MACARTHUR of the Ph ilippines by JIll. N. Querol N J anuary 1942, Douglas MacArthur f ound himself in an aw bvard position. HIS Fllamencan tlOOpS had been awar ded the coveted Presidential Citat ion for their masterly wit hdrawal into the cit adel of Bataan; but t he t actical situat ion - which is to say, his tac tical situation-had deteriorated beyond all hope. America's Pacific Fl eet upon which the democracies had depended to challenge Japan's southward march of empire, lay in the silt of P earl Harbor. Guam had fallen; Manila h ad capit ulated; Singapore was about t o f all. I n the Bataan jungles 70,000 F ilamericans were walled in between Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma's imper ial t r oops and the sea. It was probably the greatest dilemma ever f aced by a field commander since the Au strians, badly outmaneuvered at Ulm, surr ender ed to Na poleon without f iring a shot. B'lt MacAr thur kn ew that it is the office of the good commander to be as a torch spilling its light in the dar k, t hat cheerfulness in the face of disast er is one of the secrets of command. Across the blue water from Corregidor sped the words that drew a laugh from t he men at the front .... "They have the bot tle. But I have the corle" MacArthur was determined to hold that cor k. He knew that the Philippine Sea had become a Japanese lake and that immediate help was not forthcoming from the outside world, but he had no doubt of the ultimate arrival of a mighty armada loaded with the men
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and material to beat the J ap. Therefore his strategy of defense was one of depth, capable of sustaining prolonged fighting and incessant retreat. Not for him the tactics of cavalry-fighting one moment and fleei:1g the next. He would make the J ap pay dearly fOl' every inch of ground he took. Let him come and try to smother the Filamericans with overwhelming firepower: they would be dug in along a line of battle, ready to meet him there. When their supplies became low, he, MacArthur, would con~ duct lightning Taids on the enenlY's stores, then retire to the safety of his lines with his precious prize. The J ap's superiority in armament and numbers would tell in the end and defeat would have to be faced; but even then there was to be no sur render. He intended to spiit his forces into guerrilla ban us, take to the hills, harassing the enemy from every side. Then, when help arrived from the American mainland and fresh troops were landed on the beaches, his guerrilla army would appear from nowhere and strike at the enemy's rear. MacArthur arrived at this decision not upon military considerations alone. Five years before, he had assured his friend Manuel Quezon that the Philippines could be defended and that no power would attempt a Philippine invasion unless it was prepared to lose millions of lives and billions in treasure. Upon that assurance he had staked his professional reputation.
