The European Security and Defence Union Issue 9

ISBN 978-3-934401-20-4

Independent Review on European Security & Defence

Volume No 9

Main Topic

The European Security Strategy (ESS) Kristalina Georgieva, Member of the European Commission for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid, Brussels

The European Institutions must now pull together on the same rope for Europe’s security Cecilia MalmstrÜm, Member of the European Commission for Home Affairs Ana Gomes MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

Arnaud Danjean MEP, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, European Parliament, Strasbourg/Brussels

Edition 1/2011

Editorial

Editorial

Crisis Prevention, a new field of EU solidarity Haiti, Russia, Pakistan, Hungary, Australia and Brazil: these are just some of the countries that have been hit by natural or manmade disasters over the past 12 months, causing endless hardship for the populations concerned.

Good intentions The European Union has stepped in frequently and swiftly to meet the most urgent needs, in particular deploying units on the ground to get practical assistance to where it was needed.

But if a disaster like the one in Haiti had hit a region in southern Europe or on Europe’s doorstep, would it have been the same picture? In all likelihood Europe would have been hard put to take the lead in resolving the situation.

The rising number of disasters has been a wake-up call for the European institutions; their reaction – on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty, under which the EU is called upon to get organised at a multinational level in order to deal with major catastrophes – has been vigorous and swift.

The European Parliament, for example, feels duty-bound to call for a coherent approach by the Commission and Council, as well as put forward its own proposals for improving coordination and resources. The interviews and articles in this edition illustrate the serious nature of the EU’s intentions and efforts in the field of crisis management. No longer will it be a matter of leaving things to chance: the current ad hoc procedures are to be replaced by a system of planned cooperation between the EU institutions and nations.

Need for coordination The question, however, is whether it is possible to coordinate with the mosaic of responsibilities and competences for crisis management put in place within the Commission by its President Manuel Barroso, along the lines of “divide et impera”. On top of that there needs to be coordination with the General

Impressum The European − Security and Defence Union ProPress Publishing Group Brussels/Berlin Headquarters Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557 412-0, Fax: +49/30/557 412-33 Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Avenue des Celtes, 30, B-1040 Brussels Phone/Fax: +32/2732 3135, GMS: 0049-1723 282 319 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr Bonn Office: Am Buschhof 8, D-53227 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970 97-0, Fax: +49/228/970 97-75 Advertisement Office Bonn: Karin Dornbusch Phone: +49/228/970 97-40 E-Mail: karin.dornbusch@behoerdenspiegel.de

Affairs Council which, with its European External Action Service (EEAS), is now properly set up for dealing with crises and sees a greater role for itself in the field of European crisis management.

Under the Lisbon Treaty, it is after all up to the Council to determine, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission, how Hartmut Bühl the EU’s crisis-management system is to function. The big question to my mind is to generate synergies given the complexity of the patchwork and to coordinate these different responsibilities. How will the very necessary coordination be organised with the military, whose help may at times be required, but only as a last resort? Much more clarity is needed here to apply the comprehensive approach efficiently.

European solidarity In my view the binding force of solidarity can help Europe move forward in the fields of crisis management and internal security, as well as in other areas. Following the economic and monetary union and the adoption of the euro, could the new locomotive for progress be the principle of solidarity, rather than a defence union? Europe should now work consistently in that direction. Solidarity is about more than taking action: it is a frame of mind. It can point the way forward for Europe as a whole. The experience of solidarity generates a sense of belonging, a readiness to stand up for each other as well as for others who cannot or are not permitted to join this Europe of ours as members. If Europe heads in that direction, I believe will be on the right track.

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Brussels Editorial Deputy: Nannette Bühl-Cazaubon, Paris Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll E-Mail: magazine@euro-defence.eu Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berliner Sicherheitskonferenz), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management.

For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit www.euro-defence.eu Suscription: This magazine is published in Brussels and Berlin.

The copy price is 16 Euro: 3 copies for one year: 42 Euro (Euro EU Subscription).

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THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Helena Lindberg, Director General, Swedish Civil Contingency Agency (MSB), Karlstadt

Nicola Beer, States Secretary for European Affairs of Hessia, Wiesbaden

POLICY and POLITICS Editorial

The EU Security Strategy (ESS) EU Security Strategy – the way ahead Interview with Arnaud Danjean MEP, Chairman Subcommittee on Security and Defence, Strasbourg/Brussels Towards a stronger European Disaster Response Interview with Kristalina Georgieva, Member of the European Commission for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid, Brussels

Addressing a reality of trans-boundary risks and European solidarity

by Helena Lindberg, Director General, Swedish Civil Contingency Agency (MSB), Karlstadt 24 6

A footprint for European Ballistic Missile Defense

by General (ret.) Harald Kujat, fomer Chairman, Military Committee, NATO, Berlin 27

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The EU Internal Security Strategy – towards a more secure Europe

by Cecilia Malmström, Member of the European Commission for Home Affairs, Brussels 18 Member States must enact an enhanced EU CBRN Action Plan

by Ana Gomes MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

21

European Security and Climate Change

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Climate Change: threat and challenge

by Christoph Nick, Journalist, Brussels

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The International Climate Conference in Cancún a commentary by Nicola Beer, States Secretary for European Affairs of Hessia, Wiesbaden

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Climate change: Small steps are better than hanging on to a global breakthrough Graham Weale, Chief-Economist, RWE AG and Alexander Nolden, Vice Director Public Affairs/Energy Policy, RWE AG, Essen

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Content

Michael Gahler MEP, Deputy Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

Dr. Thomas Czirwitzky, Brigadier General, MoD, Berlin

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS The French-British Accord – what about?

by Doug Henderson, London

European Space Policy Galileo and GMES – Essentials for Europe

by Michael Gahler MEP and Deputy Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

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MEADS – a contribution to NATO Missile Defence

by Nannette Bühl-Cazaubon, Journalist, Paris 47 34

Protection of Crisis Management Forces Active and passive protection Protection of the soldier – a question of requirements and industrial capabilities

by Dr. Thomas Czirwitzky, Brigadier General, MoD, Berlin 48 Out of the danger zone – Virtual Reality simulation systems reduce risks and costs for training

by Klaus Bock-Müller, CEO, szenaris GmbH, Bremen 51 Active protection of the soldier through guided weapons

by Yosef Berger, EuroSpike GmbH, Röthenbach a.d. Pegnitz 53

Defence and Forces (NATO / EU) NATO’s New Strategic Concept a commentary by General (ret.) Klaus Naumann, former Chairman, NATO Military Committee (MC), Munich

38

A White Book on Security an Defence

by Dr. Karl von Wogau, Secretary General of the European Security Foundation (ESF), Freiburg

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How to communicate security and defence

by John Greenway, Reyedale

Unclassified satellite data for intelligence observations

by Lars Petersen, Security and Defence Applications expert, Astrium GEO-Information Services, Friedrichshafen 56

Security and Defence News

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Authors 2010

61

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Do we need a permanent structured cooperation ….

Yes, we do need a “PESCO”

by Denis Verret, CEO, DV-Conseil, Paris 44

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The EU Security Strategy (ESS) Crisis prevention and crisis management is on the agenda of the European Union Arnaud Danjean ............................................................................. 6 Kristalina Georgieva ..................................................................... 12 Cecilia Malmström ........................................................................ 18 Ana Gomes................................................................................... 21 Helena Lindberg ........................................................................... 24 General (ret.) Harald Kujat ............................................................ 27

The European Union has to maintain its military ambitions in the form laid down in the CSDP

European Security Strategy – the way ahead Interview with Arnaud Danjean MEP The European: Mr. Danjean, twelve years ago the ESDP was created and over the last years the EU has become a serious actor in crisis management. Are you proud of these achievements? As I heard you saying in the European Parliament, the future does not seem so rosy.

Mr. Danjean: Yes indeed, we can be proud of what has been achieved so far. In 2009 we celebrated the anniversary of the launching of the ESDP. We can be proud of the achievements in terms of missions, in terms of institutions, and in terms of the spirit that has enabled the European Union to affirm itself in the international stage in the field of defence.

The European: And what about the Lisbon Treaty?

Mr. Danjean: Surely, we also had in the last year the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force and was full of promises to enhance the common effort in the field of defence. Since then, we speak of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

But despite this good news, the last year was a difficult one.

The European: Was it because it was a transitional period, or was it more generally because there was less appetite among the Member States to dedicate means and political will to this common effort in the field of defence? How do you qualify the last year?

Mr. Danjean: I do hope it was just a transitional period, because we had to launch Lisbon and because we had to put into force new institutions, all of which took time. To come to the point: the feeling we had was that the CSDP was not really at the top of the agenda. I hope that this was just an impression due just to this transition period. Nevertheless, we see in Europe a certain common spirit for security and defence.

The European: This sounds not optimistic, but I think it is realistic. But it’s fine to hear that there is European spirit.

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Arnaud Danjean MEP Chairman of the EP Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) since 2009. He was born in 1971 in Louhans.

Graduate (1992) and Postgraduate Diploma (DEA) in politics from the Paris Institute of Political Studies (1993). 1994 – 2004, Ministry of Defence, Paris. 2004 – 2005, Representative of the Secretary-General of the EU-Council/HR for the CFSP in Kosovo.

2005 – 2007, Adviser in the private office of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Director-adviser, EZL Consulting, Paris. Mr. Danjean is Member of the National Council of the UMP (Saône-et-Loire) and he is an elected member of the Bourgogne Regional Council.

Nevertheless, as you have said, there is no room for complaisance. How can the EU meet its citizens’ expectations for strong security?

Mr. Danjean: Absolutely, you are right. The first step is that most of the Member States and the EU institutions need to recognize that collectively, we face huge security challenges.

And these challenges can be met only by a common response and a more common policy. Neither any single Member State, nor security structures like NATO, can address all the challenges.

The European: And what is the consequence?

Mr. Danjean: We need something at the European Union level.

The EU first has to recognize this reality. All of the EU Member States and all of the EU institutions have to be fully convinced of it. And it is only under this condition that we can progress either at home or outside of Europe.

The European: But does this mean that the EU is ready to adopt

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

of expenses. But we have means that could be better used in common. These ideas of pooling and sharing in equipment and capacities, a field where we are structurally weak, is a good first initiative and should be enhanced. Here we can greatly capitalise.

Missions: Another issue concerns the missions. We have to make CSDP missions more visible, because some of them truly address our own security concerns. I am thinking e.g. about the anti-piracy policy off the Somali coast. I think we should both make the missions more visible and strengthen them. We should establish priorities, probably in Africa and maybe also in the Caucasus and the Balkans.

Arnaud Danjean with Hartmut Bühl in the European Parliament in Strasbourg.

Photo: Danjean

its role as a global player? A global player needs common thinking among its nations and institutions. Do you think society will follow? With the financial crisis, people also have a lot of other problems.

Mr. Danjean: In my opinion, the public opinion is ready. I would even say that our militaries and security forces are ready.

The European: But then where is this “lack of will” you have noted?

Mr. Danjean: The lack of will is in the Member States, their institutions, in the political leadership, and in the EU institutions. Citizens are aware that a single Member State cannot address all the threats, like terrorism, proliferation or regional conflicts. But Member States are focussed on the economic and monetary crises, and the political energy is going toward these problems. I can understand this, but unfortunately this is hampering the broader strategic thinking.

Defence The European: Could you identify the fields where strong and immediate efforts in defence need to be made?

Mr. Danjean: I think it was rather encouraging that in December 2010, for the first time ever, all of the Ministers of Defence in the Union met together. For the first time we had a real “Council of Ministers”.

The European: Did they make any decisions?

Mr. Danjean: It was a useful meeting in the sense that they addressed the right issues: Pooling and sharing: One field in which we can make progress is pooling and sharing. We have fewer budgetary means, we are in the middle of a financial crisis and we cannot afford a lot

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The European: When you speak of pooling and sharing, could permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), as it is defined in the Lisbon treaty, bring a solution?

Mr. Danjean: The concept of PESCO is rather symbolic of where we stand now in the field of defence. On the one hand, it looks very attractive and full of promises, and this is probably the right way to act. But on the other hand, what we see in practice is that none of the Member States are really taking the issue seriously.

The European: Why this hesitation?

Mr. Danjean: No one is really putting forward any ideas on what PESCO should be, how it should work or how it should concretely be handled. And that is rather frustrating, because it is one of the great innovations of the Lisbon treaty, yet at the moment it remains only on paper. I do hope that, by starting pragmatically, with a few countries being keen on pooling and sharing, that we will make the concept more effective.

The European: So, for the moment it is a non-flyer. Could you imagine that the French-British cooperation – and I am very sceptical on this – could be helpful here?

Mr. Danjean: I hope so. It is true that there was a lot of scepticism among the other European partners. And many felt that the British-French agreement was, in contrast to St. Malo, not Europeanised enough. St. Malo was explicitly framing a European way, which is not the case with the more recent agreement. Nevertheless, when we put aside all political considerations, especially on the British side, we can maybe see a way forward for the other Member States. I think that if this FrenchBritish agreement can work as an “electric shock”, telling the other Europeans, “well, move now, do whatever is necessary to come together”, then it will be helpful.

The European: So as a trigger…

Mr. Danjean: Yes, as a trigger. And recently I noticed that Sweden and Germany have started to think about pooling and sharing ideas, a little bit along the lines of this kind of agreement. So if it could encourage others to move ahead with

The EU Security Strategy (ESS)

more cooperation, it is a good path. Later we had that very interesting common approach by the Weimar triangle, Poland, Germany and France, also reaffirming their will to strengthen European defence.

Scrutiny The European: The Lisbon treaty gives the European Parliament real power. Power in every sector – oversight, financing etc. But in the field of security and defence, I think there is some hesitation – the treaty does not give the Parliament much power in this specific field.

Mr. Danjean: You are right. I think the most important thing for us, and the way the Parliament will exercise its new power, is in two ways: Budgetary control: We tend to forget that the CSDP budget in terms of missions, which are mainly civilian missions, is funded by the EU and needs the approval of the Parliament.

So we have a major role to play, and we should credibly play that role.

The European External Action Service (EEAS): The second way to affirm our strength is not written in the treaty, but rather is in the spirit in which it will be implemented. That is what we experienced last year when we established the External Action

Service. On many issues, the High Representative had to rely on the Parliament. The negotiation process showed that the Parliament could go far beyond what was envisaged in the treaty.

The European: Do you mean that the EEAS cannot work effectively without the Parliament?

Mr. Danjean: Without the Parliament, it cannot function properly in practice. Thus, while in the treaty itself we do not have so much power in terms of security and defence and foreign policy, but rather in the way the institutions will practically function, we can have a broader say in the system. But it is also up to us Parliamentarians to take this opportunity to show that in this respect we bring real added value.

Security The European: Let us come back to what is currently happening in Brussels on security. We have the Communication of Mrs. Georgieva, the Communication of Mrs. Malmström and the report of Mrs. Zanicchi in the Committee on Development (DEVE) and Mr. Gualteri in your Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE), who is preparing a report on CSDP after Lisbon.

And we have Ana Gomes’ report on CBRN in the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee (LIBE). I have the feeling

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

there is a multitude of efforts, but what is the real role of the Parliament; what is your role, as chairman of SEDE, in security?

Mr. Danjean: You are right in the sense that the security issues are too fragmented. For example, LIBE of course has a huge role, but I think SEDE should have a broader role to play as well. Similarly, the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) has its role, and the Development Committee (DEVE) has its special role as well.

The European: Isn’t it a little contradictory to what Lisbon is promoting?

Mr. Danjean: Indeed, the Lisbon treaty is telling us to have more comprehensive, integrated approaches in terms of foreign policy, yet at the same time we stick to old structures from previous treaties which fracture the work on security issues. That is really not very helpful. We lack visibility but I am not sure that we lack efficiency, because at the end of the day, what I see is that when you talk about security issues, you always talk to the same people.

The European: So you have a sort of “club”…

Mr. Danjean: (smiling). Ah, sort of, but if we want the Parliament to be seen playing its role, and if we want Member States and their publics to be fully aware of the challenges in the field of security and defence, it would be better to have a broader club and not to continue on as a little group of 20 experts dealing with all these issues.

The European: Would it be helpful then if SEDE would become a full-fledged committee?

Mr. Danjean: I think that would make sense due to the fact that we now have a more integrated policy. It could also increase the pressure we would be able to put on the Commission and Council to deliver on those issues. The EU should cooperate in a broad manner on security and defence, since the expectations of society are rather high.

The European: Let us please stay with this issue. I think that if SEDE became a full-fledged committee, the national parlia-

ments would have another point of access to you, as scrutiny is of high importance.

Mr. Danjean: Our colleagues from national parliaments often neglect the EU Parliament in the fields of defence and security.

This is primarily because they unfortunately don’t know enough about our work and experience.

The European: Perhaps you can illustrate with an example?

Mr. Danjean: Of course: consider my own country. In France, people think that when we talk about the CSDP, we are only talking about military matters, and that military matters have to remain only at the national level. And that is simply not correct, because we all know very well that CSDP is also about civilian missions, police, customs or information. Out of the 23 missions conducted under the ESDP/CSDP over the last ten years, the huge majority was civilian. So this view that the CSDP is military and that the military is national is not correct, and you can go to other countries to find the same wrong perception I am criticising.

The European: It seems significant that you play a role in the EU institutions that cannot be played by national parliamentarians.

Mr. Danjean: agree with you. Our colleagues from the national parliaments do not have the level and frequency of access to the European institutions that we do. When we have a SEDE meeting, to which we can invite people from the Council and Commission, it is very easy to do so because we talk to each other every day. We are in the same city and almost in the same buildings. The European Parliament, Council and Commission are natural interlocutors, which is not the case with the national parliaments. You will hardly ever see sessions of the defence committees of national parliaments involving people from the Commission or the Council.

The European: What could be a solution?

Mr. Danjean: We have to find a very pragmatic and realistic way to work together. I feel that the debate we are in at the moment is too much about exclusive institutional positions.

Everyone likes to keep their prerogatives. But I think there is

News Debate on NATO Summit in the European Parliament Arnaud Danjean at the debate in the European Parliament on the outcome of the NATO summit in Lisbon (15 December 2010 – Strasbourg): “Let me say a word on the complimentarily of NATO and the EU. It is essential but has to be organized with intelligence. I don’t want that the complimentary becomes a sine qua non in which the European Union will act as the Red Cross of armed forces which were NATO. The

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European Union has to keep its military ambitions in form of the CSDP in the way it is laid down in the trilateral letter between France- Germany and Poland.”

Resolution on Humanitarian Aid On 18 January, the European Parliament voted a Resolution on the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, drafted by Michèle Striffler (EPP, FR) for the Committee on Development (DEVE). The Resolution calls for a clear division of labour between military

and humanitarian bodies in crisis areas.

The Resolution is available at: http://tinyurl.com/5r9t8jf Report on CSDP after Lisbon Roberto Gualtieri (S&D) is currently drafting a report on the “Development of the Common Security and Defence Policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty”. The report is scheduled to be voted in committee (AFET) on 13 April and in plenary sitting on 11 May 2011.

The EU Security Strategy (ESS)

space enough to work together and I hope that we might come up with a solution this year. Moreover, because the ESDA/WEU Assembly will be dissolved, it is also a chance to find another way to inter-parliamentary cooperation.

Capabilities The European: Let us come back to the capabilities. Capabilities depend on politics, the budget, and the industries. How far away are we from the establishment of a real industrial and technological base in Europe? Are we now closer to it than a few years ago?

Mr. Danjean: We are probably halfway. Lots of effort has been made, and my predecessor Karl von Wogau did a tremendous job to further an industrial and technological base. We e.g. had the defence package passed in the European Parliament, though its mandates have yet to be implemented in each country. But organizing the defence and security market is one thing. Currently the greatest challenge is to make our industry competitive and create equal access to other markets. This question is too often a taboo for the European institutions, especially for the Commission.

The European: Are you making an allusion to reciprocity?

Mr. Danjean: Yes, let’s talk about reciprocity. We cannot have a defence industry in Europe if we do not integrate the concept of reciprocity in this field into our relations with bigger powers.

Today it is the U.S., but tomorrow it could be China, Israel, Russia or Brazil. Otherwise we are weakening ourselves and it will lead to an absurd situation where at a time that we want to have a CSDP, we will rely on others and lose our competitiveness in terms of capacities.

One should not forget that behind this question of the competitiveness of our defence industries, there are jobs, there are technologies and there is know-how. So it’s not only about being proud to have a defence industry. We have to work now with industries, with the Commission and with the Member States to make not only the internal market better functioning, but also to make our industries competitive and to have access to other markets.

Programmes and capacities The European: Don’t you think that the market “will come” at that very moment when we have common products emerging onto common military or civil requirements?

Mr. Danjean: That is the key question: do we really want and can we really afford better integrated and coordinated programmes? If you talk to industry representatives, they will not spontaneously talk about markets – they will talk about programmes. In terms of capacities, I also think that greater efforts are necessary for closer cooperation with the European Defence Agency (EDA). Maybe we even need to redefine the role of the agency.

nies like EADS? That is, companies including three or more nations?

Mr. Danjean: Good question. That is in fact a key issue. We can talk about coordination; we can talk about cooperation, mutualization or integration. All this sounds very nice, and everyone would agree that we should pursue this goal.

The European: But what does that mean in practice?

Mr. Danjean: How we do this practically, and what it means in terms of industrial consolidation, is of course a very sensitive issue. As a politician, I can understand that as nations, Member States have to take care of jobs, social needs and the industrial assets they possess. It depends on how you see the consolidation. If it means for some countries to give up their capacities, you will have strong reluctance. But I think there is still space for finding synergies between different industries from different Member States without being too controlling and forcing them build some kind of bureaucratic industry.

The European: I think you are right; we shouldn’t overprotect the industrial culture of a country, and so I come to my last question. What important goals should be realized for the European industries before the end of your mandate in 2013?

What about the crucial question of programmes?

Mr. Danjean: We have a lack of capacities, and what is hampering the CSDP is not the institutions, but the lack of capacities.

When you go to the U.S., they will talk very nicely with you regarding the CSDP, and they will also admit the relevance of having a CSDP. But then they will come to the important question: which capacities are you developing? And that is the decisive point. It is not only a question of interoperability, but of co-operability. It means that, at a high political level, Americans wish Europeans were co-operable for common engagements in the field.

The European: And this is my fear, that we are a long way from achieving this and for the foreseeable future will therefore have no say in the decision-making and be unable defend our interests.

Mr. Danjean: I agree. This means that politicians and military have to define what the objectives are and what goals we pursue with CSDP. With that as a starting point, we can define our programmes: what do we need now and what will we need in 20 years in terms of equipment and capacities. We can then task the EDA with the rapprochement of the relevant industries. This for me is the main challenge. Perhaps the budgetary constraints will now help make everyone more aware of the necessity of this process.

The European: Mr. Danjean, thank you very much for this interview.

The European: On the other hand, should we have more compa-

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The European Commission is pushing for active interaction and cooperation with key actors

Towards a stronger European Disaster Response Interview with Kristalina Georgieva On 26 October 2010, the European Commission presented proposals to reinforce the EU’s capacity to act on civil protection and humanitarian assistance. The aim is to improve the EU’s disaster response, both within and outside its borders. The proposals call for developing response scenarios for primary disaster risks, along with identifying the assets needed if these disasters materialise. In addition, a map will be drawn of Member States’ resources currently available for EU response, and national authorities will be requested to put core equipment on standby voluntarily, to be available as needed for rapid European assistance.

The Commission proposes setting up a European Emergency Response Capacity, based on Member States’ expertise and assets, and a European Emergency Response Centre as a new platform for more effective EU coordination whenever disasters strike. This centre, which will merge the humanitarian aid (ECHO) and civil protection (MIC) crisis rooms, will collect realtime information on disasters, monitor hazards, alert Member States, and coordinate the EU’s disaster response actions.

centration of people in urban areas, and because we have become richer, thus we have more to lose when a disaster strikes. The year we just left behind was very telling with regard to this trend. 2010 was marked by record disasters – the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, the floods in Pakistan, the unprecedented forest fires in Russia and Israel and the worst environmental catastrophe in U.S. history after the explosion at the Deepwater Horizon oil platform. Around 300 thousand people lost their lives, and the damage is measured in nearly 200 billion Euros. In a world with increased frequency and intensity of disasters, and with limited resources to fight them, we in Europe need disaster response that is well coordinated, and makes the most efficient use of our collective capacity. This is exactly what the new Communication is about: increasing the speed, predictability, coherence and effectiveness of EU disaster response, and doing so at the least cost to the EU taxpayer.

In situations where every hour counts, Europe will have a system that can guarantee that the available assets match the needs and are ready for immediate deployment.

The European: Mrs Georgieva, with your communication from 26 October 2010, you are pushing Europe forward to install a reliable system for crisis prevention and humanitarian aid. What are the objectives of the Commission in disaster response?

Mrs. Georgieva: The main objective of this communication is to match EU disaster response capacity with the challenges we face. The world is changing, we also need to change. Since 1975 the number of natural disasters recorded worldwide has risen five-fold. The costs they impose on our societies have increased even more because of population growth and con-

The European: Is Europe, are European nations, really ready and willing to build up the disaster management instruments proposed? Is the solidarity clause of the Lisbon Treaty sufficiently strong enough and are the nations conscious of the need for creating the necessary solidarity?

Mrs. Georgieva: Our citizens have given us a clear message - 90 percent of them want the European Union to work together in the face of disasters. So do the governments of our 27 Member States. They are prepared to collaborate even more closely in disaster response, but under one condition: that primary responsibility for disaster prevention, preparedness and response remains with the national authorities. The Commission respects this position, and the Member States agree with us that EU cooperation in this area can add substantial value to our disaster response.

There are several arguments for this. First, when a country is overwhelmed by a disaster, the effective delivery of international assets and expertise can save lives and reduce economic and social costs. Second, joint efforts are cost-effective, as individual governments no longer need purchase equipment to deal single-handedly with every possible disaster. At a time when public finances are increasingly tight this is a compelling argument. Third, joint training of Member States’ civil protection teams, and learning from each others’ experience, also help strengthen national systems. Finally, a strong European response, both at home and in third countries, contributes to Europe’s positive image and standing around the world.

Kristalina Georgieva Member of the European Commission for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid & Crisis Response since February 2010.

Commissioner Georgieva was born in 1953 and studied Political Economy and Sociology in Sofia. She received a Doctorate in Economic Sciences in 1986. In the 1990s, she was a visiting scholar at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard Business School. Commissioner Georgieva joined the World Bank Group in 1993.

1998 – 2000, Sector Director for Environment and Social Development, East Asia and Pacific. 2000 – 2004, Director of the Environment Department. 2004-2007, Director and Resident Representative to the Russian Federation, Moscow. 2007 – 2008, Director, Strategy and Operations, Sustainable Development. 2008 – 2010, Vice President and Corporate Secretary of the World Bank Group.

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The EU Security Strategy (ESS)

“The EU needs a system that guarantees the availability of key assets for immediate employment”.

Kristalina Georgieva in discussion with Hartmut Bühl at her office in Brussels.

The European: What should be the role of Europe in disaster management and humanitarian aid worldwide?

Mrs. Georgieva: Europe is built on solidarity – this is a value we express not only to each other here at home, but also to those in the world who need our help. We live in a globalised world where common solutions are required for the problems that affect us all.

In the event of a major emergency outside Europe, the EU can coordinate and facilitate Member States’ assistance. It is clear that the better the EU organises itself internally, the easier it will be for us to “plug in” the overall relief effort.

When we help disaster-stricken countries around the world, we do it under the leadership of the UN. EU assistance is effectively integrated into the overall relief effort coordinated by the UN. The European: That means there is an interface between the political agenda and humanitarian aid, crisis prevention and crisis management. Could you please elaborate with one or two concrete examples?

Mrs. Georgieva: Yes, such an interface exists, but whether and how it is used depends on the context.

As Commissioner for humanitarian aid and crisis response, I am the first and most rapid respondent when a country is hit by a disaster: earthquake, floods, drought and hunger or ethnic conflict. Once the dust has settled, the time comes for political discussions and long-term reconstruction and development support.

Kyrgyzstan after the ethnic conflicts in the south, and Pakistan after the floods are good examples.

First example: In Kyrgyzstan, we immediately provided 5 million Euro and I visited the country to make sure we mobilised the most appropriate assistance and delivered it as quickly as possible.

Second example: In Pakistan, in the aftermath of the disaster, the EU Member States and the Commission committed 220 million Euro for immediate relief. In both countries, this first

response was followed by wider political consultations about recovery and development.

Of course, if we face a complex emergency with substantial humanitarian needs, but also a considerable breakdown of authority due to internal or external armed conflict, then we coordinate with the other relevant players. Examples are Sudan, the DRC, Somalia and others.

And then, there are crises like Afghanistan and Iraq, where the political and military dimensions are the framework in which we provide humanitarian assistance.

The European: All situations are to be faced differently. What is your leading principle?

Mrs. Georgieva: There are different contexts and it is very important that we well judge how to handle each situation. In any event, we make the independence and neutrality of EU relief our highest priority. We need to be quite strict in making this distinction – last year, 102 humanitarian workers were killed, more than peacekeepers. We must make sure that humanitarian workers are not confused with security or political actors.

Factoring the humanitarian dimension in the formulation of EU foreign policy and strategy is particularly important in the context of countries in crisis or in conflict. Let’s take the example of Sudan. High Representative Cathy Ashton has recently set up a Sudan Country Task Force to which my services actively contribute with field expertise and knowledge.

The European: What is the role of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in this field? Humanitarian Aid is not part of the EEAS. What are the links between EEAS and Humanitarian Aid? Mrs. Georgieva: You are quite right. EU Humanitarian Aid does not form part of the EU’s external cooperation with third countries, neither in terms of development aid, nor in terms of political or economic relations. This is to protect some of the fundamental principles of humanitarian assistance such as

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

neutrality, impartiality and independence, and is clearly established in the Lisbon Treaty. That is why it is not under the purview of the EEAS, which is by all means a political service of the EU. But of course there are links and shared goals. We are all contributing to effective EU action when people are in need, irrespective of the institutions we belong to. I am sure the collaboration between DG ECHO and EEAS in the field will continue to be very good.

The 2010 flood disaster in Pakistan.

Photo: www.n24.de/media

The European: The communication speaks of a coherent response bringing together the different constituencies, including the CSDP. Does this mean bringing together civilian and military crisis management?

Mrs. Georgieva: The trend is a growing that a variety of actors, other than traditional humanitarian organisations, get involved in crisis management and response from the early outset of a crisis.

Our approach to crises is a comprehensive one, and therefore we are keen on collaboration with all actors which engage in helping people in the greatest need. We have adopted a building-block concept, where Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid are one block and the military can be another. We have to make sure these blocks fit well together when necessary.

The European: What is the reality on the ground? To get humanitarian aid efficiently in place and distributed to the people, you need in many cases the support of the military, especially in the first response on the ground. Do you see a priori any non-compliance with the 1996 Oslo Guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets in international disaster relief?

Mrs. Georgieva: We are very committed to the Oslo Guidelines they are our anchor for disaster relief. We live in a much more complex world now than we did in the 1990s. At present, there

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are between 30 and 40 countries around the world that are either in conflict or at immediate risk of one. This is why, in case of need, military capacities can supplement civil protection and humanitarian assistance in disaster relief – of course, in adherence to the principles of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and the other international guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets in emergencies and disaster relief.

The European: As I understand, it takes specific circumstances to use military support.

Mrs. Georgieva: For instance, in very specific circumstances, military support can help to cope with natural disasters (see Haiti), and in some exceptional circumstances, it can contribute to a secure environment for humanitarian workers. This was the case of Haiti, where swift military deployment saved lives, improved logistics and enhanced security in the aftermath of the earthquake.

Lack of transport can be a bottleneck that prevents experts, equipment and supplies to reach the scene of a disaster. When we need to mobilise additional transport capacity for relief items, DG ECHO coordinates with the EEAS’ Military Staff and its Movement and Planning Cell, and explores the possibilities to use EU military aircraft under a civilian and relief lead. We have had great success with pooling transport assets. For instance, as part of the EU response to the floods in Pakistan, the Commission helped organise the flight of a Czech cargo aircraft carrying 100 tons of assistance items from Germany, Italy and Austria.

The European: How to avoid the risk of misuse of military forces?

Mrs. Georgieva: Yes, we have also seen mistakes being made, such as the use of humanitarian aid to achieve military ends for example, offering food against intelligence in Afghanistan.

Such actions blur the line between humanitarian aid and military ends. We want to make sure these mistakes are not repeated. This is why it is very important to engage in dialogue with the military.

The European: Does that mean the use of the military capabilities is the “last resort?” Are there prerequisites from your side for their execution?

Mrs. Georgieva: Yes - in order to avoid blurring of the lines between military operations and humanitarian aid/civil protection, military assets and capabilities should be used only as a “last resort”, i.e. where there is no comparable civilian alternative to meet critical humanitarian needs. Additionally, they should be provided at no cost to the affected state or receiving humanitarian actor.

But let me be clear - when I say “last resort”, I don’t mean this is the last option we think about. We need to plan in advance, and to be prepared to use these resources when they are called

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

“We are interested in coordinating with all relevant EU actors, including the military bodies which contribute to the Union’s comprehensive approach.”

The 2010 wildfire disaster in Russia.

Photo: www.n24.de/media

for. Such a case was Haiti, where cooperation with the military improved both the services provided to the affected population, and the delivery of essential aid.

The European: Is my understanding correct that there should be in the future a much more cooperative style for collaboration, let us say a constructive method of proceeding, between the civil forces and the military, as long as the latter are needed in the field to make help possible?

Mrs. Georgieva: Active interaction and coordination with key civilian, military and political actors will continue to be essential. We are interested in coordinating with all relevant EU actors, including the military bodies which contribute to the Union’s comprehensive approach. Areas of discussion can be the protection of civilians (including internally displaced persons and refugees), challenging of information on abuses against civilians, securing a safe humanitarian environment, the rule of law and respect of international law, and the fight against impunity.

The European: If I may come back to the political agenda, there are three major fields of activities: Firstly, your communication designing the framework; Secondly, the Humanitarian Aid Corps and Thirdly, the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Action Plan (2008). How do you see the priorities?

Mrs. Georgieva: There is a great deal of synergy between the priorities you mentioned. Disaster response at home and overseas will be bolstered once we have put together a vibrant European humanitarian aid corps. A boost to our response will also come from the review of our Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, which will ensure the more efficient provision of aid.

So far, we have made very good progress on all three fronts: we have received the political green light from the General Affaires Council (GAC) for strengthening disaster response, and in 2011 we will advance legislation and practical actions in this area.

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On the Voluntary Corps, this year we will propose the concrete design for its structure, so that it adds a maximum value and so that it offers Europeans an exciting new opportunity to make a difference in the world. With regards to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, we are working on sharpening the focus on results. This will make sure we continue to engage in appropriate, principled and effective humanitarian action.

The European: The Commission proposes setting up a European Emergency Response Capacity, based on Member States’ expertise and assets, and a European Emergency Response Centre as a new platform for more effective EU coordination whenever disasters strike. This means that the EU departs from ad hoc features toward a permanent structure. What are the consequences?

Mrs. Georgieva: At present the deployment of EU assets is based on voluntary offers of assistance, which creates the risk of improvisation and delays. To tackle these issues, the Commission has proposed to develop a European Response Capacity by: - Drafting reference scenarios for the main types of disasters and developing contingency plans; - Mapping the civil protection assets of Member States that are available for an EU response; - Establishing a voluntary pool of Member States’ assets on standby for deployment in European response operations; - Ensuring that logistic arrangements are in place for the immediate deployment of EU assistance.

The European: You will have enormous coordination and training needs.

Mrs. Georgieva: Since the heart of our proposal is to make best use of existing capacities, real-time disaster information, coordination, and joint training are absolutely essential. This is why the Communication proposes to pool our capabilities in crisis response into a new emergency response Centre that can monitor hazards, prepare scenarios for different types of di-

The EU Security Strategy (ESS)

sasters, and coordinate the EU‘s disaster response efforts. The Centre will be linked with the civil protection and the humanitarian aid authorities in Member States, allowing it to process in-kind assistance and ensure a fully integrated approach to disaster response. These developments will guarantee that key assets can be mobilised and deployed faster and more efficiently, and help better those in need of relief.

The European: Will you procure special assets at the EU level, and can you initiate that some nations procure missing assets in your catalogue of capabilities and stock them at home?

Mrs. Georgieva: I am a firm believer in the bottom-up approach to disaster reaction - it is important to have capacities near home, and to build skills locally. This is the basis of good preparedness.

And yet, there are teams and equipment that can best serve their purpose as a collective asset - because they are highly specialised or are so rarely deployed that it makes little sense for each of the 27 Member States to maintain one of its own.

An example of such a collective asset is the Baltic Module for fighting floods, in which three countries pool their resources to act jointly against a particular disaster that often affects their neighbourhood. Once we take stock of what we have and what we still need, we will propose cost-effective ways to fill the gaps, always seeking ways to do so by having local homes for our collective assets.

At the EU level, our responsibility is to plan and coordinate the joint European response. In this, we are guided by two principles - the need to be prepared for any likely disaster, and the ability to react in the fastest, most coherent and most cost-effective manner.

The European: That means that the burden is on the shoulders of the nations and will require coordination and training. Do you have a perception how to use the most modern technologies for training, e.g. computer based simulation? I could imagine that the Response Centre, merging the humanitarian aid (ECHO) and the civil protection crisis rooms (MIC) could have, besides the coordination task, a very important role for training.

Mrs. Georgieva: Training plays a big role and we will continue to expand our work in this field. The Commission has set up a modern and high-standard training programme in civil protection; its goal is to improve the compatibility between the inter-

vention teams from the participating states when they take part in relief operations facilitated by the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. Over the years, hundreds of national experts have followed courses organised under this training programme; all together, they constitute a comprehensive pool from which are selected members for the EU Civil Protection Teams that can be dispatched on-site in case of major emergencies.

We are also encouraging civil protection exercises, with the aim of establishing a common understanding of cooperation and accelerating response and coordination in major emergencies.

Of course, modern technologies play a substantial role – not just for training, but also for the most practical side of our preparedness and response to disasters. For example, European experts share the access to computer-generated scenarios that allow them to monitor and plan for the evolution of floods through a variety of data, for instance from meteorological centres.

The European: Please allow me a last, maybe very personal question. I am amazed to see you pushing so strongly to realize a valid disaster response for the European Union. Why? Mrs. Georgieva: The European Union decided to create this portfolio in the Commission, and it was the right decision, taken at the right time. 2010 proved this with the unprecedented scale and number of disasters it brought. They spared no continent, and some of them struck more than once - earthquakes, floods, forest fires, industrial incidents. Last year was my “baptism by fire”, and having faced all these challenges, I am the person who sees most clearly how critical it is to have a response that matches the problems we face.

From the earthquake in Haiti to the industrial spill in Hungary, we have seen that a combined European response can be more effective – both in terms of results, and in terms of cost. In a situation where every hour counts, the European Union needs a system that guarantees the availability of key assets for immediate deployment. We cannot afford to wait for the next mega disaster before we take action. Improved EU capacity in this area has multiple benefits: most importantly, the possibility to save lives and to give hope to those who need it the most.

The European: Commissioner Georgieva, I thank you for this interview and wish you success.

News Commissioner Georgieva presented on 26 October 2010 the Commission Communication “Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance”.

The Communication is available at: http://tinyurl.com/4ezrs5x

On 21 December 2010, the Commission issued a “Staff Working Paper on Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management”. The main aim of the guidelines is to improve coherence among the risk assessments undertaken in the EU Member States at the national level in the prevention, prepared-

ness and planning stages and to make these risk assessments more comparable between Member States.

The document is available at: http://tinyurl.com/4f7c58d

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Communication on Internal Security – the first document explaining EU objectives in this field

The EU Internal Security Strategy – towards a more secure Europe

by Cecilia Malmström The European: A few months ago you presented an EU Internal Security Strategy in Action. This was a key point in the Stockholm Programme, which sets the agenda for the area of justice and home affairs for the coming years, and was also called for by the Spanish EU Presidency when they started outlining the EU’s security challenges a year ago.

Why does the EU need its own Internal Security Strategy?

Mrs. Malmström: Because this is our reality. Europe is exposed to cross-border and common threats which require concerted EU action. While considerable progress has been made in law enforcement, judicial cooperation, customs and border management, I believe that the EU response to the security challenges of today has for too long been following a silo mentality. The truth is that everything is interlinked, and therefore we need a broad strategy with clear targeted actions for how to come to terms with the security threats ahead. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has provided us with a unique opportunity to do this.

The European: The strategy outlines five main strategic objectives. What are the main threats represented by those objectives?

Mrs. Malmström: Today’s security challenges are cross-border and cross-sectoral and no single Member State is able to tackle them by itself. Our strategic objectives target the biggest threats. Crimes like drug dealing or car theft can often be traced to international organised crime groups which flout border and customs controls. Terrorist networks seek out ever more unpredictable means of launching attacks, such as the printer cartridge turned into a bomb and sent via air cargo from Yemen last autumn.

Violent extremism is an issue for many communities around the EU, where individuals who feel alienated from mainstream society are susceptible to terrorist propaganda. Attacks on information systems are increasing. With some 150,000 viruses and other types of malicious software in circulation, every individual and business using the Internet is potentially vulnerable to identity theft, credit card fraud and other cybercrimes. Natural and man-made disasters, like the recent toxic sludge leak in Hungary, demand a more coherent approach both to threat and risk assessment and to emergency response.

The European: Regarding the first objective, how can the EU combat cross-border and cross-sectoral crime?

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Cecilia Malmström Member of the European Commission since 2010, responsible for Home Affairs.

Born in 1968, Mrs. Malmström grew up partly in France, and has lived and worked in Barcelona and Stuttgart.

She obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Göteborg and worked for a number of years as a researcher teaching a.o. European politics.

From 1999 to 2006 she was a member of the European Parliament, working mainly on foreign affairs, human rights and EU enlargement.

In 2006 Mrs. Malmström was appointed EU Minister of the Swedish Government where she was in charge among other things, of preparing the Swedish EU Presidency.

Mrs. Malmström: Our actions focus on building internal capacity and helping law enforcement and judiciary authorities investigate and identify criminal activity. Above all, the EU should do more to target criminal assets by confiscating the proceeds of crime and preventing them from falling back into criminals’ hands. We know that it is a greater punishment for many criminals to get their assets confiscated than to be sentenced to a few years in prison. Therefore, we must target our actions where it hurts the most and go after the money. In other words, we must protect the licit economy from corruption, money laundering, fraud, and other criminal activities.

The European: How far are you with the legislation on confiscating proceeds of criminal activity?

Mrs. Malmström: This year, we will propose legislation to strengthen the EU legal framework on confiscation. But this is also about better implementation of the tools we have, and increased exchange of best practices. Later this year we will also make proposals on how to better fight corruption.

The European: Terrorism is one of the main threats, if not the most significant threat of all. How can the Internal Security Strategy in Action help prevent terrorism?

Mrs. Malmström: We propose concrete measures to cut off terrorists’ access to funding and materials. To respond to the increasing risk of ‘home-grown terrorism’, we propose EU action to support and facilitate community networks to understand and address radicalisation. We also plan to strengthen EU transport security policy and to propose an EU approach for

The EU Security Strategy (ESS)

Documentation Five strategic objectives for internal security Commission Communication “The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe” Presented by Commissioner Cecilia Malmström on 22 November 2010 The communication identifies the most urgent challenges to EU security in the years to come and proposes five strategic objectives and specific actions for 2011-2014.

Excerpts: “OBJECTIVE 1: Disrupt international crime networks Despite growing cooperation between law enforcement authorities and the judiciary within as well as between Member States, international crime networks remain highly active, creating vast criminal profits. Alongside corruption and intimidation of local populations and authorities, these profits are often used to penetrate the economy and undermine public trust.

To prevent crime it is therefore essential to disrupt criminal networks and combat the financial incentive which drives them. To that end, practical law enforcement cooperation should be strengthened. Authorities across all sectors and at different levels should work together to protect the economy, and criminal profits should be effectively traced and confiscated. We also need to overcome the obstacles posed by divergent national approaches, where necessary through legislation on judicial cooperation to strengthen mutual recognition and common definitions of criminal offences and minimum levels of criminal sanctions. (…)

OBJECTIVE 2: Prevent terrorism and address radicalisation and recruitment The threat from terrorism remains significant and is constantly evolving. Terrorist organisations adapt and innovate, as demonstrated by the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the attempted attack on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 and plots uncovered recently affecting several Member States. Threats now come both from organised terrorists and from so-called ‘lone

wolves’, who may have developed their radical beliefs on the basis of extremist propaganda and found training materials on the internet. Our efforts to combat terrorism need to evolve to stay ahead of the threat with a coherent European approach including preventive action. Furthermore, the EU should continue to designate critical infrastructure and put in place plans to protect those assets, including transport services and energy generation and transmission, which are essential to the functioning of society and the economy. Member States have the primary role in delivering on this objective through coordinated and effective efforts, with the full support of the Commission, and assisted by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. (…)

OBJECTIVE 3: Raise levels of security for citizens and businesses in cyberspace Security of IT networks is one essential factor for a well-functioning information society. This is recognised in the recently published Digital Agenda for Europe which addresses issues related to cybercrime, cyber security, safer internet and privacy as the main components in building trust and security for network users. The rapid development and application of new information technologies has also created new forms of criminal activity. Cybercrime is a global phenomenon causing significant damage to the EU internal market. While the very structure of the internet knows no boundaries, jurisdiction for prosecuting cybercrime still stops at national borders. Member States need to pool their efforts at the EU level. The High Tech Crime Centre at Europol already plays an important coordinating role for law enforcement, but further action is needed. (…)

Cecilia Malmström at the occasion of the presentation of the Commission Communication “EU Internal Security Strategy in Action- Five steps towards a more secure Europe”, on 22 November 2010: “EU internal security has traditionally been following a silo mentality, focusing on one area at a time. Now we take a common approach on how to respond to the security threats and challenges ahead. Terrorism, organised, cross-border and cyber crime, and crises and disasters

OBJECTIVE 4: Strengthen security through border management With the Lisbon Treaty in force the EU is better placed to exploit synergies between border management policies on persons and goods, in a spirit of solidarity and sharing of responsibility. In relation to movement of persons, the EU can treat migration management and the fight against crime as twin objectives of the integrated border management strategy. It is based on three strategic strands: • an enhanced use of new technology for border checks (the second generation of the Schengen Information System (SIS II), the Visa Information System (VIS), the entry/exit system and the registered traveller programme); • an enhanced use of new technology for border surveillance (the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR) with the support of GMES security services, and the gradual creation of a common information sharing environment for the EU maritime domain; and • an enhanced coordination of Member States through Frontex. (…)

OBJECTIVE 5: Increase Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters The EU is exposed to an array of potential crises and disasters, such as those associated with climate change and those caused by terrorist and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, hostile or accidental releases of disease agents and pathogens, sudden flu outbreaks and failures in infrastructure.

These cross-sectoral threats call for improvements to long-standing crisis and disaster management practices in terms of efficiency and coherence. They require both solidarity in response, and responsibility in prevention and preparedness with an emphasis on better risk assessment and risk management at the EU level of all potential hazards.”

are areas where we need to combine our efforts and work together in order to increase the security of our citizens, businesses, and societies across the EU. This strategy outlines the threats ahead and the necessary actions we must take in order to be able to fight them. I encourage all relevant actors to take their responsibility to implement these actions and thereby to strengthen EU security”.

Communication available at: http://tinyurl.com/2cfnqg5

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emergency response capacity employing the right equipment and properly trained staff. This means implementing fully the Lisbon Treaty’s solidarity clause – a proposal from the Commission and the High Representative will be tabled in 2011. It means a more comprehensive approach to threat and risk assessment, pooling the different areas of EU and Member State expertise, making full use of existing situation awareness centres and secure zones – including the one in DG Home Affairs – and creating a more efficient, coherent and visible capacity for responding to disasters. For this, we will propose a European Emergency Response Capacity.

Border surveillance.

Photo: FRONTEX

extraction and analysis of financial messaging data that will help law enforcement agencies track terrorists and prevent future attacks.

The European: Let us consider border security. How do you envisage strengthening EU border management?

Mrs. Malmström: We want smarter and safer borders, allowing smooth border management and more open trade in trusted goods. Border controls and surveillance are sometimes viewed mainly as a migration management tool, but coordinated and integrated border management can also be a powerful means of disrupting organised and other serious crime. We can strengthen security through border management by improving cooperation and coordination in dealing with threats associated with the movement of persons and goods. Frontex, the EU’s border agency, can contribute considerably to internal security if it is able to process relevant personal data for preventing and combating crime, especially human trafficking, at external borders.

The European: If I may come back to that what you mentioned about crisis and disaster response. Roughly at the same time as you presented the EU Internal Security Strategy in Action, Commissioner Georgieva put forward a Communication on crisis management. Also the Parliament seems to pay great attention to this policy area. It seems like a concerted effort to increase EU crisis management?

Mrs. Malmström: Yes indeed, we are proposing a European

The European: And how do we ensure – for me a crucial question – the proper protection of individual rights?

Mrs. Malmström: I attach enormous importance to individual rights, and in everything we propose I make sure we have a thorough impact assessment on what effects it can have on fundamental rights and data protection. We must also very carefully validate all proposals against the principle of proportionality.

The European: How can we ensure the Strategy meets these challenges? Will nations, as contributors, follow your ambitions?

Mrs. Malmström: The success of the Internal Security Strategy depends on everyone’s commitment to playing their role – Member States, agencies, civil society and local authorities.

Our proposals are not exhaustive – other important activities are taking place or are planned at EU and national levels to support these objectives. We will shortly establish a Commission working group on internal security involving relevant Commission Directorate-Generals and the External Action Service to ensure that our various activities and policies are coherent and synergized. An annual report on the state of internal security will measure how the EU is collectively achieving the Strategy’s strategic goals.

The European: It seems that the EU will open a new chapter in this field.

Mrs. Malmström: This marks indeed the beginning of an important new chapter for the Union‘s security.

The European: Commissioner Malmström, many thanks for the interview. I wish you much success.

News During her visit to Washington on 8-9 December 2010, Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström discussed with Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano and Members of Congress cyber crime and cyber security, cargo security, terrorism and migra-

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tion. “We have had good discussions on a number of subjects”, said Cecilia Malmström.

“We have taken the first step in the negotiations on a new Passsenger Name Records (PNR) agreement by respectively presenting our priorities. I am also glad that we have

taken the decision to set up a common working group on cyber security.”

Mrs. Malmström’s speech on transatlantic security cooperation is available at: http://tinyurl.com/348scd7

The EU Security Strategy (ESS)

The possibility of mass-scale victimisation with CBRN materials needs an appropriate EU response

Member States must enact an enhanced EU CBRN Action Plan

by Ana Gomes MEP Last December, the European Parliament (EP) adopted its opinion on the EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Action Plan, based on a report which I drafted.

One of the main conclusions is that it is vital for EU Member States to make the most out of civilian-military cooperation to effectively counter CBRN-related risks and thus best protect their citizens.

An all-hazard coordinated approach is needed It is paramount to bring together the expertise, the resources, the people and all the tools at our disposal to face some of the potentially deadliest threats to European security. The relevance of a European approach to CBRN security stems from the transnational character and the mass-scale victimisation involved in possible terrorist attacks, natural accidents or industrial disasters with CBRN materials.

The transnational character of “early” interventions An appropriate response against these dangers does not include only ex post facto intervention programmes, but starts much earlier when dealing with such materials: ensuring their proper storage, limited access, stringent controls, etc. Also, an aftermath intervention demands large-scale cooperation between different national authorities within a Member State (civil protection, military, law enforcement, etc.), as well as among national authorities of different Member States and EU Institutions. An all-hazard coordinated approach is needed, since the EU common security in this field depends only on the strength of its weakest link.

No laxity allowed The consequences of laxity in a CBRN incident may know no borders. It is wrong to assume that CBRN risks are low, as demonstrated by the recent waves of packages with explosives mailed to embassies in Greece, Italy and different destinations in the USA, or by the accident in an aluminium factory in Hungary that dumped toxic mud into the Danube. We are dealing with unknown risks of potentially devastating consequences, stemming from either accidental or criminal activities.

The EU’s action to counter CBRN threats The EU started dealing with trans-border CBRN issues with the declaration of the Ghent European Council of 19 October 2001, focused on combating terrorism “in every form throughout the world” as a direct response to the 11 September 2001 attacks

Ana Gomes MEP Member of the European Parliament’s committees on Foreign Affairs and Human rights, the Subcommittee Security & Defence, and a Substitute for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Mrs. Gomes was born in 1954 in Lisbon. In 1979 she graduated in Law from the University of Lisbon where she also received a diploma in Community Law (INA) in 1981, as well as a diploma from the ‘Institut International des Droits de l’Homme’ (Strasbourg) in 1989. From 1982 – 86 she was diplomatic adviser to the Portuguese President before being posted to the Permanent Mission to the UN and International Organisations in Geneva (1986 – 1989) and to the Embassies in Tokyo (1989 – 1991) and London (1991 – 1994). In 1995 she became Head of Office of the Secretary for European Affairs (1995 – 1996) before becoming Member of Portugal’s Permanent Mission to the UN in New York in 19971998. From 1999-2003 she was Ambassador of Portugal to Jakarta.

in the USA, and followed by the conclusions of the Laeken European Council of 13-14 December 2001. Subsequently, the “Programme to improve cooperation in the EU for preventing and limiting the consequences of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terrorist threats” was adopted in 2002, which was replaced by the EU Solidarity Programme in 2004.

In 2008, a CBRN Task force was established by the Commission to prepare the main elements of a new plan.

The weakness of the current EU Action Plan The EU CBRN Action Plan was proposed by the Commission in June 2009 and adopted by the Council in November 2009. The Action Plan, to be implemented by 2012, is divided into four main parts: Prevention, Detection, Preparedness and Response. Recognising the importance of each of these four stages in dealing with CBRN materials is crucial to ensure proper coordination of risk assessment studies, response and countermeasures.

The Action Plan also emphasizes the need for a cross-cutting and cross-border approach to dealing with CBRN materials through the proper allocation of measurable Goals and Actions in each of the four parts into which the Action Plan is divided.

This Action Plan should ensure the efficient interaction of national and EU initiatives in addressing CBRN risks and preparing the necessary response.

However, in my opinion, overwhelmingly endorsed by the European Parliament, I argue that the current EU CBRN Action

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Plan is weak, lacks coherence and is not being implemented by all Member States. Comparing the EU Action Plan adopted by the Council with the earlier version sent by the Commission in June 2009, we can see that the changes introduced by the Council make the Action Plan dilute the binding level of the measures foreseen and weaken the monitoring and control of their implementation.

Reinforce and implement the Action Plan Stressing that CBRN accidents or attacks pose serious threats to the security of the people living in the European Union and can disrupt critical infrastructure and the normal functioning of societies in one or more EU Member States, the European Parliament calls on the Council and the Commission to rapidly review and strengthen the Action Plan according to its recommendations. The Parliament calls, namely, for the strengthening of the normative and regulatory role of the European Commission and for the creation of a specialised European mechanism for crisis reaction, able to coordinate civil and military capabilities in order to ensure an EU rapid response capability to fight a CBRN disaster.

Crisis reaction – a specialized mechanism is needed A special European Crisis Reaction Mechanism should be set up to help national authorities cope with any chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear disaster caused by an accident or terrorist attack. This should enable swifter coordination and deployment of specialized civilian and military resources. Such a mechanism could be articulated with a European Civil Protection Force based on the existing EU Civil Protection Mechanism – a longstanding demand of the European Parliament – to enable the Union to bring together the resources necessary to provide emergency assistance, including humanitarian aid, within 24 hours of a CBRN disaster inside or outside EU territory. The European Parliament also calls for the creation of regional or EU-wide stockpiles of response resources and EU/regional specialized response teams, including medical, law enforcement and military personnel.

The Solidarity Clause The CBRN Action Plan offers a valuable opportunity to enact the Solidarity Clause enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. Unfortunately, the current Action Plan makes no reference to the Clause, but a revised CBRN Action Plan, as recommended by the Parliament, should point out ways in which Member States would share resources and take joint countermeasures in the

event of a CBRN accident or terrorist attack, so as to put the new Solidarity Clause into practice.

Reinforcing international agreements The Parliament also stresses that CBRN risks stem from not only State activities, but also from non-state actors. Therefore, it considers most important the strengthening of non-proliferation regimes and disarmament through the full and universal implementation of all relevant treaties and international agreements, namely the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as achieving agreement on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes (the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty).

The Commission and Member States should work on the legal framework regulating and monitoring transactions of CBRN materials to ensure that all suspicious transactions, as well as the loss or theft of CBRN materials, are reported.

The role of the private sector The Parliament urges EU Institutions, Member States and the private sector to put the safety of EU citizens first, while recognizing the economic costs of replacing high-risk with lower-risk materials for the relevant industries. What is at stake in this equation, stresses the Parliament, are fundamental rights: the rights to life, liberty and security of all people in Europe and their societies. The chemical industry, in particular, should replace the use of high-risk chemicals with suitable lower-risk alternatives, where such replacement is “scientifically, technologically and environmentally possible” and where “there is a clear increase of security”. In this connection, MEPs ask the Commission to deliver a study on the implementation of the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemical substances (REACH) regulation.

Conclusion A review of the current EU CBRN Action Plan in line with the European Parliament’s well-researched recommendations is paramount to ensuring the safety and security of all EU citizens against the grave risk of possible accidents or terrorist attacks involving CBRN substances. The Action Plan must be urgently strengthened and its implementation closely monitored by the European Commission in all 27 Member States. At stake are citizens‘ lives, the environment, as well as critical infrastructures in the Union. CBRN risks and threats should not be underestimated.

News Ana Gomes drafted the report for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on “Strengthening chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security in the

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European Union – an EU CBRN Action Plan”.

On the basis of this report the European Parliament adopted in plenary session a non legislative Resolution on 14 December 2010.

The Resolution is available at: http://tinyurl.com/6gmdkzh

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The potential contours in a new policy field of European solidarity are visible. How to coordinate them

Addressing a reality of trans-boundary risks and European solidarity

by Helena Lindberg In the well-known European newspaper, the European Voice, there is an annual election of “the Europeans of the year” described as “those individuals who have most influenced the European Union’s agenda”. One of the more striking aspects of this year’s version of “EV Awards” was that most of the nominees had somehow been involved in managing recent adversities affecting the Union: the ongoing financial crisis, the unexpected volcanic ash cloud or the mega-disasters in Haiti and Pakistan. I believe this example to be quite telling as an illustration of the heightened political profile of EU cooperation on crises and disasters. A successfully managed crisis has become one of the more efficient ways of proving leadership qualities, at both national and European levels. Crisis and disaster management has also become an increasingly dynamic area for defining EU added value.

The growing role of the EU in crisis management – an impetus for nations As the Director General of a national agency in charge of managing everything from flooding to volcanic ash clouds, pandemics, breakdowns in critical infrastructure and cyber attacks, I have experienced the growing role of EU cooperation in this area first hand. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) was created two years ago. Within less than a year of its establishment, the new Lisbon treaty entered into force, providing conditions for a more coherent and ambitious approach to EU

Documentation Solidarity Clause (Article 222 TFEU) 1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to: (a) - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; - protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; - assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack; (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

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Helena Lindberg Director General for the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency (MSB) in Karlstadt since 2009.

Helena Lindberg has a Master’s Degree in Law and worked as an Associate Judge of Appeals, before joining the Swedish Ministry of Justice as a Deputy Director. She served also as the Director General for Legal and Administrative Affairs at the Ministry of Defence in Stockholm.

When the Agency for Swedish Civil Contingency started its work in 2009, Helena Lindberg, became the first Director General.

cooperation on crises and disasters. The abolishment of the pillars, the creation of the EEAS, new articles such as 222 TFEU (the Solidarity Clause) and the strengthened role of the European Parliament – all of these treaty-based changes are already having an effect on how we cooperate and where we are heading.

The gradual emergence of a new policy field?

Seen in perspective, my impression is that the current dynamic developments may gradually lead to the emergence of a whole new policy field for “European crisis and disaster management”.1 We are not there yet, but the potential contours of this new field of European cooperation are already visible. The epicenter lies in the area of civil protection, run by Barroso’s new “Crisis Commissioner”, Kristalina Georgieva. But the field reaches wider and includes important elements of both internal security and external action. In order to get a grasp of the whole policy field from a national level, there is currently a need to identify the different pieces in the puzzle and link them together. Applied to the recent flow of EU documents we can see how the communication from Commissioner Georgieva “Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance” needs to be assessed in conjunction with proposals from HR Ashton on the use of CSDP and/or military capabilities. And, as an additional piece in the equation, we have the communication from Commissioner Malmström on the Internal Security Strategy which addresses some of the same issues “.2 Time to make a reality of buzz-words The argument that we will see a closer integration between policy areas dealing with crisis and disaster management builds

The EU Security Strategy (ESS)

on a number of trends which are currently shaping national systems in Sweden and elsewhere. I am thinking about the urge to make a reality of buzz-words like “cost-efficiency”, “non-duplication”, “dual-use” and “the internal-external nexus”. In Sweden those buzz-words were critical factors behind the establishment of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) in 2009.

trans-boundary miseries seems to be the development of specific coordinating functions at the central level, applying a whole-of-government approach to risk management. We find such structures in a growing number of countries like the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland and Canada. In Sweden there is MSB, but also the Crisis Coordination Office in the Prime Minister’s Office.

The Swedish example

The European Union’s advanced approach

MSB’s mandate is in many ways a concrete expression of a widened policy field for crisis and disaster management, integrating the multi-sectoral, the internal and the external, the risks and the threats, as well as the different management phases, before-during-after. The benefits of this policy coherence are evident. When MSB for example analyses capacity needs in the area of CBRN security, we are not only looking at risks and threats in a broad national perspective, but will also consider scenarios involving our international humanitarian missions and Swedish citizens in third countries. And, whenever possible, we will try to weigh the need for response capacities against an evaluation of preventive measures. This will be done in close cooperation with other responsible agencies, with MSB functioning as a hub, giving support and direction.

The wide grasp provides for an effective use of all available resources.

Applied to the context of the EU, there are still a number of uncertainties as to where responsibilities lie for preparing a coordinated response to some of the serious events we can spot on the horizon.

MSB – the central coordination platform The same integration applies in the response phase where MSB serves as a central coordinating platform at the agencylevel. In a situation like a pandemic or a bio-attack affecting large parts of society, MSB would work together with responsible stakeholders to collate information and produce horizontal impact assessments for government. MSB can also assist with capacities, both nationally and internationally. A high-value asset such as the Swedish National Air Medevac can be deployed by MSB to transport patients within Sweden, EU citizens from the site of a terror attack or wounded soldiers from the EU Battlegroups.

Addressing a reality of trans-boundary risks Besides arguments of “cost-efficiency” and “non-duplication”, there are also more fundamental reasons for strengthening coordination in the field of crisis and disaster management. It is a fact that a growing number of the risks that confront us today have no natural “home” but tend to float above sectors and national borders. In that sense they may be called “transboundary”.

Cyber attacks or ash clouds are two good examples of transboundary risks. Managing them requires an understanding of impacts across all functions of society. The instruments involved implicate both internal and external security.

The most frequent solution within Member States to cope with

“… it does not seem unfair to wonder where to find a natural locus of coordination in a trans-boundary crisis. Who would bring whom to the table? ”

Uncertainties in coordination For example, where should one look within the Institutions to find a holistic EU assessment of a scenario involving cascading power breakdowns across the Union, satellite outages and the disruption of a range of critical functions in Member States?

Those are some of the consequences that could be expected if the EU was to be hit by a so called “geomagnetic storm”. 3 The scenario may seem extreme, or even outlandish, but is very seriously analyzed and continuously monitored by responsible agencies in the U.S.4 How to coordinate through the EU Institutions The recent communication from Commissioner Georgieva and the proposal to create an Emergency Response Center promises to make DG ECHO a focal point for assessments and contingency planning. This is excellent, but despite a boosted capacity for DG ECHO in this area, it seems clear that assessments and perhaps also response planning regarding internal security issues remain a shared competence with Commissioner Malmström and DG HOME. There are also a number of other stake-holders within the Commission that could claim a role in a situation of serious disruptions across the Union territory: surely other DGs for sure, and the Secretariat-General, which has taken on an explicit responsibility for multi-sectoral crises.

How the European External Action Service (EEAS) could fit into the puzzle If we turn to the External Action Service there is SitCen, CMPD and a recently appointed Managing Director for Crisis Response. We also have bodies like Europol and the Joint Research

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Satellite view of the ash cloud after the eruption of the volcano Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland.

Photo: ESA

Center (JRC). Moving upwards we find the Cabinets of President Barroso and of HR Ashton as well as the European Council, which according to the Lisbon treaty “shall regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable the Union and its Member States to take effective action”.5 Against this background, it does not seem unfair to wonder where to find a natural locus of coordination in a trans-boundary crisis. Who would bring whom to the table?

“Unpacking” the concept of European solidarity6 The reality of trans-boundary risks is no doubt messy and places a whole new set of demands on our capacity for coordination – at all levels. Some steps have already been taken within the EU to promote cross-cutting coordination in crises and disasters.7 With the Lisbon Treaty in place there is a newfound opportunity to push ahead with this important mission.

The Solidarity Clause (TFEU 222) could provide the vehicle needed for this endeavor. The Clause, which urges the Union and its Member States “to act jointly in a spirit of solidarity” when an attack or a disaster strikes also contains an obligation for the Union “to mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by Member States”.

The trans-boundary nature of this provision is confirmed by the arrangements for the implementation of the Clause, which “shall be defined by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the High Representative”. During 2011 the “unpacking” of the Solidarity Clause will begin as the proposal for implementation will be drafted.

This process may offer a chance to come to terms with some of the existing institutional fragmentation in the field of crisis and

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disaster management.8 It may help clarify coordination responsibilities and provide a basis for institutional synergies, so that next time when a trans-boundary event hits we stand a little more ready.

1 The idea about a widening policy field for crisis and disaster management was first presented in a Special Issue of the Journal of European Integration, Vol.28, No.5, December 2006. See the opening article “Protecting the Union: Analysing an Emerging Policy Space”, by Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren and Mark Rhinard, pp. 405-421.

2 See COM(2010) 600, “Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance”, Brussels, 26.10.2010; and COM(2010) 673, “The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps toward a more secure Europe”, Brussels, 22.11.2010.

3 The wide-reaching consequences of this scenario were explored at a joint workshop organized by FEMA, MSB and the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), in February 2010, including also the European Commission (DG ECHO). The after-action report from this event can be downloaded at www.msb.se/sv/Tools/News/Sweden-and-the-US-exchanged-views-ongeomagnetic-storms.

4 See for example the homepage of NOAA, www.swpc.noaa.gov.

5 See Article 222 (TFEU), paragraph 4.

6 These issues will be dealt with during a seminar that MSB organizes with the European Policy Center (EPC) on March 24, 2011. The title of the event is “Developing EU capacity for crisis and disaster management: Searching for Solidarity”. We are very honoured to be able to welcome Commissioner Georgieva to this event as key note speaker. More information on the event will be published on the homepages of MSB (English version), www.msb.se and the homepage of the EPC, www.epc.eu.

7 There are for example the Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) in the Council which aim to facilitate strategic decision-making in large-scale events.

Although the CCA have not yet been activated, the arrangements stay updated thanks to yearly exercises. There is also the ARGUS system in the Commission, which links existing early-warning systems within different sectors.

8 See The European Union’s Solidarity Clause: Empty Letter or Effective Tool?, UI Occasional Paper, No.2 2010, by Sara Myrdal and Mark Rhinard.

The EU Security Strategy (ESS)

A truly effective defence against ballistic missiles will persuade potential aggressors to cooperate

A footprint for European Ballistic Missile Defense

by General (ret.) Harald Kujat

While NATO’s new Strategic Concept reaffirms the collective commitment to common defense – that Article V remains the cornerstone of the alliance – it does put further demands on the increasingly strained resources and efforts of the member nations for several new priorities, particularly for cyber security and for missile defense.

NATO’s response to asymmetric threats It is clear to everyone that the primary threats to NATO are no longer of conventional military invasion by traditional armies, nor of massive nuclear attack as in the past. The threats are from increasingly decentralized and unstable elements, of both state and non-state actors, who are willing to employ just about any means to further a cause or destabilize a perceived enemy. Thus a wide array of so-called asymmetric threats can and do attack not only our armies, but our general societies as well, and it happens more regularly than we ever could have imagined in the past.

The fundamental, and by no means inappropriate, reaction of NATO to this distressing development has been to keep it as far away from home as possible, which is the primary motivation for the war in Afghanistan and the focus on operations beyond NATO territory. And the attention given to improving crisis management, stabilization and reconstruction capabilities, in NATO’s new Strategic Concept, is a reflection of this.

Example of Ballistic Missile Threat Ranges.

General (ret.) Harald Kujat Born in 1942 in Mielke. He joined the German Armed Forces on 1 July, 1959 and completed the 20th General Staff Course (Air Force), at the Command and Staff College, Hamburg.

1992 – 1995 Chief of Staff and Deputy German MilRep to the NATO Military Committee and Western European Union, Brussels.

1996 – 1998 Director, IFOR Coordination Centre (ICC), SHAPE, Belgium and later Assistant Director, International Military Staff (Plans & Policy) and Deputy Director, IMS, NATO Headquarters, Brussels.

1998 – 2000 Director of Policy and Advisory Staff to the German MOD, Berlin.

2000 – 2002, Chief of Defence (CHOD), Federal Armed Forces, Berlin.

2002 – 2005, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Brussels.

New technologies create also new threats Even if this strategy, in combination with effective border control, were fully successful at keeping the physical threats away from Europe, we know that new and spreading technologies provide the ability to attack over much greater distances than in the past. Cyber attacks can be executed from anywhere to anywhere else in the world with potentially crippling effect.

Even more devastating attacks with weapons of mass destruction, over thousands of kilometers, are enabled by proliferation of ballistic missiles. It is plausible that the same type of non-state actor we are now defending against with our troops in Afghanistan may obtain access to these technologies, yielding the ability to threaten our territory and populations as never before. The capability to carry a warhead over 3,000 kilometers was provided by North Korea to Iran. One can imagine what could happen due to the instability in Pakistan, or when NATO troops eventually withdraw from Afghanistan.

The threat is real and growing and not limited to Iran, but can be made available country to country or country to non-state player in a similar fashion or by coup or revolution. While prevention and diplomacy must be employed to the fullest extent, the possibility that such systems could fall into the wrong hands on relatively short notice could leave Europe unprePicture: Harald Kujat

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

more politically acceptable system proposals, which are tailored to the real and credible threats that NATO is likely to face. From Reagan’s original “Star Wars” vision, to the Bush administration’s “Third Site” plan, considered by many to be an overreaction, and now to the Obama administration’s more modest “Phased Adaptive Approach”, the Americans have slowly made the transition to thinking that aligns much better to what is needed for Europe.

Also, over the years NATO and its staff have displayed perhaps uncharacteristic unity of purpose by diligently analyzing all options and prudently implementing a multilateral command and control architecture, under the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense program (ALTBMD), able to accept each nation sensor and interceptor system contributions as needed and as they become available. Although designed for protection of deployed forces, the ALTBMD architecture can be easily expanded for Territorial Missile Defense.

Japan SM-3 test launch, oct. 2010.

Photo: U.S. NAVAIR

pared to defend itself against an actor willing to ignore rational considerations. And if one waits until this happens to respond, it may be too late to deploy an effective defense.

An effective missile defence is needed An effective defence against ballistic missiles would give policy makers and diplomats a new tool strengthening their ability to persuade potential adversaries to cooperate on preventative measures such as non-proliferation. Along with deterrence, missile defense further discourages an adversary from attacking, as chances of success are limited. And in the event of failure of diplomacy and occurrence of an actual attack on Europe, missile defense offers a much more acceptable option than just to suffer the attack and have to retaliate with associated horrific consequences.

From “Star Wars” to “Phased Adaptive Approach” So what constitutes an effective missile defense for Europe?

We have seen quite a change in the political and operational approaches to this question over the years, with movement toward more realistic, more practical, more affordable and

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A system to defend Europe and all NATO nations Indeed the work being done now by NATO answers many criticisms of previous plans. The approved approach is no longer centered on defense of the United States against the very long range missile (ICBM) threat that has not yet materialized; but is designed to defend Europe, and all NATO nations equally, against the more rapidly expanding medium and intermediate range ballistic missile threat. It will be implemented in phases, with each additional step in capability taken only if and when the respective threat materializes. Its operational decisions will respect the sovereignty of each nation as rules of engagement for interception of missiles, under various scenarios, are worked out and agreed among NATO’s members. And it can no longer be interpreted as a provocation to the strategic nuclear balance, as planned interceptors are even less suited to counter Russia’s ICBM force than with previous plans. Moreover, the hand of cooperation has now been extended to Russia to work together with NATO on territorial missile defense.

Tested and practical solutions and systems The current approach is also technically grounded in years of testing and scrutiny, primarily in the United States, but also in Europe in selected areas, that have demonstrated which technologies are capable of succeeding at the tasks of actually detecting, tracking, and intercepting these missiles and destroying their dangerous payloads. With its Phased Adaptive Approach the Obama administration has decided to curtail the less successful programs and cut back overly ambitious efforts in favor of practical solutions and systems which have proven themselves through extensive successful testing. One of the centerpieces of the plan is the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), an upper-tier or above-atmosphere interceptor, scheduled for deployment in Europe this year. It is capable of intercepting

The EU Security Strategy (ESS)

resources to advanced interceptors as discussed above, and to specific sensor technologies such as radar target discrimination to identify real targets from decoys or warheads from associated debris, Europe has certainly developed some complimentary systems and technologies applicable to upper-tier missile defense as well. Advanced naval combat systems, long-range radars, airborne IR systems come to mind. It would be highly beneficial to avoid duplicating efforts, whether with the Americans or within European Territorial Missile Defense.

Europe, but rather to Photo: Kujat, Public Photos combine the best of proven U.S. and European systems. A good example would be integrating the U.S. missiles into An effective defence needs Europe’s contribution European frigates or integrating available long-range EuroBut the U.S. contribution is by no means sufficient for an pean sensors into the network. Efforts to integrate available effective defense of all of Europe. Though they will provide a systems are much more affordable than new full-up developsignificant capability, much of the missile defense force ments, and they can be done in the near term to align with structure of the United States will remain devoted to their the U.S. contributions. Future follow-on developments of other security commitments in Asia and the Missile East, and upper-tier relevant technologies can be performed as comto North America itself. For complete coverage of Europe, mon efforts, similar to what Japan is doing with the U.S. NATO is counting on complimentary offers of similarly capable systems from leading European allies.

The available lowertier missile defense systems in Europe, Perspectives like Patriot and SAMP-T, and even developmental systems It is essential that we step up to the challenge now, recognizsuch as MEADS, are devoted to terminal defense, primarily to ing the reality of the greater ballistic missile threat to Europe, protect deployed forces from shorter range ballistic missile and the logic of NATO’s phased approach to defend against it. threats, in the 1000 km class. Though these systems can be Air defense and missile defense efforts and resources should integrated or deployed with upper-tier systems for a complibe re-aligned, away from redundant systems or duplicative mentary capability, they are not capable themselves against developments, and toward providing complimentary capabilithe 3,000 km threat and are no substitute for the required ties that fit this critical requirement as NATO’s new Strategic technologies and systems needed to counter this imposing Concept demands. threat.

There is a realistic prospect that the strategic NATO partnership with Russia, along with the already extensive U.S. coopWhat can Europe offer? eration with Japan, may lead to the development of compleThis begs the question of what Europe can offer and how it mentary BMD systems with similar footprints in North American be done affordably. While the U.S. has devoted significant ca, NATO-Europe, Russia and Japan.

the threats coming from 3,000 km, and pulverizing them in space, thoroughly destroying the warhead and minimizing debris.

This four-stage ship-launched missile has successfully destroyed 17 ballistic missile targets (and one defective satellite) over the last eight years, and has been operational with the U.S. and Japanese navies for some time now. Longrange radars, satellite and airborne detection systems, and command and control systems needed to support such missile intercepts have been just as extensively tested, and in many cases are also in operational use.

So effective missile defense for Europe is not only feasible, it is already proven and available today in operational systems.

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European Security and Climate Change Climate change is a threat multiplier. Active protection is not a ‘wait and see’ game Christoph Nick......................................................................... 30 Nicola Beer ............................................................................. 31 Graham Weale / Alexander Nolden ............................................. 32

Climate change is a permanent revolution – our readiness to adapt will be decisive

Climate Change: Threat and Challenge

by Christoph Nick* The impact of climate change on European security is still abstract; concrete are only the deliberations on climate change in the “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy”, approved by the European Council in December 2008, a kind of legacy of Javier Solana.

In this strategy, climate change has already had a career. In 2003, when the European Council adopted its first security strategy, climate change was only mentioned. By 2008, it had become a challenge worthy of a headline. In the future, climate change will be seen in line with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, cyber security and energy security.

Climate change is a threat multiplier In 12 lines out of 12 pages, climate change is described as a threat multiplier “especially in situations of poverty and population growth”. One must immediately admit that neither are problems for prosperous, ageing Europe. At best, one might see increased migration from poorer regions suffering from climate change, which the report duly lists, as a welcome side-effect and necessary ‘blood transfusion’ for the European Union. Solana located the threats of climate change mainly outside of Europe. This is correct, in the first place, since Western, Northern, Eastern and Central Europe will be all but profiting from climate change – as far as we can tell – for at least 100 years. Vegetation will spread and yields will rise.

Moderate climate might even become a new trademark for foreign investment, returning to Europe a competitive advantage that enabled its economic development in the first place.

In Southern Europe, the situation is unfortunately different.

Climate change is a permanent revolution After the Cancún Conference, which celebrated the status quo as a major success, it is clear that adaptation to climate change is the most important task of the day. With its focus on combating climate change and keeping the planet’s warming under two degrees, the international community has so far neglected the most important point: climate change is a threat that will last. It is not a threat to be tamed within a century,

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but a threat that will continue to produce its effects for centuries. It is clear that climate change will produce effects that can and will completely change the world we know. Climate change is something like a permanent revolution.

When it comes to climate change, humans are from now on an adapting species. Species adapt in evolutionary processes.

Therefore, the challenges of climate change are not primarily political, but evolutionary. This presents the true scope of the challenges. Every nation or federation of nations which does not see this will not be prepared as necessary. Our readiness to adapt will be decisive. The most imminent threat to European security is a threat to our consciousness: we must learn to see climate change as the biggest challenge that humanity has had to confront in its entire history.

Worldwide continuous efforts Unfortunately, it is outside of Europe’s reach to solve the climate change problem. It can only be tackled and solved in worldwide cooperation. This fact alone underlines the huge evolutionary challenge we are confronted with. Never in history, apart from minor problems, has humanity acted or had to act as a whole. If we succeed, the conditio humana will have changed decisively.

Strengthening the EU’s crisis management means This change might well take centuries. In the decades to come, Europe will be challenged in ways it must learn to cope with.

At first, the European Union must strengthen its capacity to react to natural catastrophes, a field where it is the biggest global player. The Commission is doing so with new legislative proposals due in mid-2011. Effective help in crises, whether or not due to climate change, will limit the scope of catastrophes and therefore their impact on Europe. Secondly, the EU must study the continuing effects of climate change on its southern members. Their climate will become more and more African.

European solidarity is necessary for Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece to successfully adapt. *Christop Nick is a freelance journalist in Brussels on Belgian and European politics. In the 1980s he was director of a development project in Chad.

European Security and Climate Change

Europe´s regions lead the way through active climate protection – Climate change begins at home

The Cancún Climate Conference A commentary by Nicola Beer* Climatic changes are becoming noticeable at a regional level, and this is precisely where relevant measures for climate protection must be implemented. From the Arctic Circle to Andalucia, Europe’s regions are characterised by extreme variations in their climatic conditions. Top down, “quick fix” models are of no use here, as individual regions themselves know best which climate protection measures can be implemented locally in a concrete fashion.

Exchange and sharing of knowledge This wealth of experience should be shared and utilised: through an exchange of knowledge and technology, we can approach our common goal of successfully battling climate change. Many of these local activities have extremely concrete aims, such as supporting and accelerating the implementation of research and innovation. Should we fail to act now, valuable time will be lost and costs will be noticeably increased.

Progress begins at home In order to achieve truly efficient, sustainable and successful improvements, local people need to be involved in this process. It is vital that citizens show their own initiative, with home owners, for instance, insulating their homes, installing new energy efficient heating or windows or consciously choosing a new energy-saving model of household appliances. Progress begins at home and personal responsibility is essential.

The key role of the European regions In the run up to December’s Climate Conference in Cancún, I had already pointed out the special importance of sub-national levels and regions in this context whilst presenting my position paper for the Committee of the Regions in Brussels: all future European and international agreements on climate change policy must be characterised by suitable recognition of the key role of regional and local levels, as any measure that cannot be practically implemented in our towns, communities and regions is bound to fail.

Hessia and its strategy on appropriate climate adaptation My home region of Hessia has been blazing the trail with its activities: its sustainability strategies, including the 100 Local Authorities, Schools and Businesses for Climate Protection, the Schwalm-Eder district winning the “Local Climate Action” prize in 2010, Hessia’s ambitious goal of achieving a carbon neutral regional government by 2030 and the specialist centre for climate change in Hessia’s State Agency for Environment and Geology.

This is where Hessia bundles its competences in specialist knowledge, research and suggestions for solutions with regard to regionally noticeable climate changes and appropriate climate adaptation measures. A successful example of Hessia’s cooperation in the EU is the coordination work done by the Energy Centre at the Technical University in Darmstadt for the “Regional Innovation Communities” in the Climate KIC of the European Institute for Technology.

Cancún – a perspective for the European regions The documents approved by the international community of states in Cancún can undoubtedly be viewed as a success. I attended the climate conference for two days in my capacity as representative of the EU Committee of the Regions and experienced first-hand the incredible vitality there. The goal of 2 degrees as a limit for global warming is laid out in the final accord, as is the setting up of a “green fund” for developing countries and a resolution to protect forests.

Cancún can also be viewed positively from a European regional perspective. The reference to sub-national levels in the preamble of the final accord of the Cancún Conference is a result of successful regional networking. In this final accord, the necessity of “involving the global, regional, national and local levels, including the sub-national and local government levels” is explicitly referred to. This is a first and entirely thanks to both the tireless efforts and the powers of persuasion of different networking agencies.

Active climate protection, not “wait and see” – Europe’s regions are playing their own part, – appropriate and achievable. Regions need climate policies that they can actually implement. For that reason, it is entirely consistent that they be actively involved in shaping these policies themselves.

Now it is extremely important to stay on track when it comes to the decisive stage towards a legally binding international agreement, possibly already this year in Durban (South Africa). International and European regions are right to require consideration and an active role in international climate negotiations and therefore have to be prepared to go into concrete action.

*Nicola Beer, States Secretary for European Affairs in the Government of Hessia, Wiesbaden since 2009, was born in Wiesbaden in 1970. She has a German-Franco high school education and studied law at the J.W. Goethe University in Frankfort. She worked as a lawyer from 1999 to 2009.

Political career: 1997 – 1999 town councillor for The Liberals (F.D.P.) in Frankfurt.

1999 – 2009 member of the state parliament of Hessia, Wiesbaden.

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The EU cannot heal the whole world by itself the cost burden must be shared fairly and globally

Climate change: Small steps are better than hanging on to a global breakthrough

by Graham Weale and Alexander Nolden, Essen * “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.”

That is what the Chinese founder of Taoism, Lao Tzu, is reported to have said many years ago. But his spirit is still alive, most recently being proved in Cancun, where thousands of people were gathering and looking for a breakthrough to combat climate change. The result was a further small but encouraging step beyond Kyoto, not to mention Copenhagen.

The global community has pledged to reach the “2° Celsius” target and to set up a Green Climate Fund. Is it enough?

Some observers applauded, some expressed concerns. Successful instruments such as emissions trading, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI) were not appreciated as a blueprint for a global solution, with a common price signal for CO2. And major emitters like the U.S., China and India are still behind the fence.

How to revive the multilateral approach However, the multilateral approach to manage climate challenge is not dead. But it does need a more balanced judgement as to how we can achieve our goals. The European Union cannot pioneer a low-carbon economy alone. This would obviously be to the detriment of our economies and industries.

Between Cancun and Durban – and beyond – the global community has to agree upon an even global playing field. EU leadership initiatives will not be sufficient to meet the 2° Celsius target. Greenhouse gas abatement has to be cost-efficient, and the cost burden must be shared on a fair basis that takes into account historic greenhouse gas emissions as well as the needs of developing countries. Hence, we need to strengthen flexible and market-based instruments and solutions like cap-and-trade and the CDM. This would trigger the transfer of capital and technology to wherever it is most economical to meet specific emissions reduction goals.

A more sober look at the facts The EU cannot heal the world alone, and we should not forget the limits of what our economies can support. A sober look at some facts certainly paints the picture we should see: by 2050, nine to ten billion people will be living on planet Earth – that is 50% more than today. Currently, 1.5 billion people still do not use electricity. The International Energy Agency (IEA) expects that the world will be using nearly 40% more energy in 2035 than today, and that this increase will come mainly from China, India and developing and emerging countries. China is planning to build 32 gigawatts worth of new coal-fired power

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stations and around 25 new nuclear power stations. China is also investing in renewable energy sources, yet these, according to its own strategy, will only contribute to 15% of its total consumption in 2020. The United States, on the other hand, have the largest coal reserves in the world and derive half of their electricity from coal. According to IEA estimates, their CO2 output will continue to rise, not fall, through to 2035. So what difference will it make if Europe alone makes massive reductions in its CO2 emissions, while global CO2 output increases by 20%, 30% or even more?

Interim steps on the way toward a global carbon market Greenhouse gas savings on a global scale can be made swiftly and effectively using the CDM. CDM projects are driven by the market economy and are already leading to substantial financial, know-how and technology transfers. Greenhouse gases are being demonstrably reduced and the living conditions of people at the project locations are being improved. So far, European companies will be able to earn about 1.8 billion certified emission reduction credits through CDM/JI projects in the period from 2008 to 2020. Significantly more would be welcome.

The path to success through small steps We have to stick to the goal of a global carbon market. It would set one price signal for CO2, thereby creating the basis for fair and equal market conditions worldwide. Interim steps on that path could be to link the cap-and-trade system in the EU with those of other countries or regions, such as Canada or California. Successes at this level could also breathe new life into the faltering UN process.

Cancun has shown that the pitfalls are many when we seek a “big bang” solution for saving our climate. Evolution is often a quicker way to reach a goal than revolution – and more sustainable. A global climate treaty will only be successful when it is economic and efficient. Therefore, let us make progress with Lao Tzu and head for some of the smaller gains, rather than risk another standstill.

* Graham Weale is Chief Economist at RWE AG. Alexander Nolden is Vice Director for Public Affairs / Energy Policy at RWE AG.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

European Space Policy GALILEO and GMES are a “revolution” for European societies – citizens will greatly profit of these cutting-edge technologies Michael Gahler MEP....................................................................... 34

Both space infrastructure projects have a strong civil security dimension

Galileo and GMES – essentials for Europe

by Michael Gahler MEP Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) such as the American Global Positioning System (GPS), the Russian GLONASS and the soon-to-be-operational Galileo are significant innovations. They provide major civil, security and military applications, and offer high returns on money invested. Hence, navigation systems are an important cutting-edge space infrastructure. The European Union (EU) is also working to establish a spatial data infrastructure complementary to Galileo. This includes the development of Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) as the European Union’s contribution to a Global Earth Observing System of Systems (GEOSS).

Galileo. However, it is true that the European Union’s part of the funding comes out of the 7th Research Framework Programme (FP7), which is, per its name, a research programme and not a programme to establish operational infrastructure.

Parliament has recently approved a plan under which GMES will receive an additional € 107 million for initial operations from 2011 to 2013. This is on top of € 209 million from the space portion of FP7 and applies to accompanying research activities.

The financing structure for the fully operational GMES by 2014 will be set up as appropriate; however, the Commission should, according to a Parliamentary Report, submit a long-term financing strategy in early 2011.

The decisive role of the EU Parliament for Galileo The origins of Galileo date back to the late 1980s. After a lengthy initial period, it was set up as a public-private partnership, with private companies and investors contributing twothirds of the cost of implementation and the EU and European Space Agency (ESA) dividing the remaining cost. When industry finally withdrew in 2007, the entire Galileo project was at risk.

In this situation, the European Parliament in particular advocated that the EU could not go without such a major system. This led to the decision to finance the entire infrastructure of Galileo through the Community Budget.

The decision was taken, together with the Council, to secure financing of Galileo until the end of the current financial period in 2013. And as we are starting to prepare negotiations on the next financial period 2014-2020, we also need to decide on further funding for Galileo, which, according to the Commission’s planning, will begin providing services as of 2014. From 2018 onwards, additional operational costs will need to be accounted for.

GMES Complementary to Galileo, the European Union has developed another major space infrastructure project, Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): While Galileo is a positioning system working with radio communication to tell us where things are situated, GMES is a radar and optical system providing us with space imagery.

The financing of GMES: may run much more smoothly than for

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What do citizens gain from Galileo and GMES? Scientific progress: First of all, developing and using cuttingedge technology is always a key to creating wealth and jobs. It triggers scientific progress and develops and retains know-how in Europe.

Market application: On another level, Galileo’s infrastructure will provide the basis for a multitude of market applications.

Potential for applications in transport, security and surveillance go beyond economic aspects.

Civil security dimension: Although a civilian project, Galileo has a strong civil security dimension and substantial potential for military applications. Galileo is going beyond pure positioning services and will contribute to greater safety, such as through landing control of aircraft.

Civilian applications: Furthermore, cartography, intelligent traffic management systems from aeronautics to pedestrians, agriculture, environmental management, border security and crisis management will all benefit from Galileo’s services.

Support of CSDP/external action: Apart from applications in support of CSDP/external action, border management, illegal immigration, trafficking, etc. can also be better monitored and managed, especially at sea.

New dimensions of services: Applying dual receivers, which are able to process signals from both Galileo and GPS, will allow positioning precise to a few millimetres. Such technical brilliance, currently in the testing phase, offers new dimensions of services: navigating helicopters to precisely land on a hospi-

The European Space

tal’s roof even under bad weather conditions, or guiding blind people as securely as with a trained dog while at the same time providing them with information such as where a specific store or bank is located.

Improved crisis management and decision-making: The geospatial information services that GMES will offer include precise maps and analyses that can contribute to improved crisis management and decision-making at policy levels. Constantly available, GMES services will for example provide very detailed maps of areas hit by earthquakes and, hence, enable quick and efficient reactions. Incidents such as the dispersion of the May 2010 volcanic ash cloud could be charted and predicted far more precisely to help decision-makers.

What is at stake?

As financing negotiations are about to go into the next round, four key issues have to be clarified and discussed: Full political commitment for the complete system Galileo is the navigation system that will guarantee a high level of public services being applied to save lives by providing information about the closest hospital and the closest available ambulance, by precisely locating victims of earthquakes, tsunamis and floods, and ensuring their rescue by observing and securing aircraft landings. As life-saving actions will depend on Galileo’s performance, a maximum of reliability must be provided. With 27 satellites plus 3 back-up satellites, Galileo will constantly be able to ensure coverage by at least four satellites of any spot on earth at any time. Cutting the number of satellites would mean decreasing Galileo’s reliability and, hence, questioning its function as a public service intended to provide safety. The same argument can be made about commercial applications, especially in a business context, that depend on guaranteeing business continuity at all times.

The issue of rising costs Large infrastructure projects invariably face cost increases over their long project duration. There are still 12 out of 30 satellites left to tender, which precludes an exact forecast of cost. A number of special requests by Member States, rather than necessary agreements on system requirements, have in the past led to both rising costs and delays. At the same time nations have blamed the Commission for delays and cost increases. It is true that the financing structure of Galileo and GMES is new and unique for the Commission. However, the European Court of Auditors in its report on the management and implementation phase of Galileo has pointed out a clear lack of leadership from the European Commission on Galileo.

There is no end date of Parliament’s political will for Galileo.

Parliament is available for financing Galileo for the period 20142020. However, a clear and credible timeline as well as a sincere step-by-step plan from the Commission for further development stages is mandatory. On that basis, the European Par-

Michael Gahler MEP Michael Gahler MEP was born in 1960 in Frankfurt/Main, Germany. He has a university degree in law. Attaché formation at the diplomatic school of the German Foreign Office. Since April 1999 he is a Member of the European Parliament. There he is a Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and serves as EPP Coordinator on the Subcommittee on Security and Defence. Prior to that, he worked as Desk Officer for the Baltic States and the Council of the Baltic Sea States in the German Foreign Office (1995-1999), Assistant in the International Office of the CDU (1993 – 1995) and Desk Officer for “International Environmental Politics” of the German Foreign Office (1991 – 1993).

liament can verify if taxpayers’ money is spent correctly and sensibly for a major European infrastructure project from which European citizens will benefit for decades.

The application: potential and strategic autonomy Space is a high-tech and cutting-edge technology area. In line with our overall goals for economic development and growth, it is therefore crucial that we keep space technology and knowhow in Europe. Our private and business life will come to depend more and more on space technology. Space is thus a key enabler of economic development. At the same time, it is crucial to acknowledge that other navigation systems in the world are military systems that generate “collateral profit” in market applications. In a way, these systems are “cross-subsidised” by the military. It is therefore an illusion to assume that Galileo would – as an exception – become profitable purely through its civilian commercial applications. Enlarging the scope of applications further into the military area should be carefully investigated. Space is a strategic asset, and its importance will increase. Political decision-making needs reliable and timely information. Space imagery plays a growing role here, as information from independent sources allows making wellfounded decisions during international crises.

Conclusion We need the full constellation of 27 satellites plus 3 back-up satellites in order to secure the constant and reliable performance of satellite navigation at all times.

• Galileo and GMES will make substantial contributions to the fulfilment of the economic development goals of the EU. We also need to consider the military dimension.

• To lower costs all 27 Member States have to focus on the overall benefits rather than focusing on adding details according to national wish lists, causing many delays and increasing costs • The EU’s financial authorities should develop new and appropriate financing instruments for Galileo and GMES. In the less stable and predictable security environment of the 21st century, Galileo and GMES will contribute to making the lives of European citizens safer.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Unlocking value with informa

Economic conditions over the past two years have forced both private and public sector organizations to look for creat information technology professionals are continually being asked to do more with less funding. However, at the same from IT in rolling out new initiatives. A global study conducted by HP in October 2009 revealed that more than seven o enabler of their business success.1

“Innovation Gridlock” While department and communication and CIS-heads alike agree that technology can drive overall benefits, the challenges of rigid infrastructures and aging applications have presented significant roadblocks. Both continue to eat up the bulk of IT budgets in operations, severely restricting the amount that can be spent on driving the introduction of new capabilities. The result is what HP refers to as “innovation gridlock,” a situation where the technology organization is blocked from driving new innovation due to the majority of funding being consumed in operating the current environment. Thus, a critical challenge for the IT department within a Department of Defense today is finding ways to break this innovation gridlock.

Self-funding The secret to success will be “self-funding,” meaning investing sin projects that will free up funds that can then be invested in new capabilities. To do so, IT section groups should look for projects that allow transformation within current budgetary constraints and have quick paybacks like application retirement, creative financial arrangements and ways to reduce

“The best IT value is the value of interlinking information, technology and people within any activity or command-driven processes.”

• IT budgets − cost cutting, while expectations grow • COTS at the core of IT practices driven by technology and new business models − but challenging • Use of IT as a business value enabler • In-Time Information Management as the main weapon • Time for a new model of governance

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Tobias Bahlinger Tobias Bahlinger was born in Sindelfingen, Germany. He has been working at HP since 1995 and has held different positions in consulting and sales.

Tobias Bahlinger is the responsible Client Principal for HP’s Public Sector, Defense and Security segment in Germany since November 2006. In this role, he is accountable for driving the growth, revenue, profitability and customer satisfaction of HP’s Public Sector Defense and Security business across the entire HP Technology Service Portfolio.

licensing requirements. MoD IT departments should turn to COTS technology vendors that can help their CIS departments self-fund and create technology environments that are architected for change. Building new solutions for change allows CIS departments to quickly and easily add new functionality as the situation requires. This ensures that today’s innovation does not become tomorrow’s legacy, while reducing the on-going operational cost of the new solution as compared to its predecessor.

Consolidation, integration and virtualization In the past IT infrastructures were often put in place to support specific needs but this has led to islands of under-utilized, unconnected infrastructure and excessive wastage. Defense teams need to look across their entire CIS infrastructure and understand the full portfolio of their assets – data centers, networking; – and systems, their tools, their applications, and their processes. They need to look for areas where they can consolidate, integrate and virtualize to drive out costs, increase utilization and ultimately provide the same or improved services at a reduced cost.

IT departments also need to help their headquarters use IT as a means of reducing costs in their missions. IT needs to help the headquarters unlock mission value and enable new capabilities by changing the way an existing process is managed or delivered, or by helping to introduce a new capability.

By utilizing technology services and infrastructure consulting intelligently, Hewlett Packard can create cost-efficient technology infrastructures that are reliable, more flexible, readily scalable and secure. In addition, projects that modernize the

COMMUNICATION

ation technology

tive ways to stay competitive. Even as organizations recover from this era of unpredictability, e time Ministries of Defense and users are demanding increased service levels and support out of 10 business executives indicated that their technology department was a fundamental

applications infrastructure can increase responsiveness to MoD priorities, improve productivity and reduce costs, eliminating the complexity inherent in legacy systems.

Flexibility Many CIS departments are looking increasingly at technologybased solutions that allow them to increasingly access IT as a mission utility – the same as one would consume electricity.

Utility mission solutions help reduce capital expenditures by allowing users to pay only for the services consumed. These can often provide a good means to help introduce a new service or capability more quickly and cost-effectively but with the appropriate security and reliability.

In-time information Increasing focus is also put on extracting information from the IT infrastructure with departments turning to IT as the information service provider. IT section groups are investing in solutions to provide the right information in a timely fashion to help military personnel. The extracted information will be used in critical and operational situations. Information needs to be turned into intelligence and needs to be available and secure.

Regardless of the route chosen to break innovation gridlock, the key is finding a strategic partner who can bring together the skills, knowledge and capabilities to help MoDs to drive new mission innovation.

IT Towers Technology Utility Cost, availability and the range of technological innovations are mainly influenced by the offered IT functions.

Service Center IT function delivers services according to service level agreement. Extracting the value of IT services is driven by the responsibility of the business.

HP Capabilities

Technology, Cost, Business - oriented

Business owner – IT supplier model, IT service delivery - oriented

Business Technology IT is considered one of the competitive levers of business.

The value of technology and information are the main key performance indicators of a company.

Business process Partnership

- oriented

New model of governance It is time for a new model of governance. Public sector and commercial departments need to start sharing best practices and experiences from freeing up money to investing in new capabilities and missions.

The rapid rate of change continues to escalate. Defense teams that are unable to harness that change will continue to rack up great disadvantages from the cost of loss – lost time, lost effort and lost opportunity.

Contact Details: Tobias Bahlinger, Principal for Public Services Hewlett Packard GmbH Hewlett Packard Str. 1 61352 Bad Homburg, Germany Tel.: + 49-151 1475-1666

Abbreviations used: (CIS) = communication and information systems services (MoD) = Ministry of Defense (COTS) = Commercial off-the-shelf 1 HP Research: Thrive in Unpredictability,” Coleman Parkes Research Ltd, October 2009.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Defence and Forces (NATO / EU) The new Strategic Concept is a basis for further steps – the willingness of nations will be essential Klaus Naumann........................................................................ 38 Dr. Karl von Wogau................................................................... 40 John Greenway ....................................................................... 42 Denis Verret ........................................................................... 44 Doug Henderson ...................................................................... 46 Nannette Bühl-Cazaubon .......................................................... 47

The new Strategic Concept is a viable approach to transatlantic security and defence

NATO’s New Strategic Concept A commentary by Klaus Naumann* NATO’s Heads of States and Governments agreed at the Lisbon Summit on 20 November 2010 to a new Strategic Concept under the heading “Active Engagement, Modern Defence” and they adopted the Lisbon Summit Declaration, which contains an ambitious agenda for the implementation of this concept. This new concept is not revolutionary, but it is a solid basis for the future development of NATO. Moreover, it constitutes for the first time, after the watershed event of 9/11

and after an enlargement process, that did not leave too much time to discuss fundamentals, an agreement of all 28 NATO members. NATO’s Secretary General has to be commended for the results and the approach he chose in developing the concept, transparency and broad participation in the beginning and a tightly controlled top-down approach in the end game.

Core tasks and principles of NATO The concept defines the core tasks and principles of NATO. It is based on a crystal clear description of the security environment and the general assessment that there is an indeed low risk of a conventional attack against NATO. This description is important since there are discrepancies in risk awareness among the NATO nations. Thus the remaining task for the political leaders of the NATO nations is to inform their citizens of the risks and dangers NATO is confronted with. The Strategic Concept offers an excellent basis for doing that, which should result in the citizens’ lasting preparedness to shoulder risks and burdens collectively. Moreover, it should be noted that the NATO assessment is almost identical to similar EU statements. The concept defines three core tasks for NATO: Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security.

Defence and Deterrence

The NATO Secretary General, content with the results of his Lisbon Summit.

Photo: NATO

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The description of defence and deterrence is relatively precise.

It is noteworthy that there is an agreement by all 28 members on the remaining deterrent value of nuclear weapons although NATO commits itself for the first time to the long-term objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. Also remarkable is that the concept contains expeditionary operations as one option of conducting defence and that it speaks of crisis response at a strategic distance. Obviously, the concept falls short of describing how to deter non-state actors and it is a little vague on the future role of nuclear weapons. It remains

Defence and Forces (NATO / EU)

“While the world is changing, NATO’s essential to be seen to what extent the March and June 2011 meetings of Defence Ministers will provide more clarity.

The concept of crisis management Remarkably clear is the concept on crisis management. There NATO stresses the necessity to prevent crises beyond NATO’s borders if they pose a direct threat to the security of the Alliance territory or populations. Based on the lessons learnt in more than a decade of NATO-led operations, the Alliance draws the necessary consequences by deciding on the establishment of a modest civilian crisis management capability and by fully embracing the comprehensive approach. Remembering past discussions, it is indeed a sign of a new resolve and a new unity of purpose that NATO as a defensive alliance signals by its new Strategic Concept that its 28 member nations are determined to keep dangers at a distance from the NATO Treaty Area.

Security through cooperaation Nobody expected revolutionary approaches to be taken in the third core task, security through cooperation, but the statement on Russia is fundamental for achieving the long-term objective of lasting stability in Europe. NATO repeats its desire of achieving a true partnership with Russia based on reciprocity and states once again that it does not pose any threat to Russia. The invitation to Russia to work with NATO on a common missile defence, which the Russian President accepted, could pave the way for a truly needed and much wider cooperation. The new Strategic Concept provides a basis that would make ideas such as the Medvedev proposal of a new European Security Agreement superfluous. In this part of the Strategic Concept NATO renders itself as the true corner stone of transatlantic and pan-European security and stability in the 21st century, but makes at the same time its success dependent on the good will of others, first and foremost of Russia and the European Union.

The Concept – a solid basis for the next steps The Concept is a solid basis for further work, not more. Much will depend on shaping the follow-on steps of implementation and on the willingness of the NATO nations of really implementing the Concept, i.e. in acquiring and providing the necessary capabilities. However, if the nations were willing to meet the obligations they took by agreeing to the Concept, then NATO would indeed become the indispensable instrument for security, stability and peace from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

*General (ret.) Klaus Naumann was the Chief of Defence (CHoD) of Germany from 1992 – 1998 and then assumed the position of the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (MC NATO) until 2005.

mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.”

Documentation “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 20.11.2010 Active Engagement, Modern Defence Preface We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners: It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.

It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.

It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.

It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.

It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence.

The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe. While the world is changing, NATO’s essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The EU needs a roadmap on Security and Defence as a complement to the EU Security Strategy (ESS)

A White Book on Security an Defence

by Dr. Karl von Wogau In various resolutions, the European Parliament has insisted that we need a White Paper for Security and Defence. What is the idea behind this proposal?

Europe needs a roadmap on Security and Defence Now that the fundamental decisions concerning the European External Action Service (EEAS) are in place and NATO has adopted its new Strategic Concept, we need a roadmap for the future of the European Security and Defence policy. This roadmap will not replace the European Security Strategy, which remains the basic document of the Security and Defence Policy of the EU. The proposed White Book will be a guideline for its implementation. It will reflect the comprehensive approach of the Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. The White Book should therefore cover the fight against natural disasters, prevention of armed conflicts, the protection of critical infrastructures and outside borders of the Union, as well as interventions of armed forces as a means of last resort and post-conflict reconstruction.

Dr. Karl von Wogau Born 18th July 1941 in Freiburg.

Studies in Law and Economics in Freiburg, Munich and Bonn.

Member of the European Parliament from 1979 – 2009. Cofounder and Chairman of the Kangaroo Group. 1994 – 1999 Chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy. 2004 – 2009 Chairman of the Subcommittee in the European Parliament on Security and Defence.

Substitute Member in the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Since 2009 Secretary General of the European Security Foundation (ESF), Brussels.

try to answer the question if all our values are universal or if there are specific European values which are part of a European Identity. We will have to discuss what these values mean in practical terms. Are we prepared to defend these values not only internally but also abroad? What about armed interventions in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity?

Why do I call it a “White Book” I must say that I was impressed by the Livre Blanc which has served as the basis for the reform of the armed forces in France.

Not so much because of its content but mainly because of the method of its production. Unlike what is called a white paper in the British terminology, it is a political and not an administrative document. Moreover, it has been published in the form of a book in two volumes. The commission entrusted with the drafting of the French Livre Blanc was not only composed of representatives of the armed forces and the relevant government agencies, but also of Members of Parliament as well as personalities from academia, strategic think tanks and industry.

The French White Book as an example The most interesting feature of the French White Book is the way in which it was produced. The document was drafted on the basis of a including televised and on-line hearings, field visits, a website and an on-line forum. This could be the most interesting element of a European White Book: a public debate about the security of the European Union in which the European Citizens have a possibility to participate. Every reflection on European Security will have to start from the values and the security interests of the EU and the threats to these as defined in the European Security Strategy.

European values and security interests We must first define what we are willing to defend. We should

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Where lies the security interest of European Societies We should also look into the question whether our security interests are mainly of a national, European or transatlantic nature.

Analyzing the Security Strategies of the Member States, one will find that the main preoccupations of our governments are very similar: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism; regional conflicts; failing states; cyber security; organized crime; security of energy supply and of trade lanes; pandemics and the security aspects of climate change.

The geography ordains security interests However, if you ask the Ministers of Defence of Greece and Estonia what could cause them sleepless nights, you will find that their principal preoccupations are fundamentally different due to their immediate geographical neighbourhood. It is obvious that the security interests of France and Great Britain are of a more global nature than those of Germany and Poland.

What has been achieved so far The European Union has not only been very successful in the preservation of peace. Due to its economic and monetary power, it also has become a global player in diplomacy, human rights, development aid and crisis management.

Following the decisions of the heads of state and government in 1999, the Council has set up the necessary instruments to

Defence and Forces (NATO / EU)

conduct civilian and military operations under the leadership of the European Union. The European Parliament has set up a Subcommittee on Security and Defense which contributes to the parliamentary scrutiny of these operations.

The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the new structures for planning and conducting civilian and military missions are the latest steps on this way.

Since 1999, more than 20 operations under the leadership of the European Union have been conducted, such as Protection of elections in Congo and of refugee camps in Chad, the antipiracy mission off the Horn of Africa, the observer mission in Georgia and the rule of law missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The experiences can serve for recommendations.

Better spending on Security and Defence The Member States of the European Union spend about 200 billion Euro per year on Defense, about half of what the U.S. spends. But we are told that the efficiency of the spending is somewhere between 10 and 20 % . This shows that there is certainly scope for better spending of the European taxpayers, money. Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg has proposed that the Member States should take a new look at their defense expenditure and decide which capabilities they want to retain for themselves and where they see possibilities of cooperation

and specialization. The European Defence Agency (EDA) will be looking into that issue. The White Book should look at possibilities for new common projects, especially those which are too expensive for individual Member States. This is specially the case satellite based observation, navigation and telecommunication.

It should also make proposalsfor the creation of a single European market for Security and Defence: implementation of the European legislation concerning procurement and intercommunity transfer, European certification of helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and common technical standards, e.g. protected telecommunications. Last not least, the White Book should look at further possibilities of cooperation in security research, pooling, maintenance and specialization as well as possibilities to reduce red tape.

Conclusion More and more often, Europe sends soldiers and civilian persons into dangerous missions all over the globe. We have to make sure that inadequate equipment or structures of command do not expose them to unnecessary risks.

The elaboration of a White Book would be a good opportunity to reflect on the conditions of Security for the citizens of the European Union.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The public opinion in Europe has not yet caught up with reality in the field of security and defence

How to communicate security and defence

by John Greenway Our modern world is highly dependent on communications: no political decision can be taken without them. Every organisation must invest in this area if its efforts to do its job are to meet with any success.

Which public to involve – whom to address In the area of security and defence policy, one may well ask what is to be gained by trying to involve the public at large in the political decision-making process. Is this really a subject that is accessible to the majority of people, or is it up to the governing classes to manage this process of reflection from start to finish?

It is of course important to distinguish the public’s general disinterest in defence and security policy from public anxiety whenever loss of life occurs during military operations. The scale and severity of loss of life suffered by European troops in Afghanistan have deeply shocked citizens in troop-sending countries and beyond, resulting in a marked reduction in public support for the NATO/ISAF operation.

Another distinction has to be drawn in regard to media interest in major defence procurement decisions, as evidenced recently by press coverage of the UK Government’s announcement regarding the outcome of its defence review. The media focus was very much on the big-ticket decisions affecting troop numbers, ships and aircraft, with little if any in-depth analysis of how future military assets needed to be seen in the context of strategic cooperation, whether through NATO or, increasingly, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in Europe.

Public opinion has not yet caught up with reality in security and defence The idea that European allies such as France might wish to cooperate in providing aircraft for one of the two new UK aircraft carriers was greeted with derision in many quarters.

Members of the European Security and Defence Assembly know only too well that future cooperation in the commissioning and deployment of military capabilities and assets will be critical to Europe’s future security. Sadly, the media and public opinion have not yet caught up with this reality.

The role of politicians How can politicians resolve the dilemma whereby public opinion may be positive and favourable towards European and international cooperation at the project stage, but becomes nationalistic and strongly critical when it comes to the actual implementation of such cooperation? To meet that

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John Greenway Mr. Greenway has been a Member of Parliament for Ryedale (North Yorkshire/United Kingdom) since June 1987. He is currently Rapporteur on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations of the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA).

Mr. Greenway is the author of numerous reports of the Assembly. In particular, together with Mr. Muñoz Alonso (Spain), he recently submitted a report on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on “European security and enlargement: shifts in public opinion” (Document 2054), which was adopted during the December 2009 plenary session of the European Security and Defence Assembly. He is also the Chairman of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly.

challenge, an ongoing in-depth public communication effort is needed, and trends in public opinion need to be closely monitored. Politicians must play a more active part in shaping and guiding public opinion. They have a clear responsibility to their electorate to do so.

The public needs greater transparency In the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), it is important to envisage preparing the ground in order to promote public support for future decisions. After 60 years of peace in Europe, there is little public appetite for armed conflict and troop deployment. So when troops and military assets are deployed, it is vital that communication strategies take account of public attitudes and prepare Europe’s citizens for the objectives and possible consequences of planned operations. Greater transparency and openness can help avoid loss of public support when operations encounter difficulty.

The question of scrutiny Although CSDP remains intergovernmental and national parliaments will continue to take decisions on resources and troop deployments, the EU Council will increasingly take the initiative on EU peacekeeping missions involving military as well as civilian assets and capabilities from several EU Member States. An interparliamentary body that draws its members from national parliaments is essential to ensuring proper scrutiny of all elements of the political process underpinning the EU’s CSDP missions. The new body taking over from the European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of the Western European Union will play a critical role in that aspect.

Defence and Forces (NATO / EU)

tarian assistance and rebuilding communities throughout the world ravaged by conflict or natural disasters. A much greater effort needs to be made by both the EU and Member State governments to improve their communication strategies so as to strengthen public engagement and support for the EU’s CSDP operations.

The WEU made an enormous contribution to peace and security The Western European Union has made an enormous contribution to peace and security in Europe for more than 50 years. The mutual assistance provisions of the modified BrusEvery engagement of forces abroad needs transparency and continuous support by parliasels Treaty have been a significant benefit to mentarians, at home and in Brussels.

Photo: MoD, Berlin peace and security in Europe. One has to recognise the courage, dedication, sacrifice and professionalism of troops from WEU member states wherever and whenever they have been deThe ESDA to be dissolved ployed in support of peace and security in Europe and the The Assembly enables national parliamentarians from all EU wider world. and European NATO member states that contribute to EU Unfortunately, communication policy and the need for strong operations to establish a structured dialogue with the EU future parliamentary scrutiny of security and defence policy executive, giving them the opportunity to cross-examine the were not properly considered by member states before they Presidency, member state ministers, officials and military decided to close down the WEU and its Assembly. In addition, representatives. By being better informed about European the enlarged European Union of the 21st century and its defence issues, members are better able to scrutinise their potential future expansion require new structures for security governments’ security and defence policy in the context of and defence policy that should continue to embrace allies from CSDP. This democratic scrutiny is vital and will remain so for non-EU countries. Moreover, public support is of critical the foreseeable future. importance for the deployment of troops and military assets in On 31 March 2010, the 10 WEU members, signatory states to peacekeeping, defence and security missions within and the modified Brussels Treaty, collectively decided to denounce beyond Europe’s borders. that Treaty, thereby closing down the Assembly. The WEU Assembly will therefore cease its work in June 2011. In their statement to that effect, the WEU member states called for Conclusion “the enhancement of interparliamentary dialogue” on the As a matter of priority, EU Member States should therefore Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common reassure the people of Europe that the mutual assistance Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). provisions of the Lisbon Treaty match the strength and unity of European defence enjoyed by the citizens of Europe under the The EU needs an inter-parliamentary entity Brussels Treaty. They should also adopt a communication Negotiations are underway in the national parliaments of the strategy that provides transparent information to national EU Member States with a view to forming a new interparliaparliaments, the European Parliament and the citizens of mentary entity to which the ESDA/WEU will pass the baton. On Europe about all CSDP operations. In collaboration with NATO, the initiative of the various EU national parliaments, in particuEU Member States should also work to ensure that the CSDP lar of Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Portugal, it meets the new challenges and threats to European security, is proposed that a “standing conference” be set up to provide including terrorism, organised crime and unresolved conflicts for interparliamentary scrutiny of CFSP and CSDP. The Conferwithin and near Europe’s borders. Last but not least, EU ence of Speakers of Parliaments of the EU (EUSC) has instructMember States should urgently cooperate with national ed its current Belgian Presidency to submit a proposal at its parliaments and the European Parliament to facilitate the next meeting in spring 2011. establishment of an interparliamentary body to continue the Many CSDP missions have achieved considerable success in work of the WEU Assembly in the future scrutiny of the CSDP, conflict resolution, peace-building, training of police and with a clear mandate to focus on parliamentary and public security forces, providing vast sums of money for vital humaniopinion in regard to CSDP operations.

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The EU capabilities for defence are less than sufficient. The structured cooperation might help, but...

Do we need a permanent structured cooperation …. Yes, we do need a “PESCO”

by Denis Verret Permanent Structured Cooperation has to be part of a new security and defence architecture for Europe. For the time being, it is more a “sleeping beauty.” Let’s awake her! I will try to explain why and how and I begin with three remarks: • Belgium, Hungary, Poland and Denmark, responsible in turn for four EU Presidencies, have produced a truly stimulating Position Paper on Permanent Structured Cooperation, i.e. on PESCO, which is its recently adopted nickname.

• Javier Solana invented the motto: “Spend more, spend better, spend more and better together!” Today, facing public, economic and social deficits the new motto can only be: “Spend better together!” This shorter version is far better than “Spend less and, above all, separately!”

• A word of caution! I’m talking today on my own behalf; I’m definitely not pretending to represent (nor to misrepresent!) the position of any industry company on this matter.

Denis Verret President DV-Conseil Denis Verret was born in 1949 in Paris.

1971, studies at Paris Institute of Political Science. 1976, Master’s degree in Public Law, (ENA). 1976, Urban Planning and Architecture Administration. 1981 to 1983, Commercial Counsellor, French Embassy in Washington DC. 1982, Technical Advisor for International Economic Affairs to the French Minister of Industry and then the Prime Minister.

1986, Denis Verret joined Thomson CSF. 1994, Aerospatiale, Corporate Vice President in charge of International and Commercial Affairs.

2003, Coordination and Support, EADS International Paris 2008, Senior Vice President for Strategic Business and International Relations in the Strategy and Marketing Organisation (SMO) of EADS. 2010, Denis Verret created his own company, DV-Conseil, consulting in international, institutional and strategic affairs.

What is it about PESCO? The state of affairs of European defence is not satisfactory.

Today, PESCO triggers more perplexity than enthusiasm. But of course, they are ways to make a good use of PESCO as recommended by the paper of the three EU Presidencies.

The European defence situation is far from satisfactory Shortages in defence capabilities and technologies continue to be a serious issue for Europe: the Capability Development Plan is a fair assessment of the operational shortages. And the technological gap, which is the other side of the same coin, is ongoing. Take the emblematic example of the UAVs: Europe is suffering both operational and technological limitations if it is procuring them from the U.S. or Israel!

tion, even for its closest ally, the U.S. continues to impose limits on access to its best operational and technological capacities, and on its market and export licenses. None of the reactions of the allies, such as renunciation or duplication, is fully convincing! Unfortunately, the EDA is weak, with lack of empowerment and even lack of political support!

Financial constraints The financial constraints observed everywhere in Europe tempt each country to play solo and to forget the big picture. If I may use a metaphor, it is the “my last cent will be spent at home” syndrome!

Some perplexity about PESCO No new great European programmes Where is today the historical virtuous circle of “program/consolidation?” This combination founded the success stories of Eurocopter, MBDA (not to mention Airbus on the commercial side of our dual industry) and ultimately the creation of EADS. It also worked well for Agusta Westland and Thalès Alenia Space! But, for about a decade now, no new European program nor transborder consolidation has been created!

Global Unbalance NATO’s new Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon on 19 November 2011 will not address the “Global Unbalance” within the Alliance between the U.S. and all its allies. With no excep-

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What to do about it? Let me give four remarks here: • Disillusion seems to first come from certain LOI countries.

The part failure of the LOI proves the difficulty of getting effective results from a narrow defense club within Europe.

• There is the risk of “a two-speed Europe,” or the contradiction between being demanding but exclusive or inclusive but not ambitious enough.

• The danger yet again of creating another institution, another bureaucracy, despite reduced resources, to supposedly focus on capacities.

• In other words, it is nothing exciting, when at the same time one elegant solution is emerging as the new paradigm: bilateralism, with the inspiring Franco-British initiative.

Defence and Forces (NATO / EU)

No argument here: this initiative is more than helpful, especially when these two countries may build some synergy on something specific to them, like deterrence. But for more ‘conventional’ projects, the Franco-British initiative must be open to others! “Two” is not the magic number for joint operations nor for launching a program on cooperation! EFA, METEOR, A 400m, ASTER, NH90 – none of these is a bilateral program. The only orthodoxy in terms of a number of members for a European program is the critical mass necessary to launch the program. For the A 400 M, it was 180 aircrafts with seven nations and now still 170 aircrafts fortunately with the same seven nations!

on a new initiative in armament capabilities, to firstly not duplicate similar capabilities already launched by other members, and secondly to invite other members to join the initiative.

To properly control the commitment is essential! I suggest, merely, that the EDA could serve as an “instrument of control” empowered by PESCO members. This solution would have two advantages: Firstly it would avoid creating an additional institution, with undue costs and duplication of expertise, and secondly it would indirectly politically reinforce the present ‘soft’ role of the EDA towards each of its 26 Members.

Is there a way ahead?

What model of PESCO “National security essential interests” are protected by Art. 346 (formerly the famous Art. 296) of the Lisbon Treaty.

Without infringing on these limits, the Commission is extending its activities, as recently shown by the famous two Directives. The Member States surely do accept the legal extension of the jurisdiction of the Commission into defence, but somewhat reluctantly.

The “difference” with PESCO would be a definition of a new frontier within the Institutions. “Commitments and controls” would become the basic rules for the members of PESCO. Through regularly extended commitments taken by one member and recognized by the others, more and more questions that come under “national security essential interests” would be transferred to and controlled by PESCO. EDA, LOI, OCCAR – each existing institution is lacking in power: PESCO would be empowered. This is “the sea change!”

Europe, especially its NATO members, chronically suffers from American limitations, resulting in lack of security of supply.

PESCO offers the chance for Member States to commit among themselves to the security of supply. But security of supply means nothing if the group has nothing to supply. Facing the most critical operational and technological shortages, some or all of the PESCO members, according to their needs and means, would launch new capacity program initiatives and offer the resulting solutions to their members. PESCO, without new European programs, will be null and void!

Documentation Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

Examples of quantitative commitments, tailored by country What types of commitments? Simply that each nation, from where it stands, would commit to progress, at its own realistic pace, towards directions convergent with the others, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Examples of quantitative commitments are: • progress on the percentage of national Defence forces capable of participating in joint operations out of area; • progress on the percentage of total R&D expenditures spent in cooperation; • progress on the percentage of the defense equipment budget spent through European programs; • later, when public deficit levels allow it, commitments to increase defence efforts in relation to GDP.

Examples of qualitative commitments Examples of qualitative commitments to be taken by every PESCO Member State are: • acceptance of a principle of mutual dependence based on security of supply for equipment produced within PESCO; • commitment by every PESCO member, when willing to take

Provisions in the Lisbon Treaty relating to permanent structured cooperation are Article 42(6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which states: “Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. […]”

Further details on permanent structured cooperation are set out in Article 46 TEU on the procedure for implementing permanent structured cooperation, and Protocol No. 10 on permanent structured cooperation which is annexed to the TEU and sets out the conditions for taking part.

The further development of PESCO was on the agenda of EU Defence ministers at their informal meeting on 23 – 24 September 2010 in Ghent, where they discussed the possible implementation of the new possibilities of cooperation offered by the Lisbon treaty, and the development of PESCO in the context of the present budgetary concerns in many of the Member States.

On 9 December 2010, after their official meeting in Brussels, Defence ministers underlined in their Conclusions that “possibilities for the use of Permanent Structured Cooperation shall be explored in order to enhance defence capabilities with a view to strengthening the EU’s ability to respond to crises.”

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Is there any expectation for cooperation, or will the accord end as a bluff?

The French-British Accord – what is about?

by Doug Henderson* NATO Defence Ministers met at the Lisbon Summit in November to agree on a new NATO Strategic Concept. It recognises the global role that NATO has adopted to guarantee the security of Member States under Article 5, to counter terrorism and to meet environmental and disaster relief objectives. It envisages a developing role with partners and specifically refers to Russia and Middle East States. Notably, it is silent on any more formal links with China. Yet most policy makers would acknowledge that a relationship with China is a key plank in any structure of international security. The statement also recognises the crucial working link with the EU: “NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security”.

The French hopes for Europe The French appear to be far from their position in 2008 during their EU presidency. Hervé Morin, French Defence Minister, outlined at that time the main focus of French policy for the EU. “A package of significant new capacity building projects, initiated by a few countries and open to any nations wishing to participate, to meet operational commands, (strategic air transport, tactical transport, air mobility, in-flight refuelling and space observation).” The French then had hopes that those capabilities would be established at the EU level, led, of course, by President Sarkozy. But, that list bears a very strong resemblance to items in the recent accord.

Chad, have largely achieved their objectives. The Police missions in the Middle East and Afghanistan, though very limited in scale, have made some impact on the ground. The monitoring missions in Georgia have, though not without controversy, helped foster more stable diplomatic structures.

The new accord – what benefit for NATO and CSDP? But, the question which is being asked following the NATO summit is whether the new French/British Defence accord alters NATO’s expectation of European Security and Defence Policy. France and Britain do after all contribute over 50% of EU defence and security resources and invest nearly 75% of research and development. I think it must!

I believe that the Common Security and Defence Policy (which used to be known as the CSDP) will need to be revised. I doubt if any European Union activities will take place under the “Berlin+” arrangements if there is any suggestion that ‘hard power’ will be involved – such as peace making which involved significant fighting. In that scenario, which existed in the Western Balkans in the early 1990s, it is likely in the future that NATO would undertake such a venture perhaps utilising French or British core capability. But, in my view it would be very wrong for France and Britain to become isolated from other European partners. Those partners could make a significant contribution in complementing and augmenting French/British commitments. In the longer term it may be that this structure emerges as a revised CFSP.

Does the CSDP reach its ambition aims?

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What role for Europe: pooling and sharing?

Now, Brussels is aware that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has fallen far short of its ambitious aims. The original plan called for the establishment of a 60,000 strong expeditionary force capable of any international deployment, endorsed by the UN Security Council. But this force is still a eurocratic pipe dream. The Council of Ministers also committed the Union to setting up battle groups, envisaging units of up to 3,000 armed forces from 2 or 3 countries. But, these battle groups are still a theoretical concept never having been deployed. When there was a real opportunity to deploy in Chad in 2008, Stockholm balked at the idea of a Swedish-led battle group taking control in a peace-keeping capacity. The force for Chad took many months to assemble and ended up as a coalition of units largely with French and Polish troops under the leadership of an Irish General!

There are many roles that could be fulfilled by an EU nation.

Peace making and peace building could be complemented by gendarmerie units from France and Italy. Helicopter support could be provided by eastern European countries. Maritime support could come from nations like the Netherlands. Environmental, disaster relief and medical teams could come from Scandinavia and Germany. Counter-terrorist units could come from other European countries – perhaps involving reservists.

There are, therefore, many issues which NATO will need to address in the coming years. I am sure that NATO will welcome the French/British initiative. But, it would be better for both the future of NATO and the future of CSDP in Europe if all of the European countries contributed to the partnership with NATO.

Some successful CSDP missions Notwithstanding these difficulties, there have been some successes. The interventions in the Congo and, eventually in

*Doug Henderson was an MP of United Kingdom until 2010. He is a former Minister for European Affairs and he has been over the years Chairman of the Defence Committee of the ESDA/WEU Assembly in Paris.

Defence and Forces (NATO / EU)

Over the years European industries have developed an enormous know how – now it should be used

MEADS – a contribution to NATO Missile Defence

by Nannette Bühl-Cazaubon The new Strategic Concept adopted by NATO at the Lisbon summit on November 2010 stressed missile defense: “We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will develop the capability to defend our people and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners”.

Capability to be used by any “coalition” Recognizing the importance of coalitions, MEADS can provide the required interoperability within a NATO framework. The MEADS battle management capability has already demonstrated interoperability with the NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS) during a Joint Project Optic Windmill (JPOW) test in July. The interface test was conducted using the Active Layer Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) Integration Test Bed being developed by NATO. MEADS also provides the Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) radar capability, which helps protect the coalition’s forces.

A design for the future When Germany, Italy, and the United States first laid out the requirements for the Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS), they maintained that it was done with an eye on a growing threat in the 21st century, one that would proliferate and one that would have stealth characteristics. This view of the future has proved accurate. However, could MEADS be a key element of a NATO missile defense capability, and could MEADS become Germany’s contribution in support of the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense for Europe?

MEADS, under development by Germany, Italy and the United States, includes a launcher, 360-degree fire control and surveillance radars, and a battle manager with plug-and-fight command and control abilities not found in current systems. MEADS is designed to provide greater firepower with less manpower than current systems, producing dramatic operation and support cost savings.

The capabilities German industries embed key military requirements such as high mobility, a distributed architecture and modular components to increase survivability and flexibility of employment in a number of operational configurations, and significantly increased firepower with greatly reduced personnel and logistics requirements. One unique feature of MEADS is that the system can be configured to appropriately respond to specific threats. The rapid link-up of individual modules such as fire control radar, the battle manager, and the launcher using “plug-and-fight” capability is possible at any time, anywhere, and without interruption of ongoing operations. MEADS radars scan the complete perimeter to locate threats quickly and accurately. The system is designed to permit full interoperability between U.S. and other Allied forces, and it is the only medium-range AMD system to provide full 360-degree coverage.

Technology data The Launcher: The Launcher and Reloader both carry a complement of eight MEADS Certified Missile Rounds, using designs that are common to the maximum extent possible. The Launcher incorporates a Palletized Load Handling and Elevation System that provides for full pallet reload and elevation to launch position. The Certified Missile Round includes the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missile. It uses hit-to-kill kinetic energy to destroy tactical ballistic missiles and air-breathing threats.

The radars: The radars are equipped with advanced Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF) subsystems and improved non-cooperative threat identification and typing.

The Battle Manager: The Battle Manager incorporates an open systems architecture that supports both site-centered and netteddistributed operations. The broadband plug-and-fight communication network and common standard interface enables the netteddistributed system to be used for inter-system operation, as well as for MEADS. Key benefit: A key benefit of the MEADS plug-and-fight capability will be command and control over other air and missile defence system elements through standardized interfaces. MEADS can therefore provide a unique ability to work with secondary missile systems if selected by the participating countries, and to evolve as other capabilities are developed. No AMD system has previously done this.

Not only can MEADS use data from non-MEADS sensors, but it can also control other defined air defence missiles to give the commander extraordinary flexibility against the threat. MEADS can also integrate other systems defined by the nations as the best approach to meeting their specific needs. No other system has this capability.

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The industries’ contribution From an industry perspective, the European industries and governments are contributing significantly, not only in terms of workload, but with significant technological contributions to the overall program.

Germany: The highly advanced transmit/receive modules that populate the MEADS Multifunction Fire Control Radar are an excellent example of Germany’s contributions.

United States: The MEADS primary interceptor, the PAC-3 MSE, is an example of the United States’ contributions.

Italy: FFI was developed by MBDA Italia, and is the first IFF device of its type outside of the United States approved by the U.S. National Security Agency.

Thus, all three nations are contributing technologies and all three nations are benefiting from these contributions.

The modern soldier, regularly risking his life in internation

Protection of the soldier – industrial capabilities

by Brigadier General Dr.-Ing. Thomas Czirwitzky

The way ahead In August 2010, the MEADS program successfully completed an extensive series of Critical Design Review (CDR) events. The program team’s focus now moves to final build, integration and test activities leading to flight tests involving all system elements. The first MEADS launcher, for which LFK-Lenkflugkörpersyteme GmbH (MBDA Deutschland) bears lead responsibility, has already been delivered to MEADS International. The completed launcher will advance to system integration with the initial MEADS battle manager and multifunction fire control radar at Pratica di Mare Air Force Base in Italy in early 2011. The MEADS system will begin flight testing at White Sands Missile Range (U.S.) in 2012.

The tasks performed by the armed forces have changed significantly over the last 25 years. Today’s operations can be classified either as peace support, security, stability, combat or counter-terrorism operations. Each of these kinds of operations is fundamentally multinational in nature and conducted under the umbrella of the European Union, NATO or the United Nations. For the soldier to be able to accomplish his mission at the international level, he needs combat equipment that is state-of-the-art, functional, flexible, efficient and interopera-

Conclusion The ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range. A number of states are also working to increase the protection of their ballistic missiles from pre-launch attack and to increase their effectiveness in penetrating missile defences. Several states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads for their missiles. Such capabilities could be significant sources of military advantage during a conflict. But they may be equally significant in times of relative peace, when they underpin efforts to coerce states near and far.

MEADS can meet challenging new requirements not addressed by any previous or planned air and missile defense system.

MEADS will offer us the needed flexibility to react to different mission types with its netted and distributed approach.

MEADS could become a core element for NATO’s future AMD and Germany’s contribution to NATO missile defence. *Nannette Bühl-Cazaubon M.A., Paris, is a journalist specialized in security and defence.

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Blücher Systems has developed an innovative load bearing, protection and clothing system for the infantryman of the future – IdZ 2.

Photo: BLÜCHER

Protection of Crisis Management Forces

Protection of Crisis Management Forces The personal protection of civil and military personnel has become a priority for societies engaged in warfare Dr. Thomas Czirwitzky .................................................................. 45 Klaus Bock-Müller........................................................................ 51 Josef Berger................................................................................ 53

nal theaters, needs functional, state-of the-art personal protection.

– a question of requirements and

ble. Different operational scenarios call for different kinds of equipment. Soldiers today – be they mounted or dismounted – have to be able to fight in a variety of scenarios all over the world. In this context, personal protection in combination with weight constraints is a crucial issue.

Core capabilities and requirements When defining military requirements, the right balance has to be struck between core capabilities such as command and control, mobility, sustainability, effective engagement and – last but not least – protection. An imbalance in core capabilities seriously affects a soldier’s ability to accomplish his mission. In order to achieve these complex objectives in the best possible way, industry and the military are challenged to explore the influence that each individual requirement has on the overall system and to propose adequate solutions.

Dr.-Ing. Thomas Czirwitzky Brigadier General Dr.-Ing. Czirwitzky, born 1956, joined the Bundeswehr in 1976.

1977 studies in mechanical engineering at the Bundeswehr University, Hamburg: Command and General Staff course and Battalion Commander.

2005-2008 Army Armaments Affairs, Chief of Army Planning MOD, Berlin. Since 2008 Director of Equipment for Land Forces, MOD, Berlin.

from chemical and biological threats. He needs to be able to operate under all weather conditions, while the system should offer optimal comfort.

Industrial capabilities Scales of equipment Different operational scenarios call for different scales of equipment, resulting in different system requirements. An armoured infantryman sitting in an armoured vehicle, for example, should have as little volume on his back as possible.

On the other hand, a paratrooper may need to have all his equipment with him for making the jump and operating for the next 72 hours.

Equip the soldier with adapted equipment Providing the soldier the possibility to be combat-ready on the ground at all times is one of the major challenges. It is therefore vital to provide him with a system of clothing, protection and load-bearing that can protect him effectively and that is lightweight yet still allows him to carry the equipment he requires to accomplish his mission. The requirements regarding clothing and body armour are manifold. The soldier needs protection against bullets, shrapnel and knives, as well as

In order to achieve these complex objectives, industry, in close cooperation with the armed forces, is required to study and harmonize the influence of each individual layer on the overall system. This will result in the development of a modular system, starting with underwear and ending with the outermost protective layer, in which each layer is meticulously tailored to those around it. The main challenge in producing such a complex system of soldier protection is to find an industrial partner with the competence to integrate the components so as to form a fully functional unit.

System modularity The ultimate ambition is to provide forces with a system that optimizes the well-being of the soldiers in all scenarios while improving overall performance.

The garment – a high technology product Because body armour, especially the kind that needs to be

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The chem-bio garment If required by the scenario, a chem-bio garment can be worn.

The chem-bio material developed for the German advanced soldier system is a unique fabric that offers protection against both chemical and biological agents. In addition to the tried and tested filter material that adsorbs chemical agents, the new fabric has a second layer that blocks biological agents effectively while offering good air permeability.

Modular integration Keeping system volume low requires the modular integration of protective elements into system components. In this regard, a load-bearing system offering stab protection while also accommodating ballistic plates that provide protection against hard-core projectiles has proved its worth.

Electronics: Focus also has to be put on the possibility of integrating electronics into the load-bearing system in a modular manner in accordance with the user’s function and the requirements of network-centric operations.

Weapons: Another important aspect that has to be considered is interaction with the soldier’s weapons. The system has to allow all relevant weapons to be used in different firing positions.

Signature: Last but not least, the aspect of signature management has to be considered with regard to protection. Special thermal patches are used to disrupt the signature of the soldier and to cover hot spots both of the human body and of electronic components and weapons. This enables the complete system to blend into the environment better in the near and far infrared spectrum.

Future soldiers – Warrior 21.

Photo: EADS

An ergonomically designed modular protection system with an undercoat, protection level 1 vest, air ventilation shirt and protection level 4 armouring best meets the protection requirements. Because the modular system components reduce the burden, load and volume for the soldier, he retains his sustainability and mobility, the latter also constituting a form of protection.

Conclusion tight-fitting, interferes with the movement of moisture from the body to the exterior, ventilation becomes necessary. In the German advanced soldier system, for example, an innovative ventilation shirt improves sweat management. The various knitting zones of the underwear are exactly fitted to the ventilation shirt worn directly over it. The ventilation shirt allows air to flow along the body through special channels and thus carry away moisture.

Depending on what type of operation is being conducted and where, it is necessary for clothing to have different insulating layers and for battle dress units to be worn over the ventilation shirt.

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The protection of the soldier as described above is, however, only one aspect of protection. The best individual system available must be integrated into an overall protection system that comprises, among other things, armoured vehicles and camp protection.

A soldier’s predominance in communication, fully automatic synchronisation of situational awareness to NATO standards in the field and the use of equipment that is interoperable with the equipment used by allies also needs to be considered.

Setting a new global standard for excellence, these measures ensure that soldiers will soon be outfitted with an optimized, advanced array of infantry equipment, systematically designed to meet the needs of the modern battlefield.

Protection of Crisis Management Forces

Simulation offers a practical and cost-effective alternative for training while reducing risks

Out of the danger zone – Virtual Reality simulation systems reduce risks and costs for training

by Klaus Bock-Müller In many cases, training with original equipment is very cost-intensive or only possible with limitations due to potential hazards. Virtual Reality-based simulation systems provide a practical and economically reasonable alternative.

Disarming bombs Disarming bombs is one of the most dangerous tasks of special police and armed forces. Specially trained mine clearance divers work on Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) in the oceans in up to 50 metres water depth. Recognising the correct mine type and detailed knowledge of its structural characteristics are indispensable for disarming it which is usually carried out in tedious manual labour.

Klaus Bock-Müller Klaus Bock-Mueller was born in 1962. After his A-Levels, he became a regular soldier for twelve years with the German Navy in the field of command control electronics. Afterwards he studied business informatics for system analysis in Bremerhaven and has been working in a variety of positions since. From 2001 until 2009 he worked for Ray Sono AG as a managing partner for the business division Training & Simulation. Together with Dr. Uwe Katzky, he is one of the two founders and CEOs of szenaris GmbH, Bremen.

On-shore threat scenarios

Reducing material wear and tear

But also on-shore threat scenarios by bombs and other explosive devices have become more and more common. Special police forces increasingly often employ high-tech equipment for reconnaissance and disarming explosive charges: EOD robots are remote-controlled vehicles which can be operated even in narrow spaces or up and down stairs. Suspicious objects can be handled from a safe distance and can be brought to a safe place to initiate a controlled explosion or for disarming purposes. High resolution video cameras attached to the robotic vehicle enable the explosive ordnance experts to control the situation at any time and to optimally navigate the vehicle.

Whether on- or off-shore – the training and continuous further education for such dangerous situations constitutes a special challenge for the Special Forces. Apart from the most important task – to protect the trainee’s life and health – the costs also become a factor when using highly sensitive technical equipment. Robotic vehicles such as the German “tEODor” are packed with high-tech components such as water cannons or X-ray cameras. A single wrong control signal from the remote control device in rough territory can turn the vehicle, which weighs 400 kilograms and costs around 150,000 Euros in the basic version, into a heap of scrap. Consequently, trainers were seeking for training options which reduce the robot’s wear and tear while still providing a realistic training situation.

Also, the mine clearance divers of the German Federal Armed Forces require special training scenarios to prepare for their dangerous tasks under water. For example, they need to be able to access all necessary information on the encountered mine type while on a diving mission and to quickly and precisely perform the required work steps for disarming the mine.

For both scenarios, state-of-the-art Virtual Reality simulations provide an optimal solution. The Bremen-based szenaris GmbH has developed virtual worlds enabling a safe, wear and tear free but still realistic training for the police EOD specialists, as well as for the mine clearance divers of the German Federal Armed Forces. “To ensure an efficient information transfer, the activation of different senses is important especially in learning processes”, says Dr. Uwe Katzky, one of szenaris’ two CEOs. “In everyday life, people use 70 percent

Virtual Reality Simulation: tEODor and PackBot EOD manipulator vehicles Photo: szenaris

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

visual, 20 percent auditory, 5 percent olfactory, 4 percent haptic and 1 percent gustatory senses. Studying from books mainly uses visual senses, while Virtual Reality simulations additionally address the auditory and haptic senses. Thus, 94 percent of the trainee’s senses are addressed when working with such simulations, enabling comprehensive experiences in the learning context.”

training in the virtual world also features a highly realistic representation of the EOD situation. In addition to the selection from 26 different mine types, the system supports the configuration of different lighting situations in different depths, of the mine’s weathering condition and of its position on the sea bottom. Original sounds deriving from breathing from compressed air cylinders or an underwater detonation impart learning experiences here, also.

Standard tools and custom-made applications

The principle of comprehensively addressing sensual perceptions has been consequently applied in the VR simulation for EOD robotic vehicles. The virtual robotic vehicle is controlled by means of the vehicle’s original control device rather than by a joystick or PC keyboard. Truth to the original was attached with the highest importance also when developing the virtual scenarios. “EOD exercises can be configured based on 13 different scenarios, e. g. at a car, in a bus, an airplane or an airport, on a tarmac or in public buildings. The virtual vehicle’s reactions are absolutely realistic, since parameters like tilting, driving dynamics, acceleration and braking or climbing and descent dynamics are realistically simulated”, says the other szenaris CEO Klaus Bock-Mueller. The mine clearance diver

When developing such complex Virtual Reality simulations and training systems, szenaris uses long-established developing programs providing tools for realising the training systems in a first step. “However, not all applications can be realised with standard developer tools”, emphasises Klaus Bock-Mueller.

“For special tasks such as connecting the original control devices to the training simulation, special applications are programmed in programming languages such as C++. Reducing the application complexity to the program code while keeping the system as easy to operate as possible for the user is part of the szenaris experts’ corporate philosophy. This is why all applications are designed for standard PCs. Mobile training systems enable on-site training, e.g. on naval training ships. szenaris has also successfully realised a team training solution for the German Federal Armed Forces, enabling the training of building floating bridges, which are used by the Armed Forces to cross rivers, using the “Virtual Reality Team Trainer” to learn all required work steps for all participating soldiers step by step on the computer.

However, all their technical enthusiasm does not distract Dr. Uwe Katzky and Klaus Bock-Mueller from the fact that Virtual Reality simulations can always cover only a certain area of a training situation: “In training and further education, the ‘Blended Learning’ concept has prevailed. In this concept, learning content is imparted theoretically in on-site seminars or by studying literature in a first step and then practically trained in virtual environments and practical tests.”

Virtual Reality simulation: floating bridge.

Virtual Reality Team Trainer system overview.

Virtual Reality simulation: mine clearance diver with moored mine.

Photo: szenaris

Improved learning success

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Photos: szenaris

Protection of Crisis Management Forces

In any engagement, troops need to protect themselves actively

Active protection of the soldier through guided weapons

by Yosef (Yossi) Berger What could be the fantasy of a soldier in a battlefield under real risk of being hit by the enemy? To be actively protected by being able to see, but not be seen! Is this realistic? It becomes realistic with the Spike Missile Family System. The Spike system has unique technical features which allow unique operational concepts by using the most modern technology, and which makes this fantasy become true.

Control over the flight avoids collateral damage Spike Missiles are a family of Electro Optical guided missiles with ranges of up to 4 km with Spike Long Range (LR), up to 8 km with Spike Extended Range (ER) and up to 25 km with Spike Non-Line of Sight (NLOS). Similar to other Electro Optical guided missiles, the basic guidance concept is based on a sophisticated tracker which locks on the target that appears on the seeker image. These kinds of missiles are guided after launch by the tracker and are therefore “fire and forget”.

Spike missiles furthermore have a unique additional capability – a data link communication with the Command Launch Unit.

This allows the gunner to observe the seeker image in real time, before and after launch, while the missile is approaching the target. In addition to the capability to see the seeker image, the gunner is also able to take control of the missile and manually update the seeker locking point or to steer it to the desired point of impact. As the target appears on the gunner screen, it gets larger and clearer as the missile gets closer to the target. The result is that in the last phase of the missile trajectory, the gunner sees the target with much more detail and magnification than before. He can update the locking point to the most vulnerable point and hit the target very precisely.

Yosef (Yossi) Berger Yosef (Yossi) Berger has been Joint Managing Director at EuroSpike GmbH since 2005.

Mr. Berger was born in Tel Aviv in 1953 and earned his diploma in Industrial Design at the Bezalel Academy for Art and Design in Jerusalem. In 1991 he graduated with a Master of Sciences in Industrial Engineering and Management from The Technion in Haifa. Having begun his career at Rafael, in 1990 Mr. Berger was appointed head of the Human Engineering Department. From 1997 to 2002, he was Project Manager for SPIKE in Finland.

In 2003, he became a member of the implementation team changing EuroSpike into a joint venture company per the decision of the EuroSpike partners Rafael, Rheinmetall and Diehl.

to hit a hidden target without having a line of sight. This means that the enemy cannot recognize when and from where the missile has been launched. This capability actively protects the soldier and dramatically increases his survivability.

With Spike Family Missiles, the soldier can very precisely hit non-line of sight targets with a very high hit and kill probability and with very high survivability. The fact that the Spike Missile is lethal against a variety of targets, has a relatively low weight and is easy to operate makes it a most effective system of active protection for the soldier. Eighteen purchasers, including nine NATO armies, and nearly 20.000 produced missiles speak to this reliable system.

High survivability through non-line of sight targets The reader may now ask, “how does the data link communication feature relate to the capability to see but not be seen?”

The Spike Missile can be thought of as a controlled and broadcasting exploding flying camera. This capability provides, as described before, very high accuracy, but the fact that the gunner can see the target area from above while the missile is in the air allows him to engage as well as to hit. It means that the gunner doesn’t need to see the target before launching. If he has information about targets within the missile range, he can launch a missile to the target azimuth, without having line of sight. As the missile rises, it acquires a line of sight to the target area. The result is that it is possible with Spike Missiles

The infantries of nine NATO-nations are equiped with Eurospike.

Photo: Eurospike

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Security & Intelligence organizations worldwide rely on progress in monitoring earth`s surface

Unclassified satellite data for intelligence observations

by Lars Petersen With reliable monitoring concepts and innovative evaluations, today’s commercial Earth observation satellites meet global reconnaissance needs – and with more, superior sensors to come, the future looks promising.

Roads have been constructed and are being frequently used, and extensive activities can be observed - the activity in and around the highly secured facilities north-east of the Iranian City of Qom is obvious to the expert’s eye. Knowing that the site in question is one of the largest nuclear facilities in the country, where uranium enrichment is allegedly conducted, intelligence experts at Astrium GEO-Information Services in Friedrichshafen, Germany are continuously keeping a close eye on the latest developments.

Lars Petersen Security & Defence Application Development Manager, Astrium GEO-Information Services Lars Petersen, born in 1976, worked for the German Naval Air Arm as an Imagery Analyst from 1997 to 2001, before completing his higher education at the Armed Forces' Advanced Technical College and the University of Applied Sciences, Karlsruhe. After graduating as Diplom-Ingenieur for Cartography and Geomatics, he joined Infoterra GmbH, the German part of Astrium GEO-Information Services, in 2007.

Lars Petersen dedicates his experience and expertise towards the development and implementation of operational services for the intelligence communities' specific needs.

Tracking developments on the earth The team employs data collected by TerraSAR-X, the uniquely precise and highly flexible radar satellite with up to 1m resolution, in intervals of only a few days. By comparing this data to previous acquisitions of this and other sensors, the experts can extract information on construction and dismantling activities, excavations, or even the use of roads.

Innovative methodologies Two innovative methodologies, developed specifically for radar satellite data evaluation, are applied. For “Coherence Change Detection” (CCD), SAR data containing phase information is used to detect subtle changes below the spatial resolution of the SAR sensor. “Amplitude Change Detection” (ACD) typically

Monitoring of nuclear facilities near Qom, Iran: TerraSAR-X radar data unveils significant activities and changes in and around the site (above); the recent SPOT-5 image dispatched via the SPOTMonitoring online data service helps analyse the situation (below).

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indicates substantial changes within the range of the spatial resolution and beyond by using the intensity of the SAR data.

The Qom nuclear enrichment facility In the example, the intelligence experts have identified activities and changes around the nuclear enrichment facility in Qom. In the TerraSAR-X CCD image (top), the dark parts (surrounded by a red buffer) represent changed areas, where activities such as excavations and the use of roads and tracks took place. This data on recent changes enables information to be derived about the situation on-site – especially when evaluated in combination with recent optical satellite imagery such as the annotated SPOT-5 change detection image (bottom), which allows for more precise identification of the nature of the observed facilities.

Spot Monitoring account In addition to specific TerraSAR-X based CCD and ACD change detection analysis, users can employ Astrium’s change detection service SPOTMonitoring, which delivers accurate and current information derived from multi-source and multi-resolution satellite imagery. Today, 60 sites around the globe are regularly monitored for operational use by defence and security institutions, large corporations and international organizations.

Users can easily open a SPOTMonitoring account via the internet. With this, they can view all monitored sites, receive email alerts about monitored sites of interest, view archive data, and even define individual areas of interest and monitoring requirements. Automatic processing of the satellite imagery highlights the main changes. Subsequently, interpreters check

Protection of Crisis Management Forces

The combination of changed areas (labelled in black) with a TerraSARX Elevation Model provides a clear understanding of terrain conditions and the focus of recent activities – in this case, major traffic towards the entrances of underground facilities located inside the mountain.

TerraSAR-X based surface motion assessment performed during the construction of a new subway line in Budapest, Hungary. Significant surface displacements of up to approx. 10 mm per year along the new track have been observed especially in the vicinities of the subway stations, reflected by the yellow and red colouring in the image.

and analyse the image, produce a report, and annotate the image with arrows and colour-coded areas. Whenever a change is detected, the user is alerted to check the change report. The source image, which may currently come from SPOT 5, Formosat-2 or TerraSAR-X, can also be downloaded.

The addition of elevation models allows deeper insight into the actual terrain conditions of the site, often facilitating a sound interpretation of items that may be unclear when viewed in 2D imagery (e.g. roads leading into tunnels or paths leading into caves). If no elevation data is available or its quality is unsatisfactory, new models with an accuracy of up to 5m can be created. The TerraSAR-X images used for the change detection can also be used to create digital elevation models (DEMs), thus no additional data collection is necessary and a perfect match of elevation data and change information is guaranteed.

• the TanDEM-X radar satellite formation has started data collection for a global homogeneous elevation model of unprecedented accuracy (< 2m relative vertical) and coverage in early 2011; • the Pleiades, very high-resolution satellite constellation, scheduled for launch in 2011, will bring 50 cm optical imagery with a 20 km swath, the widest available today; • the continuity of the SPOT mission has been secured by Astrium’s recent commitment to build SPOT-6 and -7; • the TerraSAR-X follow-on mission TerraSAR-X-2 is currently being defined, with greater than 50 cm resolution radar data envisaged and an Automatic Identification System planned to improve ship detection services.

What is going under the earth In addition to monitoring events on the Earth’s surface, innovative methodologies enable an indication of what is going on below the surface as well. TerraSAR-X radar satellite data proved to be ideally suitable to detect movement of the Earth’s surface with sub-centimetre precision. These precise monitoring applications can be used to observe e.g. tunnels, subways or bunkers for the effects of sub-surface mining or underground gas storage. Moreover, such slight disturbances of the surface can indicate an ongoing underground expansion of existing facilities or the excavation of new tunnels and chambers.

The unique accuracy of TerraSAR-X geolocation data assures that its derived information can easily be integrated into the monitoring systems used by the current user organizations.

Radar-based evaluations are significantly enhanced when backed by additional satellite data or information such as DEMs. Security and intelligence organizations worldwide today rely on these and similar services, and the future looks bright for suppliers and users alike of such intelligence-oriented applications, as a number of new sensors and missions are underway:

Innovations for maximum user benefit One additional promising prospect for the future use of commercial Earth observation services is the fact that Europe’s leading space systems and services specialist Astrium has recently integrated the satellite imagery and geo-information specialists Spot Image and Infoterra into the business division Astrium GEO-Information Services. The new GEO-Information division is now a unique one-stop-shop for a portfolio of multi-source and multi-resolution optical and radar satellite imagery and offers an unrivalled expertise across the entire geo-information value chain.

Driven by the clear ambition to become the world leader in geoinformation services, and backed by Astrium resources, the division’s defence and intelligence experts can be counted on to continue the development of innovative and efficient cuttingedge solutions for the global military community. Relying on its unique access to numerous Earth observation satellites, Astrium GEO-Information Services will in particular promote the innovative combination of both optical and radar satellite data. An integration of their respective key advantages will optimize information extraction and maximize customer benefit in optical-radar imagery solutions.

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Security and Defence News

Security & Defence News EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT European Parliament voted Resolution on EU humanitarian aid A European Parliament resolution on Humanitarian Aid, voted on 18 January, calls for a clear division of labour between military and humanitarian bodies in crisis areas. The resolution, drafted by Michèle Striffler (EPP, FR), focuses on the implementation of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, in the light of a growing number of complex

crises. MEPs call on the Commission to present a proposal to establish a European civil protection force, as advocated

by Michel Barnier following the 2004 tsunami in south-east Asia. Furthermore MEPs argue that during complex crises there needs to be a very clear distinction “between the remits of military and humanitarian bodies”. Also, the use of

military resources should be kept to a minimum and constitute a last resort.

The report also urges the Council and the Commission to “introduce precise and transparent rules on cooperation and co-ordination between the European External Action Service and the Commission in the management of large-scale crises outside the EU.”

European Parliament recommendation to the Council of 14 December 2010 on setting up an EU rapid response capability (based on a report of Eva Zanicchi/DEVE committee) Excerpts: The European Parliament (…) (g) urges the Council to strengthen the EU’s disaster response capacity as a high priority, especially in view of the discussions on setting up an EU Civil Protection Force, and to follow up the European Parliament’s repeated requests that the proposals put forward in the Barnier report in 2006 should be implemented; (h) calls for the immediate establishment of an EU Civil Protection Force which must be adequately equipped with the necessary technological and technical resources; (…) (m) considers that the EU civil protection force should build on the EU Civil Protection mechanism, should optimise the tools available, which would gain in efficiency and visibility, should involve the voluntary pooling of existing logistical and human resources with regard both to disaster-response training and disaster management by developing initiatives taken during preparatory actions, and it should be capable of providing initial aid within 24 hours of the occurrence of a disaster; (n) recommends that the EU civil protection force be based on the principles that it should: • be based on an assessment of needs, with the participation of all humanitarian actors,

• be civilian • operate under the banner of the EU • observe international humanitarian law • respect the voluntary nature of the Member States‘ participation in the intended arrangements • be based on the principle of burdensharing • be open to contributions from non-EU countries • recognise the UN’s overall role in coordinating international relief outside the territory of the European Union; • be organised on a preventive basis, according to specific scenarios; (o) considers that, with particular reference to humanitarian aid operations, and based on the lessons learned from intervention in Haiti and Pakistan, the EU should, as far as possible, operate under the coordinating umbrella of the UN, concentrating on those fields where its intervention can contribute greater added value; (p) considers that the European civil protection force could be based on a commitment by some Member States to voluntarily make available pre-determined civil protection modules that are ready to intervene immediately in EU operations coordinated by the MIC, that most of these modules, which are already available nationally and thus would not entail significant additional costs, would remain under their control,

and that the deployment of these modules placed on standby would form the nucleus of the EU’s civil protection system for responding to disasters inside and outside the EU; (…) (t) acknowledges that military and civil defence assets in disaster relief should be used as a last resort, in compliance with the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and the Oslo guidelines; recalls that military means often constitute an important contribution to disaster response, along with civil protection and humanitarian aid, and notes that military assets can be necessary for filling critical capacity gaps (particularly strategic lift, specialised assets, heavy engineering and transport); therefore stresses the need to develop a comprehensive approach and to improve synergies between civil and military capabilities, and to identify areas in which Member States can pool their efforts and capabilities at EU level to contribute to EU disaster response, which is particularly important in a difficult economic climate; (u) emphasises the need to build up permanently available civilian capabilities in the EU which operate independently from military structures and to identify areas in which Member States can pool their efforts and capabilities at EU level in this respect; (…)

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

COUNCIL EU PRESIDENCY: The Hungarian EU Presidency Programme “Strong Europe with a Human Touch” Justice and Home Affairs “In line with the efforts of recent years and the general guidelines set forth in the Lisbon Treaty, we will strive to bring the EU closer to citizens. Therefore, one of the goals of the Hungarian Presidency is to produce tangible, quantifiable and perceivable results in the areas of freedom, security and justice, which are highly relevant to the everyday life of people.

Public safety, effective enforcement of citizens’ rights, and legal certainty are key areas. We would like people to experience specific results of justice and home affairs cooperation at first hand, as foreseen in the Stockholm Programme.”

Fight against organised crime “In a European Union where checks at internal borders no longer exist, organized crime poses a serious threat to the security of citizens and Member States.

The Hungarian Presidency attributes great importance to citizens’ right to security.

Therefore, increasing the efficiency of fight against organized crime will be one of its priorities. To this end and in line with the Internal Security Strategy adopted by the European Council, the Presidency will continue with the implementation of the recently adopted policy cycle, which provides for increased coherence in operational cooperation. Our Presidency will rely on more active involvement of EU agencies in sharing experiences and training law-enforcement officers. Evaluation of the implementation of the Prüm Decisions, which provide for enhanced crossborder police cooperation, will also be an important task for the Presidency.”

Common European Asylum System “Better management of migratory flows, having home and host countries alike reaping the full benefits of migration and the integration of migrants remain of utmost importance. The Presidency wishes to draw attention to the necessity of achieving a geographically balanced migration policy. Europe needs an

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asylum system that is efficient and provides a high level of protection everywhere in the EU to those in genuine need of international protection. It should be realistic and pragmatic, taking into account the Member States’ capacities.

To this end, the Hungarian Presidency will endeavour to contribute to the creation of a Common European Asylum System by 2012.”

Border management “Migration management cannot be effective without border management; therefore the Presidency will continue to work on strengthening FRONTEX and amending the Schengen Borders Code to reflect the experience gained during the years of implementation and to address the new challenges we face.”

IT systems “State-of-the-art IT systems are necessary to guarantee the security of our citizens.

Work on the second generation of the Schengen Information System (SIS II) will continue, and the main part of the Visa Information System (VIS) will be launched during the Hungarian Presidency.”

Disaster management “The world is witnessing an increase in the frequency and intensity of natural and man-made disasters; therefore, it is of utmost importance that cooperation between Member States in the field of disaster management is further enhanced. Particular attention will be paid by the Hungarian Presidency to flood management and risk assessment activities, in order to improve the protection of European citizens.”

External aspects of JHA policies “It has become clear in recent years that intensified international cooperation in justice and home affairs matters is closely linked to the external relations of the Union. (…) The Hungarian Presidency will make efforts to deepen the Union’s strategic transatlantic relations, in line with the Washington Declaration and the Toledo Joint Statement. Protection of personal data is a fundamental objective

in the context of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters with third States and it will be a key issue throughout the negotiations of the PNR Agreements with the US, Canada and Australia, as well as in the planned EU-U.S. Data Protection Framework Agreement. The Presidency will be following these negotiations closely.”

External Relations European External Action Service “We expect the European External Action Service to become operational during the Hungarian Presidency. The Presidency aims at providing all possible support to the High Representative and the EEAS in fulfilling all their tasks enshrined in the Treaty. Relations with strategic partners should help the EU to strengthen its global position. The review of strategic partnerships will continue during the Hungarian Presidency. The Presidency intends to contribute to the preparation of tailor-made strategies on individual partners, which will be developed with the leadership of the High Representative and in accordance with the strategic guidance of the European Council.”

Common Security and Defence Policy “During the Hungarian Presidency, the most important task in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the successful management of CSDP missions and operations. Furthermore, it is important to make progress on the implementation of the new, CSDPrelated provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon; to continue strengthening the EU’s civilian and military crisis management capabilities; and to enhance synergies between conflict prevention and crisis management structures within the framework of the European External Action Service (EEAS). (…) In addition, the Presidency is going to organize several CSDP-related events.”

Security and Defence News

First informal JHA Council under the Hungarian Presidency On 20-21 January 2011, an informal Justice and Home Affairs Council took place in Gödöllö, near Budapest (Hungary). The reinforcement of the fight against organised crime and integrated border administration were the topics on the agenda of the EU Interior Ministers.

Since 2000, the EU has had a strategy to combat organised crime, but the Hungarian Presidency thinks the issue

should be revisited. Budapest hopes that a comprehensive document will be prepared, including the main points of the fight against organised crime, by the June informal meeting of Justice and Interior Ministers. At the meeting in Gödöllö, the ministers also discussed the security of borderlines in the presence of Frontex, the EU agency responsible for border security. Participants and

Commission representative Cecilia Malmström acknowledged the potential importance of border security from the perspective of Europe’s security. It was also pointed out that appropriate and efficient management was necessary for the Schengen System. Member States supported the European Commission’s new proposal on the reform of the Schengen evaluation mechanism.

GENERAL COUNCIL: Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment – annual report On 13 January, the Council published its twelfth annual report defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

Throughout 2009 and 2010 Member States have continued to work to introduce into their national legislation the

Council Common Position (2008) defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, which replaces the Code of Conduct on arms exports in force since June 1998. The report also notes that third States like Bosnia and Herzegov-

ina, Canada, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro and Norway have officially aligned themselves with the Common Position’s criteria and principles.

The report is available at: http://tinyurl.com/5vpndd2

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS): EEAS – transfer of staff from Council and Commission On 1 January, the European External Action Service entered a new phase: Altogether, 1643 permanent officials have been transferred from the Council and Commission to the new diplomatic service. On the Commission side the transfer includes a majority of staff from DG External Relations (RELEX), which will cease to exist, and part of DG Develop-

ment (DEV), of which the remaining part will be merged with DG External Cooperation Programmes (AIDCO) into DG Development Cooperation (DEVCO). In the Council Secretariat, staff working in DG External and Politico-Military Affairs was transferred. In order to assure smooth transfer of staff a provisional organisational structure was established for the

EEAS. This organisational structure will be fine-tuned and improved in the course of 2011. The legal basis for the transfer of staff is the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 on the establishment, organisation and functioning of the EEAS, as well as the amended Staff and Financial Regulations and the 2011 EU budget.

EEAS Website: http://eeas.europa.eu

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY (EDA): New EDA Chief Executive appointed On 7 January, EU High representative Catherine Ashton welcomed the appointment of Claude-France Arnould (France) as Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA) for a three-year term.

The appointment was approved unanimously by the agency’s Steering Board.

In her former position, Ms Arnould was Deputy Director of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate of the European External Action Service (EAS).

Prior to that she served as Director at the General Secretariat of the Council for Defence issues, from 2001 to 2009.

Claude-France Arnould, Chief Executive Officer, European Defence Agency

European and United States Defence Expenditure in 2009 In December 2010, the European Defence Agency published new defence data. EDA has compared its data on European defence expenditure with United States defence spending in 2009. The data show that the U.S. spent € 498 billion on defence in 2009, almost two point six times more than the € 194 billion spent in Europe. The European data represent spending by the 26 EDA participating Member States, the U.S. data are based on public sources, mainly U.S. Government publications.

EDA Website: www.eda.europa.eu

European – U.S. Defence Expenditure 2009 Europe US € 194 Bln € 498 Bln Total Defence Expenditure 1,67%

4,90%

Defence Expenditure as % of Total Government Expenditure

3,3%

11,7%

Defence Expenditure per Capita

€ 392

€ 1.622

Defence Expenditure as % of GDP

Source : EDA

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EUROPOL: New Report on Cyber Crime has been published Cybercrime is an explicit priority of the European Union law enforcement agency (Europol). As part of the strategic planning for a European Cyber Crime Centre, Europol has produced a Threat Assessment on Internet Facilitated Organised Crime (iOCTA). The iOCTA outlines how internet-facilitated organised crime will continue to increase in line with broadband internet uptake, finding new

offenders and victims in areas of the world where internet access was previously limited. The iOCTA calls therefore for new international strategic and operational partnerships. An active partnership with the private sector is also essential, according to the report, not only to share intelligence and evidence, but also in the development of technical tools and measures for law

enforcement to prevent online crime.

Furthermore, centralised coordination of intelligence gathering, analysis, training, and partnership management is required at an EU level to ensure that Member States and EU agencies make the most effective use of resources.

The iOCTA report is available on the Europol website: http://www.europol.europa.eu

COMMISSION Commission presents its Mid-term Review of GMES and Galileo On 18 January, the European Commission presented its midterm review on the development of Europe’s satellite navigation programmes GMES and Galileo. GMES became officially operational on 1 October 2009, and the Galileo in-orbit validation phase is underway.

The construction of the first four operational Galileo satellites, which are part of

the in-orbit validation phase and will be launched in 2011 – 2012, is nearing completion. Also nearly complete is the associated ground based infrastructure, including the ground control centres in Fucino, Italy, and Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany. GMES and Galileo will be financed by the EU budget with € 3,4 billion over the 2007 – 2013 periods.

It is estimated that € 1,9 billion will be

EVENTS Computer-Based Simulation for EU Crisis Management On 8 December 2010, the European Security Roundtable (ESRT) hosted a luncheon on European crisis prevention and disaster management in the European Parliament.

Chaired by Michael Gahler MEP, the Round Table was opened with an overview by Florika Fink-Hooijer, Chief of Cabinet of Commissioner Georgieva on the recent Communication on reinforcing the Union’s capacity to act in civil protection and

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humanitarian assistance. It brought together MEPs as well as Commission, Council and NATO officials to discuss the need and possibilities for more coherent policy-making in this field. A particular focus was placed on the potential of trans-border solutions for training and simulation. Representatives from CAE gave particular input on that issue. www.security-round-table.eu

necessary for the 2014 – 2020 period to complete the Galileo infrastructure. The operational costs of Galileo and GMES together are estimated at an annual € 800 million. These estimates are provisional and without prejudice to the future multiannual financial framework of the EU budget.

The Communication is available at: http://tinyurl.com/5vte9xo

Security and Defence News

List of authors and articles in 2010 Name/Title

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Aderhold, Ulrich............................................................. 3/2010 .... 46 Modern technologies for the training of European managers in Crisis Prevention and Disaster Management Albertini, Gabriele MEP .................................................. 1/2010 ...... 8 The role of the European Parliament in the Common Foreign and Security Policy Arlacchi, Pino MEP ......................................................... 3/2010 .... 23 Afghanistan: Key points of the “Report on a new European strategy for Afghanistan Bahlinger, Tobias .......................................................... 2/2010 .... 57 IT-Protection for Crisis Management Forces Barnier, Michel .............................................................. 4/2010 ...... 7 How to strengthen Europe’s freedom of political action and efficiency in crises Dr. Bellais, Renaud ........................................................ 1/2010 .... 23 Defence Spending in the European Union versus the United States Both, Jochen, Major General (GE) ................................... 4/2010 .... 47 European Air Transport Command (EATC) – a blue print for integration of European military capabilities Buckley, Edgar .............................................................. 3/2010 .... 34 What more should be done to develop a Common European Security and Defence Market Bühl-Cazaubon, Nannette .............................................. 4/2010 .... 53 Civilian armoured vehicles – a solution to better protect civil and military crisis management forces Busko, Manfred ............................................................. 2/2010 .... 35 External threats – customized concepts for effective site protection Chizhov, Vladimir, Ambassador .................................... 1/2010 .... 26 Russia’s Security Policy in new European Structures – what is behind President Dmitry Medvedev’s initiative on European Security Treaty Curtis-Thomas, Claire .................................................... 3/2010 .... 14 EU Foreign Policy – reduced liberty of action in operations due to lacking air transport capabilities – the special case of transport helicopters Das, Hans ...................................................................... 1/2010 .... 30 Coordinating Europe’s Civil Protection – The way forward Domröse, Hans Lothar, Lieutnant General (GE) .............. 2/2010 .... 44 Situational knowledge superiority is the key to future operational success Donnet, Laurent ............................................................ 4/2010 .... 38 No civil or military crisis management without transport aircraft Dr. Durodié, Bill ............................................................. 2/2010 .... 24 Apocalypse now van Eekelen, Willem F. ................................................... 2/2010 ...... 9 European security needs a parliamentary dimension Eisin, Miri, Colonel (ret.) ................................................ 3/2010 .... 19 The special dimension of Israel’s Security – how Europeans should understand it Fassino, Piero MP ..........................................................3/2010 ..... 17 The European Union and the integration of the Western Balkans Fischer, Axel MdB .......................................................... 3/2010 .... 39 The Transatlantic Defence Equipment Market – a European point of view

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Frank, Hans, Vice Admiral (ret.)...................................... 1/2010..... 45 A regional maritime security concept for the Baltic Sea Gerwert, Bernhard ......................................................... 2/2010 .... 49 Closing an urgent capability gap – Europe needs an own Unmanned Air System (UAS) for better protection of its own Armed Forces Giuliani, Jean-Dominique ............................................... 4/2010 .... 11 20 years of German unity – a success story Gray, Andrew ................................................................. 4/2010..... 41 Is it possible to conduct a civil or military crisis management operation without tactical air transport?

Greenway, John MP Turkey’s foreign and security policy – an asset for Europe ... 2/2010..... 15 Kosovo and Serbia – a common European Future ............ 4/2010 .... 12 Greuter, Dölf .................................................................. 2/2010 .... 54 Essential progress in the development of armoured transport and combat vehicles Dr.-Ing Großmann, Jürgen .............................................. 4/2010 .... 25 An energy strategy for Europe – building bridges, not walls Hancock, Michael MP..................................................... 1/2010 .... 18 Current developments in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament Dr. Hellenthal, Markus A Maritime Security Strategy for Europe – view from industries ....................................................... 1/2010..... 56 Efficient crisis management as a prerequisite for networked security.................................................... 3/2010 .... 49 Henderson, Doug MP ..................................................... 2/2010..... 18 Crisis management – Permanent Structured Cooperation Homberg, Thomas ......................................................... 3/2010 .... 37 European Defence and Security in the 21sr century Isherwood, Michael Unmanned Air Systems and the NATO Maritime Forces – an industrial view ........................................................... 1/2010 .... 61 VTUAV and Safeguarding Military and Civilian Interests ............................................................ 4/2010 .... 43 Jacob, Emanuel .............................................................. 3/2010 .... 51 Security has a social dimension Judisch, Stefan............................................................... 4/2010 .... 33 Nabucco – a historical undertaking PD Dr. Justenhoven, Heinz-Gerhard................................ 3/2010 .... 29 Afghanistan: Where does our duty lie?

Korb, Andreas LtCol (GS/GE) .......................................... 2/2010 .... 47 NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) – a decisive factor for the protection of forces Langer, Michael ............................................................. 4/2010 .... 34 The revolution in the energy supply chain and its implication for energy supply security Leinen, Jo MEP ............................................................... 4/2010 .... 31 The environment and the energy supply in Europe Lenton, Michael ............................................................ 1/2010......58 Security throughout the Mediterranean – a complex challenge Dr. Levitt, Matthew ........................................................ 2/2010 .... 29 The nuclear threat of Iran – no end in sight Lisek, Krzysztof MEP...................................................... 4/2010 .... 22 The European Union has to guarantee its Member States an equitable energy Supply – but Member States have to make greatest efforts see page 62

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Lutz, Alexander .............................................................. 4/2010 .....56 Why does the soldier’s health always come last – an appeal for higher medical budgets for crisis management forces Magne, Xavier, Vice Admiral (FR) ...................................1/2010 ......47 Mediteranean Sea Messalla, Marcus........................................................... 4/2010 .... 49 Cuts to defence programmes means Cutting deterrence, technology and jobs – the Eurofighter programme as an example Dr. Möseler, Matthias .................................................... 2/2010 .....32 Security solutions adapted to individual needs Dr. Muresan, Liviu.......................................................... 1/2010 .... 28 Security Research and Innovation for an EU 2020 Vision Dr. Nezam, Zia................................................................ 3/2010 .... 25 The regional dimension of Afghan conflict Oettinger, Günther H...................................................... 4/2010 .... 19 Securing Europe’s energy supply – the priorities for European energy policy in the coming years Dr. Olshausen, Klaus, Lt General ret (GE) ....................... 1/2010 .... 42 Maritime Strategy – a crucial geostrategic and geopolitical challenge in a globalized environment Pascu, Ion MEP ............................................................. 1/2010 ......51 A regional concept for a Maritime Strategy for the Black Sea Puranen, Bi .................................................................... 2/2010 .... 41 The Transformation Process of Europe’s Armed Forces – The Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) as an example Raab, Christoph ............................................................ 1/2010 .... 37 Steps forward to a EU Maritime Security Strategy Ramms, Egon, General (GE) ........................................... 2/2010 .... 20 How to realize a Comprehensive Approach for Afghanistan’s security Reul, Herbert MEP ......................................................... 4/2010 .... 28 Securing energy supply for the European Union through an appropriate energy diversity Dr. Roell, Peter .............................................................. 4/2010 .... 14 Maritime Terrorism a threat to world trade Rühe, Michael ............................................................... 1/2010 .... 20 Nuclear Disarmamant and Proliferation – a personal view on the need for realism Ruiz Palmer, Diego A ..................................................... 1/2010 .... 53

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NATO’s approach to Maritime Security: a bold vision Schneider, Kent ............................................................. 2/2010 .... 59 Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) Schulz, Martin MEP........................................................ 3/2010 .......8 Checks and balances in Brussels – the new role and influence of the European Parliament in the European Union Schwehm, Markus ......................................................... 4/2010 .... 58 Epidemiology in the field – how mathematical modelling can save lives Send, Matthias W. ......................................................... 4/2010 .... 35 Meeting the challenge – a roadmap for renewable e nergy toward a sustainable future Siedschlag, Alexander ................................................... 2/2010 .... 27 The European citizen’s security – a perception Skeritt-Andrew, Shirley, Ambassador ........................... 3/2010 .... 44 Haiti: What lessons to learn Dr. Stehr, Michael ......................................................... 1/2010 .... 15 EU NAVFOR Somalia – Atalanta – First anniversary Dr. Suissa, Rachel ......................................................... 2/2010 .... 13 The European Security Strategy – national threat perceptions versus EU objectives Ureña-Raso, Domingo .................................................... 4/2010 ...... 5 NATO and the European Union need urgently their military transport aircraft, The Airbus A400M Dr. Weilemann, Peter † .................................................. 1/2010 .... 11 The Lisbon Treaty – a step forward Weingarten, Bert ........................................................... 1/2010 .... 34 Cyberwar & Cyber Defence Weiss, Stefani................................................................ 3/2010..... 10 The European External Action Service (EEAS) – a good idea started off on the wrong foot Wenzler, Bernd ............................................................. 4/2010 .... 51 Defending world security – an industry view Dr. Wittmann, Klaus (Brigadier General ret (GE) .............4/2010 ..... 17 NATO’s new strategic concept Wolff Metternich, Dominik, von ..................................... 2/2010 .... 51 Force Protection on the ground – how to optimize transport and combat Vehicles for crisis management forces Worcester, Maxim ......................................................... 3/2010 .... 42 Climate change and future global security

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