Europe too Fragile to Act? The Challenges of EU External Relations.

Mini-mag Winter 2016-2017 www.eyes-on-europe.eu

EUROPE: TOO FRAGILE TO ACT? The challenges of EU external relations

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Edito Fundamentally intertwined with the recognition of the Statehood status on the international scene, foreign affairs and external action have historically been the apparatus of States. The European Union’s arrival on the stage has shaken the well-established Westphalian international order, the latter gaining, little by little, increasing external abilities at the expense of its Member States. However, the exercise of the so-called EU external competences rarely deprives States of their right to behave as fully-fledged actors on the international plane. And, in the realm of equals, things aren’t always straight forward.

Internal struggles over who is competent to conclude a treaty – member states, the EU or, more often, both – reflect the

will of States composing the EU to keep hands on foreign affairs and ensure the pursuit of their national interests externally. Conversely, as the latter may impede the development of European-wide external actions, supranational institutions try to abuse the spill-over effect of certain catch-all competences, such as the Common Commercial Policy. Recent Commission pleas to get exclusive competence for the conclusion of onesize-fit-all trade agreements, such as the CETA, are blatant examples thereof.

EU external action is, it is true, no more than an exacerbation of similar domestic disputes. However, under the international scrutiny, Member States’ fierce resistance to granting the EU further capacities is the product of a reasonable

Sommaire

Mohamed Fahmi President

des relations UE-Chine

Hélène Decottigny Editor in Chief

p.4 What’s next for the Eastern

Pauline Claessens Secretary General

Mediterranean natural gas?

Matteo Guidi Public relations manager

p.5 A fragile European response to

a complicated war

p.8

L'Europe à la conquête de l'eldorado militaire de l'Indonésie ?

Editor in Chief

Marie Lavayssière Deputy Editor-inchief Loïc Charpentier Deputy Editor-inchief Giorgia Bozzini Vice-manager for public relations

Visit our website http://eyes-on-europe.eu

Mis- or-dis- information? Russia’s potential influence over European discourses and media

Our facebook page https://www.facebook.com/eyesoneurope Our twitter @EoE_Bxl

p.9 Quo vadis? EU-Turkey relations in the

aftermath of the coup attempt p.10

Hélène Decottigny

Credits

p.3 Brexit: la situation incertaine

p.7

behavior: they fight to keep up worldwide relevance and, hereby, Statehood.

This is not without affecting the European external action and its legitimacy: inexistent, overdue, inconsistent or inefficient are not unusual qualifiers thereof. Needless to say, a disunited Union is all but strong in the face of a globalized world, where the old powers slowly relinquish their authority to the benefit of rising new players.

A European Milk Fairytale or how the EU is Destroying African Markets

p.11 Europe et migrants, entre sécurisation et

manque de vision en long terme

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Back cover by Simon Lavenne Graphic design by Laura Tran

Mini-Mag Winter 2016-2017

Brexit: la situation incertaine des relations UE- Chine La dernière visite du Président chinois Xi Jinping au Royaume-Uni en octobre 2015 a renforcé les relations bilatérales entre ces deux pays. Certains experts politiques parlent de « l’ouverture d’un nouvel âge d’or ». Mais depuis le référendum britannique – 52 % des Britanniques ont décidé de quitter l’Union européenne (UE) – l’incertitude règne en maître sur l’avenir des relations entre l’Empire du Milieu et l’UE. Cette instabilité politique se ressent sur les marchés internationaux.

Début octobre 2016, Theresa May a an-

noncé vouloir déclencher l’article 50 du Traité sur l’Union européenne avant la fin du mois de mars 2017. Cette procédure sera la première étape dans le processus de divorce avec l’Union européenne et le début des négociations des termes de sortie. Deux scénarios ont été mis en avant. Le premier est le « soft Brexit » : ce scénario signifierait que le Royaume-Uni garde ses avantages commerciaux qu’offre le marché unique, mais serait soumis à la législation européenne. Il serait également assujetti à la libre circulation des personnes et devrait participer au budget européen – un statut quasi-similaire à la Norvège et à la Suisse qui font partie de l’EEE (Espace économique européen). Le second est le « hard Brexit » envisageant un divorce ferme avec l’UE, ses partisans prônent une indépendance complète vis-à-vis de l’UE, tant dans le domaine économique que dans le domaine de l’immigration – à l’image des accords actuels entre les États-Unis et l’UE. Theresa May, la Première ministre britannique semble se tourner vers le camp du « hard Brexit ». Les relations entre la Chine et l’UE seront probablement modelées selon le type de Brexit choisi.

La Chine respecte le choix britannique Lors des conférences de presse du Ministère chinois des Affaires étrangères, la Chine a souvent soutenu l’intégration européenne. À titre d’exemple, le porte-parole du Ministère, Hua Chunying déclara le 23 Si officiellement la juin 2016 (jour Chine respecte la du référendum décision des électeurs britannique): “[la] britanniques de quitter Chine soutient l’UE, le spectre d’un […] l’intégration européenne et marché financier souhaite voir une instable et la possible UE unie, prospère réduction de la zone et stable qui joue de libre-échange ne plaisent pas du tout aux un rôle important dans les affaires investisseurs chinois. internationale.”

Sur un ton diplomatique, elle affirma également que la Chine “attache une grande importance à ses relations avec

le Royaume-Uni et entend poursuivre la coopération mutuellement avantageuse avec le Royaume-Uni dans tous les domaines.” Ainsi, quelle que soit la manière dont le l’État britannique entend mener le Brexit, la Chine a d’ores et déjà affirmé vouloir continuer les relations bilatérales avec les deux entités.

Pour autant, l’enthousiasme des médias et des internautes chinois sur le cas du Brexit est loin d’être similaire à celle de mars 2015. En effet, le Royaume-Uni était alors le premier pays occidental à rejoindre la Banque asiatique d’investissement pour les infrastructures (BAII), une banque d’investissement introduite par la Chine. Une action qui a fâché son allié américain. Même si certains commentateurs estiment que le Brexit est “une occasion extraordinaire” pour la Chine d’avoir une plus grande influence politique sur la scène internationale, des répercussions d’ordre financier sont à prévoir, à l’exemple des investissement chinois au Royaume-Uni qui risquent d’en souffrir.

En général, le Brexit a été reçu de manière très négative par le public chinois. Pékin doit désormais prendre toutes ses précautions sur l’impact de ce séisme politique au niveau national et international dans le domaine économique, mais aussi géopolitique. Si officiellement la Chine respecte la décision des électeurs britanniques de quitter l’UE, le spectre d’un marché financier instable et la possible réduction de la zone de libre-échange ne plaisent pas du tout aux investisseurs chinois.

Inquiétude sur la stabilité des marchés financiers La plus grande partie des investissements chinois se trouve dans les secteurs financiers et immobiliers. Par conséquent, la Chine ne risque pas grand-chose. Cependant, l’impact psychologique du Brexit se fait déjà ressentir sur les bourses de Hong Kong (qui a chuté de 4,7 % en juin 2016) et de Shanghai (- 1,2 %). La Chine craint l’instabilité des marchés financiers internationaux.

Dans un contexte de commerce direct 3

d’État à État, la Chine subira peu l’impact du Brexit sur sa croissance économique.

Cependant, il ne faut pas sous-estimer l’impact potentiel par effet domino sur la Chine de la perte de vitesse de Hongkong, qui était autrefois une colonie britannique. Car cette région administrative spéciale est aujourd’hui la porte d’entrée des investissements de capitaux étrangers en Chine. Il n’est donc pas surprenant que le Royaume-Uni possède toujours des acquis, surtout financiers, sur cette ville portuaire, et réciproquement. Ainsi, Hong-kong est susceptible d’être le premier maillon à subir les conséquences du Brexit, ce qui corollairement touchera également la Chine continentale.

En octobre 2015, la Banque populaire de Chine a émis ses premiers bons offshores en renminbi (la devise chinoise) à Londres. L’objectif était d’explorer un marché international et de faciliter le commerce et les investissements transfrontaliers. Avec le Brexit, la Chine craint un ralentissement de l’internationalisation du renminbi et ainsi que le blocage des investissements. En effet, Londres devait être la porte d’entrée du renminbi dans l’Union La sortie du Royaume-Uni européenne. Si de l’UE signifie également Bruxelles était une dissipation du poids amenée à retirer ses euros de l’Union sur la scène de Londres, les internationale. Aussi, bons offshores on peut imaginer que la chinois en euChine et d’autres pays ros pourraient étrangers tenteront de être affectés, récupérer à leur profit et par la même cette part d’influence occasion perdans les décisions turber l’internainternationales. tionalisation de sa monnaie.

Une Union divisée a peu de poids La sortie du Royaume-Uni de l’UE signifie également une dissipation du poids de l’Union sur la scène internationale. Aussi, on peut imaginer que la Chine et d’autres pays étrangers tenteront de récupérer à leur profit cette part d’influence dans les décisions internationales. En effet, une

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Europe affaiblie politiquement est une opportunité pour la Chine de faire passer sa vision de la politique internationale.

L’UE sans le Royaume-Uni, et réciproquement, sera ainsi indubitablement soumise à la pression externe.

L’UE perdra de son poids dans les futures négociations commerciales, notamment dans le cadre d’un potentiel traité de libre-échange entre les protagonistes. Dans la même optique que le traité de libre-échange avec le Canada (CETA) signé récemment, les ambitions

de l’UE se dessinent petit à petit : elle désire élargir l’espace commercial de libre-échange bien au-delà de l’Europe.

Des négociations bilatérales ont déjà eu lieu avec la Chine sur un éventuel accord commercial. Bien que la signature d’un tel traité est encore loin d’être une réalité, les enjeux économiques et politiques sont, eux, déjà bien réels.

tique. Dès lors, une Union divisée aura, non seulement, moins de poids dans les futures négociations commerciales avec la Chine, mais souffrira également au niveau politique, national et international.

En effet, la portée d’un partenariat commercial n’est pas uniquement limitée à sa dimension économique. Les répercussions sont également d’ordre poli-

Dorian Liu est étudiant en Master sciences politiques à l’ULB

What’s next for the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas?

The discovery of natural gas reserves in Tamar (2009) and Leviathan (2010) in Israel, and in Aphrodite gas field (2011) in Cyprus raised questions about the feasibility of so-called “peace pipelines”. Some argue that through energy cooperation political impasses could be overcome. However there is little evidence that suggests that it would be the case from a the Eastern Mediterranean energy prospect, at least in the near future.

If the Eastern Mediterranean Region dis-

tinguishes itself from the Levant or the Middle East (Leigh, M., 2014), it is however still bound to the geopolitical implications of its location. Syrian War and the instability of neighboring countries aside, the Cyprus question remains one of the most important concern influencing future prospects of the natural gas exploitation in the region.

Although generally geopolitics are avoided to be treated under the International Relations theories (Gokmen, 2010), every country is constrained by its geographical realities, which in turn bear an impact on the inter-state relations and politics of the respective country (Gokmen, 2010). While the commercial and monetary interests regarding the exploitation of the energy resources can influence the foreign policy decisions of countries to a certain extent, the reverse is also true. Indeed, according to neorealists, the energy companies are held by and primarily oriented towards national interests (Winrow, 2016), sometimes to the of commercial interests themselves.

A case in point would be Russian energy company Gazprom, whose commercial activities are highly influenced by Russian foreign policy.

The Options to Monetize Eastern Mediterranean Gas A natural alliance was formed between Israel, the Republic of Cyprus and Greece following the gas discoveries in the region. But, most importantly, the incentive for such cooperation was the troubled relationship of the three states with Turkey which claims a prominent regional role. In that context, two projects were proposed with the support of the European Commission. They have indeed be recognized as part of the projects of common interest (PCI), namely energy projects increasing the competitiveness of the EU’s energy market and helping the diversification of EU’s energy suppliers in order to ensure energy security of the European Union (European Commission). The first project planned is the Euro Asia interconnector, an underwater electricity cable that passes from Israel to Greece through Cyprus. The second project is a pipeline from offshore Cyprus to Greece, however due to the depth of the sea the costs of this project remain relatively high compared to other options in spite of the EU financial support (Winrow, 2016; Stergiou, 2016). On the other hand, an LNG (liquefied natural gas) facility in Vasilikos in Cyprus was foreseen by the companies invested in the Aphrodite gas field. Nevertheless, in 2013 it was discovered that the natural gas in the reservoir was only 1/3 of the forecasts, which was not sufficient enough to in4

vest in an LNG plant not covering Israeli gas as well (Stergiou, 2016). Furthermore Leviathan partners (Noble Energy and Delek Drilling) also considered exporting options by LNG facilities, however a deal foreseen on that matter with the Australian Woodside Petroleum was canceled due to regulatory and tax issues in Israel (Winrow, 2016). The exploitation the Leviathan and Tamar gas fields and its potentialities of by American Noble Energy and the Israeli Delek Drilling extremely suffered from the incident.

However, on the 13th of October the Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz met the Turkish Energy Minister Berat Albayrak. During the meeting Ankara also expressed their will to realize humanitarian projects in Gaza to which Steinitz responded, “Israel welcomes any involvement of Turkey in improving lives of ordinary people in Gaza. We will do our best in order to enable this” (Israel Hayom, October 2016). While keeping energy cooperation options open with Jordan, Egypt, Cyprus and Greece, Steinitz underlined that, nonetheless, “the Turkish option is very important” (Times of Israel, October 2016). In the meantime, Israel also struck a deal on its natural gas with the Jordanian government in October, which however rose protests by the Jordanians over Amman’s decision to import Israeli gas (Israel Hayom).

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What about Cyprus?

As far as Cyprus is concerned the aformentioned envisaged energy cooperation deals face one major difficulty. The island is divided in two since 1974 in the aftermath of a Greek Cypriot coup d’état attempting a so-called “enosis” (reunion) with Greece where Turkish Cypriots’ right to self-determination was not considered. In 1974 Turkish military forces entered the island which was then followed by the declaration of independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983.

Today, although the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus possesses all other conditions for statehood such as territory, population, and governmental authority, it lacks international recognition except from the Turkey (Stergiou, 2016).

On the grounds of the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus, both Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus contend that the two Cypriot communities have their equal rights to exploit the resources of island. On the other side of the border the southern Republic of Cyprus refuses hitherto to give its consent to the contemplated pipeline from the Leviathan gas region to Turkey which will, indeed, have to pass through the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Cypriot Island.

Israel refrains to bypass the consent of the Republic of Cyprus and, in any case,

the present war in Syria does not permit the envisioned pipeline to go through the EEZ of Syria.

In order to reach a settlement of the « Cyprus situation’ » real progresses have to be made by the two Cypriot communities but also by the other parties concerned.

The efficient exploitation of resources is in the interests of the whole region in additition to being a true financial opportunity for Nicosia which in 2013 underwent a tough financial crisis. In this

context and is political obstacles can be overcome, Turkey is likely to become the future energy hub. As the former Energy Minister of Turkey Yildiz stated, Turkey is the “centre of energy geopolitics between Caspian region, Middle East and Europe” (Winrow, 2016).

Cansu Oguz International Relations MA Graduate

A fragile European response to a complicated war The Syrian civil war drags on into its fifth year, and Europe still hasn’t found a position which will help to bring a resolution of the conflict. The EU is in a vulnerable situation - both internally and externally. It has yet found a coherent response to deal with terrorist attacks and the continuing influx of the refugees.

The lack of a common European foreign poli-

cy vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis is having a profound damaging impact on the EU’s role in the world.

The Middle-Eastern country has become the main talking point between international powers, and several actors are directly interfering in it. Those who have influence there, can extend it elsewhere to further their own interests. In one hand it can be state actors like Russia, with its renewed aggressiveness in Europe, on the other hand, it can be non-state actors like the Islamic State which now has a permanent presence in 6 countries.

The EU Fragile responses For the European Union and its member states, the Syrian war has brought to surface the differences and weaknesses vis-á-vis a common foreign policy. This has resulted in the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Frederica Mogherini and her predecessor Catherine Ashton putting out statements and declarations which followed the US line “Assad must go”, but not backing them up. This is a problem Europe has had for decades with other countries within the European Neigbourhood Policy. The High Representatives put themselves in a corner, only resorting in condemning and sanctioning the Syrian regime without any real influence on

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the ground, while other European figures have decided to take another course. Some members of the European Parliament visit Damascus occasionally, and other leaders like the Spanish foreign minister call for dialogue with President Bashar al-Assad. This makes the lack of cohesion between the EU and its member states clearly visible. At the same time, according to the Syrian government behind-the-scenes information exchanges are regularly taking place between them and European security services, especially since the recent terrorist attacks in Paris, Germany and Brussels.

When the Syrian demonstrations started in 2011, key figures like Francois Hollande, David Cameron were quick to jump on the bandwagon. First

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they condemned the regime’s use of violence, then they called for the Syrian President to step down, and later they campaigned for military intervention in the aftermath of the Ghouta chemical attack in 2013. Although the EU was historically one of Syria’s biggest trading partner before the turmoil, there were only two major agreements signed between them. One Cooperation Agreement in 1977 and later the EU-Syria Association in 2009 was successfully negotiated between the two entities. Furthermore there was an EU delegation in Damascus until late March of 2012, when they left because of the heavy fighting reaching the capital itself. Even though most embassies suspended their operations and moved to Lebanon, some remained, like the Romanian and Czech, two former communist states, still holding deep ties with the Syrian government.

Foreground allusions During the beginning of the Arab Spring, kings and dictators were loosing their seats one after the other in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, and the West assumed that the regime of Bashar al-Assad was just another hostile Middle-Eastern state which would soon collapse. Even with Bashar remaining in power, the condemning words from Ms Ashton and Mr Barroso were left with no concrete action, and lost much of their legitimacy not only in Syria but in the wider arena as well, because of the internationalization of this conflict.

As the war was picking up pace during the spring of 2012 many European leaders miscalculated the importance of the country’s history and religious diversity. During the French mandate in the 1920s, France played a key role in lifting up the Alawites (the minority sect Bashar al-Assad belongs to) from poverty. Even with the prior extensive knowledge of its former colony, the French government campaigned for a military intervention in 2013, but was finally left hanging by its western counterparts who thought it was wiser not to interviene. In regards to the Syrian civil war there seems to be a lack of leadership in Europe, whether institutional or national. There is a blame-game going on, and fingers are pointed at each other for the problems with the refugees, terrorist attacks, and for the continuation of the Syrian war.

The Council of the European Union has resorted in sanctioning the Syrian government. However, it did not have any real pressure on the small circle of Syrian leaders, instead it has put the population into an even bigger misery. Under blockade, and inflation soaring along with the economy collapsing, it’s the regular Syrians who pay the biggest price and continue to blame the west for the current situation. On the other side, the EU gives aid, especially to the opposition parties operating inside and outside of the country.

By working closely with the United Nations, refugee camps in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon are funded, and one of the key polices of the European Council is to help these countries to remain stable. The last two are at great risk because of the war across their borders and the refugees it brings to them.

Support to the opposition The EU now also funds Syrian radio stations broadcasting in opposition held territory. Moreover, several studies have gained support to further the opposition agenda, like the series of “Cities in Revolution” by a website called Syria Untold. One of its pieces describes how the city of Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria has gradually fallen from regime control, and relates the fall of the town to demonstrations taking place elsewhere.

The study argues that “on July 22, 2011, more than a million protestors flocked to Hama” (Darwish, 2016). The town itself has 845,000 inhabitants according to a 2009 census, so the number of demonstrators is a tremendous exaggeration.

Logistically a town of that size can’t bear anywhere near that many people on the street, and neither can many European capitals. If a popular demonstration anywhere near that magnitude would have taken place in Syria the regime would have fallen, as there is no army capable of controlling a mass manifestation like that. Today Hama is firmly under Syrian Army control. The legitimacy of the rest of the piece is put in question with several arAccording to the guments about “hundreds of thousands” Syrian government of demonstrators in behind-the-scenes Deir ez-Zor, a city of information 211.000 according to a exchanges are 2004 census. The EU regularly taking place flag is shown on the between them and website (http://cities.syriauntold.com/), European security services, especially and it’s also stated in the study that it since the recent was financed by the terrorist attacks in European Union and Paris, Germany and written by Syrians.

Brussels.

With a policy of funding clearly biased research articles like this, the European Union jeopardizes its role as a credible actor in the Middle-East, and generates more external resentment in the Arab world.

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Europe’s position in the international arena has become weaker and more fragile since the beginning of the Syrian conflict. The European continent doesn’t have a real voice in the resolution of the conflict, but at least it had a seat at the much anticipated Geneva II peace conference in 2014. At the round-table major world powers had a seat, but also the Vatican City and South Korea. The sole recent peace initiative the EU tried to put together in early 2016 did not materialize, and during the peace negotiations in spring and this September, Europe was completely sidelined. The future With a policy of of the conflict lies funding clearly biased in the hands of the research articles like US and Russia, and while the EU strugthis, the European gles with handling Union jeopardizes its the refugee crisis role as a credible actor within its border, in the Middle-East, the war and the suffering continues in and generates more external resentment in its neighbourhood.

the Arab world

Noel Daniel Vig is a EU Studies Master’s student at the Institut d’études Européennes Photo Credit © Goran Tomasevic (flickr.com)

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L'Europe à la conquête de l'eldorado militaire de l'Indonésie ?

L’Union Européenne s’intéresse de plus en plus aux politiques de défense en Europe. Des projets comme une armée européenne ou un budget défense commun reviennent régulièrement sur la table. En attendant des résultats dans ces possibles réformes les complexes militaro-industriels se tournent vers la vente d’armes à l’étranger. Et, ces derniers temps, l’Indonésie semble être un nouvel eldorado pour ces derniers. La nouvelle doctrine de Joko Widodo, dit Jokowi, président indonésien élu en 2014, tend à favoriser les investissements dans les trois armées indonésiennes (navale, aérienne, terrestre).

Nous avons demandé l’avis de Bruno Hellendorff, chercheur spécialiste des questions de paix et sécurité en Asie du Sud-Est au GRIP. Compte rendu de notre entretien.

L'Indonésie : un défi pour l'Écosystème européen de l'industrie militaire.

Les besoins en matière d’armement de

l’Indonésie sont conséquents. En effet, l’armement permet au pays d’assurer un certain prestige national en tant que puissance régionale et de répondre aux défis sécuritaires internes, tel que le terrorisme. Cette situation offre aux entreprises européennes de l’armement un marché d’opportunités économiques mais aussi de nombreux défis à relever.

L’Indonésie est un marché émergent et offre donc des perspectives immenses pour les entreprises. Les salons de l’armement en Indonésie sont de plus en plus importants et attirent de nouveaux acteurs du marché chaque année. La France avec, entre autres, Airbus et Thalès, les Pays-Bas avec DAMEN et l’Allemagne avec Rheinmetall sont bien engagés sur le marché indonésien. Certaines de ces entreprises possèdent même des usines dans l’archipel. Airbus Helicopter possède notamment un centre de maintenance dans la région de Jakarta (Airbushelicoptere.com).

Des perspectives alléchantes accompagnées de défis Mais ces perspectives alléchantes s’accompagnent de défis pour les investisseurs étrangers. Le nationalisme dont fait preuve l’Indonésie se retrouve également dans la vie économique de l’archipel. Cette dernière tente d’assurer son indépendance militaire vis-à-vis de ses fournisseurs. Marquée par l’embargo américain, elle a choisi de diversifier ses fournisseurs, limitant ainsi les perspectives des entreprises européennes. Ainsi

par exemple, elle achète se tourne vers les russes pour l’achat de C130. Cette indépendance se manifeste aussi par le développement de l’économie nationale, priorité du gouvernement Jokowi. Il en découle nécessairement un transfert de compétences et l’implantation d’usines sur le territoire indonésien.

De même la corruption est très présente en Indonésie. Elle provient tant de la société civile que du monde des affaires.

D’ailleurs, le gouvernement indonésien ne nie pas ce fait et Jokowi a fait de la lutte active contre la corruption un de ces fers de lance. Une commission anti-corruption a été mise en place en Indonésie afin de surveiller les mouvements financiers des institutions publiques.

Une des dernières arrestations en date étant celle d’une ancienne ministre de la Santé, Siti Fadilah (Jakartaglobe, 2016).

Une position commune préférable pour relever le défi Aussi, pour l’Union Européenne, il serait préférable d’adopter plus régulièrement une position commune. L’exemple de la vente des Léopard par l’Allemagne après le refus néerlandais illustre bien les divergences entre les pays européens sur l’interprétation des critères institués par l’Union Européenne permettant d’autoriser ou non la vente d’armement à un pays tiers.

La compétence militaire, incluant la vente d’arme, reste une compétence principalement exercée par les Etats membres et non les institutions européennes. Une européanisation plus complète de la compétence permettrait ainsi d’éliminer des divergences sur l’interprétation de ces fameux critères et peut être de mener une politique économique unique sur le marché asiatique.

L’Indonésie pourrait être un eldorado pour les entreprises européennes de l’armement du fait de l’importance du marché tant en raison d’événements internationaux que des défis nationaux de l’archipel que sont l’unité et le terrorisme. Pour se concrétis-

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er, ces perspectives alléchantes doivent relever certains défis, dus tant à la qualité de pays émergent qu’est l’Indonésie mais aussi au propre système institutionnel européen. L’Européanisation de la politique commerciale extérieure de l’Union en matière d’armement pourrait jouer en faveur des entreprises. Le traité de libre-échange en cours de négociation entre l’Indonésie et l’Union Européenne pourrait être un premier pas.

Loïc Charpentier est étudiant en relations internationales à l’ULB

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Mis- or dis- information?

Russia’s potential influence over european discourses and media The 23rd of November 2016 is a date to be remembered. The European Parliament has adopted a resolution in order to limit Russian media activities in Europe. 304 deputies have voted in favour, 179 against and 208 abstained. The document asserts that Russia promotes anti-EU propaganda. The press agency Sputnik, the television station RT, the foundation “The Russia world” and the Russian Federal Agency “Rossotroudnitchestco” are concerned. The Russian answer was not long in coming: the spokeswoman for the Russian diplomacy Zakharova argues that this resolution is the “witness of an information crime.” So where does the “information crime” come from: Russia or Europe?

The Russian stance towards information warfare

During the Cold War, goals of USSR and

Western countries were to spread their truth in order to undermine the enemy. Various methods were used: press, way of life, music etc. During the bipolar order, the idea of hybrid warfare emerges with a combination of non-military, military and paramilitary actions. First, the USSR focus on the military (2/3) and less on non-military (1/3). For Gerasimov, the ration between the non-military should be 4 (non military) to 1 (military). The objective of hybrid warfare was, at first, not to be defeated. Then, due to the Gerasimov doctrine, the aim is the classical military victory: the opponent should stop resisting. Because an overwhelming share of the ratio is based on non-military, information is at the centre of hybrid warfare. With the emerging idea of constant war in Russia, the central element of combat for new generation is information warfare.

The bipolar order ended with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and this idea of “truth” died with it. According to Pavlovski “the concept of truth was important in soviet times.

Now [...] you can just say anything, create realities”. Currently, this is, what can be called, the “post truth” period, when the media is not longer anchored in the facts.

The case of Brexit: Facts or lies?

In the Brexit case, the Vote Leave side did not fact-check many of its arguments: media is not longer relying on facts. The famous example of the bus advertising that the EU membership costs £350 millions a week to the UK underlines this argument. Indeed, when what the EU gives back to the UK is taken into account (subventions and so on) the cost is around £120 millions and not £350 millions. Brexiters based their campaign on false argument and misinformation. Their main objective was to

get people’s attention. It is not accidental that this kind of information is circulating; it can be a part of a deliberate strategy of the information warfare. In fact, information is a way to channel power, to control and not inform.

The discourse style is important to convey a message. In the past, political speeches were based on Aristotle’s triad of rhetorical tools: logos i.e. formal arguments, ethos and pathos i.e. personality, authority and emotions. Currently, discourses rather use ethos and pathos than logos. Rhetoric of promotion gets the upper hand on traditional rhetoric due to the use of the best marketing strategy (intensity and brevity). Now, perceptions matter more than facts, it was also the case of Brexit and Trump’s campaigns. On one hand, the Remain campaign was lampooned and described as “Project Fear”. Philip Corr, a City University psychology professor in London stresses that the Remain side campaign had a “very effective means to convey a message” because it personalized the economic risks of leaving by using words as “your future”, “your risk.” On the other hand, Brexiters used discourse style to prove their point. Their favourite tools were super-short sentences emphasising certainty and determination that lead to emotional logic. Their mottos were “Take back control” or the day of the referendum was depicted as the “Independence Day.” These phrases offered the prospect of opportunity and hope. In the Brexit campaign, both sides employed mal-information methods as well as disinformation, which is often used by Russia to interfere in European affairs. Yet, Russian influence is far from being confirmed in the UK, contrary to Poland.

The Polish and Hungarian cases: a major influence of Russia?

According to a case study by Wiktor Ostrowki and Kazimierz Woycicki of the Krzyzowa Academy, Russian information warfare operations have had some success in Poland. The anti-western stance is a recurring tropism in

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Russian disinformation since the cold war.

The swindler western partner invaded Polish media in the past, contrary to Russia that is presented as a better-suited partner.

Nowadays, Polish nationalist websites are implicitly in favour of Russian nationalism because “at least there they can tell the truth” (Ostrowki & Woycicki). Polish nationalist magazines, as in the daily mail and other nationalist magazines in the UK during the Brexit campaign, have adopted anti-EU rhetoric and use Russian-inspired media tools. Wiktor Ostrowki and Kazimierz Woycicki take the example of the conservative Gazeta Polska in July 2016, which put on the front page a swastika tearing through a hole in the European flag; it is an image that could figure in a Russian magazine. Nevertheless, Poland also has its own misinformation. Thus, pinpointing which misinformation is from Poland or from Russia is far from being easy as propaganda is also supposed to be subtle enough to convince without caricaturing facts.

In the meantime in Hungary, the contested president Viktor Orban walks on a tightrope in belonging to Europe, while fuelling national pride and sovereignty. In his Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) speech of 26 July 2014 addressed to young people, Orban underlined the failure of liberal ideas. He takes the examples of three periods: WWI, the end of the cold war and the 2008 economic crisis and points out the liberal weaknesses of the USA “the strength of American “soft power” is deteriorating, because liberal values today incorporate corruption, sex and violence, and with this liberal values discredit America and American modernization.” Due to new challenges such as the financial crisis, terrorism, migration and a generational change, liberal democracy is not efficient anymore and is no longer defining the Hungarian current politics. It appears that liberal state is not strong enough to protect the people and to catch up with these new challenges. In order to unite people, liberal democracy is not useful and no longer valid, so Orban is looking for something different, a new democratic system closer to

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“the stars of international analyses” such as China and Russia: “a trending topic in thinking is understanding systems that are not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies, maybe not even democracies, and yet making nations successful.”

politics for the next few years. Indeed, the objective of the new disinformation is not to convince, but to distract, to confuse, and to keep people passive and paranoid. Governing illiberal state, such as in Hungary, is then much easier. Because the people consume the media so willingly, it is making the task easier for the illiberal state.

Thus, the Russian influence is almost palpable. First, because of the admiration of Viktor Orban toward its Russian big Brother; the French magazine L’Express in 2015 even described the Hungarian president as “the small Putin of Budapest”, hence a close relationship between the presidents. Some Europeans even see this relationship as treason: they even describe their Hungarian counterpart as the “Trojan horse” of Russia. Second, Russian clout can be seen in Orban ideas in order to renew its state.

Impact on the opinion and efficiency of the rhetoric In Brexit and Hungarian cases, campaigns and speeches focused on specific arguments. Both Brexit and Remain sides share a common theme, similar to the Hungarian president speech: fear. According to Ruth Wodak, professor of linguistics at Lancaster University, these politics of fear are “very strong in persuading audience who don’t have much information so that they will vote with their gut feeling, which is where rational discussions don’t find a space.” Emotion is once more preferred to logic and rationality. Orban and Vote Leave in the United Kingdom (UK) have centred on the encroaching powers of

the EU if Britain were to stay in the bloc of if Hungary should accept the quotas of migrants.

Other arguments in both countries are the loss of sovereignty and the lack of control over immigration.

In the UK, there have been ups and downs in the survey and a high number of undecided. The electorate was indeed confused due to political leaders discourses and the media.

Yet, what is even more concerning is that the rhetorical devices that prove more persuasive may come back for the future election and in

Quo Vadis? EU-Turkey relations in the aftermath of the coup attempt Despite their differences and problem-

atic relations, the EU and Turkey have carefully managed their relationship since the beginning of the 1960s. At times, the EU’s credible political conditionality contributed to a rapid democratisation process in Turkey, as was the case during the ‘golden’ years of Europeanisation in Turkey between 2002 and 2005 (Öniş

In the case of Poland, the major goal of Russian propaganda is “social disintegration” (Ostrowki & Woycicki) in order to accentuate the division of the society and finally make the people loose their faith in liberal democracy and Western Europe –as in Hungary.

The propaganda aims at sowing doubt in politics by promoting extreme Polish nationalism. In Poland, Russian disinformation is nurtured by social networks. According to Edward Lucas and Peter Pomeranze in their report, Winning information war, “this means that the content is more likely to be read, understood and shared.” Thus, Russian influence is eager to spread both in Europe despite measures recently taken by the European Parliament and in the USA as it is suspected during the presidential elections.

Blandine Malvault est étudiante en Master 2 Sécurité Extérieure et Sécurité Intérieure de l’UE à Science Po Strasbourg Crédit Photo © Internet Archive Book Images (flickr.com)

While the failed coup attempt in July 2016 and subsequent measures taken by the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma PartisiJustice and Development Party) have accelerated the authoritarian drift in the country, it has also had serious repercussions for EU-Turkey relations by halting the possibility of re-launching a genuine accession process for Turkey in a foreseeable future.

2008). At other times, especially at critical junctures of Turkey’s highly turbulent democratisation process or when the EU lacked a clear commitment vis-à-vis Turkey for various reasons, the convergence on fundamental interests and the dissimilar strengths of the parties kept EU-Turkey relations alive. Nowadays, EU-Turkey relations are increasingly marked by a growing pragmatism on 9

both sides. While the failed coup attempt in July 2016 and subsequent measures taken by the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-Justice and Development Party) have accelerated the authoritarian drift in the country, it has also had serious repercussions for EU-Turkey relations by halting the possibility of re-launching a genuine accession process for Turkey in a foreseeable future.

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The Decline of Democracy in Turkey

or run by Kurds or the Alevi religious minority, on charges that they spread ‘terrorist [PKK] propaganda’ (Yackley 2016).

The Ascent of Pragmatism in Turkey-EU relations

While Turkey has survived the coup attempt, the government’s measures to ‘cleanse’ Turkish bureaucracy of elements of the Hizmet movement of Fetullah Gülen, who was ­identified by Turkey as the mastermind of the coup, posed serious challenges to the already fragile democracy in Turkey. First, the government initiated a series of extensive purges in the first week following the failed putsch.

According to the main opposition party CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-Republican People’s Party), some 100,000 people, including judges, prosecutors, journalists, academics, police and army officers were purged. While over 50,000 people were detained, more than 30,000 people were arrested for their alleged links to the Fetullah movement (CHP 2016). The government’s decision to go after coup plotters, has mostly hit the judiciary and the media. The closure of a number of television and radio stations, as well as the detention, arrest or dismissal of several journalists have marked just another blow to press freedom in Turkey, which was systematically restricted under the AKP government. According to a recent report issued by Reporters without Borders (2016), since the failed attempt, 200 journalists have been sent to jail while more than 100 newspapers, radio stations, TV channels and news agencies have been closed. Similarly, since 15 July, the dismissal of over 3,000 judges and prosecutors together with the 2010 constitutional reforms as well as the measures taken by the AKP government – especially since December 2013 corruption investigation (see Özbudun 2015) – have rounded out the establishment of full executive control over the judiciary.

Third, emergency decrees raised serious concerns with regard to a possible violation of human rights and basic freedoms in Turkey as they include extraordinary measures, such as the extension of the maximum period of police detention for terrorism and organized crime from four days to 30 days without appearing before a judge, or the restriction of a detainee’s access to a lawyer for the first five days of police detention (Human Rights Watch 2016). These procedures, while in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (which Turkey temporarily suspended in the wake of the coup attempt), cast a shadow on basic aspects of the rule of law. Moreover, there are signs of ill treatment and grave violation of basic human rights of detainees (Amnesty International 2016). As warned by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, derogations from absolute rights are not possible, including ‘the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ even during exceptional emergency situations. The Venice Commission also calls for strict limits on the duration, circumstances and scope of emergency powers (Council of Europe 2016). Clearly, the government’s decision to extend the duration of the state of emergency beyond the initial three-month period, coupled with the enlarged scope of detentions and allegations of torture are alarming indicators that this state of emergency might not be compliant with the rule of law.

While Turkish democracy has progressively converted into an authoritarian rule, a series of quite remarkable developments unexpectedly altered the EU’s approach towards Turkey, resulting in a renewed pragmatism in Turkey-EU relations. Over the course of 2015-2016, the EU has faced a massive influx of refugees crossing the Aegean Sea from Turkey to Greece. The interests of several member states rapidly converged over stopping the uncontrolled refugee flow into the Union, hence leading to a ‘EU-Turkey joint action plan’, which was activated in November 2015 (European Commission 2015). According to the deal, in return for Turkey’s cooperation in controlling illegal and irregular migration from Turkey to the EU, Turkey has obtained the following privileges: generous financial support in coping with the high number of Syrian refugees in Turkey; the long-awaited EU promise to lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens travelling to the Schengen area and equally important, a re-energizing of the EU-Turkey accession process through the launch of ‘structured and more frequent high-level dialogue’ with the EU , an upgrading of the Customs Union, the opening of new Chapters, and the enhancement of mutual cooperation in key areas such as counter-terrorism, energy, business, and foreign and security policy (European Council 2015).

Second, the state of emergency declared on 20 July allowed the government to rule by decree and hence to issue decrees with immediate effect ‘with minimal oversight from parliament and none from the constitutional court’ (Ward 2016). As noted by Ilter Turan (2016), the government used these emergency powers to expel not only a huge number of officials from state bureaucracy, but also university professors, teachers, businessmen and civil society representatives alleged to have links to the Gülenist plot. Also, there are clear signs that the government has taken advantage of the emergency situation to silence other opposition groups in Turkey. For example, some academics who had signed the “Peace Petition”1 earlier this year and some members of the press with dissident voices have been fired or arrested.

More recently, the government banned a number of television channels and radio stations, which are known to be owned

These exceptional measures adopted by the government following the coup attempt came not only as a major blow to the already fragile Turkish democracy but also accelerated the consolidation of power in the executive branch, particularly those powers held by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Amidst this politically volatile transition period, in October 2016, the Turkish government has embarked upon a constitutional reform process for institutionalising the Presidential system, which is likely to mark the end of the parliamentary democracy in Turkey by downplaying the role of the Grand National Assembly at the expense of the consolidated and unrestrained powers of an elected super-President.

1. Over 1,000 academics signed a statement entitled ‘We will not be a party to this crime’, which was made public at a press conference in January 2016. The signatories condemned the Turkish government’s security operations against the terrorist organisation Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which had devastating effects on local Kurdish people and called for a resumption of peace talks with the PKK.

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This new approach to bilateral relations, which prioritises mutual interests over a value-guided accession process, has survived despite the devastating effects of the coup attempt on Turkish democracy. In the immediate aftermath of the botched coup, parties expressed their commitment to Turkey-EU agreement on Syrian refugees. However, the deal remains very vulnerable not only due to several humanitarian and legal concerns associated with its implementation, but also because of Turkey’s resistance to amending its anti-terror law, which is a core condition of the EU for the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens.

While it is not realistic to expect Turkey to amend its counter-terrorism law in the midst of a state of emergency and while mired in the fight against the terrorist organisation PKK, neither the EU nor Turkey is prepared to break the deal.

On the EU side, the agreement provides member states a much needed safety net against an uncontrollable migrant influx in the run-up to elections in several key member states as well as during a complex period in which all EU member states try to mitigate the consequences of multiple challenges to the integra-

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tion process, including Brexit, illiberal tendencies in some member states, international terrorism and the on-going economic crisis. On the other hand, the Turkish government, though not willing and able to comply with any political criteria, would be reluctant to completely turn its back to the EU during a time when it aspires to deal simultaneously with terrorism, the consequences of the Syrian civil war and the eradication of the Gülenists from the Turkish political landscape.

In sum, the refugee deal will shape the relations in a near future as long as both the EU and Turkey continue to benefit from it. Although this interest-guided pragmatic approach to relations might bring a breath of fresh air to the current stagnation in Turkey-EU relations, in the long-term, by halting the much needed external reform anchor for Turkey, this approach might further alienate Turkey from a genuine EU accession process leading to full membership.

Seda Gurkan, Lecturer and postdoctoral researcher, Political Science Department, Universite libre de Bruxelles

A European Milk Fairytale or how the EU is Destroying African Markets On January 23rd European milk farmers sprayed milk powder at the EU Council in Brussels.

By this act, they showed their protest against the low milk prices, destroying local farmers.

However, this milk powder was probably supposed to leave European frontiers for exports...

Globalization at its glance

About 8500 years ago, somewhere in South-

ern Eastern Europe people began to domesticate goats and sheep. This period, also known as the Neolithic revolution, constitutes the beginning of dairy farming in Europe. Ever since Milk consumption worldwide has been growing consistently at a high rate, but above-average in the form of processed dairy products. Nowadays, the EU, together with New Zealand, is the biggest milk producer and exporter worldwide.

New outlets are desperately sought in a world where competition and competitiveness play a leading role. Milk, produced in the EU can be found all over the world, also on the African West Coast. There, it is sold much cheaper than local milk. The consequences of it: destruction of the local dairy farming production.

European Milk Policy The Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) constitutes the oldest and biggest financial sector of the EU. At the end of world war II, the continent was from devastated, hungry, and poor.

Therefore, the policy has been, from its very beginning, equipped with considerable funds.

Almost 70% of then Community’s budget was made available to the CAP (today 37%). Quite

rapidly, success stories were written. Due to massive subsidies programs, immense surpluses were reached by the 70’s. Several reforms followed, including on quotas so as to lower the waste and to keep prices stable, accompanied by compensations payments to soften income loses. In the 90’s, international pressure became stronger, interventionist programs were gradually phased out and the liberal agenda reached the CAP. Ever since each reform of the CAP made a further step towards liberalization. In the meantime, a green pillar was instated to compensate for the damages done by the tremendous agricultural production.

The latest reforms have brought along disastrous consequences for farmers all around the world, including within Europe. In 2008, an expiration date for milk quotas was set for 2015.

Before this reform farmers were only allowed to sell a certain amount of milk, which guaranteed a certain degree of price stability. However, overproduction remained a problem. But, at least officially, milk couldn’t be sold and, as a result, was stored, often in forms of milk powder which has a longer hang than liquid milk. Financed by the EU, the storage however turned out to become into an increasing financial burden (Germanwatch 2015). The warnings of the European Court of Auditors, explaining that a further liberalized World market oriented milk policy would lead to loss of farms, were ignored

by European agricultural policy’s decidors. Both the European Commission and the majority in the Council of the European Union agreed on the necessary decision to discontinue the quotas without replacement. From then on, farmers were able to sell even more surplus on the international market, including the west coast of Africa.

African milk vs European milk La Chine semble vouloir être présente dans tous les secteurs. En France, les investisseurs chinois ont plutôt tendance à investir dans les secteurs niches du pays, tels que le secteur du tourisme, 11

de l’agroalimentaire ou encore médical. Au Royaume-Uni, c’est plutôt le secteur financier et des services qui intéressent les entreprises chinoises. Mais le pays qui attire le plus d’investisseur se passe de l’autre côté du Rhin. L’Allemagne est en effet le pays où les entreprises chinoises investissent le plus, et ce, principalement pour l’acquisition de sa technologie, réputée pour son ingénierie.

Ces rachats en masse d’entreprises européennes montrent l’intention des chinois de mener une politique d’expansion internationale. Les vocations économiques n’étant jamais très loin des vocations politiques chinoises, cette offensive entrerait dans une perspective d’ambition internationale afin de se placer en position confortable sur l’échiquier mondial.

Faute de ne pas pouvoir imposer ses propres entreprises au niveau mondial, la Chine a décidé de racheter les entreprises étrangères.

Linking policy areas: the CAP and development cooperation The EU and its Member States are also devoted to reduce poverty and enhance development, especially on the African continent. Billions of Euros are spent to this end. In the agreement on the economic partnership with West Africa, the EU expresses its willingness to boost economic development through trade: exports worth 31 billion Euros are entering the West African market annually (European Commission 2015).

The stated goal to integrate this region into the world market is however affected by many problems, which prevent the development of an African internal and competitive market.

It also destroys local agriculture. One of those structural problems is the European Common Agricultural Policy. Milk, one export product out of many, is a striking example of fatal consequences of an utterly misplaced development policy. European products are sold on markets that could produce the exact same products

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on their own, internally, and that so solely by reason that we are overproducing milk and that it brings us little economic return. Simultaneously and rather counter-productively, the EU opened programs to construct dairy companies in West- and Central Afrika in 2012 (European Commission 2016). Hundreds of thousands of euros were dedicated to support small dairy farms and cooperatives so as to create incentives to increase productivity, competitiveness, and sustainability. Dairy farms were constructed without ever being put in operation. At the same time, highly subsided milk is exported to this region. When confronted to this problematic Phil Hogan, Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development, argued that, apparently, the problem doesn’t lay within European

agricultural policy and that therefore no action is required. He suggests, instead, to send Europeans to train local people to use the machines.

The moral in the story Hogan’s position reflects a wider fourfold problem. Firstly, abolishing quotas and over-production further increases deterioration of milk prices worldwide. Due to that, both milk-farmers in Europe and Africa go bankrupt. Secondly, goals formulated and money spent to address poverty in developing and emerging nations are rendered useless. Thirdly, European arrogance and ignorance towards non-Europeans risks to, eventually, backfire. One hardly sees how, in a given region and sector where people cannot

find work by reason of EU rules, it can develop economically. Economic refugees might be an inevitable consequence of it.

To sum up, bundled forces and combined strength has put the EU in a comfortable situation. Not only are the needs satisfied, but also are surpluses produced. Despite several efforts to reform the CAP by reducing the interventionist policies and providing additional money to make up for excessive use and over-exploitation of agricultural land, the export strategy remains unchanged - at the expense of local farmers in poorer countries.

Camille Nessel is in Master at the Institute of European Studies

Europe et migrants, entre sécurisation et manque de vision en long terme Alors que l’UE souhaite parvenir à réaliser 160 000 relocalisations en deux ans, elle n’est parvenue à « relocaliser » temporairement que 9700 réfugiés, majoritairement en provenance d’Italie et de Grèce. Par conséquent, l’UE est à la recherche d’autres moyens afin de réguler la crise migratoire et d’assurer sa sécurité, notamment via des accords avec des États tiers. Cela n’est pas sans conséquences sur ces derniers ainsi que sur les conditions de vie des migrants.

La

«tolérance ne peut se faire au détriment de notre sécurité. [...] Nous devons savoir qui franchit nos frontières.[...] Nous défendrons aussi nos frontières par un contrôle strict de tous ceux qui les franchiront.» Tels sont les mots qu’utilise Jean-Claude Juncker lors de son discours sur l’état de l’Union en septembre 2016. En effet, suite à la crise Syrienne et la vague de réfugiés ayant atteint l’Europe, l’UE a dû prendre un certain nombre de mesures et a notamment décidé de revoir son système d’asile et d’immigration afin de mettre l’accent sur sa sécurité. L’agenda européen sur les migrations de l’UE de 2015 se fonde ainsi sur quatre piliers : réduire les incitations à l’immigration irrégulière, sauver des vies tout en assurant la sécurité des frontières extérieures, adopter une politique d’asile commune, et parvenir à une nouvelle politique en ce qui concerne les migrations légales. Si l’ambition est grande, les moyens sont relativement faibles et les États membres, notamment le groupe de Višegrad, peu enthousiastes ; l’UE boxerait-elle au dessus de sa catégorie? Les résultats s’en ressentent.

Alors que l’UE souhaite parvenir à réaliser 160 000 relocalisations en deux ans, elle n’est parvenue à « relocaliser » temporairement que 9700 réfugiés, majoritairement en provenance d’Italie et de Grèce. Par conséquent, l’UE est à la recherche d’autres moyens afin de réguler la crise migratoire et d’assurer sa sécurité, notamment via des accords avec des États tiers. Cela n’est pas sans conséquences sur ces derniers ainsi que sur les conditions de vie des migrants.

Accord UE-Turquie: une aubaine pour l’UE et la Turquie, une malédiction pour les réfugiés ?

Le premier accord de relocalisation passé par l’UE avec un État tiers, et sans doute le plus médiatisé, n’est autre que celui décidé avec la Turquie le 18 mars 2016. Par cet accord, la Turquie accepte de reprendre des Syriens arrivés en Grèce de manière irrégulière. En retour, l’UE accepte de recevoir pour chaque réfugié relocalisé en Turquie, un Syrien qui était en Turquie dans un camp avec une procédure d’asile en cours. Ce principe s’applique depuis le 4 avril 2016. Ainsi, lorsque des migrants entrent dans l’UE de manière irrégulière, ils sont refusés. La priorité est donnée aux migrants légaux.

Mais quels bénéfices pour la Turquie ? Si cela permet à l’UE une meilleure sécurisation de ses frontières et une meilleure maîtrise de la crise des réfugiés, la Turquie y voit avant tout un avantage financier. Elle obtient trois milliards d’euros de soutien aux camps de réfugiés et trois milliards de plus en 2018 si le premier montant ne s’avèrent pas suffisant afin d’avoir des infrastructures adéquates. En outre, la Turquie a lié cet accord à une accélération de la libre circulation de ses citoyens dans l’UE et à l’abolition des formalités de voyage entre l’UE et la Turquie. Néanmoins, 75 conditions doivent être satisfaites par cette dernière afin que les visas soient supprimés. Bien 12

que la Turquie ait fait des efforts pour remplir ces conditions, elle n’a, jusqu’ici, pas atteint le niveau requis par l’UE. Par exemple, elle n’a toujours pas révisé sa législation antiterroriste, trop floue aux yeux de l’UE. En effet, celle-ci peut être instrumentalisée à l’encontre de l’opposition politique. Ainsi, alors qu’en octobre 2015, l’UE était censée abolir les visas pour les Turcs, force est de constater que cela n’a pas été mis en œuvre. Si l’accord pourrait alors être remis en question, cela demeure néanmoins peu probable car cela nuirait aux deux protagonistes: tant bien à L’UE, qui devrait de nouveau faire face au flux de réfugiés illégaux, qu’à la Turquie, qui n’obtiendrait pas les trois milliards d’euros supplémentaires.

Si l’accord semble remplir, au moins partiellement, sa fonction: il a découragé nombre de réfugiés syriens d’entrer en Europe de façon irrégulière, cela n’est pas sans faille. Ainsi, la pression migratoire semble s’être déplacée, au sein de l’UE, de la Grèce vers l’Italie et Malte. De même, d’après un communiqué de presse de la Commission européenne du 15 juin 2016, «les progrès sont trop lents ». En effet, entre le 4 avril et le 15 juin 2016 seulement « 511 Syriens ont été réinstallés dans l'UE depuis la Turquie.» De plus, les hotspots, qui avaient pour objectif initial d’identifier et d’enregistrer les migrants, se focalisent à présent sur le retour des migrants dans leurs pays d’origine ou sur leur transfert vers un État tiers.

Un rapport du Conseil de l’Europe a également souligné le fait que la Turquie n’est pas signataire

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de la Convention sur les réfugiés (Convention de Genève), ce qui peut se révéler problématique.

En effet, la majorité des demandeurs d’asile ne sont que ‘tolérés’ en Turquie. Les droits et la protection accordés par la Convention de Genève ne s’appliquent pas dans le pays. L’accord UE-Turquie est, ainsi, avant tout une décision politique et non une décision à visées altruistes quelconques.

Accords dans le cadre de la Politique Européenne de Voisinage: vers un déclin de l’Europe ?

Pour lutter contre l’immigration, l’UE a passé des accords de réadmission dans le cadre du Partenariat Oriental et de sa politique de voisinage.

Ainsi, quand des migrants irréguliers arrivent en Europe, ils peuvent être renvoyés dans leur pays d’origine ou les pays de transit avec lesquels l’Europe a un accord. L’UE met donc l’accent sur sa sécurité avant tout et utilise son voisinage comme un rempart face à ‘l’invasion’. Or, pour faire accepter à son voisinage ces accords de réadmission, l’UE doit leur offrir garanties et bénéfices d’autant plus importants. Elle doit les convaincre que leurs intérêts seront pris en considération. Une question se pose alors: du fait d’une contrainte budgétaire croissante, l’UE a-t-elle encore les moyens d’assurer la coopération des pays tiers ? En d’autres termes, parviendra-t-elle à les convaincre de poursuivre la mise en œuvre de ces accords ? La problématique du déclin de l’influence européenne est posée. Si l’UE veut continuer à externaliser la relocalisation des migrants et la lutte contre l’immigration irrégulière, elle va devoir payer le prix fort. En effet, elle sera tout d’abord obligée de débloquer des fonds (comme c’est le cas dans l’accord avec la Turquie). En outre, l’UE devra prendre davantage en compte les revendications des États voisins. Une des demandes du voisinage (oriental notamment) n’est autre que la libéralisation des visas, demande à laquelle les États membres peuvent difficilement faire faveur étant donnée la crise migratoire actuelle. Néanmoins, si l’UE ne répond pas à ces revendications, d’autres pays risquent de profiter de la situation pour se rapprocher du voisinage européen. Nous pouvons penser à la Russie, qui au travers de l’Union Eurasiatique, est plus

encline que l’UE à libéraliser les visas avec le voisinage oriental de l’Europe afin d’accroître son influence déjà importante dans cette région.

Ainsi, l’externalisation de la lutte contre l’immigration illégale nécessite que l’UE fasse des compromis, qu’elle ne semble pourtant pas encore être prête à faire. De même, si l’UE veut accroître son influence, promouvoir ses valeurs et obtenir l’aide de pays tiers dans la gestion des migrants, elle doit être crédible auprès de ses voisins (conditions d’accueil respectueuses des droits fondamentaux qu’elle défend, système d’asile et d’immigration unifié), être à leur écoute et renforcer son attractivité.

Crise des réfugiés et sécurisation de l’Europe mettant en péril l’équilibre géopolitique de certains États tiers : l’exemple du Liban Revenons brièvement sur l’histoire et la situation du Liban afin d’expliquer au mieux l’impact des migrations et des choix de l’UE sur ce dernier.

Du fait de sa situation géographique, le pays a déjà été la cible de flux migratoires importants, notamment de réfugiés palestiniens qui sont arrivés après la formation de l’État d’Israël en 1948.

Ces réfugiés sont des apatrides de génération en génération et représentent aujourd’hui près d’un demi-million de personnes. Le Liban est aussi l’un des premiers pays affectés par la crise Syrienne.

Ainsi, l’État libanais accueille le nombre plus grand nombre de réfugiés proportionnellement à sa population dans le monde. Un habitant sur quatre est un réfugié. Pour faire face à cet afflux de migrants, le gouvernement libanais a fait le choix, en janvier 2014, de réglementer l’accès des réfugiés syriens à son territoire. Ces derniers doivent justifier leur visite. Cette mesure équivaut à une fermeture claire et nette des frontières pour les Syriens. Victime de la baisse des cours du pétrole, l’économie libanaise et ses infrastructures sont dépassées. D’après le Haut Commissariat aux Réfugiés, les réfugiés ont tout de même accès à la plupart des services de base. L’UE aurait déjà alloué « plus de 776 millions d’euros d’aide aux réfugiés syriens et aux communautés vulnérables au Liban » (article du Parlement Européen du 23/09/2016). Néanmoins, ces aides européennes et internationales ne sont pas suffisantes et, d’après Claude Moraes, président de la Commission des Libertés civiles, « l’aide humanitaire seule ne peut pas régler la situation : il faut des solutions politiques pour mettre un terme au conflit ».

Une fois de plus, l’UE ne semble pas prête à aider politiquement le Liban. Nabil de Freij, ministre de la Réforme Administrative Libanaise, dans un article de L’express du 03/07/2016 se pose la question suivante : « Pourquoi l'Europe a-t-elle fait tant de cas des

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réfugiés syriens installés en Turquie, avec ses 80 millions d'habitants, et parle-t-on si peu de ceux du Liban. » L’UE semble préférer des accords avec ses voisins proches tels que la Turquie aux dépens d’autres États tiers. Quelles raisons à cela ? Économiques, politiques ? Non. Sécuritaires.

Quelles conséquences pour le Liban ? L’afflux de réfugiés a affecté les infrastructures sanitaires (approvisionnement en eau et en électricité) et éducatives libanaises, ce qui impacte directement les réfugiés qui vivent dans des conditions de plus en plus précaires : ils sont vulnérables. Ainsi, moins d’un tiers des ménages a accès à l’eau du robinet et près de la moitié des enfants syriens réfugiés au Liban n’a accès à aucune forme d’éducation. Ces conditions de vie nourrissent des tensions entre les communautés libanaises et les réfugiés syriens et peuvent déstabiliser le pays.

Quelles solutions pour l’UE, pour le Liban et pour la Communauté internationale ? Du 19 au 22 septembre 2016, les membres de la Commission des libertés civiles de l’UE ont visité le Liban afin d’observer les difficultés de la réinstallation des réfugiés dans le pays. Claude Moraes a conclu que le « Liban a de loin surpassé les efforts du reste de l’Union européenne dans sa réponse à la crise et s’en est remarquablement bien sorti dans des circonstances très difficiles » (Communiqué de presse du Parlement Européen, 21/09/2016).

Néanmoins, les problèmes demeurent et le Liban aurait besoin d’un soutien et d’une solidarité internationale afin de résister à la crise syrienne et faire preuve de résilience. Si l’UE s’engage à s’assurer « (...) que le fonctionnement du système de réinstallation soit optimisé pour adopter des outils législatifs qui fonctionnent et contribuent à soulager la pression démographique » (Claude Moraes, Communiqué de presse du Parlement Européen, 21/09/2016), les mesures qui vont dans ce sens sont pour le moment insuffisantes.

Accuser l’UE d’immoralité dans sa gestion de la crise migratoire est peut être exagéré. Cependant, si le Liban voit sa situation se détériorer et que la région se déstabilise, l’UE aura sa part de responsabilité. Effectivement, comme l’UE ne parvient pas à régler la crise migratoire au niveau interne (dissension entre les États membres et problème du système européen d’asile), elle a choisi d’externaliser et de sous-traiter la relocalisation des migrants. L’Europe fait une fois de plus preuve d’une obsession sécuritaire aux détriments des valeurs qu’elle défend (droits fondamentaux, droits de l’homme, état de droit etc.). L’UE prend des décisions avant tout pour protéger ses citoyens (accord avec la Turquie, avec ses pays voisins, etc.) aux dépens des réfugiés eux-mêmes et aux dépens des pays tiers comme le Liban.

Blandine Malvault est étudiante en Master 2 Sécurité Extérieure et Sécurité Intérieure de l’UE à Science Po Strasbourg Crédits photo: © Max Pixel

EYES ON EUROPE

2016 IN REVIEW Events Azov Movie On the 21st of November, the “Azov” movie, a documentary about the Ukrainian conflict was screened at the ULB. The documentary, produced by Alberto Gerosa and Davide Arosio, aimed at showcasing the perspectives of young Ukrainians on their country in the aftermath of the Maidan protests. It is part of a wider project, awarded in 2015 by Advocate Europe, whose aim is to make the European population aware of the situation within Ukraine. After the screening, an animated debate took place between the participants (mainly ULB students) and a panel composed of experts of Ukraine at various levels, including the director of the movie.

This event was organized in partnership with ThinkYoung, Advocate Europe and the IEE.

Our PR team at Brussels Town-Hall

Employment perspectives for young people in Brussels On the 8th of December, we had the honour to enter the Town-Hall of Brussels, in the Grand place, where our drink-debate: “Brussels, Capital of Europe: Which employment prospects for young people?” took place. This event was organized in partnership with FEPS, VoteWatch Europe and the IEE. It was part of the MeEYTIC project: Mobilise the European Youth for Citizenship and Democracy, co-financed by the programme Europe for Citizens.

The debate, moderated by a journalist of CaféBabel Brussels, aimed to discuss about the issue of youth (un)employment in Brussels and its different stakes.

The panel was composed of academic experts from the IEE and UCL, a local representative from the “Belgian League of Youth”, members of the Belgian agency Actiris and representative of the private sector. Two members of the European Parliament, including a policy analyser for the S&D group, were also present.

The debate ended with a drink where speakers and participants exchanged their view on the issue.

Writing contest Eyes on Europe, VoteWatch Europe, and the Institute for European Studies (ULB) organized a Writing Contest in November 2016. This contest aimed at encouraging students to express their opinions, by means of an article, on the level of youth participation in the European decision making process.

The jury was composed of Professor Ramona Coman (IEE), Alexia Samuel (IEE), Davide Ferrari and Claudia Zelazowska (VoteWatch Europe) and Pauline Claessens (Eyes on Europe).

Jonathan Dehoust, Master student in Political Science at Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL) won the first place.

Jonathan Piron, also a Master student in Political Science at UCL won the second position.

This contest was part of the MEYTIC project: Mobilise the European Youth for Citizenship and Democracy.

New Partnerships Eyes on Europe is proud to introduce its new partners: VoteWatch Europe, ThinkYoung and Global Initiativ’.

In the end of the year, we started to monthly exchange some of our web articles with our new friends of CaféBabel Brussels. Also, we are already developing some fresh projects for 2017 with their PR team.

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Mini-Mag Winter 2016-2017

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