The Philippine Question : An Analysis [1332] by Filipiniana Online

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION AN ANALYSIS BY MAXIMO M. KALAW, PH. D. D,a,,, CoU.11• of Liberal Arla, Univenit-y of the Philippin,1, T,a/nll«,l Advi,.r, Fir,t lwd,pmd~e Misaion, E~,cu~tio Stcreta.ru, Flr1t Jndeperuitmce C9nqre.11,

Author, "The Caao for t:h«- Filipino•"• "Self~Govern11ier,t in the Philippine•'', nThc DS1Jtlop,n,axf of PliU-ippine Politic,", "Philippim G01Jerr1.1nfflt Under tlw, Joru, Law'\ etc.

OONATF.D BY AY ,\' .\ C0RPORAT :,,J TO flLlPlr.As .l<\.lUNi:>.\TION, !NC.

(lleprlnled from THE PHILIPPDIS IOCUL IICIEl!CE 11.EVIIIW, Jlalllla, September, 1911, Vol, m, Jl'o. ,. )

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS / By MAXIMO M. ~AW, Ph. D.

Pn:sidcnt, P!tilivpine Acaa6my of Social S ciences, Dean, College of Liberal Arts, University of the Philippines.

CONTE NTS CHAPTER I. THE F ILIPINOS AS MALAYS-The Malays-No Pure-bl ooded Malay- Two Malay Empires-Improvements under Spain, p. 3. CHAPTER II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PH I LIPPINE NATIO NALISM-Th e Crushing of a Republic-Self-D etermination-The Rule of the Philippine CommiS"SionThe First Assembly on Independence-Our Case Against Governor W ood-Independence Congress-Ang Bagong Katipunan-Latest Independence Memorial, p. 9. CHAPTER III. THE $20,000,000 PAID TO SPAIN-The Cuban Debts-America's Stand oll Colonial Debts-Reasons for the Twenty Million-Considerations !or Filipino Cooperation-Will Am.e rca Reverse Her Attitudc?-The Settled Policy of AmericaPhilippine Loss During the American-Philippine Wa r, p. 19. CHAPTER IV. DIFFI CULTI ES OF THE JONES LAW-Duali ty in Government.J ones Law Built on Wrong Theory- Lack of Posi tion for Filipino Leader-Governmen t by Legis]ature, p. 24. CHAPTER V. THE DILEMMA OF COOPERATI0N- America's Stem OrdersDefyin,g American Sovereignty-Cooperation with Taft a nd .Stimson-A Trying Situat ion, p. 29. • CHAPTER VI. OUR TARIFF RELATIONS WITH THE U NITED STATES-The Tariff of 1901-The Tariff of 1905-The Tariff of 1906-The Tariff Act of 1909The Tariff of 1913, p. 35. CHAPTER VII. AMERI CA GOVERNS ON MISINFORMAT!ON-Misrepres-enta-

1,dence, ~:iai:::g43.P~~~a~~~j:~t~~:i::nA!~:~o;~:~!p~!s~n°i:~~1g~i~!~:d-;~heI:d~;!~: p.

CHAPTER VIII. THE PROMISE OF INDEPENDENCE-Early Policy as to In\dependence-The Jon.ea Law-"Stable Government" in American History-Stable Government in Cuba.-Jones Law Preamble Inspired from Cuba-"Stable Government" ~n t he League of Nations--"Stnble Government" Recognized in th e Philippines-New Standards for t he Wood-Forbes Mission-Wood on Stable Government--Coolidge's Conditions-Secretary Hurley on t he P rom ise-Hurley's Conditions-No Diminution of Control, says Hurley-New Objectives---Promises are Merely Words to Tense Along - Conclusion, p. 51. C HAPTER IX. T HE MORO BUGABOO-Early American Adm inistration in the Mow Region- T he Department of Mindan ao and Sul u-4lhc Moro Bugaboo--Moros and Independence-Historic Unity Olde11 t han American, p. 6G. CHAPTER X. IN DEPENDENCE AS A MEANS-Political Development under Independence-Social Reform&-Oultural Contribution, p. 78.

CHAPTER XI. IN DEPEN DENCE IS I NEVITABLE AND IMPERATIVE-Finances of an Independent Republic-Guara ntees for Independence-American Traditions Demand I ndependence-A Contribution of Ame:rica and the P hilippines, p. 84.

FOREWORD

I have endeavored to p1·esent in the following ch0JJJte1·s an analysis of the Philippine question from the Filipi1w viewpoint. Most of these chapters, in their original form, appea1·ed as ~rticle.~ in Philippine periodicals. I do not hide the fact that my° app1·oach is favorable to independence; bid I hav e t1-ied to present data and inforination which are not usually found in articles and books on the subjects.

Iii view of the fact that the futii1·e of the Philippines is being discussed in the United States, stitdies of this nature should be timely and helpful. M. M. K.

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION BY DEAN MAXIMO M. KALAW CHAPTER I

THE FILIPINOS AS MALAYS

Who are the Filipinos ? To what racial stock do they belong ? The answer to these questions varies with the pre-conceived ideas of the man to whom they are addressed. The in-'1,nd-out r etentionist will immediately present the following observations: First, that the bulk of Philippine population is about 90 10 Malay, a race which is inherently lazy, unprogressive and unfitted to business and democracy; second, that there is a smaller class of people, the mestizo, which means people with Chinese and other foreign blood, being the only vociferous and intelUgent element of the Philippine population, constantly agitating for independence; and third, that so far the Malays have never shown a capacity for state organization, they have had no kingdom or empires to their credit, implying thereby that what they have not done in the past they cannot do in the future. THE MALAYS

A sample of such statements can be found in the article written by former Governor Stimson before he was appointed as Governor-Genera l, which appeared in FOREIGN AFFAIRS for April, 1927. Mr. Stimson said: "* • • There is in the Islands today a marked difference in political and business capacity between the pure-blooded Malays who constitute over ninety-per cent of the population and the small minority of , more competent Mestizos, or mix-blooded descendants from Chinese and 1Spanish immigrants, who have inter-married with the Malays." He spoke lin another part of the same article "of the Malay farmer who constitutes over 90 % of the population." The division of our population into t hese two classes is both unfortunate and scientifically unsound. Let us study the social components of the Malay. Some anthropologists still classify the races of the world into three important groups,-the Caucasian, the Negroid, and the Mongoloid. The Caucasians occupy Europe and the southe~n portions of Asia, south of the Himalayas, including India. The Negroid includes the Negroes of Africa and our Aetas. The Mongoloid constitutes the rest of Asia consisting chiefly of the Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and the so-

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS

called Malays, the last Ji,ving chiefly in the East Indian archipelago including the Philippines. The term "Malay" is often applied to all the inhabitants of the archipelago altho some anthuopologists make the distinction between Indonesians and Malays. They all agree, however, that t he people of t his aFchipelago, including the Philippines, are the least pure of all the Mongoloi,ds. TheFe is no such thing as a pure-blooded Malay. The Malay is already a composite 1·acial element. It was the Malay group of all the Mongoloids which received the greatest Caucasian influence both culturally and racially. In fact some anthropologists believe that what makes t he Malay peoples quite different from the other Mongoloids is the fact that before they migrated to the East Indian archipelago including t he Philippines, that is when t hey were still on the mainland of Asia, they had already intermarried with the Hindus and Chinese. After they had migrated to the East Indian archipelago further mixtures were made. A. C. Haddon, in The Races of Man, pp. 128129, says: Insufficient work has been done on the other natives of tihe East Indian Archipelago, but there is evidence to show that there can be distingui shed a dolichocephalic type among the brachycephalic elements. The former, according to · current usage, is termed Indonesian (Nesiot, p. 23); the latter, or at all events certain groups of them, arrived later; they are Pareocans and probably there were vario~s stocks of these that overran the islands, and as a rule they have dominated the Nesiots, although as a matter of fact, even in· early times, a large amount of intermL"Cture seems to have taken place, possibly in part even before leaving the mainland. These two main racial stocks are so intermixed that scarcely any tribe or people can be considered as a pure rep1•esentative of either.

In t he case of the Philippines it is harder to find t he pure-blooded Malay . Further mild;ures occurred with purer Chinese Mongoloids and Spanish immigrants during the last four or five hundred years. Mr. Robert Bennett Bean, who made the first anatomical and anthropological study of t he Filipino, says in his book, The Racial Anatomy of the Phmppine Islanders, p. 37: · ['he word Malay has been avoided purposely so far because I have been unable to decide to my own satisfaction what is the Malay type, if there is such a type. opinion is thafl the Malay is a composite of the Iberian from Europe, the Primitive from Asia, and the Austrnloid from its primary center, wherever that may have been. 1\fy

In an,other part of the same book, page 222, Mr. Bean says: The studies of Filipinos from all parts of the archipelago show that a large proportions of the population, probably more thnn a third , is Iberian. NO PURE-BLOODED MALAY

Prof. H. Otley Beyer, the foremost student of Philippine ethnology, quite differs from the earlier student, Mr. Bean, and finds three elements among the Christian Filipinos, the Indonesian, the Malay, and the Papuan, although the exact types of t hese groups cannot be given, for he believes

THE PHILIPPINE QUESII'J0N- AN ANM,YSJS

that the Malay is alr.eady an ancient blend of Mongoloid and Indonesian elements. He says: -. • • Among Philippine l\falnys, every graduation can be found from an almost pure Indonesian to a pure :Mongoloid type. 'Fhis is even more noticeable among the Christian Filipinos of the lowlands than it is among the non-Christian mountaineers. Pure blends constitute a minor:i ty e.verywhere, while the majority of indiriduals incline either to one type or the other. As a general proposition, it may be stated that the Luzon Christians are predominantly Mongoloid, whi le both tho Christian and Mohammedan groups to the south of. Luzon are predominantly Indonesian. This is no way vitiates the term Malay, however, which-if it may be applied to any-may be applied equally to all.

A former Governor-General, Mr. W. Cameron Forbes, a man who is not in favor of an early independence, in a most comprehensive book which appeared recently on the Philippines, has .this to say of the racial composition of the Filipinos:. Racially the Filipino is a Malay and throughout the Island s the bulk of the population is sufficiently similar in type to indicate no great differences in origlits. There is no doubt that there has been continued infusion of blood from the continent of Asia, especially Mongolian., and limited infusions of: the blood of other Asiatic and Polynesfan peoples. 'Fhere is little app earance of Caucasian blood in Filipinos except in the city of Manila and a very few other localities.1

In tr.uth, the assertion t hat the Filipinos with Chjnese blood may be considered as a separate class is ridiculous. As stated by Mr. Forbes the infusion of Mongoloid blood has been going on for a long time that everybody seems to have some Mongoloid blood-. There is no such t hing as a pure-blooded Malay. The Malay is himself a mestizo, and the Filipino is more of the m estizo type than any other of t he Mala,y group. Recent intermarriages between Filipinos and Chinese do not, therefore, constitute a new blend; hence they cannot alter values in the offspning, for the Malay Filipinq was alri,ady pa rtly Chinese \before his ancestor left the mainland of Asia. and has been receiving further mixture since his arnival here. In t he r elationship between races and peoples, t he less we talk of racial superiority the better for all concerned. Modern anthropologists eny that there is such thing as a race inhenently superior to other races. 'o one race can boast of a superior biological equipment for cultural f evelopment. I "The Filipinos," says Mr. For.bes in the book above-quoted, "are not an inferior people. They have shown in much of the work they have done enough aptitude to justify t he American policy of placing many governmental fonctions in their hands.'' "The el<!)lanation of t he intellectual and moral outlook of evecy individual and community," says G. Elliot Smith in his E S SO//JS On the FJvo1,ion of Man, p. 133, "is to be sought mainly in his or its histol'y, and not in some blind mechanically working force of evolution. '11hroughout 1 W. Cameron For.bes, The Philippine Islands, Vol. I. p. 14.

6 ·i;.-i:~~~=-

THE PHILIPPINE QUES<rION-AN ANALYSIS

the course of human history man's attitude has been determined, not by t he alteration of t he structure of the mind, but by the intellectual and moral influence which have been impressed upon each individual's mind by t he community in which he lived." It is of far-reaching significance t hat in so far as their Philippine policies were concerned the two colonial powers, Spain and America, which have dominated us, have acted rather on the theory that our nature and mentality were capable of changes and improvements. :rwo MALAYAN EMPIRES

At the . time of the Spanish conquest, t he ancestors of the present Christian Filipinos numbered about half a million people, scattered all over the islands under more or less independent petty kings, or chiefs . They had been in contact with three cultures or civilizations, the Hindu, the Mohammedan, and the Chinese. It is not t rue that the Malays never had any great states or empires to· theiir credit. There had been at least two great Malayan empires, bhe Shri-Visaya and the Madjapahit, of which the Philippines was ,a pant. The Shri-Visayan Empire was established with a seat in Sumatra about the 7th century, and extended to the places now known as Java, Sumat ra, the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas, and the Philippine Islands. At t he end of the 13th century a new empire called Madjapahit was founded in J ava, which absorbed the Shri-Visayan kingdom. At about t he end· of t he 14th century, this new empire comprised all the territories controlled by the Shri-Visayan empire as well as Siam, French Inda-China, Borneo and New Guinea. ~ e culture which predominated in these two empires was Hindu. · The gr eatest pre-Spanish influence on the Philippines was, therefore, the Hindu influence. Hindu culture had given the early Filipinos a system of writing, a mass of religious ideas and practices, though not a welldefined religion, and a general culture far superior to that of t he aborig,ines, the Negritos. It had taught t hem some mechanical and industrial art such as metal working; out it had not greatly changed t he structure of society, nor had it brought in ideas of a well-defined national political organization. "At the time of the Spanish discovery", according to H. Otley Beyer, "not only were t he more civilized Filipinos using the Indian syllabaries for writing, but their native mythology, folklore and written literature all had a distinct Indian cast. The same was true of t heir codes of laws and t heir names for all sorts of political positions and procedure. The more cult ured Philippine languages contain many Sanskrit words, and t he native art a noticeable sprinkling of Indian design. A strong Brahmanistic religious element was also certainly introduced, though it seems to have affected chiefly a limited class, while the mass of the people still clung to t heir more ancient pagan worship."

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTIO N- AN ANALYSIS

Agriculture in the pre-Hispanic Philippines was in a comparatively flourishing condition. They had sugar cane, coconuts, indigo, sweet-po,tatoes, bananas, hemp, and cotton. Irrigation was used. Pigs, goats, and Philippine buffaloes, or carabaos, were common. Fishing was engaged in; mining and metal work were practiced; and textile industries, such as the spinning and weaving of cloth, were in evidence. Their houses were constructed of wood and bamboo. Gunpowder was manufactured. Hides were prepared and exported. Some of t he largest ships in the world at the time were built in the Philippines. There was t rade wit h China, J apan, Malacca, Siam, Cambodia, Borneo and other Islands. To China from thir ty-t hr ee to for ty ships sailed year ly fro~ Man ila. l I MPROVEMENTS UNDER SPAIN

On the whole, the early Spanish government was an improvement over the previous conditions. The country was unrned under a more centralized government in place of the old decentralized organ ization. There was more peace and order, alt hough now and then local uprisings occurr~d. Undoubtedly t he greatest blessing brought by Spain was the converstion of the people to Christianity. But du ri ng the first two centuries, progress along economic lines was very slow. Agricultural methods remained very much the same as in pre-Span ish times. Restrictions upon t rade and commerce reduced t he commercial importance of ports like Manila. It was not till t he nineteenth century that greater progress was shown. General economic improvement succeeded t he fi nancial torpor of the previous two cent ur ies. Roads and bridges were built , agricultural products increased in value, industry and commerce were fostered. and foreign business houses were established in Manila. In 1842 there were 59 Spanish and foreign commercial houses in Manila of which seven or eight were English, two American, one French, and one Danish.2 Sugar was raised in Pampanga and Negros; hemp, in Ambos Camari nes, Albay, and Sorsogon; coconuts, in Tayabas; tobacco, in Cagayan and the Ilocos provinces ; and coffee, in Batangas. This in1 1crease in production naturally increased the polit ical knowledge and t he ~ntelligence of the people. More contact with foreigners brought in better ideas of government. Prosperity aroused the spir it of independence and criticism. A strong well-to-do class was formed from which leaders of the new liberal movement could be recruited·.3 "'Fhe Filipino," stat es Dr. Barrows, "had now become embarked upon a new current of intellectual experience- a course of enlightenment which has been so full of unexpected development, and which has already car1 Craig and Benitez, Philippine ProgreBB Prim· to I 808, p. 46. 2 Benitez, Old Pllilippine,, p. 69. B/bid, pp. 72-74.

THE PHILIPPINE QUES'JIION-AN ANALYSIS

ried him so far from his ancestor of one hundred years ago, that we cannot say what advance another generation or two may bring. Throughout all the towns of t he Islands a class was ;apidl(I' g,owing up to which the new industries had brought wealth. Their means enabled them to build spacious and splendid homes of the fine hardwoods of the Philippines, and to surr ound t hemselves with such luxuries as the life of t he Islands permitted. This class .was rapidly gaining education. It acquired a knowledge of the Spanish language, and easily assumed that gr aceful courtesy which distinguishes the Spaniards." l Another important factor for liberalism came in the nineteenth cent ury in the form of the printing press and the newspapers. It was also in the nineteenth century t hat the first system of public instruction was established:. While the system left a great deal to be desired, still it was a tremendous factor for political education. In 1866 there were schools in 900 municipalities with an enrollment of 135,098 boys and 95,260 girls, out of a population of 4,411,261 people. In 1892 t here were 2,137 schools.2 When America decided to embark on her Philippine experiment, the Filipino people had had the influence of four mighty civilizations or cultures, t he Hindu, the Mohammedan, t he Chinese, and the Spanisl\. ;Because of these contacts American statesmen became convinced that tbe Filipino people were capable of the most wholesome development. Thus, it was with hope and confidence that the following utterance of William H. Taft, t he then Civil Governor, was received by t he American people: Contrast the F'ilipinos with other Malays and the Oriental peoples, and I ask you to name peoples offe11ing more oppo1·tunities for development along the lines which American ideals require than the people of these islands. To begin with, they are a Christian people and they have been so for three hundred years.

In the following chapters we shall trace the growth of nationalism among the Filipino people and analyze their reasons for believing . t hat separation from America is best for t heir own progress and development.

1 Barrows, H-ieto1~y of th D PhiUppinas, p. 277. Censlls o/ 1903, Vol. III, pp. 69, 60.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE NATIONALISM Philippine natiqnalism is probably about a century old. Im the beginning of the nineteent h century the first leaders of t he nationalist movement began to agitate for individual rights like those t hen enjoyed by Spaniar ds. Several sporadic attempts at revolt were made; but the most serious one, before Aguinaldo's move, was t he revolt of 1872. Following that r evolt came a period of intense reform movements led by the national hero, Dr. Jose Rizal, and followed by Qther men like Marcelo H. de! Pilar. This movement culminated in the revolt of 1896 led by Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo which was temporarily stopped by the Pact of Biak-na-bato, signed in December, 1897. THE CRUSHING OF A REPUBLIC

When in 1898 the United States declared war against Spain on the 1-.ighly humanitarian mission of freeing Cuba from Spanish oppression, the Filipino people thought that the time had come for them to renew their struggle against Spain, especially inasmuch as Spain fa iled to fulfill her promises given by virtue of the Pact of Biak-na-bato. The expectations of our people found the most ent husiastic encouragement from American representatives in the Far E ast . The American consul at Sin1gapore, Spencer Pratt, began immediate negotiations with the President ,of the Philippine Republic, who was then in the latter city on his way to 'Europe. Our Filipino leader was prevailed upon to come back to t he Philippines. He received assurances ·that America would surely not colonize the Philippines. He was invited by Admiral Dewey to go to Hong/<Ong for a conference, and was brought in an American boat from Hongkong to Manila. Admiral Dewey r eceived him as a friend and ally. He ;was told to recruit his troQps and fight the common enemy. He was given arms and ammunitions by the American commander, and thousands and t housands of Filipino soldiers, upon seeing the friendship of the Filipino general for the American troops, flocked to his standard. President Aguinaldo's manifestos to the people urging them to support him because he was supported by the American troops who had come as disinterested friends and allies, did not receive any denial from American quarters. He began his successful campaign which, in less t han a year, made the Filipino r evolut ionists masters of practically the ent ire Philippine archipelago. He laid siege to Manila and had it not been for t he Filipino troops encircling the capital, t he American army would have found the taking of t he city a much more difficult undertaking. !But when the American troops came, the Filipinos received disillusionment, for they were told that Manila must be taken by t he Americans alone

IDHE ' pffJILJIPPINE Ql!JESTION-AN ANALYSIS

and not in conjunction with the Filipinos, who had made t he easy capture of 'Manila possible. Here began the parting of the ways between t he two peoples. In spite of this desire of the American Army, the Filipinos could not be puevented f,uom participating in t he capture of Manila and several districts of the city were taken by them. But on t he smcrender of the city the Filipinos received the solemn order that they must evacuate the districts captured at the cost of Filipino blood. This was naturally received with bitter disappointment. But the Filipino leaders were patient. They relied, as ever we have relied, on the good intention of America. T,hey r elied on peaceful negotiations whfoh would solve the question satisfactorily. They could not think that America would easily br,,,ome imperialistic. They hoped that t he Paris conference would settle the question in their favor, an\! they sent their commissioner, first to Washington and then to Paris. They were fully convinced that America, nourished as she had been and as she is, by the noble Declaration of Independence wher ein the principle of the "consent of the governed'' interpreted later on to mean national self-determination, would not permit her government to decide the future of eignt million people, contrary to t heir own desires. Our commissioner was told by President McKinley to' go to Paris ; but the doors of the Paris Conference wer e closed to him, and the treaty of peace was signed without even hearing the representativ~ of the Filipino people. SELF-DE'J\ERJ\IINAT ION VIOLA'J\ED

When t he American people went to war in 1917 to make t he world "safe for democracy" and oo vindicate t he principle of national self-determination, we wonder if they had forgotten that in a previous treaty signed also in P aris, the principle of· national self-determination was completely ,·iolated and the victim was the Filipino nation. Inspite of t he fact that he was t urned down in Paris, the Filipino commissioner went to Washington to see if the Senate might be induced to amend the t r eaty so as to declare the Philippines independent, or to pass a r esolution in favor of independence. But all his work was of no avail, for the Treaty of Paris was ratified without any amendment and with the independence •·esolution by Senatou Bacon defeated. In the meanwhile, here in t he Islands, attempts at peaceful conciliation with America were r epeatedly made. We pleaded and pleaded that we had waged war on Spain not to change masters; that ,ve had won our independence by force of arms and, therefore, it should not be taken away from us; t hat we were willing to make some concessions to America, but that at least America should r espect our right to independence. What was the answer to our plea? It was the stern ordei· t hat we must bow to American sover eignty unconditionally. In vain did that gallant defender of Filipino rights, t he late Senator Hoa1·, iu reply to such arguments, thunder in the American Senate : Was it ever heard before that a civilized, humane, and Christian nation made

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS

war upon a people and refused to tel1 them what they wanted of them? You refuse to tell these people this year or next year or perhaps for twenty years, whether you mean in the end to deprive them of their independence or no. You suy you want them to submit. To submit to what? To mere military force? But for what. purpose or for what end is that military force to be exerted? You decline to tell them. Not only you decline to say what you want of them, except bare and abject surrender, but you will not even let them tell you ,vhat they ask of you.

We do not blame the American people, but we blame their representatives. The American representatives in the Philippines led President McKinley and the American people to believe t hat the opposition to American rule in 1899 was not universal ; that only a few Taga log leaders with a handful of followers were against American rule. When the fateful hostilities on February fourth took place, the F ilipino soldiers were not ready on that particular day and the Filipi110 general at first asked for a cessation of hostilities; but he was given the stern reply that once the war had begun let it continue to the grim end . What could the F ilipinp people do, except to accept the challenge, inspite of the fact that their leaders knew they would be defeated ? We often speak nowadays of the tremendous accomplishments undertaken by America in public works, in sanitation, and in education. Granting that there have been accomplishments in these lines, who can say that they fully compensate the tremendous loss of property, of life and of national freedom as a result of America's forceful subjugation of the Filipinos? " Th&re it was," says H. G. Wells in his "Outline of History,"

"that the United States came nearest to i1TIJ[)e1·iaUsm of the Great Power t,ype am.d- that her record is most questionable." TH E RULE OF 'I'HE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION

While we do not belittle the work of the American government in the , Phjlippines it is now our duty here to be frank with America and to tell her that even after the war had been won, there were many injustices and abuses committed here. There was a period of suppressed nationalism after the war when the people were for six years prohibited from agitating the independence question, when no association was permitted peacefully to proclaim that it was still the ideal of the people to be free \ from America. Freedom of the press, although procla imed in law, was lnot a reality. The abuses of American agencies, like the Philippine Constabulary, controlled by Americans, the concentration system which forced inhabitants of one t erritory to a narrow limit, and the other severities of a military rule, such as the deportation of leaders and tortures practiced upon Filipino prisoners to extort confession- ail these characterized the early yeans of American domination over the Philippines. The second Philippine commission which t he President of t he United States sent to the Philippines in 1900 governed the rslands from 1901 to 1907 as an absol ute body without hardly any reference to popular desires and public opinion. T,he Filipino people decided to continue the work of the revolution

THE 'PIHb~PPINE QUES'Thl©N-AN ANAL'ilSIS

with the implements of peaee. As soon as per.mission to establish nationalist parties was gra,nted, a great Nationalist Party was formed. Its platfoFm appr,oved i'n March, 190?; contained the following as its main objective : The attainment of. the immediate independence of the Philippine Islands to constitute it into a f.ree and sovereign nation undev a democratic government, without prejudice t'o the adoption in aue time of any for.m of guarantee which would be convenient to the interes~ of the Filipino people and suitable to the circumsta'nces. THE FIRS'll ASSEMBLY ON INDEPENDENCE

When the first Assembly was established, the more radical members began agitating for the inclusion of a r.esolution for independence. But it was believed that t he critics of the Assembly would find ground to crticise should such a resolution be approved early in the session, hence the Assembly postponed discussion of the quest ion until the end. Their final attitude was expr.essed in the form of a resolution approving the address of their Speaker, Mr. ©smefia. Among ot her things, Mr. Osmefia in that address said: Mlow me, gentlemen of the House, followin g the dictates ofi my conscience as · a delegate, as a representative of. the country, under my responsibility as Speaker of the House, to declare solemnly as I do now before God and before the wo,r,la, that we believe that: our people aswire for theiT irtdependenc~ that our people" consider themselves capable of leading an orderly life, efficient for themselves and for others, in the concert. of free and civilized nations, and that we believe that if the peopl:e of the United States were to decide at this moment the Philippine cause in favor of tlie Filipinos the latter cou1tl, in assuming the consequent responsibility, comply with their duties to them~elves and to others, without detriment to liberty, to justice, _and to right.

It ,viii be noticed that tl\e program of the Nationalist Par.ty in 1907 called only for immediate independence ( withQut t he words "complete and absdlute" ). As to the guarantees for independence, to quote the platform, t hey would be decided when the time eame fo1· the establishment of independence. In t he meanwhile, the minovity, the F eder.alist Party, which had advocated annexatioru had also advanced its position, had dropped its name, and was now agitating for ultimate independence under the name 01 Partido Progresi-sta. ln 19iJ.4, the D em,0,yra,ta. PartY was formed out oJ; a wing of the Nationalist Party and in 1917, the De·m ocm.ta and the Prog,·esi.sta were fused, forming; the present Pwrtido FJemocrata, whose progr am for independence is as radical as that of the Nationalist Party. l'n 191!9 upon the termination of the World Wa:i:, the Filipino people serrt the first Philippine parliamentary mission for the purpose of presenting to the authorities in America the immediate and favorable settlement of the Philippine problem in view of the fact that the war for democracy and self-determination had been won and the Filipinos, on tl\e other hand, had alr.eady fulfilled the prerequisite oii a stable govern. ment preparato1·y to tihe granting of independence which was requir-ed

THE PHILIPPINE ~YE5TION---'-AN ANALYSIS

in the preamble of the J ones Law. The first Philippine mission was officially reeeived by the Secretary of War and t he congr essional committees. In the committees of Congress Governor-General Harrison testified that there already existed in the Philippines the stable government r equired by the Jones Law. President Wilson stated that only a little time was needed to finish the treaty arrangements and t hat as soon as the problems in Europe were settled his attention would be directed to the Philippine problem. The official attitude of the Filipino people was announced by the Philippine Legislature when on March 17, 1919, it approved the famous Declaration of Purposes. "The Philippine question,"- t he Declaration of Purposes read- "has reached such a stage that a full and final exchange of views between the United States of America and the Philippine Islands has heeome necessary. We need not r epeat the declarations respecting the .national aspirations of the Filipino people. Such declarations have been made from time to time in the most frank and solemn manner by the constitutional representatives of the Philippine Nation and are a matter of permanent r eeord in public document covering more than a deeade of peristent efforts particularly during the last three year s. America, on her part, has been sufficiently explicit in her purposes from the beginning of her occupation of the Philippines." Before leaving office President Wilson r ecommended to Congress the granting of independence in view of the establishment of stable government as required by the Jones Law. However, it was well !mown t hat the reeommendation would not be taken up as another party was coming in power. In fact he recommended it to the Democratic Congress which was meeting for the last time after the election had already taken place. 1 OUR CASE AGAINST GOVERNOR WOOD

When the Republican Party came into power in 1920, we tried to renew our independence negotiations and we sent the second mission in 1921. We were told by -President Harding that he did not believe the time had yet come for the independence of the Philippines. At the same 1time he assured us that America would not r ejoice in keeping a people f nder subjection and that with regard to the governmental powers, "no ~ackward step is contemplated, no diminution of your domestic control js to be sought." The Filipinos interpreted "domestic control" to mean powers enjoyed by the people or their repr esentatives which are found in the Jones Law or which are legal or extra-legal developments under the Jones Law. We have always taken pride that we a re connected with an Anglo-Saxon country whose process of constitutional development is not by m eans of statutory or constitutional enactments alone but also through evolutionary or historical growth. To Englishmen and Amer- · icans, democratic practices, whether they be found in actual law or not, are sacred and must r emain inviolate. We relied on that heritage of America which interprets a political Jaw in accordance wit h democr atic 1

For further discussion of "stable government'' see Chapter VIII.

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

practices and 'prinoiples and not necessarily in strict complia nce with its letter. We t hought t hat the example of the election of the President of the United States was sufficient. Legally, under the Federal Constitution, the election of the American president is still in t he hands of electors select ed by t he voters of the different states. As a matter of practice, however, it is the voters that actually elect him, contrary to the provisions of the American c~nstitution. We sincerely believed that America, with such tradition and respect for democratic constitutional practices, would not r esort mer ely to the strict letter of the law, especially when a practice in question is in accordance with democr acy. But instead of t hat , what a jolt we received when Governor-General Wood said t hat he 11espected no practices and would execute the law, in accordance with its strict letter. Suppose that the electors who were selected by t he voters in 1924 instead of choosing P r esident Coolidge, switched around and chose Mr. Davis or Senator LaFollette, what would the American peopl9 have done? And yet legally the electors have a perfect r ight to do so. We thought that similar democratic practices, such as the amount of domestic control insured us under Governor Harrison's administration. would be respected in the Philippines, and in this we were sadly deceived. When Governor-General Wood refused to abide by those practices, · and converted the Philippine government practically into a government by one man, we sent a, special mission to Congress which stated our grie,.,. ances against Governor Wood in t he following words : Governor-General Wood has set at naught all understandings the Filipino people have had with the American Government, and has ignored the assurance given them by the late President. He has most decidedly taken a backward step depriving our government of the key and the nerve-center of the former autonomous administration-the counsel of the Filipinos. He has surrounded him self with a secret cabinet composed of military and other e.xtra-legal advisers, which has encroached upon the legitimate functions of the Filipino officials in the government. He has broken asunder the bonds of concord that united Americans and Filipinos after the bloody struggle of 1899, a concord that reached its highest expression in the first years of autonomous government. He has placed himself over and above the laws passed by the Philippine Legislatu-re, law s that have never. been dec.lnred null and void by the courts or by the Congress of the United States. He ha s claimed for himself an unlimited executive responsibility that neithe1· the e.'\'.isting laws nor the practices already established have recognized. He has deviated from the policy of the American Government, a policy announced by every President beginning with President McKinley and ratified by the Congress of the United States in the Jones Law. He bas abused the veto power, exercising it on the slightest pretext on mattet;'s of purely local concern that did not affect the sovereignty of the United States or its international obligations. Thus he has attempted to control our legislature, a prerogative that has never been claimed by the elective executives of America, by the President of tht'U nited States, or the Governors of the several states. He has disregarded the right: o!i~hc Senate in hi s exercise of the appointing power. He hns destroyed our budget 5-ystcm, the grentest achievement in tl\e finnncinl administration of our government. He has endeavored to defeat the economic policy laid down by the Philippines.

Except for the brief period of the secession of the so-called Colectiv ista Pan•fl/1, t he Nationalist Party has been continuously in power up to

t he present.

The opposition party has also been forced to adopt the pro-

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

gram of immediate independence. In about t he year 1923 t he Nationalist Party, now called the PO!rl:ido Naciona/:uJta Consolidado, advocated immediate, complete and absolute independence on the gr ound t hat the American opponents of independence had branded t he independence agitation as timid,- as working for independence with a possible string tied to it. Now t hey wanted t o shQw that they were unafraid of the risks and responsibilit ies of absolute political separation. Following that lead, the Legislature and our local bodies have been approving r esolutions in favor of immediate, complete and absolute independence. E very year the same litany is heard in the Legislature. INDEPENDENOE CONGRESS

In February, 1930 a group of Filipino citizens outside of active politics appointed the writer to call a huge assembly of all the r epr esentative elements of the country; a nd for that purpose some two thousand delegates, composed of heads of civic organjzations, leaders in the various professions, publicists, educators, labor, r eligious a nd student leaders, municipal presidents, Moro chiefs, co-workers of Rizal and de! Pila r in Spain, veterans of t he revolution, elective officials of the provincial governments, high officials of the former Philippine Republic, past and present, members of the Philippine Legislature· and Filipino members of tbe Council of State, met in Manila on February 22nd to 26th, 1930. There were two plenary sessions and four days of sectional meetings, divided into political, economic, educational, inter national relat ions, national defense and communications, labor; Mindanao and Mountain Province, a nd Women's sections. Important papers were read and discussions ensued. The economic effects of absolute independence were stressed and while it was ad_mitted that absolute independence would make Philippine industries s uf fer and that some products in case of independence would not be able to find a market immediately, tbe economic section of t he congress without 1any hesitation went on record as in favor of immediate, complete and absolute separation. Problems · of national defense were also taken up and the majority of t hose in that section pronounced themselves in favor 1f f military training as a means of preparation. The result of t he deli br rations of t he Congress was a new declar ation of the independence fait h pnanimously appr oved by t he two thousand delegates at t he last plenary ~ession, February 26, 1930. In this declaration the Filipino stand on the various questions to independence was clearly stated. For historical reasons, the Independence Congress was in favor of independence because it believed t hat "the establishment of a Bhilippine Republic will but be the logical and just C\lltcome of our long struggle for freedom and will be in keeping with America's history and t raditions." On the economic side it declared: "T.he uncertainty of our future political status hampers the economic development of the country. Out· present trade relations with t he United States are not conducive toi the economic independence of the Philippines, and whatever may be the temporary advantages of such r elations, we are ,wiling to forego them

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

for the sake of freedom." And then it continues, "The longer we remain under America, the harder will it be for us to be freed from our political and economic dependence on her." As to the pneparation of the country for an independent existence, the Congress said: "We are now better pnepared for nationhood than many independent states, of today and we are ready to assume the risks and responsibilities of independence." As to the relationship between the Americans and Filipinos, in view of the racial prejudices shown recently against Filipinos in America, the Independence Congress had this to say: "lilifferences in race, history and ci vili2ation render difficult, if not impossij:>le, a common life under one flag between t he American and Filipino peoples;" and then it adds, "Independence will make for closer friendshlp and better understanding between America and the Philippines, while retention fosters distrust and ill-feeling." The Congress concludes its arguments by stating that "the genius and potentialities of the Filipino people can only be developed in an atmosphere of freedom unrestrained by foreign rule." ANG BAGONG KAfl\IPUNAN

The latest phase of the nationalist movement was the recent establishment of a non-partisan national organization, the "Ang Bagong Katipunan", founded by Speaker Roxas, with t he following decalogue as its fundamental principles : I.

OUR NATIONAL DESTINY

We believe tfiat independence is the only way to our national self-realization and that the destiny of our nation can only be entrusted to our own people. We owe it to ourselves, to our forbears and to our posterity to strive and work for our emancipation. We will not allow a day to pass without doing our share in thought and in deed, for the attainment of our freedom.

II.

NATIONAL UNITY

We will maintain our national unity. W,e will pevmit no barriers to divide us. We will consider every Filipino, Ohristian or non-Christian, our brother in blood, aspiration and ideals, We. are, as Filipinos, bound to one another by ties of common interests and a common pu~pose.

III. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM We hold that our country is the inalienable patrimony of our people. We will conserve and develop our lands, forests, mines, water power, and other natural resources, lind will insi st that their disposition and control be kept in the hands ofi our people. We will practice economic nationalism. We will .:>rgani ze and struggle for economic self-sufficiency. We will strive to produce what we need and buy what we produce. We will encourage the development of our home industries. We will patronize our countrymen who are engaged in business but condemn those who e::,,.-ploit customers. \'\"c will buy from abroad only those commodities which we do not produce, giving preference to articles coming from countries which buy our products.

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS IV.

RACE EQUALITY

We believe in race equality. We take pride in our race, demand just treatment everywhere, and oppose all discrimination on account of color. \Ve insist upon the equal protection of the laws, and will deny to no one the same measure of justice we demand for ourselves.

HUMAN RESOURCES

We will husband our human resources. We will foster athletics and the outdoor life; we will observe in our homes the rules of sanitation and hygiene; and we will encourage wholesome diet from the products of our land, seas and forests.

VI.

VEN ERATION FOR OUR PAST

We will venerate our past. We wi11 look up to our national heroes for inspiration in our daily lives. We will rear our children in the love of our country. We will instill in them the spirit of our forefathers and imbue th':'m with t he high destiny of our race in the progress of mankind.

VII.

NATIONAL CULTURE

We will develop our own culture without rejecting the best of other nations. W2 will give expression to the soul of our race in the arts and li teratu re, in our customs and in our civilization. We wi ll release our native genius and stimulate our creative power. We will preserve and keep uncontaminated those fine qualities which distinguish our people.

VIII.

NATIONAL DIS CIPLINE

We will cultivate national discipline. We will guard against those destructive influences which provoke c1ass or sectional strife. We will subordinate our person n! and party interests to the exigencies of our fight for freedom.

IX.

PUBLIC OFFIOE IS A PUBDIC TRUST

We will uphold a high standard of public administration. We will insist that public office is an opportunty for service and not for profit, and we will denounce corrupt public men as enemies of their country.

IDEALISM

\ We will consecrate our li ves to righteousness which exalteth a nation. We wi ll be loyal to principles and ideals, and abhor expediency and personal advantage. We will keep the soul of the nation aglow with faith in God.

LATEST INDEPEJNDENCE MEMORIAL

The latest independence memorial was unanimously approved by the Philippine Legislature on September 24, 193l. Theue was not even a Mouo dissenting vote. It was handed to Secretary Hurley the following day and it reads thus: We, the members of the Philippine Legislature in joint session assembled, for ourselves and in behalf of the Filipino people, do hereby reiterate our petition for the immediate political separation of the Philippine Islands from the United States.

THE Pffllil!il•PPIINE .QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

Our desire for liberty was repeatedly manifested, in the course of our history, throughout our many struggles for political emancipation, culminating in the estab lishment of. the Philippine Republic. We lost om: independence because of the supe~ 1·ior force of America ; we expect to regain it because of her plighted word. We acquiesced in American rule only when we were assured that she came not as a conqueror but as a liberato~. In a ll good f aith we relied on her promise made through her highest executive officials and confirmed by the Congress of the United States when it declared that the independence of t he Philippine Islands shall be granted upon the establishment of a stable government. This condition having been fulfilled, the Filipino people rightfully expect that their independence will be recognized without any funther _delay. Practical considerations also justify this urgent desire for immediate separation. 'l\he present movement to exclude Filipinos from the United States is g iving rise to friction and misunderstanding . The manner in which the campaign is being conducted cannot but arouse among the Filipino people a feeling that it is impelled by other than purely economic motives. Even at the present time it is not safe foi: ~ilipinos in some parts of the United States to engage in lawful occupation. So long as we remain under the American flag, justice demands that we shall be allowed freely to travel, work, and live in any American territory. The dual responsibility in our government--the one assumed by the GovernorGeneral and the other by Filipino officials-has been t he source of serious conflicts in the past and is ever fraught with difficulties. Such an unsatisfactory situation must end. A backward step is unthinkable. The only solution is indepe'ndence. Our present trade r elations with the United States are uncertain and unstable. Exclusively •Tegulnied as they are by the American Congress_, America's -interests rather than our own ate the dominant consideration. There is an increasing demand by American producers to maintain the American market solely for their benefit. Powerful Amer ican interests are now conducting a p ersistent campaign against the free entry of Philippine products. No one knowS" how Jong the American market will remain open to us. Doubts and misgivings have seized upon the minds of Philippine producers and investors, thus checking our development. We believe that enduring economic progress can only be achieved under an independent Philippines, free to dictate its own policies. ll!'hese facts prove the wisdom ot the declared purpose of. t he United States to "grant us independence. They also serve to strengthen our belief t hat political separation is the only solution to our problems. We see no other alternative. The happiness and prosperity of the Philippines and the economic interests of America are not to be found in the present artificial union which hampers our national development and injures economic progress, but in political separation, wherein each may live tl\e life suited to its distinct individuality and its national interests. ':Dhe independence of America from the Philippines woulil seem to be as imperative ns the independence of the Philippines from America. Therefore, with all due respect, with n deep feeling of gratitude to America, a nd with full consciousness of the burdens and responsibilities of an independent life. we hereby submit tliat the time has come for the redemption oi America's solemn promise to declare and recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands.

CHAPTER

III

THE $20,000,000 PAID TO SPAIN Was the Philippines bought for 20,000,000 dollars ? A good many people think so; and a proposal has been made which would make us pay the money back to America in case of independence. A closer study of the 'f\reaty of Paris will convince us that the twenty million dollavs which America paid to Spain was not chargeable exclusively .to the Philippine Islands. And a matter of forty million pesos for a poor country like ours would seem to merit a little study. The only ground for belief in the theory that the money was paid for the Philippines is that the offer of twenty million dollars was made at the same time that the cession of the country to the United States was demanded. But a little history of the negotiations will clear the doubts about this. THE CUBAN DEBTS

The first questions dealt with at the Paris Conference of 1898 concerned the disposition of Cuba and Porto Rico. In r elinquishing Cuba, Spain insisted that the United States should assume the Cuban debt, but tbe American commissioners were determined not to assume it. A break of the conference became imminent. In the evening of October 26, the Spanish ambassador called on Mr. Reid, one of the American commissioners, for an informal conversation. Mr. Reid again assured the ambassador that the Ameriean Government could not assume the Cuban debt, the Ameriean people being strongly against it. Then the ambassador "urged the question to be laid aside until it could be seen if some concessions elsewhere might not be found which would save the Spanish I commission from utter repudiation at home." The ambassador then begged Mr. Reid to search for some possible concession somewhere and in' quired about the Philippine Islands. Apparently this informal talk tsmoothed matters a little, for the next day the Spanish commissioners 'announced that they accepted the draft of Articles I and II, by which it was agreed that Spain would relinquish her sovereignty ever Cuba and !Porto Rico without any r eference being made as to the Cuban debt, but that this acceptance would be "subject to agreement being reached on all the articles which the treaty should contain." Evidently they expected better treatment in the case of the Philippines. The refusal of the United States to assume the Cuban debt was contrary to practices of European diplomacy, hence it made the United States unpopular in European circles, and with the exception of England, every other European power sympathized with Spain. The reason adduced by the American commissioners in refusing to grant the Cuban

'.llHE PHrLIPPLNE QUES'.lll©N-AN ANALYSIS

debt was that they did not want to put a burden on Cuba at the starting point of her independent life. AMERICA'S SIJlAND ON COLONIAL DEBTS

Expenditures made by t he mother country to enslave or fetter the colonies are not and should not be chargeable to the colonies·. This was t he stand taken by America, an attitude at the time contrary to International practices. Thus in an add1·ess delivered in Chlcago, Mr. Reid, one of the American commissioners, said that the American commis~ioners had "maintained, in the face of the most vehement opposition, not merely of Spain but of well-nigh all Europe, a principle vital to oppressed people struggling for freedom, a principle without which our own freedom could not have been established, and without which any successful revolt against any unjust rule could be made practically impossible. T,hat principle is that, contrary to the prevailing rule and practice in large transfers of sovereignty, debts do not necessarily follow the territory if incurred by the mother country distinctly in efforts to enslave it. REASONS FOR THE TWENTY MILLION

How did t he United States come to offer the twenty million dollars? Various considerations have entered into it: First, because the liberation of Cuba and the cession of Porto Rico and other islands of t he East Indies, with America's refusal to assume colonial debts, were agreed to only tentatively by Spain, subject to better concessions in the latter part of the negotiations. It has already been noted that tJhis refusal of the United States to assume the Cuban debt put the American commissioners in bad light before the '.European nations. Second, the United States wanted to pay Spain for whatever pacific improvements in the Philippines were paid by Spain from a bond issue of forty million pesos floated in July, 1897. Notice t hat the United States made it a policy during t he peace negotiations not to pay for any bonds or money used by Spain to enslave the colonists. So the commissioners made it specific that they wer e offering to pay for pacific improvements in the Philippines paid from the bond. Mr. Reid, in explaining the reason for the American commissioners resolved, in a final transfer, to fix an amount at least equal to the face value of that debt, which could be given to Spain as an acknowledgment for any pa.cifio improvomonts she might ever have made there not paid for by the revenues of the islands themselves. She could use it to pay the Philippine bonds if she chose. That was the American view as to the sanctity of public debts legitimately incurred in behalf of ceded territory; and that is an e."Xplanation of the money payment in the case of the Philippines, as well ns of the precise amount at whi4h it was finally fixed.

But none of the forty million peso bond issued by Spain in 1897 was paid for pacific ir>llf)1·ovemm,ts in the Philippines. This bond issue produeed "38,5170,494.27 pesos net; of this sum, 19,891,800.60 were used in t he Philippine War of 1896-97; 7,660,403.13 were retJurned to Cuba to

T>HE PHILIPPIN E ~UESTION- AN ANALYSIS

pay a lo&n made from the Cuban war revenues; and 10,938,477.02 were advanced to Cuba for t he war there. CONSIDERATIONS FOR FILIPI NO COOPERATION

President McKinley never considered the twenty million dollars as a purchase price for the Philippines . In his final instructions, he insisted that responsibilities to t he Filipinos demanded that t he United States wrest the sovereignty over the Philippines from Spain. Also t here was the consider ation of the Filipino cooper ation during the war, as a motive for the cession of the Philippines . Thus when the Spanish commissioners spoke of the so-called alliance between Filipinos and Americans the American commissioners said : This is not a relation which the Government of the United States inte nded to establish; but it must at least be admitted that the insurgent chiefs returned and resumed their activity with the consent of our military and naval commanders, who permitted th~m to arm with weapons which we had captured from the Spaniards, and assured them of fair treatment and justice. Should we be justified in now surrendering the~-e people to the Government of Spain, even under an amnesty, wDich we know they would not accept?

There is not a word in either .the Treaty of Paris itself or in the voluminous negotiation s to the effect that the twenty million dollars is the puochase price for t he Philippines. The greatest American scholar on the Philippines , James A. LeRoy, summarizes the reasons for this offer of twenty millon dollars in the following words : "This cash offer had gradually presented itself as the solution of the differences between the two Governments, as an outcome both of the Amevican proposition ' to assume the debt for pacific improveme nts in the Philippines and of \ the feeling of some of t he American commission ers that they must make a concession in order to get a treaty." As has been explained no pacific \ improvements in t he Philippines have been made by Spain from any bond issue that she floated or from her own treasury. Where is then our responsibility to answer for the twenty million dollars that America paid to Spain? The most t hat can be said is that t he freeing of Cuba with her debts, the cession of Porto Rico, as well as that of t he Philippine Islands, all are part and parcel of t he entire treaty transaction, for \ which, in r eturn the Untied States paid twenty million dollars. It was \partly due to Cuban debt, to the cession of Porto Rico, as well as to that pf t he Philippines, but by no means should the entire twenty million dollars be chargeable to the Philippines exclusively. I maintain t hat no impartial court, after studying the peace negotiation s in Paris, will claim that the Philippines should pay for the entire twenty million dollars. WILL AMERICA REVERSE HER ATTITUDE?

If we are to· judge from America's own policy and attitude towards Spain during the peace negotiation s in 1898, the only obligations t hat we should pay the United States or American capitalists are the bonds

THE PHililPPINE QUEJSl!:ION-AN ANALYSIS

which have been issued, amounting to about one hundred sixty million pesos, which have been spent for "pacific improvements'' in the Islands. But, the payment of these public debts must not be a prerequisite to independence, for there are many )'lations which owe America, but a1·e not made colonies of the United States. Sufficient guarantees, it is true, must be made, before the granting of independence, that the debts will be paid in due time. As for the fortifications and military expenditl)res of the United States here, it would be weJI to remember the standard which she applied to Spain. If the expenditures are not for pacific improvements, but of a military character to insur e the subjugation of the people, it would be awkward, to say the least, for America to require us to pay for thelll\ on the face of her own refusal to pay Spain for military expenditures incurred in Spanish colonies prior to 1,898. And how can America morally require us to pay for the domains which our ancestors have possessed since time immemorial? How can she make us pay for t hose lands in defense of which floods of blood have been shed generations after generations? THE SET'I'LED POLICY OF AMERICA

America has promised us through her own executives and governorsgeneral that the Philippines are held exclusively in trust for the people of the Islands. President McKinley, who was mostly responsible for the_acquisition of the Islands said:

·we accepted the Philippines from high duty in the interest of their inhabitants and for humanity arid ciyilizntion. Our sacrifices were with this high motive. We want to 'improve the condition of the inhabitants, securing them peace, liberty, and the pursuit of their highest good. Mr. Taft, as civil governor, summed up American policy as foJlows: From the beginning to the end of the state papers which circulated in these islands as authoritative expressions of the Executive, the motto that 1the Philippines are for the Filipinos' and that the Government of the United States is here for the purpose of preserving the 'Philippines for the Filipinos,' for their benefit, for their elevation, for their civilization, again and again appear.

President Wilson went e\<en so far as to say : "We are not owners of the Philippine Islands. We hold them in trust for the people who live in them. They are theits for the uses of their life, we are not even their partners." ' Has America changed? Is the idealism of the early years of American occupation gone foreveu? Or was the promise of President Mc.Kinley, Mr. T11ft and others simnly a snare to pacify the rebellious Filipinos? PHILIPPINE LOSS DURING THE AMERICAN-PHILlPPINE WAR

Of course, for the present, it seems that only a few Americans are sponsoring the ambitious financial scheme. But if it is ever enter-

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS tained by responsible American leaders, would it not be in order also to raise the question of the devastation a nd losses of property caused by the American-Philippine War? No s,me-minded man will ever dispute the fact t hat it was purely a defensive war wh erein we were the victims. No economist has ever found out the cost of destruction, in lives and property. In plain dollars and cents they would run over hundreds of millions of pesos- and more. Think of the spectre of that war which devastated fields and towns, spread famine and starvation to the poor, l<illed the flower of our youth, wrought havoc and desolation to hundreds of thousands of. fami lies-and trampled down the birthright of a nation I

'No ! America will not dare charge the $20,000,000 to us.

I I

!VHkP'J!ER IV

ID[FFLCUL'iFIElS OF THE JONES LAW

•

It was the privilege of the writer to have been in Washington at the time the Jones Law was being discussed, and he was positive thait; the understanding of its authoi:, the congressmen who supported it, and even of those who were fovced to acquiesce in it, was veally to give the people of the Philippine [slands a decisive control over their own affaivs. Fifteen years have elapsed since the passage of the Jones Law. The fourth Governor-Geneva! under it now sits at Malacaiiang. Sufficient time has probably elapsed for us to judge what t he law has done for the country. A prominent American official remarked to me that the /Jones Law has been very satisfactory in that it is elastic. The GovernorGeneral can be as powerful or as liberal, as he wants to. lt might be thus satis:fiactory from the American standpoint, but surely not, fov the same reason, from the Filipino standpoint. If I were asked point blank whether the Jones Law has been a success here, I would hesitat e to answer, for at least, I can enumerate the following weaknesses: First, it has failed to define the powei:s that should belong to the Filipino people or theh· representatives and the powei:s that should belong to the American repvesentatives. Second, it was built on the wrong theory. It has been a made-tooFder goveFnment framed for us, although with the consent of our representatives, by a IVongress sitting ten thousand miles away and ignorant of the political conditions and the political genius of the country. Third, it has dictated to us specified types of political institutions instead of allowing us to choose the !<ind that we want and that are suited to us. Fow:th, it did not provide . for an undisputed and recognized official position in the government for th,e political leader of the people. Fifth, it has encouraged the principle of government by legislature which has been found to be a failure in most countries. DUALIIJ'Y IN GOVERNMENT

Let us take up the first poin~the definition of powers. The inten" tion of its author to give us ample autonomy was clear. Tts title is, in part, "An Act ..... to provide a, mor e autonomous goveFnment foi: these Islands." 1n its p1:eamble it proposes "to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affah-s as can be given t hem without, in the meantime, impairing the exercise of the rights of soveveignt y by the people of the United States, in order that,

THE ·PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the better prepa,ed to fully assume t he responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence." Mr. Jones himself said t hat the law wolJild give the Filipinos "the control of t heir domestic affairs in all essential particulars." The American representative in the Islands, Mr. Harnison, in explaining the meaning of fille Jones Law to t he Filipino people, said: "It should never be possible, and it will now never be so here, for an executive to ride ruthlessly over the people he is sent here to govern, without due r ega,:d for their sentiments and due consideration of their wishes.'' In actual practice, however, that liberal spirit promised us by the authors of the measure soon drifted away. Under the Wood regime, the Governor-General nullified the autonomous nature of t he government. In the words of our own Legislature, sitting as a Commission of Independence: "His conduct of the government has been characterized by a train of usurpations and arbitrary acts, resulting in the curtailment of our autonomy, the destruction of our constitutional system, and the reversal of · America's Philippine policy. "He has adopted the practice of intervening in, and controlling directly, to its minute details, the affairs of the Philippine government, both insulan and local, in violation of the principle of self-government." Under the Wood regime, we really had a less autollQmous government than during the last years of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Then we had a majority of Filipinos on the Commission with the Governor-General dep,ived of the veto power. t Even a mere cursory glance of the conflict between the leaders and «lovernor Wood will show that although there were incompatibilities of dparacter, the root of the evil rested on the different interpretations of the leaders and the general as to the meaning of t he organic Jaw. Hence t~e dra,fting of the law was defective. H under that measure the Chief EJxecutive could in one administration be most liberal -"a mere tenuous ct nnection between the United States and the Philippines" in the words o~ Secretary of War Baker-and in another administration a great autoc:rrat, there must indeed be something Jiundamentally wrong in its draft. in~, inasmuch as one of the chief pu:rrposes of an organic Jaw, such as the Jones Law is precisely to define the powers that must belong to the different organs of government. This duality in our government is one of the reasons now used by the Legislature in urging independence. The last independence memorial approved in September of this year (19M) reads: "'.Phe dual responsibility in our govemment--,the one assumed by the Governor-General and the other by Filipino officials-bas been t he source of serious conflicts in the past and is evev fraught with difficulties. Such an unsatisfactory situation must end. A backward step is unthinkable. The only solution is independence.''

THE PHIIJIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS JONES LAW BUILT ON WRONG THEORY

The Jones Law had a vicious origin. It was built on t he wrong theqry. With all due respects to the late Congressman Jones, who unselfishly fought for the ,v.elfare of the Filipinos, and who, together with President Qu,ezon, was mostly responsible for the passage of the Jones Law, I beg to state that his basis for the di·afting of the organic law was entirely erroneous and, to a certain extent, he did not follow American precedents. In 1902 when t he Philippine Bill of that year was being discussed the Democrats of the Senate and the Democrats in the House offered two different plans-one was the plan of Mr. Jones and the other was the plan of the Democratic senators in the Senate. The senate plan would allow the Filipinos immediately to hold a constitutional convention for the purpose of framing a government preparatory to independence, in accordance with local conditions and the political genius of the people. The Jones plan would have Congress frame that constitution for the Philippines preparatory to independence. I say that the Democnatic plan in the senate was the more natural, because it allowed discretion to the people or their leaders as to what "kind of government t hey wanted and that idea is more in consonance with American practices. Because Mr. Jones was the one member that kept on his interest in t he Philippines and those who had proposed the plan in the Senate either died or had lost interest, after the Democrats had gained power, Mr. J ones' plan was the one approved in 1916 with the passage of the Jones Law. I submit that this plan is not the most logical scheme. The best plan wot,ld have been first, to define what powers belong to the people of the Phiiippine Islands or their representatives and what powers belong to the American representative; second, to let the Filipino people within the powers conferred upon them to devise the means and instrumentalities t,hat they want to follow in the carrying of their prerogatives. For instance, if it was the intent ion to give the people a senate, why not let them decide what kind of senate ,they want? If it was the intention to give them a share in the administration; why not let them determine what should be the relationship between the Cabinet and the Legislature? Why not give us discretion as to what kind of political institutions we want to establish? ✓

LAOK OF POSITION FOR FILfPINO LEADER

- Another difficulty we found in the earlier years of the Jones Law was the absence of a well-defined oJ;ficial position for the recognized leader of the people. In this respect the framers of the Jones Law ~ommitted the same mistake that ·wilson found in the American constitution. There was no place for the party lender in the original framework of the American government. It is the fonce of circumstances and t he extra-legal development in the election of the President of the United States plus

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

the use of the ,;eto power which has made the President the political leader of t he people, as well as the leader of the party that he represents. We may have agreed to t he old t heory o!f collectivism in leadershlp, but I know of no more discredited political principle today than the idea that there should not· be a recognized leader. The growth of t he President's and the state governors' prerogatives in America, the development of the Premier of England and the dictatorships of Mussolini and Primo de Rivera with the virtual acquiescence of the people all point out to the principle that there must be one recognized national leader. Before t he Jones Law when we had only one elective body, the Assembly, there was no doubt that t he Speaker of the Assembly was the national leader. When another elective body, the Senate, was added, it was different. There was some do11bt as to who should be the leader. Senator Osmena, then Speaker of the Assembly, believed that the leader should remain in the House, hence he remained there as its speaker although he could have easily run for the Senate and have been the president of t hat body. For a time the question as to who should be the leader in the government was solved with the artificial creation of the Council of State when the vice-chairman was given to the Speaker. But then later on, Mr. Quezon said that such an arrangement was unsatisfactory, being a mere execu,'tive creation, and that the President of t he Senate should still officially outrank the Speaker. This organic defect was one of the causes of the split between Mr. Quezon and Mr. Osmeiia in 1922. GOVERNMENT BY LEGISLATURE

Our present system of government is such that the more democratic we want to make it, the more we have to increase the influence of the legislature or its leaders on administration. We must more and more approach the type of government by the legislatures and this has been very much ~scredited during the last th1,ee or four decades. P eople.s everywhere have come to distrust their own legislatures. This is undoubted ly one of e re.asons why there has been in recent years a growing toleration, and en support, of ?ne-man _leadership, and _i n some cases, of the establish~ ent of actual dictatorships. The American people are no exception to tlus general rule. They early became disgusted with the behavior of their own legislatures and began tying their hands. A distinguished Amerioon political scientist, the late Professor Ford, has gone to the extent of saying: "A representative assembly is bound to become a public nuisance, if it is allowed to do anything more than watch over the government and pass judgment on its recommendations." Many states limit sessions of their legislature so that they might do the least evil. Others have narrowed the scope of legislative functions by means of direct legislation and of the enactment of long and detai led constitutions. The people of practically every state now welcome the veto of the state governor as a safeguard against poor legislation. And yet it is such a system or a

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN AN ALYSIS

similaF one, that the Filipinos, by t he force of circumstances have been obliged to adopt. Some have suggested that our goveFnment without any amendment to the Jones Law, may yet develop into an autonomous one like Canada. But we must remember that Canada's constitutional development has followed that of England, the mother country. The governor of a dominion was originally appointed with great powers whlch he subsequently ceased to exercise, in the same way that the King of England has ceased to use his veto and other powers. The decrease of the power of the executive in Canada <runs parallel with the decrease of similar powers of t he English Crown. There was, indeed , a time when it was believed we might follow t he footsteps of an English dominion, like the process in Canada or Australia. Many of the governmental practices under Harrison could not be found, strictly speaking, in any legal provision. But these practices were, as we have seen, unceremonioll(SlY waived aside by Governor Wood, and thus the English type was abandoned. Our constitutional development rat her followed the American tendency whereby the President and Governors of States have grown in power and prestige a't the expense of the legislative department. We know very well that t he instinct of t he American people is for justice; but we cannot make them think differently by saying: "Now, look here! In your country you are giving more and more power to the state governors because you elect them. In our country we cannot do it because our governor is not elected by us." What is vital to them is their experience t hat t hei•· governors and president ar e doing good . work in co1Tecting t he abuses of the legislative powers, and instinctively they trunk that that is the same work Governor Wood should do in the Philippines. Another trouble with our expected constitutional development is the absence of traditions of colonial self-government in America, hence, we are subj ect to the individual ideas and whims of different Governoi:s-Gener al and Secretaries of War. I liken our constitutional establishment to a unique building planned by a foreign archltect in 1916, modified to suit the original purpose and t he democr atic leanings by Harrison, completely remodelled by Wood, brought back half to its former position by Stimson, weak and out o.f bearings beeause of t hese various changes, the scene of internecine wrangling in 1923 which shook its very foundation-now an undefinable structure subject to further changes as its new occupants may dictate. I am afraid that if its first architect, Mr. Jones, could be brought back to life and we were to ask him what we could do with the building, he would say, "This has been so changed and rechanged since I first planned it, that I do not claim it is my own work any more. Rather than remodel this old t hing, I would suggest that you ask Uncle Sam Ito allow you to build a new house-even if it be one of bamboo and nipa only, provided it is yollll" own, free and separate from the American mansion, suited to your temper and your needs, a product of your genius and experiences."

CHAPTER V

THE DILEMMA OF COOPERATION The position of the Filipino people as regards proper cooperation wJth the Amer.ican government has always been a delicate one. From th,e beginning of our relationship wit h America we have been left to choose between two things : whether to submit ourselves uncondit ionally and trust to hev kindness, or whet her to protest and even struggle t hough in vain, so as to show her that as a nation we know how to defend our rights and liberties. When in 1899 America stated that she was mistress here, that she had a title over the Islands by the Treaty of Paris, we r eplied that we had won our independence by force of arms and, therefore, we could not give it up without any assurance that it would be ours then or in the future to enjoy. Thereupon America gave us the ultimatum: "Submit fi,st, before we can give you any answev as to your future. " AMERICA'S STERN ORDER

Because of the two conflicting determinations-a-America for our unconditional submission and the Filipinos for independence--,the war had tQ come. We knew we were weak and again we pleaded for considerat ion. We invoked .America's declaretl liumanitarian motives and said that being a weak people, we would be willing to come to t erms if there cf uld only be peace with honor, if our right to nationhood could at least br recognized. Again the reply came: "Lay down your arms first. We catn:~~~lk about terms to men in arms. Surrender. Submit uncondi-

Ana Aguinaldo, the man who led the Philippines in that !Jloody strugwas pictured by imperialist propagandists as a bandit chie:ll, a Filipino ng Bull. '.l1here was, indeed, a meagre offer from America, the Hay p~aposal for partial autonomy, which was in fact a little move liberal th~n the government established by Mr. '!'.aft. But /t was far from t he desires of the people .and no cessation of hostilities for consult ation with the people could be secured, hence it had to be refused. The rule of the strong over the weak had to predominate. After an exasperating warfar.e of three years, the F1ilipinos were forced to submi t unconditionally. America became complete mistress and for half a decade no association could even speak of independence. After that period of suppr.essed nationalism the right of petit ion and assemblage and £tee speech were gea nted. Political parties in favor of separation laboring thnough peaceful means wer e allowed t a or.ganize, and for a time we thought that we could talk as a people to the sovereign

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS

nation of America without fear, stating our demand with due respect but also with determination. Gradually the instrumentalities of government were little by little given to Filipino officials subject to American supervision, culminating in the establishment of virtual autonomy under the Democratic regime. ' Then the Jones Law was appr~ved which in the words of the author, was a moral covenant between the American and Filipino peoples. The Filipinos believed that a different stage had been reached in American-Philippine relations. More and more the Filipino people was being considered a nation, an individuality that could be dealt with thvough its leaders. "Never again will you be governed in defiance of your wishes," we were assured. DEFYING AMERICA~ SOVEREIGNTY

But that relationship was not to last. It was meant to be temporary. When the Republican administration returned, the r elationship of absolute soveveign requiring relentless and unconditional submission was again demanded. The new Governor-General acted contrary to previous practices and disregarded those principles which the Filipinos believe ;ere contained in the Jones Law. There was a cry of protest and the recognized leaders resigned from the Council of State. This action of t he Filipino leaders was bvanded by @overnor-@eneral Wood as "a challenge to His Authol"ity as Governor-General of the Philippines and to the sovereign power of the United States." These were the ori·g inal words expressed by the Governor-General when he received the resignation of the council members. Later on, in his formal letter of acceptance of the resignation, he softened his statement somewhat, and said that he "con,, sidered the action as an organized and preconcerted attack upon the authority of the Governor-General and as t he r epresentative of the sovereign power of the United States." Is it a crime against the sovereignty of the United States for officials who have been elected by the people or whose appointments have b'een confirmed by the representatives of the people, legally and peacefully to sever their official connections with the Governor-General and appeal for justice to a higher authority-to the President and Congress of the United States, who are vastly more authorized to exercise t he powers o:IJ American spvereignty ? When has it been heard of in the history of America that it is a crime and an affront to t he sovereign power, for the <representatives of a people peacefol!y and legally to make their protests known and to appeal to the real sovereign power,-the people of the United States? Under what principle of American law and go,,ernment can an appointive officer arrogate to himself alone the sovereignty of one-hundred million people· and brand every official who diffevs with him in the interpretation of laws as an "enemy of the sovereign power of the United States ?" Why, even Congress and the President, who are directly commissioned by the American people to hold the reins of government will not dare go that far. Congress, which has supreme author-

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-

AN ANALYSIS

ity over the Philippines, would not dare say that we cannot appeal from their decision; for back of them still stands the source of all powerthe people of the United States. Ah! How different has been the picture in our minds of mighty and democratic America! Often have we been told of how her sovereign wings have put the Philippines under her protection and driven away forever the germs of monarchic government so that the principles of democratic sovereignty might grow and expand as a shining example to the entire ,vorld ! An appeal was sent to the Washington government, but that appeal was turned down. America again echoed her words of thirty years ago, to the effect that there was no other way but to sub'mit unconditional!\!' and to recognize American sovereignty as supreme and that no concessions could be made unless in the spirit of unconditional cooperation. Here were the words of President Coolidge: • • • one cannot but feel that if the Filipino people cannot cooperate in the support and encouragement. of as good an administration as ha s been afforded under Governor-General Wood, their failure will be rather a testimony of unpreparedness for the full obligations of citizenship than an evidence of patriotic eagerness to advance their country. • • • I feel that I am serving those same interests by saying frankly that it is not possible to consider the extension of a larger nreasure of autonomy to the Filipino people until they shall have demonstrated a readiness and capacity to cooperate fully and effectively with the American Government and authorities. For such cooperation I earnestly appeal to every friend of the islands and their people. I feel all confidence that, in the measure in which it shall be extended, the American Government will be disposed to grant in increasing degree the aspirations of your people. Nothing cou ld more regrettably affect the relations of the t}vo peoplE!s than that the Filipinos shou ld commit themselves to a program calculated t{_) inspire the fear, that possibly the governmental concessions already made have 1fen in any measure prem·ature.

\ The veterans of our Revolution, wiser because of t heir experience of 1899, had warned our leaders. They said: "It is useless to take a ant attitude towards America. She is a strong nation and we are ak. We have no arms at our command except persuasion and diplocy." And it is because of that attitude of our veterans that Aguin,ildo who in the armed confHct in 1899, had been called a bandit, became ill\ the eyes of many Americans, the greatest living Filipino, and the leader~. who led a policy of non-cooperation, were termed cheap politicians an\i demagogues.

COOPERA'l'ION WITH TAFT AND STIMSON

The two outstanding examples of Filipino cooperation with AmerJean Governors-General who afterwards reached high posts in t heir country, have, in the long run, proved disastrous to the cause of our country or to the leaders who cooperated with t hem. I refer to the late William H. Taft and Henry L. Stimson. In these two outstanding instances, it was they who have received the lion's shar-e in the bargain of cooperation .

'J!HIE PHIUPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS

Mr. Taft came here when the revolutionists were still in the field of fighting America tooth and nail. With his slogan of "The Philippines for the Filipinos," with his disavowal of the ultra-imperialistic tendencies of the militarists, and with his plan of establishing ci vii government here, he won the friendship of the existing leaders-the F ederalists under Tavera. Under the aegis of peace, harmony, and cooperation, Mr. Taft and the Federalists sat cheek by jowl at the council table. E verything that the Federalists did seemed to get t he approval of Mt. Taft. The closest friendship and attachment were developed bet ween the Federalist leader, IDr. Tavera, and Mr. Taft. When Dr. Tavera enunciated his plan of federation or ultimate statehood, Mr. Taft kept quiet. When Dr. T.aver a got into difficulties wit h the American members of the Commission headed by Mr. Tan, Mr. Taft seemed to side wit h Dr. Tavera. E veryt,hing went beautifully. Mr. Taft needed the F eder alists in order to make his administration in the Philippines a success. He needed them to make a good showing before the American public. However, as soon as he left the Philippines, his attachment to the leaders and his interest in the Philippines began to wane. He had to ser ve the broader American interests. Whe.n he was asked at t he Senate hearing as to the Federalist plan of ultimate statehood, he denied its having any value in the Philippines, and intimated that he was against it. Sometime later, to the great disappointment of Dr. Ta era, an American member of the Commission with whom he had serious misundl'r standings was appointed Governor-General. "I pr epared a strong letter to Mr. Taft," Dr. Tavera confessed to the writer once, "asking why he made th; t appointment inasmuch as when he was he11e he made me understand that he would never do it." The letter was never sent. The plain fact was that once Taf>t was out of the Phrlippines, with all the friendship and personal 11egard that he might have for Tavera, the Federalist leader could no longer be of any political help to him. Something similar has happened in the case of Mr. Stimson and the Nationalist .leaders. With all the reputation that the late Governor Wood had, Washington was getting uneasy as to the situation in t he Philippines resulting from the Governor's conflict with the leadei·s. The one who could clear up the situation, who could place t he count ry bac.k in normal conditions, who could r-egain the cooper ation of t he leaders, would have a r ecord for diplomacy that could be made a stepping-stone to higher office. Such an opportunity the far-sighted Secretar y Stimson saw. He was p1·obably convinced t hat Governor Wood had gone a little too far and he was willing to return some of the lost prerogatives to the leaders. But he was playing for gi·eater stakes. On the other hand, the leaders saw t hat the conflict was not giving them immediate political advantages, hence they were ready to welcome a policy of cooperat ion-. Sure enough there were some changes made by Mr. Stimson. The leaders proudly pointed out the fact that under St imson t he Council of State was r e-established, party government wa r eturned, and Stimson 's interp1·etation of control and supervision over the executive departments

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

was not as autocratic as Wood's. He approved t he amendment to the rules of procedure of both Houses giving cabin~t members t he privilege of t he floor. No Filipino student of Philippine Government can ignore these changes from the absolutism of Wood. We may, however, wonder whether t hese things could compensate for what Mr. Stimson secured in their place and for what he afterwards did and is likely yet to do against the cause of independence. T):,e first and foremost gain resulting from the bargain for him is his promotion to the position of Secretary of State, based chiefly on the fact that he was able to return Philippine political situation to a normal state. The Legislature was forced to swallow a measure known as the Belo Act on the plea that if they did not approve t he bill, t he American Congress would do it. The bill approved P250,000 to be spent at the discretion of the Governor-General in hiring his technical assistants and in other matters. What we did· not realize at the beginni ng and even up to the end of his rule was that behind all his activities and his concessions, and behind his elaborate economic plan, was his decisive purpose not only to oppose the independence aspirations but to kill its agitation here. True, Mr. Stimson was able to make the Philippines return to "normalcy."' He became a staunch opponent of restriction to Philippine trade. He left exchanging bouquets ,vith the leaders whom he classified as statesmen. Up to Japan, they seemed to be still on the very best of terms. But the minute he reached American soil, he made the statement that he had been able to. kill independence agitation in the Philippines. This, naturally, the leaders did not like. He repeated the statement at the committeei hearing a yea r ago w hen he said that he had made an 3rgi·eement with the leaders not to agitate for independence. He insinuated at a Congressional hearing in the presence of Speaker Roxas and Senator Sumulong that he had been asked by the· leaders to speak at the !\earing against independence. Fortunately, this was denied then and there by Speaker Roxas and Senator Sumulong, The Filipino people, therefore, n o longer consider ed him as their frier.d.

A TRYING SITUATION

The eternal dilemma of cooperation is this: If we cooperate unconditionally, if we show no signs of protest, that means that we are happy, that we have no ambition. Therefore no changes are necessary; we are no longer for independence. If we rebel and protest, that is a sign of irresponsibility or lack of tact, of struggling against the impossible. We are getting to be a bad boy and we must be ~panked. What a trying sit uation that is ! It is a sit~ation that breeds in our public men opportunism, inconsistency, hypocrisy. What has been the tenor of their work so far? Fencing with the Washnigton government, humoring the vagaries of various Governors-General whose governmental policies can be as different, -as conflicting as night and day. To keep

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

their party in power they have been forced to magnify before the people a dinner at the White House as a colossal triumph, a hearing in Congress as a decisive political concession, a tr.ip on t he Governor's yacht as the reversal of a governmental policy. To use the American expression, they are ever ''between the devil and the deep sea." If they show a determined and uncompromising attitude towards the .American government, constantly harping on independence, they are accused of disloyalty, and are called agitators and demagogues, yet they may be simply following the popula, desire. If they show a desire to cooperate, to follow American wishes and to stop the independence agitation, American papers may elevate them to the category of statesmen, but our people call them weak and vacillating and brand them as untrue to the national ideals. T.hey have been forced to juggle with the political situation merely instead of required to grapple freely with actual economic and political problems. Under such circumstances our best minds are diverted into most unprofitable channels. The only way out is independence.

CHAPTER VI

OUR TARIFF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES Some people believe that the issue in America is independence or the continuation of our present trade relations without any modification. 'Phat seems to be not the issue at all. What to my mind will be decided by the Amexican people is whether to give independence to the Philippines or to keep her and at the same time to limit or tax the entry of our products which compete with American products and prohibit the entry of Filipino laborers in America. I am convinced that if we do not get our independence we are bound to lose a great deal of the trade privileges ·that we are enjoying and the freedom to go to America. The real issue is independence or economic discrimination; independence or inequality under the Americ;an flag. If the discriminatory legislation proposed last year was t emporarily checked in America it was chiefly because the solution offered by our leaders which is independence would meet the purpose of American interests. 9:'he blow was 1;1ot given because they wanted to protect Philippine indust'vies. It was stopped temporai:ily because a better solution, to their mind, was offered which would suit their objective and that is political separation. My reasons for believing that we are not always likely to receive 1 justice in tariff matters from America is the history of our tariff relaj,ions wjth her which I am going to review briefly. In our taviff. ;elations with the United States it must be confessed that American interests have dominated from beginning_ to end. 'F,he interests of Filipino con~umers and Filipino farmers have been neglected or sacrificed when such ·nterests conflicted with American capital. Upon the establishment of American rule, the old tarif:li arrangeents under the Spanish regime continued and, at least from the stand~oint of revenue, it was satisfactory. American products were received i'i' the Philippines on equal footing witl! fo;eign products, and simila~ly, the Dingley tariff of the United States imposed foll-rate duties on Phili~pine goods. But American businessmen wei:e not satisfied with this state of equality and many complaints auose. A dem(lnd fo.l' the revision of the old Spanish tariff arrangements was made for the sole purpose of giving nreference to the United States in the classification of goods. The Philippine Commission was forced to revise the tariff and by authority of the President, passed the Tariff Act of 190L

THE TAR,IFF 0F 1901

'I'he Tariff of 1901 discriminated in favor of American producers and manufacturers. Djsc~iminatory provisions on textiles, wine, beer,

36 '

THE PHl'LIPPINE ~UESIJ'ION- AN ANAL¥SIS

and canned goods were prominent. ln some nespects, it was an abominable tariff, for it taxed the poor rather than the rich. Take the case of coa,i•se cloth which was taxed much more heavily than the fine ones. 'l'he bu.den of taxation fell heavily on the poor who bought dothes made of coar-se materials, whlle the rich who could afford to buy fine linen and cotto!l clothes were favpred . by the tariff. Wine and beer were taxed in favor of American products as against wine and beer froI!l other countries. It was a brazen effort to foster American trade. Naturally, the scheme was displeasing to foreign competitors. The principle of benefitiing t he Filipino consumers was completely forgotten. When we add to this the unpopularity of the then collector of customs and his arbitrary rulings which always favor ed American merchants, we must record a sonry chapter in the first pages of the tariff relations between the Philippines and t he United States. To favor American merchants the American government was forced into t he sad spectacle of violating the Tneaty. of Paris signed wit h Spain. · Article IV of the Treaty provides: "The T'.Jnited States will, for tihe term of fen years from the date of the .exchange of the ratifications of t he present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports o:1! the Philippine Islands on the sam_e terms as ships and merchandise of the United States." And in the Tariff of 1901 discriminations wene made in favor of American goods. An American economist, Mr. Hoxie, speaking on the taniff in 1901, said that t he ~hilip,pine Commission, "exercised the right to use the tariff as a means for trade discrimination agaiust colonial possessions." <rHE· <rARIF F 0F 1902

But t he American merchants were not satisfied and they demanded more and more, so there was another tariff act in 1902, which was a re. enactment by Cong,.ess of the Tariff of ,1901· with modifications. It was again a tariff to benefit Amevican business inte,·ests. In spite of the fact that the Philippine Commission demanded reduction of duties on Philippine goods to t he li.Jnited States, no such reductions were appvoved. ln vain did Ci<vil Governor Taft plead fov 50 % reduction. The Tar.iff of 1902 repealed the e.xport duties, but only in so far as the United States was concerned. 'Fhe duties on goods e.xported to foreign countries remained. There was also another very outrageous feature of the TariJif of 1902, with r,egard to Philippine hemp. The export duty levied on it upon leaving the Philippines for the United States was refunded by the Philippine government to American importers in the United States. rn thls way much money was taken kom t he people and given to the hemp importers in America. It cer tainly looked as if the Admfaistration wanted to enrieh a few Americans at ~he expense of the Philippines. The report of t he Philippine Commission, as of June 30, 1906, states that up to tihat period, $1,471,208.4'1, or nearly three million pesos, had been 'given as a gi:fit to the hemp trusts. knd the Philippine Commission composed in its ma9ority of .Americans, us.ed as hard a language as I am

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTI©N- AN ANALYSIS

using now, when in commenting upon this gif t, it said : "These manufacturers were already prosperous before t his bounty was given t hem and it seems hardly consistent wit h our expressions of purpose to build up and develop the Philippine Islands when we are thus enriching a few of our own people at their expense. . . . . . . This nwney has been- taken

out of the poverty of the insular treasury to be dleliveredi dfllrectltiJ vnto the hands of manufacturers of cordage and other users of Phtili ppine hemp in the United States for thein· enrichment . ... . .. . " In t he face of such dowmight !\'raft perpetrated with t he consent of the Congress of th.e United States, how can we say that we have always been treat ed benevolently by tbe American government in tariff matters? THE TARIFF OF 1905

Agitation in favor of free trnde between the United States and the Philippines grew. Some honestly believed that this would benefit the Philippines because t hey lost their market in Spain, and therefor e they should be given a new market in America. But the beet, sugar and tooacco interests in America were opposed to free trade believing t hat it would unduly compete with American sugar and tobacco interests. There was also an agitation against the r efund of the export duties on h emp to American hemp import~rs but this opposition did not prosper. ''Fhe jl'ariff Act of March 3, 1905, was approved without many changes exbept in t he reduction of duties on iron and steel, cotton, yam s, wheat and ,flour, and refined sugar, and increased rates on :vaw cotton, raw wool, woolen fra~ns, rice and raw sugar, and 1,he insertion of mor e articles on the Jlree ' ist. The export tax was continued. On the whole, this was an improvement over the previous tariff law, put t he same discriminatory nature was shown. The following year, bongress again amended the Tariff Act of 1905. THE !l'ARIFF OF 1906

On February 26, 1906, Congress amended the Taviff Act of 1905, and nother discviminatory practice was allowed where the insidious hands df certain American interests manifested t hemselves. The Act of 1906 Pfovided for a relatively low duty on cotton goods produced with narrow cotton fabrics. T.lie reason was simple; the foreign countries produced t1ie double width goods, hence they must be heavily taxed. 11',he refund tax on hemp had been found so iniquitous as to demand its immediate r epeal, but nothing was dope. THE TARIFF AC'F OF 1909

By 1909 the inhibition in t he Treaty of Paris with regard to equality 0f treatment between Spain and American goods was lifted, hence more discviminatory legislation could now be passed. Id' formerlii,' the Ame,ican administration was bold enough to \'iolate the Treaty of Paris in or-

'llHE PH:,J ,UPPINE QUES'lllON-AN ANALYSIS de, to pass discriminatory legislation in favor of American goods, to what extent would it now go when no ureaty prohibitions r,estricted its powers? '11he movement for, free trade in the United States grew stronger, but the repr,esentati,v e from the Philippines at Washington, Don Pablo Ocampo, t hen Resident Commissioner, opposed it on t he ground t hat it meant monopoly by the 'United States of Philippine products. The sugar and tobs1cco interests in t he United States were still opposed to complete free t rade, hen~e they succi;eded in limiting Bhili ppine sugar that was shipped to the Uni.ted States to 300,000 tons a year, and tobacco, to 150,000,000 dgar,s. .Ml the other American interests were in favor of free trade not because they favoved the Philippines, but because they were convinced that that would be to their own interests. The export duties were continued although somewh at r educed. By t he Act of 1909, t herefore, t here was complete open door for American goods of all des-cription but not for Philippine goods; for besides tobacco and sugar, Philippine rice was completely pr,ohibited from entering American market. O.f course t his prohibition was of no consequence because t he Philippines had been for many years a rice importing country. The pr.ovisions was inserted because of the fear entertained by the rice growers of t he South. This fact again illustrates the tendency-natm,a:l enough- to support American interests iirst and..Philippine .interests second. THE TARIFF OF 1913

By the Ta,riff Act of 1913 most of the restrtctions to free trade were eliminated; but only when th American interests found that such an elimination would not be a det riment to their own business. Yet it is not tr ue that we have now com11lete free trade, for while all American goods are admitted free, Philippine goods with 2<Yo/o of foreign material are excluded from the list of free goods t hat could enter the United States. Speaking of the disadvantages of the present ta riff relations wit!\ 1Jhe United States, t he Bu11eau of <Gommerce and Industry of the Philippines, in its memorandum to <Go!. 'I\hompson said: In the first place, while thei:e is a per,feot trade reciprocity between the two countries in so far as "all aTticles, the growth oii proauct" of either countr.y is concerned, there is no equal tr-ade opporbunity in the case of manufnctured goods. For an article manufactul'ed in the Philippines to enter the United States free, it must be made of: 100 per cent Philippine material, or American materials, or Philippi.neAmer,ican materi als. But for, an article manufactured in the liJnited States to enter the Philippine Islands free, it is suificient thatl it is a "manufacture of the United States." It may consist of any material, native or foreign, nnd the slightest change made on it by any manufacturing process within the United States makes it a "manufacture of\ the l!l' nited States, 11 entitled to free entry in the .Philippine Islands. In the !reeond place, in orde1· that an article manufactured in the Philippines with Philippine-foreign materials or American-foreign materials, may enter the United States free ofi dUty, it must 0 not contain foreign materials to the value of more than 20 pe'r cent of its total value, upon which no drawbnck of cu~toms duties has been allowed in the Philippines." 0n the other habd, an article manufactured in the United States which contains foreign materials, upon which no drawback hes been

THE PHILIPPINE Q"\)ESTJON- AN ANALYSIS

allowed in that country, even to the extent of 100 per cent of its value, enters the Philippines free of duty. Philippine cmbro"ideries and ground coffee from the United St.ates are in point. In -riew of the 20-per-cent-foreign-materinl limitation, P hilippine embro idery manufacturers are limited to the production for exportation to the United States of underwears, infants\ dresses, table sets, waists and such other embroidered articles as would not contain more than 20 per cent foreign materials. On the other hand, Brazi1ian coffee seeds, roasted, ground and packed in the United States are exported to the Phi1ippine Islands free of duty. In the third place, while the drawback provision is equally applicable to both, it is more advantageous to the United States than to the Philippine Islands. If an article manufactured in the United States contains foreign material s to the value o! 100 per cent of its total value, upon wh ich no drawback is a llowed in t hat country, it is admitted in the Philippine I slands duty-free. But if an article manufactured in the Philippine Islands contai ns foreign materials to the value of 100 per cent of its total value, upon which no drawback is allowed here, it is subject to a duty t}te amount of which will be based upon the value in excess of the 20 per cent of the total value of the article. In other words, it is duty-free to the extent of 20 per cent, but dutiable on the basis of the excess over and above 20 per cent of its value.

As a matter of fact, to what extent are our products protected in American markets? We protect American products, all of them, because we close our" doors by levying tariff on all products coming from other countries. What does America give us in r eturn? Under present tariff arrangements, the principal products protected by America are coconut oil, shredded and desicated coconut meat, sugar, tobacco and embroideries. We have to admit that in case the Philippines is treated, in tariff matters, like a foreign country, these protected products will suffer. A certain period of readjustment will be necessavy so as to find other markets. This fact has been over emphasized by Americans like Ex-Governor Stimson and Secretary Hur ley. A Filipino lobbyist who is reported to be under the employ of American interests, Mr. Villamin, went so far as to say: Separation from America means • • • destruction of industries, depletion df foreign and domestic commerce; high taxation and low taxpaying capacity; poverand unemployment. 1

In this connection we want to quote what another Filipino economist, i rofessor J ose P . Apostol, said:

Undoubtedly there will have to be made some changes in our productive enterprises, but I can not agree with Mr. Villamin that "the bulk of the total Philippine export will be effectively shut off from America." For three reasons. First, it can be assumed that the pres'i,nt United States tariff law which places copra, hemp and maguey on the free list or on favorab le terms would be continued. It is reasonable to suppose that the U. S. A. will not be fo olish enough to shut out tth,ese p)"oducts just because the P. I. is separated politically. Second, it is a mistake · to t hink t hat all of our sugar, tobacco, coconut oil, copra cake, embroide ry and the other oxports are dependent entirely on protection. That only a part of these exports to thf> United States-how much nobody can tell-is dependent is obvious i1 we examine one by one the nature of t hese products. Third, our sugar which constituted 31 % 1

Th e Pfrilippi:ne Social Science Review, May, 1931, Vol. III, No. 3, p. 267.

THE PHILIPPINE QlJESTION- AN ANALYSIS

of our export to the U. S. A. would not be as dependent now as it used to be in 1903, because since the World War, we have adopted up-to-date-methods of production, thus lowering the costs. Fourth, whatever portion of our exports will be shut off will be absorbed pantly or wholly by other countries, for if we lower our customs duties on their goods, especially if we raise the rates on products coming from the U. S. A. until they are on the same level, we shall be able to consume more of their goods. l 1

All t hese supposedly economic advantages are not given us as a matter of gift, but because they do not conflict with American interests. Whenever Philippine interests conflict with American interests, Philippine interests will always be as they have always been, sacrificed . That is why several states like California and Washington succeeded in passing anti-Philippine oil bills prac6ically violating our free trade relations with America, for Philippine oil conflicts with American dairy interests and American interests must be served first. Control of the tariff is the keynote to American economic imperialism in the Philippines. Even in t he so-ealled Fairfield Bill, the tariff relations between the United States and the Philippines are to remain in t he hands of t he American Congress. We have a lways been denied t hat fundamental right of tariff autonomy, a right as sacr ed as the right 1 to liberty and tlie pursuit of happiness; for to quote Adam Smith, ' "Fo prohibit a great people froin making all that they can 01 every part of t heir own product or from employing t heir stock and their industry in th e way t hat they judge most advantageously to themselves, is a manifest violation of the most sacr ed rights of mankind." No greater critic of America's policy can be found than a prominent member of the United States Tariff Commission himself, Mr. William Smith Culbertson. In his book on lnte,-.iati.onal Economic Policies, a recognized t reatise on t he subject, he says: In developing their close-door policy in the Philippines, the American people have maintained an attitude both naive and uncritical. At the some time that they have urged the open door in Chinn, they have enacted discriminatory legislation in the Philippines. Only occasionally has a voice been raised against the inconsistency of suoh a position. Genuinely liberal forces hnve at times even sanctioned it on grounds of justice · to the Filipinos and fairness to America. Our policy, however, appears less broad when compared with that of the French in Indo-Ohina and the Italian in Eritrea, or when viewed not from the purely nationalistic standpoint but from that of world policy.

Those who gloat upon t he apparent prosperity which the Philippines receive because of t he present trade relations with the United States, will do well to r ead the following observations by the same American authority whose soundness cannot be disputed by fair-minded people : Wihe closed door is in confli ct with the interest of colonies themselves. It limits their development. It is true that preference in the mn1·kets of the mother country at times benefit colonial producers, but the number of people benefited is always limited and the ultimate gains nre not likely to be commensurable with the losses. The close-door policy as it has been npplied has for its chief objective the profits oi certnin groups of manufacturers and traders in the mother country. Preferences in import tariffs of colonies benefit the producers of manufactu1·ed articles in the l Philippine Social S c i01100 Rov-iew,

May, 1931, p. 267.

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS

mother country, while preferences in export taxes give advantages to the industries consuming raw materials in the mother country. In either case the basis of these. preferences is exploitation. They are a product of the old colonial theory that colonies exist for the benefit of the mother country, or, rather !or the benefit of certain classes in it.

I believe that the foregoing will show that we have not been so magnanimously treated in the past as regards ti-ade matters, as some Americans would have us believe. Our present trade relations are not at all absolutely fair. It is one-sided. Certain products of ours have been benefited it is true, but the history of our trade r elations will prove that we are running into the danger of losing the benefits that we have had for sugar and Philippine oil which conflict with similar products in America. Nay, I am positive that we cannot fight those American manufacturers and traders successfully. They have the money and the votes. They elect senators and representatives and their lobbyists are strong. Even with the help of local Americans here, we cannot beat them. Judging from our history we cannot but conclude that we are allowed to progress economically only so long as such progress will not conflict with American products. Speaker Roxas was right when he said that the highest economic development in the Philippines has been reached under the American flag. From now on it will be on the decline, for competition has come. Let me repeat that the real issue in America is independence or economic discrimination, independence or inequality under the American flag. What sort of a place should we have under American rule if we become the victim of discrimination and inequality? The t merican flag will no longer symbolize freedom, equality and square deal. Add to this the fact that the uncertainty as to our future prevents inversion of capital and we come to the conclusion that political separation is also an economic imperative. In the long run it will mean a sounder and more stable economic development. ·1 I

1 TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES COMPARED WITH ALL OTHER COUNTRIES

ear;;;-:1;~ Trade with, the United States Total Trade Per cent of total trade \ Pesos 1899. . . . . . . . ).900. . . 1901. 1902 . . . . . . . . 1903.... 1904 . . .. ... 1906 . . . .... 1906. . . . . . 1907. . . 1908 . . . .. . .. 1909 .. . ..... 1910 . .......

10,576,682 10,228,098 16,161,094 31,258,244 33,817,052 33,607,676 40,860,706 32,694,360 30,793,860 31,106,182 42,343,688 74,620,634

16 11

15 26 26 28 32 27 24 26 32 41

Trade with. all other count,rin Total trade Pesos 67,602,454 86,48 0,206 93,170,664 92,769,896 98,699,208 83,946,886 86,149,942 86,398,970 96,309,604 92,409,202 89,673,824 106,076,114

THEl PHI!JIPPINEl QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS

1911 . . 78,159,228 1912.... 94,382,034 1913. . 86,220,558 1914. 96,878,222 1915. . . . . 100,068,560 1916.. . .. 117,021,611 1917... .201,710,012 1918. . . . . 296,943,059 1919. , . .264,288,213 1920. . . .... 396,012,081 1921. . . . ... 248,973,616 1922 ........ 223,699,862 1923 . . . ..... 2~0,799, l il.6 1924.... . .316,426,0 11 1926. . . . 366,686,049 1926 . . . . 343,167,666 1927 . ....... 875,033,094

1928. 1929. 1930.

..... 398,887,8.86 . . 434,116,863 .367,060,179

42 40 42 50 48 51 62 63 57 66 61 63 65 66 66 67 69 69 70 72

107,663,840 138,800,368 115,960,926 97,678,352 106,181,815 113,845,429 121,092,662 171,644,328 199,226,643 206,112,196 168,934,177 127,862,033 146,706,358 171,286,104 180,636,028 169,208,967 167,818,019 180,635,002 189,097,3?1

146,469,983

CHAPTER.

VII

AMERICA GOVERNS 0N MISINFORMATION If America governs by means of public opinion and public opinion cannot exist without some information, the conclusion with r egard to Philippine government is that America has governed the Philippines on misinformation. This is another r eason why the present sit uation is most unwholesome and artificial. It should prove that a democracy such as America, is incapable of governing an alien people. One of the gFeatest contributions of American democr acy is the influence of public opinion. The government acts, to paraphrase M,. Bryce, at the behest of public opinion, wit hout such public opinion being necessarily expressed in term$ of the ballot. But public opinion cannot act without information and the information that America r eceives on the PhUippines is most unfortunately biased and one-sided. The real facts seldom, if ever, get into the press. The Filipino side has not had a chance for presentation. This is due first , to the fact that the American administration in Washington has a means of propaganda t hat is unequalled ; second, because of the American newspaper practice that "When a dog bites a man, it is not considered news for the press ; but when a man 9ites a dog it is news for publication." MISREPRESENTATION DURING THE FIDIPINO-AMER.ICAN WAR.

( When the American administration for the first tinie decided to extend its rule over the Philippines, it met with the traditional American feeling against the government of alien peoples. This feeling was molded *Y such documents as the Declaration of Independence whenein it is denlared "that governments derive theh, just powers from tbe consent of tihe governed," and by such men as Abraham Lincoln, who declared that ' no man is good enough to rule another man without that man 's' consent." 1'!Je American administration, however, cleverly replied in r eturn t hat ~~ese principles would not apply in t he Philippines because the Filipinos in general, welcomed American rule. President McKinley assured the Alm:erican nation that it was not the Filipino people that was opposing American :rule but "one of the eighty t nibes" inhabiting the Islands. He was loudest in his assurance to his people that his manifestos and the foncible extension of American sovereignty were welcomed by the majority of the Filipino people. After nearly a year of constant fighting, when most American officials had confessed t hat they had undevvalued the determination and tenacity of the Filipino insungents, and when he himself had alveady sent about 80,000 soldiers to the Islands, he still asserted t hat the majonity of the Filipino people favored American rule. "I had reason to believe," he said in his message of December, 1899, "and

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS

I still believe tbat this transfer of sovereignty was in accordance with the wishes and the aspirations of the great masses of the Filipino people." Did the American people have then any chance to know t he truth about the Philippines, the tenacity with which the war was fought and the flagrant violation of t he principles of self-determination and the consent of the governed ? CONSENT OF GOVERNED VIOLATED

Yet we can now produce American writers who had to acknowledge t he practically unanimous Filipino opposition to American rule. Charles B. Elliott,· who served under a, Republican administr ation in the Islands first as associate justice of the supreme court and late,· as Secretary of Commerce and Police, in his comprehensive and scholarly book on the Philippines described the popular support of the Revolutionary Government at "the time of the opening of hostilities in the following words : (1) It is idle to assert that the mass of the people ol Luzon and the central islands were not at that time in sympathy with the attempt to drive the Americans from the country and establish an independent government. (l)

"The people," said General MacArthur, "seem to be actuated by the idea that , in all doubtful matters of politics or war, men ar e never nearer right than when going with their own kith ana kin, r egardless of t he nature of the action or of its remote consequences." ( 2) Captain Taylor who collected t he Philippine Insurgent Records but whose historical r.esume is so brazenly anti-Filip ino that Secretary of War Taft refused to sanction its ptlblication, could not but agree to the state. ment that the Filipinos were a unit against American rule. Speaking · of the government of the r evolutionists, he said : It must be remembered that it was favored, or at least accepted, by the great majority of the people of the archipelago. (;_i)

Thus it can be plainlf seen that when America decided upon the policy of retention-a policy that concerned the hopes and happiness of an entire people-she acted on misr epresented facts. And from that time on her public opinion has been f01·med upon similai· exaggerations and misinformations. 'IJHE ADMINIS'IJRATION'S PROPAGANDA

Ame1·ican governois of the Philippines, from Mr. Taft down to Mr. Forbes, saw to it t hat the American press was constantly supplied with reports of their work in the Islands. They were aided in this work of publicity by t he War lilepartirnent. As t he Amer.ican people r ead these r eports, they were nat urally filled wit h pride over such a nol'> le work. (1) Elliott1 The Philippin.Gs, To tho Elld of tho Military Regime, p. 467. (2) Report of t.ho Liout. Ge11~ Comma,rdfng the Army, 1900 Pt. 3, p. 61.

(") Taylor, Vol. 11, 68 HS.

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-A N ANALYSIS

They beheld a people alleged to be semi-barbarou s drawn out from the deep recesses of tropical jungles into the sunlight of civilization; they saw good roads built where there had been, according to r eports, nothing but the trails of the head-hunters; costly hospitals erected where t her e had been disease-breeding huts; t hey pictured splendid school-houses towering over vast wildernesses, children r ecruited, pestilence stopped, commer ce enhanced. In every phase of this development t hey saw only t he ingenious hand of t he pioneer American. The cooperation of t he F ilipinos was hardly mentioned. So convinced wer e the American people of t he utility of the great work said t o be in progress in t he Philippines that they elevated to the chief execut ive post of t he nation t he man whose greatest claim to that high office was his record as governor of t he Philippines, William H. Taft. Many of the administration 's publicity agents have gone to t he extreme of deliber at ely misr epresenting conditions in t he Philippines sla ndering the entire Filipino people, and picturing them as a mere conglomer ation of contemptible savage t ribes separated from one another by age-long jealousies and hat r ed. They sent Igorrotes to the St. Louis E xposit ion who created in the minds of hundreds of thousands of Americans the indelible impression that the Filipinos have not yet emerged from savagery. '!lhere was hardly a magazine in the Union which did not embellish its pages with photographs of "head-hunters, " directly or indir ectly con,;eying to the lay mind that they were typical Filipinos. There was hardly a newspaper that did not open its columns to bizarre stories of t he wonderful transform ation of these savage Filipinos that was being wr ought. American audiences have been regaled with the same stories, supplemented qy pictures and told with moue vividness, even wibh the glamour of romance, because the lecturer himself had been on the scene of action and )jad participated in the great enterprise. And the men most responsible for this kind of campaign have r edeived princely salaries from the pockets of the F ilipino people ! I In order that I may not be deemed unfai r in delineating this mental a\ttitude of the American official in the Islands and his foregone conversion to believe in the incapacity of the Filipino people, I shall quote the c~nfession of an ex-official himself, a former mem'ber of t he Philippine Commission, the Hon. W. Morgan Shuster. He wr ote in t he " Century Magazine" for Janua ry, 1914 : The record s of our congressional committee and of the war department are filled with reports, speeches, ]etters, testimony, and statistics going to show what the party then in power wanted the American people to think about the Filipinos. If any one thought differently, he became at once, in official eyes, a dreamer, an antiimperiali st, or a demagogu e. Hi s opinions were taboo in hi gh governmental circl es, and he was deemed an unsafe man to hold important office. 'Fhis was only natural, and I recall it merely to show how the opinion of th e Am erican people on th e qu es-tion has really been formed. The opinion of the ordinary American citi zen as to the Filipinos is largely influenced by the statements or the pronouncements o( the very few men in public life who have had, or were thought to have had, exceptional faci l• ities for knowing the real facts and situation. Thus the views of Ex• Presidcnts Roose•

'FHlE PH!IIJI•PPINIE Ql!JES11I0N-A,N ANALYSIS

velt and 'Da:lit, of Ex-Secretary of War Roo\ of Senator: l!todge, of the different Philippine governor.s and members of the l?hilippine Commission, of the commanding generals who have served in the Islands have been the real source of "American public opinion." As a matter of fact, it is doubtful wllether the views of any of these gentlemen were reached iru a strictly impartial and judicial manner. With the possible exception of M,r. 'Faft, t hey took up tho subject, as I did, with a previously formed conv iction tliat the facts ·1ifere g oing t o sustai1i. ths accepted goverm:ment belief and policy, whfoh were that the Fil11pinos we·re not fit to be, amd should not of right be, indepen.denb, at least for a very fo ng t-ime to co me . How long, few ventured to predict.

Possibly the newspaper practice that " when a dog bites a ~an it is not news, but when a man bites a dog it is good news" is acceptable newspaper ethics; but such a practice has caused incalculable harm to the Philippine cause. As we have seen, the Filipino people have been exp1,essing their opinion in favor of independence since Amei;ican rule, at first rather vigorously with bullets and then later with the more ci viii-zed means of the ballot. E very year there is a resolut ion approved by the Legislature in favor of immediate, complete, and absolute independence. Such an attitude has pi;obably ceased to become news. What is news is the Filipino opposition to independence. If there is the tiniest individual opposed to freedom, then he is likely to be played up and his name may become a national one in America. He is likely to be employed by American papers or inte1·ests. Thus, the only two or three known Filipinos opposed to early independence are employed either as lobbyists in Ame1·ica or as write1·s for the American dailies. A Dr. Alemany who does not repi;esent more than twenty people was last year herald<!d as heading a strong national association against independence and his name was flashed to the Amenican press; while the r esolution of the Independence Oongress of 2,000 members, represent ing all activities in t he Islands was gi,,en the scantiest of mention. The opinion of a Mt. Villamin said to be in the pay of American interests, would be given greater importance in the Amei;ican press than the opinion of the Legislature, th~ constitutional representatives o:£ thirteen million people! With the coming into power of the Democrats in America who had a policy more in favor of independence than the previous administration, there was a noticeable change<. T,he Filipino Resident Oommissioners were given a chance to play a more important part. A commission of independence was established by law in the Philippines with an appropriation of 'Pl,000,000 for publicity work in America. But when the Republicans came back to power t his appropriation was declar ed unconstitutional. And thus the pi;act ice that only the administration can be amply presented to the American people was again supreme. PRESENJJl AJJlTITUDE MISREPRESENT ED

It is surprising how t wo OF three correspondents can do so much harm to the cause of Philippine justice. fn their news service to America1 t hey belittle everything that savors of independence. Every little thing said here which may be construed as in favor of delayed inde-

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

pendence would be flashed to America in r adiant colors. Ther e is a conspiracy of silence with regard to t he supr eme and overwhelming aspirations of the Filipinos for independence. F or instance the dispatches sent last May to America by American correspondents gave t he full assurance that the Filipinos had modified their demand for independence. The American papers published, the news with the following headline: " FILIPINOS DROP DEMAND FOR FULL INDEPENDENCE, Leaders of Both Parties Publish Marufestoes as American Commission Arrives; FILIPINOS MODIFY INDEPENDENCE PLEA ; Disposition grows to accept a Compromise, such as Senator Vandenberg's 30-Year Plan." What has been the r eal temper of the Filipino people during this time? At this writing, September, 1931, and for the last few months, the independence agitation has reached unprecedented heights. On July 12, 1931, on the occasion of the presence of Senator Hawes in the Islands, one of the a uthors of the Hawes-Cutti ng Bill, a mammoth parade of over 200,000 people was held in Manila. The American correspondents in their dispatches to America saw fit to minimize it and even cha rged the students who participated in it with having been forced or compelled to attend by the professors. The Filipino students concerned telegraphed to America saying the charge was not true; but the misrepresentation has continued. So stupendous was this demonstration that tbe MANILA DAILY BULLETIN, the American-owned anti-independence daily in the Philippines in its issue of July 16th was forced to admit: Sunday's independence parade was undoubtedly the largest and most stirring demonstration of its kind ever held in the Philippine Is1ands. There has been no attempt in any quarter to minimize the significance of the turnout or the number of people attending, although the Bulletin learns that it has been criticized for placing its estimates too low. The num ber who came to march and to watch was conser• vatively estimated in Monday morning's edition at 150,000 people. • • • Other Manila newspapers said 250,000 were present. This is a possible figure. It represents the highest estim ate quoted in Monday's Bulletin. No one knows how many were there. The crowd was unbelievably large. • • • As a demonstration of patriotism Sunday's independence parade was a stirring thing broad in spirit and broad in every aspect. As a national expression it reached heights rarely touched in the day-to.day life of a big city. '* • •

At about the same time a new Legislature was being convened and it m, t on July 16, 1931. On that same date, the following Independence Resolution was unarumously approved : CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ASKING THE CONGRE SS OF THE' UNITED STATES TO GRANT IMMEDIATELY COMPLETE AND ABSOLUTE INDEPENDENCE TO THE PHILI PPINE ISLANDS. Resolved by the House of Representatives, the Philippine Senate concurring, That the petition to the Congress of the United States of America, asking that the Philippines be granted immed iate, complete and absolute independence be, and the same hereby is, reiterated. Adopteci, July 16, 1931.

I am sure this r esolution approved unanimously was never given any mention in America.

WHE PHILll/PINiE ~l!JES'llION- A,N ANALYSIS A:GUINALDO AND INDEPENDEN©E

Anotiher source of misrepresentation has been the alleged attitude of GeneFal Aguinaldo against independence. Time and agai·n American covrespondents have sent artides to tihe United States stating that General Ag;uinaldo l\ad changed from an independence ad,vocate into a supportes of , etenti0n. An arbic1e in that tenor appeaned in the Saiur.da!y Evening Post several years ago under t he signature of a well-known American journalist. I hastened to call on the General to ask fer h is rectification. He was suFprised when l showed him the article. "It is true that he visited me," he said, "but he never asked me t hose questions," he added. He gladly dictated his rectification, which I cabled to America with his signatut·e. During the visit of Senator Harvy B. Hawes, the Senat:or requested him to state his views which he did gladly in writing wherein he said : I ~elieve that a delay of twenty or thirty years in the concession of Philipp ine independence will work irreparable harm to the cause of economic and political progress, aside fr om t he fact tha t during such a long period of time new difficulties might a rise which would necessitate f urther postponement of the grant. At present, t he country is litera lly mortgaged to t he United States. Twent)T yea-rs henc.e, there. fore, t he big interests will have intrenched t hemselves in such a manner and will command such mean s as would enable t hem easily to stifle our f uture as well as our desires for ema ncipation. 'Dhose big interests which made the indepe"ndence of € uha a solemn fiction ;will, if Philippine independence were further delayed, make t ha t independence an eternal aspiration impossible of realization. If t he present situation cont inues fo r twenty years mor e, at t he end of that period, t he Philippines will be a political as well as economic tributary ofi American cap ital. Individual initiative in t he manhood of our r ace will have disappeared and we w ill be nothing but a nation 0£ bureaucrats an d employees groaning beneath the t humbs of political chieftains, and whatever vestige of democracy we have now '";n t hen be a myth. Other contingencies too might arise if t he granting oi independence were to be delayed f urther . T he difficulties incident upon severance of relations will naturally increase a t housandfold. Val'ious other ne,w interests of the l!Jnited States might be a ffected by the continuance of our. association. 'Farifi on our pi::oducts will have to be imposed in the meant ime if, certain American industries are to be saved from extinction. A gr eater a gricult ural or industria l development here will have its telling effect on America's own agri'cultural and industrial interests. T he severance of free· trade r elations woulcl seem to be inevitable. Congress would not pre._vent t hat even if it wanted to. 'J."he t ime, t her efore, will sur ely come when the relations between America and t h e P hilippines will be purely political ; we wi11 be a foreign country to her as r egards trade r elations, but politically we will be under he1· supervision and pr otection. 0n t he other hand , ll independence were granted now, it woul d stimulate our ini tiative as a n ation. ';Che idea ofi political dependence will disappear from our minds. \Ve coulcl begin to fashion t he structure of our nationnlitlr in our own way. We shall grapple with our problems in accordance wit h our capacity and means. And we shall have a n opportunity to be strong and really prosperous1 a thing we never can accomplish under the tutelage of another nation. T he argument t hat we are not prepared for independence is gratuitous. And in t he strict sense, we are not being prepared for independence a"fl..VWBY even under t he aegis of the l!1nited States. W here is the prepnrntion for a n army and navy, for a.viation and for aer-ial defense? Wner e is t he preparation in diplomacy and consular

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS

service? It is true that much has been accomplished under American guidance; we have better roads, sumptuous government offices, a higher standard of living and a modern system of public instruction. Nevertheless, as the enemies of independence would interpret the word upreparation," we have not got it, in spite of thirty years of tutelage. And two centuries from now we will be told the same thing.

With the American press fed with only one kind of news from the Philippines, what chance has the Filipino people to be dealt with fai rly by the American public? Granted that the American people are just, but with t he public opinion formed the way the Republican administration wants it, what chance is there for justice, ''What is truth?" asked Oswald Spengler, the German philosopher, "For t he multitude, that whkh it continually reads and hears. The public truth of the moment, which alone matters for effects and successes in the fact-world, is today a product of the Press. W hat the Press wills, is true. Its commanders evoke, transform, interchange trut hs. Three weeks of press work, and the truth is acknowledged by everybody • • • The Press today is an army with carefully organized arms and branches, with journalists as officers, and readers as soldiers. But here, as in every army, the soldier obeys blindly, and war-aims and operation-plans change without his knowledge. The reader neither knows, nor is allowed to know, the purposes for which he is used, nor even the role that he is to play. A more appalling caricature of freedom of thought cannot be imagined. Formerly a man did not dare to think freely. Now he dares, but cannot; his will to t hink is only a willingness to t hink to order, and this is what he feels as his liberty." (1) REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

There has been another practice of American admi nistration which does not square with the recognized principles of government. When a 1people possess a representative government, there is only one way of learning their desire, and that is through t heir representatives. No better barometer to find out the people's will is recognized. Yet, since 1920, the Republican administration has sent here two missions, the WoodForbes Mission and Mr. Carnu Thompson, for the purpose in part, of as~ertaining whether the Filipinos wanted independence or not. The nussion in the person of Secretary Hurley has just left (1931). t hird 1 We submit that such a practice is only increasing the difficulties in the way of the proper solution of the Philippine problem. We have representative institutions in our country. Popular elections have been held since 1907, and from that time, the verdict of the people by means of the ballot, has always been in favor of immediate independence. The party which advocated American retention of the Philippines was relegated to oblivion, and had to change its name, and later on, had to fuse wibh a party claiming to be more radical than t he Nationalist Party. Municipal councils, provincial boards, the Philippine Assembly from 1907 to 1916, the Philippine Legislature from 1916 up to the present time, and 1 ( )

Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, Vol. II, pp. 461-463.

THE .PMl'&~PPI1N.E QUESTr©N-AN ANAIWSIS

all the political parties operating in the Philippines have manifested that the desire o:f the people is to have immediate separation from America.. Yet a few American officials come here on a flying trip, talk with barely a dozen people in each place a'!ld when they return to Amer,ica, they dare tell the American people and Cong;ress t hat the record and elections of our municipal ,councils, our provincial boards, the Philippine Assembly, and the Philippine Legislatur,e do not reflect the people's desire for independence. lllhey know better. And when the Philippine Legislature, t ired of so much misrepFesentation, prnposed the only more authoritative way of knowing tlie people's desire, a National Plebiscite, the measUFe was killed by executive veto! If after the election of President Hoover a few Filipinos had toUFed the United States, then came back and told us that the election of Pr.esident Hoover did not mean the triumph of the Republicans; but that on the contrary, the people wanted t he Democrats to be in power, how wou,ld such statements be met ? Undoubtedly with derision. Wherein does that differ from the Philippine situation? Here you tell the people to elect municipal officials, provincial boards and members of the Philippine Legislature and i-n all these elections t he aspirations for immediate independence have been written large ; antl yet despite all t hese proofs, ther'e are still Americans who believe that personal inspection is more reliable than Vhe ballot box. Why establisli a representative government if we do not believe in tlie chief if!unction of a r epr.esentative government? I beg to r.epeat: American IDemocracy is unfit to rule an alien nation 10,000 miles away!

CHAP11ER VIII

THE PROMISE · OF IND]j)PENDENCE ''When they show sufficient capacity," "When they ave able to govern themselves," "When they are educated enough." Thus run t he answers of many Amevicans pressed with the question as to when the Flilipinos should be granted their independence. Now, "ability" "capacity" and "sufficient educati6n"-what do they mean in black and white? Senator Sorghum may t hink no people is capable of self-government that does not establish the j udicial r ecall, or that has no Billy Sunday. John Smit h of Summerville may think no people is capable of self-government that does not vote his Democratic ticket, or go to church on Sundays. "Capacity for self -government" is as broad and elastic as the world, and that criterion for the granting of Philippine Independence, is tantamount to a crisp order from America: "You might as well quit your agitation. I ,viii give you independence whenever it pleases me to do so." Fortunately, the American promise to the Philippines is not based on such obscure and abstract conditions. The early American policy towards t he Philippines, it is true, was somewhat indefinite as to time and condjtions for independence. But that was not so in the case of the Jones Law. It was clear, however, that even in the early days ultimate independence was the goal of America.

EARLY POLICY AS TO INDEPENDENCE

In President McKinley•~ instructions to the first Philippine Commission, on January 20, 1899, he expressed the hope that the commissi+ers would be r.eceived as bearers of "the richest blessings of a, liberating r ather than a conquering nation." In his message to Congress in th~ same year, among other t hings concerning th e Philippines, he said, "Tbe Philippines ave ours, not to e,oploit, but to develop, to civilize, to edclcate, to tr.ain in the science of self-government. This is t he path of dufy which we must follow or be recreant to a mighty trust committed to hs." Dr. Schurman, President of the first Philippine Commission, construeil the American policy to mean "evev increasing liberty and self government, • • * and it is the nature of such continuously expanding liberty to issue in independence." . Bvesident Taft, while Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands, on the 17th of Iilecember, 1903, said, "From the beginning to the end of the state pape•s which wer e circulated in these !!!lands as authoritative expr.essions of the E,cecutive, the motto that 'the Philippines ar.e for the

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSTS

Filipinos' and that t he Government of the United States is here fo1· the purpose of preserving the 'Philippines for the Filipinos', for t heir benefit, for their elevation, for t heir civilization, again and again appear • • • Whllther an autonomy or independence or quasi-independence shall ultimately follow in these Islands ought to depend solely on the question : Is it best for the Filipino people and their welfare?" When Mr. Taft was Secretary of War, in ·April, 1904, in the course of a speech upon the Philippines, he said, ''When they (the Filipinos) have learned the principles of successful popular self-government from a gradually enlarged experience therein, we can discuss the question whether independence is what they desire and grant it, or whether they prefer the retention of a closer association with t he country which, by its guidance, has unselfishly led them on to better conditions." In opening the Philippine Assembly on October 16, 1907, l\Jfr. Taft, t hen Secretary of War, said, "T,he policy looks to the improvement of the people, both industrially and in self -governing capacity. As t his policy of extending control continues, it must logically r educe and finally end the sovereignty of the United States in the Islands, unless it shall seem wise to t he American and t he Filipino peoples, on account . of mutually beneficial trade relations and possible advantages to t he Islands in their foreign relations, t hat the bond shall not be completely severed." In 1908, after the Philippine Assembly had been opened, p'resident Roosevelt, in his message to Congress, said, "I trust that ,vithin a generat ion the time will arrive whe11 the Filipinos can decide for themselves whether it is well for them to become independent or to continue under t he protection of a strong and disinterested power, able to guarantee to t he Islands order at home and protection from foreign invasion." President Wilson, in a message to t he Filipino people delivered by Governor-General Harrison in Manila, October 6, 1913, said, "We regard ourselves as trustees acting not for the advantage of the United States but fo1· the benefit of the people of the Philippine Islands. Every step we take will he taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that independence." And in his message to Congress, on December 2, 19[3, the President said, "By their counsel and experience, r ather t han by our own, we shall learn how best to serve t hem and how soon it will be possible and wise to withdraw our supervision." THE JONES LAW

During the sever al years preceding the passage of the Jones Law, various measures providing for qualified or fo1· complete independence were introduced either in the House of Representatives or in t he Senate of the United States. All of these bills, however, failed to secure the approval of both houses of Congress. In F ebruary, 1916, Congress took up t he Philippine question, and the final result of the discussion of this matter was the passage of the act known as the Jones Law.

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

The full t itle of the Jones Law is " An Act to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous government for these Islands." The declaration of purposes is contained in the following preamble : 'Whereas it was never the in tention of the people of of the United States in the incipiency of the War with Spain to make it a war of conqu est or for territorial aggrandizement; and Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Island s and to recognize their independence as soon as n stabl e government can bo established therein; and Whereas, for tho speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the hands of the peo pl e of the Philippines as large a contr.ol of their domestic affairs as can be g iven them without, in the meantime, impairing th e exercise of the Tights of sovereignty by th e peopl e of the United States, in ord er t hat, by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the better prepared to fully assume th e responsibilities and enj oy all the privil eges of complete independence: Therefore • • •

The Jones Law was received by the Filipino people as the r eal pledge of the American people, for the statements of American Presidents were me/rely executive opinion not necessarily binding on the United States. In numerous public meetings and in r esolutions passed by provincial boards and by municipal councils, the measure was heartily endorsed. American sovereignty in the Philippines was henceforward considered to exist ,vith the consent of the governed. The Jones Law was declared by its author as a covenant or compact between the American , and Filipino peoples, by means of which a government a utonomous in nature was given t he Islands preparatory to complete independence to be granted "when a stable government can be established in the Islands." " STABLE GOVERNMENT" IN AMERICAN HISTORY

The greatest moral cla im of the Filipinos for independence is the promise in the preamble of the Jones Law that as soon as a stable government can be establi shed in t he Islands American sovereignty will be 1 withdrawn and Philippine independence recognized. We believe it is a \ definite promise. The phrase "a stable government" is not, as has been claimed by some, vague and am biguous. It has a definite meaning in American international law, especially in the history of America's relations with weak countries struggling for independence. It has n definite meaning in the League of Nations. It was not the first time that t he American Government used the phrase in connection with t he recognition of new states. When in 1875 there was considerable agitation in the United States to recognize the independence of the Cubans, struggling to shake off the Spanish yoke, President Grant, in his message to Congr ess, expressed the idea that not until the Cuban people had set up a government " pos-

'llHE PHILIPPINE QUES'll!ON- AN ANALYSIS

sessed of the elements o:li stability" could recognition be possible. ing his own words :

Quot-

Where a considerable body of people, who have attempted to free themselves of the control of the superior government, have reached such point in occupation of territory, and in general organization as to constitute in fact a body politic, having a government in substance as well as in name, possessad of t he elements of stability, 8.nd equipped with the machinery for the administration of internal policy and the execution of its laws, prepared and able to administer justice at home, as well a.s in its dealing witfh other powers, it is within the province of those other powers to recognize its existence as a new and independent nation .1

E lucidating further what he meant by such a government he said: Tliere m\lst be a people occupying a known territory, united under some known and defined form of government, acknowledged by those subject thereto, in which the functions of government are administered by usual met hods, competent to mete out justice to citizens and strangers, to afford remedies for public and for private wrongs, and able to assume the correlative international obligations and capable ofi performing the corresponding international duties resulting from its acquisition of the rights of sovereignty.

·President McKinley, when confronted with the same problem of the recognition of Cuban independence, quoted the very words of President Grant, saying: The l!l'nited States, in addition to the test imposed by public law as the condition of the recognition of independence by a neutral state (to wit, that the revolted state shall 11constitute in fact a body politi c; havi ng a govei·nment in substance as well as in name, possessed of all the elem.ents of sta bilifly ," and forming de facto, "if left to itself, a state among the nations, reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a state."), * * * *

In the recognition ·of foreign governments, the conditions imposed by the United States before such recognition could be granted, were merely conditions of fact-wnetlier the government which desired to be recognized was a de facto government, "in which the functions of goverl)ment ai:e administered by usual methods." A similar exposition of the American theory was made by President Jackson in his message of December 21, 1836, upon the question of recognizing the independence of Texas. Following the foregoing principles, the South American republics were one by one recognized as soon as they had shown t hat t hey had a government exercising all governmental functions witliout the possibility of its being reconquered by the ruling state. STAB!JE GOVERNMENlr IN CUBA

The more pei,tinent precedent for the Philippines is t he case of Cuba. The United States had required of Cuba the establishment of the very 1 Messages a11d Parpo,i-s of tho Presideflts, Vol. X, 4186-4626, p. 4291, Seventh Annual Message, Bureau o:fi Nat. Lit., N. Y. The italics are the author's.

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS

same kind of government which she no,v requires of the Filipino people -a stable government-before final recognition was given to the Cuban Republic. It may be recalled that the misery and starvation of the Cuban people under the hands of the Spanish government in Cuba was the prime causei of the Spanish-American War. In his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, depicting what was happening to Cuba and what Amer ica should do, President McKinley said: The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization., in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Ouba must stop. In view of these facts and of these consid_erations I ask the CongresS' to authorize and empower the P resident to take measures t-o secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spaill and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government capable of •m aintaining order a1td observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquility and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

As a result o,f the war, Spain was obliged to withdraw her sovereignty from Cuba. The American Government occupied t he Islands temporarily and proceeded to establish a stable government. T,he first step was the taking of a census to ascertain the political capacity of the people. It was found that "sixty-six per cent of the inhabitants of the islands could not read and write" (a much higher per cent than in the Philippines) ,1 and a limited suffrage was therefore established based on the same conditions as those in the Philippine Islands before the recent election reform except th at t hose who had served in t he Cuban army were allowed to vote. After t he census was taken, a provisional law was ordered by the Military Governor, General Wood, to hold municipal and provincial elections. When the same voters who voted in the municipal and provincial elections were called upon to elect t he members of a constitutional convention which was to draft a Constitution for Cuba. The Military Governor opened the convention and, by direction of the Secretary of War, said, among other things: "It will be your duty first to frame and adopt a constitution of Cuba. . adequate to secure a stable, orderly and free government." 1 The literacy of the Filipinos compared with that of some other countries-, the census of 1918 gives the fo llowing:

Philippines Islands, 1903 Spain, 1910 . . . . . . . Porto Rico, 1910 . . ..................... . Siam, 1916 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,.,................. British India, 1911 . . . ...... ...... United States, 1910 ............

Per cent 44.2 40.7 35.5 11.7 6.9 92.3

By 1918 in the Philippine Islands 49.2 per cent were liternt,e, 26.4 per cent being males and 22.8 per cent being females. (Census, 1918, 11, 63, 64, 68)

THE PHfLIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

To explain furth er what was meant by a government" when the convention appeared to clusions of its constitution-drafting, Secretary tions to the convention through the Military Root then said :,

"stable, orderly and free be drawing near the conRoot again sent instrucGovernor of Cuba. Mr.

• • • It is plain that thE; government to which we were thus to tramd'er our tempora1:y obligations should be a gover.nment based upon the peaceful suffrages of the people of Cuba, representing the entire people and holding their power from thepeople, and subject to the Jimitations and safeguards which the experience of constitutional government has shown to be necessary to the preservation of individual rights ...

An interesting document, the American Government's official account of the establishment of Cuban independence, prepar ed by the War Department and entitled "The Establishment of Free Government in Cuba," describes the stable govermnent required of Cuba, in t he following words : !J?he occupation of the island by the United States being established, it was necessary to enter upon the work of creating and estab1ishing a stable goventme-u.t administered by the Ouban people, republican in form, and competent to discharge the obligations of international relationship and be entitled to a place in the family of nations,

The constitution drafted by the Cuban people was not even to the entire satisfaction of Secretary Root, but it was the deliberate work of the r epresentatives of the Cuban people and, therefone, it was considered acceptable. On December 31, 1901, t he Cuban people elected provincial governors and councillors, members of the House of Representatives, and presidential and senatorial electors. The presidential and senatorial electors, in tu rn, met on February 24, 1902, to elect a President, a VicePresident and Senators. After all these officials were duly elected, the American Government prepared to transfer the government into their hands. The conditi.on of stability had been accomplished and on May 20, 1902, the Military Governor, representing the President of the United States, read t he fateful instrument which transferred to "the duly elected representatives of t he people of Cuba the government and control of the island," and declared "the occupation of Cuba by the United States and the military government of the islands to be ended." A stable government has therefore meant in Cuba a government duly elected by the people. This is the unmistakable interpretation given by the American Government to the words stable government. When in 1906 America was, upon t he petition of President Palma, obliged to intervene in Cuba and stop the revolution which threatened the downfall of the government, a stable gove,·mnent had again to be established. The provisional governor saw to it that t he Cuba11 people elected municipal and provincial officials, members of t he House of Representatives, Senators, a Vice-Preside11t and a President. As soon as all these officials were elected and installed in office, Cuba was again 1·estored to t he Cuban people-1tnder a stable govemment. America left!

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

JONES LAW PREAMBLE INSPIRED FROM OUBA

That this was the same meaning given to the phrase stable gove,rn.. ment as used in the preamble to the Jones Law is very easily demonstrated. '!;he phrase stable goverMnent was first used in connection with t he Philippine p1·oblem in t he Democrat ic platfol'm of 1900. "We favor au immediate declaration," read t he platform of 1900, "of the nation's purpose to give the Philippines, first, a stable form of government; second, independence; and third, protection from outside interference, s uch as has been given for nearly a century to the republics of Central and South America." Mr. Bryan, who was rtbe author of the Philippine plank of 1900, declared that the phrase stable gove,-nment meant the same kind of government that was being estabUshed in Cuba. In accepting t he nomination for the presidency, he said : "If elected, I will convene Congress in extraordinary session as soon as inaugurated and recommend an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose, {irst, to establish a stable fonn of gov.,,,..,,nient in the Phili,ppine Islmnds, just as we wre now establishing a stable form of gove,..,iment in Cuba; second, to give independence to ·the Filipinos as we have promised to give independence to the Cubans; third, to protect the Filipinos from outside interference while they work out their destiny, just as we have puotected the r epublics of Central and South America, and are, by the Monroe Doctrine, pledged to protect Cuba." His opponent, President McKinley, did not differ from him as to the kind of government a stable government meant, but he did not favor at that time the establishment in the Philippines of such a government. He said : "We aue required to set up a stable government in the interest of t hose who have assailed our sovereignty and fired upon our soldiers, and then maintain it at any cost or sacrifices against its enemies and against those having ambitious designs from without." "S:rABLE GOVERNMENT" IN THE LEAGUE OF NA'I'IONS I\

The _interpretation of the League of Nations of the words stable government is similar to the interpretation that has been cited above. Possession of a stable gove,-n1nent is one of the conditions required by t he League of Nations before new states can be admitted to it. The Committee on Admission of t he First Assembly of the League of Nations which was presided over by Sr. Huneeus of Chile laid down in 1921 t he foJlowing questions to be answered by each applicant:

(a) Is its application for admission to the League in order? (b) Is the Government applying ior admission recognized de j'ure or de facto and by which states? ( c) Is the applicant a nation with a stable gove-ni,ne-nt and settled tir.ontiers? What are its size and its population ? (d) Is it fully self-governing? (e) What has been its conduct, including both acts and assurances, with regard to its international obligations and the pre!.'Criptions of the League as to armaments?

THE !PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS

What was the criterion used by the League of Nations in determining whether an applicant had a stable government or not? Had the Philippines been an applicant, would she have li,ved up to that criterion? T;he best answer to that question is to mention what countries were declared to be possessors of stable governments and then compare the conditions in those countries with Phllippine conditions. Austria, was declared by the sub-committee' to have a "stable government established within well-defined frontiers." "Austria," it was said, "bad a free sYstem of government; she had expressed her desire to obser ve her international obligations, and declar ed that she had given proof of t his by her conduct."

As to Bulgaria, another sub-committee's report read : "She has a stable governrnent and well-defined frontiers." Similarly, Costa Rica, Finland and Albania, were declared to possess stable govermnents. Of Finland, it was said that she represented all the characteristics of a free government with historic frontiers. Of the process of the establishment of a stable govermnent in Costa Rica, R. Restrepo of Columbia, said : Costa Rica was then governed by Seiior Alfredo Gonzales, an eminent statesman, who named General T,inoco chi ef of police. General Tinoco took advantage of this position to effect a "coup d' etat"-a thing common in other countries and other· continents also. In that way Costa Rica became the victim of this "coup d' etat/ ' and the United States of America, under the influence of President Wilson "Tllled that they would not recognize "de facto" any revolutionary Government in South America. The consequence was that Costa Rica found itself with no international status and therefore could not ask to be admitted to the League of Nations. Gene~al Tinoco, upon this, in a true patriotic spirit, withdrew and recommended general elections and the setting up of a proper constitutional Government.

Albania's application was also approved in spite of the fact t hat she had not yet been r ecognized by other nations, its frontiers were not fully defined, and some of its territories were still held by foreign troops. In other w01·ds, a stable goveni,nen.t has been interpreted by t he learned internationalists of the Assembly of the _L eague of Nations as a de facto government which has the support of t he people. (Any impartial observer will favorably compare t he conditions of the Philippines with those of other countFies which were in 1921 declared by the League of Nations to be t he _possessors of stable governments.) "STABIJE GOVERNMENT" RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPlNES

The representative of the American government in t he Philippines, who supervised the establishment of the government under t he Jones Law, Goveo·nor-General Harrison, has concurred in the r eport of the Ph,ilippine Legislatur e as to t he existence oi a stable government. He reported to Congress t hru the joint committees which heard the Philippine Mission in 1919 t hat there was already in the Philippine Islands, the stable government demanded by Congress-"namely, a government elected by the suffrages of the people, which is supported by the people,

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS

which is capable of maintaining order and of fulfilling its international obligations." President Wilson in his farewell message to Congress officially certified that the Filipino people have already performed the condition imposed upon them as a prerequisite to independence. He said: • • • Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable governme nt since the last action of the Congress in their behalf, and have thus fulfilled the condition set by the Congress as precedent to a consideration of granting independence to the Islands. I respectful1y submi t that this cond ition J7l'ecedcnt having been fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet.

The Filipinos did not expect that the Republican party upon t heir coming into power would try to reverse the previous actions towards t he fulfillment of America's promise, for they always considered her Philippine policy as the work not only of one party, but of all parties. The Jones Law with its preamble, was approved in the end with no practical opposition on the part of the Republicans and t he policy of stable government prepar atory to independence was indeed a Republican policy, for it was borrowed by Mr. Bryan from Republican work in Cuba and from the recognition of new states by Republican Presidents. As soon as President Harding was installed in office, t he Filipino leaders sent President Quezon, to Washington to find out the policy of the new President. It then became apparent that even if there was then no plan to diminish domestic control, there was no desire on the part of the new administration to carry out the program of independence, in pursuance of t he Jones Law and on the strength of the existence of a stable government which had already been r ecognized by President Wilson. In order to justify the change of independence policy, President Harding decided to send the Wood-Forbes Mission. He frankly stated t hat his reason for the sending of the mission was the message of P,resident Wilson to Congress, whereby the Democratic President recognized the existence of a stable government in the Philippines and urged the granting of independence. President Harding, in his instructions, furth er admitted that the message of President Wilson was based on the report of the highest authority in the Philippine Islands, meaning t he GovernorGeneral. He wanted, therefore, to find out whether the allegations of President Wilson and Governor Harrison were true to facts. The standard of a stable government used by the Democratic administration was, as we have seen, the standard recognized by America in its foreign policy, as well as the standard used by the League of Nations. NEW STANDARDS FOR THE WOOD-FORBES MISSION

While President Harding did not ratify or disapp~ove the standard used by the previous administration in determining whether the Philip-

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS

pines had a stable government or not, Secretary of Wa r Weeks, in another instruction to the Mission, used an entirely differ ent standa rd. He did not t ake the Jones Law preamble as t he criterion which should be used in measuring t he possibilities for independence in t he Islands, alt hough t he preamble of the J ones Law is t he only statement of policy t hat was ever voted upon and appr oved by the Congress of t he United States. Secr etary Weeks p1·edisp'osed the mind of the Mission in favor of indefinite r et ent ion when he said: Th e pleasing of the F ilipinos of this generation wou ld be a mi nor satisfaction if it were believed that it would result in the bondage or destruction of the F ilipino

people for all time hereafter. Wh ether the result 0£ your investigation may or may not be to the satisfaction of the majo1;ty of the F ilipino people at this time, I am convinced that, undertaken in the sp irit in which it is committed to you and in which you have undertaken it, it cannot but be to the fu ture satisfaction of the F ilipinos and must, of necessity, result in their perm anent well-being and progress. WOOD ON STABLE GOVERN MENT

The Wood-Forbes Mission thus started its work with t he a ,,bit ra ry st andards set down by Secr etary Weeks, as a guide. It did not accept t he standard of a stable government as defined by t he League of Na- · tions, by t he United States in t he past, or by Governor-General Harrison. In fact, no ment ion whatever was made in t he Wood-For bes report or"the promise of independence contained in t he preamble of t he J ones Law. It seems that t he Cha irman of t he Mission had a differ ent interpr etation as to t he te,,m "stable government." At the meeting held by the Philippine Columbian Association, he was r eported to have defined "stable government " in t he following words : A stable government means civic courage, courts of justice which give equal opportunities to the Senator as well as to the simple "tao," resources ready for dis;. posnl at any moment they are needed by the country, organ ization which enables the cou ntry to defend its integrity, adequate hospitals all over the Islands which nre not found in t-he provi nces we have just visited, sooinl organiiations which show keen human interest in the protection of the needy and the pool\ effecti ve public sanitation, common language, and many others.

Let us suppose that in t he survey of Philippine conditions t he WoodForbes Mission had used t he Wilson-McKinley standard of a stable government. Critical as t he survey was, I believe that the conditions e.xposed in the i·eport wo uld compar e favorably with t he condit ions of four countries admitted in 1921 into the League of Nations because, among other t hings, t hey possessed stable governments- Austl"ia, Bulgaria, Costa Ric•. and F inland. Ther e a re appar ently in President McKinley's estimate two ma in elements in a stable government : first, ability to maintain order and insu r e peace and tranquility and t he security of citizens; second, ability to obsen,e its international obligations. To these t wo elements, Mr. Root in h is instructions for t he Cuban people, also added the following : it must r est upon the peaceful auffrage of t he people and must

THE PHILIPPINE QUEST!ON--- AN ANALYSIS

contain constitutional limitations to protect the people from the arbitrary actions of the government. These four elements will be found in the facts gathered by t he Mission. It was admitted by the Mission that excellent order prevailed, and t hat our constabulary was sufficient to maintain internal peace. The tranquility and security of the citizens were not jeopardized. Elections were peaceful. As to the obligations for international life, the Wood-Forbes Mission recognizes that there were people in our service who could do credit to any government; that our legislatur e was filled with r epresentative men. Without desiring to enter into invidious cpmparisons, t he F ili pinos would show an advantage over any other Oriental count ry in so far as ability to maintain international relations is concerned, for t he simple r eason t hat we are t he most western of all Oriental peoples and our laws are not taken from Oriental sources. COOLIDGE'S CONDITIONS

Further evasion of the pledge contained in the preamble is shown in two letters of President Coolidge, one dated February 21, 1924, addressed to Speaker Roxas and t he other to Governor Wood explaining his veto of the Plebiscite Bill. Here is the criterion which President Coolidge would use as regards the granting of independence : The ability of a people to govern themselves is not ea~ily attain.ed. History is filled with failures of popular government. It cannot be learned from books; it is not a matter of eloquent phrases. Liberty, freedom, independence, nre not mere words the repefition o! which brings fulfillment. They demand long, arduou s, self. sacrificing preparation. Education, knowledge, experience, sound public opinion, in . telligent partici pation by the great DOily of the people, high ideals these things are essential The degree in which they are possessed determines the capacity of a people to govern themselves. In frankness and with the utmost friendliness, I must state my sincere conviction that the people of the Philippine Islands have not as yet attained the capability of full self-government.

Such a standard would be absolutely elastic. It may mean requiring 90 % of literacy, the establishment of a public opinion to the extent that obtains in E ngland and _America, the existence of as intelligent a democracy as Switzerland. Those things, President Coolidge would consider the silne qua Mn of independence. SECRETARY HURLEY ON THE PROMISE

The present Secretary of War, Mr. Hur ley, went a step further in the interpretation of America's promise of independence. In his letter to Senator Bingham of t he Commi1Jt;ee oil Ter r itories, Secretary Hurley expressed his doubts as to t he promise of independence as specified in the pr eamble of t he J ones Law : An examination of the record leads to the conclusion that no commitment, legal or moral, exists as regards immediate independence or independence within any specific period of years; and no commitment as regards ultimate independence ha:5

THE PHIIJIPPINE QBESTION- AN ANALYSIS

been found which appeaTS to be more binding than the correlative obligation for the continuation of American sovereignty over the Philippine Islands until the trust whicb has been assumed, in behalf of the Philippine people as a whole, can honorably be terminated when they are adequately prepared to fully assume the responsibilities . .. of complete independence.

We may agree with the first part of his statement "that no commitment, legal or moral, exists •as regards immediate independence or independence within any specific period of years;" but we will have to disagree most strenuously with the second part "that no commitment as regards ultimate independence has been fou nd which appears to be more binding t;han the correlative obligation for the continuation of American sovereignty over the Philippine Islands until the trust which has been assumed, in behalf of the Philippine people as a whole, can honorably be terminated when they are adequately prepared to fully assume the responsibilities. . . of complete independence." We cannot believe t hat the repeated statements of American executives, which we have quoted in the first part of this paper, mean absolut ely nothing. We cannot believe that t he promise in w1·iting contained in t he Jones Law, passed by Congress and signed by the President - a promise which was called a covenant betwe.:>n the two peoples-is a mere scrap of paper. So long as it is retained in the Statute Books of America it cannot mean to us other than the plighted word of America. We cannot believe that promise is simply tantamount to the implied moral obligation attendant upon an assumed trust. And who gave America that trust? The Filipino people? No. The World? Neither. It was selfassumed. It was t he same old story of the "White Man's Burden," undertaken by force of arms upon the excuse of civilization, enlightenment, progress, etc. Such a declaration places America on the same footing as the other ce1)onizing powers which announced to the world that they would stay in their colonies until their task is finished. And it will never be finished. It is the shield behind which the most sordid and cruel imperialism in Africa has flourished. HURLEY'S CONDITIONS

When will that trust in behalf of the F ilipino people as a whole terminate-? Never, judging from the conditions that are being imposed on us. According to Secretary Hurley, our readiness for independence would depend in part only upon the following: First, "the extent of participation by the Philippine people in the existi1ig stable government in the Philippine Islands." Then he goes on to say that "ult imate executive, legislative and judicial control have been, and are, American, although the governmental personnel operating under that direction consists almost exclusively, of Filipinos; hence, although there is a stable government, under the present conditions it cannot be said to be by the Filipinos. Second, "while general conditions of excellent order exist for over twenty-

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

five years, they have been brought under American direction," he says. Third, "Not only forceful aggression is to be considered. The possible submerging influence as regards the native Filipinos, of economic penetration and mass immigration must be kept in mind." Under such conditions, may we not also suggest the control of Siam for she cannot stop the economic penetration of China, a nd the domination of those other countries which cannot prevent mass immigration from their neighbors. Fourth, ability to meet the cost of government. We have the words of our own Secretary of Finance, Mr. Unson, in a car eful study of the problem, that the )?hilippines would be able to meet the cost of government in case of independence. Fifth, develop,nent of informed public opinion among the masses. Other conditions that he would take are: safety to exercise the political franchise, the possible effect of Philippine independence upon the international situation; the particular circumstances which have been largely responsible for the ,present discussion of Philippine independence; the extent and character of the demand for inoependence among the Filipinos; and the r elation of the question of Philippine independence to the ultimate best. interests of the American people. NO DIMINUTION OF CONTROL, SAYS H URLEY

In the opinion of Secretary Hurley, there is a stable government here now; but it is not a Filipino government. He observes that we still have the Governor-General, the Head of the Constabulary and the American Army that are obstacles in the way of the fullest establishment of a: Filipino sta,ble government; tben if that is the case why not try to eliminate them? The establishment of a stable government is demanded by the Jones Law; yet Secretary Hurley in that very letter maintains that he does not believe there should be a diminution of American control : Disregarding such minor amendments as experience may, in the future, indicate be and, in general, has been exercised in the actual application of potential powers of control, by the United States, over the actions of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is not apparent that such powers of guidance and direction as have been reserved, under the present Organic Act, to the Federal Government and its appointees in the Philip pine Islands, exceed the minimum of control necessary for the reasonable assurance that our responsibilities in the Islands sha11 duly be met . to be expedient, and bearing in mina the wide latitude that may

We maintain that the entire government can be made Filipino if we are allowed to elect a Filipino Governor-General and Vice-Governor, and another Filipino is made a member of the Supreme Court; t hen the American army can leave bag and baggage, and order will . be kept in the Philippines and the government will continue as a going concern. At any rate, why not try it? It would meet the conditions of a stable government in the very opinion of Secretary Hurley. How can he say that we cannot make a success of it until we are given a,chance?

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS NEW OBJECTIVES

But Secretary Hurley believes that the present situation is uncertain and, therefore, undesirable. He would like to have another statement of policy, another set of conditions precedent to the granting of independence. He would make t he conditions for independence in the form of objectives. He wou)d thus amend the Jones Law: The period to elapse before complete independence shall be granted should be outlined, if at all, in terms of objectives in the nature of conditions precedent to independence rather than in terms of years. If a period of time be stated in this connection, it is believed it should be stated, not as a period to which the contihuance of United States sovereignty shall be limited, but as the minjmum period which should elapse before there shall be considered the question as to whether or not the essential conditions precedent to independence shall have been achieved.

In another paragraph he stated some objectives as follows: The concrete objectives should include both the definite relief of the United States from any degree of respOnsibility to the holclers of obligations of the public debt of the government of the Philippine Islands and the presentatioit of satisfactory evidence that an independent Philippine Government would be able to meet the necessary cost of gover.nment under the conditions which an independent status would presumably entail. They should also include satisfactory evidence that advances in public education among the masses of the people, in the establishment of a common· language and in the means for the general dissemination of information on public questions shall have reached a point reasonably indicative of an understanding and i'1lforrned public opinion and should include similar evidence that an independent government would be reasonably well prepared to maintain itself against undermining influences, domestic or foreign.

The first part of t his objective is clearly reasonable but we submit t hat the latter part with regard to "evidence t hat an independent government would be reasonably well prepared to maintain itself against undermining influences, domestic or foreign" is vague and is liable to all sorts of interpretation. It will be one vicious circle after another . Secretary Hurley's proposal would only further befog the issue. It will cr eate distrust. The discussion as to whethei· t hose objectives are fulfilled or not ,vill again be a source of endless trouble. Indeed, as Secretary Hurley himself stated: "All the conditions which should be fulfilled in order to justify ultimate independence cannot easily be foreseen and defined with accuracy." PROMISE~ ARE MERELY WORDS TO TEASE ALONG

We beg therefore to submit that in requiring many other conditions prerequisite to independence instead of the one condition of a stable government and in insisting that t he stable government now existing is not Filipino and yet refosing to yield to any further Filipino control, Secretary Hurley places himself in th!c' saddest of quandaries. We have shown that the present condition of a stable government stated in the preamble of the J ones Law is much clearer and more objective than the one proposed by the Secretary.

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

The present situation is ably and fairly pictured by Edward Bowditch, (A s-ia, April, 1930) , who was private secretary to former GovernorGeneral Forbes, vice-governor and secretary of the Moro Province, and a member in Governor Wood's so-called "cavalry cabinet." He said: It seems to be the opinion of most of those who have experience in the Islands that independence shou ld not be granted now and should be granted only when the Filipino can maintain a stable government under which the rights of the individual are safe and will be fully protected. Yet thi s answer gets you nowhere; for, although it is definite in regard to granting of ind ependence now, the terms and conditions of when and how are so vague that the answer will satisfy no one but the man who is definitely against independence. What is the practical way of proving whether a government is stable? Experience! The on ly way of proving that people is capable of governing itself is to allow it to govern itself. The proof oi the pudding is in the eating. Ii this is the only answer we will give to the Filipino, no wonder he raves and tears his hair. Commissions irom Washington have come and gone and have reported. To the criticism of defects, the Filipino replies: 'Why hold us up to n perfect standard of conduct? That is not fair. Our courts are less behind the docket than yours. Our graft cannot be compared to the graft reported in your big cities and states. Our law and order are ahead of, and our crime records far behind, yours. Do these show we can govern ourselves as well as you govern us?' The answer all too often received is, 'All this has nothing to do with the question.' No wonder the Filipino feels that all the promises of independence are but words to tease him along. CONCLUSION

We have shown that America's promise of independence has a definite seizable meaning. "Stable government" has a recognized interpre tation in America's international relations and in the League of Nations. At most, it means only a government supported by t he people and capable of maintainjng order and fulfilling its obligations. We submit that we have those conditions now or can meet them at any time. At any rate we have the moral right under the Jones Law to demand a chance to establish such a government, immediately. We consider the elaborations of, and amendments to, the conditions necessary for independence made by Secretary of War Weeks, Governor Wood, President Coolidge, and lastly by Secretary Hurley as unfair and unwarranted. They do not find any Congressional sanction. They range from the establishment of an ideal democracy and the building of more hospitals to the formation of a government that will stand the greatest foreign aggression and prevent all economic penetration. We submit that no nation on earth can qualify under each and every one of these conditions. We are inclined to agree that those are mere words to tease us along. We hope that the new development in America and the natural progress of oui- independence movement, have eliminated these new demands that are being imposed on us. They do not make for friendship between the American and Filipino peoples. They only widen the gulf between the two nations.

CHAP'DER IX

THE MORO BUGABOO The greatest bugaboo of the Philippine problem is t he Moro question. Saine writers maintain that the Mo,·os in case of independence, will immediately declare war and overrun t he Christian provinces. Other writers contend that Mindanao should be segregated flrom the Philippines because it belongs to the Mohammedan people. Uiis, however, is based on a false premise. It is true t hat six of the so-called non-Christian provinces- Bukidnon, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Zamboanga, and Suluhave a considevable Moro population, and that t he first five provinces a re on the island of Mindanao ; yet the Christians in t hat island out number the Mohammedans 2 to 1. The exact number is 497,418 Christia ns and 249,158 Moros. It is only the Sulu Anhipelago which is chiefly in the hands of the Mohammedans. These facts ar e clearly borne out by the follo,ving table: Chris tian, Mohami-medan, and P agan l?thab-itaints of Minda,11ao Gro1Lp N ON - CHRIS'Ill ANS

Chris Prov inces •

Island of Mindanao : Agusan

.. ···· ··· ····· ·• ·

··· ······· ······· ·· ··· ······ ···· ······ Sulu Archipelago: Sulu ······ .., ... .... .... Palawan Group: ., ......... , .... . . P alawun ... ... Misamis Surigno

Z amboanga

'Dotal

ll'otal

6,112 37,766 53,630 46,013 493 3,663 2,589 36,651

44,740 48,544 171,978 108,222 91,459 198,943 122,164 147,333

168,610

446

172,7'16

46,656

6,531

17,866

69,053

546,796 46.5%

42'3,299 36 %

10,110

·· ··•···· ····

········

1\iohammedans

Pagans

38,596

Bukidnon Cotabato Davao

Lanao

tians

7, 683 53,130 7,680 195,066 119,416 65,837 3,721

52 668 110,865 9,079 83,286 224 159 4'1,846

206,118 (1) 1,176,212 17.6 %

The Mohammedans of Sulu and Mindanao have not by any means been politically united. The Sultan of Sulu has never claimed sovereignty over the entir e island of Mindanao. I'n 1878, a t reaty was signed by the Spanish government and t he Sultan of Sulu by w11ich the Sultan acknowledged Spanish sovereignt y o;er the entire ar chi pelago, and in ex(1 ) From J ose G. Sanvictores, THE NON-CHRISTIAN PROBLEM OF THE PHILIPP IN ES, quoted in Laurel, Local Go11ern1ne-nt of tl.t,e Pkilipp1'.ns Is ltuuis, p. 162.

Hi s basis is the census of 1918.

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

change the Spaniards gave t he Sultan a salary of P2,400 with smaller gratuities to his advisers. Under that treaty the Sultan retained t he r ight to impose and collect taxes and t he Moro inhabitants were given absolute freedom to exercise their religion and customs. EARLY AMERICAN ADMlNlSTRATION IN THE MORO REGION

The history of the administration in the Moro country since American occupation may be divided into four periods: The purely military period, the establishment of the Moro Province, the establishment of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and t he present regime. The first American expedition was sent in 1899 and was intended to relieve t he Spaniards. The Sultanate was opposed to t he coming of the Americans, for it believed that it should logically succeed Spanis h authority. In view of the fact that there were not sufficient American troops to effect a forceful occupation, General John C. Bates of the American troops wa.s obliged· to enter into a treaty with the Sultan. This treaty pr omised that the United States would not interfere in the native religion and customs and would respect the rights and dignities of the Sultan and his advi.sers. On the other hand, the Sultan of Sulu promised to recognize American sovereignty over the Sulu Archipelago, to fly the American flag and to suppress piracy. As in the treaty signed by Spain money considerations figured . General Bates distributed ten thousand pesos, Mexican currency, to correspond to gratuities which the Sultan and his advisers r eceived from the Spanish government. This t reaty fa iled to secure the approval of the Senate and was afterwards rescinded by t he President of the United States on the ground that the Sultan did not live up to his agreement to suppress piracy. ,:he arrangement under the Bates treaty was terminated by t he creation of t he Moro Province.l 1 "The treaty continued in force until March 21, 1904. Thi s S'O-called "treaty" was the source of much embarrassment and difficulty almost from the moment it was signed. General Bates had fallen into the serious error of supposing that the "Sultan" of Sulu exercised some real contTol over the Moros, whereas the truth turned out to be that he was but one of a group of chiefs. The treaty itself was highly unsatisfactory, even in the English version, which General Bates supposed represented the Sultan's understanding of the agreement. In brief, the agreement provided that the religion and customs of the Moros should be maintained, and that the salaries aggregating about $9,120 annually should be paid by our government to the Sultan and his chief men. In return, the authority and sovereignty of the United States were nominally recognized, and this wa!J substantially the only concession made to our government..... . But the Bates treaty, in the eyes of the Moros themselves, was a document very different in character from that which General Bates supposed he had signed. NCither he nor any of his associates understood a word of the Sulu language, and a study of the native copy of the treaty in the vernacular shows that be must have been grossly deceived. &rticle I of the English version reads "The sovereignty of the United States over the whole Archipelago of the Sulu and its dependencies is declared and acknowledged," but a careful translation of the docoment from SuJu into English would be "The support, aid, and protection of the Sulu Island and Archipelago are in the American nation"-a very dilferent statement" (Wil1is. Our Philippines Problemi, p,p . 87-89, Note). Upon the instigation of Mr. Frank W.

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- AN ANALYSIS

The l't;!oro P Fovince was organized in July, 1903, by an act of the Philippine Commission. It comprised t he districts of Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Sulu and Zamboanga. The law p.ovided for a legislative council, a governor, a secretary, a treasurer, an attorney, an engineer, and a superintendent of schools. Military officials could fill civil positions. The legislative council was composed of t he provincial governor, t he secretary, the treasurer, the attorney, the engineer, and the superintendent of schools. It had both executive and legislative powers. It could pass laws for the Moro region, subject, however, to review, annulment or amendment by the Philippine Commission. Tpe first governor appointed was Maj01· General Leonard Wood. E ach district had a district governor, a secr etar y, and a treasurer, appointed by the Governor of the Moro Province, subj ect to the approval of the legislative council. Municipalities and t ribal wards, which now correspond to municipal districts, were organized with a view to controlling the Moros and the pagans. They were delimited, as far as practicable, so that each contained a single tribe or a homogeneous division. A · local headman for each ward was appointed by the district governor with t he approval of the provincial governor. In selecting men for this position, preference was given to those chiefs or "datus" of t he districts who commanded respect and wielded influence over their people. The establishment of the Moro Province was responsible for the pacification of the Moro people. It had greatly assisted in winning the confidence and the good-will of the Moro l\nd the non-Christian people and in paving the way to the establishment of t he civil goveunment of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. It provided for, as a means of pacification, the general disarmament of the Moros, which r eceived tremendous opposition on the part of t he natives. THE DEPARTMENT OF MINDANAO AND SULU

The Moro Province was converted into the Department of Mindanao and Sulu by virtue of Act 2309 of the Philippine Commission which was approved on December 20, 1913. Under this act the p1·ovince of Agusan and t he sub-province of Bukidnon were made parts of the Depal'tment of Mindanao and Sulu. The chief department officials were the governor, t he secretary, t he treasurer, the attorney, and the delegate, all appointed by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of t he Carpenter, Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, another agreement was entered into between the Sultan and the l?hi1 ippine Goverriment whereby the Sultnn was 1·educed to the position 0£ utitular spiritual head of the Mohammedan Church in the Sulu Archipelago, with all tihe rights and privileges which under the Government of the United Stntes of America may be exercised by such an ecclesiastical authority and subjeet to the same limitations which apply to the supreme spiritua l heads of all othe~ religions e...xisting in American territory,''! continuing, however, to receive the gi·atuities granted to him by the Spaniards in the Treaty of 1878. (Laurel, op. cit., p. 161.)

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

Phllippine Commission. These officials wer e constit uted into an Administ rative Council to act in an advisory capacity to t he Governor . Upon the resignation of Gener al J ohn Pershing as Governor of Moro Province, Frank W. Carpenter became Governor, being the first civil governor of t he Moro region. He was t he chief executive of t he Department, exer cising general supervision and control over t he various offices of the depart ment, the provincial governments, and t he government of other political subdi visions. The work done by t he Department of Mindanao a nd Sulu was indeed r emarkable. One of the most striking r ecognitions of progr ess made in the Moro country dur ing thls period of Democratic administr ation was made by Mr. Edwar d Bowditch, who was privat e sceretary to former Governor Forbes, vice-governor and secr etary of the Mor o P rovince and member of t he "cavalry cabinet" of former Governor Wood : Under Governor Harri son, the relations between F ilipinos and Americans be• came much more cordial, and there was great progress in the south. One of the few dangers in Phil ippine independ ence convincing' to William Jennings Bryan was the reputed menace of the war•like Moro to his more peaceful northern brothers. This also might well be a convi ncing argument against independence if played up in the American press. 'Dherefore this particular phase of the problem loomed large in the Democratic mind of Harrison. In seeking to solve it he showed g reat judgment in his choice of the civil governor of the Moro P rovi nce. He named for t his position Frank W. Carpenter, his executive secretary and the most experienced and perhaps the most intelligent man in the civi l service, and gave him a free band and unlimited support to change things in Moroland. :Miracles happened during the next eight years. (l)

The complete elimination of outlaws was one of t he outstanding feats of t he civil governmen~ established in 1914. More far-r eaching in its consequences was its wo~k in public improvements, in the building of schools and in t he establishment of fri endly relations bet ween t he Moros and the Christian Filipinos. While t he military government had begun public improvements and started schools, t he work of the departmental government along these lines was on a much larger scale. Money for these enterprises was given in plenty, considering the finances of the Islands, by the Insular Government. Hundreds oi tho~ands of pesos were taken yearly from the Insular t veasury and spent for public improvements for the non-Christians. In t he question of schools especially, t he progress was notable as shown by the following data: Year 1914 1915 1916 19U !918 1919 1920

( 1)

. .. . . ..

No. of Schools N o. of in operation Teachers 311 167 378 180 X

.. .. •. .. . . . ....

292 372 468 606 (x ) No data available.

A sia, April, 1930, Vol. XXX, No. 4, p. 260.

618 772 1,049 1,261

·Enrollment 14,800 16,019 X

26,167 32,438 41,179 68,096

'11HiE PHM, I<P PINE · QNES'.FI0N-

A,N A,NALXSIS

In t he bui,lding of roads, t r ails, and telephones, the following table is significant: Year 1914 l915 1916 1917 1918 . .... 1919 1920 ....

.... ......... . . . . . .. .

F irst Class Kms. None 6~ 9 94.9

Second Class

118.8 143.5 143.5

Kms. 90 114.9 87.2 184.5 234.7 190

Thixd Class K ms. 199 285.2 340.3

'Frails

Telephones

Kms. 2,400 2,437 2, 515

X X

567

2,327.7 209.6 220

1,898.3 2,076.7 2,000

1,381.6 1,381.6

In the extension of sanitary measures, a tremendous advance was made liy the establishment of new hospitals and field dispensary stations . Government hospitals wer e established in t he pr ovincial capitals of Agusan, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Sulu, and Zamboanga. Dispensaries were located in schools and the t eachers were instructed in the use of simp1e medicines, for in t he r emote places no doctors could be had. The work of extending healt h facilities became a great factor in establishing friend!¥ relations between Moi·os and Christian Filipinos. ( 1) THE M ORO BUGABOO

Mr. Bowditch has very ably r emarked in the article above quoted: " Mohammedan menace is more or less of a bugaboo". The Moro pr oblem is being solved, silently and surely. Let foreigners not try to divorc~ the M01·os from their Christian brot hers, and the process will be f aster. Independence will enhance a greater unity. In th e words of J ose P . M.elencio, son-in-law of General Aguinaldo and for many years a r epresentative in the Legislat ur e of a Moro district, "A new Mindanao is even now emerging. It does not, and it need not stand in the way to freedom. Out (J. ) From an unsympathetic authoi:, former Governor William Cameron F orbes, who has been unduly critical as to the work of his successor, Ml·. Francis B. Ha.rrison, we ha ve the fo llowing : "There was substanbi al progress in Mindanao nnd Sulu dur ing the ,period 1914 to 1920 in the extension of construction. of roads and trails, impro,,ement of ports, public health service, public schools, and public order. Following the publication of the abdication of sovereignty by the Sultan, additional local governments were organized with · Moros as municipal presidents and councilors. 'Dhere was a lack of American school teachers and doctors, and S'Uch places were filled by qualified Filipinos. Dispensar ies and schoo1s were established in all important villages however remote from Constabulm:y garrisons. F ilipino engineers, foremen of road construction, and land surveyors worked unmolested throughout the province. Upon the entrance ·of the United States into the WorltJ War, the greater pl.'oportion of American officials and employees in both Mindanao and Sulu resigned from. the Philippine sel'vice to enter the a-r,my, and their places were filled by Fili pinos, genernllv by promotion from lower gi·ades, By 1920 the American governors of provinceS'1 e.'l:cept Sulu, had resig ned either to enter the t:J.nited States civil or military service or to engage in private business. 'Dhese important posts were like,vise filled by Filipinos." ~w;. C. Forbes, The P hil-ippi?u1 hdqtuls, Vol. II, pp. 82-SS.)

THE PHILIPPINE QUES'PION- AN ANALYSIS

of the uncertainties of yesteuday, the ,·amparts of a better order ar e there being constructed. 0n all sides evidences of a quickened existence ar e discernible. The cross and the crescent are not inconsistent there. (1) "Goodnaturedly, they smile on each other, mar chlng hand in hand as friends and comrades. Some day, perhaps, one of them will be discaeded altogether ; the more fit will suevive. But t here will be no actual clas hes due to religious convictions and impulses. More noteworthy yet, Christians and Mohammedans, every now and then, go to the marriage altar together, to be there united by the · compelling dictates of their hearts. In no known case yet has one of those marriages hit the rocks of disaster. "There are other encouraging signs of the times. Our Mohamme<ian kinsmen are steadily embracing the ways of modernity. Age-old prejudices and antiquated traditions are gradually being dumped into the scrap-heap, and a new outlook towards life is manifest everywhere. More and more, faster and faster, they are adopting the trappings of modern civilization. '11heir wants ar e increasing; t hey are beginning to produce more. ']:'hey ar e fond of riding in motor cars. They enjoy moving picture shows. They get the S'ame thrill out of athletics and of boxing bouts as we do. Many of t hem ar e fitting their picturesque vintas with motqrs so they can travel about faster. 'Fhey are having t heir 1ands r egistered under the Torrens System, and they are building more substantial homes. A goodly number of them are acquiring a speaking knowledge of the Spanish, the Visayan or the Tagalog, while English is becoming widespread among those of t he young generation who could take advantage of t he public schools." (2) Some writers have gone to the extent of believing that the Chuistian Filipinos would be no match with the Moros. In this respect Mr. Forbes, an anti-independence advocate, comes to the rescue. He says : It is an unfortunate fact that certain elements among t he Americans have not hesitated to discredit Filipinos. Especially humiliating was the frequent charge that

(1) Mr. Forbes in the above quoted book says: "The Mohammedan Malays arc inclined to religious tolera nce. Crawfora ascribes the liberal attitude to their extensive intercourse with men of varfous religious persuations, the Buddhists of farther. India, the Chinese, e hri stians, and pagans of their own country.

•~under American administration the Moros have shown an increasing disposition to fraternize with Christians, and in some communities, notably in the Ftilipino colonies in the upper Cotabato Valley, the Moros have contributed materials and ,labor in preparations for the celebration of Christmas and other Christian festivals. Reciprocally, during the period 1914 to 1920, Christian Filipino officials and private per- · sons assisted in the celebration of the Mohammedan festivals expecially. that at the close ot the Ramadan, the annual f ast. Moros rarely raise any question ns to food offered them wh~n visiting, ·and the preparation and kinds of food offer no difficulties involving specia1 kitchens in the Constabulary or in boarding-schools." (W. C. Forbes, The PMippim Isla,uls, Vol. II, p . 41.) (2) Proeeedinqs of the Pirst Indep endence Congress, 1980, pp. 265-266.

THE PHIIE.lrPJ.?INIE QT!TESTI0N-AN ANALYSIS

the Filipinos were not courageous as fighters and compared unfavorably with the Moros in this respect. The record of the F\ilipinos in the ranks of the Scouts and constabulary was good and did not justify this sort of comment. It is to be noted that some distinguished officers of the army and of the Constabulary who had had experience with hostile Flilipinos during the· insurrection and later with hostile Moros in Lanao and Su1u, expressed the conclusion that in organized warfare or guerrilla operations the Filipino is equal or S11perior to the Moro. 1

Then Mr. Forbes proceeded to quote the foJlowing report from Brigadier-General G§orge W. Davis: Were the Filipinos or American Indians defending the Lanao countr.y we would have on our handS' a problem of vastly greater difficulty than the one which now confronts us, for the force would be brave, desperate, resourceful, and elusive, while now we Kllow beforehand exactly where to find the enemy and what will be his general plan of operations. 2

There is one reason which has been overlooked as to why tbe intelligent Moro leaders would want to have the policy o:li cooperation with their Christian brothers continue and that is the financial reason. If the administration of Mr. Carpenter from 1914-1920 was a success, it was chiefly due to the foct that Mr. Carpenter was given plenty of money to make improvements in the Mor.o country. This money came from the Christian population. 1n other words the Moro country is not as yet self- " supporting and :lirom 1914 to the present, the Insular government .)\.as been giving eJ<traordinary aid to this region. Thus despite the crisis in the proposed budget for 1932 there is a grand total of P-428,000 requested for "furthering the agricultural, industrial and social development of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Pbilippine Islands and their progress in civilization including intermigration expenses and the traveling expenses of a non-Christian commission to visit the provinces of Luzon and Visayas." 3 Of this amount P3:W,000 will be spent as an "aid to the provinces under the control of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to be distributed by the Seci:etary of the Interior." 4 The major portion of this money will go to the Moro country. The regular provinces inhabited by Christians do not receive similar amounts. MOROS &ND INDEPENDENCE

One frequent soui:ce of misrepresentation is the alleged attitude of the Moros as totally and solidly opposed to indep·endence-. 'Fhus, Nicholas Roosevelt in 'his book "The Philippines- A Treasure and A Problem" after a stay of barely si,, weeks in the Philippines made his positive asse-.eration that the Moros and other non-€:hristians are solidly opposed to independence and have repeatedly asked the Americans to remain in the Islands indefinitely. "fo the Philippines all evidence centers on tihe fact 1

W. €ameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, Vol. 11, pp. 42-43.

2 !Md, pp. 42-48.

8 Budget for 1932, Philippine Islands, Item 87, p. 92. ' Ibid., Item 41 (t-1), p. 96.

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

that the non-Christian peoples are a unit in opposing independence. This the Americans cannot overlook. In the case of the Moros specific promises were made. We disarmed them and agreed to protect them from Filipino oppression. Little wonder that many of the Moros say, 'If you are going to give the Filipinos independence, give us back our guns and we will take care of ourselves!'" (!) Let us have a glimpse of Moro politics from another angle. During the time of Harrison, the majority of the Moros were in favor of independence and were loud in their protestations in favor of national unity. \¥hen they found out that Wood was anti-independence, then many of them turned anti-independence. Mr. Roosevelt forgets t hat t he politics of the Moros is to play up to the man in power. I am reminded of a story about the Moros told me by Director Hidrosollo himself. The Director accompanied some Americans to Mindanao and on one occasion the Moro chieftains in their usual oratorical fashion told the Americans that they did not want the Christian Filipino to rule them, and that they wanted the Americans to remail;l there. Later on when one of those Moro chiefs realized that Director Hidrosollo was there, he invited the Director to a private corner. When they were out of hearing of the Americans, the Moro datu, said, "Well, Director, don't mind what we said in our speeches. T,hey are for American consumption. The real thing is that we are brothers. Christian Filipinos and Moros are of the same blood and race. So don't believe what I told them," The Moros are unfortunately forced by circumstances to play that kind of politics. Recently with the news of the probability of independence, nationalism among the Moros has been visibly on the ascendant. Many Moros attended the Independence Congress last year. Some of them had actively participated during the time of General Wood agitating against independence. One of such men is Datu Mandi who had led ten thousand Moros in a public demonstration against Filipinos and who is now a staunch advocate of national freedom . Upon his motion the Mindanao section of the Congress approved the following resolution :

[RESOLUTION) PRESENTED BY DATU MANDI

REQUESTING THE COMM ITTEE ON RESOLUTIONS OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONGRESS TO MAKE KNOWN IN A CLSAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL WAY THAT THE MOHAMMEDANS, THE SAME AS THEIR BRETHREN, THE CHRISTIAN FILIPINOS, WANT THE ABSOLUTE·, COMPLETE AND IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PHILIPPI NES AND THAT THEY PROTEST AGAINST ALL INTENT TO DIVIDE AND DISIN!fEGRATE THEM. Whereus, the Islands which fonn the group ca lled Mindanno and Sulu are au

integral part of the Philippine Archipelago; Whereas, the said islands are inhabited by people of the same race which populate the rest of •the Philippines; (l) Roosevelt, The Philippines-A Trecuure and A Problem, pp. 97-98.

['H>E PH1IMPP~NE <ilJES'i:I©N-AN ANAL:YSIS Wl}.ereas, the MOhammedans that inhabit Mindanao and Sulu and tbat constitute only one-third of its total population think and feel in the same way as $ieir, brethren, the Christian Filipinos; 'Ph orefore, be it resolved to reguest as we at present request, the Committe on

Resolu,tions of tlie Independence Congress in order that in a clear and unequivocal way it may be made known that the Mohammedans, Jike their: brethren, the Chri stian Filipinos, want the absolute, comJ?}ete and immediate independence of the Philippines and that they protest against any intent to divide and di sintegrate them. Manila, February 26, 1930. Unanimously approved.

It was the privilege of the writer to accompany Senator Hawes in his trip through t he Moro country. The most astounding discovery on this trip was the tremendous nationalism manifested by the Moros!. The enthusiasm shown for independence by the Moros in Zamboanga and Lanao was unprecedented. Nat a single voice of dissent was heard in Zamboanga, for as we have seen Datu Mandi had changed in favor of independence. During the trip of Secreta~y Hurley a Mr. Taupan led a group of Moros with ,placards against independence; but t he g roup led by Dat u Mandi was, according to impartial observers, much bigger. In Lanao there were formerly two parties Jieaded by Sultan Sa Ramain, pro-independence leader, and Amay Manabilang, an ti-independence. With the· death of Amay Manabilang, the anti-independence faction was almost disbanded with t he result t hat the vast majority of the Moros there" are for independence. Fifteen prominent datus welcomed our party most enthusiastically, chief among whom were Sultan of Mag.indanaw, Sultan Sa Ramain, and thirteen other datus. Thousands of .their followers met t he party on its way from Iligan to Dansalan with hundreds of placards bearing "Independence!' One solitary Datu, Datu Lawi, tried to gain audience with Senator Hawes but he did not bring an~ follower.s. He wanted to say that in case of independence Mindanao should be separate. It was t he only discordant note in t hat vast assemblage of thousands of Moros. PHILIPPINE ROY ALIS'.I)S C0MPARED WITH AMERICAN TORIES (i)F 1776

Even if there should be a few thousand Mor.as now .against independence, that would not be a sufficient reason fo1· the denial of independence. Complete unanimity among a people 13,000,000 strong is never possible. We submit that we are more united for it than many bther nations that secured their independence. Not a single outstanding Christian leader is against it. Let us take the independence r esolution approved by the Philippine Legislature on July 16 this year (1931! , ,vhich we printed above. There was not a disseming vote in either house, ,w~ even fro,n the Moro Senator and R,epresentatJives appointed by the Governor-Gemn-ai. During the last four or five years we recall only one dissent ing vote when similar resolutions were up for discussion in the Legislatm·e and that was last year when Mr. 'raupan, a Moro, voted against it; but the other Moro repre-

THE .PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

sentatives refused to follow him. Even Senator Hadji Butu, to many the most outstanding Moro leader, voted for independence resolutions, while in the Senate. We wish to compare our record of practical unanimity with-the record of the American Continental Congress, which spoke for the thirteen colonies of America. The question of political separation from England came up in the Second Continental Congress in connection with the resolution for independence presented on June 7, 1776, by Richard Henry Lee, a member of the Virginia delegation. Before this time actual fighting had already started in several parts. T,he delegates in the Continental Congress acted under definite instructions from their respective States, and they voted by States, each State having one vote. At the time the independence resolution was moved, only five colonies were openly for the measure, namely, Virginia, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Connecticut, and New Hampshire. Rhode Island, Georgia, and South Carolina were non-committal, while New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland; Delaware, and New Jersey were opposed to independence. When the resolution was voted on in committee of the whole on June 10, 1776, only a bare majority of the colonies voted in its favor. In view of the absence of a unanimity of views, it was decided to postpone the final action to July 1, 1776. The intervening period was employed by the friends of independence to convert the reluctant colonies. In New Jersey, the revolutionary party staged a successful coup d'etat, set up a r evolutionary government, and the new government on June 22, gave the necessary instructions to the New Jersey delegates to vote for the independence resolution. In Pennsylvania and Maryland the revolutionary party was also able to get control of the provincial government and thus s,ving those states in favor of independence. On the 1st of July, 1776, the Congress took up the independence resolution and it was carried in the affirmative by the votes of New Hampshlre, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia. South Carolina and Pennsylvania voted against it. Delaware was non-comittal. The New York delegates refrained from voting in the absence of definite instructions. The ultimate question, whether the Congress would agree to the resolution of the committee was postponed to the next day. When it was again taken up on July 2, 1776, it was approved by the votes of all the States except New York. It was not until July 8, that a convention in New York approved of the independence resolution. 1 About one-thlrd of the Americans, ac· cording to John Adams, were at first opposed to the Revolution. Many Americans, to quote Professor Marshall, an American historian, "remained faithful to the king; they called themselves Loyalists, but the Patriots called them Tories. The Tories were very numerous but 1 Howard, Preliminaries of the America.n Revolution,· Great Debates in Amtrican History,· Ma.rahall, America.n History.

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

were unorganfaed. The Patriots made life miserable for them. Many of them were tarred and feather.ed. Often the Tories were forced to flee i6rom their homes, and many of them sought t he protection of the British army whenever it chanced to be in t heir neighborhood." Is the meagre dissenting voice from the Moro region sufficient reason why independence should be withheld when comparatively t her e were so many more American Royalists in 1776 ? HISTORIC UNITY OLDER THAN AMERICAN

Neither would the presence of a few thousand anti-independence Moros be an argument in favor of the segregation of the great island of Mindanao from t he r est of the archipelago . The fact is that t he island of Mindanao--! am not speaki ng of the Sulu Archipelago proper-is Christian rather than Mohammedan. The /repo1·t of Director Sanvictores based on the census, which we quoted above was that the inhabitants of Mindanao island proper, excluding Sulu are 497,418 Christians, 249,158 Mohammedans, and 186,807 pagans. In other words, the Christians outnumber the Mohammedans in Mindanao proper to almost 2 to 1. How can anybody, ther.efore, say that M,indanao is more Mohammedan than Chris- "' tian? How can it be maintained that from the standpoint of self-determination, even granting for the sake of argument-and I am only granting this for the sake of argument,-that some Moros desire separation from the PhHippines, Mindanao should be turned over and be separated from the rest of the Archipelago? The only portion of t he Mindanao and Sulu group where the numerically predominant inhabitants are Moros is the Sulu Avchipelago, wheve the proportion is 9'7 o/o Mohammedans and only 2.6 Christians. Granting for the sake of argument again-and I say I am only granting this for the sake of argument-that the Mohammedans of Sulu archipelago proper desire separation from the rest of the Philippines, it is only this archipelago excluding Mindanao which under the principle of majority rule and self-determination can properly demand separation from the rest pf the Philippines. How is it that we do not hear from the imperialists the request for the separation of Sulu? To me the reason is simple. Because Sulu archipelago in itself offers no economic possibilities. It is now thickly populated. No great natural resources abound there, whe1·eas Mindanao has such tremendous possibilities. Because a common background creates a strong bond, Mindanao has another very strong claim to a perpetual association with us. Historica lly t he unity of t he Philippine archipelago is older than the oldest settlement of the United States; for long before the first white man settled in Massachusetts, at t he time when what is now the United States was yet a vast wilderness peopled by Indians, Mindanao was already a part of the !Philippine Islands. In fact to the early cartographers Mindanao wM better known than Luzon. When our revolutionary fathers stamped the three stars on the Filipino flag under a central sun radiating unity and nationalism, they did

THE P1IUUPPINE QNESTION-AN A:NALYSIS

not create a new scheme, discover a new land or conquer a new t erritory; they symbolized what centuries of Philippine history had already made a fact-the geographic and political unity of the Philippine Archipelago.

CHAPTER X

INDEPENDENCE AS A MEANS We believe that independence is the only way to our national self-realization and that the destiny of our nation can only be entru sted to our own people.

Thus reads t he first article of t he Decalogue of the Ang Bagong Kat i punan, a national non-partisan organization established recently in the Philippines by Speaker Roxas. it is the philosophy back of the independence movement. The Filipino people believe t hat their fullest development can be best attained and maintained thru independence. Independence is t hus a means and not an end by itself. It is the sur est way to the political, intellectual, social and econ omic progress of the country. W e believe that independence would foster a quicker and a more stable political development than the present status. The time has come when for t he cause of self-government itself the Philippines should be· independent. The r easons a re obvious . POLITICAL DEVELOPME NT UNDER INDEPE NDENCE

In the first place, a foreign rule cannot infuse proper r espect for the government and t he sta te. Loyalty fo r t he government is the si1,e qua non of a democracy. The American government cannot infuse that loyalty. H erein lies t he fundamenful defect of ;American rulel The stronger a nationalistic movement is in a subject community, the greater becomes the dissatisfaction of the people towards t he state organization. The independence movement breeds a da ngerous discontent with the existing governm ent. The grant ing of independence itself will be the only way to a proper sense of loyalty to the state. In the second place, the qualit ies of self-sacrifice and self-reliance so necessary in the proper political development of a ny people can be best cultivat ed under an independent existence. When the people feel that they and they alone are responsible for t he success or failure of t heir government, when they realize that t hey must provide both for internal secur ity and external safety, t hey will be forced to build a national morale and a national discipline which will make them put up a decent and orderly national organization. As masters of their nationa l destiny they w ill work for national cohesion ; and their common dangers will make them give up theh· petty selfishness and internecine wranglings. If independence will not produce t hese results, t hey will probably lose it again. In the third place, w hile the Filipinos are under the United States, t hey a re forced by the very nature of t hings to follow American ideas a nd practices of government irrespective of whether those ideas and practices a re fitted to t hem or not. I t was the good fortune of the writer

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

to be present in Washington when the Jones Law was being discussed and he recalls perfectly what the late Congressman Jones, author of the Jones Law, had as reasons for favoring a senate directly elected by popular vote. The year was 1915 and the agitation for an elective senate in the United States was at its height. Hence, Mr. Jones, following the agitation in the United States, incorporated in the Jones Law a provision for a popularly electi ve senate in the Philippine, . irrespective of whether t his type was the one needed by the country or not. The writer is one· of those who believe that probably the Philippine Senate should have been constituted in a somewhat different wa)'. Anyway the people should have been allowed to determine what kind of a senate they wanted. Again, in the same Jones Law it is not clear to many as to whether the presidential type of government was meant for the Philippines or the parliamentary type, although the writer again recalls that t he J ones Law did not prohibit r epresentatives or senators from occupying cabinet positions. T_he author probably intended to have some modification of the presidential type. What the writer maintains is that under the circumstances even with the limited autonomy t hat the people of the Phi lippines have under America, they should have been allowed to decide on the form of government they want to establish . Finally, the independence question itself is the greatest deterrent to the political development of the Philippines. So long as t hat question remains unsolved, r eal political progress is practically impossible. E very other political issue is over shadowed by independence and no r eal party system is developed. Philippine politics ever centers on the independence question and every other question is relegated to the background. Under t he circumstances, t herefore, no real party system can exist and no other issues can become prominent enough aside from the issue of independence. Some people even believe that at present, t he one-party system is better because the government is really run by the American Government as the r eal party in power and the Filipino party. If it is agreed that a democracy can best be worked out by the existence of two well-balanced parties that condition will remain unfulfilled so long as we are under America. The people's mind' must be taken away from the independence issue before it can show real political progress. It is conceded that there are many other Philippine problems of a political nature which must be studied and solved for the proper political development of the country. There is the problem of the system of government to be established. There is the problem of the relation between the central and the local governments. There is t he problem of corruption in the government. 'Dhere is the problem of elections. SOCIAL &EFO&MS

The present situation prevents a wholesome movement for social r eforms . The attitude of self-criticism should exist in every people so that its political, social, and economic evils can be exposed for correction.

THE IPHtLJIPPiiNE QUEJSil'ION-AN ANALYSIS

Under the present sit uation the Filipinos have been just!¥ chauged with being over sensiti ve as to t heir defects. Ther e is little or no campaign of self-crit icism, political or social, for the simple r eason that one of t he arguments used by the imperialists against independence is the alleged incapacity of t he people. 'P,o support th at avgument irnpeuialists point out and expose every def ect of t he people. 'Ji'he -people naturally resent such an attitude. A book t hat became very unpopular in t he Pbilippines is that of Miss Katherine Mayo depicting wit h vile inuendoes and exaggerations the worst of Philippine life. As a r evolt against such attit ude the people have whitewashed their defects and have not made any serious attempt at social or political r.eform. P erhaps tha t attit ude is mi staken in many respects. What t he writer wants to say is that it is t he nesult of the present political situation, _w hich thus prevents a r apid social pr·ogress. An independent personality is n eeded for the intellectual development of the people. A sovereign power imposed by for ce and maintained agai<nst t he consent of t he people is a perennial blight upon t he intellectual unfolding of that people. A prominent American exponent of independence once wrote to me: "Have you ever stopped to t hink that ·• the Malay mind is the on!¥ mind so far unexpressed in the council of the nations ?" ~ It is true that there have been some very notable improvements in our mode o.f life since America came. J.t js not the purpose of t he writer to minimize them. We might perhaps mention a f ew of .t hese improvements such as the ,·aising of the intelligence of t he people through popular educat ion; the popularization of sanitary standards which destroyed superstitious beliefs about health and sickness ; t he est ablishment of civil rights which protected the freedom of individuals ; t he institution of r epresentative government; and the introduction of suoh sound principles as the dignity of labor, indi" idualism, square deal, a11d majorit y rule. On the other hand, our dependence has increased our desire to adopt everything . fo reign. This fa speeially t rue as t o t hose outward forms of our mode of Hfe like clothing, smoking, and our social behaviors. Our moral standards seemed to have been lowered, the spirit of political mat erialism has invaded t he country, t he spirit of abnegation and sacrifice so mani:fiest during our war with America and Spain has declined, our time-honored politeness and r espect for elder s ·h as diminished, a lack of loyalty to. the state has been engender ed by political agitation, and some social evils, like the drink habit, have been incr eased r ath m· tha n diminished. The first requisite Qf a sound eult ur al development is the very fr.eedom to di rect it or an independent national state. The motive power must be set free so that the people may orient ate their 'cult ural development in t he way most suited t o t heir genius and potentialities. When our municjpal councils , ou1· pro:vincial governments, our Legislature, or fodependence CongJ·ess and a t housand other associa tions pass resolutions for om• immediate separation from America, t hey simpl.v express a wish

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

to make the people arbiters of their cultural development. What peoples strenuously object to is the forceful and indiscriminate extension of for-

eign culture. The right of every people to its own cultural development was probably the greatest issue of the recent world war. The fear that the spirit of Old Germany with its militarism, its s.acrifices of the individual for the state, aroused th e other peoples to oppose her invasion with all their might. The Germans were probably as good as anybody individually. Their government was perhaps more effi cient. They have developed science to a high degree, but the other people rightly or wrongly feared a forceful extension of a distinctively German culture. By this l do not mean that peoples must close t heir doors from all intrusion of foreign culture, for the modern age with its machine and transportations has made certain cultural traits universal. The problem for every people is to develop its potentialities so that it may contribute to world civilization, to retain its qualiti es which are not inimical to progress, and to adopt those uni ver sa! traits o,f culture demanded by t he modern age. These things can be best accomplished upon t he basis of national freedom. Fortunately modern science supports the view that human nature is not stagnant, tl)at in so far as we are concerned there is no, such thing as an innate Malay nature. While there are certain races possessed with certain qualities better than other races, these qualities are matters of evolution. The human mind, to quote Professor Robinson, "is a matter of accumulation and it has been ;n the making ever since man took his first step in civilization." This postulate of the modifiability of bu.man nature has been amply justified by the findings of social science. "Human personality" says Professor Charles A. Ellwood, "is created in a social situation and it is always largely a social product." · "It follows that the social behavior of men and the institutions of human society are plastic and modifiable. They are the r esult, not of innate traits plus the influence of physical environment, but rather of mental patterns in the minds of the individuals or a group." · In other words, even gi·anting that om· Malay mind has not so far developed a great capacity for great economic enterprises ther e is no r eason why, through our own initiative with the pnoper government we should not attain the state of commercial development reached by other nations. We have the very good example of the merchants in Japan who were, under the old Samurai code, a despised class. Yet in the modern age which necessarily places the businessmen on a high plane, we have seen the spectacle of Japanese businessmen occupying the positions of highest prominence in the political and social life of our neighboring kingdom. CULTURAL CONTJHBUTIONS

Whenein, you might ask me, will our chief cultuual conteibutions lie for the benefit of mankind? 'Dhere are several lines of activities wherein impartial observers of our national traits find that we n~e bound to lead,

such as in music, t he fine arts, and probably in literature. We feel a t h viii ifllJ our hearts when we hean: ouu own J ovita Fuentes and when we r ead of the successes of other renowned si,n gers like Luisa Tapales. We a,ue reminded of the notable artistic tviumphs in Elurope of Luna and Resurrecci6n J;J\idalgo. We fe,e l transfixed w,ith the admirable beauty of ·t he statues of Gu illermo Tolentino or the Philippine scenes of Amorsolo. We vener ate the literary achievements of Rizal. We have heard Guerrero. Apostol, and Balmori tuning t he lute to admil·ing Spanish audiences. Our severest critics find in our young ,Vlliters in English promise for development of a literature that is distinctively Filipino. But it is not alone in t hese 1ines that our contribution to wollld civilization will lie. It will be found in t he very strategic cultural position of our own people, a Malay stock influenced in Pre-Spanish times by Hindu and Chinese civilizations, converted into Christianity and strengthened with funda mental t raits of Latin civilizatiC\11, and for nearly a generation under t he influence of the other t,Y'pe of dominant Western civilization, t he Anglo-American. We have long been trained to accept Western culture. When Amevica decided to retain the Philippines and extend its rnltuve here there was no social upheaval. We did not experience the shock that at the present t ime China, so thoroughly Chinese or Oriental, is undevgoing. 'L'he visitor in our neighbor ing Republic is surp1·ised to . find that in the land where t hirty years ago the feet of the distinguished lad;)' were bound, and her head and hear t subj ugated to the four obediences of womanhood, he now finds the modern girls enjoying the freedom of t heir American comrades and often going out alone with their boy friends, thus outstripping our own woman here. We are equally surprised to find t hat the Chinese students who were thirty years ago submissive and well-disciplined are now demanding that they control their own schools and their own teachers. In such a sudden clash of cultures t here is pound to be abuses and irregularities. Having been in contact with Weste•n culture so long the F\ilipinos are not e"pected to go to such ext1·emes. At the last Kyoto Conference which I attended, I noticed that our cultural development was being watched wit h interest. There were two types of delegates; the Western delegates from E·n gland, United States, and Austualia, representing Occidental culture and the Oriental delegates from J apan and China representing Oriental civilization. '11here were bound to be conflicting viewpoints and attitudes among the representatives of these two mighty civilizations. China and Japan could not belie their ancient civilizations ; China with her classics, and Japan with her Buddhistic culture. When t he Chinese spoke of the trad itional in cult ure t hey meant Confucius and their civilization of thousands of years. Everythi ng Western was new. \llhis, the Occidental representati\,e could not easily understand. 'l'he F'ilipino viewpoint t hen became illt1minating, for with us any cult ural element t hat !\as pr oven its worth becomes classical

THE PHILJ!PPINE QlJES'Pl0N- AN ANALYSIS

and ti·aditional. Thus we speak o:£ Rizal's novels written in a foreign language anil bavely forty years old as classical. We cherish t hem as among the very best o:£ our own. We cannot but admire t he J a panese and the Chinese cultures which look back to thousands of years. But we believe that for the convenience of progress it is easier for a people ,v.ho h as been somewhat separ ated from its anoient Asiatic moor-ings to accept everything worth while in the new. 1 maintain that our people w hich wa~ in touch for three hundred years with Lati n cu1tu r.e and for a generation with the Anglo-American civilization is in a position to dictate its own cultural development, not dilly because it is its r ight but because its experience will be of value to the civilization of t he world. As I left t he Kyoto Confer ence where the representativ.es of th e mighty civilizations met I felt that in t he coming intercourses of Pacific nations in this hemisphere so pregnant with possibilities for good ov evil, the Philippines, with her unique experience has a role and a mission to fulfill and that this role can best be entrusted to an independent Republic. We have thus a most str ategic cultural position-an Oriental people st anding at t he portals of Asia in deep sympathy with their kindred neighbors yet ,vith hands outstretched to the cultures of Spain and America. We still relish with pleasure the chivalr y a nd courtesy that our ancient metropolis has bequeathed to us; at t he same ti me we are holding on to America's ideal of democracy, her business m ethods, her efficiency, her high standards for health and sanitation, her espousal of machine methods, and her idea of popular education. We owe it to our posterity and to t he world to effect a ha rmonious blending of all t hese cultural elements. Under t he aegis of freedom we expect to evolve a mode of life adapted to t he modern age yet sufficiently Asiatic in t he feeling of comradeship with our Oriental nations. We plan to continue r etaining a per.sonalit:11 ofi our own a nd to develop the good traits of our. people. Our hospitality, our geperosity, our nespect for the elders, our neace-loving nature, and our artistic bents, we intend to preserve. Our chief characteristic sl\ou1il be our Catholicity; our chief strength t he harmonious amalgamation of the East and rthe West.

CHAPTER XI

INDEPENDENCE IS I;NEVITABLE AND IMPERATIVE Philippine independence is inevitable and imperative-I. Because the thirteen millio~ Filipinos are practically a unit de-

manding it-2. Because the continued occupation of the Philippines by America is a constant travesty on America's noblest principles and traditions3. Because no matter how lightly an alien control may rest on a people, it cannot, it will not, make that people happy4. Because retention breeds animosity and distrust; while independence will foster friendship and cooperation5;. Because independence is the only logical outcome of four centuries of struggles and privations undergone by the Filipino people6. Because American retention prevents the freest and fullest development of the genius and potentialities of the Filipino _people7. Because the longer we remain under America, the harder will it be for us to be freed from our political and economic dependence on her8. Because we are now better prepa,-ed for natio"nhood than many independent states of today and we are ready to assume the risks and responsibilities of independence9. Because America has pledged our freedom and "America's word is America's bond."10. Because the only condition for the redemption of that pledge has been fulfilled· 11. Because the establishment of a Philippine Republic through America's generosity would increase her prestige as a liberty-loving nation12. Because with $ under America, powerfol economic interests t hreaten to make the American flag a symbol of inequality and discrimination13. Because the American administrative policy in the Philippines has been halting, inconsistent, and often contradictory14. Because America, through constant misinfo1'mation and misrepresentation, has proved unfit to govern ~n alien peopleFIN ANCEs · oF AN INDEPENDENT RE·PUBLJC

Some would immediately ask whether we can financially support an independent government. In reply to t his we say that othei· countries with less resources and le s r evenues are maintaining an independent existence. Siam for instance is an example of n country whose revenues are about the same as ours and she is maintaining an independent e,dstence, in spite of t he fact that she has to guard a long line of land bound-

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

eries on two sides of which are her powerful neigh bors, England and Fra nce. The Philippines ar e better off financially than many of the smaller independent count ries of Europe. Many of our minds h ave studied the question of our finances caiefully and we a re confident t hat what we shall tiaverse even in case of independence wilJ not be worse t han what we have gone through in the past. Our Secreta ry of Finance, Mr. Unson, who is an unquestioned authori ty on the matter a nd who has been connected with our budget-mak,ing for t he last fifteen years discu.ssed this thoroughly at t he last Independence Congress. Mr. Unson said: Studying the effects in t he past oi economi c cha nges as far-rea ching and important as may be those produced by t he granting oi ind ependence to the Philippines, we have to cite instances that may guide us in estimating and calculating t he possible effects of the e."cpected crisis.

The most recent instance was the enormous and almost unforseen fall in th e prices of all our ex ports in 1921. The second insta nce that we can cite is tha t of the economic depression of 1898 caused by t he upri sing of 1896 and L897 a gainst

t he Spariish Government. I t mu st be observed that both instances cited exerci sed an infl uence on our economic life greater t han that which any other event of a poli tical or economic character may exercise on t he present state of affairs in t he count ry. In t he first case, it was a very large and abrupt reduction in t he values of all our products, perhaps unprecedented in our hi story, and it, having been a crisis of uni versa l character, affected not only the Philippines but also a ll of t he countries consuming her products. The second historical case mentioned by us, though but a local uph eava l, affected our economic life down to its very fo und at ion. That effort t o overthrow a secular sovereignty r end ered necessary, not only a complete abandonment of some of our sources of production and a general neg lect of others, but it also implied the useless consum_ption and even the destructi on of wealth which are unavoidable" consequences of war. Ii it is logical and r ational to base our vision of the future on the events of the past, we are justified in cherish ing t he hope that t he ~economic upheava l originat;.. ing from the political separation of America and the Philippines will be successfu Jly overcome by the FiH pino people, in t he same way a s t he former commotions, and perhaps with more effectiveness, consdering our greater resources and th e increased vitality of our agricultural industries.

In order to meet some necessity for economic nead9ustm.ent in case of independence, General Aguinaldo in the letter above refe!"l"ed to sugges"ted the continuation of free trade for ten years. . H e said : I venture to assert then that the economic structure of the country will be more stable if we secure a n access to other markets besides those of th e Uni ted States; although for reasons of graiitude and other considerations which we hold towards her, we Would be willing a lways to consider America as the favored nation under equal circumstances. I am convinced that the contemplated readjustment of free t rade relations should come after the conceS'Bion of independence. Disposed as we ate to face the consequences imposed by new obligations t hat will arise, our count ry will intcnsif,y its a~tivities in all li nes of endeavor with those new obligations in mind. Necessity i6 the mother of progress, and on the necessities incident upon a n independent government, t he Filipino people will construct the edifice of their prosperity and nationa] greatness. On the understanding, therefore, that t he adjustment regardfog free

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

trade should not precede the concession of independence, notwithstanding opinions to the contrary, I would suggest a period of not more than ten years within which we hope to be able to adjust the economic difficulties attendant upon sepa,ration in a way satisfactory to both peoples. Let independence come at the earliest hour, however, at the latest within the next five years, inasmuch as the continuation of the present guardianship will ki11 our spirit of initiative as well as the char~ acteristic elements of our nationality.

In support of General Aguinaldo's stand we might cite the Treaty of Paris which ceded the Philippines to Spain. As a means of economic readjustment, it provided that for ten years Spain and the United States would be placed on an equal tariff foo'ting. The oppositi'on of American agricultural interests might be met by limiting the sugar and oil that can enter America during this period of readjustment and closing the American door to Philippine labor. However, these, are mere details. If the choice is between immediate, absolute and complete separation and indefinite continuation, with no period of readjustment, which the present circumstances require, our vote would be for the former. But that, as we have said, is not even the issue. The real issue will be between separation and restriction. The main thing is to decide upon immediate independence; the conditions, details, and working arrangement can be taken up in a meeting participated in by representati ves of both peoples. If Philippine Independence is inevitable and imperative, what should be its form? Immediate, absolute and complete independence has been the request of the Filipino people since 1922. The insertion of "complete and absolute" was the result of the visit of the Wood-Forbes Mission. It was then insisted that whal the leaders wanted was indepem:lence with a string tied to it and hence both parties changed their p1·ogram into immediate, absolute and complete independence to signffy that the people were willing to shoulder all the responsibilities of independence. GUARAN'FEES FOR INDEPEN DENCE

What would be the guarantees of an independent Philippines? Some suggested that the United States could ask a treaty of neutrality. Those who believe that this scheme is feasible point to the geographic position of the Philippines. Great water-ways separate her from the rest of Asia, thus, lessening t he prospects o:fi its neutrality being violated in case of war. Again it is argued that if in the four-power treaty, England, France, J apan, and the United States agreed to respect the territorial integrity of the Philippines while it is under America, these nations, if America wanted, should have no ueason to object to respecting the neutrality of an independent Philippines. On the contrary, England would prefer that Japan should not take it because the Philippines in the hands of Japan would destroy the continuity of English colonial possessions from Australia, Borneo, the Malay Settlements and India. And neither would France and J apan like to have the Philippines occupied by England. It

THE PHILIPPINE QUES'Jl!ON-AN ANALYSIS

is contended that the very jealousy of the great powers should be an inducement for them to pledge for the perpetual neut ra lity of the Philippines. Oth ers urge that the League of Nations should afford s ufficient guarantee and that America herself should allow t he Philippines to be a member of the League. Prof. Walter B. Pit kin, of Columbia, wrote t hat such an act would solve the American-Japanese "crisis" and he says: rhe Japanese cri sis can, I think, be permanently solved if we attack the underlying causes of it in the fo llowing manner: 1. Di spel the be1ief, now current in Asia and a good part of Europe and South America, that we are secretly and hypocriticaJJy commi tted to economic imperialism. To this end, grant immediate ind ependence to th e Philippin es on condition that the new island nation join the League of Nations at once. This move will protect th e Philippines against a possible invasion by the Japanese militarists, if the League of Nations amounts to anything. If, on the other hand, the League should prove unwilling or incompetent to protect one of its smaller memtierS' against agression from a powerful one, the Un ited States would then have adequate evidence as to the futility of t.he League and could keep out of it. Quite apart f rom our moral obligation to keep our promise to the Filipinos, such a move would serve two important purposes." ( 1 )

Another group would induce the United States to t ry to maintain a sort of protectorate for the Philippines very much like t hat over Cuba. The objection to this plan is that t he Philippines is too far from the United States for protection. And on the part of the Philippines, the fact that the Platt Amendment has been made part of the Cuban Constitution means a curtailment of the sovereign rights of Cuba. E very international r elationship that the Philippines will have should be on the treaty pasis. The majority of the Filipinos would probably prefer no such relationship. The genetal plan outlined by the Filipinos for complete separation should be in general adhered to. The dangers of absolute independence have been over-stressed. Nations now realize the evils of war and aggression. The r ecent World War did not benefit any one nation,. Nobody was t he r eal victor. The millenium of permanent peace has not come ; but greater securities for independence are not now in evidence. The establishment of the League of Nations, the World Court, the various naval disa"rmament conferences, the Kellogg Pact, and the arbitration treaties ar e signs of the growing desire of mankind for the amicable settlement of international disputes. At the present time respeqt for a nation's independence is the rule and aggression is the exception. Out of some sixty-four nations in the world today, there is not a case of invasion at present . Any nation that keeps order, protects the lives and properties of foreigners and fulfills its international obligations, can maintain its independence. M the criterion to repel invasion were applied to all nations not more than five or six of them can qualify. Siam right now would not be able to repel invasiotJ by France and England and these are on her border line. Persia (1

•

B. Pitkin, Mm t We Figkt Japan ? pp. 381-382.

1!'1'l)El PHIJfJ!JioPPIN< El QWElSil'ION-

AN ANM.¥SIS

could not fight FFance and none oJr the twe1ve OF more small nations of Europe could stand the aggression of lta:Jy or France. And yet, these nations are enjoying their independence. Lnternational peace and goodwill is pvacticed at present move than ever before. The world is now a better and safer place to li'Ve in. The Filipino people will lie determined to defend their country. We are not so wanti,ng in manhood and courage. Our past has proved it. Our showing when America invad·ed us was not so bad. It took the great American Republic three years of exasperating· warfare and the presence of 120,00'0 American soldiers and it cost her over $400,000. Elven assuming that America has not increased our capacity for protection- which is not to her credit-what other nation can afford to spend that much for our conquest? Will it pay to have to spend that much for our colonization? A CONTRIBUTION OF AMERICA AND THE PHllilPPINES

There is another aspect of Philippine [ndependence movement that should not be lost sight of by Americans and Filipinos. I't is the only movement for separation which has been carried on through the instrumentalities of law and order, using elections and public officials as the vehicles for the expression of the nation's desire. When; as we have noted, Amevican administrators do not give full credence to manifestations of public desire made by the oruv autho,itative way which is the ballot box, they are not only ignoFing the recognized principle of representative government but they also fail to realize that, >n this respeet, the Philippines is making a distinct contribution in the hlstory of emancipatory· movements. At present there are three known ways of condueting campaigns for political separation. The first is the bloody way, or r.evolution, which has been utilized by the Thirteen Colonies, by the Filipinos in 1896 and 1898, by t he South Amevican peoples in the be~nning, of the nineteenth century, and by practically every other nation that secur.ed its independence. Th~n, there is the Indian emancipatory movement, under the leadership of Gandhi, which is based on virtual non-cooperation. It practices peacefol resistance and disobedience to Jaw. While people at first laughed at Gandhi's method, its effectiveness is now universally recognized. Gandhi himself is bieug called to Londo..n for a round table conference on the Indian situation. The third and last method is the one contributed by the Filipinos ,vherein the campaign is conducted within the Jaw, through elections authorized by . the American government itself, in the town and pr0\/11l.• cial halls wher,e public 01ficials meet, in public meetings duly authorized by the government, in the halls of the Philippine Legislature where 'the l'ep1·esentatives 01 the people assemble in accordance with law, aqd in the "1ery halls of American Congress where meµibevs of the Phllippine Mission and elected Resident (l;ommissioners spe9k with authority f their

THE PHILIPPI NE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

people.' There have been, as we have noted in the previous chapters. some embarrassing situations e.xperienced by our leaders which simply prove that the s ooner the question is solved the bet ter. They ofte n find it difficult to reconcile cooperation with the sovereign power with the popular demand for emancipation. In the very nature of things, the situation is unsatisfactory and transitional; but if the movement succeeds, it will intrench in our mind the third and by far the most civilized metboJ of campaigning for political separation. The triumph of Philippine independence through these legal and peaceful instrumentalities w ill add prestige to both the American an d Filipino peoples. It will be a distinct contribution to the solution of colonial problems. It will be a distinct step towards internationa l peace and understanding. America and the Philippines are never meant to be together culturally . politically, or economically. The different racial consciousness a r e bound to clash and a re now clashing. The genius of the E ast is not for America. The present economic arrangements are already seriously t hreatened. Powerful American interests are determined to modify if not t o completely abolish our trade relations. They want either of t wo things, com plete political separation or the close door for our competing products. The issue is therefore not independence or the continuation of our· trade relationship ;- but independence or economic discrimination; independence or inequality under the American fla g. To the self-respecting Filipinos and fair-minded Americans, the choice is inescapable. AMERICAN TRADITIONS DE MAN D INDEPE·NDENCE

The best Amer ican principles and traditions demand independence. America may give perfectly valid reasons for a half-hearted support of a League to enforce peace; she may say that the other nations a re not sincere in their advocacy of t he right of self-determination and t he consent of the governed; she may claim that the Treaty of V er sailles was confabulated precisely to perpetuate autocracy and imperialism and preser ve the status quo. On these grounds she can practically r efuse her help in the further application of those noble principles in the far-off nooks and corners of the globe, in the still dark caverns peopled by submerged nationalities. "What is the use ?" she might say, "The other nations do not believe in these principles, and I certainly will not be the self-appointed guardian of their morals and consciences." But can America consistently refuse the application of this doctrine in a land within the confines of her own boundaries, in a purely domestic problem like hilippine Independence, in t he solution of which her pride cannot and ,.,ill not require t he consent or the san ction oJi a ny other nation? T.he right of self-determin ation like all n oble principles h as certainly limi tions in its practical application. It is difficult to apply it in a land here we do n ot know who will do the determining and how it will be do . In "many cases conflicting interests clash. Wheve theve is diver-

'FHE PHILIPPINE QUESTION-AN ANALYSIS

sity in races it has been found necessary, as in the provinces ceded to Denmark and in the Saar Valley, to have a plebiscite. In many cases propinquity and paramount national inte.ests and other vested rights demand the temporary sacrifice of the doctrine, and thus we see portions of the globe still denying its very existence. But America cannot find those obstacles in the Philippines. Here we have a people already politically organized under her own supervision into a representative government-a people who have said in all the elections, the acknowledged channels for the expression of popular will, that t hey want the full application of t he doctrine, political independence. Se1f-determination and the consent of the governed were the very principles the Filipino people invoked when they demanded to be heard at t he Paris Treaty Conference in 1898; they were the very same principles which made the Filipinos wage a disastrous and unequal war rather than unconditi<mally submit to American sovereignty; they were the very same principles they held on to when, defeated in war, they had to appeal to the spirit of justice a nd fair-dealing of the American people; and they are the very same principles which 'they are invoking at present when they ask, in all respect and friendship, that the United States do now recognize the independence of the Phllippines. It is the plea of the only Christian nation in the Orient to the greatest nation-leader of Christian mo".ements in the world. America holds the key to the doo. of Philippine independence. Can she afford to keep that door locked when the liberals of all continents await its opening as a signal that America is still the leader of enlightened statesmanship? Can she consistently 1·efuse to unlock the door which leads into the avenue of democracy and self-determination? That avenue, once open, goes into the very heart of Asia. As an American writer puts it, "Phllippine independence will light a new lamp in Asia!" And Asia houses and feeds one half of the human race!