The European-Security and Defence Union Issue 53

The European

Security and Defence Union

EU enlargement and security

Strengthening Europe’s geostrategic position

What direction will Georgia take?

Moldova on the path to EU accession

Mihai Popșoi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Moldova, Chişinău

Elise Bernard, PhD, Head of Studies, Robert Schuman Foundation, Paris

Phone call to Moscow

by Hartmut Bühl, Paris

Shortly before the thousand-day anniversary of Russia's fullscale invasion of Ukraine, Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz made a phone call to Moscow. His nice idea was to ask Putin to end the war and call his troops home.

While in the western camp criticism and approval of Scholz’s initiative were evenly balanced, Ukraine complained that such talks would reduce Russia’s isolation and carry the risk of opening Pandora's box. After Trump’s election victory, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy fears that Ukraine could end up being abandoned and forced to give up territory for peace in negotiations with Moscow.

Putin reacted calmly to the global turmoil that Scholz’s phone call had provoked. He stated that discussions are always useful - as long as the right topics are discussed! It is clear that for him, they include consolidating the territorial gains, including Crimea, that his army has made in the war so far, as well as Ukraine renouncing NATO membership. The Russian dictator, who recently lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear powers and their allies, opposes any freezing of the conflict because he wants to make all of Russia’s gains permanent.

However, against the background of a global situation plagued by uncertainty – the only certainty being Donald Trump's return to the White House in January 2025 – President Zelenskyy played his cards wisely: bearing in mind that Trump has promised to end the war within 24 hours and that no one knows what this would mean for Ukraine, Zelenskyy went out of his way to congratulate Trump on his victory, assured him that the west needs him and stated that “a strong and unshakable leadership role for the US and the western world is irreplaceable for a just peace”. However, whenever Zelenskyy appears on a screen, one can see his fatigue and feel his desperation about his country’s

plight after 1000 days of war. He declared in a radio interview on 16 November that he wants to bring peace to Ukraine by diplomatic means in 2025.

In the meantime, Russian troops, despite huge losses, are continuing to make incremental gains on Ukrainian territory. And while Ukraine is running out of soldiers, the outgoing US President Joe Biden is calling on Ukraine to mobilise more young people. To support the Russian side, 10,000 North Koreans are in the process of being deployed. Some of them have already deserted, after discovering the harsh reality on the ground.

Trump’s victory has acted as an accelerator. A taboo was broken when, in mid-November, Joe Biden finally authorised Ukraine to use American ATACMS missiles against Russian military infrastructure. Moscow responded by firing a long-range RS-26 missile at the large city of Dnipro in eastern Ukraine.

The much-feared escalation seems to be happening, even though no one really wants it as everyone stands to lose. Paradoxically however, it is also increasing pressure for possible peace negotiations.

What role Chinese President Xi Jinping might play in bringing peace to Ukraine remains largely unknown, but neither Putin nor Trump will be able achieve it without him. One thing seems predictable, however: Europe is divided over how to end the war and is therefore unlikely to play a decisive role in the peace process, as the German Chancellor's failed attempt already suggests.

Hartmut Bühl

Hartmut Bühl

15–34 MAIN TOPIC

8–14

In the Spotlight

Guiding the Union through stormy times

8

Guest commentary

The United States have voted.

What can Europe expect?

Gesine Weber, Paris

9 The pressure on Europe is growing

Trump’s victory – Europe must react to save Ukraine and secure its future

Interview with Roderich Kiesewetter MdB, Berlin

11 Commentary

Destroying infrastructure –the other way of war

Hartmut Bühl, Paris

12 Withstanding populist narratives

Could the European Union fall apart over the migration issue?

Interview with Julian Pahlke MdB, Berlin

14 DOCUMENTATION

Andrius Kubilius' Berlin speech on European defence

Strenghtening Europe’s geostrategic position

16

The beginning of a new chapter

EU enlargement – a geopolitical necessity and opportunity

David McAllister MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg

18

Keeping the accession process credible

The EU’s increased prioritisation of enlargement in times of war

Bernard Brunet, Brussels

Enlargement of the European Union –state of play 21

Report on Ifri Webinar

Ukraine between war and reforms –conversation with Olha Stefanishyna

Nannette Cazaubon, Paris

22

DOCUMENTATION

EU enlargement – focus on the candidates for membership 24

Following the EU Strategic Compass

Moldova on the path to accession

Mihai Popșoi, Chişinău

26

A post-election analysis

What direction will Georgia take?

Dr Elise Bernard, Paris 28

EU accession – a net positive

The impact of EU membership on Romanian society / Bulgaria’s way back to Europe

Prof Ioan Mircea Pașcu, Bucharest, and Boyko Noev, Sofia 30

The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI)

Putting the EU’s foreign policy into action

Interview with Dr Peter Wagner, Brussels

32

Conversation with Christian Schmidt

The High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina – complex tasks in a complex country

Hartmut Bühl, Paris

34

Memories and outlook

The Bosnia-Herzegovina imbroglio

Gérard Cardonne, Colmar

©European Union, 2024

©Shutterstock / stoimilov

35-42

Security

and Defence

Defining how Europe will defend itself in the future

36 Prioritisation, coordination and cooperation

Planning and commanding EU military operations in a complex security landscape

Interview with LtGen Michiel van der Laan, Brussels

40 Creating a continuous dialogue

How the CARD report is central in EDA’s role to shape collaboration in capability development

LtGen Stefano Cont, Brussels

42 Establishing a worthy common defence

The time is no longer for general comments on European defence

Jacques Favin-Lévêque, Paris

Masthead

THE EUROPEAN –SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Volume 53 4/2024

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Incoming EU Presidency Security is top priority for Poland

EU enlargement Georgia stops accession negotiations

After the disputed parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024, protest demonstrations against the populist Georgian Dream party that has retained control of parliament do not stop. The European Parliament condemned the organisation of legislative elections “which did not meet international standards” and called for their reorganisation within one year. In response, Georgia’s Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze decided to suspend his country’s efforts to join the EU, at least until the end of 2028. Since, the protests have gained momentum despite harsh repression. The Standing Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), meeting in Luxembourg on 29 November 2024, condemned “the brutal repression of the peaceful demonstrations that took place in Tbilisi to protest against this decision, as a violation of the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and assembly.” It expressed its concern that the decision to halt accession negotiations may have a significant impact on the implementation of reforms that are essential for the strengthening of the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions in Georgia.

➭ See the article on Georgia by Elise Bernard, pp. 26-27

(nc) Poland will take over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) from Hungary on 1 January 2025 for six months. Warsaw’s main preoccupation is the massive security risk that Russia’s war in Ukraine poses to Poland and the whole EU, and the unknown about whether Trump as the new US President will abandon NATO and Kyiv. To prepare for the Polish EU Presidency, Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament (EP), together with the representatives of the EP’s political groups (Conference of Presidents) traveled to Warshaw to meet with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and other government officials on 5 December 2024. According to the Polish Press Agency (PAP), Tusk said that the Polish EU Presidency will be marked by actions concerning security that encompass various aspects including political, military, economic, environmental and human. "Whether these will be talks on energy, climate, food, increasing the defence capabilities of Europe as a whole and its Member States, transatlantic cooperation, policy towards the Russian-Ukrainian war - everywhere we will have to climb above traditional divisions and we will have to remember that the security of the entire continent depends on us," said the Prime Minister.

Grand South

The BRICS states – far from a shared strategy

(hb) The so-called Grand South has wind in its sails. A political power factor has quietly emerged with the growing markets of the BRICS states: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, which were joined by Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates in 2024, striving for political influence and the destabilisation of the west.

At the pompously staged BRICS summit in Kazan in 2024, Russian dictator Putin called, in his opening speech, for “fair multilateralism without dictates”. Now that’s sarcasm!

But there was a shadow over Putin's summit. China is aiming for leadership of the BRICS states, which doesn’t follow Putin's intention to break completely with America. They primarily want to change their relationship with the United States by reducing their dependence, and they want to have a say in the world, by building influence at relevant institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, counting on their strength as 50% of the world's population, achieving 40% of the world's economic output by a growing population.

The summit in Kazan has shown that quantity is far from being quality. There is no text adopted worthy of being seen as a threat to the west: the Global South is not yet a power factor because of dividing interests, but the west is far from being able to agree on a common strategy against Russia and China’s growing influence in the Grand South.

Roberta Metsola and Donald Tusk in Warsaw, 5 December 2024

(nc) On 2 December 2024, Radmila Shekerinska from North Macedonia took office as the new Deputy NATO Secretary General. She “is a true believer in NATO, knows the work it takes to join the Alliance, and what it means to be a full member”, said NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at her appointment. Radmila Shekerinska was born on 10 June 1972 in Skopje. She graduated from the Faculty of Electrical Engineering in Skopje and received her MA in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, US. She served two terms as Minister of Defence (2017–2020, 2020–2022), the first woman to hold the post and the longest-serving since the country's independence in 1991. She played a key role in preparing North Macedonia for NATO accession. The country became NATO's 30th member in 2020, successfully achieving full military integration into NATO in less than 19 months.

Sahel

France asked to withdraw its troops

(hb) Over the last two years, France had to close its military bases in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso and withdraw its troops stationed there following the ending of defence agreements. At the end of November 2024, Chad also announced that 66 years after the proclamation of the republic, it has had enough and will ask Paris to withdraw its troops from the country’s territory. According to Chad's Foreign Minister Abderaman Koulamallah, this marks a "historic turning point, but not a break with France as in Niger or elsewhere." The same day, Senegal’s President Bassirou Diomaye Faye told French media that French soldiers should leave the country in the medium term. While Chad is looking for new partners in the Arab countries (UAE) and wants to cooperate more closely with the European Union (EU), Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are increasingly succumbing to Putin's charms. The end of the geostrategic dominance of France as a former colonial power in the Sahel region is also reducing Europe’s influence. EU Member States followed a more or less coordinated and rather linear course for almost ten years, which remained largely unchanged despite the apparent lack of success. European partners have neither properly challenged French leadership and its political guidance, nor have they succeeded in correcting the course once taken.

Letter to the editor Interview with OCCAR-EA Director

(Volume 52, no3/2024)

The interview with the OCCAR-EA Director Joachim Sucker of 28 August 2024 (“The complexity of European and transatlantic defence programmes”), published in your October 2024 issue, presented OCCAR not only as a strong procurement agency but also as an organisation that covers “through management” of complex and cooperative defence equipment programmes in its DNA.

The interview gives some encouraging indications that OCCAR-EA works closely with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA).

In this context it is important to recall that among these, EDA is the only organisation which is rooted in the EU Lisbon Treaty and that the reason for its creation goes far beyond the definition and harmonisation of equipment requirements.

The return of war to Europe led to noticeable efforts by Member States to strengthen their military capabilities, resulting in a surge in defence spending in 2023. According to the European Defence Agency's (EDA) annual Defence Data 2023-2024 report, spending across all 27 EU Member States rose 10% on the previous year to a record €279bn, marking the ninth year of consecutive growth. Eight Member States allocated 2% or more of GDP to defence in 2023, up from five Member States in 2022. Two out of these eight spent at least 3% of GDP on defence (Estonia, Poland). The development and procurement of new weapons, systems and equipment was the primary factor driving the rise in total defence expenditure. Member States are seeking to replenish stocks depleted through military aid to Ukraine, address critical capability gaps, and enhance defence readiness and preparedness for high-intensity conflict. Defence spending is projected to reach €326bn for 2024.

➭ See the article by LtGen Stefano Cont on EDA’s Coordinated

pp. 42-43

EDA’s role as the intergovernmental defence nexus at EU level, working for all 27 Member States and the Council, is confirmed by the 2024 Long Term Review. The dramatic changes in the security environment have shown that, on the ground, mass and technology matter to strengthen European defence. That, in turn, means increasing the speed of procurement, quickly bringing innovative solutions into service and producing and delivering defence capabilities in very high numbers.

It is good news that all three players above work side by side in that direction.

Martin Konertz, BrigGen (ret)

➭ Read the interview published in Volume 52–3/2024 (pp. 34-37) https://bit.ly/3CaWpuU

Guest commentary

The US has voted. What can Europe expect?

by Gesine Weber, Research fellow, German Marshall Fund of the US, Paris

With the election of Donald J. Trump as 47th president of the United States, Europeans must brace for a period of uncertainty. They have long been aware that their security hinges to a significant degree on voter preferences in US swing states, and that the American strategic priorities have shifted to the Indo-Pacific since the first Obama administration. However, it was perhaps Trump’s comments in early 2024, when he openly questioned the willingness of the United States to defend European allies in case of an attack, that made them realise that a future where Europeans will have to defend their security with less, or even without, US participation is relatively likely, if not imminent.

The most pressing security challenge is the situation in Ukraine. It is almost certain that Europeans will have to provide the lion’s share of military and economic support going forwards, but highly uncertain how the situation could evolve once Trump takes office. As the promise to quickly end the war in Ukraine was one of the key messages of his electoral campaign, a scenario where Trump strikes a deal with Putin without taking European or Ukrainian interests into consideration cannot be excluded.

Under the new US administration, Europeans will have to shoulder much more of the burden within the alliance. The lack of defence spending of most Europeans was always a point of criticism during Trump’s first presidency, but in contrast to other US presidents, Trump might condition the protection of European allies in case of an armed attack on their level of defence spending. Within Republican circles, the scenario of a “dormant NATO”, where Europeans are mostly responsible for European security and the United States only serves as a “backstop”, provided Europeans have sufficiently stepped up in terms of capabilities, has gained traction over the last year. Significant defence investment is therefore perhaps the best strategy to generate goodwill in the White House.

Beyond European security and defence, Europeans will have to brace for more coercion from Washington. As Trump has announced to impose blanket tariffs of 20% on all goods imported to the United States, including from Europe, the new administration might use this option as leverage to convince Europeans to increase their own imports from the United States, including Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), as already suggested by EU leaders recently. If the incoming US administration decides to pursue an approach of competition or even confrontation with Beijing, it is likely that the United States will demand alignment from Europeans – and to condition either transatlantic economic ties or the US security guarantee for Europe on their compliance.

A critical challenge for Europeans in all this is maintaining European unity. During his first presidency, Trump had a tendency to focus on bilateral relationships rather than seeing the EU as a primary interlocutor. While the EU’s main challenge will be to remain relevant, European capitals will have to double down on coordination and coherent messaging towards Washington. The success of this endeavour will, however, depend on the potential individual hedging strategies of European states to generate goodwill in the White House, even if that means abandoning a common European approach.

Regardless of the strategic choices of the Trump administration, Europeans must expect to do much more in the fields of defence, economic and tech policy, and more generally as actors on global challenges. The best forum to coordinate on these challenges is the EU – and whether one likes the term or not, there is a good case to be made for European strategic autonomy, meaning the definition of European strategies based on European interests. Even if a Democrat takes over in the White House in 2028, this approach can only benefit Europe and transatlantic relations. ■

©private

The pressure on Europe is growing

Trump’s victory –Europe must react to save Ukraine and secure its future

Interview with Roderich Kiesewetter MdB, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag, Berlin

The European: Mr Kiesewetter, America has voted and Donald Trump will take power on 20 January 2025. It seems clear that this will mean a paradigm shift in transatlantic security policy. Is Europe prepared for it?

Roderich Kiesewetter: I'm not sure if it's a paradigm shift, at least it shouldn't be. Because, let's be honest, Europe is already lagging far behind in terms of our contribution to transatlantic security. Even under Kamala Harris, the pivot to Asia would inevitably have continued and the demand for burden-shifting would have been raised sooner or later. President Trump however will start by demanding even more from Europe and

dealing more consistently with the failings of some Member States. The pressure on Europe to act is growing. It must finally understand that the transatlantic partnership is not a one-way street. Many countries have long since understood this and are therefore fulfilling their commitments and stepping up their defence spending.

The European: How do you view your own country in this context?

R. Kiesewetter: Germany has not delivered on its NATO pledges. This is now backfiring on us. In the US, the concept

“ Europe must finally understand that the transatlantic partnership is not a one-way street”

©Tobias Koch

SPOTLIGHT

of integrated deterrence and defence has dominated security policy to date. This concept is necessary to take action against China, Russia, Iran, and North-Korea (CRINK) and the way in which these states are already waging war against us as part of an overall strategy. Germany needs this approach of integrated deterrence and defence, which we have not even begun to formulate yet due to the failure of the German government. The US election does not change the need for Germany and the Bundeswehr to develop this, but the election of Trump makes it more urgent.

The European: Donald Trump has stated that if elected president he would end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours. What can we expect in terms of American support for Ukraine and what does that mean for Europe? Is there a risk that the European Union and NATO will break apart over this issue?

R. Kiesewetter: It remains to be seen how Trump will behave towards Ukraine. Clearly, Ukraine is not the blueprint for Trump that it is for those countries who see the rule-based order under pressure. He will probably propose a deal with Putin, as announced. If this fails, there are several options. Either he will withdraw support completely or perhaps even increase it, although that is a very optimistic view. He could also simply decrease support without a deal. In any case, there is a danger that NATO will lose its strength and deterrent effect. That would entail an enormous risk of the war expanding to the rest of Europe and ultimately represents an enormous danger for Ukraine and for us.

The European: What are the consequences if NATO loses its deterrent effect?

R. Kiesewetter: It would be tantamount to an invitation to Putin not only to test NATO in Europe, as he is already doing, but to expand the war. However, it is possible to counteract the worst-case scenario with smart policies. And Ukraine also has added value to offer the US thanks to its technological capabilities. Unfortunately, despite countless warnings, Germany has not prepared for these scenarios at all. In any scenario, Europe must finally go “all-in” financially and materially to support Ukraine.

The European: Do you see the risk of a split in Europe and the NATO states?

R. Kiesewetter: We are already seeing such a split, between those who want to act proactively, involve the US by making their own efforts, form a coalition of the willing to provide all-out support for Ukraine. On the other side, there are those states that want to wait and see, continue in their strategic blindness, desperately clinging to old beliefs that have long since been proven wrong and who think they can tame the terrorist states of the CRINK alliance with appeasement. Germany in particular.

The European: Has Europe’s time come?

R. Kiesewetter: We in Europe have the choice to decide what our future looks like: should the rule of law and the international rules-based order prevail, or do we allow the CRINK states’ regional zones of influence to spread terror and injustice? Ukraine can become a negative or a positive blueprint.

The European: As you said, Europe has to take on more responsibility for its own security. What does this mean in practice?

R. Kiesewetter: We need a security concept that encompasses integrated security and overall defence and war capability. In Europe, we must overhaul the post-war welfare systems we have settled into and be prepared to fight for freedom, just as the Americans did when they liberated Europe in the Second World War. So, we must shoulder more of the burden and do for ourselves what the US has done for so long. We must therefore be prepared to deter militarily and economically.

The European: What does this imply in terms of defence spending?

R. Kiesewetter: We need to reorganise our spending priorities. The Europeans must invest at least 3 % of their GDP in defence, build up massive capacities and boost arms production. In order to achieve NATO's Minimum Capability Requirement (MCR), Germany, for example, needs 400,000 soldiers and a defence budget of at least €110bn. There also needs to be a geostrategic shift in the burden. Europe must become more involved within Europe and its “near abroad”, e.g. in the Western Balkans, in North Africa and the Middle East, so that the US can engage more resources in the Indo-Pacific.

The European: Liberal democracies around the world are under “attack” by an alliance of autocracies. What does Europe need to do to ensure that the US remains the leading nation in transatlantic security?

R. Kiesewetter: We must think in terms of total defence, because the CRINK alliance is attacking us not only militarily but also economically and in hybrid warfare with grey zone tactics. The US needs a united and strong Europe if we want to put a stop to China's imperial ambitions. Europe can also help build an alliance of rules-based states. But first and foremost, we have to decide what we want. There is no middle ground, no more partnership with China or appeasement of Iran or Russia. We need determination and consistency in dealing with CRINK.

A lot will depend on an intelligent response to the new deal mentality that a Trump presidency will promote. We don't have to share it, but we have to offer the US something that will convince them to stick with NATO and the transatlantic security architecture in their own interests.

The European: Mr Kiesewetter, thank you for these insights. ■

Commentary

Destroying infrastructure –the other way of war

by Hartmut Bühl, Paris

At the end of November 2024, the hitherto steadfast Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy spoke, for the first time and with a heavy heart, about possible, albeit temporary, surrendering of territory to Russia.

In an interview with Sky News, Zelenskyy said: “If we want to stop the hot phase of the war, we need to take under the NATO umbrella the territory of Ukraine that we have under our control.” He hopes that Ukraine will be able to recover the occupied territories by diplomatic means in the future.

©ESDU

Zelenskyy is primarily concerned about the growing moral fatigue of the Ukrainian population and therefore its fundamental will to hold out, both on the frontline and the home front. Added to this are Moscow’s cyber-attacks and demoralising propaganda, designed to destabilise the population.

But what Zelenskyy fears more than a military defeat are Russian attacks on critical infrastructure. On 17 November, starting at 3am, major Ukrainian cities were hit by drone strikes aimed at destroying the country's energy infrastructure, which has already been significantly damaged over the past three years. According to Ukrainian sources, 120 missiles and 90 drones were fired into the skies over Ukraine, of which only 70 were shot down.

The remaining missiles destroyed energy production facilities and electricity distribution stations. For the coming winter, the Ukrainians need 18 to 20 gigawatts of production capacity and currently only 12 gigawatts are secured, an amount which is at risk of being further reduced with each attack.

These Russian attacks on energy supplies are clearly aimed at undermining the morale of the Ukrainian population and destroying Ukrainian industrial capabilities. An additional goal of Putin's could be to show Donald Trump that he is determined to negotiate from a position of strength in any upcoming negotiations with the next US president. And no

one knows how or if Trump will represent Ukraine's interests.

After almost three years of war, Ukraine is clearly at a critical juncture: its armed forces are in steady retreat in the east and lack heavy weapons, which are only being delivered half-heartedly by the west. But above all there is a lack of trained soldiers.

“ What Zelenskyy fears more than a military defeat are Russian attacks on critical infrastructure.”

Whether the deployment of American short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Russian territory will be a game changer is questionable.

An increasing number of states friendly to Ukraine are calling for an end to the war to avoid Ukraine's defeat, while Putin is threatening to reduce the city of Kyiv to dust with his hypersonic missile “Oreshnik”. With the help of his dictator friend Kim Jong-un, Putin can, at least temporarily, make up for the huge losses of the Russian armed forces with North Korean soldiers. And he is also drawing supplies from Iran, mainly drones.

In view of possible future negotiations that Trump may impose, it is of the utmost importance that Europe increase its support to Ukraine in terms of arms and economic assistance so that it can negotiate from a position of strength.

Both warring parties must consider their political, economic and military future: Ukraine within the European Union and NATO, Russia to overcome its isolation and restore its global political position, which cannot happen without a "reconciliation" with Europe. ■

Standing firm against populist narratives

Could the European Union fall apart over the migration issue?

Interview with Julian Pahlke, MdB, Speaker of the Parliamentary Group Alliance 90/The Greens, Deutscher Bundestag, Berlin

The European: Mr Pahlke, the increase of conflicts worldwide, the abundance of authoritarian regimes, and the acceleration of the climate crisis are just some of the reasons why people are willing to leave their homes and risk their lives to reach Europe. All over the European Union, governments have to deal with the issue of migration and asylum. Has migration become a dominant factor in politics?

Julian Pahlke: Our debates often focus on the situation here in Germany or in the European Union. Yet, you rightly pointed out the global scale of the current humanitarian crisis. 120 million people worldwide are fleeing war, terror, hunger, political oppression and a progressing diminishing of their livelihoods due to climate change. Never before has the number been this high. The vast majority of refugees is taken in by neighbouring countries, such as Türkiye, Uganda or Pakistan. Here in Europe, we are not carrying even a fraction of their burden.

The European: However, the topic is often exploited by rightwing extremist parties to gain power.

J. Pahlke: Rightwing extremist parties exploit the topic of migration and asylum to create a climate of fear. Using racist narratives, they try to portray governments as being out of control. They present migration as a simple problem with simple solutions. But in reality, they do not offer any solutions, let alone solutions that do justice to the complexity of the issue. As democratic parties, we have a responsibility to stand up to these detrimental narratives. We cannot ignore the challenges of host communities, but at the same time, we need to be firm about our commitment to human rights and the humane treatment of those who have lost their homes to war, terror, and oppression, as well as to our commitment to work together as Europeans on this issue.

The European: I agree that the problem of migration and asylum cannot be solved nationally but is a common European task as it is determined in the Pact on Migration and Asylum of 24 May 2024. However, some EU Member States have dropped out: Austria, Hungary, and Germany, for example, tried to solve

Sub-Saharan migrants rescued in the Mediterranean are cared for by Red Cross volunteers, Muelle de Arguineguín, Las Palmas, Canary Islands, 28 August 2024 ©Shutterstock

the problem by systematically controlling or even closing their borders. Can these be efficient solutions, or are these countries just giving in to societal pressure?

J. Pahlke: I think border controls mainly serve as political symbols. They require a lot of personnel and will never prevent migration altogether. Smugglers simply adapt and alter their routes. Also, according to European Union law, asylum seekers must be given access to regular procedures. They cannot be pushed back at the border. If we want less irregular migration at our borders we need to focus more on safe and legal pathways to protection. Truly effective, sustainable measures to manage migration and asylum require holistic approaches and cooperation at the European level.

Furthermore, border controls tend to disrupt commercial and private traffic in border regions. However, the right to free movement is essential to the European idea and at the core of our prosperity. It is an immeasurable accomplishment that we should fiercely defend.

“ Migration has become one of the most insidious weapons in the hybrid arsenal of the Kremlin. Putin has realised that migration and the discourse around it has enormous potential to destabilise our societies.”

The European: Italy's far-right Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has advocated for a shift of the problem to non-EU Mediterranean countries. Recently, migrants and refugees have been intercepted before being able to reach EU territory and “deported” to a fortress-like camp in Albania, funded by Italy, where their right to asylum is examined. For Meloni, Italy has become a role model, and some in Brussels seem to agree. Have Europeans lost their sense of humanity?

J. Pahlke: I don’t believe there is a unified stance among "the Europeans" on this issue. Last year, the Member States reached an agreement on the Common European Asylum System, a framework for regulating migration at the European level. This is the way forward, as it creates clear rules and distributes refugees among Member States more fairly.

At the same time, as members of Alliance 90/The Greens, we will work to ensure that human and constitutional rights, the rule of law, and humanitarian principles are upheld. After the Holocaust and the immense destruction Nazi Germany brought to Europe, the international community decided to enshrine the right of asylum as a fundamental human right. We Germans have a special historic responsibility towards those who need protection from violence, oppression, and destruction.

The European: Do you see a risk that the subject of migration could make our Union implode?

J. Pahlke: The greatest threat to the European Union is not migration, but the rightwing populists and extremist parties that exploit this issue for their own agenda. And of course, they are not only encouraged but even directly or indirectly supported by those who take issue with a society based on freedom, tolerance, equality, and democracy. Migration has become one of the most insidious weapons in the hybrid arsenal of the Kremlin because Putin has realised – correctly, I am afraid – that migration and the discourse around it has enormous potential to destabilise our societies. People on the move are the ones who suffer most under this attempt. It is our responsibility to stand firm against the populist anti-migration narratives so to let this “weaponisation” strategy fail.

The European: How can societies be more resilient to such attacks on democratic values?

J. Pahlke: As democratic parties, our most crucial challenge is to reinforce trust in and enthusiasm for democracy, democratic institutions, and the rule of law, standing firm against the attacks from anti-democratic and rightwing extremist forces. In this we will only succeed if all democratic parties stand up to wrong and simplistic narratives.

At the same time, we politicians need to work on solutions that address the daily struggles of the people in Germany and all over Europe: affordable transportation and housing in times of rising prices; quality daycare and schools; secure jobs through investments into our infrastructure and carbon neutral technologies. This, as well as the continued commitment to peace in Europe by supporting Ukraine in its defence against the Russian aggression will make our societies more resilient in the long run.

The European: Mr Pahlke, I thank you for your openness. ■

Julian Pahlke

has been a member of the German Bundestag since October 2021. Responsible for European and international refugee policy in the parliamentary group of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, he is a member of the Committee on Interior and Home Affairs, the Committee on European Affairs and a deputy member of the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid. From August 2020 to February 2021, he worked as policy advisor in the office of Claudia Roth, then Vice President of the Bundestag. Mr Pahlke studied international management as well as linguistics and cultural studies in Flensburg, Sønderborg, Marseille and Jönköping. Since autumn 2016, he has been active in civilian sea rescue in the Mediterranean.

© Private

SPOTLIGHT

Preparing ourselves for the possibility of Russian aggression

Andrius

Kubilius on the urgency of strengthening European defence

(nc) In a speech in Berlin in November 2024, the then Commissioner-designate for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, gave his views on urgent steps to strengthen European defence. Kubilius warned that EU Member States urgently need to prepare for the possibility of Russian aggression against the Union. He outlined the important topics that should be included in a White Paper on Defence that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has asked him to draft in collaboration with the new EU High Representative Kaja Kallas.

Kubilius’ Berlin speech (excerpts):

“Until now the European Union was not considered an important player in European defence issues. However, this notion is changing. I will not elaborate on why the EU needs a Commissioner for Defence. Putin’s war against Ukraine provides the biggest share of answers to this question. Let’s concentrate instead on what the European Union needs, wants, and can do to strengthen European defence.

Until now it looked like European defence was a business for NATO and Member States only. But times are changing. For me, it is crystal clear – no matter the changes in our security environment, one thing will not change: the European Union has never competed, is not competing, and will not compete with NATO on European defence. […]

What the EU can do is to bring added value to assist EU Member States (that are also NATO members) in developing defence capabilities and defence resources needed for the implementation of NATO defence plans. The EU can do what NATO cannot: raise additional funds for defence and introduce new legal regulations, which can help Member States to develop their defence resources.

What are those capabilities and resources that the EU can help to develop and sustain? There are four types of defence resources, necessary for defence both before and during the course of a war:

• Defence equipment and services, including space services; they must be ready and available at the stage of preparation for defence.

• Trained military personnel, who could be mobilised in case of war.

• Military mobility and logistics.

• Military industry capability on European soil, able and ready to produce what is needed, located close to a frontline, if the war comes.

As things stand, we in Europe have some challenges with regard to all those capabilities and resources. To better understand those challenges, we need to look into threats to our security. […]

The mission letter, which I received from the Commission President, tasks me, together with High Representative Kaja Kallas, during the first 100 days of our mandate to prepare and publish a White Paper on European Defence. This White Paper shall define the measures to help Europe to ready itself for “the most extreme military contingencies”. […]

In the light of the low level of our preparedness, there are two strategic factors, that we need to have in mind when discussing Europe’s defence needs: firstly, we must urgently prepare ourselves for the possibility of Russian aggression against the EU; secondly, we need to prepare for a longer-term challenge, that the US will be forced to shift more and more from the defence of Europe towards mitigation of China’s rising military power. […] Personally, I would like to see the upcoming White Paper to focus on the three most important blocks, where we need to come to an agreement on urgent common decisions, necessary to be implemented either to diminish the threats or to be ready to defend ourselves. Those 3 blocs should focus on:

1 Our military support for the defence of Ukraine.

2 Ramping up our defence industry production in order to meet NATO Capability Targets not until 2044, but by 2030.

3 Defence financing – how will we finance the urgent needs of our defence preparedness.

[…]

Let me conclude by stressing again: we all are in the same boat – militaries, industries, CEOs and politicians, citizens of the EU, and citizens of Ukraine, all of us. And we find ourselves in very stormy waters.

So, either we row in a synchronised way and by joining all our forces to overcome the storms of today, or each one of us will stay alone at the mercy of the storms and our aggressive adversaries.

“ We find ourselves in very stormy waters.”

Andrius Kubilius held this keynote speech on 20 November 2024 at the Berlin Security Conference (BSC).

MAIN TOPIC EU enlargement and security

Under the impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine and Putin’s repeated threats voiced against Europe and NATO, the EU enlargement process has gained new momentum. In 2024, accession negotiations were opened with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Moldova. However, some Western Balkans countries have become frustrated over the stony way to their accession, and the process with Georgia has been de facto halted under the influence of the pro-Moscow government. It will be essential for the Union not to leave grey zones in Europe, as Putin is deliberately exploiting the frustration and enlargement fatigue in accession countries to enhance his expansionist interests.

The beginning of a new chapter

EU enlargement – a geopolitical necessity and opportunity

by David McAllister MEP, Chairman of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Brussels/Strasbourg

The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has marked a fundamental shift in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU). It has put Europe’s peace and security architecture to the toughest test since the end of the second world war.

Geopolitical power politics has come back with a vengeance. One of its most strategically significant but least recognised consequences is the renaissance of EU enlargement policy. The new European Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, has pledged to use this renewed momentum, and build on the political guidelines of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the European Council’s Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. A new chapter of enlargement policy is beginning and being accelerated in the wake of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine – and rightly so. In 2019, the EU had seven enlargement partners, now we have ten. We had five candidate countries, now we have nine. In 2019, three countries were negotiating their accession to the EU, now this number is up to seven and might extend to eight, after the European Council’s decision earlier this year to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Avoiding grey areas

Grey areas in our neighbourhood are danger zones. They give Putin room to expand on his imperial fantasies by ploughing a trench through Europe. We must not allow Russia nor China to exploit the vacuum that the EU has admittedly created – at least partially – by not delivering on the many promises made to the countries of the Western Balkans twenty years ago in Thessaloniki.

Moscow and Beijing are deliberately exploiting the frustration and enlargement fatigue in accession countries by propagating false narratives and creating critical dependencies to enhance their expansionist interests. This not only destabilises our neighbourhood, but the European Union itself. There can no longer be any doubt that EU enlargement is a geopolitical imperative.

EU enlargement is a success story

EU enlargement has been and continues to be our most tangible “instrument” to pursue a Europe that is united and at peace. It is one of our greatest success stories. The history of European integration has always been one of enlargement.

David McAllister and Marta Kos after the confirmation hearing in the European Parliament, Brussels, 7 November 2024

Over the years, seven rounds – in 1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, 2004, 2007 and 2013 – have helped us promote stability, cooperation, and prosperity on the continent, while safeguarding our common values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. Enlargement is an investment in peace, security and prosperity on our continent. Importantly, it deepens the EU by bringing us closer together not only in terms of shared values, but economically, through the single market, and culturally, through the free movement of people.

“ Grey areas in our neighbourhood are danger zones. They give Putin room to expand on his imperial fantasies by ploughing a trench through Europe.”

Nevertheless, we are currently witnessing the second longest period without a new country joining the European Union. This was preceded only by the period between the foundation in 1957 and the first round of enlargement in 1973.

The EU needs to be fit for new members

The European Parliament can and should play a crucial role in the enlargement of our community. Our institutional frameworks offer us a range of instruments to support our partners in terms of democratic support, capacity building or parliamentary exchange.

Finally, if we expect aspiring Member States to be fit to join the EU, the EU needs to be fit for them to join. An enlarged European Union will only be stronger if we ensure the continued functioning of our European institutions and institutional processes. This will be a key responsibility for this new term. The internal decision-making processes need to be reformed to gear up for the challenges of an enlarged Union, especially in our CFSP. The Commission’s proposal on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews are a welcome step. The Council ought to adopt a clear roadmap for future work, so that we can start this new term with headwind. ■

Marta

Kos – new Commissioner for enlargement

Integrating candidates gradually Precisely because enlargement brings tangible benefits to our citizens, the European Parliament supports attempts to gradually integrate the candidate countries into the EU. People in potential accession countries must not be left with an “all or nothing” perception of the EU. Rather, we should enable people in potential future Member States to witness the tangible benefits of the EU at an early stage. Therefore, the aim of the incoming European Commission is to advance a country’s political association and economic integration as far as possible before its formal accession. The recently established Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, the Ukraine Facility and the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova serve this purpose.

EU enlargement is a shared responsibility of the current and the aspiring Member States. The current geopolitical situation cannot be understood as a free pass to EU membership with disregard for the accession criteria. Enlargement must always stay merit based. The Copenhagen criteria, and most importantly, the fundamentals of rule of law and democracy must be upheld at all times. Preserving the integrity of our enlargement process is key. The EU will only persist as a functional entity if we do not compromise on the substance of our community: our values.

The positive developments in Ukraine, Moldova and most of the Western Balkan countries towards meeting the accession criteria in recent years should be acknowledged and encouraged. The latest green light for accession negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina by the European Council clearly underline this. It is important that we maintain this momentum.

(nc) “The enlargement process is a marathon, not a sprint”, said Marta Kos on 7 November 2024 during her successful confirmation hearing as the designated Commissioner for enlargement with the Foreign Affairs Committee in Brussels. Of Slovenian nationality, she told MEPs that enlargement “runs like a red thread through my life”.

Born on 28 June 1965 in Slovenj Gradec, Slovenia, Marta Kos is an experienced diplomat, business leader, and communications specialist with a personal background in elite swimming sports. From 2017 to 2021, she was the Slovenian Ambassador to Switzerland and Liechtenstein, and Ambassador to Germany and Latvia from 2013 to 2017. She has been engaged in Slovenia's political life as a vice-president of the social-liberal Freedom Movement party. Among the positions she held while employed by the government are Director of the Public Relations and Media Office and government spokesperson.

David McAllister MEP is Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) in the European Parliament. Born in Berlin in 1971, his political career started in 1998 when he became a member of the state parliament of Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony). He served as Prime Minister of Niedersachsen between 2010 and 2013. Since July 2014, he is a member of the European Parliament and a VicePresident of the European People’s Party (EPP).

Ensuring the credibility of the accession process

The EU’s increased prioritisation of enlargement in times of war

by Bernard Brunet, Former Head of Unit, DG European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR), European Commission, Brussels

The brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent realisation among EU leaders that President Putin envisions a restored Imperial Russia has produced the greatest security crisis on the European continent since the Cold War. This new geopolitical landscape has emerged as the prominent factor in the European Council’s decision to accelerate EU enlargement, including a clear EU membership perspective for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia and a faster accession process for the six Western Balkan countries.

Easy solutions do not exist

Despite the EU’s commitment, at the highest level, it is evident that the next enlargement will not be an easy nor a rapid process. The European Council made it clear that enlargement remains a merit-based approach and that it will continue to be based on the existing accession criteria. While the Commission’s October 2024 enlargement package gave the clearest indications so far that accession negotiations could be finalised with Montenegro and Albania before the end of the decade, it highlighted nu-

merous problematic issues for which easy solutions do not exist. Within the EU, there are concerns that a swift accession of new Member States could lead to significant challenges. There’s apprehension that the competitiveness of exports from the potential new members would disrupt the single market, while their citizens seek better economic opportunities and employment in the richer EU Member States. Furthermore, unresolved bilateral issues between candidate countries and EU Member States (e.g. Bulgaria/North Macedonia) further complicate the enlargement process.

The next EU enlargement will also be more complicated due to external factors. Russia will continue to act as a spoiler, backing anti-EU parties within existing Member States and candidate countries. Russian interference is already evident and growing in many countries, notably in Serbia, as well as in Moldova, as evidenced by the open efforts to influence the recent presidential elections and the referendum on EU membership. Russia will do its utmost to drag candidate countries away from their EU paths.

The then EU High Representative Josep Borrel (left) and the then European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi during a press conference on the 2024 enlargement package, Brussels, 30 October 2024

Preparing for the next enlargement

To make the next enlargement a success, the EU must step up its support of the security and prosperity of candidates, while the authorities in candidate countries need to increase their commitment to, and implementation of, EU-related reforms.

Unlocking a process of rapid and sustained real income convergence will bridge the poverty gap and ease the necessary investments in security. This process will require more than strong macroeconomic fundamentals: candidate countries must accelerate domestic reforms across the board. Moreover, the EU must bolster the credibility of the enlargement process to ensure that economic operators anticipate the benefits of accessing the EU single market. This would trigger much-needed inflows of foreign direct investment and thus accelerate modernisation.

In this context, the EU has mobilised additional resources for the Western Balkans (€6bn), Moldova (€1bn) and Ukraine (€50bn) for the period until 2027. These additional resources will support much needed economic and social reforms and investments in the key areas linked to EU accession. Sustained reforms by the candidates in the areas of the rule of law, an independent judiciary, fundamental rights, and the improvement of the quality of institutions will be necessary complements to economic reforms and investments. Achieving this will require a “whole of society” reform agenda, with a particular focus on advancing reforms related to EU accession in those areas.

“ Russia will continue to act as a spoiler, backing anti-EU parties within existing Member States and candidate countries.”

Focus on policies, not on EU institutional reforms

To ensure the credibility of the enlargement process, the EU must also prepare itself for an expanded Union. The main objective of such changes should be to adjust and design EU policies that ensure greater security and strategic autonomy on the continent as soon as possible.

This should take precedence over the debate on institutional reform of the EU, which could turn into a distraction given the high stakes at play. Recent years have demonstrated that existing institutional structures and rules did not prevent effective EU actions, from the Commission issuing bonds on capital markets to the common purchasing of millions of vaccines and the procurement of lethal arms in support of Ukraine.

A starting point in the policy reflection is to focus on strengthening unity in the face of what looks like a new, multi-year confrontation with Russia on the European continent. This will require the design, or redesign, of policies that ensure solidarity and unity, with all EU Member States recognising that their

security is tied to the collective security of the European continent and is a shared responsibility well worth the investment. The second factor to consider in redesigning EU policies for the future is to acknowledge that there will be a constellation of more diverse national interests in an enlarged EU and that this may require a greater mix of action at the national and EU levels to reach common objectives.

Setting the right priorities for foreign and security policy

With political expressions of populism and nationalism remaining strong in many EU countries, policymakers should be ready to focus on a reduced number of priorities, specifically security and defence, the single market, strategic autonomy, and the green deal. This will require additional resources at the EU level.

In the security and defence area, the EU should focus on building the EU industrial basis and stepping up efforts to reduce duplications and build common armament platforms. The presentation of the European Defence Industrial Strategy, including the launch of the European Defence Investment Programme, is a positive start. However, Member States must substantially scale up their resources earmarked for the fund. Also, more effort is needed towards joint procurement and the establishment of common export control rules of armaments, the lack of which currently hampers common projects.

Building closer relations with the UK, Switzerland, and Norway is essential. Regardless of their status, all three countries have a stake in the security, stability, and strategic autonomy of the European continent. The EU must therefore strengthen ties with the UK in the defence sector, including through cooperation with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and in the context of the new European Defence Industrial Plan. Regarding Norway and Switzerland, particular attention must be given to energy security, protection of critical infrastructure, access to critical materials, and the development of common projects for enhancing strategic autonomy. ■

Bernard Brunet

has spent almost 30 years in the European Commission. He was Head of Unit in charge of relations with Türkiye (2018-2023) and Head of Unit in charge of evaluation, relations with international financial institutions, economic governance and public administration (2014-2017). Mr Brunet was member of Commissioner Füle's cabinet in charge of enlargement and neighbourhood between 2011 and 2014. He was deputy Head of the Unit in charge of relations with the Maghreb countries between 2009 and 2011 and was posted to Tunisia between 2002 and 2005.

Enlargement of the European Union – state of play

(nc) In 2023 and 2024, the EU enlargement process gained new momentum. The annual enlargement package of the European Commission (EC) presented in October 2024 provides a detailed assessment of the state of play and progress made by the nine candidate countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the potential candidate country Kosovo – on their respective paths towards EU membership. The merit-based and often lengthy enlargement process requires determination to implement irreversible reforms in all areas of EU law.

Progress in 2023 and 2024

North Macedonia’s screening for the six clusters of the EU acquis was completed in December 2023. The EC states that the country must continue to deliver on the implementation of EU-related reforms, particularly in the judiciary and the fight against corruption and organised crime. Trust in the justice system needs to be strengthened.

This has been an important recognition of Ukraine's determination to pursue reforms on the path of EU accession, states the Commission. The EC is looking forward to the opening of negotiations on clusters, starting with the fundamentals, as soon as possible in 2025. (See article p.21)

The opening of accession negotiations has also been an important recognition of Moldova's efforts to pursue reforms despite facing continuous Russian interference and the impact of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Negotiations on clusters, starting with the fundamentals, are likely to be opened in 2025. The conference also confirmed that overall, Montenegro met the interim benchmarks for the rule of law chapters (23, 24), allowing the provisional closing of further chapters if conditions are met. In the rule of law area and judiciary, further progress is needed.

The EC welcomes the opening of negotiations on the fundamentals cluster with Albania at the second intergovernmental conference held on 15 October 2024. The EC states that it is essential for the Albanian authorities to further step up the pace of EU-oriented reforms, notably in the areas of the rule of law, the effective fight against corruption and organised crime, and the promotion of fundamental rights, including media freedom, property rights and minorities.

Serbia has fulfilled the benchmarks to open cluster three (competitiveness and inclusive growth). It is expected to speed up work on reforms in 2025, with a particular focus on the rule of law interim benchmarks as well as ensuring a truly enabling environment for civil society and media, making credible efforts to shut down disinformation and foreign information manipulation.

The European Council granted candidate status to Georgia in December 2023, however, its accession process has been de facto halted. Regarding the parliamentary elections on 26 October 2024, the preliminary findings of the joint International Election Observation Mission identified several shortcomings that occurred in a tense and highly polarised environment (see the article on Georgia pp 26)

In March 2024, the Council opened accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EC states that the country demonstrated tangible results, including on migration management, full alignment with the EU's foreign security policy, as well as by passing legislation on integrity of the judiciary, anti-money laundering and conflict of interest.

Accession negotiations were also opened with Ukraine and Moldova at the first intergovernmental conference in June 2024.

Türkiye has candidate status since 1999, but accession negotiations with the country remain at a standstill since 2018. The EC reports that serious concerns remain in the areas of fundamental rights and rule of law, including the independence of judiciary. A gradual re-engagement of relations took place following the April 2024 strategic guidance of the European Council, and steps were taken towards exchanges on issues of joint interest. Kosovo submitted an application for EU membership in December 2022. The EC reports progress in the fight against organised crime, and the business environment improved. Visa liberalisation for Kosovo entered into force on 1 January 2024. Kosovo needs to intensify its efforts to strengthen the rule of law and public administration and to protect freedom of expression.

EC Communication: https://bit.ly/3VeGEJO Factsheet: https://bit.ly/4id297O ➭ See also the documentation pp. 24-25

Ifri webinar – conversation with Olha Stefanishyna

Ukraine between war and reforms

A report by Nannette Cazaubon, Paris

On 18 November 2024, the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri) invited Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine and Minister of Justice, to an exclusive conversation on the situation in Ukraine almost 1,000 days after the start of the Russian invasion. The webinar was led by Ifri’s Deputy Director Marc Hecker and Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, Director of Ifri’s Russia/Eurasia Center.

The discussion, which took place a day after a large-scale Russian air attack on Ukrainian cities, focused on the unprecedented situation Ukraine finds itself in. Not only does it have to wage a war to counter Russian invasion, but the country, a candidate for membership of the European Union (EU) since June 2022, must also undertake structural reforms to secure EU accession and hopes to protect itself against any future Russian aggression by joining NATO.

Military situation

With Ukraine in dire need of troops and ammunition, and Russia using North Korean troops to push Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region, Trump’s election victory adds to fears of a reduction in US military aid to Ukraine. Asked about her vision for 2025 in this context, Stefanishyna replied that she saw no alternative to developing European strategic autonomy to ensure peace and European values. She stressed the importance for the European Union to remain united and not to disperse itself into various individual initiatives to address Moscow – as German Chancellor Olof Scholz recently did – because this could be interpreted by Putin as legitimising his aggression against Ukraine. The Deputy Prime Minister stressed the importance of focusing on some key decisions, such as those outlined by President Zelenskyy in his “victory plan” presented to the Ukrainian parliament on 16 October 2024 (see box). His plan is aimed at creating a solid basis for the democratic world to “design the choreography of victory”, she said. She called US President Joe Biden’s authorisation to use long-range missiles against the Russian aggressor an important and long-awaited decision.

NATO accession

Asked about her vision of Ukraine's future NATO accession, Stefanishyna said that NATO membership "is a geopolitical element" and that, at the moment, it is not about NATO accession itself but about an invitation to start negotiations on Ukraine's NATO membership. Regarding the recently circulating ideas that Ukraine could become a member of NATO on the model of West Germany at the time, where only the parts of the country over which Kyiv exercises full control would be admitted, she said that Ukraine should join NATO on the basis of its 1991 borders.

EU accession

Speaking about Ukraine's accession to the EU, she considered that the current period was historically unique and that the accession of new countries to the EU was "a huge contribution to the future of the EU". She expressed hope that the new Commissioner for enlargement Marta Kos will be able to advance this process as much as possible.

Ukraine has completed preparations for negotiations on the first six chapters, which concern the rule of law, the functioning of democratic institutions and the functioning of the entire state system. “Ukraine wants not only to join the EU, but also to contribute to a peaceful, politically and militarily strong Union,” Stefanishyna said, adding that Ukraine, as a large agricultural country with many natural resources, could contribute to the development of the EU and help Europe become more resource independent.

Asked about the recent corruption scandals, the Deputy Prime Minister said that Ukraine was committed to meeting the accession criteria. That is why it was decided that she would also head the justice ministry. However, she admitted that in wartime, the risks of corruption were higher.

Domestic political situation

Asked about the domestic political situation, with a war-weary Ukrainian population, a high number of military desertions, the absence of elections and Zelenskyy’s declining popularity, Stefanishyna said that “it is very difficult to live with the war on a daily basis, there is exhaustion, and at the same time it does not affect our unity.” She emphasised that Ukrainians are a freedom-loving nation, striving for independence in all areas, and that Ukraine’s European aspirations also help to keep them united. ■

Victory plan for Ukraine

(nc) In mid-October, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy unveiled his plan for Ukraine in a speech at the parliament.

The plan contains five main points:

1. Unconditional invitation for Ukraine to join NATO.

2. Further arming Ukraine and strengthening its defence industry, boosting air defence capabilities and removing restrictions on weapon use.

3. Deterring Russia from any further aggression by placing a comprehensive non-nuclear strategic deterrence package on Ukraine’s soil.

4. Agreement between Ukraine, the US, the EU and other allies allowing for joint investments and use of Ukraine’s natural resources (uranium, titanium, lithium, graphite and others.)

5. After the war, the use of Ukraine’s armed forces to enhance the security of NATO and replace some of the US forces currently stationed in Europe.

EU enlargement – how it works

(nc) Any European state that respects the European Union’s (EU) democratic values and is committed to promoting them may apply for EU membership. The Union integrates new members through the enlargement process once they meet a number of political and economic conditions (Copenhagen criteria): firstly, the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Secondly, a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Thirdly, the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that

Türkiye

Candidate since 1999

©Adobe Stock / seqoya

DECEMBER 1995

Creation of Customs Union between EU and Türkiye

DECEMBER 1999

European Council grants Türkiye candidate status

DECEMBER 2004

European Council decides to open accession negotiations

North Macedonia

Candidate since 2005

©shutterstock / Anyarnia

Montenegro

Candidate since 2010

©Adobe Stock / JFL Photography

Serbia

Candidate since 2012

©Adobe Stock / Mirco

MARCH 2004

Application for EU membership

APRIL 2004

Stabilisation and Association Agreement enters into force

DECEMBER 2008

Application for EU membership

MAY 2010

Stabilisation and Association Agreement enters into force

DECEMBER 2010

European Council grants candidate status

DECEMBER 2009

Application for EU membership

MARCH 2011

EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina starts

MARCH 2012

European Council grants candidate status

make up the body of EU law (the acquis), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. The opening of the formal accession negotiations requires the agreement of all EU Member States. When negotiations on all policy areas are completed, the terms and conditions for accession are incorporated into an accession treaty which needs the European Parliament’s consent and the Council’s unanimous approval before all EU Member States and the candidate country can sign it. To date, there are nine candidate countries for EU accession, and one potential candidate country. ■

https://bit.ly/4947JFg

MARCH 2016

EU-Türkiye Statement on stopping flow of irregular migration to Europe

JUNE 2018

Accession negotiations officially at a standstill, in line with decision of Council

MARCH 2021

Launch of positive political agenda

NOVEMBER 2023

Joint Communication on state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations

APRIL 2024

The European Council tasks COREPER to advance work on the recommendations of the Joint Communication

DECEMBER 2005

European Council grants candidate status

MARCH 2020

European Council decides to open accession negotiations

JUNE 2012

European Council decides to open accession negotiations

DECEMBER 2013

Opening of “Rule of Law“ Chapters (23 and 24)

JUNE 2020

All 33 screened chapters opened, three of which provisionally closed

JUNE 2013

European Council decides to open accession negotiations

SEPTEMBER 2013

Stabilisation and Association Agreement enters into force

JUNE 2021

Intergovernmental Conference under the revised enlargement methodology

Factsheet Türkiye: https://bit.ly/3OnalVl

JULY 2022

Intergovernmental Conference on accession negotiations; start of screening process

Factsheet North Macedonia: https://bit.ly/4i4azhW

JUNE 2024

Intergovernmental Conference on meeting the interim benchmarks set for “Rule of Law” chapters

Factsheet Montenegro: https://bit.ly/3ZkM5JM

DECEMBER 2021

22 out of 35 Chapters opened, two of which provisionally closed

Factsheet Serbia: https://bit.ly/3ZkNlfY

Albania

Candidate since 2014

©Adobe Stock / andrii_lutsyk

Moldova

Candidate since 2022

©Adobe stock/ pelinoleg

Ukraine

Candidate since 2022

©Adobe Stock / Ruslan

APRIL 2009

Application for EU membership; Stabilisation and Association Agreement enters into force

JUNE 2014

European Council grants status of candidate

APRIL 2018

Commission recommends opening of accession negotiations

JULY 2016

Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) enter into force

MARCH 2022

Application for EU membership

JUNE 2022

Commission recommends candidate status

SEPTEMBER 2017

Association Agreement and DCFTA enter into force

MARCH 2022

Shortly after the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression, Ukraine applies for EU membership

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Candidate since 2022

Georgia

Candidate since 2023

©Adobe Stock / Boris Stroujko

Kosovo

Potential candidate

MARCH 2020

European Council decides to open accession negotiations

JULY 2022

Intergovernmental Conference on accession negotiations; start of screening process

FEBRUARY 2016

Application for EU membership

OCTOBER 2022

Commission recommends candidate status

JULY 2016

Association Agreement and DCFTA enter into force

MARCH 2022

Application for EU membership

JUNE 2022

Commission recommends candidate status and outlines 12 key priorities, which are endorsed by European Council

JUNE 2022

European Council grants candidate status

NOVEMBER 2023

Commission recommends opening accession negotiations

JUNE 2022

Commission recommends candidate status

JUNE 2022

European Council grants candidate status

NOVEMBER 2023

Commission recommends opening accession negotiations

DECEMBER 2022

European Council grants candidate status

NOVEMBER 2023

Commission recommends opening negotiations once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved

OCTOBER 2024

Intergovernmental Conference to open accession negotiations for Cluster 1 – Fundamentals

APRIL 2016

Stabilisation and Association Agreement enters into force

NOVEMBER 2016

First meeting of the EU Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Council

NOVEMBER 2023

Commission recommends candidate status on the understanding that nine steps are implemented

DECEMBER 2023

European Council grants candidate status on the understanding that Georgia takes relevant steps set out in Commission recommendation

DECEMBER 2022

Kosovo submits its application for EU membership

JANUARY 2024

Kosovars benefit from visa-free travel to the EU

Factsheet Albania: https://bit.ly/3ZjlNYe

JUNE 2024

First intergovernmental conference opening accession negotiations takes place, screening process starts

Factsheet Moldova: https://bit.ly/4i4aLxG

JUNE 2024

First intergovernmental conference opening accession negotiations takes place, screening process starts

Factsheet Ukraine: https://bit.ly/4i5Fjij

MARCH 2024

European Council decides to open accession negotiations. Invites Commission to prepare negotiating framework the moment all relevant steps set out in the October 2022 recommendations are taken.

Factsheet Bosnia and Herzegovina: https://bit.ly/3OnYfvd

JUNE 2024

European Council finds Georgian government’s course of action jeopardised Georgia’s EU path, leading to a halt of accession process

Factsheet Georgia: https://bit.ly/411Zibz

Factsheet Kosovo: https://bit.ly/4g1JVnT

©Adobe Stock / Mazur Travel

Following the EU Strategic Compass

Moldova on the path to accession

by Mihai Popșoi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Moldova,

The strategic vision of the Republic of Moldova in developing the partnership and relations with the European Union (EU) has always been systemically constructive for the last twenty years. The roots of today’s institutionally mature security and defence cooperation with the EU go back to the 2005 EU-Moldova Action Plan, the 2012 agreement on the participation of Moldova in the EU crisis management operations, and the 2017 agreement on exchanging and protecting classified information.

However, the year 2022 changed the gradual and evolutionary path of developing security and defence cooperation. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, which Moldova has strongly condemned since its first days, has brought and continues to bring major risks for Moldova, as Russia has an entire arsenal of hybrid war tactics and tools: from missiles and drones falling on our territory, to the rise of cross-border crime attempts, to the pressure on the economy. As a result, negative effects of the war as well as increasing hybrid threats changed

the strategic mindset in Moldova and gave additional strong synergetic impetus to our long-lasting cooperation.

Security and defence cooperation with the EU

The 2022 EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence provided a clear vision for developing a tailored Moldova-EU partnership. From our view, it started with the launch in March 2022 of the Moldova-EU High Level Political and Security Dialogue, as well as with practical measures such as the April 2023 EU restrictive measures in the view of actions destabilising Moldova. Also, establishing the Moldova-EU Security Hub on internal security and border management proved to functionally be an effective law enforcement cooperation mechanism between Moldova and the EU institutions and Member States. Subsequently, the European Peace Facility (EPF) budget for Moldova increased from €7m in 2021 to €50m in 2024 and the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM) launched in May 2023. These became eloquent examples of deep and intensive

Chişinău

Meeting between Moldovan Minister of Foreign Affairs Mihai Popșoi and the then EU High Representative Josep Borrell in Brussels, March 2024

© European Union

practical cooperation on the ground. In fact, in May 2024 this vision was reflected in the Moldova-EU Security and Defence Partnership.

Security and defence partnership

We are proud that the security and defence partnership with Moldova was the first of this type for the EU. The EU later extended this type of agreement to other third countries and concluded partnerships with Norway, Japan, South Korea, Albania and North Macedonia. This partnership is meant to make our cooperation with the EU more holistic, integrated, better structured, covering most of the issues at the Moldova-EU discussion and consultation table in the field of security and defence. At the same time, we are looking forward to uncovering new areas for mutually beneficial interaction and cooperation. For example, we would be interested in establishing cooperation with the European Defence Agency (EDA), as well as exploring the possibilities for the integration of Moldova into the EU defence industry basic chains in the spirit of the European defence industrial strategy. In this vein, we hope that the future European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) will be open for Moldova.

EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM)

We are also proud that the EUPM has been the first EU mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to have hybrid threats and cybersecurity in its mandate. It has become a reliable partner for Moldovan authorities in those fields, including also in the fight against illicit party financing and disinformation, as well as in the strengthening of crisis management capacities. We count on the EU’s support for the extension of the EUPM mandate beyond May 2025, along with the provision of adequate human and financial resources to continue combating the effects of the hybrid war that Moldova has actively faced for the past decades. We believe that the experience gained by the EUPM could be of added value both to EU Member States and for the future EU engagement with other third countries facing similar challenges. Overall, on our side, Moldovan resilience will be enhanced, making us a safe, stable and reliable partner with EU membership aspirations.

chapter got the highest score from the European Commission among all the accession chapters. We want to continue in the same spirit, demonstrating our determination in this field.

Commitment to the CFSP

We would also like to be a contributor to European and global security. We treat our security and defence cooperation with the EU not only as an opportunity, but also a responsibility. Moldova is committed to gradually increasing the alignment with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Our alignment rate to the EU CFSP declarations and sanctions increased from 64% in 2022 to 89% in 2023 and to 91% in January to October 2024. So far Moldova has aligned itself with 37 out of the 41 EU sanctions regimes it has been invited to align with. In 2023–2024, we aligned with the 16 EU sanctions regimes that Moldova hadn’t previously aligned with, including five out of six sanctions regimes on Russia. Even in cases when existing political, economic or security vulnerabilities don’t allow us to align to a sanctions regime, we do our best to act with due diligence to prevent sanctions circumvention, including through the export control mechanism.

Bringing stability to the Transnistrian region

“ We treat our security and defence cooperation with the EU not only as an opportunity, but also as a responsibility.”

Transnistria remains a potential source of instability in our country and the region. Therefore, we re-affirm our determination to maintain peace on the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova and to solve the Transnistrian conflict exclusively through political dialogue and peaceful means, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, within its internationally recognised borders. At the same time, the continuous illegal presence of the Russian military forces in the Transnistrian region remains an infringement of Moldova’s sovereignty and constitutional neutrality.

Moldova’s way towards EU membership

In June 2022, the European Council made a historic decision, recognising Moldova’s European perspective and granting it candidate status. This crucial anchor on our EU accession path was followed in June 2024 by the official launch of accession negotiations. Moldova’s goal is to become an EU member state by 2030.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversees the accession chapter 31 on foreign, security and defence policy. In the case of Moldova, in the 2023 and 2024 enlargement packages, this

We stand firm in our position and call for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova in line with the 1999 Istanbul OSCE commitments, as well as the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 72/282. I would also like to draw your attention to the ammunition storage facility in Cobasna which remains a major risk factor for Moldova and the entire region. These approximately 20,000 tons of expired ammunitions must be destroyed or withdrawn through a proper, internationally transparent procedure.

Becoming a strong and reliable partner

Finally, we continue to support CSDP missions, recently seconding Moldovan personnel in Somalia (two people since 15 July 2024) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (19 people since 1 October 2024) and considering the feasibility of future extension. As a result, the vision is that Moldova becomes a reliable and strong member of the EU by 2030, being an added value for the European community. ■

A post-election analysis

What direction will Georgia take?

by Elise Bernard, PhD, Head of Studies Robert Schuman Foundation / civilian attendee, War College, Paris

Georgia currently finds itself in a complex situation, caught between its pro-western ambitions and the constraints imposed by Russia. The main scenarios and dynamics for its future seem contradictory, which radicalises positions and fosters fear and surprise.

Georgia as a former Soviet entity

Georgia declared its independence from the USSR on 9 April 1991, following widespread protests. This independence was soon accompanied by internal conflicts, particularly in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are ethnically more diverse, highlighting tensions that had been suppressed during the Soviet era. Between 1991 and 1993, confrontations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia led to the defeat of the government in Tbilisi and a declaration of independence by both territories. In response to Tbilisi's NATO aspirations, Russia increased its military presence in these regions, which have Russian populations, recognising their independence following the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict. This has also led to displays of military force, thereby further escalating tensions between the two countries. Today, these conflicts continue to influence Georgia's relations with both the west and Russia.

The Russian military presence has significant implications for Georgian politics. First, it limits Tbilisi's ability to regain control over these regions. Furthermore, the fear of escalating violence induces the government to adopt a low profile and accept limitations on its sovereignty over its own territory. Georgia still appears largely pro-EU; however, the ruling party, which has been in power since 2012 and which won the most recent elections, has effectively instilled the belief that any anti-Russian rhetoric is viewed as a stance favouring a return to conflict. Lastly, it is important to remember that although the fortunes of the founder of the Georgian Dream party are bolstered by intense trade relations with Russia, it is difficult to envision a challenge to the oligarchic model similar to what Ukraine has experienced.

Strategic perspectives

In the aftermath of the legislative elections held on 26 October 2024, the direction taken appears to favour the maintenance of the status quo, characterised by a frozen yet stable situation where tensions persist without the outbreak of open conflict. This precarious stability allows the Georgian authorities to avoid direct confrontation and maintain trade relations with

Tbilisi, Georgia, May 2024

Russia. However, it has negative consequences both for the occupied regions and for the territory governed by Tbilisi. It is already evident that a wait-and-see approach carries risks, as it may render Georgia vulnerable to new Russian provocations. Moreover, the lack of action is generating frustrations among the Georgian population, which is seeking clarity regarding its necessary cooperation with Russia, the European Union, and NATO.

Heightened destabilisation

The intensification of Russian destabilisation in Georgia has become manifest through the exploitation of internal divisions within the country. On the ground, South Ossetia (pro-Kremlin, with military bases established there, and functioning as a Russian protectorate) may be viewed as an additional lever of pressure if violence in Abkhazia (which is not favourable to the Kremlin) escalates, assuming that the Kremlin still has sufficient personnel and resources to operate in this manner. In the immaterial realm, the Kremlin can still exacerbate political or ethnic divisions and foster an atmosphere of uncertainty by disseminating biased narratives that undermine citizens' trust in their institutions and fuel a divided public opinion.

This context helps explain why the Georgian Dream party is perceived as the least unfavourable option for Georgia's current situation. The party led by oligarch Ivanishvili promised throughout the electoral campaign − and continues to promise − that its actions shield the country from a new war with Russia while maintaining its candidacy for European Union membership. However, it is widely acknowledged that having candidate status with the EU does not guarantee accession, especially given that this hard-won status has yet to lead to the opening of accession negotiations. The outcome is far from certain, particularly if the Georgian government − which presents itself as seeking to appease the Kremlin − enacts legislation that aligns with Kremlin precepts and diverges from the requirements of the European rule of law, motivated by fundamental freedoms.

Encouragement of pro-EU ambitions

Since gaining independence, Georgians have sought to distance themselves from Russia, and a significant part of the population seems to believe that accession to the EU will ensure their democratic development, reflecting a pronounced sovereignty in the face of the Kremlin. EU membership has been a constitutional objective in Georgia since 2010, in response to the Rose Revolution. The first step was marked by an Association Agreement signed in 2014.1 Furthermore, since 2017, Georgian citizens have been able to travel without a visa to the Schengen area for short stays, strengthening cultural and economic ties with Europe.

President Zurabishvili – who has been replaced by a President with an anti-Western tropism on 14 December 2024 in a controversial election process – has played a central role in this dynamic. While she occupied a – supposedly – symbolic position from an institutional standpoint, her international image reinforced Georgia's credibility with the European Union. The statements made by Charles Michel and Josep Borrell on 27 October 2024 regarding the accusations of fraud during the elections held on 26 October illustrate this.2 The failure to open accession negotiations sends a clear message: the 27 are not prepared to negotiate with a government that has attempted to deceive them by withdrawing the “foreign agents” law to secure candidate status, only to subsequently adopt it and undermine NGOs that favour closer ties with the west.

Thus, a new election leading to the formation of a coalition government with representatives from parties other than Georgian Dream would maximise the chances of opening negotiations with the 27. Unfortunately, this scenario seems less likely than the first, especially as Prime Minister Kobakhidze is considering banning opposition parties. However, fostering an environment in which opponents of the oligarchic model continue to express their vehement dissent primarily exposes the instability of the current regime. This instability is concerning for the Kremlin, which helps explain Russian foreign minister Lavrov's promise to withdraw Russian troops from Georgia’s separatist territories. The withdrawal of these troops would allow the EU to play a mediating role, paving the way for gradual reintegration via the proposal of expanded autonomy.

Dr Elise Bernard

holds the position of Head of Studies of the Robert Schuman Foundation. Her research agenda is particularly devoted to EU enlargement, foreign defence and security policies. Specialised in European studies, she obtained her PhD in 2011 in public law from the Sorbonne University in Paris. Her dissertation on EU Law and post-Yugoslav states received an award from the Varenne foundation and was published as a book (Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris) in 2012. From then on, she has been a guest consultant for the Paris UNHCR office on asylum issues. ©private

NATO's entry into the equation

In Georgia, the EU is viewed as an influential actor due to its democratic values rather than its military or economic power. The entry of NATO, the organisation capable of ensuring defence against Russia, could possibly be considered if the current instability in Abkhazia prompted Russian military manoeuvres in Georgia. This would mean that all efforts by Georgian Dream to avoid displeasing the Kremlin will have been in vain, leading to a rift that would lead to closer ties with the alliance. If the threat is real, perhaps Georgia will align itself with Ukraine and Moldova and propose cooperation.

1 https://bit.ly/3OkclxF

2 https://bit.ly/40VMzXU

What EU membership has brought to societies and the Union

Bulgaria and Romania

(nc) Bulgaria and Romania both joined the European Union on 1 January 2007. We wanted to know more about their stony way back to Europe after decades of Soviet influence and the benefits that EU membership has finally brought to their societies. We asked two former defence ministers, one Romanian, the other Bulgarian, to give us their point of view.

The impact of EU membership on Romanian society

By Professor Dr Ioan Mircea Pașcu, former Romanian Defence Minister and former Vice-President of the European Parliament, Bucharest

“ Fulfilling the acquis helped Romania make major changes in its society, thus strengthening both its democratic system and its market economy.”

At the end of the war, Romania became, against its will, part of the Soviet sphere of influence. After the cold war, when the Soviet Union disintegrated, Romania and the other former communist states were offered a window of opportunity to join the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, guarding themselves against a Russian comeback.

From the very beginning, Romania’s aim has been to join both NATO and the EU, which we did in 2004 and 2007, considering them two facets of the same coin, with NATO offering access to security and the EU to prosperity. Consequently, Romania applied for membership to both organisations immediately when that became possible.

Therefore, Romania valued the two equally, even when, at the beginning of the 2000s, some were asking us to choose between the two in the context of disagreements regarding the intervention in Iraq. It was as if a child had been forced to choose between their parents.

Obviously, the requirements for EU admission were more complex and left a larger imprint on Romanian society, given the complexity of the EU compared to NATO, which is a political-military alliance.

Fulfilling the acquis helped Romania make major changes in its society, thus strengthening both its democratic system and its market economy. Romania’s GDP has increased from €97bn in 2006 to a projected €350bn for 2024. Spending almost 20 years within the EU has helped Romania to become a reliable member of the organisation, as it has become one in NATO too.

However, one cannot say that Romania, and Bulgaria too for that matter, have been fully integrated into the EU from the beginning. For a long period, they were subject to the Mechanism for Cooperation and Certification (CVM), lifted not long ago, while full admission to Schengen has been denied at the time of the writing.

It should be said that such differentiation in status between Romania (and Bulgaria) and the other members, together with EU insistence in imposing some issues seen to affect the traditional values of the society, have been skillfully manipulated by Russian propaganda, as proven by the current presidential and general elections.

Consequently, at the time of the writing, in the middle of the current elections, the main narrative propagated by the Romanian so-called sovereignists is that “the west has humiliated Romania”, while its “leaders have not been negotiating properly”, calling to “take back our country”!

Unfortunately, the mainstream parties were slow to recognise both the threat of such narratives, as well as the changes within the electorate (the “TikTok generation” has replaced the mature, rural electorate dominating all this time), so that the situation we face now is more complicated than anticipated, requiring extra effort to resolve.

Bulgaria’s way back to Europe

by Boyko Noev, former Minister of Defence and Ambassador of Bulgaria to NATO, Sofia

“ Being part of the Soviet empire tore the country and its people from the rest of Europe where it historically belonged.” © private

It is not possible to fully understand the importance of the European Union’s enlargement for the countries of central and eastern Europe without putting it against their post-second world war geopolitical and socio-economic background.

Like most of these countries, Bulgaria became a victim of the postwar geopolitical deals struck by the allies with Stalin, falling on the wrong side of the Yalta divide. Being part of the Soviet empire tore the country and its people from the rest of Europe where it historically belonged, behind the barbed wire of what was proudly called the socialist camp. That “camp” absorbed the economy, which was completely nationalised, including agriculture, while industrialisation was carried out on Soviet rails.

Bulgaria did not have Soviet troops on its territory but took arguably the heaviest individual share of the Warsaw Pact defence burden. It became the most militarised country in Europe, tasked to fight and possibly prevail over Greece and Türkiye. 3,200 main battle tanks, hundreds of combat aircraft, thousands of armored vehicles and artillery pieces and a significant missile force, potentially with nuclear capabilities under Soviet control – all this lost its purpose and value with the end of the cold war.

A huge loss of human effort and material resources paid for by the Bulgarian people as a result of geopolitical misfortune became only too obvious.

The geopolitical choice to rejoin Europe was unequivocal, although Bulgaria ran behind its former Warsaw Pact central European partners, being outside the immediate German neighbourhood, and importantly, behind the flames of the Yugoslav wars, which obscured the geopolitical horizon of the major European Community (EC) players at the time. A decade of embargos and sanctions over neighbouring Yugoslavia badly affected Bulgaria’s socio-economic development.

A reformist, pro-western government had the first full four-year term between 1997 and 2001 and laid the foundations for the practical integration of the country in NATO (2003) and the EU (2007), together with Romania. The overall effect of the geopolitical repositioning of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, including Bulgaria, within the EU and NATO brought immediate and long-term benefits not only for the new members, but for the larger European and Euro-Atlantic family from every perspective.

It dramatically increased the geopolitical weight of the EU, enlarging its territory by about a quarter (4.2m sq km), its population by a sixth (450 million), also contributing to the two-fold expansion of the EU economy (€19.4tn). The specific benefits of EU enlargement include economic growth, regional development, political stability and democracy, free movement, human rights, the rule of law, and last but not least, cohesion and solidarity.

In summary, joining the EU was a net positive and benefited Bulgaria and its allies as well.

The aggressive war waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine brought to the fore the importance of a stronger European defence within NATO and especially the role and place of the countries of the eastern flank of the Alliance. The need for a stronger EU role within NATO, the appointment of a new EU Commissioner for defence and space, and decisions to strengthen the EU defence industrial base are a clear recognition that security and defence will be a focus of EU priorities for the years to come.

Bulgaria’s defence industry, especially in the large calibre ammunition niche, is among the biggest in the EU, being currently a major contributor to the Ukrainian and overall allied defence effort. New partnerships would bring higher efficiency, resilience and technological advances of the industry across the EU to meet the challenges of increased demand in the foreseeable future.

The CEE members of the EU (and NATO), Bulgaria included, along the entire potential line of conflict from the Baltic to the Black Sea, are bound to take a disproportionate share of the risks and the respective defence burden. Their security interests demand that they should have an adequate role and place in the shaping of the inevitable current and postwar security arrangements in the region. ■

“ Given political developments, we had to strengthen our presence in the eastern neighbourhood in the last few years.”

Service for Foreign Policy Instruments – a global footprint

Putting the EU’s foreign policy into action

Interview with Dr Peter Wagner, Head of the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), European Commission, Brussels

The European: Dr Wagner, you are the Head of the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) which is under the responsibility of the High Representative of the Union/ Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). Could you briefly sum up the range of actions under your service?

Peter Wagner: FPI’s mission is to turn EU foreign policy into action and contribute to making the EU a stronger security, geopolitical and geoeconomic actor on the global stage. FPI has a unique global footprint (in high-income countries, emerging countries, fragile and conflict-affected countries, work on transnational threats) and the capacity to respond fast and flexibly to crises.

FPI is particularly strong in the fields of peace, security and defence. It designs and implements peace, security and crisis re-

sponse actions financed by the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). It also manages the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, and we are the administrator of assistance measures to third countries and partners under the European Peace Facility (EPF).

The European: How does FPI cooperate with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and other Commission Directorates General (DGs) to ensure a coherent and effective workshare?

Peter Wagner: FPI and the EEAS were married at birth! Both report directly to the HR/VP. As part of the European Commission and given our mandate, we are however working with many other Commission DGs on both external relations and internal issues.

The European: In response to Russia’s war of aggression, assistance for Ukraine by the EU and Member States amounts to more than €82bn. Does FPI contribute to this collective effort?

Peter Wagner: Absolutely. In Ukraine, FPI was present since the beginning of the Russian aggression in 2014/15. In 2022, some of our actions started less than a week after the start of Russian full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. This includes the vital supply of military equipment to Ukrainian armed forces through the EPF, humanitarian mine action to enable people to return to de-occupied territories and resume agricultural production, access to education in frontline communities, assistance with export and import through the refurbishment of solidarity lanes promoting alternative routes to the Black Sea. Furthermore, we service a Ukrainian government centre which ensures 24/7 monitoring and fight against Russian disinformation. It also delivers assistance in the investigation of war crimes from the local prosecution teams to the international investigations at the International Criminal Court or at the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression.

We have provided CBRN technical assistance, so the Ukrainian authorities are better able to protect their critical infrastructure. We also foster nuclear security by supporting the partnership between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU), including at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant.

The European: Can you give us some details on the financial aspect of this support?

Peter Wagner: The above actions, which generally aim at protecting civilians and preparing for early recovery and reintegration, amount to nearly €200m.

FPI is also responsible for the financial management of the civilian CSDP mission in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine).

In addition, we are the administrator of the EPF, through which substantial military support is channelled to Ukraine. This includes €1.5bn financed via the 2024 windfall profit from already mobilised, frozen Russian assets. For the next segment of expected €1.9bn, the EU has proposed to allocate €1bn to the Ukrainian industry.

The European: Beyond Ukraine, the eastern neighbourhood plays a key role in the Commission’s next mandate given the European leaders’ decision to reignite the enlargement process. How does this link to your work in the eastern neighbourhood?

Peter Wagner: Given political developments, we indeed had to strengthen our presence in the eastern neighbourhood in the last few years. There is a strong emphasis on Ukraine and the impact of Russia’s aggression on the wider region. In Moldova for example, we support the resilience of Moldova to foreign interference, the consequences of the energy crisis and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. The support notably focuses on addressing hybrid threats, secure service delivery, cybersecurity, and strengthening the ability of authorities to provide services to Ukrainian refugees and host communities. Since 2021, five EPF assistance measures for an overall amount of €137m were adopted to enhance the operational effectiveness

of the armed forces of Moldova, accelerate compliance with Union standards and interoperability, and thereby better protect civilians in crises and emergencies.

The European: Are you also present in the Western Balkans and the Caucasus?

Peter Wagner: In the Western Balkans, similarly to Moldova, the EU notably helps to counter hybrid threats from Russia and promote peacebuilding activities such as dialogue between communities.

EPF assistance measures (€35m) are benefitting the armed forces of five Western Balkans partners. The general objectives are to upgrade the capabilities and equipment of specific units of the beneficiaries’ armed forces; to increase their contribution to military CSDP missions and operations, and other international peacekeeping operations; and to better protect civilians.

We are also present in the Caucasus where we use inter alia mine action as a confidence building measure to underpin the EU facilitated high-level discussions between the EU (President of the Council), and the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. We are also supporting a series of initiatives over 10 years, focusing on prevention of the escalation of violence, including in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The first assistance measure to support the armed forces of Armenia under the EPF, adopted on 22 July 2024, foresees the provision of a fully deployable logistics camp for approximately 500 soldiers and a maximum reference amount of €10m.

The European: Dr Wagner, let me finally mention a very successful project that is under the responsibility of your service: the CBRN Centres of Excellence (CoE) initiative, which will be celebrating its 15th anniversary next year. Can you conclude our interview by telling our readers in what way this initiative is a true success story serving as an example?

Peter Wagner: Through this initiative the Commission is recognised internationally as a credible partner in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A proof of its success is also confirmed by the many requests of membership we received from countries in Africa, Central and South America. Its success is mainly due to a few key characteristics:

• The stable network. This extensive network of over 500 participants, across 64 countries, facilitates robust technical cooperation and allows for the efficient exchange of knowledge and best practices across regions.

• The demand-driven approach ensures that initiatives are tailored to the specific needs and priorities of the participating countries, which enhances their ownership, relevance, and impact.

• The programme's expertise that is carefully tailored to the geopolitical dynamics and specific needs of the regions it serves, ensuring that the support provided is both relevant and effective.

The European: Thank you, Dr Wagner. Your service has the chance to help people; I wish you every success.

The interview was led by Hartmut Bühl. ■

Conversation with Christian Schmidt, Sarajevo

The High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina –complex tasks in a complex country

by Hartmut Bühl, Paris

In a conversation at the end of November 2024, I was able to ask the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina (HR), Christian Schmidt, about his duties. I was interested in his view on the EU accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), which the European Council decided to start in March 2024, but also in the sometimes harsh criticism of the Dayton Agreement and of the HR's powers.

Complex tasks

In our conversation, Schmidt, who has held the office of HR since 2021, describes his role as essentially that of a "mediator and intermediary". He says that he works every day to help the country, with its different religions and ethnic groups, develop into a stable democracy. A complex task indeed in a state that, since the end of the Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the Dayton Peace Agreement (see box), now consists of two entities: the Bosniak-Croat dominated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb dominated Republika Srpska. In BiH’s north is located the self-governing district of Brčko (see map). The country, formed by the Dayton Peace Agreement, was conceived as a multi-ethnic state. Institutional and constitutional adjustments are therefore still necessary in view of potential membership of the EU.

According to the Dayton Agreement, the HR is responsible for implementing the civilian aspects of the peace agreement. He is nominated by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which comprises 55 states and organisations such as the OSCE. The HR receives political guidelines for his tasks from the PIC's Steering Committee and chairs regular meetings in Sarajevo with the ambassadors of the Committee's member countries. He is independent in his decisions and can also pass laws, a right that has been used repeatedly in the past.

Too much influence?

For Schmidt, criticism of the HR is part of the domestic political power play. Each of the ethno-nationalist parties that currently dominate political events repeatedly use criticism of partisanship against Schmidt to mobilise their own voters, he tells me. Schmidt points out that unfortunately, Republika Srpska is increasingly ignoring the state's legal requirements. He explains to me that he is attentive to such criticism and is trying to mediate,

above all to make it clear that he expects those responsible locally to implement the legal requirements of Dayton and the EU. Sometimes, “local political representatives give the impression that they are happy to sit down at the table set by the HR and then criticise the cook without contributing anything to the success of the evening”, he says. However, there is also discussion at the international level as to whether the HR has too much influence on the country's internal affairs, for example with the change in electoral law in BiH initiated by Schmidt in spring 2024. In doing so, he enforced the EU's organisational and technical demands regarding the transparency and integrity of the electoral process, he emphasises.

The Bonn Powers

The function of the HR has undergone a certain change since it was established. The core of the executive mandate remains unchanged in the so-called Bonn Powers. Since the Bonn Conclusion, adopted at a PIC conference in Bonn in 1997, the HR can, among other things, dismiss public officials who violate legal regulations or the Dayton Peace Agreement. He can issue laws that he deems appropriate, provided that these cannot be passed by the central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bonn Conclusion has thus developed into the actual “power base” of the HR. When I asked about the exact legal nature, Schmidt replied that according to Annex 10 of the peace treaty he had a clear mandate and can act “as he deems necessary”.

EU candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina

When I finally ask whether he sees a future strong and democratic state of BiH with chances of joining the EU, Schmidt answers with great openness: "It will be a difficult path, that's for sure. But it can be mastered. Ultimately, it depends on the elected politicians how good the chances are." ■

Dayton Peace Agreement

After the beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and a brutal three-and-a-half-year war (1992-1995) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the BiH Peace Agreement was initialed under the mediation of the United States with the participation of the European Union on 21 November 1995 at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, and signed on 14 December 1995 in Paris. The agreement stipulates, among other things, that Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to exist as a sovereign and undivided but highly decentralised state within internationally recognised borders, with Sarajevo as its capital, and that it will consist of two entities, Republika Srpska with 49% and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with 51% of the territory.

https://bit.ly/3OHQD6Z

Western Balkans

Special process for EU accession

(nc) The candidate and potential candidate countries for EU accession in the Western Balkans follow a unique enlargement process called the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The SAP aims at stabilising these partner countries politically and economically so that they are eventually ready to join the EU. Currently involved in this process are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. On 8 November 2023, the European Commission adopted a new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans aimed at integrating the partner countries into the EU’s single market; advance regional economic cooperation; deepen EU-related reforms and increase pre-accession funding. To support this process, a new €6bn financial instrument, the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, was adopted for the period of 2024 to 2027 and entered into force on 25 May 2024. Financial support under the facility will only be disbursed upon the successful implementation of reforms by the beneficiaries. Each beneficiary must prepare a reform agenda.

https://bit.ly/3ZCPaVJ

Talks with Serbia and Kosovo

(nc) On 3 December 2024, António Costa, in his new role as President of the European Council, hosted the leaders of the Western Balkan countries for an informal dinner in Brussels ahead of the annual EU-Western Balkans Summit on 18 December 2024. On the sidelines, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas met separately with the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić and the Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti, in the context of the recent attack on the Ibar-Lepenac water canal in Zubin Potok, Kosovo. Some hours after the explosion, Kurti expressed his government’s belief that the attack was carried out by gangs directed and orchestrated by Serbia. Vučić refuted these accusations and said that there was no involvement of Belgrade. Kallas posted on X: “The only way to EU membership is through the normalisation of their relations, on the basis of the Ohrid agreement. I welcomed the readiness to fully cooperate after the recent terrorist attack. Perpetrators must face justice”.

Memories and outlook by a humanist traveller

The Bosnia-Herzegovina imbroglio

by Gérard Cardonne, Reporter without borders, Strasbourg

(Hartmut Bühl) After writing the foreword to his book “The Violinist of Sarajevo” (Le violoniste de Sarajevo, 2023), I had the pleasure of presenting the CIDAN Prize for “European Values” to Gérard Cardonne in Berlin in November 2024 as a reward for his journalistic and humanitarian commitment. I asked him to write down for our magazine some very personal experiences of his travels through southeast Europe, in particular Bosnia-Herzegovina, a country that is close to his heart.

(Gérard Cardonne) My Bosnian adventure began at the Staff College in 1964. I had sponsored a Serbian officer, Jovan Divjak. We became inseparable friends in peace and war. For the inauguration of the Sarajevo stadium, he had me invited by Marshal Tito. I discovered a country that was endearing in its rejection of Soviet communism and its attraction to European democracy. With the emergence of Milosevic, the Balkan ambiguity reappeared. War between peoples divided by religion set Europe back centuries.

When I returned from Afghanistan, I was free again. In Paris, I met the Bosnian ambassador and offered to commit myself to the Bosnian cause. He pointed to the walls of the room (!) and so we had coffee outside to talk safely. As we were leaving, he wished me luck and slipped a piece of paper into my hand. We had understood each other!

Back in Strasbourg, I went to Kehl in Germany (!) to phone the number on the paper. Three weeks later, with a group of 15 European volunteers, we slipped into the tunnel, secretly dug under the Sarajevo airfield to escape the vigilance of the UN. There I met up again with my friend Jovan Divjak, the Serbian general who was defending the city against Milosevic's hordes: I had chosen the right cause!

Peace, restored as part of the game of dominoes conceived in Dayton in 1995, continues to seek its place in a quasi-artificial country with borders between three

quasi-religious entities and a tripartite government under European oversight: a ploy to create a homogenous nation. Europe has failed to understand that its commitment must be kept, as it is only the ideal of freedom that can keep the subject on a straight and narrow path. By referring to “a jihadist time bomb” in Bosnia that is “ticking next to Croatia”, France has thrown a spanner into the European works. Confining the danger to Bosnia alone is to point to just one tree in the forest. The process of balkanisation by internal divisions is laying the groundwork for the same civil war that caused 100,000 deaths between 1991 and 1995. Since then, Salafism has settled on the Bosnian fault line and inspired Vladimir Volkoff's novel, La Crevasse.

During the war, Izetbegović enjoyed the support of the international community. Muslim countries from the Gulf, Iran and Turkey dispatched fanatisised volunteers. Clandestine airdrops and pseudo-humanitarian NGOs transported weapons, equipment and other supplies in return for the adoption of sharia law and customs. Bosnian women felt obliged to wear the islamic headscarf for their own security. This war of attrition led the population to visibly, but insincerely, embrace Islam.

Today, Islamist networks are making insidious attempts to extend the “Sarajevo tunnel” all over Europe.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia

have since become independent states, a process that has cost thousands of lives. The European integration of these new states is proceeding with some difficulty. Slovenia (2004) and Croatia (2013) have already joined the European Union (EU), while Montenegro, though not a member of the EU, became NATO's 29th member in 2017. Bosnia-Herzegovina applied for EU membership in 2016. Serbia is struggling to join the EU.

A “black hole” at the heart of Europe. Far from the promises of prosperity and security, most of these new states are fragile. Some are on the verge of becoming “failed states”, according to political scientist Robert Bates. The endemic corruption of the region's political elites, the exponential expansion of criminal gangs and the chronic instability caused by the failure to eradicate poverty, as well as the persistence of territorial claims along ethnic lines, are a breeding ground for trends that could plunge the Balkans into chaos and spread to the rest of Europe.

As a counterpoint to the West’s optimistic scenarios for the region, a different reading of these divergent viewpoints should help us produce a fresh prospective analysis for a region of great geostrategic importance, whose evolution will have an impact on the whole of Europe.

I shall always hear the cellist Vedran Smailovic playing Albinoni's Adagio in G minor in the ruins of Sarajevo under Serbian sniper fire... ■

Gérard Cardonne (left) receiving the CIDAN prize for European values, Berlin, 18 November 2024

© Jacques Tissier

SECURITY AND DEFENCE

Europe is in the process of defining how it will defend itself in the future. This European defence needs to be concrete and realistic, based on politically, socially and militarily feasible ideas and common capabilities. While there is no doubt that the Atlantic Alliance stays important for Europe’s security, it is to be feared that the leading NATO power, the United States with its growing geostrategic orientation towards the South Pacific, will be less willing to care about Europe. The European Union must act accordingly.

van der Laan and Hartmut Bühl during the interview in Brussels, 30 October 2024

Prioritisation, coordination and cooperation

Planning and commanding EU military operations in a complex security landscape

Interview with Lt General Michiel van der Laan, Director General EU Military Staff (EUMS) and Director Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), Brussels

The European: General, you currently serve as both Director General of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and Director of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). Do you see yourself as the head of the “European military headquarters” and as the commander of a “European army”?

LtGen van der Laan: That is a question I’ve been asked before. There is no such thing as a European army, and I do not think there will be in the foreseeable future. Units comprising of military personnel from up to 27 Member States would be extremely difficult to organise logistically but also because of differences in language and (military) culture. However, I do see opportunities for further cooperation, for example by clustering military activities of Member States that are

“ All missions deliver added value and can only do so because of the hard work of the men and women that are deployed.”

geographically and culturally related. The German/Netherlands Corps is a great example of this. European military cooperation is certainly on the rise and offers opportunities to improve our capabilities and the way we use them.

LtGen

The European: I was expecting this response to my question, to be honest. Yet, what you are commanding are the ongoing EU military missions.

LtGen van der Laan: In my capacity as Director of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), I am the Mission Commander of the five military missions the Union currently has. There are two EU training missions, in Central African Republic and Somalia. In Mozambique, we have recently transformed the EU training mission into an EU military assistance mission. The EU military assistance mission for Ukraine, operating on EU soil, is the largest of the EU’s military missions. And last year, the EU security and defence initiative in the Gulf of Guinea was launched. It consists of both a civilian and a military pillar and I command the latter. The current operations of the EU are commanded by either SHAPE (EUFOR Althea) or national OHQs (EUNAVFOR Atalanta, Irini and Aspides).

The European: There is thus not one European military headquarters, but rather several options.

LtGen van der Laan: That is right. As mentioned in the EU’s Strategic Compass, the MPCC will be the preferred operational headquarters for the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) and for exercises. To ensure the MPCC is capable, it must be able to plan and conduct either two small-scale or one medium-scale executive operation(s) in 2025. For this, the MPCC has taken in new personnel and has moved to a new location in Brussels. I look forward to the MPCC’s future with great confidence.

The European: How do you manage the planning externally with the nations and internally with your operations centre?

LtGen van der Laan: It is for our political masters to decide when and where the EU is militarily active. Formally, decisions to launch, extend, adjust or end the mandates of missions are taken by the European Council. In practice, most of the decision making is done in the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which I regularly attend to discuss military matters. Basically, this is where the “what” is decided. The subsequent question of the “how” is very much of a military nature.

The European: How does the planning work?

LtGen van der Laan: For the planning of military missions or operations we use the so-called planning snake, which usually starts with a political framework for crisis approach. The EUMS will contribute to different phases of the planning process with the MPCC eventually responsible for the drafting of the operation or mission plan (OPlan/MPlan), depending on the type of military action. Throughout the entire planning process, the EU Military Committee (EUMC), which consists of the military representatives of all 27 Member States, has an important role to play by providing military advice at the request of the PSC on a number of planning documents. Once the OPlan/MPlan is finalised, it will be formally agreed by all Member States through a Council decision.

I wish to underline that I am fully dependent on Member States to provide the personnel and assets needed to execute missions and operations. Their contributions are managed during regular force generation conferences.

The European: General, our readers would certainly be interested to know which is the most complex and difficult mission you are commanding currently, and which is the one showing rapid success?

LtGen van der Laan: All missions deliver added value and can only do so because of the hard work of the men and women that are deployed. If I have to name one that stands out, it would be the one in Ukraine, EUMAM UA. This is our largest mission, with the most Member States contributing. It is extremely productive in terms of the number of training modules delivered and is certainly attracting the most attention in the political and public arenas. The training we deliver is at the express request of our Ukrainian counterparts. Given the everchanging landscape, EUMAM UA needs to develop further, which is our main effort at the moment.

The EU’s approach is shifting to focus more on the requirements of the host nation. EUMAM Mozambique is a good example of our ability to adapt to their changing needs. When the EU training mission was about to meet its goals, we shifted direction, in close cooperation with the Mozambican authorities, to ensure the mandate continued to deliver on what the Mozambicans required. Consequently, the name of the mission was changed and the mandate converted from training activities to mentoring and advising.

EUMAM Ukraine –the EU’s largest military mission

The EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), launched on 15 November 2022, is the largest military mission of the Union. EUMAM Ukraine works closely together with all other like-minded international partners. The objective is to help Ukraine defend its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised border and be able to deter and respond to possible future Russian military offensives by providing a structured EU response to the Ukrainian armed forces’ urgent as well as longer-term training needs. So far, 24 EU Member States and Norway have offered training modules and personnel.

The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) is the operational headquarters and ensures the overall coordination and synchronisation at the strategic level within the mission’s framework. All activities take place in a multinational Combined Arms Training Command (CAT-C) established in Poland, a multinational Special Training Command (STC) responsible for training activities in Germany, and in other multiple locations across the EU.

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The European: You briefly mentioned the EU’s future Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC). Could you elaborate on the importance of multi-national units on land, in the air and at sea as an element crucial for European defence?

LtGen van der Laan: Multinational units are not a goal in themselves but are a tool to support our ability to provide operational effects. We are currently working hard to make sure the RDC will be fully operational by 2025. The RDC is a framework for the generation and rapid deployment of highly capable, prepared and exercised military forces, and always as part of an integrated approach to crises. It is therefore closely connected to different initiatives to defend the EU’s interests as part of the CSDP and CFSP.

“ We cannot expect the situation in the world to change any time soon – it’s basically the Cold War all over again.”

The Rapid Response Force (RRF) is the element of the RDC that will be deployed in case of activation. It consists of the already existing but slightly modified EU battlegroups (EUBGs), including enablers and pre-identified national modules across all domains. The EUBG packages are a combined and committed force standing ready to deliver its rapid response capability and come with their dedicated enablers. In addition, Member States are requested to pre-identify potentially available forces, enablers and modules that could be requested by the EU to enhance the EUBGs and create a tailored joint RRF capable of dealing with a variety of different crises. In essence, the RDC gathers Member States to bring operational effects together, because we are more capable when we work together.

The European: General, the current global security landscape is more than complex and there is an urgency to be capable of responding to various threats, ranging from the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine to the escalating threat of cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare. This means that security challenges are no longer confined by geography and the need for a coordinated and comprehensive approach has never been more pressing than today. What role does the cooperation between the European Union and NATO take in this context?

LtGen van der Laan: Close cooperation between the EU and NATO is key. 23 Member States are also NATO allies, and the security concerns of both organisations are aligned. The EU has a 360 degree view to security and defence. Its integrated approach offers a wide array of tools and policies to tackle the challenges at hand: diplomacy and security cooperation,

financial instruments, trade, humanitarian aid and its military endeavours. However, for collective defence, NATO is and will remain the cornerstone.

To ensure coherence, efforts done on both sides of Brussels need to be mutually supportive, and they are: the EU’s efforts to boost Europe’s security and enhance the military capabilities of its Member States will benefit NATO – and vice versa. Let it be clear, EU military CSDP generally covers other terrains than NATO: we deliver training and advice outside of the Union, while NATO focuses on territorial defence through its deterrence and defence posture.

However, cooperation is unfortunately not always a given; the complex rules concerning the exchange of classified information tend to be an obstacle.

The European: And how do you think that a European pillar can be designed from the European side?

LtGen van der Laan: There is no such thing as a European pillar within NATO and I don’t think we should strive for this to be created. It would create a division, a sect if you will, within the Alliance. Especially at this point in time, unity is of the utmost importance, within NATO and the EU. NATO needs a strong and united EU, just as the EU needs this from NATO.

The European: Would you agree that a certain spirit of European defence is evolving?

LtGen van der Laan: Today’s challenges force us to work together more closely than ever. We cannot expect the situation in the world to change any time soon – it’s basically the Cold War all over again. This timeframe does give us the unique opportunity to strengthen our cooperation. Member States are stretched to the limit, also because many of them have obligations with NATO. That necessitates prioritisation, coordination and cooperation.

The EU is evolving into an actor capable of taking care of its own security, in coherence with NATO, but definitely within what one could describe as a spirit of European defence. Pay close attention to what the EU White Paper for the future of European defence and the EU’s preparedness strategy will bring early 2025, aiming at enhancing the EU’s resilience and defence capabilities.

The European: General, thank you for this conversation. I would like to ask you one last, more personal question: after 18 months in your position, is there anything you are particularly proud of?

LtGen van der Laan: My first year and a half in this position has been very eventful, somewhat of a rollercoaster at times, but above all very rewarding. I am most proud of my people. The collaboration and teamwork of all colleagues in both the EUMS and MPCC really stands out. I’m equally proud of the personnel deployed in the missions and operations, in challenging operational environments, far away from their families and homes for extended periods of time. Their sacrifice and excellent work are remarkable and can only be commended. ■

Peter Neumann, »STURM / STORM« / Hardcover 256 pages / format 26 x 30 cm / € (D) 39,95 / ISBN 978-3-7822-1326-4

Creating a continuous dialogue

How the CARD report is central in EDA’s role to shape collaboration in capability development

by Lt General Sefano Cont, Capability, Armament and Planning (CAP) Director, European Defence Agency, Brussels

On 19 November 2024, the 27 EU Ministers of Defence welcomed the new Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) report and approved its recommendations, highlighting a very important moment in the efforts of the European Defence Agency (EDA) to foster collaborative capability development. The 2024 report summarises the most relevant elements, trends and indicators in an EU “State of the Union” on defence. It also provides key messages and recommendations on how to prepare for the future. Finally, it presents 18 consolidated collaborative opportunities (COLOPs) marking a significant step forward in addressing shared defence needs. For some of them, the level of maturity achieved allowed for the first time for a clear Member States’ commitment towards deeper cooperation. This was achieved through the signing of Letters of Intent on four relevant capability areas: Integrated Air and Missile Defence, Electronic Warfare, Loitering Ammunition, and the Next Generation Surface Combat Vessel.

The three main functions of CARD

Within the EDA Capability Development Planning System, the CARD exercise has three main functions: first, to monitor the implementation of the EU Capability Development Priorities at EU level and in national defence planning, to assess the evolution and trends of Member States’ defence efforts and to measure their coherence with established EU goals and the commitments of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Second, building on EDA activities and proposals, CARD identifies, proposes and discusses with the Member States new COLOPs to support the fulfilment of the identified priorities. Finally, it represents a true and effective tool to prepare an informed discussion at the level of Ministries of Defence on what should be done, and which COLOPs have political support to move forward. Therefore, the CARD exercise allows Ministers of Defence to guide EU defence efforts in terms of identifying capability needs, setting priorities, and establishing collaboration paths,

allowing Member States to continue playing a crucial role in shaping the EU’s defence cooperation and architecture through EDA.

Achieving unity of effort among Member States

EDA Annual Conference

The CARD process can be seen as time- and resource-consuming but is essential to progressively achieve unity of effort among Member States on a crucial subject: defence has traditionally been considered a purely national prerogative. Identifying and exploiting collaborative opportunities requires harmonising goals and requirements, as well as timing and financial planning. It requires understanding the diversity of opinions, threat perceptions and decision-making processes coupled with an

“ The CARD process is less about imposing what countries should do and more about showing them what is possible if they work together.”

extensive professional knowledge of the military and defence mechanisms and the related technological and industrial issues. It is less about imposing what countries should do and more about showing them what is possible if they work together. In the 20 years of its existence, EDA has developed these skills and competences and refined its tools and mechanisms to achieve enhanced EU defence collaboration with the goal of better efficiency and effectiveness in terms of spending, interoperability and cost-saving through economies of scale.

An evolving architecture for capability development

The 2024 CARD report has shown that it is possible to provide evolving architecture for EU capability development with an intergovernmental component that can identify the operational ways and means to achieve agreed political objectives. As new defence initiatives are progressively introduced, this architecture needs to be reinforced and refined, further specifying the related roles and responsibilities of different actors to ensure effective coordination, synergies and clarity in governance. Within the current EU treaty-established roles, the identification of the overall defence needs, and the definition of military and defence priorities to address the EU and its Member States needs, is conducted through an agreed set of processes and tools that is the responsibility of EDA. Key inputs and responsibilities come from the EU Military Commitee (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS), particularly by providing the military perspective on needs and priorities.

A balanced system for a stronger defence capacity

Still, this relevant “bottom-up” approach is not enough if we aim to achieve robust and effective EU action for a stronger defence. An EU communitarian policy, and supporting component, which

The European Defence Agency (EDA), which celebrates its 20th anniversary in 2024, will hold its Annual Conference “New horizons in EU defence: enhancing ambitions, accelerating actions” on 22 January 2025 in Brussels and online. Speakers will address a wide range of questions such as

• What will be the future priorities for EU defence?

• How are the EU and its Member States adapting their defence policies to face Europe’s deteriorating security environment?

• How can EU Member States and NATO allies best support Ukraine in successfully resisting Russian aggression?

• How can EU Member States come together and develop full-spectrum, high-end capabilities?

Information, registration and draft programme: https://annualconference.eda.europa.eu

elaborate the much-needed EU defence industrial and technological policies and identify and implement the required array of EU procurement supporting tools, is central to achieve our priorities. This crucial effort also aims to reinforce the European Defence Technical and Industrial Base (EDTIB) as an essential component of defence.

We often hear that EU defence is at a crossroads and that we need to act now. Building upon the successful CARD results, and better reinforcing this approach between different areas of responsibilities and instruments is key to achieving a balanced system where political, military and industry are in continuous dialogue to achieve our common goal of a stronger EU defence capacity. ■

Lt

CARD Report 2024: https://bit.ly/4f2xTJZ

EDA

©

has been Capability, Armament and Planning Director at the European Defence Agency since 1 April 2022. Born in Trento in 1963, he received a doctorate in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Trieste. After having been a command pilot in the Italian Air Force, LtGen Cont served for many years as Head of the Political Military Office in the Cabinet of the Minister of Defence in Rome. Prior to his current position, he worked as Defence Attaché in Washington D.C. accredited to the United States, Mexico and Canada.

Gen Stefano Cont

Establishing a worthy common defence

The time is no longer for general comments on defence

by Jacques Favin-Lévêque, General (ret), EuroDéfense-France, Paris

Taking into account the rise of Russia and the threat it could shortly pose to the territorial integrity of Europe, but also the geostrategic bloc that is Russia-North Korea, Iran, and even China, which seems to be taking shape in the east of our continent, the time is no longer for general remarks on the strengthening of European defence and for theoretical reflections on the strategic autonomy of the European Union (EU).

We must act and establish a genuine common defence before it is too late. It is therefore a question of defining as soon as possible and in a very concrete and realistic manner an operational structure for the EU countries’ forces in order to effectively defend Europe’s vital interests and geography. The primary objective of this defensive system will be to deter a potential aggressor, in fact very concretely, Russia.

“ We must act quickly and establish a genuine common defenses before it is too late.”

This structure should be that of a military coalition of EU Member States, with or without the participation of American or British forces or those of other European countries close to the EU. Under the protection of an anti-missile ground-air shield, this defence will first be land-based and will involve forces with a volume far greater than the 5,000 men of the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) planned in the Strategic Compass.

An organisation adapted to geography

The Ukraine war shows us that the conquest of terrain remains the major objective of military aggression. The defence of Europe must therefore take place concretely on the ground, particularly along the eastern border of the Union. The multinational battalions and command centres already established there could constitute the beginning of this operational structure. France would retain the place it already has in Romania, the same would apply to the German brigade in the Baltic States.

While being aware of the new dimensions of high-intensity combat, particularly in terms of cyber defence, mastery

Jacques Favin-Lévêque General (ret), EuroDéfense-France

of space and control of low-medium altitude in the face of the drone threat, the structure of this coalition of EU countries could draw inspiration from the system planned by the western allies during the Cold War. The countries on the eastern borders of the EU would provide the large units of the eastern front, reinforced by those of certain central or southern European countries. Reinforcements from the westernmost countries of the continent, or even from Great Britain or the United States − pre-stationed in Europe − would constitute the second echelon of forces in direct support of the units on the front.

European planning and management staff

An “Afcent-Northag-Centag” type structure, such as what NATO created during the Cold War, would allow European operational headquarters like Eurocorps or Baltic Corps to regroup the contingents provided by each Member State. These at corps, division or even brigade level, depending on the possibilities of each, would retain their national structure, but could become multinational on a case-by-case basis and enlist one or two allied units.

The areas of responsibility and the operational plans of these large units should be planned and controlled in the event of engagement by a European General Staff endowed with a real and solid capacity for planning and conducting operations. In terms of logistical support, the European territory should be crisscrossed by a homogeneous road and rail network, thus giving reality to the military mobility initially planned by the EU within the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Here again, we could draw inspiration from the logistical network which covered the European theatre of operations from the Atlantic to the iron curtain during the Cold War, with roads, bridges and structures being an important factor for the mobility of forces on European territory.

The difficulty in defining such an operational structure, which would allow autonomy of engagement based on European units (the famous European pillar), will be to retain as many NATO structures as possible to remain compatible with engagement within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole with participation from the US and/or the UK or other European partners.

The way forward

An in-depth study of these issues should be entrusted to the EuroDéfense network, with its 14 member countries, and the results presented as quickly as possible to the European Commissioner for Defence and Space and to the European Parliament. ■

The

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