IN AN ATTEMPT TO MANAGE THE NARRATIVE OF THE EVENTS AT GETTYSBURG ON THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 2, AN ANONYMOUS LETTER APPEARED IN THE MARCH 12, 1864, EDITION OF THE NEW YORK HERALD, EXAGGERATING AND MISINTERPRETING DAN SICKLES' ROLE IN THE BATTLE.
sickles's advance and wounding
"THE WHOLE CONFEDERATE ARMY WAS ASSEMBLED"
Any study of the Sickles-Meade saga must begin with the account of Brigadier General Henry Jackson Hunt, who served as Chief of Artillery in the Army of the Potomac. Hunt was uniquely positioned and unbiased to describe the events that would remain contested for the next couple decades.
MR. SICKLES GOES TO WASHINGTON 32
In February 1864, the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War called upon Dan Sickles who was eager to cooperate. During his testimony, the one-legged general presented his biased account of the events of July 2, 1863.
43
SO WHO WAS HISTORICUS?
The identity of Historicus has been a topic of debate ever since the pseudonym first appeared in the Herald in 1864.
from the editor
Jeffrey R. Biggs
Welcome to HardtackIllustrated
Welcome to the Summer 2025 issue of Hardtack Illustrated! This is our seventh edition, and I’m thrilled to share that we've surpassed 1,500 visits from over 800 unique visitors. While these numbers are modest compared to more popular sites, my focus is not on volume but on attracting quality visits that explore interesting and novel topics related to the Civil War.
I am dedicating this issue of HardtackIllustratedto one of my favorite topics: the Battle of Gettysburg, which occurred from July 1 to 3, 1863, in the southern Pennsylvania town of Gettysburg. I have touched on this battle before in the magazine, notably in the Summer 2025 issue that focused on eyewitness accounts of Pickett's Charge. However, in this issue, I will explore the Sickles-Meade controversy. While passions have cooled over time, the topic was highly emotional in the decades following the battle. This led me to include primary accounts that frame the controversy. For those who find these accounts intriguing, I have provided a few recommended starting points for your journey into the Sickles-Meade controversy.
All the articles featured in the magazine have also been added to the Hardtack Blog, where you can access at www.hardtackbooks.com. The quarterly magazines can be reached by web browser, as a downloadable PDF or through www.issuu.com. I prefer the digital version which has the satisfying feature of turning and curling a page oldfashioned style! Additionally, there is a resource section for Civil War enthusiasts that provides links to numerous free 19th-century newspapers. There are no paywalls—
everything is completely free. I also have a Facebook account which we encourage you to like and follow so you never miss out on new content.
For those who may not be familiar with Hardtack Books, I focus on republishing timeless narratives from the Civil War. Using modern typography, graphics, and design— such as those featured in Hardtack Illustrated—I bring these firsthand accounts into the twenty-first century. The publications illuminate both the experiences of soldiers during the war and the lives of those on the home front during this critical period. The platform consists of the digital quarterly magazine, Hardtack Illustrated , as well as printed works, distributed through Amazon and other book outlets, which are typically released once a year.
Hardtack Books is a way of preserving the legacy of the Civil War for future generations, by giving old books a new and modern life.
The Summer 2025 edition of Hardtack Illustrated features a piece titled "The Historical Account of the Battle of Gettysburg." This article shares the anonymous letter published in the March 12, 1864, issue of the New York Herald . The letter was likely written or dictated by Dan Sickles and presents an exaggerated and misleading narrative that contributed to the controversy surrounding the battle. This edition includes a slightly abbreviated version of the letter, along with sidebars to provide better context for the narrative.
One of the oddest encounters during the Gettysburg Campaign occurred when President Abraham Lincoln visited Dan Sickles, who was recovering from a serious leg wound that had resulted in amputation. This visit took place on July 5, just three days after Sickles was injured. Known for his confidence and boldness, Sickles quickly shifted the conversation and is rumored to have started forming a defense for his actions on July 2. Fortunately, we have an eyewitness account which is titled "Sickles Seizes the Initiative, July 5, 1863."
Supplementing the two features is Henry Hunt's account, which is thought to be the most reliable and unbiased description of the framework of the Sickles-Meade controversy. Finally, no account of the controversy would be complete without carrying Dan Sickles own self-aggrandizing testimony to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War which is carried in "Dan Sickles goes to Washington."
Finally, don't overlook my own sidebar piece over the true identity of Historicus. It's self-evident in light of today's scholarship but its still a fun topic to explore who else was thought to have aided in the mystery.
I would like to extend to readers the opportunity to contact me in case you come across Civil War era material which you think would be great to include in future editions, or if you can think of ways to improve. I can be reached at jeffreybiggs@verizon.net.
JeffBiggs
George Alfred Townsend was a special war correspondent for the PhiladelphiaPress and NewYorkHeraldduring the Civil War. He followed McClellan’s Army of the Potomac and Pope’s Army of Virginia in the spring and summer of 1862, ling dozens of dispatches to his editors. Finally, a er su ering from the e ects of ‘swamp fever,’ he took a two-year break in Europe, where he lectured about his experiences. Townsend returned to the war front in 1865 and -a er taking the pen name of “GATH” - was the rst correspondent to describe the war’s climax at Five Forks. He released his memoir in 1866, detailing his personal experiences and recollections of the Civil War and those dramatic days.
Campaigns of a Non-Combatant: The Memoir of a Civil War Correspondent
is Hardtack Books reissue of Campaignsofa Non-Combatantis not a facsimile of the original work. Instead, it reimagines Townsend’s work in a modern font with dozens of illustrations and editorial footnotes.
About Hardtack Books: Hardtack Books specializes in republishing timeless Civil War narratives. Our goal is to make these captivating stories more accessible and appealing to today’s history enthusiasts at a moderate cost. By using modern styles in typography, graphics, and design, we bring to the twenty- rst century these rsthand accounts that shed light on both wartime experiences and the lives of those on the home front during the critical years of the Civil War.
At Hardtack Books, we are dedicated to preserving the rst-hand accounts of enlisted men, newspaper correspondents, and war leaders. Our mission is to bring these original sources, including memoirs, correspondence, and newspaper articles, together in contemporary publications.
THE WHOLE CONFEDERATE
ANY STUDY OF THE SICKLES-MEADE SAGA MUST BEGIN WITH THE ACCOUNT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HENRY JACKSON HUNT, WHO SERVED AS CHIEF OF ARTILLERY IN THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. HUNT WAS UNIQUELY POSITIONED AND UNBIASED TO DESCRIBE THE EVENTS THAT WOULD REMAIN CONTESTED FOR THE NEXT COUPLE OF DECADES.
ON THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 2, HUNT WAS SENT BY MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE TO ASSIST MAJOR GENERAL DANIEL E. SICKLES IN POSITIONING ARTILLERY ON FAVORABLE GROUND IN FRONT OF HIM, WHICH SICKLES WANTED TO COVER. HOWEVER, UPON DISCOVERING THAT THE GROUND GENERAL SICKLES WISHED TO OCCUPY WAS WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE FEDERAL LINE, GENERAL HUNT, UNAWARE OF MEADE'S BATTLE PLANS, DEFERRED ANY DECISION UNTIL HE COULD CONFER WITH HEADQUARTERS.
YEARS LATER, HUNT WROTE ABOUT THIS INCIDENT, AND HIS ACCOUNT IS CRUCIAL IN ESTABLISHING THE FOUNDATION FOR THE LATER CONTROVERSY. HERE WE INCLUDE AN ABRIDGED VERSION OF AN ARTICLE HUNT WROTE FOR CENTURY MAGAZINE DETAILING HIS RECOLLECTIONS OF THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 2, 1863, AT GETTYSBURG.
WORDS BY GENERAL HENRY HUNT
FROM "THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG," BATTLES AND LEADERS, V. 3. (1887)
THE MORNING was BUSY
and in some RESPECTS
AN ANXIOUSONE,
it was believed that the whole Confederate army was assembled, that it was equal if not superior to our own in numbers, and that the battle would commence before our troops were up. There was a gap in Slocum's line awaiting a division of infantry, and as some demonstrations of Ewell about daylight indicated an immediate attack at that point, I had to draw batteries from other parts of the line — for the Artillery Reserve was just then starting from Taneytown — to cover it until it could be properly filled. Still there was no hostile movement of the enemy, and General Meade directed Slocum to hold himself in readiness to attack Ewell with the Fifth and Twelfth, so soon as the Sixth Corps should arrive. After an examination Slocum reported the ground as unfavorable, in which Warren concurred and advised against an attack there. The project was then abandoned, and Meade postponed all offensive operations until the enemy's intentions should be more clearly developed. In the meantime he took precautionary measures. It was clearly now to his advantage to fight the battle where he was, and he had some apprehension that Lee would attempt to turn his flank and threaten his communications,
A MODERN VIEW
TROSTLE FARM HOUSE. THE FARM SERVED AS GENERAL SICKLES HEADQUARTERS COMMAND.
HARRY W. PFANZ
(THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS, 1987)
— just what Longstreet had been advising. In this case it might be necessary to fall back to the Pipe Creek line, if possible, or else to follow Lee's movement into the open country. In either case, or in that of a forced withdrawal, prudence dictated that arrangements should be made in advance, and General Meade gave instructions for examining the roads and communications,
and to draw up an order of movement, which General Butterfield, the chief-of-staff, seems to have considered an order absolute for the withdrawal of the army without a battle. These instructions must have been given early in the morning, for General Butterfield states that it was on his arrival from Taneytown, which place he left at daylight. An order was drawn up
THE ORIGIN OF THE CONTROVERSY: THE TROSTLE FARM IS THE STARTING POINT OF THE LONGSTANDING DISPUTE BETWEEN GENERAL SICKLES AND MEADE.
accordingly, given to the adjutant general, and perhaps prepared for issue in case of necessity to corps commanders; but it was not recorded nor issued, nor even a copy of it preserved. General Meade declared that he never contemplated the issue of such an order unless contingencies made it necessary; and his acts and dispatches during the day were in accordance with his statement. There is one circumstance pertaining to my own duties which to my mind is conclusive, and I relate it because it may have contributed to the idea that General Meade intended to withdraw from Gettysburg. He came to me that morning before the Artillery Reserve had arrived, and, therefore, about the time that the order was in course of preparation, and informed me that one of the army corps had left its whole artillery ammunition train behind it, and that others were also deficient, notwithstanding his orders on that subject. He was very much disturbed, and feared that, taking into account the large expenditure of the preceding day by the First and Eleventh corps, there would not be sufficient to carry us through the battle. This was not the first nor the last time that I was called upon to meet deficiencies under such circumstances, and I was, therefore, prepared for this, having directed General Tyler, commanding the Artillery Reserve, whatever else he might leave behind, to bring up every round of ammunition in his trains, and I knew he would not fail me. Moreover, I had previously, on my own responsibility, and unknown to General Hooker, formed a special ammunition column attached to the Artillery Reserve, carrying twenty rounds per gun, over and above the authorized amount, for every gun in the army, in order to meet such emergencies. I was, therefore, able to assure General Meade that there would be enough ammunition for the battle, but none
Photograph by jeffrey Biggs
for idle cannonades, the besetting sin of some of our commanders. He was much relieved, and expressed his satisfaction. Now, had he had at this time any intention of withdrawing the army, the first thing to get rid of would have been this Artillery Reserve and its large trains, which were then blocking the roads in our rear; and he would surely have told me of it...
On my return to headquarters from [the course of my inspection of the lines]
General Meade told me that General Sickles, then with him, wished me to examine a new line, as he thought that assigned to him was not a good one, especially that he could not use his artillery there. I had been as far as Round Top that morning, and had noticed the unfavorable character of the ground, and, therefore, I accompanied Sickles direct to the Peach Orchard, where he pointed out the ridges, already described, as his proposed line. They commanded all the ground behind, as well as in front of them, and together constituted a favorable position for the enemy to hold. This was one good reason for our taking possession of it. It would, it is true, in our hands present a salient angle, which generally exposes both its sides to enfilade fires; but here the ridges were so high that each would serve as a " traverse " for the other, and reduce that evil to a minimum.
On the other hand it would so greatly lengthen our line — which in any case must rest on Round Top, and connect with the left of the Second Corps — as to require a larger force than the Third Corps alone to hold it, and it would be difficult to occupy and strengthen the angle if the enemy already held the wood in its front. At my instance General Sickles ordered a reconnaissance to ascertain if the wood was occupied.
About this time a cannonade was opened on Cemetery Hill, which indicated an attack there, and as I had examined the Emmitsburg Ridge, I said I would not await the result of the reconnaissance but return to headquarters by way of Round Top, and examine that part of the proposed line. As I was leaving. General Sickles asked me if he should move forward his corps. I answered, "Not on my authority; I will report
favorable positions for artillery, but that its relations to other lines were such that I could not advise it, and suggested that he examine it himself before ordering its occupation. He nodded assent, and I proceeded to Cemetery Hill. The cannonade there still continued; it had been commenced by the enemy, and was accompanied by some movements of troops toward our right. As soon as I saw that it would lead to nothing serious, I returned direct to the Peach Orchard, knowing that its occupation would require large reinforcements of artillery. I was here met by Captain Randolph, the corps chief of artillery, who informed me that he had been ordered to place his batteries on the new line. Seeing generals Meade and Sickles, not far off, in conversation, and supposing that General Meade had consented to the occupation, I sent at once to the reserve for more artillery, and authorized other general officers to draw on the same source.
▫
A WARTIME PHOTOGRAPH OF GENERAL DAN SICKLES.
"GENERAL SICKLES ASKED me IF he SHOULD MOVE FORWARD HIS CORPS. I ANSWERED, "NOT ON my AUTHORITY; I WILL REPORT TO GENERAL MEADE FOR his INSTRUCTIONS."
- GENERAL HENRY HUNT
GENERAL HUNT IN THE UNIFORM OF A MAJOR GENERAL.
A WARTIME PHOTOGRAPH BY ALEXANDER GARNDER OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE ON CEMETERY RIDGE.
"THE HOURS OF THE MORNING WORE AWAY AND SO FAR AS ANY BUT THE TWO ARMY COMMANDERS KNEW, THERE WERE NONE IN EITHER ARMY COGNIZANT OF WHAT WAS TAKING PLACE IN THE OTHER, BUT AT LAST WE BECAME AWARE OF A MOVEMENT IN OUR OWN RANKS. SEATED ON MY HORSE, AND IN COMPANY WITH GEN. HANCOCK, ON THE HILL OCCUPIED BY THE RIGHT OF MY DIVISION, LONG LINES OF BATTLE COULD BE SEEN MOVING ACROSS THE LOW GROUND TO OUR LEFT AND FRONT AND IN A BEAUTIFUL STYLE, TAKING UP POSITION ALONG THE EMMITSBURG ROAD; BATTERIES GOING INTO POSITION AS THE LINE REACHED THE ROAD. WE COULD NOT CONCEIVE WHAT IT MEANT, AS WE HAD HEARD OF NO ORDERS FOR AN ADVANCE AND DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE MEANING OF MAKING THE BREAK IN OUR LINE. IT WAS HUMPHREY'S DIVISION GOING FORWARD. THE MOVEMENTS OF THE REST OF THE 3RD CORPS, FATHER TO THE LEFT, WERE HIDDEN FROM US BY THE INTERVENING TIMBER AND UNDULATIONS OF THE GROUND, SO THAT FROM WHERE WE SAT THE WHOLE MOVEMENT LOOKING LIKE IN IMMENSE "RIGHT WHEEL" OF A LINE OF BATTLE WHOSE RIGHT PIVOTED A SHORT DISTANCE BEYOND THE CODORI HOUSE, THE LEFT REACHING THE PEACH ORCHARD. THIS MOVEMENT WAS PERFORMED QUIETLY AND ALMOST WITHOUT ANY FIRING EXCEPT FROM THE PICKET LINES. BUT THE QUIET WAS SOON BROKEN."
WORDS BY JOHN GIBBON
FROM "PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR"
JOHNGIBBON, DIVISION
COMMANDER OF THE SECOND CORPS, ON THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 2ND, WAS IN THE COMPANY OF MAJOR GENERAL WINFIELD HANCOCK ENJOYING A BRIEF RESPITE WHEN, TO HIS AMAZEMENT, A LONG LINE OF BATTLE OF SICKLE'S THIRD CORP SUDDENLY TOOK UP THE ADVANCE TAKING POSITIONS IN THE PEACH ORCHARD AND EMMITSBURG ROAD. THE PHOTOGRAPH HERE SHOWS THE APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF THE GIBBON AS HE WATCHED THE ADVANCE. THE TROSTLE BARN IS IN THE CENTER, WITH THE PEACH ORCHARD OBSERVABLE IN THE DISTANCE.
PhotographbyjeffreyBiggs
"I NOTICED a COMMOTION near GENERAL SICKLES AND SAW HIM TAKEN FROM his
HORSE...
THE NEW YORK STATE MONUMENT, LOCATED AT THE NATIONAL CEMETARY AT GETTYSBURG, FEATURES A BRONZE RELIEF OF GENERAL SICKLES WOUNDING. THE COMMISSION WHICH PLACED THE MONUMENT WAS HEADED BY DAN SICKLES.
...I hastened to me... I immediately stopped the flow canteen which seemed ambulances which you be kind enough pocket, I remember it in the Gen. mouth. the Officers Gen in rank, my only with him along along the lines of he was mortally as that I am all this battle... "
AFTERMORE
THAN TWO HOURS OF INTENSE FIGHTING, AT NEARLY 6:30 P.M., GENERAL SICKLES, AFTER EXAMINING HIS LINES, RETURNED TO THE TROSTLE FARM, WHERE HE WAS STRUCK IN THE RIGHT LEG WITH A CONFEDERATE SHELL, LEAVING THE LEG HANGING IN SHREDS. DESPITE BEING SEVERELY WOUNDED, THERE ARE MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS OF SICKLES'S DRAMATIC BEHAVIOR ON THE BATTLEFIELD AS HE WAS TAKEN FROM THE FIELD WITH A LIT CIGAR IN HIS MOUTH. WILLIAM H. BULLARD, 70TH NEW YORK, REPORTED AS A STRETCHER BEARER FOR THE GENERAL AND LEFT AN ACCOUNT.
him thinking I could be of service in some way, the aides on his staff gave way for immediately found the wound to be a compound fracture of the leg and put on a turnkey, flow of blood. I shall never forget how white the Gen. was. I gave him something from my seemed to revive him. I then placed him on the stretcher and was about to start for the which were placed behind large rocks, when the general says before you start Major won't enough to light a cigar for me. I took one from his Cigar Case which I found in his inside remember them, they were small ones. I bit the end off put it my mouth lighted it then placed mouth. He says ah thank you. I also remember the look of astonishment on the faces of Gen Sickles noticed it I think he said it is all right I did not stop to think of the difference only thought was to help him, and get him to the Surgeons as soon as possible, I started the line we had to go quite a distance to get to the ambulance...as we were hastening of men and officers noticed we had Gen. Sickles and the word passed along the line that wounded General sickles heard them he raised himself up and said No No not so bad right and will be with you in short time period you must hold your position and win
One with slave
Largely
For a wealth soldier's soldiers
Potomac's
From to candid flawed
BELLI CIVILIS PRESS
an imprint of Hardtack Books
One of the hardest fighting regiments in the Civil War, the First Delaware Volunteers battled in virtually every engagement with the Army of the Potomac's Second Corps from Antietam to Appomattox. One of only a handful of regiments from a slave state, the First Delaware would pay a higher price than many for the cost of restoring a broken country.
TheyFoughtfortheUnion:AHistoryof theFirstDelawareVolunteersintheArmy ofthePotomacby Jeffrey R .Biggs
ISBN# 978-0986361517
Largely forgotten in post-Civil War memory, TheyFought FortheUnionrevisits these border state soldiers through wealth of untapped sources, personal accounts and soldier's diaries while always placing these conflicted soldiers into the larger context of the Army of the Potomac's struggles in the Eastern Theatre of the war. From the original recruitment as a three-month regiment the end of the conflict four years later, the author's candid retelling of these extraordinary and oftentimes flawed men is riveting.
ISBN#
Nearly twenty years after the close war, members of the First Delaware Regiment Association requested that its original adjutant, Captain William Penn Seville, prepare a history of the regiment's exploits in the late war. This revised edition of Seville's manuscript, while maintaining the dialogue and prose of the original, adds context to Seville's history by adding new voices to the work from other soldiers letters, diaries and accounts of the battles as they experienced it. New content uncovered during research on this fascinating regiment has been added in the form of footnotes and appendices.
William Penn Seville's History of the First Delaware Volunteers by William P. Seville, ed. by Jeffrey R. Biggs
978-0986361517
SICKELS SEIZES THE INITIATIVE
JULY 5, 1863
DAN SICKLES
and his amputated leg separated at Gettysburg: the amputated leg was sent to the Army Medical Museum, and by July 5, Sickles was regaining his strength in Washington, D.C. While in the capital, the general received a convalescent visit from President Abraham Lincoln. Sensing the opportunity to present his version of the events unencumbered by opposing views, Dan Sickles did not waste the chance to control the narrative. A member of General Sickles' staff, Lt. Col. James Rusling, was fortunate to have been present and would spend the next fifty years retelling the tale of when Lincoln visited Sickles sick bed.
WORDS BY LT. COLONEL JAMES RUSLING
FROM "LINCOLN AND SICKLES" (1910)
IT WAS SUNDAY, JULY 5, 1863, THE SUNDAY AFTER THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
The battle, as you know, was fought heroically on both sides on July 1st, 2nd, and 3rd. In the terrible conflict of Thursday, July 2nd, held by many to have been the real battle of Gettysburg, because of the titanic fighting and awful Confederate losses, which took the life out of Lee's army. General Sickles, while in active command of the Third Corps, had been frightfully wounded by a Confederate ball or shell; his right leg had been amputated above the knee on the field; the next day or so, he was carried by his men, on a stretcher, to the nearest railroad (some miles away) and the Sunday following, arrived in Washington. He was taken to a private residence on F Street, nearly opposite to the Ebbitt House, where he had for several months reserved a floor for his own use. Here I found him on the first floor, reclining on a hospital stretcher, when I called to see him about 3 P.M. of that day. I was then Lieutenant Colonel and Chief
Library of Congress
ABOVE: THIS IS A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BY MATTHEW BRADY IN 1865, SHOWING THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF F STREET AND 14TH STREET IN WASHINGTON, D.C. THIS VIEWPOINT IS LOCATED OPPOSITE THE HOME WHERE GENERAL SICKLES CONVALESCED AND MET ABRAHAM LINCOLN ON JULY 5, 1863.
INTERESTED IN READING MORE ON THE SICKLES-MEADE CONTROVERSY? THE BEST PLACES TO START ARE JAMES HESSLER'S SICKLESATGETTYSBURG(SAVAS BEATIE, 2009) AND RICHARD A. SAUERS' GETTYSBURG:THEMEADE-SICKLESCONTROVERY(POTOMAC BOOKS, 2003).
Quartermaster on his staff, and naturally eager to see "My General". The only other officer present was Captain Fry, also of his staff, is now long since deceased. I found the General in much pain and distress at times, and weak and enfeebled from loss of blood, but calm and collected, and with the same iron will and clearness of intellect, that always characterized him in those Civil War days, and apparently always will.
HE NEVER DROPPED HIS CIGAR, NOR LOST THE THREAD OF HIS DISCOURSE, NOR MISSED THE POINT OF THEIR DISCUSSION.
Naturally, we all three fell to talking about the battle, but had not been conversing long when General Sickles' orderly at the door announced "His Excellency the President", and immediately afterwards Mr. Lincoln strode into the room, accompanied by his little son "Tad", then a lad of ten or twelve years. He was staying out at the "Soldiers' Home" for the summer with his family. But having heard of General Sickles' arrival in Washington, he rode in on horseback, with a squad of cavalry as escort, to call upon him. He was tall and lanky; he wore a high silk hat ("stove pipe"), a long frock coat of black broad cloth, high top boots with trousers inside and spurs on; and altogether was about as ungainly a looking specimen of either statesman or cavalryman, as can well be imagined. The meeting between those two great men of that war period was cordial, though touching and pathetic, and it was easy to see they held one another in high esteem. They were both born American politicians, though of very different schools. They both loved the Union sincerely and heartily, and Sickles had already shown such high qualities, both as statesman and soldier, that Lincoln with his usual sagacity had been quick to perceive his value in the struggle then shaking the nation. Besides, Sickles was a prominent War Democrat, able and astute, and Lincoln was too shrewd to pass by any of these in those perilous war days, especially one who had raised a whole brigade of soldiers and placed them in the field, at his own expense, and commanded them ably and skillfully, as Sickles had done.
Library of Congress
DAN SICKLES (CENTER), A REGULAR ATTENDEE OF GETTYSBURG REUNIONS, IS SHOWN HERE AT THE TWENTY-FIFTH REUNION IN 1886.
Their first greetings over, Mr. Lincoln sat down and, crossing his prodigious arms and telescopic legs, soon fell to cross-examining General Sickles as to all the phases of the recent combat at Gettysburg. He inquired first, of course, as to Sickles' own ghastly wound, when and how it happened, and how he was getting on and encouraged him. Sickles was somewhat despondent, very naturally, but Lincoln "jollied" him, and said that he was something of a prophet that day, and that he would prophesy it
would not be long before General Sickles would be out and up at the White House, where they would always be glad to see him. He passed next to our great casualties at Gettysburg, (equaling if not exceeding Wellington's at Waterloo) and how the wounded on both sides were being cared for; and finally came to the magnitude of our victory there and what Meade proposed to do with it.
Sickles lay on his stretcher, with a cigar between his fingers, puffing it leisurely, and answered Mr. Lincoln in detail, but warily, as became so astute a man and so good a soldier; discussing the
great battle and its probable consequences with a lucidity and ability remarkable for one in his condition — exhausted and enfeebled as he was by the shock of such a wound and amputation. Occasionally, he would wince with pain and call sharply to his valet to wet his fevered wound. But, when Mr. Lincoln's inquiries ceased, General Sickles, after a puff or two of his cigar in silence, renewed the conversation substantially.
W“ell, Mr. President, pardon me, but what do you think about Gettysburg? What did you think about things, while we were campaigning up there?"
"Oh" replied Mr. Lincoln, "I did not think much about them. I was not much concerned about Gettysburg."
"Why, how was that?" rejoined Sickles excitedly, as if amazed. ''We heard you folks down here in Washington were much worried, and you certainly had good cause to be, for it was 'nip
come out all right at Gettysburg. And He did stand by you boys there, and now I will stand by Him! No, General Sickles, I had no fears of Gettysburg, and that is why!"
Mr. Lincoln said all this with great solemnity. When he had concluded, there was a silence, that nobody seemed disposed to break. Mr. Lincoln especially appeared to be communing with the Infinite One again, with a strange look of introspection upon his face, while General Sickles continued to puff his cigar, but more slowly. The first to speak was General Sickles, who presently resumed as follows:
"Well, Mr. President, what do you think about Vicksburg, nowadays? How are things getting along down there?"
Sickles lay on his stretcher, with a cigar between his fingers, puffing it leisurely, and answered Mr. Lincoln in detail.
and tuck' with us much of the time!"
"Yes, I know that. And I suppose we were a little 'rattled' now and then. Indeed, some of the Cabinet talked of Washington's being captured, and they ordered a gunboat here, and went so far as to send away some United States archives, and wanted me to go too, but I declined. Yes, Stanton and Welles, I believe, were both 'stampeded' somewhat, as we say out West, and Seward, I reckon, too. But, I said, 'No,
"0h", answered Lincoln, very gravely. "I don't quite know. Grant is in command down there, and still keeps 'pegging away' at the enemy. And I rather think, as we used to say out in Illinois, he 'will make a spoon or spoil a horn' before he gets through. Some of our Senators and Congressmen think him slow, and want me to remove him. But, to be honest, I kind of like U. S. Grant. He doesn't worry and bother me. He isn't shrieking for reinforcements all the time, like some of our other Generals. He takes what soldiers we can give him, considering our big job all around, and we have a big job in this war, and does the best he can with what he has got, and does not grumble and scold all the while at me and Stanton like some others. Yes, I confess, I like General Grant, U. S. Grant, United States Grant, Uncle Sam Grant, Unconditional Surrender Grant. There is a great deal to him, first and last. And Heaven helping me, unless something happens more than I know now, I mean to stand by Grant a good while yet. He fights; he fights!"
"So then, you have no fears to-day about
gentlemen, I am not going aboard any gunboat; we are going to win at Gettysburg!' And we did, right handsomely. No, General Sickles, I had no fears of Gettysburg!"
"Why, how was that, Mr. President? Why not? Everybody else down here, we heard, was more or less 'panicky'."
"Yes, so I suspect, and a good many more than will own up to it now. But really. General Sickles, I had no fears of Gettysburg, and if you want to know why, I will try to tell you, confidentially. Of course, I don't want you to say anything about this now, nor Colonel Rusling here either. People might laugh, if it got out, you know. But the fact of the business is, in the pinch of the campaign up there, when we had sent General Meade all the soldiers we could rake and scrape, and yet everything seemed going wrong, Washington endangered, Baltimore threatened, Philadelphia menaced, and the whole country in an uproar, I went into my room one morning and locked the door, and got down on my knees, and prayed Almighty God for victory at Gettysburg. I confess I was at my very wit's end. I told the Almighty this was his country, and our war His war, but we could not stand anotherFredericksburg, or Chancellorsville, or Peninsula campaign. And then and there I made a solemn vow with my Maker, that if He would stand by you boys at Gettysburg, I would stand by Him! I prayed, 'Oh God, have mercy upon me and my afflicted people ! Our burdens and sorrows are greater than we can bear! Come now and help us, or we must all likewise perish! And Thou canst not afford to have us perish! We are Thy chosen people, the last best hope of the human race !' And so I 'wrestled' with Him, as Abraham or Moses in ancient days. And after so 'wrestling' with God, sincerely and devoutly, in solemn prayer, for a considerable time, I don't know how it was and I can't explain it (I'm not a 'Meeting man', you know), but somehow or other a sweet comfort crept into my soul, that God Almighty had taken the whole business up there into His own hands, and things would
Vicksburg either, Mr. President", added General Sickles.
"Well, no, I can't say I have," replied Mr. Lincoln, very soberly but firmly, "the fact is — but don't say anything about this either just now — I have been praying over Vicksburg also. I have 'wrestled' with Almighty God, and told him how much we need the Mississippi, and how it ought to flow 'unvexed to the sea/ and
GENERAL JAMES FOWLER RUSLING, A CONFIDANT AND OFFICER OF GENERAL SICKLES' STAFF, WROTE THE ONLY KNOWN ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING OF DAN SICKLES AND ABRAHAM LINCOLN, JULY 5, 1863. Dickinson College Archives
how its great valley ought to be forever free, and I reckon He understands the whole business down there, 'from A. to Izzard'. I have done the very best I could to help Grant, and all the rest of our generals (though some of them don't think so) ; and now it is kind of borne in on me, that somehow or other we are going to win at Vicksburg too. I cannot tell how soon. But I believe we will. For this will save the Mississippi
LibraryofCongress
and bisect the Confederacy, and be in line with God's everlasting laws of righteousness and justice. And if Grant only does this thing down there — I don't care much how, so he does it right — why Grant is my man and I am his the rest of this war !"
Of course, President Lincoln did not at that moment know that Vicksburg had already fallen on July 4th, and that a United States gunboat was then speeding its way up the Mississippi to Cairo with the glorious news, that was soon to thrill America and the civilized world through and through. Gettysburg and Vicksburg! Our great twin victories of the Civil War ! What were they not to the Union in that fateful summer of 1863? And what would have happened to the American Republic had both gone the other way? Of course, I do not pretend
to say, that Abraham Lincoln's faith and prayers saved Gettysburg and Vicksburg. But they certainly did not do the Union any harm. And the serene confidence of the beleaguered President, was an unspeakable comfort and joy on that memorable July 5, 1863.
I never saw President Lincoln again. But this conversation made a deep and lasting impression upon me. I have told it hundreds of times since, both publicly and privately. It has passed into American and English histories, and gone around the world. Clearly it fixes the quaestio vexata of Abraham Lincoln's Religious Faith, unless he was a hypocrite and humbug, which is unthinkable. Perhaps I should add, I wrote home about it the same day, and now give it here as the very truth of history, much of it ipsissim averha. General Sickles himself, has also corroborated it substantially, on many occasions, both publicly and privately. I count it one of the chief honors of my life, that I was present and privileged to hear it.
GENERAL SICKLES, RECOVERED FROM THE LOSS OF HIS LEG, IS SEATED IN THE CENTER SURROUNDED BY HIS STAFF OF FOUR OFFICERS.
JAMES RUSLING FREQUENTLY DISCUSSED HIS FATEFUL MEETING WITH LINCOLN AND SICKLES, OFTEN ELABORATING ON THE EVENT. FIFTY YEARS LATER, HE WAS STILL RECALLING THE EVENT AND ADDED THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE, SUGGESTING THAT THE SICKLES MEETING WAS MORE EVENTFUL THAN IT WAS. .
"He (sickles) certainly got his side of the story to gettysburg well into the president's mind and heart that saturday afternoon; and this doubtless stood him in good stead afterward, when meade proposed to court-martial him for fighting so magnificantly, if unskillfully (which remains to be proven), on that bloody and historic July 2d. "
A POST-WAR PHOTOGRAPH OF GENERAL JAMES FOWLER RUSLING
FROM REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR, 1865
MR. sickles Goes to WASHINGTON
"Not having received any orders in reference to my position, and observing, from the enemy's movements on our left, what I thought to be conclusive indications of a design on their part to attack there, and that seeming to me to be our most assailable point, I went in person to headquarters and reported the facts and circumstances which led me to believe that an attack would be made there, and asked for orders. I did not receive any orders, and I found that my impression as to the intention of the enemy to attack in that direction was not concurred in at headquarters; and I was satisfied, from information which I
received, that it was intended to retreat from Gettysburg. I asked General Meade to go over the ground on the left and examine it. He said his engagements did not permit him to do that. I then asked him to send General Warren with me, or by himself; but General Warren's engagements were such as to make it inconvenient for him to go. I then asked him to send General Hunt, his chief-of-artillery, and that was done. General Hunt accompanied me upon a careful reconnoissance of the whole position on the left, in reference to its topography and the best line for us to occupy, and also with reference to the movements of the enemy. I
Established in December 1861, the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War was created to monitor the progress of the Civil War. Over time, its responsibilities expanded to include investigations into corruption and military contracts. From the beginning, the committee took a partisan approach, serving as a platform for generals to defend their actions and shift blame onto others.
In February 1864, the committee, investigating the dismissal of Joe Hooker and the operations of the Army of the Potomac, called upon Dan Sickles, who was eager to cooperate. During his testimony on February 25, the one-legged general presented his biased account of the events that occurred on July 2, 1863. This marked the first time he publicly shared his version of the story.
his unvarnished testimony presented here reflects Sickles' views on Meade's leadership during the battle.
THE LEISTER HOUSE, SHOWN HERE IN A MODERN IMAGE, SERVED AS GENERAL MEADE'S HEADQUARTERS AT GETTYSBURG.
PhotographbyjeffreyBiggs
pointed out to General Hunt the line that on a subsequent part of the day, when the battle opened, I actually occupied; that is, a line from Round Top on the left, perpendicular to the Emmettsburg road, but somewhat en echelon , with the line of battle established on Cemetery ridge. I asked for General Hunt's sanction, in the name of General Meade, for the occupation of that line. He declined to give it, although he said it met with the approval of his own judgment; but he said that I would undoubtedly receive such orders as soon as he reported to General Meade. Before making my dispositions on that line, I waited for some time for orders, but received none. The enemy's demonstrations became more and more decided.
I had strengthened and supported my outposts in order to give me timely notice of the attack, which I knew was very imminent. Buford's cavalry, which had been on the left, had been withdrawn. I remonstrated against that, and expressed the hope that the cavalry, or some portion of it, at all events, might be allowed to remain there. I was informed that it was not the intention to remove the whole of the cavalry, and that a portion of it would be returned. It did not return, however.
My outposts became engaged, and were being driven back from their supports. I determined to wait no longer the absence of orders, and proceeded to make my dispositions on the advanced line, as it is called. I took up that position, which is described in the report of General Halleck as a line from half to threequarters of a mile in advance, as he says, and which, in his report, he very pointedly disapproves of, and which he further says I took up through a misinterpretation of orders. It was not through any misinterpretation of orders. It was either a good line or a bad one, and, whichever it was, I took it on my own responsibility, except so far as I have already
GENERAL MEADE MET ME JUST OUTSIDE OF HIS HEADQUARTERS AND EXCUSED ME FROM DISMOUNTING, HE REMARKED THAT HE OBSERVED, FROM THE SOUND OF THE CANNON, THAT MY TROOPS WERE ENGAGED WITH THE ENEMY.
stated, that it was approved of in general terms by General Hunt, of General Meade's staff, who accompanied me in the examination of it. I took up that line because it enabled me to hold commanding ground, which, if the enemy had been allowed to take — as they would have taken it if I had not occupied it in force — would have rendered our position on the left untenable; and, in my judgment, would have turned the fortunes of the day hopelessly against us. I think that any general who would look at the topography of the country there would naturally come to the same conclusion. While I was making my dispositions on this line I received a communication from headquarters to attend a consultation of corps commanders. I sent word verbally by the officer who brought me the communication, begging, if possible, to be excused, stating that the enemy were in great force in my front, and intimating that I would very soon be engaged, and that I was making my dispositions to meet the attack. I hastened forward the movements of my troops as rapidly as possible, and had got my batteries in position, when I received another and peremptory order to report at once in person at headquarters, to meet the corps commanders. I turned over the
command temporarily to General Birney in my absence, feeling assured that before I could return the engagement would open. I hastened to headquarters with all speed, but before I got there the sound of the cannon announced that the battle had opened. However, I was quite near headquarters at the time and pushed on, but found that the consultation had been broken up by the opening of the battle. General Meade met me just outside of his headquarters and excused me from dismounting, he remarked that he observed, from the sound of the cannon, that my troops were engaged with the enemy. He said that I should return at once, and that he would follow me very soon.
On my way I found that the enemy were moving up to the attack in great force, in two lines of battle, supported by three columns. Fortunately, my left had succeeded in getting into position on Round Top and along the commanding ridge to which I have referred; and those positions were firmly held by the 3rd Corps. General Meade soon afterwards arrived on the field and made a rapid examination of the dispositions which I had made, and of the situation. He remarked to me that my line was too extended, and expressed his doubts as to my being able to hold so extended a line, in which I coincided in the main — that is to say, I replied that I could not, with one corps, hold so extended a line against the rebel army; but that, if supported, the line could be held; and, in my judgment, it was a strong line, and the best one. I stated, however, that if he disapproved of it; it was not yet too late to take any position he might indicate. He said "No;" that it would be better to hold that line, and he would send up the 5th Corps to support me. I expressed my belief in my ability to hold that line until supports could arrive. He said he would send up the 5th Corps on my left, and that on my right I could look to General Hancock for support of my right flank. I added that I should want considerable artillery; that the enemy were developing a
GENERAL MEADE APPEARED BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 5. HIS TESTIMONY WAS LESS ACCUSATORY THAN SICKLES', ATTRIBUTING SICKLES' BATTLEFIELD PERFORMANCE TO POOR JUDGMENT RATHER THAN INCOMPETENCE. TO THE RIGHT ARE SOME QUOTES FROM MEADE'S TESTIMONY ON SICKLES.
strong force of artillery. He authorized me to send to General Hunt, who commanded the reserve of the artillery, for as much artillery as I wanted. I then assured him of my entire confidence in my ability to hold the position; which I did. The 5th Corps came up, somewhat tardily, to be sure. It was three-quarters of an hour, or an hour I suppose, before it got into position. My request to General Hancock for supports was promptly met; and I feel myself under obligations principally to General Hancock and the troops of his command for the effective support which enabled me, in connexion with my own corps and the artillery which I received from the reserve, to hold the position during that very desperate encounter of Thursday, where the principal operations of Thursday occurred. The position was held, and the attacks of the enemy, which were made in great force and with great obstinacy and determination, were successfully repulsed, with terrific loss to them and a very heavy loss on our side, until I was wounded and carried from the field. The command of the 3d Corps then devolved on Major General Birney, and, of course, I only know about the subsequent operations from the perusal of his report..."
I had sent instructions in the morning to General Sickles, commanding the 3d corps, directing him to form his corps in line of battle on the left of the 2d corps, commanded by General Hancock, and I had indicated to him in general terms, that his right was to rest upon General Hancock's left; and his left was to extend to the Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was practicable to occupy it. During the morning I sent a staff officer to inquire of General Sickles whether he was in position. The reply was returned to me that General Sickles said there was no position there..."
He (Sickles) then said to me that there was in the neighborhood of where his corps was some very good ground for artillery, and that he should like to have some staff officer of mine go out there and see as to the posting of artillery. He also asked me whether he was not authorized to post his corps in such manner as, in his judgment, he should deem the most suitable I answered General Sickles, "Certainly,
within the limits of the general instructions I have given to you ; any ground within those limits you choose to occupy I leave to you,"
And I directed Brigadier General Hunt, my chief of artillery, to accompany General Sickles and examine and inspect such positions as General Sickles thought good for artillery, and to give General Sickles the benefit of his judgment..."
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG IS REFERRED
TO AS THE DECISIVE BATTLE
OF THE WAR
IN THE ACCOUNT WRITTEN BY THE ANONYMOUS AUTHOR KNOWN AS 'HISTORICUS,' WHICH APPEARED IN THE NEW YORK HERALD ON MARCH 12, 1864. THERE IS COMPELLING EVIDENCE SUGGESTING THAT THE AUTHOR OF THIS LETTER, ALONG WITH A SERIES OF FOLLOW-UP LETTERS, WAS DAN SICKLES, ALTHOUGH HE NEVER PUBLICLY CLAIMED CREDIT FOR IT. THE ANONYMOUS WRITER ECHOED THE EMBELLISHMENTS THAT SICKLES HAD PROMOTED DURING VETERAN GATHERINGS AND ANNIVERSARY EVENTS FOR MANY YEARS.
HISTORICUS PRESENTED THE MAIN ARGUMENT THAT GENERAL MEADE DID NOT INTEND TO ENGAGE IN BATTLE AT GETTYSBURG, EVEN SUGGESTING THAT AS LATE AS THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 2 A RETREAT WAS STILL BEING CONSIDERED; HOWEVER, SICKLES' INITIATIVE TO MOVE HIS CORPS FORWARD TO THE PEACH ORCHARD THAT AFTERNOON FORCED MEADE’S HAND AND ULTIMATELY SAVED THE DAY FOR THE FEDERAL ARMY.
IN FEBRUARY 1864, DAN SICKLES PUBLICLY SHARED HIS VERSION OF EVENTS AS THE FIRST WITNESS DURING HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. SICKLES SOUGHT TO RESTORE THE REPUTATIONS OF BOTH HIS BENEFACTOR, JOE HOOKER, AND HIMSELF, FOLLOWING INITIAL REPORTS FROM BOTH GENERAL MEADE AND GENERAL-IN-CHIEF HENRY HALLECK, WHICH SUGGESTED THAT
HOOKER HAD MISINTERPRETED HIS ORDERS AT GETTYSBURG. SICKLES ASSERTED THAT HE HAD NOT MISINTERPRETED ANY ORDERS AND THAT, IN FACT, HE HAD RECEIVED NONE. BELIEVING A RETREAT WAS IMMINENT, HE TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO ADVANCE TO MEET THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK.
IN TODAY'S FAST-PACED POLITICAL NEWS CYCLE, WHERE POLITICAL FIGURES OFTEN TRY TO CONTROL THE NARRATIVE AROUND A NEWS STORY, THE HISTORICUS LETTER WAS PUBLISHED IN MARCH 1864 ON THE SAME DAY THAT GEORGE MEADE MADE HIS SECOND APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE. THIS TIMING IMPLIES AN EFFORT TO MANAGE THE NARRATIVE RATHER THAN MERELY RESPOND TO IT. THE LETTER REITERATED POINTS MADE DURING SICKLES' TESTIMONY, REINFORCING THE BELIEF AMONG MANY HISTORIANS THAT IT WAS EITHER WRITTEN BY SICKLES OR DICTATED BY HIM.
THE VERSION OF THE LETTER INCLUDED IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES IS SLIGHTLY ABBREVIATED, FOCUSING SPECIFICALLY ON THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO AND INCLUDING JULY 2, 1863. ALTHOUGH THE HISTORICUS ACCOUNT EXAGGERATES AND MISINTERPRETS THE EVENTS OF THAT AFTERNOON, WE CANNOT DENY THAT THIS LETTER IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLE. IT CONTRIBUTED TO A NARRATIVE THAT MANY INTERESTED PARTIES STILL BELIEVED IN DURING THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY. THE EDITOR HAS PROVIDED CLARIFICATIONS IN THE FORM OF SIDEBARS, BUT READERS ARE ENCOURAGED TO EXPLORE ADDITIONAL SOURCES FOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPLEXITIES SURROUNDING THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
THE 'HISTORICUS' ACCCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG — IMPORTANT COMMUNICATION FROM AN EYEWITNESS
HOW THE VICTORY WAS WON AND HOW ITS ADVANTAGES WERE
LOST
GENERALS HALLECK’S AND MEADE’S OFFICIAL REPORTS REFUTED, ETC.
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG is the decisive battle of this war. It not only saved the North from invasion, but turned the tide of victory in our favor. The opinion of Europe on the failure of the rebellion dates from this great conflict. How essential, then, that its real history should be known. Up to this moment no clear narrative has appeared. The sketches of the press, the reports of Generals Halleck and Meade, and the oration of Mr. Everett, give only phases of this terrible struggle, and that not very correctly. To supply this hiatus, I send you a connected, and, I hope, lucid review of its main features. I have not ventured to touch on the thrilling incidents and affecting details of such a strife, but have confined myself to a succinct relation of its principal events and the actors therein. My only motive is to vindicate history, do honor to the fallen, and justice to the survivors when unfairly impeached. General Meade took command of the Army of the Potomac on Sunday, the 28th of June, at Frederick, Md. On Monday, as he states, the army was put in motion, and by Tuesday night
the right flank had reached Manchester and the left occupied Emmitsburg. General Buford’s cavalry had advanced as far as Gettysburg, and reported that the Confederate army was debouching from the mountains, on the Cashtown road. Upon this intelligence, General Reynolds was ordered to advance on Gettysburg with the First and Eleventh Corps, which he reached early on the 1st of July, and found Buford’s cavalry already engaged with the enemy — the corps of General Hill. Rapidly making his dispositions, General Reynolds joined in the conflict, and soon fell, mortally wounded. The command of the field then devolved on General Howard, of the Eleventh Corps, who maintained his position till about 2 p. m., when the enemy was heavily reinforced by the arrival of Ewell’s corps. The battle now raged fearfully, between Hill’s and Ewell’s corps on one side and the First and Eleventh Corps on the other, till about 4 p. m., when General Howard was compelled to yield to the superior numbers of the enemy, and fall back (losing many prisoners—nearly 4,000) to the south side of Gettysburg. His position was eminently
map by Aaron Matney
AN ARTISTIC RENDITION OF THE PROPOSED PIPE CREEK LINE
SICKLE'S JULY 1 ORDERS
GENERAL SICKLES'S CONFUSION ON JULY 1 WAS ENTIRELY JUSTIFIED. DURING THE CHAOTIC FIRST DAY OF BATTLE, HE RECEIVED CONFLICTING ORDERS FROM MEADE, HANCOCK AND HOWARD. HOWEVER, HE ALSO HAD A CLEAR DIRECTIVE FROM REYNOLDS TO MOVE TOWARD GETTYSBURG. GIVEN THAT HE HEARD THE SOUNDS OF BATTLE BEGINNING THERE, IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT HE CHOSE TO “MOVE TOWARD THE SOUND OF THE GUNS.”
critical, when, to the great relief of both the general and our valiant troops, a division of the Third Corps, under the immediate command of General Sickles, arrived, and the fighting for that day was at an end. It should be mentioned that the Third Corps was stationed at Emmitsburg, by order of General Meade, with a view to protect that important point; but information continuing to reach General Sickles that the First and Eleventh Corps were in great danger, he decided to assume the grave responsibility of moving to their relief without orders. Leaving two brigades at Emmitsburg, he made a forced march of 10 miles, in spite of the heat and dust, in three hours, and had the satisfaction to be hailed by General Howard, on his reaching the field, with the flattering phrase, "Here you are, general, always reliable, always first,” a generous tribute from one soldier to another.
GENERAL SLOCUM, of the Twelfth Corps, had arrived a short time before, but his corps
FOLLOWING THE WAR, DAN SICKLES WAS A MAINSTAY AT SOLDIER'S REUNIONS. HERE IS A G.A. R. MEMBERSHIP BADGE OF A 3RD CORP VETERAN OF SICKLES OLD EXCELSIOR BRIGADE.
PIPE LINE CIRCULAR
THE "PIPE CREEK CIRCULAR" OUTLINED A PLAN FOR ANOTHER POTENTIAL BATTLEFIELD, CREATED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ARMY ENGINEERS. THIS WAS MERELY A CONTINGENCY PLAN THAT WAS CONSIDERED BEFORE THE ADVANCE ON GETTYSBURG. BY THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 2ND, THE IDEA OF USING THE PIPE CREEK DEFENSIVE POSITION WAS NO LONGER RELEVANT, DESPITE HISTORICUS SUGGESTING THAT MEADE WANTED TO WITHDRAW FROM GETTYSBURG.
was then some 4 miles distant. In the early part of the evening (Wednesday), a conference of the leading generals took place, when some insisted on falling back toward Taneytown, while others urged the expediency of maintaining their present position as offering rare advantages for the inevitable and decisive contest that must occur on the following day. It appears that General Meade had issued a circular (of which I saw several copies) on the morning of Wednesday, July 1, to all his corps commanders, stating that his advance had accomplished all the objects contemplated, namely, the relief of Harrisburg and Philadelphia, and that he would now desist altogether from the offensive. He proposed to post the whole army in line of battle on Pipe Creek, the right flank resting on Manchester and the left on Middleburg, involving an entire change of front, and there await the movements of the enemy. The position
NationalArchives
MEADE'S SURVEY
ARRIVING AT GETTYSBURG SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON JULY 2, MEADE AND HIS STAFF ASSESSED THE UNION POSITION SOUTH OF THE TOWN. ACCOMPANIED BY ENGINEER CAPTAIN W.H. PAINE, MEADE RODE ALONG CEMETERY RIDGE AT DAWN, EXTENDING HIS EXAMINATION AS FAR SOUTH AS LITTLE ROUND TOP. CAPTAIN PAINE SKETCHED THE PROPOSED POSITIONS FOR EACH CORPS AS THEY ARRIVED ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE MAP ABOVE IS ONE OF THE SKETCHES CREATED BY CAPTAIN PAINE. THAT MORNING, SICKLES' THIRD CORPS WAS ORDERED TO OCCUPY POSITIONS ON THE NORTH SLOPE OF LITTLE ROUND TOP AND EXTEND NORTHWARD TO CONNECT WITH THE LEFT FLANK OF HANCOCK'S SECOND CORPS.
Gwhich General Meade had selected for the final struggle between the two armies was some 15 miles distant from Gettysburg, where fate willed that it should occur. Whether this important circular ordering him to fall back reached the lamented Reynolds before he became engaged at Gettysburg, it is difficult to say. It could not have failed to reach General Sickles; but he happily determined to push on to the rescue of the First and Eleventh Corps, already engaged. It is, strange that General Meade should make no mention in his report of this singular and most important fact: that he issued a plan of campaign on Wednesday, July 1, directing his whole army to retire and take up the defensive on Pipe Creek almost at the moment that his left flank was fiercely struggling with the right wing of the enemy. This proves how often the plans of a general are frustrated by unlooked-for contingencies.
eneral Meade broke up his quarters at Taneytown, as he states, at 11 p.m. on Wednesday, and reached Gettysburg at 1 a. m. Thursday, July 2. Early in the morning he set to work examining the position of the various army corps. It is hardly true to say that he imitated the example of all prudent commanders on the eve of a battle, and made a complete survey of the ground he occupied. It was on these occasions that the genius of the first Napoleon revealed itself; for at a glance he saw the advantages of his own position and the assailable point of the enemy. It seems that General Lee was somewhat more astute than Meade in this, for in his report he states what
So who wAS HISTOricus?
The identity of Historicus
has been a topic of debate ever since the
pseudonym first appeared in the NewYorkHeraldin 1864. The prevailing opinion is that Dan Sickles himself authored the articles. George Meade believed that Sickles was the writer and even appealed to Edwin Stanton, stating, "I cannot resist the belief that this letter was written or dictated by Maj. Gen. D.E. Sickles." Harry Pfanz, who wrote the definitive book on the events of July 2 (Gettysburg:The SecondDay), described Historicus as "Dan Sickles' alter ego, his partisan, if indeed he was not the general himself." Edwin Coddington, author of the highly regarded history of the Battle of Gettysburg (TheGettysburgCampaign:AStudyinCommand), agreed with Meade's assessment of Historicus's identity.
Other candidates of the true pen behind Historicus have been proposed. Coddington acknowledged one source, an officer of the 5th Corps, who fancifully suggested it was John Bachelder, an early chronicler of the battle and correspondent for many soldiers. However, there are no references in the correspondence volumes to support this claim; it is merely the speculation of one officer nearly sixty years after the battle. Bachelder had a unique relationship with many high-ranking federal officers and received permission from Meade to spend time with the in the winter following the battle, making it unlikely he would have expressed negative sentiments about Meade's leadership in such a way.
James A. Hessler, the author of SicklesatGettysburg , is the most recent scholar to consider the possibility of co-conspirators. Nonetheless, he maintains that the letters were written "physically or under the direction of Sickles." Hessler points out that of the three most frequently mentioned suspects— John Bachelder, Dan Butterfield, and Henry Tremain—the most likely culprit is Tremain, a staff officer who had a strong bias against Meade and loyalty to Sickles and the 3rd Corps. Henry Tremain (shown to the left) was the staff officer who served as a messenger between Sickles and the command held at Gettysburg on July 1st and would have been in a position to be aware of General Sickle's post-battle talking points. However, even if Tremain was involved, although a lawyer himself, it was strictly under the direction and likely dictation of Dan Sickles.
he deemed the most favorable point for his attack. “In front of General Longstreet” (opposite our left wing), Lee remarks, “the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer, then, was directed to carry this position." It is plain enough that Lee regarded the point where our left was posted as the key to our position, and if that could be taken from us our defeat was inevitable.
It is not to be supposed that General Meade refused to see this; but as he makes no mention of it in his report, I propose, for the sake of the future historian of the battle, to tell what I know about it.
Near this important ground was posted the valiant Third Corps, and its commander, General Sickles, saw at once how necessary it was to occupy the elevated ground in his front toward
SICKLE'S ORDERS
ALTHOUGH GENERAL MEADE PRIMARILY FOCUSED ON THE FEDERAL RIGHT FLANK WHILE NEGLECTING HIS LEFT, SICKLES WAS ORDERED, VERBALLY IT SEEMS, TO EXTEND THE FEDERAL LINE ALONG CEMETERY RIDGE. THIS EXTENSION REQUIRED THE RIGHT OF THE THIRD CORPS TO CONNECT WITH THE LEFT OF THE SECOND CORPS.
LONGSTREET AND SICKLES
DAN SICKLES AND CONFEDERATE MAJOR GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET HAD A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP THAT EVOLVED INTO A FRIENDSHIP. BOTH GENERALS FACED THEIR OWN CONTROVERSIES AROUND THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, BUT THEY FOUND THAT THEY SERVED EACH OTHER'S PURPOSES. HERE BOTH GENERALS ARE PHOTOGRAPHED IN 1888 AT THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BATTLE. LONGSTREET IS STANDING TO THE RIGHT OF SICKLES.
the Emmitsburg road, and to extend his lines to the commanding eminence known as the Round Top, or Sugar Loaf hill. Unless this were done, the left and rear of our army would be in the greatest danger. Sickles concluded that no time was to be lost, as he observed the enemy massing large bodies of troops on their right (our left). Receiving no orders, and filled with anxiety, he reported in person to General Meade, and urged the advance he deemed so essential. “ O,” said Meade, “generals are all apt to look for the attack to be made where they are." Whether this was a jest or a sneer Sickles did not stop to consider, but begged Meade to go over the ground with him instantly; but the commander-in-chief declined this on account of other duties. Yielding, however, to the prolonged solicitations of Sickles, General Meade desired General Hunt, chief of artillery, to accompany Sickles, and report the result of their reconnaissance. Hunt concurred with Sickles as to the line to be occupied—the advance line from the left of the Second Corps to the Round Top hill—but be declined to give any orders until he had reported to General Meade, remarking, however, that he (General Sickles) would doubtless receive orders immediately. Two p. m. came, and yet no orders. Why was this? Other orders than those expected by General Sickles were, it appears, in preparation at headquarters. It has since been stated,
DID MEADE WANT TO WITHDRAW?
HISTORICUS
MISCHARACTERIZES
GENERAL MEADE'S DISPOSITION ONCE AGAIN. IN HIS QUEST TO BE FULLY INFORMED AND PREPARED FOR ALL CONTINGENCIES, MEADE INSTRUCTED HIS CHIEF OF STAFF, DAN BUTTERFIELD, LATE IN THE MORNING ON JULY 2 TO FAMILIARIZE HIMSELF WITH THE POSITIONS AND ROAD SYSTEMS BOTH TO THE FRONT AND REAR. HOWEVER, BUTTERFIELD MISUNDERSTOOD THIS ASSIGNMENT AS A REQUEST TO PREPARE A FORMAL RETREAT.
upon unquestionable authority, that General Meade had decided upon a retreat, and that an order to withdraw from the position held by our army was penned by his chief of staff, General Butterfield, though happily its promulgation never took place. This order is probably on record in the AdjutantGeneral’s Office..
Meanwhile the enemy’s columns were moving rapidly around to our left and rear. These facts were again reported to headquarters, but brought no response. Buford’s cavalry had been massed on the left, covering that flank with outposts, and vignettes were thrown forward on the Emmitsburg road. While awaiting the expected orders, Sickles made good use of his time in leveling all the fences and stone walls, so as to facilitate the movements of his troops and to favor the operations of the cavalry. What, then, was the surprise of Sickles to see of a sudden all the cavalry withdrawn, leaving his flank entirely exposed! He sent an earnest remonstrance to General Meade, whose reply was that he did not intend to withdraw the cavalry, and that a part of this division (Buford’s) should be sent back. It never returned. Under these circumstances, Sickles threw forward three regiments of light troops as skirmishers and for outpost duty.
The critical moment had now arrived. The enemy’s movements indicated their purpose to seize the Round Top hill; and this in their possession, General Longstreet would have had easy work in cutting up our left wing. To prevent this disaster, Sickles waited no longer for orders from General Meade, but directed General Hobart Ward’s brigade and Smith’s battery (Fourth New York) to secure that vital position,
and at the same time advancing his line of battle about 300 yards, so as to hold the crest in his front, he extended his left to support Ward and cover the threatened rear of the army.
OCCUPYING LITTLE ROUND TOP
GENERAL SICKLES' ADVANCE DID NOT INCLUDE LITTLE ROUND TOP, DESPITE HISTORICUS' CLAIM THAT IT DID. SICKLES' NEW LEFT FLANK WAS ANCHORED TO PROTECT DEVIL'S DEN. IT WASN'T UNTIL LATER, WITH THE ARRIVAL OF ELEMENTS FROM THE FIFTH CORPS, THAT LITTLE ROUND TOP WAS OCCUPIED, EXCEPT FOR SIGNAL STATION OFFICERS.
MEADE-SICKLES MEETING
GEORGE MEADE DESCRIBED THIS ENCOUNTER WITH SICKLES OCCURRING DURING AN INSPECTION OF HIS LINES. EDWIN CODDINGTON, AUTHOR OF THE DEFINITIVE ACOUNT OF THE BATTLE, SPLITS THE DIFFERENCE AND SUGGESTS THEY MET HALF WAY AFTER SICKLES WAS SUMMONED TO ARMY HEADQUARTERS.
These dispositions were made in the very face of the enemy, who were advancing in columns of attack, and Sickles dreaded lest the conflict should open before his dispositions were completed. At this juncture he was summoned to report in person at headquarters, to attend a council of corps commanders. His preparations were of such moment and the attack so near, that General Sickles delayed attending the council, while giving all his attention to the carrying out of his orders. A second peremptory summons came from General Meade, and, leaving his unfinished task to the active supervision of General Birney and General Humphreys, Sickles rode off to the rear to headquarters. Before he had reached there, the sound of cannon announced that the battle had begun. Hastening rapidly on, he was met by General Meade at the door of his quarters,
THIS PENNSYLVANIA HILL, WHICH WOULD COME TO BE KNOWN AS LITTLE ROUND TOP (SHOWN ABOVE), WAS THE KEY POSITION OF THE FEDERAL LINE. THE HILL WAS LEFT UNOCCUPIED AFTER GENERAL SICKLE'S COMMAND ADVANCED. THE ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF LITTLE ROUND TOP WAS A DESPERATE AFFAIR OUTSIDE GENERAL SICKLES' COMMAND.
who said, “General, I will not ask you to dismount; the enemy are engaging your front; the council is over.” It was an unfortunate moment, as it proved, for a council of war. Sickles, putting spurs to his horse, flew back to his command, and, finding that Graham’s brigade was not advanced as far as he desired, he was pushing that brigade and a battery forward about 100 yards, when General Meade at length arrived on the field. The following colloquy ensued, which I gathered from several officers present: “Are you not too much
extended general?” said Meade. “Can you hold this front?” “Yes,” replied Sickles, “until more troops are brought up; the enemy are attacking in force, and I shall need support.” General Meade then let drop some remark showing that his mind was still wavering as to the extent of ground covered by the Third Corps. Sickles replied, “General, I have received no orders. I have made these dispositions to the best of my judgment. Of course, I shall be happy to modify them according to your views.” “No,” said Meade, “I will send you the Fifth Corps, and you may send for support from the Second Corps.” “ I shall need more artillery,” added Sickles. “Send to the Artillery Reserve for all you want,” replied Meade; “I will direct General
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Hunt to send you all you ask for.” The conference was then abruptly terminated by a heavy shower of shells, probably directed at the group, and General Meade rode off. Sickles received no further orders that day.
THE 5TH CORPS TO THE RESCUE
LIKE MOST OF HISTORICUS' ACCUSATIONS, THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE FIFTH CORPS BEAR LITTLE TO REALITY. DEPLOYED PIECEMEAL ON JULY 2, THE FIFTH CORPS FOUGHT BRAVELY SHORING UP THE LEFT FLANK IN GAPS LEFT BY SICKLES. THE SECOND AND FIFTH CORPS, ALONG WITH PARTS OF THE TWELFTH, TOOK THE PLACE OF THE STRUGGLING THIRD CORPS INSTEAD OF SUPPORTING IT. FOLLOWING THE PUBLICATION OF THE LETTER IN THE HERALD , AT LEAST THREE REPLIES WERE ISSUED TO CLARIFY THE RECORD REGARDING THE FIFTH CORPS.
There is no doubt, I may venture to add, that Sickles’ line was too much extended for the number of troops under his command; but his great aim was to prevent the enemy getting between his flank and the Round Top alluded to. This was worth the risk, in his opinion, of momentarily weakening his lines. The contest now going on was of the most fierce and sanguinary description. The entire right wing of the enemy was concentrated on the devoted Third Corps; for the object of Lee, as he states, was “to carry’’ the ground which Sickles occupied, and which both generals evidently regarded as of the highest importance. While this terrific combat was raging on our left, Lee ordered Ewell to attack "our right wing and Hill to threaten” our center, both with the object, as he says in his report, to divert re-enforcements from reaching our left, which, as we have seen, Longstreet was directed to carry.” Well may General Meade in his report say, "the Third Corps sustained the shock most heroically," for they fought like lions, against tremendous odds, for nearly an hour before the Fifth Corps, under Sykes, came up, who was immediately put in position by General Sickles to the left of the Third Corps, and General Sykes was desired to relieve Ward’s brigade and Smith’s battery on the Round Top, and hold the line from thence to Birney’s left (First Division, Third
Corps). Strange to say, this movement was not promptly carried out, and there was imminent danger of losing the Round Top, for Longstreet was making desperate exertions to “carry it.” Fearing this result, Sickles sent orders to General Crawford, of the Fifth Corps, to reinforce Ward’s brigade; but he declined to move without orders from his own corps commander, Sykes; but Captain [Alexander] Moore, of Sickles’ staff, at length overcame his scruples, and he reached the disputed point just in time to prevent its falling into the enemy’s hands. Considering our force unequal to the exigency, Sickles called on the heroic troops of the Second Corps for support, and they gave it with a will. The struggle now became deadly. The columns of Longstreet charged with reckless fury upon our troops; but they were met with a valor and stern fortitude that defied their utmost efforts. An alarming incident, however, occurred. Barnes’ division, of the Fifth Corps, suddenly gave way; And Sickles, seeing this, put a battery in position to check the enemy if he broke through this gap on our fronts and General Birney was sent to order Barnes back into line. "No,” he said; "impossible. It is too hot. My men cannot stand it.” Remonstrance was unavailing, and Sickles dispatched his aides to bring up any troops they met to fill this blank. Major [Henry E.J. Tremain, of his staff, fell in with General Zook, at the head or his brigade (Second Corps), and this gallant officer instantly volunteered to take Barnes’ place. When they reached the ground, Barnes’ disordered troops impeded the advance of the brigade. “If yon can’t get out of the way,” cried Zook, “lie down, and I will march over you.” Barnes ordered his men to lie down, and the chivalric Zook and his splendid brigade, under the personal direction of General Birney, did march over them and right into the breach. Alas! poor Zook soon fell, mortally wounded, and half of his brigade perished with him. It was about this time—near 7 p. m.—that Sickles was
struck by a cannonball that tore off his right leg, and he was borne from the field.
It was now pretty clear that General Meade had awakened to the fact which he treated with such indifference when pressed on him by Sickles in the morning—that one left was the assailable point, if not the key to our position, for he began to pour in reinforcements whose presence in the beginning of the action would have saved thousands of lives. “Perceiving great exertions on the part of the enemy,” says Meade’s report, “the Sixth Corps (Sedgwick’s) and part of the First Corps (Newton’s), Lockwood’s Maryland brigade, together with detachments from the Second Corps, were all brought up at different periods, and succeeded, together with the gallant resistance of the Fifth Corps, in checking and finally repulsing the assault of the enemy, who retired in confusion and disorder about sunset, and ceased any further efforts.”
If this remarkable concentration of troops was necessary, at last, to save the left of our army, it is almost incredible that the single corps of General Sickles was able to withstand the impetuous onset of Longstreet’s legions for nearly an hour before any succor reached it.
On Friday, July 3, the enemy renewed their efforts to carry out the original design of Lee by overthrowing our left wing, and Longstreet was reinforced by Pickett’s three brigades, and further supported by one division and two brigades from Hill’s corps. In addition to this heavy mass of infantry, the entire artillery of the rebel army was concentrated against our left. After his oversight of the day before, it may be supposed that General Meade was better prepared to defend his left, and had made adequate preparations.
About 1 p. m. the enemy opened a furious cannonade upon our left and left center, which continued some two hours, with occasional responses from us. At about 3 p. m. the enemy moved forward in column, and once more
essayed to carry our position on the left. It was during this conflict that General Hancock, commander of the Second Corps, a gallant soldier and accomplished officer, was wounded by a musket ball and obliged to retire. He contributed greatly bv his energy and valor to the success of the day. Meanwhile our artillery opened with vigor, and inflicted great damage. After a severe and prolonged struggle, the enemy at length fell back, and abandoned the contest. “Owing to the strength of the enemy’s position,” says Lee’s report, “and the reduction of our ammunition, a renewal of the engagement could not be hazarded.” Hence it is plain that our good fortune in preserving our position on the left gave us the victory at Gettysburg and yet General Meade, not having sufficiently examined the ground before the battle, disregarded the repeated warnings of that sagacious officer, General Sickles, as well as the report of his own chief of artillery, General Hunt, who concurred in all the suggestions of the commander of the Third Corps. Without meaning to do injustice to General Meade, it must be admitted that his report of this great battle is at such variance with all the statements which have appeared in the press, that it is due not only to history, but to the indomitable prowess of our heroic army, that every fact sustained by concurrent testimony should be given in order to fully establish the truth. I reserve for any suitable occasion abundant documentary evidence to support the facts furnished...[ed. The Historicus account continuesonMeade'sshortcomings,dealingin thepursuitofLeefollowingthebattle,butfor thesakethatthisisfocusedonlyonSickle'srole inthebattle,wewillleaveithere.] ▫
