobsforweaponsscientists,whichmaymakenonstateorganizationscorrespondinglymoreattractive.
2.3.5InnovativeCapacity
Sofar,ourargumentssuggestthatterroristgroupswithdogmatic,charismatic leaderswhoexerciseextremeformsofsocialconditioning(e.g.,religiouscults)are amongthemostwillingandabletopursueWMDterrorism.Yetthesesamegroups mayalsobetheleastequippedtoobtainscientificexpertise.First,extremistgroups drawtheirmembersdisproportionatelyfromalienatedindividuals.Evenwhenthese individualshavescientificbackgrounds,theirskillsareoftensubstandard(Falkenrath1998b).Second,harshconditioningandindoctrinationmethodstendtomake
eventalentedoperativesinefficient.Somethingofthissortmayhavehappened toAumShinrikyo,whereaparanoidatmospherebasedonsleepdeprivationand narcoticsseemstohaveinterferedwithmembers’abilitytodevelopbiological weapons(Rosenau2001).40
2.4Capabilities:TechnicalHurdles
Inadditiontotheforegoinggeneralrequirements,eachformofCBRNposesspecific anduniquechallenges.Weaddresstheseinturn.
2.4.1ChemicalWeapons
MaterialsandTechnologyAcquisition Chemicalweaponsrequirebothprecursor chemicalsandprocessingequipment.Ingeneral,themorebasictheprecursorthe longerandmorecomplextheproductionprocesswillbe.Theequipmentneededto makemostagentsisfairlystandard,althoughitmayoccasionallytriggerdual-use regulations.Particularlycomplexchemicalagents(includingsarinandcertainother nerveagents)oftenneedspecializedequipmentcapableofwithstandingcorrosion, hightemperatures,andhighpressures.
Almostanyterroristactorwhopossessestherequisiteknowledgecanobtainthe precursorchemicalsandequipmentforsimplechemicalagentsfromnormalcommercialsources.AumShinrikyo,forexample,wasabletopurchasemultiplenerveagent ingredients,includingfiftytonsofphosphorustrichlorideandtentonsofsodiumfluoride,ontheopenmarket(Stern1999).Precursorchemicalsformoresophisticated chemicalweaponsareoftenregulatedbytheChemicalWeaponsConvention (CWC).However,theCWCwasdesignedwithverylarge,battlefield-scaleusesin mind.Asaresult,itdoesnotcovertransactionsinvolvinglessthanonemetrictonof precursorchemicals—morethanenoughtomountaWMDattack(Falkenrath 1998b).Finally,terroristscouldpotentiallystealchemicalweaponsagentsfromexistingnationalstockpiles,includingthousandsoftonsfromtheformerSovietUnion.41
Production
Theproductionrequirementsforchemicalweaponsdependonthe typeandamountofagentdesired.Certaintypesofagents,suchashydrogencyanide,aresimpletoproduce.However,vesicantssuchasmustardandlewisiteare moredifficult,andmostnerveagentsareevenmorecomplex.Furthermore,certain productionmethodsandhigh-purityproductsrequirespecializedequipment(e.g., noncorrosivematerials)thatcoulddrawattentiontothegroup.Processesthat yieldedanimpureagentcouldsignificantlylimittheeffectivenessoftheultimateattack.42 Falkenrath,Newman,andThayer(1998)assertthatasmart,technically
